Chapter 7

from that book is our Document Number 1852-PS. I offer this book in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-449.

Through this unity of organization and personnel, the SS and the police became identified in structure and in activity. The resulting situation was described in Best’s book, which I have just offered in evidence, our Document Number 1852-PS, as follows. I quote from Page 7 of that document, Paragraph 5; from the original book, Page 95, Paragraph 3:

“Thus the SS and the police form one unit, both in their structure and in their activity, although their individual organizations have not lost their true individuality and their position in the larger units of the Party and State administration which are concerned with other points of view.”

Through the police, the SS was in a position to carry out a large part of the functions assigned to it. The working partnership between the Gestapo, the Criminal Police, and the SD under the direction of the Reichsführer SS resulted in the end in repressive and unrestained police

## activity. That will be dealt with in the case against the Gestapo. In

considering that evidence, the Tribunal will bear in mind that the police activities there shown were one aspect of SS functions, one part of the whole criminal SS scheme. I shall not, therefore, consider here evidence relating strictly to the police functions of the SS.

Control over the police was not enough. Potential sources of opposition could be tracked down by the SD. Suspects could be seized by the Criminal Police and the Gestapo, but these means alone would not assure the complete suppression of all opponents and potential opponents of the regime. For this purpose concentration camps were invented. The evidence already presented to the Tribunal has shown what the concentration camp system involved, and the end result of that system was graphically illustrated in the moving pictures displayed about 10 days ago. The responsibility of the SS in that system is a topic to which I now turn.

The first requirement for the camps was guard and administrative personnel. Part-time volunteer members of the Allgemeine SS were originally utilized as guards; but part-time volunteers could not adequately serve the needs of the extensive and long-range program that was planned. So beginning in 1933 full-time professional guards units, the Death’s-Head Units, which I have already described, were organized. During the war, members of the General SS resumed the function of guarding camps, which they had initially undertaken when the camps were created. The Tribunal will recall the provisions of the Hitler order which I read a few moments ago, directing the substitution of General SS members to the Death’s-Head Units in the event of mobilization. It is unnecessary to repeat the evidence of wholesale brutality, torture, and murder committed by SS guards. They were not the sporadic crimes committed by irresponsible individuals but a part of a definite and calculated policy, a policy necessarily resulting from SS philosophy, a policy which was carried out from the initial creation of the camps.

Himmler bluntly stated the SS view as to the inmates of the camps in his article, “Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police,” Exhibit Number USA-439, our Document 1992(a)-PS. I quote from Page 7 of the translation, last paragraph; from Page 148 of the original, third paragraph:

“It would be extremely instructive for everyone—to some members of the Wehrmacht I could give the opportunity—to inspect such a concentration camp. Once you have seen it, you are convinced of the fact that no one has been sent there unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals and freaks. No better demonstration of the laws of inheritance and race, as set forth by Dr. Guett, exists than such a concentration camp. There you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are cross-eyed, deformed, half Jewish, and a number of racially inferior products. All that is assembled there. Of course, we distinguish between those inmates who are only there for a few months for the purpose of education and those who are to stay for a long time. On the whole, education consists only of discipline, never of any kind of instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have, for the most part, slave-like souls and only very few people of real character can be found there.”

Then, omitting the next two sentences, he continues with this striking remark:

“Education thus means order. The order begins with these people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can really be accomplished only by Germans; hardly another nation would be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people are taught to wash themselves twice daily and to use a toothbrush, a thing with which most of them have been unfamiliar.”

Having heard the evidence and seen the pictures as to conditions in concentration camps, this Tribunal can appreciate how grim and savage that callous jest was. He made no such pretense in his speech to his own Gruppenführer at Posen, our Document 1919-PS, Exhibit Number USA-170. I quote from Page 43 of the original, last paragraph; from Page 2 of the translation, the first full paragraph.

“I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps. And here I must say this: We shall be able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite of all the silly talk about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of the German people in concentration camps. I’ll answer for that.”

But he is not here to answer.

Certainly there was no “silly humanitarianism” in the manner in which SS men performed their tasks. Just as an illustration, I should like to examine their conduct, not in 1944 or 1945, but 1933. I have four reports relating to the deaths of four different inmates of the concentration camp Dachau between May 16 and May 27, 1933. Each report is signed by the Public Prosecutor of the District Court in Munich and is addressed to the Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court in Munich. These four reports show that during that 2-week period in 1933, at the time when the concentration camps had barely started, that SS men had murdered—a different guard each time—an inmate of the camp.

Now I don’t want to take the time of the Tribunal to read that evidence if it feels that it is a minor point. The significance of it is this: It is just an illustration of the sort of thing that happened in the concentration camps at the earliest possible date, in 1933. I am prepared to offer those four reports in evidence and to quote from them, if the Tribunal thinks that the point is not too insignificant.

THE PRESIDENT: Where are they?

MAJOR FARR: They are right here. I will offer them in evidence. The first is our Document Number 641-PS. It is a report dated 1 June 1933 and relates the death of Dr. Alfred Strauss, a prisoner in protective custody in Dachau. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-450. I shall read a few paragraphs from that report, beginning with Paragraph 1:

“On May 24, 1933, the 30-year-old, single, attorney-at-law, Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich, who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody, was killed by two pistol shots from SS Man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk, prescribed for him by the camp doctor, outside the fenced part of the camp.

“Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the bushes located at a distance of about 6 meters from the line. When Kantschuster noticed it, he fired two shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 meters; whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.

“On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head. Besides, the body showed several black and blue spots and also open wounds.”

Skipping now to the last paragraph of the report:

“I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made application for the opening and execution of a judicial preliminary investigation as well as for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him.”

That is the first of the four reports. The significance is that you have, one after the other, murders committed within a short space of time. And, in each instance, an official report by the camp commander or the guard as to the cause of death which was completely disproved by the facts.

The second report, a report dated 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Leonhard Hausmann, another prisoner in Dachau. It is our Document 642-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-451.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read the details.

MAJOR FARR: I will offer it without reading it.

The third report which I shall offer is dated 22 May 1933. It relates to the death of Louis Schloss, an inmate of Dachau, and is our Document 644-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-452.

The fourth document, our Number 645-PS, dated 1 June 1933, relates to the death of Sebastian Nefzger, another Dachau prisoner. I offer this in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-453.

These four murders committed within the short space of 2 weeks in the spring of 1933, each by different SS guards, are but a few examples of SS activities in the camps at that very early date. Many similar examples from that period and later periods could be produced.

Indeed, that sort of thing was officially encouraged. I call the Tribunal’s attention to the disciplinary Regulation for the Dachau Concentration Camp, our Document 778-PS, which has already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-247. I want to read the fourth paragraph of the introduction to those rules, a passage which was not read when the document was originally introduced. The fourth paragraph on the first page of the translation and of the original is as follows:

“Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception, punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests of the Fatherland warrant it. The fellow countryman who is decent but misled will never be affected by these regulations. But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians and intellectual provocateurs, regardless of which kind: Be on guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck and you will be silenced according to your own methods.”

Those regulations were issued in 1933 by SS Führer Eicke, who, it is to be noted, was the commandant of the SS Totenkopf Verbände.

Furnishing guard and administrative personnel was not the only function of the SS with relation to the camps. The entire internal management of the camps, including the use of prisoners, their housing, clothing, sanitary conditions, the determination of their very right to live, and the disposal of their remains, was controlled by the SS. Such management was first vested in the Leader of the SS Death’s-Head Units who had the title of Inspector of Concentration Camps. This official was originally in the SS Hauptamt—represented on the chart by the second box from the left.

During the course of the war, in March 1942, control of concentration camps was transferred to another of the departments of the SS Supreme Command, the SS Economic and Administration Department, commonly known as WVHA. That department is indicated on the chart by the 3rd box from the left. And the Court will note under the top box the breakdown “Concentration Camps” which in turn is broken down into “Prison,” “Labor,” “Medical,” and “Administration.”

That change was announced in a letter to Himmler, dated 30 April 1942, from the Chief of WVHA. The letter is our Document Number R-129 and it has already been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-217. I shall not quote from that letter now.

This shift of control to WVHA, the economic department of the SS, coincided with a change in the basic purposes of the concentration camps. Political and security reasons, which previously had been the ground for confinement, were abandoned; and the camps were frankly made to serve the slave-labor program. The Tribunal will recall the evidence relating to that program which was presented last week by Mr. Dodd. I shall not deal at any length with the matter again, except to summarize the principal facts bearing on SS responsibility which were demonstrated by that evidence.

To satisfy the increased demands for manpower it was not enough to work the inmates of the camp harder. More inmates had to be obtained. The SS, through its police arm, was prepared to satisfy this demand, as through the WVHA it was prepared to work those who were already in the camp.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any figures you can give the Tribunal as to the total numbers in the SS and the total numbers who were employed on concentration camps? If you gave us the total number of the SS and the total number employed in concentration camps, we should see what the proportion was.

MAJOR FARR: I think I can only give you these figures: I earlier quoted some figures from D’Alquen in his book published in 1939, in which he said that the total strength of the General SS was about 240,000. That is the General SS, which was not at that time engaged in the guarding of concentration camps. The Totenkopf Verbände (the Death’s-Head Units) at that time consisted of some three or four regiments at the most. They were the guards; so that of the personnel who were employed in actual guard duty there were, in 1939, about three or four regiments.

The Court will recall that after the war had started, the Totenkopf Verbände were no longer employed in that duty and that the members of the General SS took it up. How many were employed is something that is difficult to estimate. The concentration camp program was constantly expanding; and of course, as more camps were added more personnel was needed. I can’t give the Tribunal figures on the number of persons involved in guarding the camps, but one of the matters I think significant is this: We have not only guards, we have administrative personnel; we have the whole of the WVHA which, as I want to show by evidence, had complete control of the management of the concentration camps. The members of the staff office, WVHA, were derived from the General SS; so you have on the one hand the guard personnel, Death’s-Head Units up to 1939, and then you have after 1939 more guards from the Allgemeine SS. You have, after 1939, more guards from the General SS and also administrative personnel from WVHA.

I do not have figures on how many persons were engaged in one or another phase of the concentration camp activities. You have, of course, the SD and Security Police involved in it, insofar as they went out and seized victims. You have WVHA, the entire administrative personnel of that section involved in it, insofar as they handled administrative matters.

Some conception of the number of persons who must have been engaged in the activity may be gained from noting the number of persons involved in a camp. I have a document, a report by WVHA in August 1944, which reports the number of prisoners who were then on hand in the camps and the new arrivals who were expected. That document is our Document Number 1166-PS, which I will now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-458.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we had better go into that tonight. What will you be dealing with tomorrow?

MAJOR FARR: Tomorrow, Sir, I intend to offer evidence showing how WVHA and other SS personnel were involved in the control of every phase of the concentration camp program. That is the first thing. The second thing is to point out the role that the SS played in the persecution of the Jews and their extermination; not with a view to repeating the substantive evidence to show that such acts took place, but to show how many components, how many parts, of the organization were involved in that program.

Then I shall consider the role of the SS with respect to preparations for aggressive war and the Crimes against Peace—a relatively brief discussion—and then pass on to the role that the SS played in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, set out in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment; and finally, the role of the SS in the colonization program.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonization?

MAJOR FARR: That may be an unfortunate word. Perhaps I should have said Germanization program, a program of resettlement, evacuation, colonization, and exploitation of the conquered territories.

Those, I think, are the four main functions of the SS which remain to be considered; and I shall endeavor not to go again into the substantive crimes which have already been shown to the Tribunal, but to try to show how almost every department—in fact, every department of the SS and every component—was involved in one or more—and mostly more—of these crimes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes that you will be able to confine yourself to the reading of evidence which is not cumulative.

MAJOR FARR: I have that in mind and I don’t intend to do that except to show the figures and components of the SS which were involved in various programs.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY Thursday, 20 December 1945

_Morning Session_

MAJOR FARR: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose yesterday, we were discussing the number of persons who might be involved in the concentration camp program with which the SS was concerned. Nothing better illustrates the integrated character of the whole organization than the concentration camp program.

WVHA, one of the departments of the Supreme Command, handled the administration and control of that camp program and dealt with the victims once they were in the camp. They were assisted by the Death’s-Head Units, who furnished the guard personnel for the camps, and subsequently by the Allgemeine SS, which took over guard duties during the war.

RSHA played a part in the concentration camp program—the police arm of the SS—because through it the victims were apprehended and taken to the camps. Thus the SD appears in the picture, the personal staff, the first department of the Supreme Command, sort of the top office of the whole organization, and naturally it had much to do with the work of all subordinate departments.

Thus when the question is asked how many persons in the SS had something to do with the concentration camp program, it is a question which I think it is impossible to answer. You may point out how many persons were involved in the Death’s-Head Units, who originally furnished the guard details; you might estimate how many persons were in the Allgemeine SS, but to say just what percentage of the whole organization was involved in that program, is something which I find myself unable to do.

I had just pointed out . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Can you say that one or another branch of the SS provided the whole of the staff of the concentration camps?

MAJOR FARR: By the staff, I take it, you mean guards at the camp, the camp personnel. You cannot do that. For example, the Death’s-Head Units originally started off as being the units which furnished all the guard personnel. Subsequently, their task was taken over by members of the Allgemeine SS.

THE PRESIDENT: Those are both branches of the SS?

MAJOR FARR: Both are branches, yes. Now with respect to the camp commandants, for instance, normally all high ranking officers in the SS were members of the Allgemeine SS, so doubtless such personnel would be drawn from that branch. It is certainly not beyond question that some members of the Waffen-SS may have been called on to act as guards in certain camps. I do not think that you can say that there is no component of the SS which may not have had some of its personnel involved in the program.

THE PRESIDENT: That wasn’t exactly what I meant. What I meant was: Could you say that one or other branches of the SS furnished the whole staff of the concentration camps?

MAJOR FARR: I don’t think I can say that. I think I could say this . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What other organization was it that furnished a part of the staff of the concentration camps?

MAJOR FARR: You mean an organization other than the SS?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR FARR: I know of none.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer would be “yes” then?

MAJOR FARR: I thought Your Honor was referring to any one branch of the SS which was concerned alone with that. The SS, so far as I know, is the only organization which played a part in the concentration camp picture, except at the very end of the war when I think, as Colonel Storey said yesterday, some members of the SA were also involved as guard personnel of concentration camps.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know the total personnel at the end of the war?

MAJOR FARR: Of the entire SS?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.

MAJOR FARR: That is something you would have to estimate. I quoted to the Tribunal yesterday the figures that D’Alquen gave as the strength of the Allgemeine SS in 1939. He said then that there were about 240,000 men in the Allgemeine SS. There were, at that time, about four regiments of Death’s-Head Units, several other regiments of the Verfügungstruppe, a few thousand personnel involved in the SD, so that I should say in 1939 you had about 250,000 to 300,000 members of the SS. With the outbreak of the war, the Waffen-SS was built up from a few regiments of the Verfügungstruppe to about 31 divisions at the end of the war, which probably would mean that the Waffen-SS by 1945 had had some 400,000 to 500,000 persons involved. I take it that 400,000 to 500,000 members of the Waffen-SS would be in addition to personnel of the Allgemeine SS, who were subject to compulsory military service in the Wehrmacht. So that, if I had to estimate, I would say that probably some 750,000 persons would be the top figure of personnel who had been involved in the SS from the beginning, but that is an estimate.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then you have no breakdown to show how many of those were civilians, clerks, stenographers, soldiers, and so on?

MAJOR FARR: No. When we are talking about SS members, we are not talking about stenographers who worked in the office, who were not members of the SS. By SS members, we mean personnel who took the oath and appeared on the membership list, either as a member of the Allgemeine SS, the Death’s-Head Units, or the Waffen-SS. I would think that my figure of 750,000 was a figure including members of the SS, Allgemeine SS, the Totenkopf Verbände, and the Waffen-SS.

I was pointing out the shift of control of concentration camps to WVHA in 1942, which was coincident with the shift in the basic purpose of the camps, which heretofore has been concerned with custody of individuals for political and security reasons. Now the basic purpose of the camps was to furnish manpower, and I now want to point out to the Court the agencies of the SS which were involved in that manpower drive.

The Tribunal has already received evidence of an order which was issued in 1942, shortly after the transfer to WVHA of concentration camp control, directing Security Police to furnish at once 35,000 prisoners qualified for work in the camps. That order is our Document 1063-PS, and was received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-219.

Thirty-five thousand prisoners were, of course, merely the beginning. The SS dragnet was capable of catching many more slaves. I offer in evidence a carbon, typewritten copy of a directive to all the departments of the SS Supreme Command, issued from Himmler’s field headquarters on August 5, 1943. It is our Document Number 744-PS. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-455. That directive appears on Page 2 of the translation. It implements an order signed by the Defendant Keitel directing the use of all males captured in guerilla fighting in the East for forced labor. The Keitel directive appears on Page 1 of the translation.

I shall read only the Himmler directive appearing on Page 2 of the translation. The Tribunal will note that it is addressed to every main office of the SS Supreme Command. I read that list of addressees of the directive:

“(1) Chief of the personnel staff of Reichsführer SS; (2) SS Main Office; (3) Reich Security Main Office; (4) Race and Resettlement Main Office; (5) Main Office, Ordinary Police; (6) SS Economic Administrative Main Office; (7) SS Personnel Main Office; (8) Main Office SS Court; (9) SS Supreme Command, Headquarters of the Waffen-SS; (10) Staff Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanism; (11) Main Office Center for Racial Germans; (12) Office of SS Obergruppenführer Heissmeyer; (13) Chief of the anti-partisan combat. . . .”

I point out to the Court that every one of the main offices appearing on the chart is a recipient of that directive. The next addressees are the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the various regions.

I continue to quote the body of the directive:

“Referring to Item 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order that all young female prisoners capable of work are to be sent to Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Commissioner Sauckel.

“Children, old women, and old men are to be collected and put to work in the women’s and children’s camps established by me on estates, as well as on the border of the evacuated area.”

In April 1944 the SS was called on to produce even more laborers—this time 100,000 Jews from Hungary. The Tribunal will recall the minutes of the Defendant Speer’s discussion with Hitler on April 6 and 7, 1944, which were found in our Document R-124 at Page 36 and were read to the Court in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-179—minutes in which Speer referred to Hitler’s statement that he would call on the Reichsführer SS to produce 100,000 Jews from Hungary.

The last source of manpower had not been tapped. To Jews, deportees, women, and children, there was added the productive power of prisoners of war. It was through the SS that the conspirators squeezed the last drop of labor from such prisoners.

I refer to a statement by the Defendant Speer which appears in our Document R-124 at Page 13 of the translation, the document itself having already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-179. The statement is found at Page 7, last paragraph of the original, Page 13 of our Document R-124, the next to the last paragraph on Page 13. That appears in Volume 2 of the document book. I quote:

“Speer: ‘We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsführer SS as soon as possible so that PW’s he picks up are made available for our purposes. The Reichsführer SS gets from 30,000 to 40,000 men per month.’”

In order to insure SS control over the labor of prisoners of war, the Reichsführer SS was finally appointed as head of all prisoner-of-war camps on 25 September 1944. I offer in evidence the letter referring to his appointment. It is our Document 058-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-456. It will be found in Volume 1 of the document book. That letter is a circular letter from the Director of the Party Chancellery dated 30 September 1944 and signed “M. Bormann.” I quote, beginning with the first paragraph of that letter:

“1. The Führer has ordered under the date of 25 September 1944:

“‘The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as prisoner-of-war camps and installations with guards, are transferred to the Commander of the Reserve Army from 1 October 1944.’”

Passing to Paragraph 2 of the letter, I shall read Subparagraphs (a) and (c); I quote:

“2. The Reichsführer SS has commanded:

“(a) In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS, Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm, Gottlob Berger.”

Skipping now to Subparagraph (c):

“(c) The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be organized in joint action of SS Obergruppenführer Berger and SS Obergruppenführer Pohl with the appropriate offices for allocation of labor.

“The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner-of-war affairs is to be accomplished between SS Obergruppenführer Berger and the Chief of the Security Police, SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”

Thus the SS finally took over direction and control of prisoner-of-war-camps.

So impressive were the results obtained from SS concentration camp labor that in 1944 the Defendant Göring called on Himmler for more inmates for use in the aircraft industry. The Tribunal will recall his teletype to Himmler, our Document 1584-PS, Part 1, which was read in evidence by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-221. Let me now read Himmler’s reply to that teletype. It is our Document 1584-PS, Part 3, and will be found on Page 2. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-457. I quote the beginning of that letter:

“Most Honored Reich Marshal:

“Following my teletype letter of 18 February 1944, I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.

“This survey indicates that at the present time about 36,000 prisoners are employed for the purposes of the Air Force. An increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners is contemplated.

“The production program is being discussed, established, and executed by the Reich Ministry of Aviation and the chief of my Economic Administrative Main Office, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl.

“We assist with all the forces at our disposal.

“The task of my Economic Administrative Main Office, however, is not solely fulfilled with the allocation of the prisoners to the aviation industry, as SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl and his assistants take care of the required working speed through constant control and supervision of the work-groups (Kommandos) and therefore have some influence on the results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding-up of the total work, better results can definitely be expected.”

I pass now to the last two paragraphs of the letter, which will be found on the next page of the translation:

“The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires further employment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of 14 February 1944 are already under way.

“I shall keep you, most honored Reich Marshal, currently informed on this subject.”

Incidentally, I might call to the Tribunal’s attention the fact that SS Obergruppenführer Pohl, who was head of the WVHA, was also a general of the Waffen-SS, which goes to show that there is no manner in which you can characterize functions in the SS.

The extent to which the number of prisoners was increased through SS efforts is illustrated by our Document 1166-PS, which I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit Number USA-458. That document is a report from Office Group D of WVHA, dated 15 August 1944. I shall read the first page of that report, beginning:

“With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for 1 August 1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as the clothing report for 15 August 44.

“(1) The actual number on 1 August 44 consisted of: a) male prisoners, 379,167; b) female prisoners, 145,119.

“In addition, there are the following new arrivals already announced:

“1) From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action), 90,000; 2) from Litzmannstadt (police prison and ghetto), 60,000; 3) Poles from the Government General, 15,000; 4) convicts from the Eastern Territories, 10,000; 5) former Polish officers, 17,000; 6) from Warsaw (Poles), 400,000; 7) continued arrivals from France approximately 15,000 to 20,000.

“Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be received into the concentration camps within the next few days.”

This intensive drive for manpower to some extent interfered with the program which WVHA had already undertaken to exterminate certain classes of individuals in the camps. I offer a photostatic copy of a letter from WVHA, dated 27 April 1943, our Document 1933-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-459. The letter is addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, is signed by Glücks, SS Brigade Führer and Major General of the Waffen-SS. I read the letter:

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has decided after consultation, that in the future only mentally sick prisoners may be selected for action 14-F-13 by the medical commissions appointed for this purpose.

“All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bedridden cripples, _et cetera_) are to be basically excepted from this action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can perform in bed.

“The order of the Reichsführer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the future.

“Therefore requests for fuel for this purpose are unnecessary.”

The action “14-F-13” is not defined in the letter, but it is perfectly apparent what it means. Every human being, bedridden, crippled, no matter what his physical condition, from whom any work at all could be extracted was to be excepted from the action. Only the insane, from whom nothing could be expected, were to suffer the action. What could the

## action be? It is perfectly apparent. The action was extermination.

The SS, however, was to some extent enabled to achieve both goals: that of increased production and of elimination of undesirables. The Tribunal will recall the agreement between Minister of Justice Thierack and Himmler on September 18, 1942, our Document 654-PS, which was read in evidence by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-218. I am not going to quote again from that document but will remind the Tribunal that the agreement provided for the delivery of anti-social elements after the execution of their sentences to the Reichsführer SS to be worked to death.

The conditions under which such persons worked in the camps were well calculated to lead to their death. Those conditions were regulated by the WVHA. As an illustration of WVHA management, I call the Court’s attention to our Document 2189-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-460. It is an order directed to commandants of concentration camps, dated 11 August 1942, and bearing the facsimile signature, which does not appear on the translation but does appear on the original, of SS Brigade Führer and General of the Waffen-SS Glücks, who was Chief of Office Group D of WVHA. That is Document Number 2189-PS. I will read the body of that letter:

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women by prisoners under the ordered supervision.

“In order to co-ordinate this order the Main Office Chief SS of the Economic Administration Main Office, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps for men.

“It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punishment on German prisoners.”

Even after their death the prisoners did not escape the management of WVHA. I refer the Court to our Document 2199-PS, a letter to commanders of concentration camps dated 12 September 1942 and signed by the Chief of the Central Office Group D of WVHA, SS Obersturmbannführer Liebehenschel. I offer this as Exhibit Number USA-461. I shall read the body of that directive, which appears on Page 1 of the translation. I quote:

“According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and conforming to a report of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to the home cemeteries within the Protectorate.

“In view of different events (demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in the halls of cemeteries of the home communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates, _et cetera_) within the Protectorates, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants of deceased nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the concentration camps. In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions shall be available at this agency.”

The SS indeed regarded the inmates of concentration camps as its own personal property to be used for its own economic advantage. The Tribunal will recall that as early as 1942 the Defendant Speer recognized that the SS was motivated by the desire for further profits when he suggested to Hitler that the SS receive a share of the war equipment produced by concentration camp labor in ratio to the working hours of the prisoners. I refer to our Document R-124, at Page 36, which was read into evidence by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-179. The Führer agreed that a 3 to 5 percent share should satisfy the SS commanders. Himmler himself frankly admitted his intention to derive profits for SS purposes from the camp in his Metz speech to the officers of the SS Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler,” our Document 1918-PS, Exhibit Number USA-304—the passage in question being found at the top of Page 3 of the English translation and on Page 10 of the original German, 7 lines from the bottom. The passage begins:

“The apartment-building program, which is the prerequisite for a healthy and social basis of the entire SS, as well as of the entire leadership corps, can be carried out only when I get the money for it from somewhere. Nobody is going to give me the money. It must be earned, and it will be earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals, to do positive work. The man guarding those prisoners serves harder than the one on close-order drill. The one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people will learn within 3 to 4 months—and we shall see. In peacetime, I shall form guard battalions and put them on duty for 3 months only. They will learn to fight the inferior beings; and this will not be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and inferior races. This activity is necessary, as I said, 1) to eliminate these negative people from the German people; 2) make them work once more for the great national community by having them break stones and bake bricks, so that the Führer can again erect his grand buildings; and 3) to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in houses, in ground, in settlements, so that our men can have houses in which to raise large families and have many children. This in turn is necessary because we stand or die with this leading blood of Germany; and if the good blood is not reproduced, we will not be able to rule the world.”

One final aspect of SS control over concentration camps remains to be mentioned. That is its direction of the program of biological experiments on human beings, which was carried on in the camps. Just a few days ago another military tribunal passed judgment on some of those who participated in the experiments at Dachau.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no date on that document you just read, is there?

MAJOR FARR: There appears to be no date on the English translation. The original document bears the notation of a speech in April 1943.

At a later stage in this case, evidence of some of the details of this program of experiments will be presented. It is not my purpose to deal with those experiments from the substantive aspect. I shall show only that they were the result of SS direction and that the SS played a vital

## part in their successful execution.

The program seems to have originated in a request by a Dr. Sigmund Rascher to Himmler for permission to utilize persons in concentration camps as material for experiments with human beings in connection with some research he was conducting on behalf of the Luftwaffe. I refer to our Document 1602-PS, a photostatic copy of a letter dated 15 May 1941, addressed to the Reichsführer SS, and signed “S. Rascher.” I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-454. I shall quote from the second paragraph of the translation, the fourth paragraph of the original letter. I quote:

“For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII, Munich, for a medical course. During this course where researches on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes), considerable regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: Can you make available two or three professional criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made at Bodenständige Prüfstelle für Höhenforschung der Luftwaffe, Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects may, of course, die, would take place with my co-operation. They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with the deputy of the Surgeon of the Air Force, who makes these experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problem in question could only be solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be used as test material.)”

Dr. Rascher promptly received assurance from the SS that he would be allowed to utilize concentration camp inmates for his experiments.

I refer to our Document 1582-PS, a letter dated 22 May 1941, addressed to Dr. Rascher, and bearing the stamp of the Personal Staff of the Reichsführer SS, and the initials, “K Br,” which initials are those of SS Sturmbannführer Karl Brandt. I offer this letter as Exhibit Number USA-462. I quote the first two paragraphs of that letter:

“Dear Dr. Rascher:

“Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsführer SS gave me your letter of 15 May 1941 for partial reply.

“I can inform you that prisoners will, of course, be gladly made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsführer SS, and requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch with you.”

The altitude experiments were conducted by Rascher; and in May 1942 General Field Marshal Milch, on behalf of the Luftwaffe, expressed his thanks to the SS for the assistance it furnished in connection with the experiments.

I refer to our Document 343-PS which will be found in Volume I of the document book. I offer an original letter, dated 20 May 1942, addressed to SS Obergruppenführer Wolff, and signed E. Milch, as Exhibit Number USA-463. That letter, which appears on Page 2 of the translation and on Page 1 of the original German, is as follows:

“Dear Wolff”—the German says, “Liebes Wölffchen”:

“In reference to your telegram of 12 May, our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments seems not to be necessary. However, the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils on the high seas, would be important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major Weltz (Medical Corps) will be charged with the execution and Captain Rascher (Medical Corps) will be made available until further orders in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.

“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.

“I convey the special thanks from the Supreme Commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive co-operation.

“I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with Heil Hitler! Always yours, E. Milch.”

THE PRESIDENT: Major Farr, hadn’t you better read the letter on the preceding page? It may be capable of an explanation.

MAJOR FARR: The letter on the preceding page, dated 31 August 1942, is also from General Field Marshal Milch, and is addressed to the Reichsführer SS. It reads as follows:

“Dear Mr. Himmler:

“I thank you very much for your letter of the 25th of August. I have read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture, combined with the showing of motion pictures, to my men in the near future.

“Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the occasion of my next visit to headquarters, I remain with best regards and Heil Hitler! Yours, E. Milch.”

Having finished his high-altitude experiments, Dr. Rascher proceeded to experiment with methods of rewarming persons who had been subjected to extreme cold. I refer to our Document 1618-PS, which is an intermediate report on intense chilling experiments which had been started in Dachau on 15 August 1942. That report, signed by Dr. Rascher, I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-464. I shall read only a few sentences from the report, beginning with the first paragraph:

“Experimental procedure.

“The experimental subjects (VP) were placed in the water, dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life-jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12° (centigrade). In one experimental series the neck (brain stem) and the back of the head protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments the neck (brain stem) and the back of the head were submerged in the water. “Electrical measurement gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in the stomach and 26.5° (centigrade) in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood, up to a half liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation of the right chamber. As soon as the temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) were bound to die despite all attempts at resuscitation.”

I skip now to the last paragraph of the report. I quote:

“During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was evident that rapid rewarming was in all cases preferable to a slow rewarming because, after removal from the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal warmth.

“Rewarming by animal warmth—animal bodies or women’s bodies—would be too slow.”

Although Rascher was thus of the preliminary opinion that rewarming by women’s bodies would be too slow, means for conducting such experiments were nevertheless placed at his disposal. I refer to our Document 1583-PS, a photostatic copy of a letter from Reichsführer SS Himmler addressed to General Pohl, dated 16 November 1942. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-465. I shall read just the first two paragraphs of that letter:

“Dear Pohl:

“The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13th of November 1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered through intense chilling in ice, snow, or water, and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or means:

“I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the concentration camp for these experiments for the warming of those who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the concentration camp for loose morals and because as prostitutes they were a potential source of infection.”

I think it is unnecessary for me to go on with the rest of the paragraph, in which he expresses his dissatisfaction that a German prostitute should be used for this purpose.

To insure the continuance of Rascher’s experiments, Himmler arranged for his transfer to the Waffen-SS. I offer in evidence a letter which appears as our Document 1617-PS. It is a letter from Reichsführer SS addressed to “Dear Comrade Milch”—General Field Marshal Milch—dated November 1942. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-466. I will now read the first two paragraphs of that letter, our Document 1617-PS. I quote:

“Dear Comrade Milch:

“You will recall that through SS General Wolff I particularly recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Führer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the supplementary reserve of the Air Force.

“These researches which deal with the reaction of the human organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged chilling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are of vital importance to the Air Force, in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals, who only deserve to die, from concentration camps for these experiments.”

I shall omit the next four paragraphs, in which Himmler reflects upon the difficulties of conducting such experiments because Christian medical circles were opposed, and pass on to the last paragraph on the first page of the translation. That is the seventh paragraph of the letter:

“I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, medical Officer in the Reserve, from the Air Force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this field and would put the experiences, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the Air Force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and Wolff a non-Christian physician should be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the administrative authorities, so that the results could really attract attention.

“I believe that this solution to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and under my orders, is the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the Air Force, there would certainly be much annoyance because then I would have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you because of the arrogance and presumption which Professor Holzlöhner, who is under my command, has displayed in his post at Dachau by making remarks about me to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the Waffen-SS as quickly as possible. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is that letter from Himmler?

MAJOR FARR: Yes, Sir.

Now Rascher’s experiments were by no means the only experiments in which the SS were interested. Without attempting even to outline the whole extent of the experimental program, I shall give just one further illustration of this type of SS activity. I refer to our Document L-103, which is a report prepared by the chief hygienist in the Office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police, dated 12 September 1944. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-467. (Parenthetically I might note that the office of the Reich Surgeon SS and Police will be found in the personal staff department, as indicated by the second box on the right-hand side of the line leading down from the personal staff.)

I shall read a few paragraphs from this report, which is a report prepared by the chief hygienist in the office of the Reich Surgeon of SS and Police and signed SS Oberführer Dr. Mrugowsky. It relates to experiments with poison bullets. Beginning with the first paragraph, I quote:

“On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS Sturmbannführer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann, and the undersigned, experiments with aconite nitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had been sentenced to death. The caliber of the bullets used was 7.65 millimeters, and they were filled with poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiment received one shot in the upper part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the case of two persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected.”

I omit the next few sentences and proceed beginning with Paragraph 3 of the report:

“The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable. After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to 44 minutes, a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned persons swallowed frequently; later the flow of saliva is so strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then a sensation of choking and vomiting starts.”

The next three paragraphs describe in coldly scientific fashion the reactions of the dying persons. The description then continues, and I want to quote the two paragraphs before the conclusion. It is the last paragraph on Page 1 of the translation, the sixth paragraph of the report:

“At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he put four fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became quite red.

“The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the disturbances of the motor nerves increased so much that the persons threw themselves up and down, rolled their eyes, and made aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last the disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum, the condemned lay still. Rectal cramps and loss of urine was observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, 123, and 129 minutes after they were shot.”

The fact that SS doctors engaged in such experiments was no accident. It was consistent with an ideology and racial philosophy which, to use Himmler’s words, regarded human beings as lice and offal. But the most important factor was that the SS alone was in a position to supply necessary human material. And it did supply such material through WVHA. I refer to our Document 1751-PS, which is a letter from the Chief of Office Group D of WVHA, dated 12 May 1944. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-468. I quote that letter. It appears in the original file on the last page. I quote:

“There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case permission for assignment has to be requested here before assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.

“To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in case of Aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Reich Security Main Office, and the reason for detainment in the concentration camp.

“Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes without permission.”

The translation says that the signature is illegible, but I think it appears from the original that it is the signature of Glücks, since he was the department chief of Department D of WVHA. It was on the basis of being able to supply such material that the Reich Ministry of Finance was prepared to subsidize the SS experimental program. I offer in evidence a series of letters between the Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Research Council, and the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police. They are our Document 002-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-469. The first letter from which I shall quote appears on Page 4 of our Document 002-PS and is from the head of the Executive Council of the Reich Research Council, addressed to the Reich Surgeon of SS and Police. It is dated 19 February 1943. I quote the first three paragraphs of the letter:

“The Reich Minister of Finance told me that you requested 53 leading positions . . . for your office, partly for new research institutes.

“After the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has as President of the Reich Research Council entrusted himself with all German research, he issued directives, among other things, that in the execution of scientific tasks important for war, the available institutions including equipment and personnel should be utilized to the utmost for reasons of necessary economy of effort.

“The foundation of new institutes comes therefore in question only insofar as there are no outstanding institutes for the furtherance of important war research tasks.”

I omit the rest of the letter.

To this letter the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police replied on the 26 February 1943. The reply will be found on Page 2 of the English translation. It is a letter from the Reich Surgeon SS and Police to the head of the Executive Council of the Reich Research Department, dated 26 February 1943. I quote the first three paragraphs of that letter. It begins:

“My Dear Ministerial Director:

“In acknowledgment of your correspondence of 19 February 1943, I am able to reply the following to it today:

“The statement of the budget for the 53 key positions of my office which you made the basis of your memorandum was a veritable peace plan.

“The special institutes of the SS which are to be filled, in part, with these positions should serve the purpose to establish and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research the particular possibilities of research only possessed by the SS.”

Omitting the next two paragraphs, I continue:

“I will gladly be at your disposal at any time to discuss the

## particular research aims, in connection with the SS, which I

would like to bring up after the war upon the direction of the Reichsführer SS.”

An interview between the Reich Surgeon and Mentzel, the author of the original letter, took place; and on the 25th of March 1943 Mentzel wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of Finance, which will be found on Page 1 of the translation. It is a letter from the President of the Reich Research Department, Head of the Executive Council, to the Reich Minister of Finance, dated 25 March 1943. The letter begins:

“In regard to your correspondence of 19 December”—and then follows the serial number of the letter—“to which I gave you a preliminary communication on 19 February, I finally take the following position:

“The Reich Surgeon SS and Police, in a personal discussion, told me that the budget claim which he looked after is used primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen-SS. Since it is established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of scientific research possibilities, they pertain exclusively to such affairs, which are carried out with the material (prisoners) which is only accessible to the Waffen-SS and are therefore not to be undertaken by any other experimental office. I cannot object therefore on behalf of the Reich Research Council against the budget claim of the Reich Surgeon SS and Police.”

The letter is signed, “Mentzel, Ministerial Director.”

Thus it was because the SS was in a position to supply material for the program of experiments that it took the lead in that field of endeavor.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the letter on Page 4 mean that the Defendant Göring was President of the Reich Research Department?

MAJOR FARR: Page 4 of the translation? That I understand to be the case. The point of the letter being that Göring had laid down the rule that during the war there was to be no duplication of experimental facilities. Therefore, the Reich Research Department to whom the Minister of Finance had turned for an opinion, asked the Reich Surgeon, “Why do you want to carry out this program of experiments?”

THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking whether the President of the Reich Research Department was the Defendant Göring.

MAJOR FARR: That is what is stated in the letter. I understand that to be the case.

THE PRESIDENT: Then what do the words, “President of the Reich Research Department” on Page 1 mean? Does that mean that the letter went to the Defendant Göring?

MAJOR FARR: No. The letterhead bears the notation “President of the Reich Research Department,” and the letter proceeds from an office of that department, Head of the Executive Council. The letter was addressed to the Reich Minister of Finance.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

MAJOR FARR: I have concluded the concentration camp phase.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: It will perhaps be convenient that I should announce that the Tribunal will adjourn today at 4 o’clock.

MAJOR FARR: Through its activities with respect to concentration camps, the SS performed part of its mission to safeguard the security of the Nazi regime. But another specialized aspect of that mission must not be forgotten. The Tribunal will recall Himmler’s definition of that task—a definition I referred to earlier—the prevention of a Jewish-Bolshevist revolution of subhumans; in plain words, participation in the Nazi program of Jewish persecution and extermination.

It would be idle for me to refer again at any length to the evidence relating to that program which the Tribunal heard a day or so ago from Major Walsh. I want to call attention to just a few documents showing how the program involved every branch and component of the SS.

The racial philosophy of the SS, which I dealt with at the very outset, made that organization a natural agency for the execution of all types of anti-Semitic measures. The SS position on the Jewish question was publicly stated in the SS newspaper _Das Schwarze Corps_, the issue of August 8, 1940, by its editor, Gunter d’Alquen, a statement which has already been read into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-269. It is our Document 2668-PS. I shall not repeat that quotation in which D’Alquen says that the Jewish question will not be solved until the last Jew has been deported, and that the German peace which awaits Europe must be a peace without Jews.

The attempted solution of the Jewish question through the “spontaneous” demonstrations in Germany, following the murder of Vom Rath in November of 1938, has been presented to the Tribunal. In those demonstrations all branches of the SS were called on to play a part. I refer to the teletype message from SS Gruppenführer Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued on the 10th of November 1938. It is our Document 3051-PS. Portions of that teletype have already been read into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-240. I wish to read one further paragraph, which has not been read. It appears on Page 2 of the translation, the fourth paragraph. I quote:

“The direction of the measures of the Security Police concerning the demonstrations against Jews is vested with the organs of the State Police”—by which he means the Gestapo—“inasmuch as the inspectors of the Security Police are not issuing their own orders. In order to carry out the measures of the Security Police, officials of the Criminal Police as well as members of the SD, of the Verfügungstruppe, and the Allgemeine SS may be used.”

With the outbreak of the war and the march of Nazi armies over Europe, the SS participated in solving the Jewish question in other countries in Europe. The solution was nothing short of extermination. To a large degree these wholesale murders were disguised under the name of “anti-partisan” or “anti-guerilla” actions and as such they included as victims not merely Jews but Soviets, Poles, and other Eastern peoples. With this anti-partisan activity I shall deal in a few moments.

I want to refer now to a few actions confined essentially to Jews. To take one example—the mass annihilation of Jews in gas vans—described in our document 501-PS, which was read into the record by Major Walsh as Exhibit Number USA-288. I do not think that that document appears in the document book, because I am not going to read from it. I simply want to point out that these gas vans, as appears from the letters, were operated by the Security Police and SD under the direction of RSHA. Or to take another example—the report entitled, “Solution of the Jewish Question in Galicia,” our Document L-18, prepared by SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Police Katzmann and rendered to SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger—that report has already been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-277. The Tribunal will recall that the solution, which consisted in the evacuation and extermination of all the Jews in Galicia and the confiscation of their property, was carried out under the energetic direction of the SS and Police Leaders with the assistance of SS Police units. I wish to read three short items in the report which have not already been read. The first is a text under a photograph which appears on Page 3 of the translation and on Page 3(a) of the original report. It is the first item on Page 3 of the translation. I quote: “Great was the joy of the SS men when the Reichsführer SS in person in 1942 visited some camps along the Rollbahn.”

The second is a balance sheet, which appears on Page 11 of the translation and Page 17 of the report. I read Item 3 on the balance sheet:

“3. Amount paid over to the SS cashier: a. Camps, 6,867,251.00 zlotys; b. industrial and armament factories, 6,556,513.69 zlotys; total, 13,423,764.69 zlotys.

“Further payments to the SS cashier are effected every month.”

The third item I desire to read is the last two paragraphs of the report found on Page 20 of the translation and on Page 64 of the original document. I read the last two paragraphs of the report:

“Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the first to the last day.

“Due to the high personal sense of duty of every single leader and man we have succeeded in getting rid of this plague in so short a time.”

The final example of SS participation in Jewish extermination to which I shall call the Tribunal’s attention is the infamous report by SS Brigadeführer and Major General of the Police Stroop, on the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, our Document 1061-PS. That report was introduced in evidence by Major Walsh as Exhibit Number USA-275, and the Tribunal indicated that it would take the whole report in evidence without the necessity of reading it in full. I shall not, therefore, read any further passages; but I do want to point out specifically two sections dealing with the constitution of the forces which participated in that fearful action. On Page 1 of the translation is a table of the units used.

THE PRESIDENT: It is here?

MAJOR FARR: Our Document 1061-PS. I am just going to call your attention to the table of units which were employed in this action, indicating the average number of officers and men from each unit employed per day. It will be observed that among the units involved were the staff of the SS and Police Leader, two battalions of the Waffen-SS, two battalions of the 22d SS Police Regiment, and members of the Security Police. The part played by the Waffen-SS came in for high praise from the writer of the report. The Tribunal will recall the passage which was read by Major Walsh in which reference was made to the toughness of the men of the Waffen-SS, the Police, and the Wehrmacht and in which the writer said that “considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS had been trained for only 3 or 4 weeks before being assigned to this action, high credit should be given to them for the pluck, courage, and devotion which they showed.”

The Tribunal has already heard Himmler’s proud boast of the part that the SS played in the extermination of the Jews. It occurs in his Posen speech, our Document 1919-PS, and was read into the record in the presentation of the case dealing with concentration camps. The passage to which I refer appears on about the middle of Page 4 of the translation and on Page 66 of the original. Since that passage has already been read, it is unnecessary for me to quote it again; but I do want the Tribunal to note that Himmler stated that only the SS could have carried out this extermination program of the Jews and that its

## participation in that program was a page of glory in its history which

could never be fully appreciated.

I now turn to the manner in which the SS fitted into the aggressive war program of the conspirators and, too, its responsibility for the Crimes against Peace which were alleged in the Indictment. From its very beginning, it made prime contributions to the conspirators’ aggressive war aims.

First, it served as one of the para-military organizations under which the conspirators disguised their building up of an army in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Second, through affiliated SS organizations in other countries and through some of the departments in its own Supreme Command, it fostered Fifth Column movements outside Germany and prepared the way for aggression. Third, through its militarized units, it

## participated in aggressive actions which eventually were carried out.

The Tribunal has just heard the evidence against the SA, which demonstrated that from 1933 to 1938 the SA were militarized and were in fact nothing but a camouflaged army. Some of that evidence referred to the SS as well. The para-military character of the Allgemeine SS is apparent. I have already described the military character of its structure, the military discipline required of its members, and the steps it took to enlist in its ranks young men of military age. In addition to this volunteer army, the SS created as early as 1933 fully armed professional units. These were the SS Verfügungstruppe and the Death’s-Head Units with which I have dealt yesterday.

While building up the SS as a military force within Germany, the conspirators also utilized it in other countries to lay the groundwork for aggression. The evidence, presented by Mr. Alderman, of the preparations for the seizure of Austria showed the part played by the SS Standarte 89 in the murder of Dollfuss and described the memorial plaque which was erected as a tribute to the SS men who participated in that murder. I refer to Exhibit Number USA-59 and USA-60, our Document Number L-273 and 2968-PS, which were introduced by Mr. Alderman. The Tribunal will recall the subsequent story of the events of the night of March 11, 1938, when the SS marched into Vienna and occupied all government buildings and important posts in the city—a story unfolded in Exhibit Number USA-61, our Document Number 812-PS, the report of Gauleiter Rainer which was read in evidence by Mr. Alderman, and in our Document Number 2949-PS, Exhibit Number USA-76, the record of the telephone conversation between the Defendant Göring and Dombrowski, which appears on Page 570 of the transcript of the record (Volume II, Page 417).

The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein’s Free Corps played in that country the part of Fifth Column which the Austrian SS had played in Austria, and it was rewarded by being placed under the jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS in September 1938. I refer to our Document 388-PS, which was read in evidence by Mr. Alderman as Exhibit Number USA-26.

The items touched are Items 37 and 38 of the so-called Schmundt file. Moreover, as shown by Item 36 of that file, which Mr. Alderman read into the record, the SS had its own armed units—four battalions of the Totenkopf Verbände—actually operating in Czechoslovakia before the Munich Pact was signed. SS preparations for aggression in Czechoslovakia were not confined to military forces. One of the departments of the SS Supreme Command—the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle—which is represented on the chart by the third box from the top at the extreme right—was a center for Fifth Column activity. The Tribunal may recall the secret meeting between Hitler and Henlein in March 1938, described in notes of the German Foreign Office, Exhibit Number USA-95, at which the line to be followed by the Sudeten German Party was determined. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was represented at that meeting by Professor Haushofer and SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz. And when the Foreign Office, in August 1938, awarded further subsidies to Henlein’s Sudeten Party, the memorandum of that recommendation for further subsidies contained the significant footnote “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle will be informed. . . .” I refer to Exhibit Number USA-96, our Document 3059-PS, which was read into the record by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 789 and 790 (Volume III, Pages 75 and 76).

When at last the time came to strike, the SS was ready. I quote from the _National Socialist Yearbook_ for 1940, our Document 2164-PS, Exhibit Number USA-255, on Page 1, Paragraph 2, of the translation, Page 365 of the original, Paragraph 3:

“When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudetenland began, on that memorable 1st of October 1938, the emergency forces”—Verfügungstruppe—“as well as the Death’s-Head Units”—Totenkopf Verbände—“were along with those in the lead.”

I omit the balance of the paragraph and continue with the next paragraph:

“The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the SS when it served to establish order in the collapsed Czechoslovakia. This action ended with the founding of the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.

“Only a week later, on the 22d of March 1939, Memel also returned to the Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithuania. Again it was the SS, here above all the East Prussian SS, which played a prominent part in the liberation of this district.”

In the final act in setting off the war—the attack on Poland in September 1939—the SS acted as a sort of stage manager. The Tribunal will recall the oral testimony of Erwin Lahousen with relation to the simulated attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, by Germans dressed in Polish uniform—what Lahousen referred to as one of the most mysterious

## actions which took place in the Abwehr. Describing his task of getting

the Polish uniforms and equipment together, he said at Page 620 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 450):

“These articles of equipment had to be prepared, and one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is on the official diary of the War Department—fetched them.”

The war erupted and the Waffen-SS again took its place in the van of the attacking forces.

During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities possessed by the SS, qualities not only of its combat forces but of its other components as well. I turn now to a consideration of some of the tasks in which the SS was engaged during the war—tasks which embraced the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity described in the Indictment.

The Tribunal has already received in evidence our Document 447-PS as Exhibit Number USA-135. It is a directive issued by the Defendant Keitel, on the 13th of March 1941, covering some of the preparations made 3 months in advance for the attack on Russia. Paragraph 2b of that directive, which was read into the record, provided that in the area of operations the Reichsführer SS was entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which would result from the struggle about to commence between two opposing political systems.

One of the steps taken by the Reichsführer SS to carry out those “special tasks” was the formation and use of so-called “anti-partisan” units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech, our Document 1919-PS, at Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 5, Page 57 of the original, last paragraph. I read those two paragraphs in which he discusses the anti-partisan units:

“In the meantime, I have also set up the office of the chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach is chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

“It is notable that by setting up this agency by division, corps, army in turn, we have gained for the SS the next higher step—which is the High Command of an army or even a group, if you wish to call it that.”

What the SS did with its divisions, corps, and army out of which the anti-partisan units were formed, is illustrated in the reports rendered as to the activities of such units. I offer in evidence the Activity and Situation Report 6 of the task forces of the Security Police and SD in the U.S.S.R., covering the period from the 1st to the 31st of October 1941. It is our Document R-102, and will be found in Volume 2 of the document book. It is Exhibit Number USA-470. The report shows that so-called “anti-partisan” activity was actually nothing but a name for extermination of persons believed politically undesirable and of Jews. The report is a very carefully organized and detailed description of such extermination. Section I describes the stations of the various task forces involved, Section II their activities. The latter section is divided into parts, each dealing with a different geographical region—the Baltic area, White Ruthenia, and the Ukraine.

Under each area the report of activities is classified under three headings: (a) Partisan activity and counteraction, (b) arrests and execution of Communists and officials, and (c) Jews. I shall read only a few typical paragraphs selected almost at random.

First, to show the units involved, I quote the second and third paragraphs of Page 4 of the translation, which also appear on Page 1 of the original:

“The present stations are:

“Task Force A, since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk; Task Force B, continues in Smolensk; Task Force C, since 27 September 1941 in Kiev; Task Force D, since 27 September 1941 in Nikolaiev.

“The action and special commandos”—Einsatz- und Sonderkommandos—“which are attached to the task force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.”

I shall now read from the section headed “Baltic area” and subsection labelled “Jews,” beginning with the first paragraph on Page 5 of the translation, Page 8 of the original, second paragraph:

“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in Ostland.”

I skip now to the section headed “White Ruthenia,” the subsection headed, “Partisan activity and counteraction.” The paragraph I shall read begins on Page 6, Paragraph 5 of the translation, found on Page 11, Paragraph 1 of the original. I quote:

“In Wultschina eight juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children’s home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.

“b) Arrests and executions of Communists, officials, and criminals. A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKGB agents, and agitators.”

The subsection on arrests and executions of Communists, officials, and criminals in White Ruthenia ends as follows; and I read from Page 6 of the translation, Paragraph 14, Page 12 of the original, Paragraph 5:

“The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons.”

The final item I shall quote is from the section headed “Ukraine”, under the subsection, “Jews.” It will be found on Page 8 of the translation, Paragraph 10, Page 18 of the original, next to the last paragraph:

“In Zhitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.”

This report, the Tribunal will recall, deals with the activities of four task forces: A, B, C, and D. The more detailed report of Task Force A up to 15 October 1941 is our Document L-180. It has already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-276 and some paragraphs were read from it. It will be referred to again in the case against the Gestapo. I desire to read only two paragraphs, which show the great variety of SS components in such a task force.

I might point out to the Court that this elaborately bound report, which the Court has already seen, has a sort of pocket-part supplement in which appears a breakdown of the personnel engaged in this action, in graphic form. I shall read the component parts which appear on this chart in a moment. First, I will quote from Page 5 of the translation, fourth paragraph . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Does that book you just put in refer to the extermination of the Jews in Galicia?

MAJOR FARR: This is the report of Action Group A, an anti-partisan task force which operated in the Baltic States in 1941.

The passage I will read appears on Page 5 of the translation, Paragraph 4 and on Page 12 of the original, first paragraph; I quote:

“This description of the over-all situation shows that the members of the Gestapo”—the Secret State Police—“Kripo”—that is the Criminal Police—“and the SD”—Security Service—“who are attached to the task-force group, are active mainly in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, and to a lesser extent, in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the Waffen-SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures under their own officers against the streaming back of the population. This is so much easier because the task forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have at their disposal native police units, as described in Enclosure 1, and because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to White Ruthenia.

“The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD during the individual phases can be gathered from Enclosure 2; the advance and activities of the task force group and the task force commands, from Enclosure 3. It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Waffen-SS and of the uniformed police, who are on the reserve, have declared their wish to stay with the Security Police and the SD.”

I now quote from Enclosure 1a which was referred to, showing the constitution of the force. This will be found on Page 14 of the translation. It is the graphic chart which I showed the Court a few moments ago, the translation having simply the breakdown of the components. I quote:

“Total strength of Task Force Group A, 990; Waffen-SS, 340, 34.4 percent; drivers, 172, 17.4 percent; administration, 18, 1.8 percent; Security Service”—SD—“35, 3.5 percent; Criminal Police”—Kripo—“41, 4.1 percent; State Police”—Stapo—“89, 9.0 percent; auxiliary police, 87, 8.8 percent; Order Police, 133, 13.4 percent; female employees, 13, 1.3 percent; interpreters, 51, 5.1 percent; telautograph operators, 3, 0.3 percent, wireless operators, 8, 0.8 percent.”

The Tribunal will observe that in that list there appear the Waffen-SS, the SD, Criminal Police, the Gestapo, and the ordinary police, all of which were part of the SS or under SS jurisdiction.

One final report of anti-partisan activity may be referred to. It is a report from the General Commissar for White Ruthenia to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories. It is our Document R-135, which I think is in the document book under 1475-PS—two document numbers have been combined. That document was introduced into evidence by Major Walsh as Exhibit Number USA-289, and he read into the record the letter from the Reich Commissar of the Eastern Territories transmitting the report in question. The letter he read appears on Page 1 of the translation. I desire to read a paragraph or two from the report itself, which is found on Page 3 of the translation. It deals with the results of the police operation “Cottbus.” I quote the first paragraph:

“SS Brigadeführer, Major General of Police Von Gottberg reports that the operation ‘Cottbus’ had the following result during the period mentioned: Enemy dead, 4,500; dead suspected of belonging to bands, 5,000; German dead, 59.”

I think it is unnecessary to continue further with the list. I skip to the fourth paragraph of the report:

“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The Battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.

“By order of the Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat, SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, units of the Armed Forces have also participated in the operation.”

This is as far as I will quote.

The Tribunal will recall that SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach was referred to in the Posen speech by Himmler as “our comrade” whom he had placed in charge of anti-partisan activity.

The activities I have just dealt with were joint activities, in which the Gestapo, Order Police, the Waffen-SS, and SS police regiments were all involved. But these units were also used individually to carry out tasks of such a nature.

I offer in evidence a letter from the Chief of the Command Office of the Waffen-SS, our Document 1972-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-471. It is a letter from the Chief of the Command Office of the Waffen-SS to the Reichsführer SS, dated 14 October 1941; subject: “Intermediate Report on Civilian State of Emergency.” I shall read that letter; I quote:

“I deliver the following interim report regarding the commitment of the Waffen-SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of emergency:

“In turn all battalions of the Waffen-SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia were assigned to shootings and hangings.

“Up till now there occurred in Prague 99 shootings and 21 hangings, in Brünn 54 shootings and 17 hangings; total: 191 executions (including 16 Jews).

“A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and men will be made following the termination of the civilian state of emergency.”

It is not surprising that units of the Waffen-SS and the branches which had thus been employed in extermination actions and in the execution of civilians are also to be found violating the laws of warfare when carrying on ordinary combat operations. I offer in evidence a supplementary report of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Court of Inquiry in regard to shooting of allied prisoners of war by the 12th SS Panzer Division in Normandy, France, between the 7th and 21st of June 1944. It is our Document 2997-PS, Exhibit Number USA-472. Extracts from that report consist of the formal record of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and the statement of its findings are included in the document book under that document number. They have been translated into German. Under Article 21 of the Charter, this Tribunal is directed to take judicial notice of the documents of committees set up in various Allied countries for the investigation of War Crimes and also of the records and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations. This report falls squarely within that provision. Therefore, without reading portions of the document, I shall summarize the findings of the Court of Inquiry which are set out on Pages 8 to 10 of the document. The court concluded that there occurred between the 7th and the 17th of June 1944 in Normandy, seven cases of violations of the laws of war . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

MAJOR FARR: I am not quoting, I am summarizing what appears on Pages 8 to 10.

There occurred seven cases of violations of the laws of war, involving the shooting of 64 unarmed Allied prisoners of war in uniform, many of whom had been previously wounded and none of whom had resisted or endeavored to escape; that the perpetrators were members of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the so-called Hitler Jugend Division; that enlisted men of the 15th Company of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of that Division were given secret orders to the effect that SS troops shall take no prisoners and that prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated; that similar orders were given to men of the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the Division and of the 12th SS Engineering and Reconnaissance Battalions; and that the conclusion was irresistible that it was understood throughout the division that a policy of denying quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was openly approved.

Other combatants met a similar fate at the hands of other components of the SS. I refer to the execution of Allied fliers, of commandos and paratroopers, and of escaped prisoners of war who were turned over to the SD to be destroyed. Evidence of these actions will be presented in the case against the Gestapo.

Combatants who were taken prisoner encountered the SS in another form. In the case against the Gestapo, evidence will be presented of commando groups stationed in prisoner-of-war camps to select prisoners for what the Nazis euphemistically called “special treatment”. Finally, the entire control of prisoners of war was turned over to the Reichsführer SS. I have read in evidence this morning our Document 058-PS which provided for the direction of all prisoner-of-war camps by Himmler.

The final but vital phase of the conspiracy in which the SS played a leading role must be mentioned. The permanent colonization of conquered territories, the destruction of their national existence, and the permanent extension of the German frontier were fundamental objects of the conspirators’ plans.

The Tribunal received evidence, a day or so ago, of the manner in which these objectives were carried out through the forcible evacuation and resettlement of inhabitants of conquered territories, confiscation of their properties, denationalization and re-education of persons of German blood, and the colonization of the conquered territories by Germans.

The SS was the logical agency to formulate and carry out the program. I have read into the record already the numerous statements made by Himmler as to SS training to play the role of the aristocracy of the new Europe. He put those theories into practice when he was appointed, on October 7, 1939, as Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German folkdom. The decree by which he was appointed to that office, our Document 686-PS, has already been introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-305. I shall not, therefore, read it.

To make and carry out plans for the program of evacuation and resettlement, a new department of the SS Supreme Command was created: Staff Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German nationality. That is indicated on the chart by the fourth box from the top, on the extreme right-hand side.

The functions of this office are described in the _Organization Book of the NSDAP_ for 1943, our Document 2640-PS, which has already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-323. I shall read the description of the functions of that department appearing on Page 3 of the translation, the last paragraph, and Page 421 of the original. I quote:

“The main office of the staff of the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality is entrusted with the whole settlement and constructive planning, for inclusion within the Reich of all those territories under the authority of the Reich, including all administrative and economic questions in connection with the settlement, especially the deployment, of manpower for this purpose.”

The colonization program had two principal objectives: First, the destruction of the conquered peoples by exterminating them, deporting them, and confiscating their property; second, settling racial Germans on the newly acquired land.

The extermination actions conducted by the SS, as to which I have just introduced evidence, contributed in part to clearing the conquered territories of persons who were deemed dangerous to the Nazi plan. But not every undesirable could be liquidated. Mass deportations accomplished the twin purpose of providing labor and of freeing the land for German colonists.

Evidence as to the participation of SS agencies in deporting persons to concentration camps I have already introduced.

The evacuation and resettlement program required the use of further deporting agencies. I quote from our Document 2163-PS, the _National Socialist Year Book_ for 1941, Exhibit Number USA-444. The passage in question appears on Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 5, and at Page 195 of the original. I quote:

“For some time now, the Reichsführer SS has had at his disposal an office under the management of SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz, the National German Central Office”—Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VM).

“This office has the task of dealing with national German questions and of gathering the required proofs.

“In addition to the VM, the Immigration Center Office (EWZ), with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS (under the management of SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Sandberger) and the Settlement Staff of the Reich Commissioner were created which, in co-operation with the National Socialist Welfare Organization and the Reich Railroad Agency, took charge of the migration of national Germans.”

I also offer in evidence the affidavit of Otto Hoffmann, SS Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS and Police, our Document L-49. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-473. Hoffmann was Chief of the Main Office for Race and Settlement in the SS Supreme Command, until 1943. This affidavit was taken on August 4, 1945, at Freising, Germany. I shall read Paragraph 2 of that affidavit:

“The executive power, in other words the carrying out of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich, and later Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 1942). The Chief of the RSHA also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration center, which classified the Germans living abroad who returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the Staff Main Office of the Reichsführer SS.”

Other SS agencies were involved in the program for deportation. The Tribunal has already received in evidence our Document 1352-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-176. It is a report relating to the confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises, dated May 22, 1940, and signed “Kusche.” Portions of that document dealing with the confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises and the deportation of Polish owners of the land to Germany were read into the record. I shall read only one further paragraph showing SS personnel involved in this action. It appears on Page 2 of the translation, the first full paragraph; and on Page 10 of the original, Paragraph 2.

Referring to the deportation of Polish farmers, the report says; and I quote:

“Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided: 1. By the enterprise of the East German Corporation of Agricultural Development; 2. By the SS noncommissioned officers’ school in Lublinitz and the concentration camp of Auschwitz.

“These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS men for the day of the confiscation, and so forth.”

The extent to which almost all departments of the Supreme Command of the SS were concerned with the evacuation program is shown by the minutes of a meeting on the 4th of August 1942 dealing with the deportation of Alsatians. It is our Document R-114, and was received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-314. I shall read only the list of persons and offices represented at that conference, since the body of the report has been read in part into the record already.

I start at the beginning of the document, Page 1 of R-114:

“Memo on meeting of 4. 8. 42. Subject: General directions for the treatment of deported Alsatians.

“Present: SS Hauptsturmführer Dr. Stier, SS Hauptsturmführer Petri, R.R. Hoffmann, Dr. Scherler, SS Untersturmführer Förster;”—there is a notation next to their names of “Staff Main Office”; then—“SS Obersturmführer Dr. Hinrichs, Chief of Estate Office and Settlement Staff, Strasbourg; SS Sturmbannführer Brückner, Racial German Arbitration Bureau;”—Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle—“SS Hauptsturmführer Hummitsch, Reich Security Main Office;”—Reichssicherheitshauptamt—“SS Untersturmführer Dr. Sieder, Main Office for Race and Settlement;”—RUS-Hauptamt—“Dr. Labes, D.U.T.”

The SS not only destroyed and deported conquered peoples and confiscated their property, it also repopulated the conquered regions with so-called racial Germans. Not all Germans were deemed reliable colonists, however. Those who were not were returned to Germany for re-Germanization and re-education along Nazi lines.

A typical instance of the fate of such Germans is told in our Document Number R-112, which has already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-309. It is a decree of the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of Germandom. That decree, as the Tribunal will recall, dealt with the treatment to be accorded so-called “Polonized” Germans. By the terms of that decree two SS functionaries were charged with the responsibility for the re-Germanization program: the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the Gestapo.

I think it is unnecessary for me to quote from that report, since portions have already been read into evidence. I will refer the Court specifically to Section III of the decree, which appears on Page 7 of the translation, and to Section IV of the decree, which appears on the same page, both of which indicate that the Higher SS and Police Leaders and the Gestapo were responsible for the re-Germanization actions.

In the final stage of the process, the resettlement of the conquered lands by racially and politically desirable Germans, still other SS agencies participated. I quote again from our Document 2163-PS, the _National Socialist Year Book_ for 1941, Exhibit Number USA-444. The passage appears on Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 7, and on Page 195 of the original. I quote:

“Numerous SS leaders and SS men helped with untiring effort in bringing about this systematic migration of peoples which has no parallel in history.

“There were many authoritative and administrative difficulties which, however, were immediately overcome due to the unbureaucratic working procedure. This was especially guaranteed above all by the employment of the SS.

“The procedure called ‘Durchschleusung’ takes 3 to 4 hours as a rule. The re-settler is being passed through eight or nine offices, following each other in organic order: Registration office, card-index office, certificate and photo office, property office, and biological, hereditary, and sanitary test offices. The latter was entrusted to doctors and medical personnel of the SS and of the Armed Forces. The SS Corps Areas Alpenland, Northwest, Baltic Sea, Fulda-Werra, South and Southeast, the SS Main Office, the NPEA”—National Political Education Institution—“Vienna, and the SS Cavalry School in Hamburg, provided most of the SS officers and SS noncommissioned officers who worked at this job of resettlement.”

I omit the next three paragraphs and continue with the year book’s conclusion as to the SS participation in the colonization scheme:

“The settlement, establishment, and care of the newly-won peasantry in the liberated Eastern Territory will be one of the most cherished tasks of the SS in the whole future.”

THE PRESIDENT: This might be a good time to break off until 2 o’clock.

MAJOR FARR: Yes, Sir.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MAJOR FARR: In the course of its development from a group of strong-arm bodyguards, some two hundred in number, to a complex organization

## participating in every field of Nazi endeavor, the SS found room for its

members in high places; and persons in high places found for themselves a position in the SS.

Of the defendants charged in the Indictment, seven were very high ranking officers in the SS. They are the Defendants Ribbentrop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and Seyss-Inquart. The vital part that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner played in the SS, in the SD, and in the entire Security Police will be shown by evidence to be presented after the case on the Gestapo has gone in. With respect to the other six defendants whom I have named, I desire to call the Tribunal’s attention now to the fact of their membership in the SS. That fact is rather a matter of judicial notice than proof. Evidence of the fact is to be found in two official publications which I shall now offer the Court.

The first is this black book—the membership list of the SS as of December 1, 1936. This book contains a list of members of the SS arranged according to rank. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-474 (Document Number USA-474). Turning to Page 8 of this book, line 2, we find the following: The name “Hess, Rudolf” followed by the notation, “By authority of the Führer the right to wear the uniform of an SS Obergruppenführer.” I now offer the 1937 edition of the same membership list as Exhibit Number USA-475 (Document Number USA-475). Turning to Page 10, line 50, we find the name “Bormann, Martin”; and in line with his name on the opposite page under the column headed “Gruppenführer,” the following date: 30 January 1937.

In the same edition on Page 12, line 56, appears the name “von Neurath, Constantin,” and on the opposite page under the column headed “Gruppenführer,” the date “18 September 1937.” The other publication to which I refer is _Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag_ for the fourth voting period, a manual edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial Director of the German Reichstag. This is an official handbook containing biographical data as to members of the Reichstag. It is Document Number 2381-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-476. On Page 349 the following appears: “von Ribbentrop, Joachim, Reichsminister des Auswärtigen, SS Obergruppenführer.” On Page 360 the following appears: “Sauckel, Fritz, Gauleiter und Reichsstatthalter in Thüringen, SS Obergruppenführer.” On Page 389 the following appears: “Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, Dr. iur., Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenführer.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that book?

MAJOR FARR: This book covers the fourth voting period, beginning on 10 April 1938 and covering the period up to 30 January 1947—that is, the voting period covers that course of years. The edition, I think, was in 1943. I might point out that the rank of the defendants mentioned in the 1936 and 1937 editions of the membership list of the SS may not be the final rank they held. They were Gruppenführer at that time, but they were members of the SS, as shown by the book.

It is our contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B, Page 36 of the Indictment, was an unlawful organization. As an organization founded on the principle that persons of “German blood” were a “master race” it exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine. It served as one of the means through which the conspirators acquired control of the German Government. The operations of the SD and of the SS Totenkopf Verbände in concentration camps were means used by the conspirators to secure their regime and terrorize their opponents, as alleged in Count One. In the Nazi program of Jewish extermination, all branches of the SS were involved from the very beginning. Through the Allgemeine SS as a para-military organization, the SS Verfügungstruppe and SS Totenkopf Verbände as professional combat forces, and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle as a Fifth Column agency, the SS participated in preparations for aggressive war and, through its militarized units, in the waging of aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war all components of the SS had a

## part in the War Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in

Counts Three and Four of the Indictment: the murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory, the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and the Germanization of occupied territories.

The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise—a unified organization. Some of its functions were, of course performed by one branch or department or office, some by another. No single branch or department participated in every phase of its activity, but every branch and department and office was necessary to the functioning of the whole. The situation is much the same as in the case of the individual defendants at the bar. Not all participated in every act of the conspiracy; but all, we contend, performed a contributing part in the whole criminal scheme.

The evidence has also shown that the SS was not only an organization of volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest standards of selection. It was not easy to become an SS member. That was true of all branches of the SS. We clearly recognize, of course, that during the course of the war, as the demands for manpower increased and the losses of the Waffen-SS grew heavier and heavier, there were occasions when some men drafted for compulsory military service were assigned to units of the Waffen-SS rather than to the Wehrmacht. Those instances were relatively few. Evidence of the recruiting standards of the Waffen-SS in 1943, which I quoted yesterday, has shown that the membership in that branch was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in the other branches. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other organizations alleged to be unlawful in the Indictment, might desire to show that their participation in the organization was a small or innocuous one, that compelling reasons drove them to apply for membership, that they were not fully conscious of its aims or that they were not mentally responsible when they became members. Such facts might or might not be relevant, if such a person were on trial. But in any event this is not the forum to try out such matters.

The question before this Tribunal is simply this: whether the SS was or was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has finally shown what the aims and activities of the SS were. Some of those aims were stated in publications which I have quoted to the Court. The activities were so widespread and so notorious, covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality of the organization could not have been concealed. It was a notorious fact, and Himmler himself in 1936, in a quotation which I read to the Tribunal yesterday, admitted that when he said:

“I know that there are people in Germany now who become sick when they see these black coats. We know the reason and we do not expect to be loved by too many.”

It was, we submit, at all times the exclusive function and purpose of the SS to carry out the common objectives of the defendant conspirators. Its activities in carrying out those functions involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter. By reason of its aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof, the SS should be declared a criminal organization in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation will be the Gestapo, and it will take just a few seconds to get the material here.

If the Tribunal please, we are now ready to proceed, if Your Honors are.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. STOREY: We first pass to the Tribunal document books marked “Exhibit AA.” Your Honors will notice they are in two volumes, and I will try at each time to refer to which volume. They are separated into the D documents, the L documents, the PS documents, _et cetera_.

The presentation of evidence on the criminality of the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) includes evidence on the criminality of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and of the Schutzstaffeln (SS), which has been discussed by Major Farr, because a great deal of the criminal acts were so inter-related. In the Indictment, as Your Honors know, the SD is included by special reference as a part of the SS, since it originated as a part of the SS and has always retained its character as a Party organization, as distinguished from the Gestapo which was a State organization. As will be shown by the evidence, however, the Gestapo and the SD were brought into very close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-gathering agency and the Gestapo as the executive agency of the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime.

In short, I think, we might think of the SD as the intelligence organization and the Gestapo the executive agency, the former a Party organization and the latter a State organization but merged together for all practical purposes.

The first subject: The Gestapo and SD were formed into a powerful, centralized, political police system that served Party, State, and Nazi leadership.

The Gestapo was first established in Prussia on the 26th of April 1933 by the Defendant Göring with the mission of carrying out the duties of the political police with, or in place of, the ordinary police authorities. The Gestapo was given the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the Minister of Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction. That fact is established in the _Preussische Gesetzsammlung_ of 26 April 1933, Page 122, and it is our Document 2104-PS.

Pursuant to this law and on the same date, the Minister of Interior issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a State Police Bureau in each governmental district of Prussia, subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin; and I cite as authority the _Ministerialblatt for the Internal Administration of Prussia_, 1933, Page 503, and it is Document 2371-PS.

Concerning the formation of the Gestapo, the Defendant Göring said, in _Aufbau einer Nation_, of 1934, Page 88, which is our Document 2344-PS, and I quote from the English translation a short paragraph, of which Your Honors will take judicial notice, unless Your Honors want to turn to it in full:

“For weeks”—this is Göring talking—“I had been working personally on the reorganization, and at last I, alone and upon my own decision and my own reflections, created the office of the Secret State Police. This instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State has contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be talk of a Communist or Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?

COL. STOREY: The date? 1934, Sir.

On November 30, 1933 Göring issued a decree for the Prussian State Ministry and the Reich Chancellor placing the Gestapo under his direct supervision as Chief. The Gestapo was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration of the Interior responsible directly to Göring as Prussian Prime Minister. This decree gave the Gestapo jurisdiction over the political police matters of the general and interior administration and provided that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to the directives of the Gestapo—and that cites the Prussian laws of 30 November 1933, Page 413, and Document 2105-PS.

In a speech delivered at a meeting of the Prussian State Council on 18 June 1934, which is published in _Speeches and Essays of Hermann Göring_, 1939, Page 102, our Document 3343-PS, Göring said, and I quote one paragraph:

“The creation of the Secret State Police was also a necessity. You may recognize the importance attributed by the new State to this instrument of state security from the fact that the Prime Minister, himself, has made himself head of this department of the administration just because it is the observation of all currents directed against the new State which is of fundamental importance.”

By a decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices were separated from their organizational connection with the District Government and established as independent authorities of the Gestapo. That cites the _Preussische Gesetzsammlung_ of 8 March 1934, Page 143, our Document 2113-PS.

I now offer in evidence Document Number 1680-PS, Exhibit USA-477. This is an article entitled “10 Years of Security Police and the SD,” published in the German Police journal, the magazine of the Security Police and SD, of 1 February 1943. I quote one paragraph from this article on Page 2 of the English translation, Document 1680-PS, which is the third main paragraph:

“Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political Police and also suggested and directed the establishment of Political Police in the Länder other than Prussia. The unification of the Political Police of all the Länder took place in the spring of 1934 when Minister President Hermann Göring appointed Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had meanwhile been named Chief of the Political Police in all the Länder except Prussia, to the post of Deputy Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police.”

The Prussian law about the Secret State Police, dated 10 February 1936, then summed up the development hitherto, and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day.

On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the Gestapo was promulgated by Göring as Prussian Prime Minister—I refer to Document 2107-PS. This law provided that the Secret State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State and declared that orders and matters of the Secret State Police were not subject to the review of the administrative courts. That is the Prussian State law of that date cited on Pages 21-22 of the publication of the laws of 1936.

Also on that same date of 10 February 1936 a decree for the execution of the law was issued by Göring, as Prussian Prime Minister, and by Frick, as Minister of the Interior. This decree provided that the Gestapo had authority to enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures affecting that area—by the way, that is found in 2108-PS and is also a published law—that it was the centralized agency for collecting political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it administered the concentration camps. The Gestapo was given authority to make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon the Party as well as upon the State.

Later, on the 28th of August 1936, a circular of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the Political Police forces of the German provinces were to be called the “Geheime Staatspolizei.” That means the Secret State Police. The regional offices were still to be described as State Police. The translation of that law is in 2372-PS, _Reichsministerialblatt_ of 1936, Number 44, Page 1344.

Later, on 20 September 1936, a circular of the Minister of Interior, Frick, commissioned the Gestapo Bureau in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the Political Police commanders in all the states of Germany. That is _Reichsministerialblatt_ 1936, Page 1343, our Document L-297.

The law regulating and relating to financial measures in connection with the police, of the 19th of March 1937, provided that the officials of the Gestapo were to be considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April 1937 by the Reich. That is shown in Document 2243-PS—which is a copy of the law of 19 March 1937—Page 325.

Thus, through the above laws and decrees, the Gestapo was established as a uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and Nazi leadership.

In the course of the development of the SD, it came into increasingly close co-operation with the Gestapo and also with the Reichskriminalpolizei (the Criminal Police), known as Kripo, K-R-I-P-O, shown up there under Amt V. The SD was called upon to furnish information to various State authorities. On the 11th of November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of Interior declared the SD to be the intelligence organization for the State as well as the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a closer co-operation between the SD and the authorities for the general and interior administration. That law is translated in 1638-PS.

The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the decrees of 17 and 26 June 1936, under which Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police and by which Heydrich became the first Chief of the Security Police and SD. Even then Göring did not relinquish his position as Chief of the Prussian Gestapo. Thus, the decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police that was issued on the 28th of August 1936, which is our Document 2372-PS, was distributed “to the Prussian Minister President as Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police,” that is, to Göring.

On 27 September 1939, by order of Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of the Gestapo and SD and also those of the Criminal Police were centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD under the name of RSHA, which Your Honors have heard described by Major Farr. Under this order the personnel and administrative sections of each agency were co-ordinated in Amt I and II of the chart shown here of the RSHA. The operational sections of the SD became Amt III, shown in the box “Amt III,” except for foreign intelligence which was placed over in Number VI. The operational sections of the Gestapo became Amt IV, as shown on the chart, and the operational sections of the Kripo—that is, the Criminal Police—became Amt V, as shown on the chart.

Ohlendorf was named the Chief of Amt III, the SD inside Germany, Müller was named Chief of Amt IV, and Nebe was named Chief of Amt V, the Kripo.

On the 27th of September 1939 Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the order of Himmler, in which he ordered that the designation and heading of RSHA be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of Interior, and the heading “The Chief of the Security Police and SD” in transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided that the Gestapo would continue to use the designation and heading “Secret State Police” according to the particular instructions.

This order is Document L-361, Exhibit USA-478, which we now offer in evidence; and I refer Your Honors to the first paragraph of L-361. That is found in the first volume. I just direct Your Honors’ attention to the date and to the subject, which is the amalgamation of the Zentralämter of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the SD, and the creation of the four sections, and then to the words:

“. . . will be joined to the RSHA in accordance with the following directives. This amalgamation carries with it no change in the position of these Ämter in the Party nor in the governmental administration.”

I might say here parenthetically, if the Tribunal please, that we like to think of the RSHA as being the so-called administrative office through which a great many of these organizations were administered and then a number of these organizations, including the Gestapo, maintaining their separate identity as operational organizations. I think a good illustration, if Your Honors will recall, is that during the war there may be a certain division or a certain air force which is administratively under a certain headquarters, but operationally, when they had an invasion, it may be under the general supervision of somebody else who was operating a task force. So the RSHA was really the administrative office of a great many of these alleged criminal organizations.

The Gestapo and SD were therefore organized functionally on the basis of the opponents to be combatted and the matters to be investigated.

I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to this chart, which has already been identified, and I believe it is Exhibit USA-53. This chart—I am in error—that is the original identification number. This chart shows the main chain of command from Himmler, who was the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, to Kaltenbrunner, who was Chief of the Security Police and SD, and from Kaltenbrunner to the various field offices of the Gestapo and the SD.

We now formally offer in evidence this chart, Document L-219, as Exhibit USA-479. The chart itself is based upon the document, which is L-219. We have photostatic copies, and you probably want to refer to the one on the wall.

This chart, from which the one on the wall is taken, has been certified by Otto Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III of the RSHA, and by Walter Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and has been officially identified by both of those former officials.

The chart shows that the principal flow of command in police matters came from Himmler as Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police directly to Kaltenbrunner, who was the Chief of the Security Police and SD and as such was also head of the RSHA, which is the administrative office to which I have referred.

Kaltenbrunner’s headquarters organization was composed of seven Ämter, plus a military office—the seven Ämter shown here.

Under Subsection D was Obersturmbannführer Rauff, who handled technical matters, including motor vehicles of the SIPO and the SD, to which we will refer later.

Amt III was the SD inside Germany and was charged with investigations into spheres of German national life. It was the internal intelligence organization of the police system and its interests extended into all areas occupied by Germany during the course of the war. In 1943 it contained four sections. I would like to mention them briefly. It shows their scope of authority. Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich. B dealt with national questions, including minorities, race, and health of the people. C dealt with culture, including science, education, religion, press, folk culture, and art; and D with economics, including food, commerce, industry, labor, colonial economics, and occupied regions.

Now Amt IV, with which we are dealing here, was the Gestapo and was charged with combatting opposition. In 1945, as identified by these two former officials, it contained six sections:

1. A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service, including communism, Marxism, reaction and liberalism;

2. B dealt with political churches, sects, and Jews, including political Catholicism, political Protestantism, other churches, Freemasonry; and a special section, B-4, that had to do with Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German citizenship; the head of the office was Eichmann;

3. C dealt with protective custody;

4. D with regions under German domination;

5. E with security;

6. F with passport matters and alien police.

Now, Amt V, which will be referred to as the Kripo, was charged with combatting crime. For example, Subsection D was the criminological institute for the Sipo and handled matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.

Number VI was the SD outside of Germany and concerned primarily with foreign political intelligence. In 1944 the Abwehr, or military intelligence, was joined with Amt VI as the military Amt. Your Honors will recall that the Witness Lahousen was in the Abwehr. Amt VI maintained its own regional organization.

And finally, Amt VII handled ideological research among enemies such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism.

Within Germany there were regional offices of the SD, the Gestapo, and the Kripo, shown on the chart up at the right. The Gestapo and Kripo offices were often located in the same place and were always collectively referred to as the Sipo. You see that shady line around refers to the collective operation of the Gestapo and Kripo—Gestapo, the Secret Police; and Kripo, the Criminal Police. These regional offices all maintained their separate identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA—that is, under Kaltenbrunner—which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, co-ordinated by Inspectors of the Security Police and SD, as shown at the top of the chart. The inspectors were also under the supervision of Higher SS and Police Leaders appointed for each Wehrkreis. The Higher SS and Police Leaders reported to Himmler and supervised not only the inspectors of the Security Police and SD but also the inspectors of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS.

In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and the SD known as Einsatz Groups, about which Your Honors will hear in a few minutes, operated with, and in the rear of, the army. These groups were officered by personnel of the Gestapo and the Kripo and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and Waffen-SS. They functioned with various army groups. The Einsatz Groups—and, if Your Honors will recall, they are simply task force groups for special projects—were divided into “Einsatzkommandos,” “Sonderkommandos,” and “Teilkommandos,” all of which performed the functions of the Security Police and the SD with, or closely behind, the army.

After the occupied territories had been consolidated, these Einsatz Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within the particular geographical location. These combined forces were placed under the Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD, and the offices were organized as a section similar to this RSHA headquarters. The Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD reported directly to Befehlshaber of the Security Police and SD, who in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

In the occupied countries the Higher SS and Police Leaders were more directly controlled by the Befehlshaber and the Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the Security Police and SD, who exercised controlling authority.

The above chart and the remarks concerning it are based upon two documents which I now offer in evidence. They are Document L-219, which is the organization plan of the RSHA of 1 October 1943, and Document 2346-PS.

Now next, the primary mission of the Gestapo and the SD was to combat the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime and to keep Hitler and the Nazi leadership in power as specified in Count One of the Indictment. The tasks and methods of the Secret State Police were well described in an article which is translated in Document 1956-PS, Volume 2 of the document book, which is an article published in January 1936 in _Das Archiv_ at Page 1342, which I now offer in evidence and quote from. It is on Page 1 of the English translation, 1956. I will first read the first paragraph and then the third and fourth paragraphs. That is in January 1936. Quoting:

“In order to refute the malicious rumors spread abroad, the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 22 January 1936 published an article on the origin, purpose, and duties of the Secret Police; extracts from this read as follows: . . .”

Then skip to the third paragraph:

“The Secret State Police is an official instrument of the Criminal Police authorities, whose special task is the detection of crimes and offenses against the State, especially treason against Land or Reich. The task of the Secret State Police is to discover these crimes and offenses, to find the perpetrators, and to bring them to trial. The number of criminal proceedings continually pending in the People’s Court for treasonable acts against Land or Reich is the result of this work. The second important field of operations for the Secret State Police is the preventive combatting of all dangers threatening the State and its leaders. As, since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the State is forbidden, a Secret State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist Führer State. The opponents of National Socialism were not eliminated by the prohibition of their organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn to other forms of opposition to the state. Therefore the National Socialist State has to track down, to watch, and to render harmless the underground opponents fighting against it, in illegal organizations, in camouflaged associations, in the coalitions of well-meaning fellow-Germans, and even in the organizations of the Party and the State, before they have succeeded in actually executing any action against the interests of the State. This duty of fighting with every means this battle against the secret enemies of the State will be spared no Führer State, because enemy forces from their foreign headquarters always secure the services of some individuals in such a state and employ them in underground activity against the state.

“The preventive measures of the Secret State Police consist first of all in the close surveillance of all enemies of the State in the Reich territory. As the Secret State Police cannot, in addition to its important executive tasks, perform this surveillance of the enemies of the State to the extent necessary, there enters to supplement it, the Security Service of the Reichsführer of the SS set up by the Führer’s deputy as the political intelligence service of the Movement, putting thereby into the service of the security of the State a large part of the forces of the Movement mobilized by him.

“The Secret State Police takes the necessary police preventive measures against the enemies of the State on the basis of the results of observation. The most effective preventive measure is, without doubt, deprival of freedom, which is imposed in the form of ‘protective custody’ if it is feared that the free

## activity of the persons in question might endanger the security

of the State in any way. The use of protective custody is so regulated by directives of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich and Prussia and by special arrest examination procedures of the Secret State Police that—as far as preventive action against the enemies of the State permits—ample guarantees against the abuse of protective custody are provided. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, haven’t we really got enough now as to the organization of the Gestapo and its objects?

COL. STOREY: I’ll omit the reading of the rest of this paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: I’m not sure that will satisfy me. What I was asking is haven’t we got enough about the organization of the Gestapo now?

COL. STOREY: Your Honor, I was through with the organization. I was just going into the question of this action of protective custody, for which the Gestapo was famous, and showing how they went into that field of

## activity and the authority for taking people into protective

custody—alleged protective custody.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that has been proved more than once in the preceding evidence that we have heard.

COL. STOREY: There is one more law I would like to refer to, that is, it’s not subject to judicial review—unless that has been established. I do not know whether Major Farr did that, or not.

THE PRESIDENT: That they are not subject to judicial review?

COL. STOREY: Review, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you have told us that already this afternoon.

COL. STOREY: The citation is in the _Reichsverwaltungsblatt_ of 1935, Page 577, which is Document 2347-PS. I would like, if Your Honors please, to refer to this quotation from that same law.

The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on the 2d of May 1935 held that the status of the Gestapo as a special Police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, and the court said in that law that the only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within the Gestapo itself.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you told us that, apropos of the document of the 10th of February 1936, where you said the Secret State Police was not subject to review by any of the state courts.

COL. STOREY: I just did not want there to be any question about the authority. I refer Your Honors to Document 1852-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA-449, also stating that theory, and also Document 1723-PS. That is the decree, Your Honor, of February 1, 1938, which relates to the protective custody and the issuance of new regulations; and I would like to quote just one sentence from that law:

“In order to counter all attempts of the enemies of the people and of the State, protective custody may be ordered as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who, through their attitude, endanger the life and security of the people and the State.”

And the Gestapo had the exclusive right to order protective custody and that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration camps.

Now I pass to another phase where the SD created an organization of agents and informers who operated through the various regional offices throughout the Reich and later in conjunction with the Gestapo and the Criminal Police throughout the occupied countries. The SD operated secretly. One of the things it did was secretly to mark ballots in order to discover the identity of persons who cast “No” and invalid votes in the referendum. I now offer in evidence Document R-142, second volume. I believe it is toward the end of the document book—R-142, Exhibit USA-481.

This document contains a letter from the branch office of the SD at Kochem to the SD at Koblenz. The letter is dated 7 May 1938 and refers to the plebiscite of 10 April 1938. It refers to a letter previously received from the Koblenz office and apparently is a reply to a request for information concerning the way in which people voted in the supposedly secret plebiscite. It is on Page 1 of Document R-142.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am told that that has been read before.

COL. STOREY: I did not know it had, if Your Honor pleases. We will just offer it without reading it then.

With reference to National Socialism and the contribution of the Sipo and the SD, I refer to an article of 7 September 1942, which is shown in 3344-PS. It is the first paragraph, Volume 2. It is the official journal. Quoting:

“Already before the taking over of power, the SD contributed its part to the success of the National Socialist revolution. Since the taking over of power, the Security Police and the SD have borne the responsibility for the inner security of the Reich and have paved the way for a powerful victory of National Socialism against all resistance.”

In connection with the criminal responsibility of the SD and the Gestapo, it will be considered with respect to certain War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which were in the principal part committed by the centralized political police system. The development, organization, and tasks have been considered before. In some instances the crimes were committed in co-operation or in conjunction with other groups or organizations.

Now in order to look into the strength of these various organizations, I have some figures here that I would like to quote to Your Honors. The Sipo and SD were composed of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD. The Gestapo was the largest, and it has a membership of about 40,000 to 50,000 in 1934 and 1935. That is an error; it is 1943 to 1945. It was the political force of the Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the date was wrong?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, the date was wrong, it is ’43 to ’45, if Your Honor pleases; 40 to 50 thousand.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): Where are you reading from?

COL. STOREY: It is Document 3033-PS, and it is an affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, one of the former officials I referred to a moment ago.

I believe, if Your Honor pleases, to get it in the record, I will read that whole affidavit. It is Document 3033-PS, Exhibit USA-488. I have the English translation here:

“The Sipo and SD was composed of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD. In 1943-45 the Gestapo had a membership of about 40,000 to 50,000, the Kripo had a membership of about 15,000, and the SD had a membership of about 3,000. In common usage and even in orders and decrees the term ‘SD’ was used as an abbreviation for the term ‘Sipo and SD.’ In most cases actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the Gestapo in place of the SD or the Kripo. In occupied territories, members of the Gestapo frequently wore SS uniforms with SD insignia. New members of the Gestapo and the SD were taken on a voluntary basis.”

And then “subscribed and sworn to on the 21st of November 1945 before Lieutenant Harris.”

I think I ought to say here, if Your Honors please, that it is our information that a great many of the members of the Gestapo were also members of the SS. We have heard various estimates of the amount but have no direct authority. Some authorities say as much as 75 percent, but still we have no direct evidence on that.

I now offer in evidence Document 2751-PS, which is Exhibit USA-482. It is an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated November 20, 1945. This affidavit particularly refers to the actual occurrences in connection with the Polish border incident. I believe it was referred to by the Witness Lahousen when he was on the stand:

“I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

“1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.

“2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: ‘Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.’ I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.

“3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops . . . . Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Müller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

“4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was ‘Canned Goods.’

“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack, report to Müller for “Canned Goods.”’ I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left.”

And then “sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin”.

The Gestapo and the SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries, as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables, by the so-called Einsatz Groups. Your Honors will recall evidence concerning the activities of these Einsatz Groups or Einsatzkommandos. I now refer to Document R-102.

If Your Honors please, I understand Major Farr introduced this document this morning; but I want to refer to just one brief statement, which he did not include, concerning the SD and the Einsatz Groups and Security Police. It is on Page 4 of R-102. Quoting:

“During the period covered by this report the stations of the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD have changed only in the northern sector.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the document?

COL. STOREY: R-102, which was already introduced in evidence by Major Farr, and it is in Volume 2 toward the end of the book. There are two reports submitted by the chief of the Einsatz Group A available. The first report is Document L-180, which has already been received as Exhibit USA-276.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, would you not pass quite so quickly from one document to another?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, pardon me, Sir. L-180, and I want to quote from Page 13. It is on Page 5 of the English translation. It is the beginning of the first paragraph, near the bottom of the page. Quoting:

“In view of the extension of the area of operations and of the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population in the fight against felons, that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.”

And also in that same document, Page 30 of the original, Page 8 of the English translation, quoting:

“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in Ostland could not be solved by pogroms alone.”

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that this has been read already.

COL. STOREY: I had it checked, and we did not catch that, Your Honor. I will pass on then.

Now, if Your Honor pleases, we will pass to Document 2273-PS next. I offer in evidence now just portions of Document 2273-PS, which is Exhibit USA-487. This document was captured by the U.S.S.R. and will be offered in detail by our Soviet colleagues later. But, with their consent, I want to introduce in evidence a chart which is identified by that document; and we have an enlargement which we would like to put on the board, passing to the Tribunal photostatic copies.

If Your Honor pleases, this chart is identified by the photostatic copy attached to the original report which will be dealt with in detail later. I want to quote just one statement from Page 2 of the English translation of that document. It is the third paragraph from the bottom on Page 2 of the English translation:

“The Estonian self-protection movement, formed as the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews; but there were no spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work. Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.”

That document is a top-secret document by Einsatz Group A, which was a special projects group. This chart, of which the photostatic copy is attached to the original in the German translation on the wall, shows the progress of the extermination of the Jews in the area in which this Einsatzkommando group operated.

If Your Honors will refer to the top, next to Petersburg—or Leningrad as we know it—and down below, you will see the picture of a coffin; and that is described in the report as 3,600 having been killed.

Next, over at the left, is another coffin in one of the small Baltic states showing 963 in that area have been put in the coffin.

Then next, down near the capital of Riga, you will note that 35,238 were put away in the coffins; and it refers to the ghetto there as still having 2,500.

You come down to the next square or the next state showing 136,421 were put in their coffins; and then in the next area, near Minsk and just above Minsk, there were 41,828 put in their coffins.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure they were put in their coffins, the 136,000?

COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon, Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure that they were executed, the 136,000?—because there is no coffin there.

COL. STOREY: No, Sir—the bottom statement—here are the totals from the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: These photostatic copies are different from what you have got there. In the area which is marked 136,421 there is no coffin.

COL. STOREY: Well, I am sorry. The one that I have is a true and correct copy of theirs.

THE PRESIDENT: Mine has not got it and Mr. Biddle’s has not got it.

COL. STOREY [_Turning to an assistant._] Will you hand this to the President, please?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the document itself will show it.

COL. STOREY: I will turn to the original and verify it. Let me have the original, please. Apparently there is a typographical error. If Your Honor pleases, here it is: 136,421, with the coffin.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Parker points out it is in the document itself, too.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, it is in the document itself. There is an error on that.

The 128,000 at the bottom shows at that time there were 128,000 on hand, and the literal translation of the statement, as I understand, means, “still on hand in the Minsk area.”

I next refer to Document 1104-PS, Volume 2, Exhibit USA-483, which I now offer in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, did you tell us what the document was? There is nothing on the translation, is there, to show what the document is.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, it is a report of the special-purpose Group A, a top-secret report—or the Einsatz group in other words—making a record of their activities in these areas, and this chart was attached showing the areas covered.

THE PRESIDENT: Special group of the Gestapo?

COL. STOREY: The special group that was organized of the Gestapo and the SD in that area. In other words, a Commando group.

As I mentioned, Your Honor, they organized these special Commando groups to work in and behind the armies as they consolidated their gains in occupied territories, and Your Honor will hear from other reports of these Einsatz groups as we go along in this presentation. In other words, “Einsatz” means “special action” or “action groups,” and they were organized to cover certain geographical areas behind the immediate front lines.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they were groups, were they, of the Gestapo?

COL. STOREY: The Gestapo and the SD.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is part of the Gestapo.

COL. STOREY: There were some of the Kripo in it too.

Now the next document is 1104-PS, dated October 30, 1941. This document shows on that date the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General of Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD operating in his area for the murder of the Jewish population of that area, and I quote from the English translation, on Page 4 of that document, beginning at the first paragraph after the colon:

“On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o’clock, a first lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno, Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival a conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action 1 day. However, he refused this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that only 2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the town of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews.”

That report was made to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories through Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, at Riga. Your Honors will recall that he was referred to in another presentation.

Now skipping over to Page 5, the first paragraph—I would like to quote it:

“For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out, to my deepest regret, that the latter almost bordered on sadism. The town itself during the action offered a picture of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part both of the German police officers and particularly of the Lithuanian

## partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them White

Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard, and in different streets the corpses of Jews who had been shot accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in the greatest anguish to free themselves from the encirclement. In addition to the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also artisans, were barbarously maltreated in sight of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also beaten with clubs and rifle butts. It was no longer a question of an action against the Jews. It looked much more like a revolution.”

And then I skip down to the next to the last paragraph on that same page, quoting:

“In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the

## action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in those

of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken away. According to statements of the troops, watches were torn off the arms of Jews openly on the street and rings pulled off their fingers in the most brutal manner. A disbursing officer reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said actually to have run about everywhere to obtain the money.”

There is another paragraph, with reference to the number of copies, on the third page of the translation, to which I would like to call Your Honors’ attention—the last paragraph on Page 3 of the translation, quoting:

“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To have buried alive seriously wounded people, who then worked their way out of their graves again, is such extreme beastliness that this incident as such must be reported to the Führer and the Reich Marshal.

“The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes every effort to win the population over to Germany, in accordance with the instructions of the Führer. These efforts cannot be brought into harmony with the methods described here.”—Signed by the Commissioner General for White Ruthenia.

And then, on the 11th of November 1941, he forwards it on to the Reich Minister for occupied countries, in Berlin.

THE PRESIDENT: Who was that at that time?

COL. STOREY: The Reich Minister, I believe—at that time at least—for the eastern occupied countries was the Defendant Rosenberg. I think that is correct. On the same date, by separate letter, the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the eastern countries that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit Institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner.

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, who was the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. That is shown on the first page of Document Number 1104-PS.

The activities of the Einsatz groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was, to a large extent, changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany.

I next refer to Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been introduced as Exhibit USA-190. This is a letter from the headquarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as Einsatz Group C, dated 19 March 1943. This letter summarizes the real activities and methods of the Gestapo and SD, and I should like to refer to additional portions to those previously quoted, on Page 2 of Document 3012-PS; and I believe I will read the first page, beginning with the first paragraph:

“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service”—SD—“to discover all enemies of the Reich, and fight against them in the interest of security, especially the security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements who by virtue of their convictions or their past might under favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be eliminated through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Führer, with all required severity. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of partisan bands. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the ‘Barbarossa’ decrees.”—The Tribunal will recall the famous “Barbarossa” code-name decrees that were issued in connection with the invasion of Russia—“I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were openly opposing us.

“2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other partisan groups formed from the population were appearing like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity without taking measures against it. It is obvious that all such measures are accompanied by severity.

“I want to take up the significant points of these severe measures:

“1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of agriculturalists; 3) the shooting of children; 4) the burning to the ground of villages; 5)”—the shooting, quoting—“while trying to escape, of Security Service (SD) prisoners.

“Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability of the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for the drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.”

If Your Honor pleases, I believe the numbers have been quoted before by Mr. Dodd. I refer on the next page to the first order, in 1 and 2—Subparagraphs:

“1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum.

“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party. Likewise members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were

## active in leading positions.”

The next subparagraphs have been read into evidence, 3 and 4, in a previous presentation.

“5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all drives against those bands are to take place only with my approval.

“6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must be aware of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly, right away. If we restrict our harsh Security Police measures through the above orders for the time being, it is done only for the following reason: the most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. There are therefore no written certificates of political reliability or the like to be furnished.”—Signed—“Christensen, SS Sturmbannführer and Commanding Officer.”

I understood that Your Honor wanted to adjourn at 4 o’clock, and I believe that I can introduce one more statement. It was the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD that operated the infamous death vans. Previously, Document 501-PS, which was received as Exhibit USA-288, referred to this operation. The letter from Becker, which is a part of this exhibit, was addressed to Obersturmbannführer Rauff at Berlin. We now refer to Document L-185. I simply refer to Document 501-PS as a reference to the death vans. Document L-185, Exhibit USA-484, is the one I now offer in evidence, Page 7 of the English translation—L-185. It will be observed that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA in charge of technical matters was Obersturmbannführer Rauff. Mr. Harris advises me that the only point to be proved by that is that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA, who made this report on technical matters, was the Obersturmbannführer Rauff; and then he refers in the same connection to Document 2348-PS, which is Exhibit USA-485. The previous one was to identify Rauff, and then to offer his affidavit which is 2348-PS, second volume. Reading from the beginning of the affidavit—it was made on 19 October 1945 in Ancona, Italy—quoting:

“I hereby acknowledge the attached letter, written by Dr. Becker . . . on the 16 May 1942 and received by me on the 29 May 1942, as a genuine letter. I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement to the effect that it was genuine. I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot give an approximate figure. The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe, in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also. Insofar as I am aware, these vans operated only in Russia. Insofar as I can state, these vans were probably operating in 1941; and it is my personal opinion that they were operating up to the termination of the war.”

If Your Honor pleases, I do not believe that we will have time to go into the next exhibit.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will now adjourn, until Wednesday, the 2d of January.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY Wednesday, 2 January 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, when Your Honors adjourned on 20 December we were presenting the Gestapo and had referred to the use of the death vans by the Einsatz groups in the eastern occupied countries and had almost concluded that phase of the presentation. Your Honors will recall we had referred to the use of some death vans made by the Saurer works, and the final reference that I want to make in that connection is to a telegram attached to Document 501-PS, which it is not necessary to read, which establishes the fact that the same make of truck or vans were the death vans used by the Einsatz groups.

The final document in connection with the Einsatz groups in the Eastern Occupied Territories which we desire to offer is Document 2992-PS, and I believe it is in the second volume of the document book. This is an affidavit made by Hermann Gräbe. Hermann Gräbe is at present employed by the United States Government at Frankfurt. The affidavit was made at Wiesbaden; and I offer excerpts from the affidavit, 2992-PS, Exhibit Number USA-494.

This witness was at the head of a construction firm that was doing some building in the Ukraine and he was an eyewitness to the anti-Jewish

## actions at the town of Rovno, Ukraine, on 13 July 1942, and I refer to

the part of the affidavit which is on Page 5 of the English translation. Beginning at the first:

“From September 1941 until January 1944 I was manager and engineer-in-charge of a branch office in Sdolbunov, Ukraine, of the Solingen building firm of Josef Jung. In this capacity it was my job to visit the building sites of the firm. The firm had, among others, a site in Rovno, Ukraine.

“During the night of 13 July 1942, all inhabitants of the Rovno ghetto, where there were still about 5,000 Jews, were liquidated.

“I should describe the circumstances of my being a witness of the dissolution of the ghetto and the carrying out of the pogrom during the night and morning, as follows:

“I employed for the firm in Rovno, in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, about 100 Jews from Sdolbunov, Ostrog, and Mysotch. The men were quartered in a building, 5 Bahnhofstrasse, inside the ghetto, and the women in a house at the corner of Deutschestrasse, 98.

“On Saturday, 11 July 1942, my foreman, Fritz Einsporn, told me of a rumor that on Monday all Jews in Rovno were to be liquidated. Although the vast majority of the Jews employed by my firm in Rovno were not natives of this town, I still feared that they might be included in this announced pogrom. I therefore ordered Einsporn at noon of the same day to march all the Jews employed by us—men as well as women—in the direction of Sdolbunov, about 12 kilometers from Rovno. This was done.

“The Eldest of the Jews had learned of the departure of the Jewish workers of my firm. He went to see the commanding officer of the Rovno Sipo and SD, SS Major (SS Sturmbannführer) Dr. Pütz, as early as Saturday afternoon to find out whether the rumor of a forthcoming Jewish pogrom, which had gained further credence by reason of the departure of Jews of my firm, was true. Dr. Pütz dismissed the rumor as a clumsy lie and for the rest had the Polish personnel of my firm in Rovno arrested. Einsporn avoided arrest by escaping from Sdolbunov. When I learned of this incident I gave orders that all Jews who had left Rovno were to report back to work in Rovno on Monday, 13 July 1942. On Monday morning I myself went to see the commanding officer, Dr. Pütz, in order to learn, for one thing, the truth about the rumored Jewish pogrom and secondly to obtain information on the arrest of the Polish office personnel. SS Major Pütz stated to me that no pogrom whatever was planned. Moreover, such a pogrom would be stupid because the firms and the Reichsbahn would lose valuable workers.

“An hour later I received a summons to appear before the area commissioner of Rovno. His deputy, Stabsleiter and Cadet Officer Beck, subjected me to the same questions as I had undergone at the SD. My explanation that I had sent the Jews home for urgent delousing appeared plausible to him. He then told me—making me promise to keep it a secret—that a pogrom would, in fact, take place in the evening of Monday, 13 July 1942. After lengthy negotiation I managed to persuade him to give me permission to take my Jewish workers to Sdolbunov—but only after the pogrom had been carried out. During the night it would be up to me to protect the house in the ghetto against the entry of Ukrainian militia and SS. As confirmation of the discussion he gave me a document, which stated that the Jewish employees of Messrs. Jung were not affected by the pogrom.”

And this original which I hold in my hand, I will now pass to the translator for reading. I call the attention of Your Honors to the fact that it has the letterhead of “Der Gebietskommissar in Rovno,” and it is dated the 13th of July 1942, and it is signed by this area commissioner. I now read this document:

“The area commissioner”—which means Gebietskommissar—“Rovno. Secret.”—Addressed—“Messrs. Jung, Rovno.

“The Jewish workers employed by your firm are not affected by the pogrom”—in parenthesis “Aktion.” As I understand, that means “action.”

“You must transfer them to their new place of work by Wednesday, 15 July 1942, at the latest.”

Signed by the Area Commissioner Beck. And then the stamp—the official stamp of the area commissioner at Rovno.

Now, just the following paragraph on the original, Page 5 or 6, I believe it is; one more paragraph I would like to read after the reference “Original attached”:

“On the evening of this day I drove to Rovno and posted myself with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after 2200 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and about three times as many members of the Ukrainian militia. Then the electric arclights which had been erected in and around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia squads of four to six men entered or at least tried to enter the house. Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did not open at the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the windows, forced the doors with beams and crowbars and entered the houses. The people living there were driven on to the street just as they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to leave their houses and resisted, the SS and militia applied force. They finally succeeded, with strokes of the whip, kicks, and blows with rifle butts, in clearing the houses. The people were driven out of their houses in such haste that small children in bed had been left behind in several instances. In the streets women cried out for their children and children for their parents. That did not prevent the SS from driving the people along the road at running pace, and hitting them, until they reached a waiting freight train. Car after car was filled, and the screaming of women and children and the cracking of whips and rifle shots resounded unceasingly. Since several families or groups had barricaded themselves in especially strong buildings and the doors could not be forced with crowbars or beams, the doors were now blown open with hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in Rovno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and over a small river to get away from the ghetto area. As this stretch of country was beyond the range of the electric lights, it was illuminated by small rockets. All through the night these beaten, hounded, and wounded people moved along the lighted streets. Women carried their dead children in their arms, children pulled and dragged their dead parents by their arms and legs down the road toward the train. Again and again the cries, ‘Open the door! Open the door!’ echoed through the ghetto.”

I will not read any more of this affidavit. It is a very long one. There is also a second affidavit, but the part I wanted to emphasize is the fact that the original exemption was signed by the area commissioner and that the SD and the SS participated in this action.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the rest of that page, Colonel Storey?

COL. STOREY: All right, Sir. I really had eliminated that because I thought there might be some repetition.

“About 6 o’clock in the morning I went away for a moment, leaving behind Einsporn and several other German workers who had returned in the meantime. I thought the greatest danger was past and that I could risk it. Shortly after I left, Ukrainian militia men forced their way into 5 Bahnhofstrasse and brought seven Jews out and took them to a collecting point inside the ghetto. On my return I was able to prevent further Jews from being taken out. I went to the collecting point to save these seven men. I saw dozens of corpses of all ages and both sexes in the streets I had to walk along. The doors of the houses stood open, windows were smashed. Pieces of clothing, shoes, stockings, jackets, caps, hats, coats, _et cetera_, were lying in the street. At the corner of a house lay a baby, less than a year old with his skull crushed. Blood and brains were spattered over the house wall and covered the area immediately around the child. The child was dressed only in a little shirt. The commander, SS Major Pütz, was walking up and down a row of about 80 to 100 male Jews who were crouching on the ground. He had a heavy dog whip in his hand. I walked up to him, showed him the written permit of Stabsleiter Beck and demanded the seven men whom I recognized among those who were crouching on the ground. Dr. Pütz was very furious about Beck’s concession and nothing could persuade him to release the seven men. He made a motion with his hand encircling the square and said that anyone who was once here would not get away. Although he was very angry with Beck, he ordered me to take the people from 5 Bahnhofstrasse out of Rovno by 8 o’clock at the latest. When I left Dr. Pütz, I noticed a Ukrainian farm cart with two horses. Dead people with stiff limbs were lying on the cart. Legs and arms projected over the side boards. The cart was making for the freight train. I took the remaining 74 Jews who had been locked in the house to Sdolbunov.

“Several days after the 13th of July 1942 the area commissioner of Sdolbunov, Georg Marschall, called a meeting of all firm managers, railroad superintendents, and leaders of the Organization Todt and informed them that the firms, _et cetera_, should prepare themselves for the resettlement of the Jews which was to take place almost immediately. He referred to the pogrom in Rovno where all the Jews had been liquidated, i.e. had been shot near Kostopol.”

Finally, his signature is sworn to on the 10th of November 1945.

THE PRESIDENT: What nationality is Gräbe?

COL. STOREY: He is German. Gräbe was a German and is now in the employ of the Military Government at Frankfurt—the United States Military Government.

Your Honor, in that connection there is another separate affidavit attached to this which is a part of the same document, which I will not attempt to read. But it has to do with the execution of some people in another area and is along the same line. I am not reading it because it would be cumulative, but it is a part of this same document.

I now pass from that subject to the next subject.

The Gestapo and SD stationed special units in prisoner-of-war camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and executing those who were screened out. The program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war who were captured on the Eastern Front. In this connection I call attention of the Tribunal to the testimony of General Lahousen, which Your Honors will recall, of the 30th of November 1945. Lahousen testified to a conference which took place in the summer of 1941 shortly after the beginning of the campaign against the Soviet Union, which was attended by himself—and I want to emphasize this, because we will later have a document that emanated from this conference—attended by himself, General Reinecke, Colonel Breuer, and Müller, the head of the Gestapo. At this conference the command to kill Soviet functionaries and Communists among the Soviet prisoners of war was discussed. The executions were to be carried out by Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD. Lahousen further recalled that Müller, who was the head of the Gestapo, insisted on carrying out the program and that the only concession he made was that, in deference to the sensibilities of the German troops, the executions would not take place in the presence of the troops. Müller also made some concessions as to the selection of the persons to be murdered; but, according to Lahousen, the selection was left entirely to the commanders of these screening units. I refer to Page 633 of the official transcript (Volume II, Page 458).

Now I offer Document 502-PS as the next exhibit, Exhibit Number USA-486. This document is a Gestapo directive of the 17 of July 1941—If you will recall, Lahousen said this conference was in the summer of 1941—It is addressed to commanders of the Sipo and SD stationed in camps and provides in part as follows, and I read from the first page of the English translation. Now, if the Tribunal please, our colleagues, the Soviet prosecutors, will present most of that document; and I am only going to read enough to show that the Gestapo were the ones that took

## part in it. From the beginning:

“The activation of Commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941. Enclosure 1.

“The Commandos will work independently within the limits of the camp regulations according to special authorization and according to the general directives given to them. Naturally the Commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the intelligence officer assigned to him.

“The mission of the Commandos is the political investigating of all camp inmates, the separation and further treatment of:

“a. All political, criminal, or in some other way, intolerable elements among them;

“b. Those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied countries.”

Now I skip to the beginning of the fourth paragraph:

“The Commandos must use for their work, as far as possible at present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from the observation of the prisoners and examination of the camp inmates. Further, the Commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which would appear reliable, regardless whether they are Communists or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

“By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners must proceed, step by step, at once. The Commandos must find out definitely in every case, by a short questioning of those reported and possibly by questioning other prisoners, what measures should be taken. The information of one informer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a suspect without further proof. It must be confirmed in some way, if possible.”

Now I skip to Page 2, the third paragraph of the English translation, quoting:

“Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the Government General are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet Russian territory.”

And then the fifth paragraph:

“In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatzgruppe into the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatzkommandos must make an agreement with the nearest State Police office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police unit and Security Service, and beyond these, with the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe concerned in the occupied territories.”

Proof that persons so screened out of the prisoner-of-war camps by the Gestapo were executed is to be found in Document 1165-PS, from which I did not intend to quote and which has been introduced previously as Exhibit Number USA-244. Document 1165-PS which shows that they executed those that had been screened out.

The first page of that document, without reading it, is a letter from the camp commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross-Rosen to Müller, who was the Chief of the Gestapo, dated the 23rd of October 1941, referring to a previous oral conference with Müller and setting forth the names of 20 Soviet prisoners of war executed the previous day.

The second page—I am still referring to 1165 but not reading from it, because it has been quoted from—is a directive issued by Müller on the 9th of November 1941 to all Gestapo offices, in which he ordered that all diseased prisoners of war should be excluded from transports to concentration camps for execution, because 5 to 10 percent of those destined for execution were arriving in the camps dead or half dead.

I now offer Document 2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489, which is in the second volume. This is an affidavit of Kurt Lindow, a former Gestapo official, which was taken on the 30th of September 1945, at Oberursel, Germany, in the course of an official military investigation by the United States Army; and I quote from that document from the beginning:

“I was criminal director in Section IV of the RSHA”—I call Your Honors’ attention to the chart on the board that he was criminal director in Section IV and head of the Subsection IV A 1—“from the middle of 1942 until the middle of 1944. I had the rank of SS Sturmbannführer.

“From 1941 until the middle of 1943, there was attached to Subsection IV A 1”—which is not shown on this chart, but has previously been described in the beginning—“a special department that was headed by the Regierungsoberinspektor, later Regierungsamtmann, and SS Hauptsturmführer Franz Königshaus. In this department, were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from this department that instructions and orders by Reichsführer Himmler dating from 1941 to 1942 existed, according to which captured Soviet political commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed. As far as I know, proposals for execution of such prisoners of war were received from the various prisoner-of-war camps. Königshaus had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to the chief of Section IV, Müller, for signature”—Müller being the head of the Gestapo.—“These orders were made out so that one was to be sent to the agency making the request, and a second one to the concentration camp designated to carry out the execution. The prisoners of war in question were at first formally released from prisoner-of-war status, then transferred to a concentration camp for execution.

“The Chief of the section Königshaus, was under me in disciplinary questions from the middle of 1942 until about the beginning of 1943 and worked, in matters of his department, directly with the chief of Subsection IV A, Regierungsdirector Panzinger. Early in 1943 the department was dissolved and absorbed into the departments in Subsection IV B. The work concerning Russian prisoners of war must then have been done by IV B 2a. Head of Department IV B 2a was Regierungsrat and Sturmbannführer Hans Helmuth Wolf.

“There existed in the prisoner-of-war camps on the Eastern Front small screening teams (Einsatzkommandos), headed by a lower ranking member of the Secret Police or Gestapo. These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the prisoners of war who were candidates for execution, according to the orders that had been given, and to report them to the office of the Secret Police.”

I will not read the remainder of that affidavit.

Passing from that phase of the case: The Gestapo and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they were executed—that is, prisoners of war who had escaped and were recaptured. The Tribunal will recall that in a document heretofore introduced, 1650-PS, was an order in which the Chief of the Security Police and SD instructed regional Gestapo offices to take certain classes of recaptured officers from camps and to transport them to Mauthausen concentration camp, under the operation known as “Kugel.” That, if Your Honor recalls, means “bullet.” That is the famous “Bullet Decree” that has been previously introduced. On the journey the prisoners of war were to be placed in irons. The Gestapo officers were to make semi-annual reports, giving numbers only, of the sending of these prisoners of war to Mauthausen. On the 27th of July 1944 an order was issued from the VI Corps Area Command on the treatment of prisoners of war. That is Document 1514-PS in the second volume, which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-491. This document provided that prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the Gestapo under certain circumstances, and I quote from the first page, beginning with the word “subject,” quoting:

“Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the Secret State Police.

“Enclosed in the annex Reference Decree 1. The following summarized ruling is issued with respect to the delivery to the Secret Police:

“1) a) According to Reference Decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war to the Secret State Police in case of punishable offenses and to dismiss them from imprisonment of war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts of the case is not necessary.

“b) Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first to the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of the police office, (Section A6 of Reference Decree Number 4 regarding the compilation of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz of prisoners of war who have been recaptured and refuse to work.)

“c) Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war have to be delivered to the Gestapo and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section A1 of Reference Decree Number 4.)

“d) Soviet officer prisoners of war who refuse to work and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and exert an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest State Police office and dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C1 of Reference Decree Number 4 and Reference Decree Number 5.)

“e) Soviet enlisted prisoners of war refusing to work who are ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and therefore exert an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be delivered to the nearest State Police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C2 of Reference Decree Number 4.)

“f) Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers) who, with respect to their political attitude, have been sifted out by the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the Security Service have to be delivered upon request by the camp commander to the Einsatzkommando and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Reference Decree Number 6.)

“g) 1. Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered, if acts of sabotage are proven, to the nearest State Police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report on this is not necessary. (Reference Decree Number 7.)

“2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of war in the cases mentioned under Paragraph 1 of this decree to the Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War, is not necessary.

“3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the Secret State Police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war, if a special order to that effect is issued by the OKW or by Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War.

“4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participation in illegal organizations and resistance movements have to be left to the Gestapo upon request for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by order of the OKW or of Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War.

“In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian military personnel, approval of Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War, has to be obtained—if necessary by phone—before delivery to the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation.”

This decree was known as the “Bullet Decree.” Prisoners of war sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under the decree were executed.

I now offer in support of that statement Document 2285-PS, Exhibit Number USA-490. It is in the second volume. Document 2285-PS is an affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Guivante de Saint Gast and Lieutenant Jean Veith, both of the French Army, which was taken on the 13th of May 1945 in the course of an official military investigation by the United States Army. The affidavit discloses that Lieutenant Colonel Gast was confined at Mauthausen from 18 March 1944 to 22 April 1945 and that Lieutenant Veith was confined from 22 April 1943 until 22 April 1945. I quote from the affidavit, beginning with the third paragraph of Page 1, quoting:

“In Mauthausen existed several treatments of prisoners, amongst them the ‘action K or Kugel’ (Bullet action). Upon the arrival of transports, prisoners with the mention ‘K’ were not registered, got no numbers, and their names remained unknown except for the officials of the Politische Abteilung. Lieutenant Veith had the opportunity of hearing upon the arrival of a transport the following conversation between the Untersturmführer Streitwieser and chief of the convoy:

“‘How many prisoners?’

“‘15 but two K.’

“‘Well, that makes 13.’

“The K prisoners were taken directly to the prison where they were unclothed and taken to the ‘bathroom.’ This bathroom in the cellars of the prison building near the crematory was specially designed for execution (shooting and gassing).

“The shooting took place by means of a measuring apparatus—the prisoner being backed towards a metrical measure with an automatic contraption releasing a bullet in his neck as soon as the moving plank determining his height touched the top of his head.

“If a transport consisted of too many ‘K’ prisoners, instead of losing time for the ‘measurement’ they were exterminated by gas sent into the shower room instead of water.”

I now pass to another subject, namely: “The Gestapo was responsible for establishing and classifying concentration camps and for committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder.”

The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the responsibility of the Gestapo for the administration of concentration camps and the authority of the Gestapo for taking persons into protective custody to be carried out in the State concentration camps. The Gestapo also issued orders establishing concentration camps, transforming prisoner-of-war camps into concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners, and so forth.

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and the chances for reforming the prisoners, from the Nazi viewpoint. I now refer to Documents 1063(a)-PS and 1063(b)-PS in the second volume, Exhibit Number USA-492. The concentration camps were classified as Class I, II, or III. Class I was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III was for the most serious. Now this Document 1063(a)-PS is signed by Heydrich and it is dated the 2d of January 1941. I quote from the beginning with the word “subject,” quoting:

“Subject: Classification of the concentration camps.

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has given his approval to classify the concentration camps into various categories, which take into account the personality of the prisoner as well as the degree of his harmfulness to the State. Accordingly, the concentration camps will be classified into the following categories:

“Category I—for all prisoners charged with minor offenses only and definitely qualified for correction; also for special cases and solitary confinement—Camps Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and Auschwitz I. The latter also applies in part to Category II.

“Category Ia—for all old prisoners conditionally qualified for work who could still be used in the medicinal herb gardens—Camp Dachau.

“Category II—for prisoners charged with major offenses but still qualified for re-education and correction—Camps Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, Neuengamme, Auschwitz II.

“Category III—for prisoners under most serious charges, also for those who have been convicted previously for criminal offenses; at the same time for asocial prisoners, that is to say, those who can hardly be corrected—Camp Mauthausen.”

I call Your Honor’s attention to the fact that we have been talking about Mauthausen, where the “K” action took place.

The Chief of the Security Police and SD had the authority to fix the length of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the term as “until further notice.” That was established by Document 1531-PS, which has previously been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-248; and the only reason for referring to it is to show that they had the right to fix the length of period of custody.

The local Gestapo offices, which made the arrests, maintained a register called the “Haftbuch,” and I understand Haftbuch simply means a block or police register. In this register the names of all persons arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds of arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the Gestapo Headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to concentration camps, an entry was made in the Haftbuch to that effect.

I now offer in evidence the original of one of these books, and it is Document Number L-358, Exhibit Number USA-495. This book was captured by the 3rd Army when it overran an area; and it was captured by the T-Force on April 22, 1945, near Bad Sulza, Germany. This book is the original register used by the Gestapo at Tomaszow, Poland, to record the names of the persons arrested, the grounds for arrest, and the disposition made of cases during the period from 1 June 1943 to 20 December 1944.

In the register are approximately 3,500 names of persons. Approximately 2,200 were arrested for membership in the resistance movements and

## partisan units. This is a very large book; and I am going to ask the

clerk to pass it to Your Honors so that you might get a look at it. It is too big to photograph. And if Your Honors will just turn to one of the pages, I will read what the different columns provide—just any one of the pages. There is a double column. It starts on the left and goes over to the other side. In the first column that heading is simply a number of the man when he comes in. The next column is his name. The third column is the family—a brief family history and his religion. The fourth is the domicile. The next shows the date he was arrested and by whom—that is the fifth column. The next column, the place of arrest. And then the next column, the reason for arrest. And then the next is another number which is apparently a serial number for delivery. And next to the last column is the disposition. And the final column, remarks.

Now, out of the 3,500 names that are shown in that book, Your Honors will notice a number of red marks. Those apparently meant the ones that were shot. Of these, 325 were shot. Only 35 of that 325 had first been tried. Nine hundred and fifty out of this list were sent to concentration camps; and 155 were sent to the Reich for forced labor. According to this register, similar treatment was accorded persons who were arrested on other grounds, for instance, Communists, Jews, hostages, and persons taken in reprisal. A large number are shown to have been arrested during raids, no further grounds being stated.

I particularly refer Your Honors to entries 286, 287, and 288, that is, the numbers in the first column of the register, where the crime charged to the person arrested was “als Juden”; in other words, he was a Jew. And by that you will find a red cross mark; and the punishment given was death.

I now pass from this document and simply call attention to Document L-215, which was heretofore introduced as Exhibit Number USA-243. I don’t intend to read from it unless Your Honors want to turn to L-215. This is a file of original dossiers on 25 Luxembourgers taken into protective custody for commitment to concentration camps. I will just refer to a sentence of the language in the document. Quoting:

“According to the finding of the State Police, he endangers by his attitude the existence and security of the people and the State.”

And in each case, with reference to those dossiers, that appears as being the reason for the execution of these 25 Luxembourgers. And in connection . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, you said execution, did you not?

COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon—sending to concentration camps.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There is no evidence they were executed?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir; they were committed to concentration camps. And also in connection with that same document there is a form provided by which the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin were notified when the persons were received by the concentration camps.

Another document—which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-279, Document 1472-PS, in the second volume—I am simply going to refer to as a predicate for another. That was a telegram of 16 December 1942 in which Müller reported that the Gestapo could round up some 45,000 Jews in connection with the program of obtaining additional labor in concentration camps. And with reference to the same subject there is Document 1063(d)-PS, which has heretofore been offered as Exhibit Number USA-219. Müller sent a directive to the commanders and inspectors of the Security Police and SD and to the directors of the Gestapo regional offices in which he stated that Himmler had ordered, on 14 December 1942, that at least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into concentration camps not later than the end of January.

Now, in that same connection I offer Document L-41, Volume 1, as Exhibit Number USA-496. This document contains a further directive from Müller dated the 23rd of March 1943 and supplements the directive of 17 December 1942, to which I referred and in which he states that the measures are to be carried out until 30 April 1943. And I would like to quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the exhibit:

“Care must be taken, however, that only prisoners who are fit for work are transferred to concentration camps, and adolescents only in accordance with the given directives; otherwise, the concentration camps would become overcrowded, and this would defeat the intended aim.”

In that same connection I offer Document 701-PS, Exhibit Number USA-497. This is a letter dated 21 April 1943 from the Minister of Justice to the public prosecutors and also addressed to the Commissioner of the Reich Minister of Justice for the penal camps in Emsland. Quoting:

“Subject: Poles and Jews who are released from the penal institutions of the Department of Justice. Copies for the independent penal institutions.

“1. With reference to the new guiding principles for the application of Article 1, Section 2, of the decree of 11 June 1940, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, Page 877—Attachment I of the decree (RV) of 27 January 1943—9133/2 Enclosure I-III a 2/2629—the Reich Security Main Office has directed by the decree of 11 March 1943—II A 2 Number 100/43—176:

“(a) Jews, who in accordance with Number VI of the directives are released from prison, are to be committed for life in the concentration camps Auschwitz or Lublin by the head office of the State Police competent for the district in which the prison is located, in compliance with directions issued about protective custody.

“The same applies to Jews who in the future are released from prison after serving a sentence of confinement.

“(b) Poles, who in accordance with Number VI of the directives are released from prison, are to be taken, by the head office of the State Police competent for the district in which the prison is located, for the duration of the war to a concentration camp in compliance with directions issued concerning protective custody.

“The same applies in the future to Poles being released from prison after serving a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months.

“In answer to the request of the Reich Security Main Office I ask that in the future: (a) All Jews about to be released and (b) all Poles awaiting release who have served a sentence of more than 6 months, are to be listed to the directorate of the State Police competent for the district for further confinement and, in due time before the end of sentence, are to be placed at its disposal for transfer.”

And the last paragraph states that this ruling replaces the hitherto ordered return of all Polish prisoners undergoing imprisonment in the Old Reich condemned in the annexed Eastern territory.

The next subject: The Gestapo and the SD participated in deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of forced labor.

With reference to the presentation heretofore made concerning forced labor, I do not intend to repeat. However, there were several references to important positions played by the Gestapo and the SD in rounding up persons to be brought into the Reich for forced labor and references in two or three documents that were introduced, I simply want to cite those documents as showing the part that the Gestapo and SD played. Document L-61, Exhibit Number USA-177. It is set out in this document book—I am simply citing it—it is a letter of the 26th of November 1942 from Fritz Sauckel, in which he stated that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into concentration camps for labor as far as they were criminal or antisocial.

The Tribunal will also recall the Christensen letter, which is our Document 3012-PS, Exhibit Number USA-190. In that letter it is stated that during the year 1943 the program of mass murders carried out by the Einsatz groups in the East should be modified in order to round up hundreds of thousands of persons for labor in the armament industry. That was in Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-190. And that force was to be used when necessary. Prisoners were to be released so that they could be used for forced labor. When villages were burned down the whole population was to be placed at the disposal of the labor commissioners.

Now in that connection the direct responsibility of the Gestapo for disciplining forced workers is shown in our exhibit, Document 1573-PS, Exhibit Number USA-498. This is a secret order signed by Müller himself to the regional Gestapo offices on the 18th of June 1941; and I quote from the document from the beginning. It is addressed:

“To all offices of the State Police—to the State Police, attention SS Sturmbannführer R. R. Nosske or deputy at Aachen.

“Subject: Measures to be taken against emigrants and civilian workers who come from the Greater Russian areas and against foreign workers.

“Reference: None.

“To prevent the return of Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack, and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers from the territory of the Reich to the East without authorization and on their own initiative and to prevent attempts of sabotage by foreign workers in German production, I decide as follows:

“(1) The managers of the branch offices of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, and Caucasian trustees office, as well as of the relief committees and the leading members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack, and Caucasian emigrants’ organizations, are to be notified immediately that they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of the Security Police until further notice. They are, at the same time, to be told to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care. Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested upon giving up their job or domicile without permission. I request a check on the presence of branch office leaders, if possible, by daily inquiries, on pretexts.

“(2) Emigrants and foreign workers who are specifically charged and who are suspected of intelligence work for the U.S.S.R. are to be arrested if the situation demands it. This step must be prepared; it is, however, not to be executed before the pass word ‘Fremdvölker’ has been transmitted by means of ‘urgent’ telegram.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think you should read the rest of that?

COL. STOREY: I don’t think so, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, I next offer in evidence Document 3360-PS, Exhibit Number USA-499, the second volume. Before I hand this document to the translator, I should like to exhibit it to Your Honors. It is an original telegram that was sent to the Gestapo office at Nuremberg. It was discovered by the C.I.C., by Lieutenant Stevens, near Hersbruck, Germany; and Your Honors will notice that parts of it have been burned. It was in connection with some documents that had been buried and they were partially burned when they were buried. This is one of the telegrams. It is from the Secret State Police, the State Police station at Nuremberg and Fürth, and it is dated the 12th of February 1944. I quote from the telegram:

“RSHA IV F 1-45/44; the Border Inspector General; urgent, submit immediately.

“Treatment of recaptured escaped Eastern laborers.”—Ostarbeiter.

“On the basis of an order of the RFSS, all recaptured escaped Eastern laborers without exception are, from now on, to be sent to concentration camps. For the purpose of reporting to RFSS, I ask for one single report by teletype to Section IV D (foreign laborers) on 10 March 1944 as to how many of such male or female Eastern laborers were turned over to a concentration camp between today and 10 March 1944.”

By these methods the Gestapo and SD maintained control over forced labor brought into the Reich.

The next subject I go into is that the Gestapo and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected civilians who lynched Allied fliers.

On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued an order which provided that the Gestapo and SD were responsible for taking counter measures against single parachutists or small groups of them with special missions. In substantiation I offer Document Number 553-PS as the exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-500. I quote from the first page of the translation, the first part of Paragraph 3:

“Insofar as single parachutists are captured by members of the Armed Forces, they are to be delivered, after report to the competent Abwehr office, to the nearest agency of the Chief of the Security Police and SD without delay.”

Now, if the Tribunal please, to divert from the text: Colonel Taylor will present the Nazi High Command and a few of their orders. This is one and there is another one with which he is going to deal extensively. My purpose in introducing these orders now is to show the part that the Gestapo and SD played in connection with those orders.

The next order that I introduce is Document 498-PS, in the first volume, Exhibit Number USA-501. That is the celebrated Commando order signed by the Führer himself on the 18th of October 1942. There were only 12 copies of this made and it bears the personal, original signature of Adolf Hitler. One copy was sent to the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. That order, without reading it and getting down to the part from which I want to quote, simply provides that all commandos, whether or not in uniform or unarmed, are to be slaughtered to the last man. I want to read down toward the bottom, the beginning of Paragraph 4, to show the part of the SD:

“If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the military forces in some other way, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD.”

Another one of those orders is Number 526-PS, Exhibit Number USA-502, to which I would like to refer. That document has to do with some alleged saboteurs landing in Norway. It is dated the 10th of May 1943 and is top-secret. I quote the first paragraph as identifying a crew:

“On 30 March 1943 on Toftefjord (70° latitude) an enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: two dead men, 10 prisoners.”

That is the crew. Near the bottom of that order, the third sentence from the bottom, is this statement: “Führer order executed by SD”—Security Service.

We have heretofore introduced Document R-110, Exhibit Number USA-333; and that was the Himmler order of 10 August 1943 which was sent to Security Police. That order provided that it was not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between Germans and English and American terror fliers who had bailed out. It was personally signed by Himmler and here is the signature. It has been introduced in evidence, but I wanted to call the attention of the Court to it again.

May I next go to the subject, where the Gestapo and the SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment? That is the so-called “Night and Fog” decree, issued on 7 December 1941 by Hitler. That decree has not been introduced in evidence.

I now refer to Document L-90, in the first volume, Exhibit Number USA-503. That decree under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territory, except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or punishment in Germany itself. And this is the original from which we quote, beginning on the first page of the translation. It is on the stationery of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, Munich, 4 February 1942. Subject: “Prosecution of offenses against the Reich or the occupation forces.”

“I. The following regulations published by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 December 1941, are being made known herewith:

“1). The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. After lengthy consideration, it is the will of the Führer that the measures taken against those who are guilty of offenses against the Reich or against the occupation forces in occupied areas should be altered. The Führer is of the opinion that in such cases penal servitude or even a hard labor sentence for life will be regarded as a sign of weakness. An effective and lasting deterrent can be achieved only by the death penalty or by taking measures which will leave the family and the population uncertain as to the fate of the offender. The deportation to Germany serves this purpose.

“The attached directives for the prosecution of offenses correspond with the Führer’s conception. They have been examined and approved by him.”—signed—“Keitel.”

And then follow some of the directives and descriptions. This is a very long document, with enclosures, and we next turn to Page 4 of the English translation, near the bottom:

“Insofar as the SS and the Police courts are competent to deal with offenses committed under I, proceedings follow on the same lines.”

Next, in connection with the same document, on Page 20, Part 2 of the English translation, which is the secret letter addressed to the Abwehr, I quote from Page 2. It is the letter dated 2 February 1942—passing down to the words “Enclosed please find”:

“1. Decree of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of 7 December 1941.

“2. Executive order of the same date.

“3. Communication of the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces of 12 December 1941.

“The decree introduces a fundamental innovation. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces orders that offenses committed by civilians in the occupied territories and of the kind mentioned above, are to be dealt with by the competent military courts in the occupied territories only if (a) the death penalty is pronounced and (b) sentence is pronounced within 8 days of the prisoner’s arrest.

“Unless both these conditions are fulfilled, the Führer and Supreme Commander does not anticipate that criminal proceedings within the occupied territories will have the necessary deterrent effect.

“In all other cases the prisoners are, in the future, to be transported to Germany secretly, and further dealings with the offenses will take place here; these measures will have a deterrent effect because (a) the prisoners will vanish without leaving a trace, (b) no information may be given as to their whereabouts or their fate.”

Now, skipping the next paragraph, to the second paragraph below:

“In case the competent military court and the military commander, respectively, are of the opinion that an immediate decision on the spot is impossible, and the prisoners are therefore to be transported to Germany, the counter-intelligence offices have to report this fact directly to the RSHA in Berlin (SW 11), Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 7, in care of Dr. Fischer, Director of Criminal Police, stating the exact number of prisoners and of the groups which belong together as the case may be. Isolated cases, where the superior commander has an urgent interest in the case being dealt with by a military court, are to be reported to the RSHA. A copy of the entire report to the Reich Security Main Office is to be sent to Amt Ausland Abwehr, Section Abwehr III.

“The RSHA on the basis of available accommodation will determine which office of the state police has to accept the prisoners. The latter office will communicate with the competent Abwehr office and determine with it the particulars of the removal,

## particularly whether this will be carried out by the Secret

Field Police, the Field Gendarmerie, or the Gestapo itself, as well as the place and manner of the handing over of the material.”

After the civilians arrived in Germany no word of the disposition of their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came or their relatives.

I now offer Document 668-PS, Exhibit Number USA-504. This is a letter of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, dated the 24th of June 1942; and I quote from the first page of the English translation:

“It is the intent of the directive of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht concerning prosecution of criminal acts against the Reich or the occupation forces in Occupied Territories, dated 7 December 1941,”—that is the order that I first referred to—“to create, for deterrent purposes, through the transportation into Reich territory of persons arrested in occupied areas on account of activity inimical to Germany, uncertainty about the fate of prisoners among their relatives and acquaintances. This goal would be jeopardized if the relatives were to be notified in cases of death. Release of the body for burial at home is inadvisable for the same reason, and beyond that also because the place of burial could be misused for demonstrations.

“I therefore propose that the following rules be observed in the handling of cases of death:

“a. Notification of relatives is not to take place.

“b. The body will be buried at the place of decease in the Reich.

“c. The place of burial will, for the time being, not be made known.”

Now passing to the next activity of the SD and Gestapo, which was that they arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied countries under special criminal procedure and by summary methods. And I next offer in evidence Document 674-PS, Exhibit Number USA-505.

The Gestapo arrested, placed in protective custody, and executed civilians of occupied countries under certain circumstances. Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases the Gestapo conducted its own proceedings without regard to normal judicial processes.

This document, 674-PS, Exhibit Number USA-505, is a letter from the Chief Public Prosecutor at Katowice, dated the 3rd of December 1941; and it is addressed to the Reich Minister of Justice, attention Chief Councillor to the Government Stadermann or representative in office, Berlin. The subject is “Executions by the Police and Expediting of Penal Procedure; without order; enclosure: 1 copy of report.” I quote from the beginning:

“About 3 weeks ago, six ringleaders (some of them German) were hanged by the police in connection with the destruction of a treasonable organization of 350 members in Tarnowskie Góry without notification of the competent court. Such executions of criminals have previously taken place in the Bielsko district, too, without the Public Prosecutor having knowledge of them. On 2 December 1941 the head of the State Police at Katowice, Oberregierungsrat Mildner, reported orally to the undersigned that he had ordered, with authority from the Reichsführer of the SS as necessary immediate action, these executions by public hanging at the place of the crime and that deterrents would also have to be continued in the future until the criminal and

## actively anti-German elements in the Occupied Eastern

Territories have been destroyed or until other immediate

## actions, perhaps by the courts, would guarantee equally

deterrent effect. Accordingly, six leaders of another Polish organization guilty of high treason in the district in and around Sosnowiec were to be hanged publicly today as an example.

“About this procedure the undersigned expressed considerable scruples.

“Besides the fact that such measures have been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are contradictory to laws still in force, a justified emergency for the exceptional proceedings by the police alone cannot, in our opinion, be lawfully recognized.

“The penal justice in our district within the limits of its competence is quite capable of fulfilling its duty of immediate penal retribution by means of a special form of special judicial

## activity (establishment of a so-called Rapid Special Court).

Indictment and trial could be speeded up in such a way that between turning the case over to the public prosecutor and the execution no more than 3 days would elapse, if the practice of reprieve is simplified and if the decision, where necessary, can be obtained by telephone. This was expressed yesterday to the head of the State Police at Katowice by the undersigned.

“We cannot believe that execution by the police of criminals, especially German criminals, can be considered more effective in view of the shaken sense of justice of many Germans. In the long run they might, in spite of public deterrent, lead to even further brutality of minds, which is contrary to the intended purpose of pacifying. These deliberations, however, do not apply to future legal competence of a court-martial for Poles and Jews.”

I next refer to Document 654-PS, Exhibit Number USA-218, which has previously been introduced in evidence but bears on this subject; and I will simply summarize, in a word, what it provided.

It states that on the 18th of September 1942 Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be turned over to Himmler to be worked to death. That is in Document 654-PS, and a special criminal procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians, who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal courts. I simply refer to that document as bearing on the same subject.

Another document, which I will not quote from but cite to Your Honors, is the order of November 5, 1942 issued by the RSHA; and that is Document L-316, Exhibit Number USA-346. I don’t think it is necessary to quote from that except to state that that letter provides that the administration—in fact, the last statement in it just before the signature provides:

“The administration of penal law for persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the administrators of justice into the hands of the police.”

That is the part that connects the police with it, and I will not quote from the document otherwise.

Now I next come to the subject where the Gestapo and the SD executed or confined persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives; and in that connection I offer Document L-37 in the first volume, Exhibit Number USA-506.

That is a letter dated the 19th of July 1944—I call Your Honor’s attention to the fact that it is dated in 1944—sent by the commander of the Sipo and SD for the district of Radom to the foreign service office in Tomaszow.

Parenthetically, that big Haftbuch that we introduced in evidence has a number of cases in connection with the district of Radom, and Your Honors will remember that it is a list of the people in the district of Tomaszow.

The subject of this letter is “Collective Responsibility of Members of Families of Assassins and Saboteurs.” I will read after the word “precedents”:

“The Higher SS and Police Leader East has issued on 28 June 1944 the following order:

“The security situation in the Government General has in the last 9 months grown worse to such an extent that from now on the most radical means and the harshest measures must be applied to the alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS, in agreement with the Governor General, has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans, or such attempts, have occurred or where saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the culprits be shot but that also all of the kinsmen are to be executed and their female relatives who are above 16 years old are to be put into concentration camps. It is strictly presupposed, of course, that if the culprit or culprits are not apprehended, their names and addresses be correctly ascertained. Male members of kin include, for example: the father, sons (insofar as they are above 16 years of age), brothers, brothers-in-law, cousins, and uncles of the culprit. The same ruling applies to the women. The aim of this procedure is to secure joint responsibility of all men and women of the kin of the culprit. It furthermore hits most severely the family circle of the political criminal. For example, this practice has already shown, at the end of 1939, the best results in the new Eastern territories, especially in the Warta district. Experience shows that as soon as this new method for combatting assassins and saboteurs becomes known to these foreign people—this may be achieved by oral propaganda—the female members of a kin to which members of the resistance movement or bands belong will exert a curbing influence.”

Now the SD and Gestapo also conducted third-degree interrogations of prisoners of war; and I refer to Document 1531-PS, Exhibit Number USA-248. This document contains an order of 12 June 1942, signed by Müller, which authorized the use of third-degree methods in interrogations where preliminary investigation indicated that the prisoners could give information on important facts such as subversive

## activities but not to extort confessions of prisoners’ own crimes.

Now I quote from Page 2 of the English translation, Paragraph 2:

“Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, asocial elements, Polish or Soviet Russian loafers, or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.”

Then I pass to Paragraph 4 at the end:

“Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist amongst other methods, of:

“Very simple diet (bread and water); hard bunk; dark cell; deprivation of sleep; exhaustive drilling; also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted).”

On the 24th of February 1944 the commander of the Sipo and the SD for the district of Radom published an order issued by the Befehlshaber of the Sipo and the SD at Kraków, which is Document L-89, Exhibit Number USA-507, in the first volume. This followed closely the provisions of the previous decree that I have just quoted from; and I quote the first paragraph after the list of offices on the first page:

“In view of the variety of methods used to date in intensified interrogations and in order to avoid excesses, also to protect officials against eventual criminal proceedings, the Befehlshaber of the Security Police and of the SD in Kraków has issued the following order for the Security Police in the Government General, which is based on the regulations in force for the Reich.”

And then the regulations are quoted. The significance of this document is that it proves that as late as 1944 third-degree interrogations were still being conducted by the Gestapo.

I next pass to the activity of the Gestapo and the SD as being primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews; and I do not intend to go into any of the evidence previously introduced, except to refer to the

## participation of these organizations.

The responsibility of the Gestapo and SD for the mass extermination program carried out by the Einsatz groups of the Sipo and SD, in the annihilation camps to which Jews were sent by the Sipo and SD, has already been considered; and I simply cite to the Tribunal the Document 2615-PS, which has previously been introduced and in which the number of Jews executed was referred to by Eichmann. I simply call attention that Eichmann was head of Section B IV of the Gestapo. That section of the Gestapo dealt with Jewish affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and the State, and the dispossession of rights of German citizenship. The Gestapo was also charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws, which heretofore have been introduced.

I now invite Your Honors’ attention to Document 3058-PS, Exhibit Number USA-508. I would like to exhibit to Your Honors that it is a red-bordered document signed by Heydrich himself and addressed to the Defendant Göring. It is dated the 11th of November 1938. I pass this to the reporter—and before it is passed to the reporter—there is an appendix attached to it to the effect that the matter had been called to the attention of the Defendant Göring.

Now this concerns a report of activities of the Gestapo in connection with the anti-Jewish demonstrations, you will recall, in the fall of 1938. This is a report from Heydrich personally to the Defendant Göring. It is addressed to the Prime Minister, General Field Marshal Göring and is dated the 11th of November 1938. The previous documents showed that that activity occurred just before—and the order for it in connection with the Jewish uprooting or extermination:

“The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the reports—815 shops destroyed, 29 department stores set on fire or destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or destroyed—indicate only a fraction of the actual damage caused, as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to general statements such as ‘numerous’ or ‘most shops destroyed.’ Therefore the figures given will be considerably augmented.

“One hundred and ninety-one synagogues were set on fire and another 76 completely destroyed. In addition, 11 parish halls, cemetery chapels, and similar buildings were set on fire and three more completely destroyed.

“Twenty thousand Jews were arrested, also seven Aryans and three foreigners. The latter were arrested for their own safety.

“Thirty-six deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and those injured include two Poles.”

I want to call Your Honors’ special attention to the paper appended to that document:

“The General Field Marshal”—that is Göring—“has been informed. No steps are to be taken. By order.”

It is dated the 15th of November 1938 and signed. The signature is illegible.

Now in that same connection Heydrich was charged by the Defendant Göring with this entire program; and we next offer in evidence the original of that order, 710-PS, Exhibit Number USA-509. That is an order dated the 31st of July 1941. It is written on the stationery of the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense; and it is dated at Berlin, the 31st of July 1941, and directed to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, SS Gruppenführer Heydrich:

“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at—through furtherance of emigration and evacuation—a solution of the Jewish problem as favorable as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.

“Wherever other Government agencies are involved; these are to co-operate with you.

“I charge you furthermore, to send me before long an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired final solution of the Jewish question.”—signed—“Göring.”

The Tribunal has already received the evidence as to what the final solution of the Jewish problem was as conceived by Heydrich and executed by the Security Police and SD under him and under the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, which was enslavement and mass murder.

Now, finally, in this presentation, the last activity of the Gestapo and SD to which I will refer is that these organizations were the primary agencies for the persecution of the churches. Already evidence has been received concerning the persecution of the churches. In this struggle the Gestapo and the SD played a secret but very highly significant part.

Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religions life. Section B1 of the Gestapo dealt with political Catholicism, Section B2 with political Protestantism, and Section B3 with other churches and Freemasonry.

The Church was one of the enemies of the Nazi State, and it was a peculiar function of the Gestapo to combat it. It issued restrictions against church activities, dissolved church organizations, and placed clergymen in protective custody.

I now want to offer in evidence Document 1815-PS, Exhibit Number USA-510. This is a very large file—this original document—and I want to quote only portions of it. This was a file of the Gestapo regional office at Aachen. It discloses that the purpose of the Gestapo in combatting the churches was to destroy them, and I want to read the first page of the English translation from the beginning.

This is dated the “12th of May 1941, at Berlin, from the RSHA, Section IV B 1, to all Staatspolizeileitstellen. For information: The SD Leit-Abschnitte; the inspectors of the Sipo and SD.” I understand this word “Abschnitte” means sub-divisions. The subject is “Concerning the Study and Treatment of Political Churches”:

“The chief of the RSHA has ordered that the tasks assigned to the SD and Sipo regarding control of the political churches, which have hitherto been carried out jointly by the SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be solely performed by the Stapostellen”—which I understand means regional offices of the Gestapo.

Then it refers to the plan for the division of work issued by the RSHA on March 1, 1941:

“In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus take over the entire Gegnernachrichtendienst”—I understand that word means counter-intelligence—“in this sphere.

“In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo and SD has ordered that the church specialists, hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, shall be temporarily detailed in equal rank to the Stapo offices and operate the ‘Nachrichtendienstliche Arbeit’”—which means intelligence service in regard to the Church—“On the orders of the Chief of the RSHA and in agreement with the heads of Amt III, II, and I, those church specialists specified in the attached list . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give us the details of this?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir, I don’t think so. At any rate, if Your Honors please, we quote from it; and it is simply a direction as to how they will proceed.

Now then, later, on the 22d and 23rd of September 1941, they called a conference of these so-called church specialists attached to the Gestapo regional offices that I have mentioned. That was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in Berlin. Notes were taken, and this same document contains notes of that conference. The program is shown; the plan is worked out in connection with the churches. I will just read the closing statement to these so-called church specialists; it is very short:

“Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made everywhere. The main thing is that the adversary”—meaning the church—“should be constantly opposed with determination, will, and effective initiative.”

And then, finally, the last thing I would like to refer to in this document is on the eighth page of the English translation, which sets out their immediate aim and their ultimate aim:

“The immediate aim: The Church must not regain 1 inch of the ground it has lost.

“The ultimate aim: Destruction of the confessional churches to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained through Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced as evidence against the church of its treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.”

I understand that long German word means intelligence activities.

Now, if Your Honors please, this concludes the factual, documentary presentation which I shall make in connection with the SD and Gestapo. Closely allied with it is the case against Kaltenbrunner, as the representative of these organizations, which will be presented immediately after lunch by Lieutenant Whitney Harris. Also, there will be one or two witnesses who will be introduced in connection with these organizations and in connection with Kaltenbrunner.

With that I should like to conclude, with just these remarks:

The evidence shows that the Gestapo was created by the Defendant Göring in Prussia in April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime and that henceforward the Gestapo in Prussia and in the other states of the Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term “Gestapo” became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.

Behind the scenes operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.

The most casual remark of the German citizen might bring him before the Gestapo where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a tyrannical rule of men, the Gestapo was the primary instrumentality of oppression.

The Gestapo and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal act of the conspiracy. The category of these crimes, apart from the thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, reads like a page from the devil’s notebook:

They fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as an excuse for attacking Poland.

They murdered hundreds of thousands of defenseless men, women, and children by the infamous Einsatz groups.

They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from prisoner-of-war camps and murdered them.

They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and murdered them.

They established and classified the concentration camps and sent thousands of people into them for extermination and slave labor.

They cleared Europe of the Jews and were responsible for sending hundreds of thousands to their deaths in annihilation camps.

They rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor and sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps.

They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected civilians who lynched allied fliers.

They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment.

They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied countries under special criminal procedures, which did not accord fair trials, and by summary methods.

They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons who had allegedly committed crimes.

They ordered the murder of prisoners in Sipo and SD prisons to prevent their release by Allied armies.

They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private property.

They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and churches.

In carrying out these crimes the Gestapo operated as an organization closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports were submitted to Berlin and all important decisions emanated from Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to concentration camps. All cases, other than short of duration, had to be submitted to Berlin for approval.

The Gestapo was organized on a functional basis. Its principal divisions dealt with groups and institutions against which it committed the worst crimes—which I have enumerated.

Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the Gestapo acted as an entity, each section performing its parts in the general criminal enterprises ordered by Berlin. The Secret State Police should be held responsible as an organization for the vast crimes in which it participated.

The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.

And as to the Gestapo, it is submitted that it was an organization in the sense in which that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter, that the Defendants Göring and Kaltenbrunner committed the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their capacity as members and leaders of the Gestapo, and that the Gestapo, as an organization, participated in and aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter.

And finally, I have in my hand here a brochure published in honor of the famous Heydrich, the former Chief of the Security Police and SD; and I quote from a speech delivered by Heydrich on German Police Day, 1941, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice:

“Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering—and yet at home with a certain feeling of security because of their presence—brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this profession.”

Those are the words of Heydrich, who was the former head of this organization.

Does Your Honor want to go ahead?

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): I have just heard that during the afternoon the evidence will concern the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I therefore regard it as advisable to make a motion regarding Kaltenbrunner now, before the recess, and not in the afternoon.

My suggestion is the following:

I ask that the trial against Kaltenbrunner be postponed during his absence. Kaltenbrunner has only been able to be present at a few days of the proceedings so far. The reason for his absence is an illness which, in my opinion, is of a serious nature, for it is obvious that in so important a trial only a very serious illness can justify the absence of a defendant. I have no doctor’s report on his present condition. It appears to me dubious whether he will be capable of attending the hearing at all in the future. Be that as it may, my present suggestion that the trial of Kaltenbrunner be postponed is not in contradiction to Paragraph 12 of the Charter. If a defendant is alive and cannot be brought to trial in person, then the trial can proceed against him in his absence. This is particularly justified if the defendant is concealing himself and it is thus his own fault if he is tried in his absence.

But Kaltenbrunner is here in prison. He did not withdraw himself from the trial and he wishes nothing more than that he may be able to face the accusations. But if such a defendant is obliged to be absent through no fault of his own, then a trial that was nevertheless carried out would hardly be consistent with justice. Article 12 of the Charter mentions this point of justice specifically.

I should regret the procedure of the trial all the more since precisely now Kaltenbrunner must have an opportunity to give me information in my capacity as his Defense Counsel. The particular Indictment is not even known to him; it was only handed over just before the Christmas recess.

I do not need to emphasize how greatly the Defense’s task is made more difficult by a continuation of the trial—indeed it is made almost impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the application which has been made on behalf of counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner and will give its decision shortly.

The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock.

COL. STOREY: If I may make just one statement in connection with that, if Your Honor pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

COL. STOREY: The evidence against Kaltenbrunner will be in connection with the part he played in these organizations; and we thought, in the interest of time, the individual case against Kaltenbrunner could be presented at the same time. Now, if it were not presented in this connection, it would be within a few days, early next week, in connection with the other individual defendants. Counsel mentions that he probably will not be able to be here for some time, and I thought I would make that statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the motion made by counsel on behalf of Kaltenbrunner, and it considers that any evidence which you were intending to produce, which is directed against Kaltenbrunner individually and not against the organizations, ought to be postponed until the Prosecution come to deal, as the Tribunal understands you do propose to deal, with each defendant individually; and the Tribunal thinks that Kaltenbrunner’s case might properly be kept to the end of the individual defendants, and that the evidence which is especially brought against Kaltenbrunner might then be adduced. If Kaltenbrunner is then still unable to be in Court, that evidence will have to be given in his absence.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, I don’t believe that the case, as we have it prepared now, can be separated as between the organizations and the individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: No, but if it bears against the organizations it can be adduced now.

COL. STOREY: I understood that, but if Your Honor pleases, I say that the preparation that we have made is in connection both with the organizations and the individuals. In other words, it is a joint presentation, therefore, under Your Honor’s ruling, as taken, it would have to go over until next week with the individual defendants’ cases, because we prepared it so that it will affect the organizations as well as the defendant individually, because his acts are in connection with what he has done with the organizations included; in other words, we don’t have it separated.

THE PRESIDENT: How will that affect you for this afternoon?

COL. STOREY: We can introduce a witness next; but if Your Honor pleases, with reference to the witness, the witness, of course, would affect the organizations, and incidentally would affect Kaltenbrunner, too. I do not see how you could separate that, except that for the witnesses this afternoon the questions could be confined to the organizations.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, of course, all the evidence which has been given up to date, much of it in Kaltenbrunner’s absence, has in one sense been against Kaltenbrunner in being evidence against the organization of which he was the head.

COL. STOREY: Colonel Amen was going to examine the witness orally, and it is primarily against the organizations; and incidentally it would affect Kaltenbrunner’s individual liability.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like you to go on with the evidence.

COL. STOREY: Yes. It has been suggested, if Your Honor pleases, that we might have a few minutes to confer about the situation, about the witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: You wish to adjourn for a few minutes?

COL. STOREY: Just a few minutes so that we can confer because it changes our order of proof.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. STOREY: Just 10 minutes will be sufficient.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; we will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear the evidence which the Prosecution desires to call, and insofar as it consists of oral testimony, the Tribunal will afford counsel for Kaltenbrunner the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses so called, at a later stage if he wishes to do so.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS and SD): I was at first appointed counsel for the members of the SS and the SD who had made an application to be heard in these proceedings. My duties were limited to presenting the incoming motions to the Court in a suitable form. Not until the Tribunal made its announcement of 17 December 1945, was I appointed as Defense Counsel for the organizations of the SS and the SD. As such I have no client or employer who could give me information or instruction for conducting the defense. In order to obtain the needed information I am, therefore, directed to communicate with members of the organizations I am representing, most of whom are in prisoner-of-war camps or are under arrest. So far, because of the shortness of time, I have not been able to get this information.

After 17 December 1945 thousands of motions were submitted to me through the Court, and in the short period of time since then I have not been able to follow the instructions they contained.

According to Article 16 of the Charter the defendant is to be shown a copy of the Indictment and of all pertaining documents, written in a language he understands, within a proper time prior to the beginning of the Trial. This provision should, according to the sense, be also applied to the indicted organizations. To serve the Indictment on the organizations is not provided for in the rules of procedure nor has the Tribunal so far ordered it.

In view of the very extensive work involved I personally was not in a position to have a sufficient number of copies prepared for distribution to the various camps in which the members of the organizations are and thereby enable them to express their views and to give me the needed information.

In view of these circumstances, for which I am not responsible nor are the organizations which I am representing, I am not in a position to cross-examine a witness who would be heard today, thereby making use of the right accorded to me as Defense Counsel. The hearing of a witness against the Defendant Kaltenbrunner likewise concerns the organizations which I represent, the SS and the SD. To hear such a witness at this point would mean limiting the Defense.

I therefore submit a motion to postpone the further discussion of the charges against the organizations of the SS and the SD. By visiting the camps, in which there are members of the organizations of the SS and SD, and after discussions with them, I shall be able to obtain the information needed for the defense. I should like to add that thereby no delay in the proceedings would be caused; and, I presume, this would in no way place a burden upon the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: If you will allow me to interrupt you, I understand your application to be that you are not in a position to cross-examine these witnesses this afternoon and that you wish for an opportunity similar to that which I have already accorded to the counsel for Kaltenbrunner, to be accorded to you. You wish for an opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses at a later stage, is that right?

HERR BABEL: Yes. At the same time, however, I should like to point out at this moment that, through the peculiarity of the task that has been allotted to me, it is being made difficult to cover questions subsequently . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Let us not take up time by that. Was your application that you might have an opportunity of cross-examining these witnesses at a later date?

HERR BABEL: My motion had that meaning but was also for the purpose of making the defense itself possible as a whole, which at a time when I cannot make the necessary use of the privileges granted me by the Charter . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is ready to give you the opportunity of cross-examining these witnesses at a later date.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WHITNEY R. HARRIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, we submit Document Book BB as a separate document book, relating to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. This book contains our documents, from which quotations will be made during this presentation. Reference will be made to three or four other documents contained in the document book on the Gestapo and the SD.

During the past 3 court days, the Tribunal has heard evidence of the criminality of the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo. The fusion of these organizations into the shock formations of the Hitler Police State has been explained from an organizational standpoint. There is before the Tribunal a defendant who represents these organizations through the official positions which he held in the SS and the German Police and whose career gives added significance to this unity of the SS and the Nazi Police. The name of this defendant is Ernst Kaltenbrunner.

I now offer Document 2938-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-511. This is an article which appeared in _Die Deutsche Polizei_, the magazine of the Security Police and SD, on 15 May 1943, at Page 193, entitled, “Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the New Chief of the Security Police and SD;” and I quote the beginning of the article:

“SS Gruppenführer Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born the son of the lawyer Dr. Hugo Kaltenbrunner, on 4 October 1903, at Ried, in the Inn Kreis, near Braunau. He spent his youth in the native district of the Führer, with which his kinsfolk, originally a hereditary scythe-making clan, had been closely connected since olden times. Later he moved with his parents to the little market town of Raab, and then to Linz, on the Danube, where he attended the State Realgymnasium, and there he passed his final examination in 1921.”

The next paragraph describes Kaltenbrunner’s legal education, his nationalistic activities, and his opposition to Catholic-Christian Social student groups. It states that after 1928 Kaltenbrunner worked as a lawyer candidate in Linz. The article continues; and I quote, reading the third paragraph:

“As early as January 1934 Dr. Kaltenbrunner was jailed by the Dollfuss Government on account of his Nazi views and sent with other leading National Socialists into the concentration camp Kaisersteinbruch. He caused and led a hunger strike and forced the government to dismiss 490 National Socialist prisoners. In the following year he was jailed again, because of suspicion of high treason, and committed to the court martial of Wels (Upper Danube). After an investigation of many months, the accusation of high treason collapsed; but he was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment for subversive activities. After the spring of 1935, Dr. Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian SS, the right to practice his profession having been suspended because of his National Socialist views. It redounds to his credit that in this important position he succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity of the Austrian SS, which he had built up in spite of all persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the right moment.

“After the Anschluss, in which the SS was a decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National Socialist Cabinet of Dr. Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a.m., as the first National Socialist leader, that the movement had achieved complete victory and that”—the article quotes Kaltenbrunner—“the SS is in formation awaiting further orders.

“The Führer promoted Dr. Kaltenbrunner on the day of the annexation to SS Brigadeführer and leader of the SS-Oberabschnitt Donau. On 11 September 1938 this was followed by his promotion to SS Gruppenführer.”

The Tribunal will recall evidence heretofore received; and I refer to Page 570 (Volume II, Page 417) of the English transcript of these proceedings, of the telephone conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in which Göring stated that Kaltenbrunner was to have the Department of Security. I continue quoting the last paragraph from this article:

“During the liquidation of the Austrian National Government and the reorganization of Austria into the Alps and Danube Districts, he was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader with the Reich Governors in Vienna, Lower Danube and Upper Danube in Corps Area 17, and in April 1941 he was promoted to Lieutenant General of Police.”

Kaltenbrunner thereby became the little Himmler of Austria.

According to _Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag_, fourth Wahlperiode, 1938, published by F. Kienast, at Page 261, our Document 2892-PS, Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932. He was Party Member 300179 and SS Member 13039. Prior to 1933 he was the “Gauredner” and legal adviser to SS Division 8. After 1933 he was the leader of SS Regiment 37 and later the leader of SS Division 8. Kaltenbrunner was given the highest Nazi Party decorations, the Golden Insignia of Honor and the Blutorden. He was a member of the Reichstag after 1938.

I now offer Document 3427-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-512. This is also an article which appeared in _Die Deutsche Polizei_, the magazine of the Security Police and SD, 12 February 1943, at Page 65; and I quote:

“SS Gruppenführer Kaltenbrunner Appointed Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.

“Berlin, 30 January 1943.

“Upon suggestion of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, the Führer has appointed SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, as successor of SS Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police Reinhard Heydrich, who passed away 4 June 1942.”

The Tribunal has heard frequent references made to the speech Himmler delivered on 4 October 1943 at Posen, Poland, to Gruppenführer of the SS, our Document 1919-PS, heretofore received as Exhibit Number USA-170, in which with unmatched frankness Himmler discussed the barbaric program and criminal activities of the SS and the Security Police. Near the beginning of the speech Himmler referred to—and I quote merely this one sentence: “Our comrade, SS Gruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who has succeeded our fallen friend Heydrich.”

Kaltenbrunner carried out the responsibilities as Chief of the Security Police and SD to the satisfaction of Himmler and Hitler, for on 9 December 1944, according to the _Befehlsblatt_ of the Security Police and SD . . .

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt just for a second? I understood the decision of the Tribunal to be that the proceedings against Kaltenbrunner were to be postponed until Kaltenbrunner is fit for trial, and now the case of Kaltenbrunner is being discussed.

THE PRESIDENT: No, the decision, which the Tribunal indicated before, was based upon the view that the evidence could be divided between evidence which bore directly against Kaltenbrunner and evidence which bore against the organization of the Gestapo; but when you attended before us in closed session, it was explained that it was impossible to do that and that the evidence was so inextricably mingled that it was impossible to direct the evidence solely to the organization and not to include that against Kaltenbrunner. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that they would go on with the evidence which the Prosecution desired to present in its entirety but that they would give you the opportunity of cross-examining any witnesses which might be called, at a later date. Of course you will, in addition to that, have the fullest opportunity of dealing with any documentary evidence which bears against Kaltenbrunner when the time comes for you to present the defense on behalf of Kaltenbrunner.

Do you follow that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly.

THE PRESIDENT: You will have the opportunity of cross-examining any witness who is called this afternoon or tomorrow, at a later date—a date which will be convenient to yourself. And in addition, with reference to any or all evidence such as is now being presented by counsel for the United States, you will have full opportunity at a future date of dealing with that evidence in any way that it seems right to you to do.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. May I just say one word more. The misunderstanding under which I am laboring is clearly due to the fact that I was of the opinion that witnesses were to be heard, whereas I now learn that evidence, a greater amount of it, is to be put forward. However, as I hear that the Tribunal is also admitting the evidence in its entirety I shall, of course, have to submit to this decision.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Kaltenbrunner carried out the responsibilities as Chief of the Security Police and SD to the satisfaction of Himmler and Hitler, for on 9 December 1944, according to the _Befehlsblatt_ of the Security Police and SD, Number 51, Page 361, our Document 2770-PS, he received, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the decoration known as the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit with Crossed Swords, one of the highest military decorations. By that time Kaltenbrunner had been promoted to the high rank of SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police.

I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the organization chart entitled, “The Position of Kaltenbrunner and the Gestapo and SD in the German Police System,” Exhibit Number USA-493. As Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner was the head of the Gestapo, the Kripo and the SD, and of the RSHA which was a department of the SS, and the Reich Ministry of the Interior. He was in charge of the regional offices of the Gestapo, the SD, and the Kripo within Germany, and of the Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos in the occupied territories.

Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the chiefs of the main offices of the RSHA including Amt III (the SD within Germany), Amt IV (the Gestapo), Amt V (the Kripo), and Amt VI (foreign intelligence).

I offer Document 2939-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-513. This is the affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, who was chief of Amt VI of the RSHA from the autumn of 1941 to the end of the war. I am going to read a very small portion of this affidavit, beginning with the sixth sentence of the first paragraph:

“On or about 25 January 1943, I went together with Kaltenbrunner to Himmler’s headquarters at Lötzen in East Prussia. All of the Amt chiefs of the RSHA were present at this meeting, and Himmler informed us that Kaltenbrunner was to be appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) as successor to Heydrich. His appointment was effective 30 January 1943. I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the office and control over the Amt. All important matters of all Ämter had to clear through Kaltenbrunner.”

During Kaltenbrunner’s term in office as Chief of the Security Police and SD, many crimes were committed by the Security Police and SD pursuant to policy established by the RSHA or upon orders issued out of the RSHA, for all of which Kaltenbrunner was responsible by virtue of his office. Each of these crimes has been discussed in detail in the case against the Gestapo and SD, and reference is here made to that presentation. Evidence how will be offered only to show that these crimes continued after Kaltenbrunner became Chief of the Security Police and SD on 30 January 1943.

The first crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the murder and mistreatment of civilians of occupied countries by the Einsatz groups. There were at least five Einsatz groups operating in the East during Kaltenbrunner’s term in office.

The _Befehlsblatt_ of the Security Police and SD—and this is contained in our Document 2890-PS, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice—contains reference to Einsatz Groups A, B, D, G, and Croatia during the period of August 1943 to January 1945.

I shall not read from that document which contains those excerpts, but the Tribunal will note those references to the name “Einsatz groups,” indicating that they were operating during the time that Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD. The Tribunal will recall Document 1104-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-483. I will only refer in passing to this document, which contained a lengthy and critical report on the conduct of the Security Police in exterminating the Jewish population of Sluzk, White Ruthenia. That report was submitted to Heydrich on 21 November 1941. Yet the same conditions of horror and cruelty continued to characterize the operations of Einsatzkommandos in the East while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD. I refer to Document R-135, which, has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-289; and I will not read anything from that but simply refresh the recollection of the Tribunal to the report of Günther, the prison warden at Minsk, under date of 31 May 1943, to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia, in which he pointed out that after 13 April 1943 the SD had pursued a policy of removing all gold teeth, bridgework, and fillings of Jews, an hour or two before they were murdered.

The Tribunal will also recall in this exhibit the report of 18 June 1943 to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories describing the practice of the police battalions of locking men, women, and children into barns which were then set on fire.

The second crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD, is the execution of racial and political undesirables.

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Harris, I think you are going perhaps a little bit too fast, and it is difficult for us to follow you when you are referring so quickly to these documents.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Thank you, Sir.

The second crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD, is the execution of racial and political undesirables screened out of prisoner-of-war camps by the Gestapo. The Tribunal will recall Document Number 2542-PS, heretofore received as Exhibit Number USA-489. I believe you will find that document in the Gestapo document book. It was introduced this morning.

THE PRESIDENT: The Lindow affidavit?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes. That is the Lindow affidavit that indicates that the program of screening prisoner-of-war camps continued during 1943.

The third crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD was the taking of recaptured prisoners of war . . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. You have not yet drawn our attention to any specific paragraph which shows that it was in operation after 1943; you are passing on to something else whilst I am looking at the document to see what I have got.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Referring specifically to the third paragraph, if the Tribunal please, which has heretofore been read into evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: That only says until about the beginning of 1943.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It says early in 1943 the department was dissolved and absorbed into the departments in Subsection IV B. The work concerning Russian PW’s must then have been done by IV B 2a.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, that is all you want it for, is it not?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes.

The third crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD was the taking of recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they were executed. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1650-PS which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-246. This is the secret Gestapo order, the Kugel Erlass, or Bullet Decree, under which escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps by the Security Police and SD for execution.

This order, dated 4 March 1944, was signed—and I quote: “Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, for the Chief,”—signed—“Müller.”

I now offer Document L-158 as exhibit next in order. This is Exhibit Number USA-514. I am not going to read this document since it is similar to the previous document offered, but I do wish to refer to the marked passages. First: “On 2 March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Berlin, forwarded the following OKW order.” Then follows the statement that upon recapture certain escaped prisoners of war should be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The document goes on to say—and I quote, “In this connection the Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the following instructions.” Detailed instructions follow concerning the turning over of such prisoners to the commandant of Mauthausen under the operation Bullet. Further, this order states, and I quote—this is at the very end of the order:

“The list of the recaptured officers and non-working non-commissioned officer prisoners of war will be kept here by IV A 1. To enable a report to be made punctually to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, statements of the numbers involved must reach Radom by 20 June 1944.”

I recall the attention of the Tribunal to Document 2285-PS, which was received this morning as Exhibit Number USA-490.

THE PRESIDENT: Has that Document L-158 already been put in evidence?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: No, Sir, I have just put in those portions. I have just put the document in evidence at this time, Sir. The document has not been read in its entirety for the reason that the contents, other than the quoted portions, are substantially the same as Document 1650-PS which has been read at length.

THE PRESIDENT: You say it is the same as Document 1650-PS?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It is, Sir, substantially the same. It relates to the same subject. It was, however, addressed to a different party, and I

## particularly wish to place before the Tribunal the last paragraph which

has been quoted and read into evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: The last paragraph does not mean very much by itself, does it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Very well, Sir. Then, if the Tribunal will permit it, I would like to read the document in its entirety.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that document 1650-PS has got these Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir. That is exactly what I do mean, Sir.

I recall the attention of the Tribunal to Document 2285-PS, which was received in evidence this morning as Exhibit USA-490. That was the affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Gast and Lieutenant Veith of the French Army who stated that during 1943 and 1944 prisoners of war were murdered at Mauthausen under the Bullet Decree. I am sure the Tribunal will recall that document.

The fourth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD was the commitment of racial and political undesirables to concentration camps and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder. Before Kaltenbrunner became Chief of the Security Police and SD on 30 January 1943, he was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration camps and of the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor and mass murder. The Tribunal will recall from previous evidence that Mauthausen Concentration Camp was established in Austria and that Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for Austria. This concentration camp, as shown by Document 1063(a)-PS, which was received this morning as Exhibit Number USA-492, was classified by Heydrich in January 1941 in Category III, a camp for the most heavily accused prisoners and for asocial prisoners who were considered incapable of being reformed. The Tribunal will recall that prisoners of war to be executed under the Bullet Decree were sent to Mauthausen. As will be shown hereafter, Kaltenbrunner was a frequent visitor to Mauthausen Concentration Camp. On one such visit in 1942 Kaltenbrunner personally observed the gas chamber in action. I now offer Document 2753-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-515. This is the affidavit of Alois Höllriegl, former guard at Mauthausen concentration camp. The affidavit states, and I quote:

“I, Alois Höllriegl, being first duly sworn, declare:

“I was a member of the Totenkopf SS and stationed at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp from January 1940 until the end of the war. On one occasion, I believe it was in the fall of 1942, Ernst Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen. I was on guard duty at the time and saw him twice. He went down into the gas chamber with Ziereis, commandant of the camp, at a time when prisoners were being gassed. The sound accompanying the gassing operation was well known to me. I heard the gassing taking place while Kaltenbrunner was present.

“I saw Kaltenbrunner come up from the gas cellar after the gassing operation had been completed.”—signed—“Höllriegl.”

On one occasion Kaltenbrunner made an inspection of the camp grounds at Mauthausen with Himmler and had his photograph taken during the course of the inspection. I offer Document 2641-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-516. This exhibit consists of two affidavits and a series of photographs. Here are the original photographs in my hand. The original photographs are the small ones, which have been enlarged, and those in the document book are not very good reproductions, but the Tribunal will see better reproductions which are being handed to it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: As the whole accusation against Kaltenbrunner personally has nevertheless been brought forward, I feel bound to make a motion on a matter of principle. I could have made this motion this morning just as well. It concerns the question of whether affidavits may be read or not. I know that this question has already been the subject of consultation by the Tribunal and that the Tribunal has come to a definite decision on this question. When I make this question again a matter for decision, it is for a special reason.

Every trial is somewhat dynamical. What was right at one time may be wrong later. The greatest and most important trial in history depends in many important points on the mere reading of affidavits which have been taken by the Prosecution exclusively, according to its own maxims.

The reading of affidavits is not satisfactory in the long run. It is becoming, from hour to hour, more necessary to see, to hear for once, a witness for the Prosecution and to test his credibility and the reliability of his memory. Many witnesses are standing, so to speak, at the door of this courtroom, and they need only to be called in. To hear the witness at a later stage is not sufficient; nor is it certain that the Tribunal will permit a hearing on the same evidential subject. I therefore oppose the further reading of the affidavits just announced. The spirit of Article 19 of the Charter should not be killed by the literal interpretation.

THE PRESIDENT: Is your application that you want to cross-examine the witness or is your application that the affidavit should not be read?

DR. KAUFFMANN: The latter.

THE PRESIDENT: That the affidavit should not be read?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to the affidavit of Höllriegl, Document 2753-PS?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the affidavit, which is upon a relevant point, upon a material point, is evidence which ought to be admitted under Article 19 of the Charter; but they will consider any motion which counsel for Kaltenbrunner may think fit to make for cross-examination of the witness who made the affidavit if he is available and could be called.

[_To Lieutenant Commander Harris._] You were dealing with these photographs, were you not?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir. They have been offered in evidence as the exhibit next in order, and I wish to refer to the first affidavit accompanying them, which appears in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It being the affidavit of Alois Höllriegl.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You had handed up the affidavit at the same time, had you not?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir, I did, Sir. That affidavit states, and I quote:

“I was a member of the Totenkopf SS and stationed in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp from January 1940 until the end of the war. I am thoroughly familiar with all of the buildings and grounds at Mauthausen Concentration Camp. I have been shown Document 2641-PS, which is a series of six photographs. I recognize all of these photographs as having been taken at Mauthausen Concentration Camp. With respect to the first photograph I positively identify Heinrich Himmler as the man on the left, Ziereis, the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp in the center, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner as the man on the right.”

THE PRESIDENT: He does not say, does he, at what date the photographs were taken?

LT. COMDR HARRIS: No, Sir, I have no evidence as to what date the photographs were taken, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there, at some time, in the company of Ziereis and Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: With full knowledge of conditions in, and the purpose of, concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or permitted to be ordered in his name the commitment of persons to concentration camps.

I offer Document L-38 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-517. This is an affidavit of Hermann Pister, the former commandant of Buchenwald concentration camp, which was taken on 1 August 1945 at Freising, Germany, in the course of an official military investigation by the United States Army, and I quote from it as follows, beginning with the second paragraph:

“With exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the concentration camps of the occupied territory, all prisoners were sent to the Concentration Camp Buchenwald by order of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt”—Reich Security Main Office—“Berlin. These orders for protective custody (red forms) were in most cases signed with the name ‘Kaltenbrunner.’ The few remaining protective custody orders were signed by ‘Förster.’”

I now offer Document 2477-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-518. This is the affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, former Chief of Department IVA1b in the RSHA. This document reads in part as follows, and I quote, beginning with the second paragraph:

“The right of taking into summary protective custody belongs to the directors of the State Police Directorates or State Police Offices; previously for a period of 21 days; later, I think, for a period of 56 days. Custody exceeding this time had to be sanctioned by the competent Office for Protective Custody in the RSHA. The regulations for protective custody or the signing of the protective custody order could only be issued through the Director of the RSHA as Chief of the Sipo and SD. All regulations and protective custody orders that I have seen bore a facsimile stamp of Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner. As far as I can remember, I have never seen a document of this kind with another name as signature. How far and to whom the Chief of the Sipo and SD possibly gave authority for the use of his facsimile stamp, I do not know. Perhaps the Chief of Amt IV possessed a similar authority. The greater part of the Protective Custody Office was transferred to Prague. Only one staff remained in Berlin.”

I now offer Document 2745-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-519. This is an order, under date of 7 July 1943, which was found at the former office of the section of the Gestapo which handled protective custody matters in Prague. It was an order to the Prague office to send a teletype message to the Gestapo office in Köslin ordering protective custody of one Ratzke, and her commitment to the concentration camp at Ravensbrück for refusing to work. The order carried the facsimile signature of Kaltenbrunner and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the original which has that facsimile for the arrest. Orders of this type were the basis for the orders actually sent out to the Prague office, which carried the teletype signature of Kaltenbrunner. At the bottom of the page the Tribunal will note the facsimile stamp of Kaltenbrunner.

I next refer to Document L-215, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-243. I believe the Tribunal will recall this document, which has heretofore been received in evidence, and which contains 25 orders for arrest issued out of the Prague office of the RSHA to the Einsatzkommando of Luxembourg, all of which carry the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner. And the Court will remember—and I am holding up the original document—that these arrest orders were the red forms which the commandant of Buchenwald referred to in his affidavit as being the forms which he saw coming from RSHA committing persons to Buchenwald.

The concentration camps to which persons were committed, according to Document L-215, by Kaltenbrunner, included Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: The most of these, Sir, were in 1944. I believe they are all in 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear on the document does it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It does appear, Sir, on the original document, yes. The first page of this translation is a summary of all of these. There is only one of the dossiers which has been translated in full, and the date on that one is 15. 2. 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I see.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Among the grounds specified on these orders carrying the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner were, quoting:

“Strongly suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich; spiteful statements inimical to Germany, as well as aspersions and threats against persons active in the National Socialist movement; strongly suspected of aiding deserters.”

I now offer Document 2239-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-520. This is a file of 42 telegrams sent by the Prague office of the RSHA to the Gestapo office at Darmstadt, and they all carry the teletype signature of Kaltenbrunner. These commitment orders were issued during the period from 20 September 1944 to 2 February 1945. The concentration camps to which Kaltenbrunner sent these people included Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenbürg, and Theresienstadt. Nationalities included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican, Lithuanian, Greek, and Jews. Grounds included refusal to work, religious propaganda, sex relations with PW’s, communist statements, loafing on the job, working against the Reich, spreading of rumors detrimental to morale, “action Gitter,” breach of work contracts, statements against Germany, assault of foremen, defeatist statements, and theft and escape from jail.

Not only did Kaltenbrunner commit persons to concentration camps, but he authorized executions in concentration camps. I now offer Document L-51 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit USA-521. This is the affidavit of Adolf Zutter, the former adjutant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp, taken in the course of an official military investigation of the United States Army, on 2 August 1945, at Linz, Austria. This affidavit states, and I am quoting from Paragraph 3:

“Standartenführer Ziereis, the commander of Camp Mauthausen, gave me a large number of execution orders after opening the secret mail, because I was the adjutant and I had to deliver these to Obersturmführer Schulz. These orders of execution were written approximately in the following form. . . .”

There follows in the affidavit a description of the order for execution issued by the RSHA to the commander of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. I omit quoting that description and continue at the next paragraph:

“Orders for execution also came without the name of the court of justice. Until the assassination of Heydrich, these orders were signed by him or by his competent deputy. Later on the orders were signed by Kaltenbrunner, but mostly they were signed by his deputy, Gruppenführer Müller.

“Dr. Kaltenbrunner, who signed the above-mentioned orders, had the rank of SS general—Obergruppenführer—and was the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office.

“Dr. Kaltenbrunner is about 40 years old, height about 1.76 to 1.80 meters, and has deep fencing scars on his face.

“When Dr. Kaltenbrunner was only a Higher SS and Police Leader in Vienna, he visited the camp several times; later on as the Chief of Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) he visited the camp, too, though this occurred much less frequently. During these visits, the commander usually received him outside the building of the camp headquarters and reported. Concerning the American military mission, which landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January 1945, I remember when these persons were brought to Camp Mauthausen. I suppose the number of the arrivals was about 12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform, which was American or Canadian, brown-green color shirt and tunic and cloth cap. Eight or 10 days after their arrival the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype. Standartenführer Ziereis came to me into my office and told me, ‘Now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the execution.’ This letter was secret and had the signature ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’ Then these people were shot according to martial law and their belongings were given to me by Oberscharführer Niedermeyer.”

The fifth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD was the deportation of citizens of occupied territories for forced labor and the disciplining of forced labor.

I am sure the Tribunal will recall, without referring to it, Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-190. That was the letter from the head of the Sonderkommando of the Sipo and SD, which stated that the Ukraine would have to provide a million workers for the armament industry and that force should be used where necessary. That letter was dated 19 March 1943.

Kaltenbrunner’s responsibility for the disciplining of foreign labor is shown by Document 1063-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-492. No part of this letter has been read into the record. This letter dated 26 July 1943 was addressed to Higher SS and Police Leaders, commanders and inspectors of the Sipo and SD, and to the chiefs of Einsatz Groups B and D.

The Tribunal will recall that Einsatz Groups A, B, C, and D, operating in the East, carried out the extermination of Jews and Communist leaders. This document proves Kaltenbrunner’s control over Einsatz Groups B and D. This document is signed “Kaltenbrunner.” The first paragraph provides as follows:

“The Reichsführer SS has given his consent that besides concentration camps, which come under the jurisdiction of the SS Economic and Administration Main Office, further labor reformatory camps may be created for which the Security Police alone is competent. These labor reformatory camps are dependent on the authorization of the Reich Security Main Office, which can only be granted in case of urgent need (great number of foreign workers, and so forth).”

I now offer Document D-473 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-522. It should be right at the beginning of the document book. This letter signed “Kaltenbrunner” was sent by him under date of 4 December 1944 to regional offices of the Criminal Police.

The Tribunal will recall that Kaltenbrunner’s responsibility covered the Criminal Police as well as the Gestapo. It provides in part, and I quote, reading at the beginning of the letter:

“According to the decree of 30 June 1943, crimes committed by Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian laborers are being prosecuted by the Directorates of the State Police and even in those cases where for the time being the Criminal Police had, within the sphere of its competence, carried on the inquiries. For the purpose of speeding up the process and in order to save manpower, the decree of 30 June 1943 is altered, and the Directorates of the Criminal Police are authorized as from now on to prosecute, themselves, the crimes they are inquiring into, within the sphere of their competence, insofar as they are cases of minor or medium crimes.”

I begin with the second paragraph:

“The following are available to the Criminal Police as a means of prosecution:

“Police imprisonment . . . Admission into a concentration camp for preventive custody as being antisocial or dangerous to the community.”

And next to the last paragraph:

“Their stay in the concentration camp is normally to be for the duration of the war. Besides this, the Directorates of the Criminal Police are authorized to hand over Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian laborers in suitable cases and with the agreement of the competent Directorates of the State Police to the Gestapo’s penal camps for the ‘education for labor.’ Where the possibilities of prosecuting an individual case are insufficient because of the peculiarity of the case, the case is to be handed over to the competent Directorate of the State Police. Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”

In addition to sending foreign workers to Gestapo labor camps, Kaltenbrunner punished foreign workers by committing them to concentration camps. I offer Document 2582-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-523.

This is a series of four teletype orders committing individuals to concentration camps. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the second order dated 18 June 1943 under which the Gestapo at Saarbrücken was ordered to deliver a Pole to the Concentration Camp Natzweiler as a skilled workman and to the third teletype dated 12 December 1944 in which the Gestapo at Darmstadt was ordered to commit a Greek to the Concentration Camp Buchenwald because he was drifting around without occupation and to the fourth teletype dated 9 February 1945 in which the Gestapo at Darmstadt in Bensheim was ordered to commit a French citizen to Buchenwald for shirking work and insubordination. All of those orders are signed Kaltenbrunner.

I offer Document 2580-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-524. This document contains three more of these red form orders for protective custody, all signed Kaltenbrunner. The first one shows that a citizen of the Netherlands was taken into protective custody for work sabotage, and the second one shows that a French citizen was taken into protective custody for work sabotage and insubordination, both under date of 2 December 1944.

The sixth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the executing of captured commandos and paratroopers and the protecting of civilians who lynched Allied fliers.

The Tribunal will recall, I am sure, without referring to it, the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 which was introduced this morning, Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501, to the effect that commandos, even in uniform, were to be exterminated to the last man and that individual members captured by the police in occupied territory were to be handed over to the SD.

I now offer Document 1276-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-525. This is an express top-secret letter from the Chief of the Security Police and SD signed “Müller,” by order, to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in which the Chief of the Security Police and SD states—and I quote from the third paragraph of the second page of the English translation:

“I have instructed the Befehlshaber of the Security Police and the SD in Paris to treat such parachutists in English uniform as members of the commando operations in accordance with the Führer’s order of 18 October 1942 and to inform the military authorities in France that there must be corresponding treatment at the hands of the Armed Forces.”

This letter was dated 17 June 1944. That executions were carried out by the SD pursuant to the said Hitler order of 18 October 1942 while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD, is indicated by Document 526-PS heretofore received as Exhibit Number USA-502. That was the order introduced this morning; I am sure the Tribunal recalls it.

The policy of the police to protect civilians who lynched Allied fliers was effective during the period that Kaltenbrunner served as Chief of the Security Police and SD. I now offer Document 2990-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-526. This is an affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, the former Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and provides in Paragraph 7—this is all I’m going to read from the affidavit:

“In 1944, on another occasion but also in the course of an Amts-chef conference, I heard fragments of a conversation between Kaltenbrunner and Müller. I remember distinctly the following remarks of Kaltenbrunner:

“‘All offices of the SD and the Security Police are to be informed that pogroms of the populace against English and American terror fliers are not to be interfered with. On the contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.’”

The seventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment, and the punishment of civilians of occupied territories by summary methods. The fact that this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is shown by Document 835-PS, which is offered as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-527. This is a letter from the High Command of the Armed Forces to the German Armistice Commission under date 2 September 1944. The document begins, and I quote:

“Conforming to the decrees referred to, all non-German civilians in occupied territories who have endangered the security and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in other ways are to be surrendered to the Security Police and SD. Only those prisoners are excepted who were legally sentenced to death or were serving a sentence of confinement prior to the announcement of these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which endanger the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are those also of a political nature.”

The eighth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the crime of executing and confining persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives. That this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is indicated by Document L-37, heretofore received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-506. That was received this morning. It is the letter of the Commander of Sipo and SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, in which it was stated that the male relatives of assassins and saboteurs should be shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age sent to concentration camps. I refer again to Document L-215, which has heretofore been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-243, and specifically to the case of Junker, who was ordered by Kaltenbrunner to be committed to Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp by the Gestapo “because as a relative of a deserter, he is expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go free.”

The ninth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the clearance of Sipo and SD prisons and concentration camps. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-53, which was received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-291. This was the letter from the Commander of the Sipo and SD, Radom, dated 21 July 1944, in which it is stated that the Commander of the Sipo and SD of the General Government had ordered all Sipo and SD prisons to be cleared and, if necessary, the inmates to be liquidated. I now offer Document 3462-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-528. This is the sworn interrogation of Bertus Gerdes, the former Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich. This interrogation was taken in the course of an official military investigation of the U.S. Army. In this interrogation Gerdes was ordered to state all he knew about Kaltenbrunner. I am only going to read a very small portion of his reply, beginning on the third paragraph of Page 2:

“Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant touch with him because he was greatly worried about the attitude of the foreign workers and especially inmates of Concentration Camps Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which were in the path of the approaching Allied armies. On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I received a telephone call from Gauleiter Giesler asking me to be available for a conversation that night. In the course of our personal conversation that night, I was told by Giesler that he had received a directive from Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, by order of the Führer, to work out a plan without delay for the liquidation of the concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish labor camps in Landsberg and Mühldorf. The directive proposed to liquidate the two Jewish labor camps at Landsberg and Mühldorf by use of the German Luftwaffe, since the construction area of these camps had previously been the targets of repeated enemy air attacks. This action received the code name of ‘Wolke A-1.’”

I now pass to the second paragraph on Page 3, continuing to quote from this interrogation:

“I was certain that I would never let this directive be carried out. As the action Wolke A-1 should have become operational already for some time, I was literally swamped by couriers from Kaltenbrunner and moreover I was supposed to have discussed the details of the Mühldorf and Landsberg actions in detail with the two Kreisleiter concerned. The couriers, who were in most cases SS officers, usually SS Untersturmführer, gave me terse and strict orders to read and initial. The orders threatened me with the most terrible punishment, including execution, if I did not comply with them. However, I could always excuse my failure to execute the plan because of bad flying weather and lack of gasoline and bombs. Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered that the Jews in Landsberg be marched to Dachau in order to include them in the Dachau extermination operations, and that the Mühldorf

## action was to be carried out by the Gestapo.

“Kaltenbrunner also ordered an operation ‘Wolkenbrand’ for the Concentration Camp Dachau, which provided that the inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau were to be liquidated by poison with the exception of Aryan nationals of the Western Powers.

“Gauleiter Giesler received this order direct from Kaltenbrunner and discussed in my presence the procurement of the required amounts of poison with Dr. Harrfeld, the Gau health chief. Dr. Harrfeld promised to procure these quantities when ordered and was advised to await my further directions. As I was determined to prevent the execution of this plan in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr. Harrfeld.

“The inmates of Landsberg had hardly been delivered at Dachau when Kaltenbrunner sent a courier declaring the Action Wolkenbrand was operational.

“I prevented the execution of the ‘Wolke A-1’ and ‘Wolkenbrand’ by giving Giesler the reason that the front was too close and asked him to transmit this on to Kaltenbrunner.

“Kaltenbrunner therefore issued directives in writing to Dachau to transport all Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol, where the final liquidation of these prisoners was to take place without fail.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY Thursday, 3 January 1946

_Morning Session_

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: If the Tribunal will recall, at the end of the last session we had finished reading a portion of the sworn interrogation of the Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich and had touched on the point where he said that Kaltenbrunner issued directives to Dachau to transport Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol.

I now offer, as exhibit next in order, the first five pages of the interrogation report of Gottlob Berger, Chief of the head office of the SS, made under oath on 20 September 1945, in the course of these proceedings. You will find these pages at the end of the document book and this is offered as Exhibit Number USA-529. These pages have been translated into German and made available to the defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: Does it have a number?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It has no PS number, Sir. It is at the very end of the document book. I wish to read only one question and answer from these pages; and I refer to Page 3 of the exhibit, the last question and answer on that page:

“Q: Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think is primarily responsible?

“A: The first one, the commandant; the second one, Glücks; because he was practically responsible for all the interior direction of the camps. If one wants to be exact, one would have to find out how the information service between the camp commandant and Glücks actually operated. I want to give you the following example:

“During the night of the 22d and 23rd of April, I was sent to Munich by plane. As I entered the city, I met a group of perhaps 120 men dressed in the suits of the concentration camps. These people made a very miserable impression on me. I asked the guard who was with them, ‘What about these men?’ He told me that these men were marching by foot to the Alps. Firstly, I sent him back to Dachau. Then I wrote a letter to the commandant to send no more people by foot to any place but, whenever the Allies advanced any further, to give over the camp completely. I did that on my own responsibility and I told him that I came straight from Berlin and that I can be found in my service post in Munich. The commandant or his deputy telephoned at about 12 o’clock and told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reichskommissar . . .” (Document Number USA-529)

The tenth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and SD is the persecution of the Jews. This crime, of course, continued after 30 January 1943; and evidence has heretofore been received that the persecutions continued until, and were accelerated toward, the end of the war. Kaltenbrunner took a personal interest in such matters, as is indicated by Document 2519-PS, which is offered as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-530. This exhibit consists of a memorandum and an affidavit; and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the affidavit. Quoting from the affidavit:

“I, Henri Monneray, being first duly sworn, depose and say that since 12 September 1945 I have been and I am the member of the French staff for the prosecution of Axis criminality and have been pursuing my official duties in this connection in Nuremberg, Germany, since 12 October 1945.

“In the course of my official duties, at the instruction of the French Chief Prosecutor, I examined the personal documents of the defendants . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all of this? What is the object of this affidavit?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: To show that this document was derived from the personal effects of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: From the personal possession?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: From the personal possession.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, you can leave out the immaterial parts.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Very good, Sir. Passing to the last sentence of the affidavit:

“Said Document 2519-PS is the document which I found in the envelope containing Kaltenbrunner’s personal papers.”

I now read the memorandum, quoting:

“Radio message to Gruppenführer SS Major General Vegelein, Headquarters of the Führer, through Sturmbannführer SS Major Sansoni, Berlin.

“Please inform the Reichsführer SS and report to the Führer that all arrangements against Jews, political, and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate have been taken care of by me personally today. The situation there is one of calmness, fear of Soviet successes, and hope of an occupation by the Western enemies. Kaltenbrunner.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is not dated?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: This is not dated.

The eleventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible is the persecution of the churches. It is unnecessary to present specific evidence that this crime continued after 30 January 1943, since this was one of the fundamental purposes of the Security Police and SD, as has already been shown.

These are the crimes for which the Defendant Kaltenbrunner must answer. As to his intent, there is no need to go outside the record before this Tribunal. On December 1, 1945, in these proceedings the Witness Lahousen was asked on cross-examination, “Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?”

After describing his meeting with Kaltenbrunner on a day in Munich when a university student and his sister were arrested and executed for distributing leaflets from the auditorium, Lahousen said—and I wish to refer only to two sentences on Page 724 of the transcript (Volume III, Page 29)—quoting:

“I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of course Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was completely shattered because of what happened that day and was still under the painful impression—and thank God there are still witnesses available who can testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was very much to the point, but at the same time he was quite cynical about it. That is the only thing I can tell you about this matter.”

Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a principal role in the betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As higher SS and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss, he supervised and had knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. The Mauthausen Concentration Camp was established in his jurisdiction and he visited it several times. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in action. With this knowledge and background he accepted, in January 1943, appointment as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the very agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to great prominence in the SS and the German Police and receiving high honors from Hitler. Like other leading Nazis, Kaltenbrunner sought power; to gain it, he made his covenant with crime.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, next will be some witnesses, and Colonel Amen will handle the interrogation. Colonel Amen.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I wish to call as a witness for the Prosecution, Mr. Otto Ohlendorf.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you spell it, please?

COL. AMEN: O-h-l-e-n-d-o-r-f, the first name being Otto. Your Lordship will note that his name appears under Amt III on the chart on the wall.

THE PRESIDENT: What did you say appeared?

COL. AMEN: The name of this witness appears under Amt III of the chart, RSHA, the large square, the third section down.

THE PRESIDENT: Amt III. Oh, yes; I see it.

[_Witness Ohlendorf took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Otto Ohlendorf, will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

COL. Amen: Will you try to speak slowly and pause between each question and answer.

OTTO OHLENDORF (Witness): Yes.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

OHLENDORF: In Hohen-Egelsen.

COL. AMEN: How old are you?

OHLENDORF: Thirty-eight years old.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the National Socialist Party?

OHLENDORF: 1925.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the SA?

OHLENDORF: For the first time in 1926.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the SS?

OHLENDORF: I must correct my answer to the previous question; I thought you were asking about my membership in the SS.

COL. AMEN: When did you become a member of the SA?

OHLENDORF: In the year 1925.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you join the SD?

OHLENDORF: In 1936.

COL. AMEN: What was your last position in the SD?

OHLENDORF: Chief of Amt III in the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: Turning to the chart on the wall behind you, will you tell the Tribunal whether you can identify that chart in any way.

OHLENDORF: I have already seen this chart. I worked on it, and I can identify it as accurate.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did you have to do with making up that chart?

OHLENDORF: This chart was made up during my interrogation.

COL. AMEN: For the information of the Tribunal, that is Exhibit Number USA-493, the chart of which the witness speaks.

OHLENDORF: I didn’t understand you.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether that chart correctly portrays the basic organization of the RSHA, as well as the position of Kaltenbrunner, the Gestapo, and the SD in the German Police system?

OHLENDORF: This chart represents the organization of the RSHA. It shows the correct position of the SD departments, of the State Police, and of the Secret Police.

COL. AMEN: Referring once more to the chart, please indicate your position in the RSHA and state for what period you continued to serve in that capacity.

[_The witness pointed to Amt III on the chart._]

COL. AMEN: What were the positions of Kaltenbrunner, Müller, and Eichmann in the RSHA, and state for what periods of time each of them continued to serve in his respective capacity?

OHLENDORF: Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD; as such, he was also Chief of the RSHA, the internal organizational term for the office of the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD.

Kaltenbrunner occupied this position from 30 January 1943 until the end of the war. Müller was Chief of Amt IV, the Gestapo. When the Gestapo was established, he became Deputy Chief, and as such he logically became Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA. He occupied this position until the end of the war. Eichmann occupied a position in Amt IV under Müller and worked on the Jewish problem from approximately 1940 onwards. To my knowledge, he also occupied this position until the end of the war.

COL. AMEN: Did you tell us for what period of time you continued to serve as Chief of Amt III?

OHLENDORF: I was part-time Chief of Amt III from 1939 to 1945.

COL. AMEN: Turning now to the designation “Mobile Units” with the Army shown in the lower right hand corner of the chart, please explain to the Tribunal the significance of the terms “Einsatzgruppe” and “Einsatzkommando.”

OHLENDORF: The concept “Einsatzgruppe” was established after an agreement between the Chiefs of the RSHA, OKW, and OKH, on the separate use of Sipo units in the operational areas. The concept “Einsatzgruppe” first appeared during the Polish campaign.

The agreement with the OKH and OKW, however, was arrived at only before the beginning of the Russian campaign. This agreement specified that a representative of the Chief of the Sipo and the SD would be assigned to the army groups, or armies, and that this official would have at his disposal mobile units of the Sipo and the SD in the form of an Einsatzgruppe, subdivided into Einsatzkommandos. The Einsatzkommandos would, on orders from the army group or army, be assigned to the individual army units as needed.

COL. AMEN: State, if you know, whether prior to the campaign against Soviet Russia, any agreement was entered into between the OKW, OKH, and RSHA?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, as I have just described them, were used on the basis of a written agreement between the OKW, OKH, and RSHA.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that there was such a written agreement?

OHLENDORF: I was repeatedly present during the negotiations which Albrecht and Schellenberg conducted with the OKH and OKW; and I also had a written copy of this agreement, which was the outcome of these negotiations, in my own hands when I took over the Einsatzgruppe.

COL. AMEN: Explain to the Tribunal who Schellenberg was. What position, if any, did he occupy?

OHLENDORF: Schellenberg was, at the end, Chief of Amt VI in the RSHA; at the time when he was conducting these negotiations as the representative of Heydrich, he belonged to the Amt I.

COL. AMEN: On approximately what date did these negotiations take place?

OHLENDORF: The negotiations lasted several weeks. The agreement must have been reached about 1 or 2 weeks before the beginning of the Russian campaign.

COL. AMEN: Did you yourself ever see a copy of this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you have occasion to work with this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: On more than one occasion?

OHLENDORF: Yes; in all questions arising out of the relationship between the Einsatzgruppen and the Army.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original or any copy of that agreement is located today?

OHLENDORF: No.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please explain to the Tribunal the entire substance of this written agreement.

OHLENDORF: First of all, the agreement stated that Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos would be set up and used in the operational areas. This created a precedent, because until that time the Army had, on its own responsibility, discharged the tasks which would now fall solely to the Sipo. The second was the regulation as to competence.

THE PRESIDENT: You’re going too fast. What is it that you say the Einsatzkommandos did under the agreement?

OHLENDORF: I said, this was the relationship between the Army and the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos. The agreement specified that the army groups or armies would be responsible for the movement and the supply of Einsatzgruppen, but that instructions for their activities would come from the Chief of the Sipo and SD.

COL. AMEN: Let us understand. Is it correct that an Einsatz group was to be attached to each army group or army?

OHLENDORF: Every army group was to have an Einsatzgruppe attached to it. The army group in its turn would then attach the Einsatzkommandos to the armies of the army group.

COL. AMEN: And was the army command to determine the area within which the Einsatz group was to operate?

OHLENDORF: The operational area of the Einsatzgruppe was already determined by the fact that it was attached to a specific army group and therefore moved with it, whereas the operational areas of the Einsatzkommandos were then fixed by the army group or army.

COL. AMEN: Did the agreement also provide that the army command was to direct the time during which they were to operate?

OHLENDORF: That was included under the heading “movement.”

COL. AMEN: And also to direct any additional tasks they were to perform?

OHLENDORF: Yes. Even though the Chiefs of the Sipo and SD had the right to issue instructions to them on their work, there existed a general agreement that the army was also entitled to issue orders to the Einsatzgruppen, if the operational situation made it necessary.

COL. AMEN: What did this agreement provide with respect to the attachment of the Einsatz group command to the army command?

OHLENDORF: I can’t remember whether anything specific was contained in the agreement about that. At any rate a liaison man between the army command and the SD was appointed.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other provisions of this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: I believe I can state the main contents of that agreement.

COL. AMEN: What position did you occupy with respect to this agreement?

OHLENDORF: From June 1941 to the death of Heydrich in June 1942, I led Einsatzgruppe D, and was the representative of the Chief of the Sipo and the SD with the 11th Army.

COL. AMEN: And when was Heydrich’s death?

OHLENDORF: Heydrich was wounded at the end of May 1942, and died on 4 June 1942.

COL. AMEN: How much advance notice, if any, did you have of the campaign against Soviet Russia?

OHLENDORF: About 4 weeks.

COL. AMEN: How many Einsatz groups were there, and who were their respective leaders?

OHLENDORF: There were four Einsatzgruppen, Group A, B, C, and D. Chief of Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker; Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe; Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Rasche, and later, Dr. Thomas; Chief of Einsatzgruppe D, I myself, and later Bierkamp.

COL. AMEN: To which army was Group D attached?

OHLENDORF: Group D was not attached to any army group, but was attached directly to the 11th Army.

COL. AMEN: Where did Group D operate?

OHLENDORF: Group D operated in the Southern Ukraine.

COL. AMEN: Will you describe in more detail the nature and extent of the area in which Group D originally operated, naming the cities or territories?

OHLENDORF: The northernmost city was Cernauti; then southward through Mohilev-Podolsk, Yampol, then eastward Zuvalje, Czervind, Melitopol, Mariopol, Taganrog, Rostov, and the Crimea.

COL. AMEN: What was the ultimate objective of Group D?

OHLENDORF: Group D was held in reserve for the Caucasus, for an army group which was to operate in the Caucasus.

COL. AMEN: When did Group D commence its move into Soviet Russia?

OHLENDORF: Group D left Duegen on 21 June and reached Pietra Namsk in Romania in 3 days. There the first Einsatzkommandos were already being demanded by the Army, and they immediately set off for the destinations named by the Army. The entire Einsatzgruppe was put into operation at the beginning of July.

COL. AMEN: You are referring to the 11th Army?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: In what respects, if any, were the official duties of the Einsatz groups concerned with Jews and Communist commissars?

OHLENDORF: On the question of Jews and Communists, the Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of the Einsatzkommandos were orally instructed before their mission.

COL. AMEN: What were their instructions with respect to the Jews and the Communist functionaries?

OHLENDORF: The instructions were that in the Russian operational areas of the Einsatzgruppen the Jews, as well as the Soviet political commissars, were to be liquidated.

COL. AMEN: And when you say “liquidated” do you mean “killed?”

OHLENDORF: Yes, I mean “killed.”

COL. AMEN: Prior to the opening of the Soviet campaign, did you attend a conference at Pretz?

OHLENDORF: Yes, it was a conference at which the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos were informed of their tasks and were given the necessary orders.

COL. AMEN: Who was present at that conference?

OHLENDORF: The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of the Einsatzkommandos and Streckenbach of the RSHA who transmitted the orders of Heydrich and Himmler.

COL. AMEN: What were those orders?

OHLENDORF: Those were the general orders on the normal work of the Sipo and the SD, and in addition the liquidation order which I have already mentioned.

COL. AMEN: And that conference took place on approximately what date?

OHLENDORF: About 3 or 4 days before the mission.

COL. AMEN: So that before you commenced to march into Soviet Russia, you received orders at this conference to exterminate the Jews and Communist functionaries in addition to the regular professional work of the Security Police and SD; is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you, personally, have any conversation with Himmler respecting any communication from Himmler to the chiefs of army groups and armies concerning this mission?

OHLENDORF: Yes. Himmler told me that before the beginning of the Russian campaign Hitler had spoken of this mission to a conference of the army groups and the army chiefs—no, not the army chiefs but the commanding generals—and had instructed the commanding generals to provide the necessary support.

COL. AMEN: So that you can testify that the chiefs of the army groups and the armies had been similarly informed of these orders for the liquidation of the Jews and Soviet functionaries?

OHLENDORF: I don’t think it is quite correct to put it in that form. They had no orders for liquidation; the order for the liquidation was given to Himmler to carry out, but since this liquidation took place in the operational area of the army group or the armies, they had to be ordered to provide support. Moreover, without such instructions to the army, the activities of the Einsatzgruppen would not have been possible.

COL. AMEN: Did you have any other conversation with Himmler concerning this order?

OHLENDORF: Yes, in the late summer of 1941 Himmler was in Nikolaiev. He assembled the leaders and men of the Einsatzkommandos, repeated to them the liquidation order, and pointed out that the leaders and men who were taking part in the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the execution of this order. The responsibility was his, alone, and the Führer’s.

COL. AMEN: And you yourself heard that said?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether this mission of the Einsatz group was known to the army group commanders?

OHLENDORF: This order and the execution of these orders were known to the commanding general of the army.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that?

OHLENDORF: Through conferences with the army and through instructions which were given by the army on the execution of the order.

COL. AMEN: Was the mission of the Einsatz groups and the agreement between OKW, OKH, and RSHA known to the other leaders in the RSHA?

OHLENDORF: At least some of them knew of it, since some of the leaders were also active in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in the course of time. Furthermore, the leaders who were dealing with the organization and the legal aspect of the Einsatzgruppen also knew of it.

COL. AMEN: Most of the leaders came from the RSHA, did they not?

OHLENDORF: Which leaders?

COL. AMEN: Of the Einsatz groups.

OHLENDORF: No, one can’t say that. The leaders in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos came from all over the Reich.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether the mission and the agreement were also known to Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: After his assumption of office Kaltenbrunner had to deal with these questions and consequently must have known details of the Einsatzgruppen which were offices of his.

COL. AMEN: Who was the commanding officer of the 11th Army?

OHLENDORF: At first, Ritter von Schober; later, Von Manstein.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal in what way or ways the commanding officer of the 11th Army directed or supervised Einsatz Group D in carrying out its liquidation activities?

OHLENDORF: An order from the 11th Army was sent to Nikolaiev stating that liquidations were to take place only at a distance of not less than 200 kilometers from the headquarters of the commanding general.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other occasion?

OHLENDORF: In Simferopol the army command requested the Einsatzkommandos in its area to hasten the liquidations, because famine was threatening and there was a great housing shortage.

COL. AMEN: Do you know how many persons were liquidated by Einsatz Group D under your direction?

OHLENDORF: In the year between June 1941 to June 1942 the Einsatzkommandos reported 90,000 people liquidated.

COL. AMEN: Did that include men, women, and children?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: On what do you base those figures?

OHLENDORF: On reports sent by the Einsatzkommandos to the Einsatzgruppen.

COL. AMEN: Were those reports submitted to you?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you saw them and read them?

OHLENDORF: I beg your pardon?

COL. AMEN: And you saw and read those reports, personally?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And it is on those reports that you base the figures you have given the Tribunal?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you know how those figures compare with the number of persons liquidated by other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The figures which I saw of other Einsatzgruppen are considerably larger.

COL. AMEN: That was due to what factor?

OHLENDORF: I believe that to a large extent the figures submitted by the other Einsatzgruppen were exaggerated.

COL. AMEN: Did you see reports of liquidations from the other Einsatz groups from time to time?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And those reports showed liquidations exceeding those of Group D; is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally supervise mass executions of these individuals?

OHLENDORF: I was present at two mass executions for purposes of inspection.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an individual mass execution was carried out?

OHLENDORF: A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect all the Jews in its area by registering them. This registration was performed by the Jews themselves.

COL. AMEN: On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?

OHLENDORF: On the pretext that they were to be resettled.

COL. AMEN: Will you continue?

OHLENDORF: After the registration the Jews were collected at one place; and from there they were later transported to the place of execution, which was, as a rule an antitank ditch or a natural excavation. The executions were carried out in a military manner, by firing squads under command.

COL. AMEN: In what way were they transported to the place of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were transported to the place of execution in trucks, always only as many as could be executed immediately. In this way it was attempted to keep the span of time from the moment in which the victims knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual execution as short as possible.

COL. AMEN: Was that your idea?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And after they were shot what was done with the bodies?

OHLENDORF: The bodies were buried in the antitank ditch or excavation.

COL. AMEN: What determination, if any, was made as to whether the persons were actually dead?

OHLENDORF: The unit leaders or the firing-squad commanders had orders to see to this and, if need be, finish them off themselves.

COL. AMEN: And who would do that?

OHLENDORF: Either the unit leader himself or somebody designated by him.

COL. AMEN: In what positions were the victims shot?

OHLENDORF: Standing or kneeling.

COL. AMEN: What was done with the personal property and clothing of the persons executed?

OHLENDORF: All valuables were confiscated at the time of the registration or the rounding up and handed over to the Finance Ministry, either through the RSHA or directly. At first the clothing was given to the population, but in the winter of 1941-42 it was collected and disposed of by the NSV.

COL. AMEN: All their personal property was registered at the time?

OHLENDORF: No, not all of it, only valuables were registered.

COL. AMEN: What happened to the garments which the victims were wearing when they went to the place of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were obliged to take off their outer garments immediately before the execution.

COL. AMEN: All of them?

OHLENDORF: The outer garments, yes.

COL. AMEN: How about the rest of the garments they were wearing?

OHLENDORF: The other garments remained on the bodies.

COL. AMEN: Was that true of not only your group but of the other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: That was the order in my Einsatzgruppe. I don’t know how it was done in other Einsatzgruppen.

COL. AMEN: In what way did they handle it?

OHLENDORF: Some of the unit leaders did not carry out the liquidation in the military manner, but killed the victims singly by shooting them in the back of the neck.

COL. AMEN: And you objected to that procedure?

OHLENDORF: I was against that procedure, yes.

COL. AMEN: For what reason?

OHLENDORF: Because both for the victims and for those who carried out the executions, it was, psychologically, an immense burden to bear.

COL. AMEN: Now, what was done with the property collected by the Einsatzkommandos from these victims?

OHLENDORF: All valuables were sent to Berlin, to the RSHA or to the Reich Ministry of Finance. The articles which could be used in the operational area, were disposed of there.

COL. AMEN: For example, what happened to gold and silver taken from the victims?

OHLENDORF: That was, as I have just said, turned over to Berlin, to the Reich Ministry of Finance.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that?

OHLENDORF: I can remember that it was actually handled in that way from Simferopol.

COL. AMEN: How about watches, for example, taken from the victims?

OHLENDORF: At the request of the Army, watches were made available to the forces at the front.

COL. AMEN: Were all victims, including the men, women, and children, executed in the same manner?

OHLENDORF: Until the spring of 1942, yes. Then an order came from Himmler that in the future women and children were to be killed only in gas vans.

COL. AMEN: How had the women and children been killed previously?

OHLENDORF: In the same way as the men—by shooting.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was done about burying the victims after they had been executed?

OHLENDORF: The Kommandos filled the graves to efface the signs of the execution, and then labor units of the population leveled them.

COL. AMEN: Referring to the gas vans which you said you received in the spring of 1942, what order did you receive with respect to the use of these vans?

OHLENDORF: These gas vans were in future to be used for the killing of women and children.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the construction of these vans and their appearance?

OHLENDORF: The actual purpose of these vans could not be seen from the outside. They looked like closed trucks, and were so constructed that at the start of the motor, gas was conducted into the van causing death in 10 to 15 minutes.

COL. AMEN: Explain in detail just how one of these vans was used for an execution.

OHLENDORF: The vans were loaded with the victims and driven to the place of burial, which was usually the same as that used for the mass executions. The time needed for transportation was sufficient to insure the death of the victims.

COL. AMEN: How were the victims induced to enter the vans?

OHLENDORF: They were told that they were to be transported to another locality.

COL. AMEN: How was the gas turned on?

OHLENDORF: I am not familiar with the technical details.

COL. AMEN: How long did it take to kill the victims ordinarily?

OHLENDORF: About 10 to 15 minutes; the victims were not conscious of what was happening to them.

COL. AMEN: How many persons could be killed simultaneously in one such van?

OHLENDORF: About 15 to 25 persons. The vans varied in size.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those persons operating these vans from time to time?

OHLENDORF: I didn’t understand the question.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those who were working on the vans?

OHLENDORF: I received the report that the Einsatzkommandos did not willingly use the vans.

COL. AMEN: Why not?

OHLENDORF: Because the burial of the victims was a great ordeal for the members of the Einsatzkommandos.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal who furnished these vans to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The gas vans did not belong to the motor pool of the Einsatzgruppen but were assigned to the Einsatzgruppe as a special unit, headed by the man who had constructed the vans. The vans were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen by the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: Were the vans supplied to all of the different Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: I am not certain of that. I know only in the case of Einsatzgruppe D, and indirectly that Einsatzgruppe C also made use of these vans.

COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the letter from Becker to Rauff with respect to these gas vans?

OHLENDORF: I saw this letter during my interrogation.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I am referring to Exhibit 501-PS, Exhibit USA-288, being a letter already in evidence, a letter from Becker to Rauff.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you tell the Tribunal who Becker was?

OHLENDORF: According to my recollection, Becker was the constructor of the vans. It was he who was in charge of the vans of Einsatzgruppe D.

COL. AMEN: Who was Rauff?

OHLENDORF: Rauff was group leader in Amt II of the RSHA. Among other things, he was at that time in charge of transportation.

COL. AMEN: Can you identify that letter in any way?

OHLENDORF: The contents roughly correspond to my experiences and are therefore probably correct.

[_Document 501-PS was handed to the witness._]

COL. AMEN: Will you look at the letter before you and tell us whether you can identify it in any way?

OHLENDORF: The external appearance of the letter as well as the initial “R” (Rauff) on it, and the reference to Zwabel or Fabel who took care of transportation under Rauff, seems to testify to the letter’s authenticity. The contents roughly correspond to the experiences which I had at that time.

COL. AMEN: So that you believe it to be an authentic document?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you now lay it aside on the table there?

Referring to your previous testimony, will you explain to the Tribunal why you believe that the type of execution ordered by you, namely, military, was preferable to the shooting-in-the-neck procedure adopted by the other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and men should be able to carry out the executions in a military manner

## acting on orders and should not have to make a decision of their own; it

was, to all intents and purposes, an order which they were to carry out. On the other hand, it was known to me that through the emotional excitement of the executions ill-treatment could not be avoided, since the victims discovered too soon that they were to be executed and could not therefore endure prolonged nervous strain. And it seemed intolerable to me that individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to kill a large number of people on their own decision.

COL. AMEN: In what manner did you determine which were the Jews to be executed?

OHLENDORF: That was not part of my task; but the identification of the Jews was carried out by the Jews themselves, since the registration was handled by a Jewish Council of Elders.

COL. AMEN: Did the amount of Jewish blood have anything to do with it?

OHLENDORF: I can’t remember the details, but I believe that half-Jews were also considered as Jews.

COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer personnel of the Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer personnel of the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The officer personnel was furnished by the State Police, the Kripo, and, to a lesser extent, by the SD.

COL. AMEN: Kripo?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the State Police, the Criminal Police and, to a lesser extent, the SD.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other sources of personnel?

OHLENDORF: Yes, most of the men employed were furnished by the Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei. The State Police and the Kripo furnished most of the experts, and the troops were furnished by the Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei.

COL. AMEN: How about the Waffen-SS?

OHLENDORF: The Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei were each supposed to supply the Einsatzgruppen with one company.

COL. AMEN: How about the Order Police?

OHLENDORF: The Ordnungspolizei also furnished the Einsatzgruppen with one company.

COL. AMEN: What was the size of Einsatz Group D and its operating area as compared with the other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: I estimate that Einsatzgruppe D was one-half or two-thirds as large as the other Einsatzgruppen. That changed in the course of time, since some of the Einsatzgruppen were greatly enlarged.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I have other questions relating to organizational matters which I think would clarify some of the evidence which has already been in part received by the Tribunal; but I don’t want to take the time of the Tribunal unless they feel that they want any more such testimony. I thought perhaps if any members of the Tribunal had questions they would ask this witness directly, because he is the best informed on these organizational matters of anyone who will be presented in Court.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not think that it is necessary to go further into the organizational questions at this stage, but it is a matter which must be really decided by you because you know what the nature of the evidence which you are considering is.

So far as the Tribunal is concerned, they are satisfied at the present stage to leave the matter where it is. But there is one aspect of the witness’ evidence which the Tribunal would like you to investigate, and that is whether the practices of which he has been speaking continued after 1942, and for how long.

COL. AMEN: [_To the witness._] Can you state whether the liquidation practices which you have described continued after 1942 and, if so, for how long a period of time thereafter?

OHLENDORF: I don’t think that the basic order was ever revoked. But I cannot remember the details—at least not with regard to Russia—which would enable me to make concrete statements on this subject. The retreat began very shortly thereafter, so that the operational region of the Einsatzgruppen became ever smaller. I do know, however, that other Einsatzgruppen with similar orders had been envisaged for other areas.

COL. AMEN: Your personal knowledge extends up to what date?

OHLENDORF: I know that the liquidation of Jews was prohibited about six months before the end of the war. I also saw a document terminating the liquidation of Soviet commissars, but I cannot recall a specific date.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether in fact it was so terminated?

OHLENDORF: Yes, I believe so.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know the number of men in your Einsatz group.

OHLENDORF: There were about 500 men in my Einsatzgruppe, excluding those who were added to the group as assistants from the country itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Including them, did you say?

OHLENDORF: Excluding those who were added to the group from the country itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how many there would be in other groups?

OHLENDORF: I estimate that at the beginning there were seven to eight hundred men; but, as I said, this number changed rapidly in the course of time, since the Einsatzgruppen themselves acquired new people or succeeded in getting additional personnel from the RSHA.

THE PRESIDENT: The numbers increased, did they?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the numbers increased.

COL. AMEN: Now, here are perhaps just a half dozen of these questions I would like to ask, because I do think they might clear up, in the minds of the Tribunal, some of the evidence which has gone before. I shall be very brief, if that is satisfactory to the Tribunal.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you explain the significance of the different widths of the blue lines on the chart?

OHLENDORF: The thick blue line between the position of Himmler as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police and the RSHA is designed to show the identity of the offices of the chiefs of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD in their tasks. The RSHA treated both ministerial questions of leadership and individual executive questions, that is to say, matters of the Sipo and the SD. From the legal administrative point of view, however, the organizational scheme shows an illegal state of affairs in that the RSHA as such never actually had official validity. The formal, legal position was different from that shown on this chart. Party and State offices with different authority were amalgamated. Under this designation RSHA, no directives or laws or orders could be issued on a legal basis, because the State Police, in its ministerial capacity, was still subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, whereas the SD, despite this set-up, was an organ of the Party.

Therefore if I wanted to reproduce this administrative scheme accurately, I should, for example, have to put in place of Amt IV, the Amt “Political Police”, a part of the former Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei. This Amt “Political Police” existed formally to the very end and had sprung from the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior. Also, the Secret State Police Amt, the Central Office of the Prussian Secret State Police, the head office of all the political police offices of the different Länder, continued to exist formally.

Thus, ministerial questions continued to be dealt with under the heading of the Minister of the Interior. So far as it was necessary to emphasize the formal competence of the Ministry of the Interior, this was indicated in the heading “Reich Minister of the Interior” with the filing notice “Pol,” the former designation of the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, together with the appropriate filing notice of the competent department of the former Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei; for example, filing notice “Pol-S” meant Sicherheitspolizei; “V” meant Amt Verwaltung und Recht (Administration and Law).

The RSHA was therefore nothing more than a camouflage designation which did not correctly represent the actual state of affairs but gave the Chief of the Sipo and the SD, as a collective designation for the Chief of the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei and the Chief of the SD Hauptamt (an office which existed until 1939), the opportunity of using one or the other letterhead at any time.

At the same time it gave him the opportunity of an internal amalgamation of all forces and the opportunity of a division of the spheres of work on a practical, effective basis. But the State offices in this Amt did remain in a way dependent on the Ministry of the Interior, and similarly the departments of the SD remained departments of the Party.

The SD Hauptamt, or the RSHA, had formally only the significance of an SS Main Office, in which the SS members of the Sipo and the SD belonged to the SS. But the SS, that is to say, Himmler, as Reichsführer SS, gave these State offices no official authority to issue orders.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I follow altogether what you have been saying; but is what you have been saying the reason why you are shown on the chart as concerned with Amt III, which refers, apparently, only to inside Germany, while, according to your evidence, you were the head of Einsatz Group D, which was operating outside Germany?

OHLENDORF: The fact that I led an Einsatzgruppe had nothing to do with my position as Chief of Amt III. I led the Einsatzgruppe as an individual and not as Chief of Amt III; and in my capacity as leader of an Einsatzgruppe, I entered into a completely new function and assumed an office completely separate from my previous one.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. And did it involve that you left Germany and went into the area invaded in the Soviet Union?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you now explain the significance of the dotted blue lines, as compared with the solid blue lines on the right-hand side of the chart?

OHLENDORF: The solid lines indicate a direct official channel for orders, whereas the dotted lines signify that there was, as a rule, no direct channel.

COL. AMEN: Was the term “SD” ever used to include both the Sipo and the SD?

OHLENDORF: In the course of years the term “SD” was used more and more incorrectly. It came to be established as an abbreviation for Sipo and SD, without actually being suitable for that. “SD” was originally simply a designation for the fact that someone belonged to the SS through the SD Main Office. When the SD Main Office was dissolved and was taken over into the RSHA, the question arose whether the designation SD, which was also worn as insignia on the sleeve of the particular SS man, should be replaced by another insignia or a new abbreviation, e.g., RSHA. That was not done because the camouflage of the RSHA would thereby have been endangered. But when, for example, I read in a Führer order that in France people were to be turned over to the SD, that was a case in point of the false use of the designation SD, because there were no such offices in France and the SD, insofar as it functioned in departments, e.g., Amt III, had no executive power but was purely an intelligence organ.

COL. AMEN: Briefly, what was the relationship between the SS and the Gestapo?

OHLENDORF: The relationship between the SS and Gestapo was this: The Reichsführer SS, as such, took over the tasks of the Police and attempted to link the State Police and the SS more closely, that is to say, on the one hand to employ only members of the State Police who were eligible for the SS and, on the other hand, to use the institutions of the SS, e.g., education and training of the younger generation by the Waffen-SS, in order in this way to supply recruits for the State Police. This amalgamation was later extended by Himmler in an attempt to bring about the same relationship between the SS and the Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the whole internal administration.

COL. AMEN: About how many full-time agents and honorary auxiliary personnel did the SD employ?

OHLENDORF: Yes, well, in this connection, too, one cannot use the term SD; one must distinguish here between Amt III and Amt VI. Amt III, as the interior intelligence service, had about 3,000 salaried members, including men and women. On the other hand, the interior intelligence service worked essentially with honorary members, that is, with men and women who put their professional experiences and the experiences in their surroundings at the disposal of the interior intelligence service. I would judge their number to be roughly 30,000.

COL. AMEN: Will you briefly give the Tribunal a general example of how a typical transaction was handled through the channels indicated on the chart?

OHLENDORF: First, a general example, invented to make things clear. Himmler heard that more and more saboteurs were being dropped from planes into Germany and were endangering transportation and factory sites. He informed Kaltenbrunner in the latter’s capacity as Chief of the Sipo and instructed him to draw the attention of his organs to this state of affairs and to take measures ensuring that these saboteurs would be seized as soon and as completely as possible.

Kaltenbrunner instructed the chief of Amt IV, that is, the State Police, to prepare an order to this effect for the regional offices. This order was drawn up by the competent authorities in Amt IV and was either transmitted by Müller directly to the State Police offices in the Reich or—and this is more probable on account of the importance of the question and the necessity to bring the order at the same time to the attention of the other offices of the Sicherheitspolizei—or he gave it to Kaltenbrunner, who signed it and sent it to the regional offices in the Reich.

An order of this sort laid down, for example, that the State Police offices were to report the measures they were taking as well as their results. These reports went back through the same channels from the regional offices to the competent authorities in Amt IV, from there to the Chief of Amt IV, from there to the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, Kaltenbrunner, and then to the Chief of the German Police Himmler.

COL. AMEN: And, finally will you give a specific example of a typical transaction handled through the channels indicated on the chart?

OHLENDORF: I take the example of the arrest of the leaders of the leftist parties after the events of the 20th of July: This order was also transmitted from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner; Kaltenbrunner passed it on to Amt IV and an appropriate draft for a decree was formulated by Amt IV, signed by Kaltenbrunner, and sent to the regional offices. The reports were returned from the subordinate offices back to the higher offices along the same channels.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal. The witness is now available to other counsel. I understand that Colonel Pokrovsky has some questions that he wishes to ask on behalf of the Soviets.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): The testimony of the witness is important for the clarification of questions in a report on which the Soviet Delegation is at present working. Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to put a number of questions to the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you said that you were present twice at the mass executions. On whose orders were you an inspector at the executions?

OHLENDORF: I was present at the executions on my own initiative.

COL. POKROVSKY: But you said that you attended as inspector.

OHLENDORF: I said that I attended for inspection purposes.

COL. POKROVSKY: On your initiative?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did one of your chiefs always attend the executions for purposes of inspection?

OHLENDORF: Whenever possible I sent a member of the staff of the Einsatzgruppe to witness the executions, but this was not always feasible since the Einsatzgruppen had to operate over great distances.

COL. POKROVSKY: Why was some person sent for purposes of inspection?

OHLENDORF: Would you please repeat the question?

COL. POKROVSKY: For what purpose was an inspector sent?

OHLENDORF: To determine whether or not my instructions regarding the manner of the execution were actually being carried out.

COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that the inspector was to make certain that the execution had actually been carried out?

OHLENDORF: No, it would not be correct to say that. He was to ascertain whether the conditions which I had set for the execution were actually being carried out.

COL. POKROVSKY: What manner of conditions had you in mind?

OHLENDORF: 1. Exclusion of the public; 2. Military execution by a firing-squad; 3. Arrival of the transports and carrying out of the liquidation in a smooth manner to avoid unnecessary excitement; 4. Supervision of the property to prevent looting. There may have been other details which I no longer remember. At any rate, all ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, was to be prevented through these measures.

COL. POKROVSKY: You wished to make sure that what you considered to be an equitable distribution of this property was effected, or did you aspire to complete acquisition of the valuables?

OHLENDORF: Yes.[1]

COL. POKROVSKY: You spoke of ill-treatment. What did you mean by ill-treatment at the executions?

OHLENDORF: If, for instance, the manner in which the executions were carried out caused excitement and disobedience among the victims, so that the Kommandos were forced to restore order by means of violence.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by “restore order by means of violence”? What do you mean by suppression of the excitement amongst the victims by means of violence?

OHLENDORF: If, as I have already said, in order to carry out the liquidation in an orderly fashion it was necessary, for example, to resort to beating.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was it absolutely necessary to beat the victims?

OHLENDORF: I myself never witnessed it, but I heard of it.

COL. POKROVSKY: From whom?

OHLENDORF: In conversations with members of other Kommandos.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that cars, autocars, were used for the executions?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know where, and with whose assistance, the inventor, Becker, was able to put his invention into practice?

OHLENDORF: I remember only that it was done through Amt II of the RSHA; but I can no longer say that with certainty.

COL. POKROVSKY: How many were executed in these cars?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. POKROVSKY: How many persons were executed by means of these cars?

OHLENDORF: I cannot give precise figures, but the number was comparatively very small—perhaps a few hundred.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that mostly women and children were executed in these vans. For what reason?

OHLENDORF: That was a special order from Himmler to the effect that women and children were not to be exposed to the mental strain of the executions; and thus the men of the Kommandos, mostly married men, should not be compelled to aim at women and children.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did anybody observe the behavior of the persons executed in these vans?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the doctor.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you know that Becker had reported that death in these vans was particularly agonizing?

OHLENDORF: No. I learned of Becker’s reports for the first time from the letter to Rauff, which was shown to me here. On the contrary, I know from the doctor’s reports that the victims were not conscious of their impending death.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did any military units—I mean, Army units—take part in these mass executions?

OHLENDORF: As a rule, no.

COL. POKROVSKY: And as an exception?

OHLENDORF: I think I remember that in Nikolaiev and in Simferopol a spectator from the Army High Command was present for a short time.

COL. POKROVSKY: For what purpose?

OHLENDORF: I don’t know, probably to obtain information personally.

COL. POKROVSKY: Were military units assigned to carry out the executions in these towns?

OHLENDORF: Officially, the Army did not assign any units for this purpose; the Army as such was actually opposed to the liquidation.

COL. POKROVSKY: But in practice?

OHLENDORF: Individual units occasionally volunteered. However, at the moment I know of no such case among the Army itself, but only among the units attached to the Army (Heeresgefolge).

COL. POKROVSKY: You were the man by whose orders people were sent to their death. Were Jews only handed over for the execution by the Einsatzgruppe or were Communists—“Communist officials” you call them in your instructions—handed over for execution along with the Jews?

OHLENDORF: Yes, activists and political commissars. Mere membership in the Communist Party was not sufficient to persecute or kill a man.

COL. POKROVSKY: Were any special investigations made concerning the part played by persons in the Communist Party?

OHLENDORF: No, I said on the contrary that mere membership of the Communist Party was not, in itself, a determining factor in persecuting or executing a man; he had to have a special political function.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you have any discussions on the murder vans sent from Berlin and on their use?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. POKROVSKY: Had you occasion to discuss, with your chiefs and your colleagues, the fact that motor vans had been sent to your own

## particular Einsatzgruppe from Berlin for carrying out the executions? Do

you remember any such discussions?

OHLENDORF: I do not remember any specific discussion.

COL. POKROVSKY: Had you any information concerning the fact that members of the execution squad in charge of the executions were unwilling to use the vans?

OHLENDORF: I knew that the Einsatzkommandos were using these vans.

COL. POKROVSKY: No, I had something else in mind. I wanted to know whether you received reports that members of the execution squads were unwilling to use the vans and preferred other means of execution?

OHLENDORF: That they would rather kill by means of the gas vans than by shooting?

COL. POKROVSKY: On the contrary, that they preferred execution by shooting to killing by means of the gas vans.

OHLENDORF: Yes, I have already said that the gas van . . .

COL. POKROVSKY: And why did they prefer execution by shooting to killing in the gas vans?

OHLENDORF: Because, as I have already said, in the opinion of the leader of the Einsatzkommandos, the unloading of the corpses was an unnecessary mental strain.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by “an unnecessary mental strain”?

OHLENDORF: As far as I can remember the conditions at that time—the picture presented by the corpses and probably because certain functions of the body had taken place leaving the corpses lying in filth.

COL. POKROVSKY: You mean to say that the sufferings endured prior to death were clearly visible on the victims? Did I understand you correctly?

OHLENDORF: I don’t understand the question; do you mean during the killing in the van?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.

OHLENDORF: I can only repeat what the doctor told me, that the victims were not conscious of their death in the van.

COL. POKROVSKY: In that case your reply to my previous question, that the unloading of the bodies made a very terrible impression on the members of the execution squad, becomes entirely incomprehensible.

OHLENDORF: And, as I said, the terrible impression created by the position of corpses themselves, and by the state of the vans which had probably been dirtied and so on.

COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to put to this witness at the present stage of the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecutor for the French Republic desire to put any questions to the witness?

M. FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON (Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the counsel for Kaltenbrunner desire to cross-examine now or at a later date?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps I could ask a few questions now and request that I be allowed to make my cross-examination later, after consultation with Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN [_Turning to the witness._]: How long have you known Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: May I be allowed to sit? May I sit down?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

OHLENDORF: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time during the journey from Berlin to Himmler’s headquarters at the time when Kaltenbrunner was to be appointed Chief of the Sipo and SD. Before that, I only knew of his existence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You did not know him?

OHLENDORF: I only knew of his existence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come into personal contact with Kaltenbrunner in private or official discussions after his appointment as Chief of the RSHA?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his views on the Jewish question, for example?

OHLENDORF: No, I don’t know his particular views on this question.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude in the church question?

OHLENDORF: In the question of the church—he repudiated the anti-church course followed in Germany. We agreed that an understanding had to be reached with the church.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude on the liquidation of civilian prisoners, parachutists, and so on?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner made special efforts to use the SD, in order to supply the criticism lacking at the Führerstab?

OHLENDORF: Yes, that was the task of the SD even before Kaltenbrunner, and he also gave his material support to this task.

THE PRESIDENT: A little bit more slowly.

OHLENDORF: It was the task of the SD even before Kaltenbrunner came, and he approved and materially supported this tendency.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that Kaltenbrunner had no authority to give executive orders, for example, that he had no authority to send people to concentration camps or release them from concentration camps, that all these things were handled exclusively by Himmler and Müller?

OHLENDORF: I think this question is too general to be answered in a concrete way, it must be divided up.

If you ask whether Kaltenbrunner could order executive actions, I must answer in the affirmative. If you then name Himmler and Müller to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, I must point out that in the organization of the RSHA Müller was Kaltenbrunner’s subordinate; and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to inform Kaltenbrunner of them.

On the other hand, it is certain that, particularly in regard to the concentration camps, the final decision on dispatch to them or release from them was really made by Himmler. I can say with absolute certainty—in this connection the expression “to the last washerwoman” was often used—that Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. Whether Kaltenbrunner had any authority at all in this regard, I cannot say definitely.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you personally see the original orders and original signatures of Kaltenbrunner ordering the liquidation of sabotage troops and so on?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that after Heydrich’s death a change, which to be sure was not a formal change, took place and that another and milder course was followed by Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: I couldn’t answer that question with concrete proof.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then I will leave that question, and come to another. Did Kaltenbrunner know that you were an Einsatz leader in the East?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Who gave you this order?

OHLENDORF: Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Heydrich gave it to you? Then it was before this time?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions at the moment.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): Witness Ohlendorf, can you answer up to what date the Einsatzgruppe under your command was operating?

OHLENDORF: The staff of the Einsatzgruppe went as far as the Caucasus and then returned. As far as I can remember, a combat command (Kampfkommando) was formed out of it under the name “Bierkamp,” and that was used in fighting the partisans. Then, I think, the Einsatzgruppe was entirely disbanded, Bierkamp went into the Government General and took a large number of his men with him.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did the group do after Bierkamp left?

OHLENDORF: I think I can say that the Einsatzgruppe ceased to exist after the retreat from the Caucasus. It took over tasks similar to those of the Wehrmacht under the immediate command of the Commander of the Sicherheitspolizei in the Ukraine and particularly under the command of the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the Ukraine.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In other words, it merely carried out its activities in different surroundings under different leadership, and that was all the difference. Such functions as were performed by the Einsatzgruppe in the past continued to be carried out in new surroundings.

OHLENDORF: No, it actually became a combat unit.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does that mean? Against whom were the military actions directed?

OHLENDORF: Within the scope of operations directed against the partisan movement.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say more particularly what this group was actually doing?

OHLENDORF: After the retreat?

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): When you say that the function of this group changed when it conducted operations against the partisans.

OHLENDORF: I have no concrete experiences myself. It was probably used for reconnaissance against the partisans and also in combat.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But did it carry out any executions?

OHLENDORF: I can no longer say that definitely for this period, for the unit now entered territories in which that sort of activity was out of the question.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your testimony you said that the Einsatz group had the object of annihilating the Jews and the commissars, is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in what category did you consider the children? For what reason were the children massacred?

OHLENDORF: The order was that the Jewish population should be totally exterminated.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Including the children?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Were all the Jewish children murdered?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But the children of those whom you considered as belonging to the category of commissars, were they also killed?

OHLENDORF: I am not aware that inquiries were ever made after the families of Soviet commissars.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you send anywhere reports on the executions which the group carried out?

OHLENDORF: Reports on the executions were regularly submitted to the RSHA.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): No, did you personally send any reports on the annihilation of thousands of people which you effected? Did you personally submit any report?

OHLENDORF: The reports came from the Einsatzkommandos who carried out the actions, to the Einsatzgruppe and the Einsatzgruppe informed the RSHA.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Whom?

OHLENDORF: The reports went to the Chief of the Sipo personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Personally?

OHLENDORF: Yes, personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What was the name of this police officer? Can you give his name?

OHLENDORF: At that time, Heydrich.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): After Heydrich?

OHLENDORF: I was no longer there then, but that was the standing order.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am asking you whether you continued to submit reports after Heydrich’s death or not?

OHLENDORF: After Heydrich’s death I was no longer in the Einsatz, but the reports were, of course, continued.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know whether the reports continued to be submitted after Heydrich’s death or not?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes?

OHLENDORF: No, the reports. . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Was the order concerning the annihilation of the Soviet people in conformity with the policy of the German Government or the Nazi Party or was it against it? Do you understand the question?

OHLENDORF: Yes. One must distinguish here: The order for the liquidation came from the Führer of the Reich, and it was to be carried out by the Reichsführer SS Himmler.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But was it in conformity with the policy conducted by the Nazi Party and the German Government, or was it in contradiction to it?

OHLENDORF: A policy amounts to a practice so that in this respect it was a policy laid down by the Führer. If you were to ask whether this

## activity was in conformity with the idea of National Socialism, then I

should say “no.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am talking about the practice.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say that objects of value were taken from the Jewish victims by the Jewish Council of Elders.

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Did the Jewish Council of Elders settle who were to be killed?

OHLENDORF: The Jewish Council of Elders determined who was a Jew, and then registered the Jews individually.

THE PRESIDENT: And when they registered them did they take their valuables from them?

OHLENDORF: That was done in various ways. As far as I remember, the Council of Elders was given the order to collect valuables at the same time.

THE PRESIDENT: So that the Jewish Council of Elders would not know whether or not they were to be killed?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 5 minutes past 2.

[_A recess was taken until 1405._]

-----

[1] Only the first half of the preceding question, originally spoken in Russian, was transmitted to the witness in German by the interpreter. The answer of the witness, therefore, refers only to this first half of the question.

_Afternoon Session_

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When you spoke of the written agreement between the leaders of the Einsatz groups and the Army, do you know whether or not the functions and purposes of the Einsatz groups were described in the agreement? Did the agreement say what the groups were going to do?

OHLENDORF: I no longer remember that. In any case the task of liquidation was not mentioned.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you understand the question?

OHLENDORF: Yes. I cannot quite remember whether there was a general clause in the agreement about the tasks and activities of the Security Police in the operational area, but I am certain that it contained nothing regarding the task of liquidation.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You stated that there had been a general order for the liquidation of all Jews. Was that order in writing?

OHLENDORF: No.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who gave the order?

OHLENDORF: Is this question with regard to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.

OHLENDORF: Regarding the Einsatzgruppen, the order came first via Himmler, Heydrich, and Streckenbach to the Einsatzgruppen and then was repeated a second time by Himmler personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did a similar order go to the Army?

OHLENDORF: I know of no such order to the Army in this form.

THE PRESIDENT: Now do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to cross-examine this witness?

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you said that several weeks before the opening of the Russian campaign, there were conferences regarding the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos. Were you personally present at these conferences?

OHLENDORF: May I briefly correct this by saying that the main subject was not the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen but the set-up within the operational area . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. Will you repeat that, please?

OHLENDORF: May I make a correction by saying that, according to my recollection, the main subject was not the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen but the establishment of these mobile organizational units for

## activities within the operational area of the Army.

DR. NELTE: In other words, this concerned tasks within the sphere of the Army?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: You testified that the written agreement was concluded between the RSHA on the one hand and the OKW and OKH on the other. Are you familiar with the difference in authority between the OKW and the OKH?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Who was present from the OKW at these conferences?

OHLENDORF: I cannot mention any one name because I personally was not present at these conferences, but these conferences were conducted by Heydrich on the one hand and by his deputy, Schellenberg, on the other.

DR. NELTE: Schellenberg also spoke on this question in an affidavit presented here, but he mentioned Quartermaster General Wagner as the official with whom he had to deal. Can you remember now whether this was also the case at the conferences to which you are referring?

OHLENDORF: At any rate the name of Quartermaster General Wagner is one of the few names mentioned which I remember in connection with these conferences.

DR. NELTE: Is it known to you that Quartermaster General Wagner had nothing to do with the OKW as an institution?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I take it that you cannot therefore name any personality who might be regarded as representative of the OKW?

OHLENDORF: No, I cannot. I merely said that I remembered—that is, I still have in my mind’s eye—the letterhead OKW-OKH. I took this double heading to mean that essential negotiations with Canaris were probably being carried out, that arrangements with Canaris were therefore included in this agreement, and that this accounted for the letterhead OKH plus OKW, which, to me as well, had appeared unusual, since the OKH, _per se_, was naturally in charge of all movement and supply.

DR. NELTE: A joint letterhead OKW-OKH, as such, did not, of course, exist. In your case then it could have been only a typewritten copy?

OHLENDORF: I can still visualize a mimeographed sheet.

DR. NELTE: Do you know which signatures were on this document which you visualize?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember, I am sorry.

DR. NELTE: One of the judges already put the question that orders would naturally result from an agreement of this kind. Is the name of the OKW, or the signature perhaps, included in any one such order?

OHLENDORF: Now I do not understand what kind of orders you mean.

DR. NELTE: When an agreement is made between two different organizations such as the RSHA on the one hand and, shall we say, the OKH on the other, then the office entrusted with the execution of that which has been agreed upon must be informed thereof in a form known as an “order” in military parlance. Is such an order known to you as originating from the OKW?

OHLENDORF: Please understand that no such orders from the War Office or the OKW were received by me. I should have had only orders or wishes expressed by the Army.

DR. NELTE: By the Army or by your superior command?

OHLENDORF: No. I am speaking now . . . If I think of the Armed Forces . . .

DR. NELTE: Therefore, there was no connection of any kind between you, as leader of the Einsatzgruppe, and the OKW as such?

OHLENDORF: No immediate connection. I know very well that individual reports reached the OKW through official channels.

DR. NELTE: If you know that, can you tell me to which office? Because, after all, OKW covered a great many.

OHLENDORF: I should assume they eventually reached Canaris.

DR. NELTE: I thank you.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Witness, in your position as Chief of the SD, you will probably have some idea about the trustworthiness of the members of the Reich Cabinet and about the secrecy in which very important matters were kept. Please answer this question: whether the order which has been discussed today regarding the liquidations, in your opinion, originated in the Reich Cabinet and whether this order, in your opinion, was made known to the individual members of the Reich Cabinet?

OHLENDORF: I am convinced that both questions are to be answered in the negative.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to ask the witness a few more questions on behalf of the Defendant Speer, since counsel for the Defendant Speer is absent and I, as a colleague, have taken over this task.

Witness, is it known to you that the Defendant Speer, contrary to Hitler’s orders, took measures to prevent the destruction of industrial and other installations?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: That these measures also extended beyond the interior of Germany to the then still-occupied area of Upper Silesia, _et alia_?

OHLENDORF: I believe that the date when I learned about this was so late that, although applicable to some small areas in the West, it no longer applied to any area in the East.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question which you might perhaps know about. Do you know that the Defendant Speer prepared an attempt on Hitler’s life in the middle of February of this year?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know that Speer undertook to turn Himmler over to the Allies so that he could be called to account and possibly clear others who were innocent?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: This question will perhaps be answered in the affirmative by another witness.

Are you well informed regarding the events of the 20th of July?

OHLENDORF: To a considerable extent.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the circle of plotters of 20 July had also planned to keep the Defendant Speer as head of his Ministry?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know any details about that?

OHLENDORF: From the participants in the plot of the 20th of July I merely learned that they had considered him, on a drafted organizational scheme, as continuing in his post as head of the armament ministry.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you believe that this intention of the plotters of the 20th of July was due to the fact that the Defendant Speer, in view of his activities, was considered not only in these circles but even elsewhere merely as an expert and not as a politician?

OHLENDORF: The question is very hard to answer. It is very difficult not to be considered a politician if one has been so closely connected with those authorities of the Reich who made the final political decisions and has perhaps been an essential contributor to the suggestions and proposals from which the decisions evolved. On the other hand, Minister Speer was known or believed not to be purely a politician.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): Witness, do you know that in April 1933 the Gestapo was created in Prussia?

OHLENDORF: I do not know the month, but I do know the year.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know what was the purpose of creating this institution?

OHLENDORF: To fight political opponents potentially dangerous to the State.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know how this institution, which was intended originally for Prussia only, was extended to the rest of the Reich?

OHLENDORF: Either in 1933 or in 1934 the institution of the Political Police was created in all of the Länder. These Political Police agencies were officially subordinated in 1934, as far as I remember, to the Reichsführer SS as Political Police Chief of the Länder. The Prussian Secret State Police Office represented the first central headquarters. After the creation of the Main Office of the Security Police the command tasks were delegated by Himmler to Heydrich who carried them out through the Main Office of the Security Police.

DR. MERKEL: Who created and instituted the Gestapo in the individual Länder?

OHLENDORF: I cannot give you an answer to this question.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know whether before 1933, in the area which then constituted the Reich, there had existed a similar institution, a political police force?

OHLENDORF: Yes, that existed, as far as I remember, at Police headquarters in Berlin, for instance; and I believe it was Department IA. At any rate political police organizations did exist.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the sphere of activities of this organization which existed before 1933?

OHLENDORF: Yes. They were the same; at any rate their activities were fundamentally the same.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the personnel of the Gestapo, which on the whole, was a new institution and consequently not constituted merely by a transfer of personnel already in existence?

OHLENDORF: When I became acquainted with the State Police it was certainly true that the nucleus of expert personnel had been taken from the Criminal Police and the majority of the leading men in the State Police offices, that is, in the regional offices of the State Police, had risen from the ranks of the civil administration, possibly also from the Police administrations of the various Länder (Länderpolizeiverwaltungen), and that they had, in part, even been detailed from the civil administration. The same was also true for the experts within Amt IV—the Gestapo.

DR. MERKEL: You say the majority of the officials were detailed?

OHLENDORF: I did not say the majority were detailed, but I said “in part.”

DR. MERKEL: Detailed in part? Was it possible for any of these members of the Gestapo to resist being taken over into the Gestapo if they did not wish it, or was it not?

OHLENDORF: I would not affirm that a definite resistance was possible. Some of them might have succeeded, by cunning, in avoiding it had they not wanted to go. But if one was detailed to such an office from the civil administration, then, as an official, one simply had to obey. As an official one had to.

DR. MERKEL: The members of the Gestapo evidently consisted almost exclusively, or exclusively, of civil service officials? Do you know anything about that?

OHLENDORF: That probably was no longer the case during the war. But as a rule it should be assumed that they were officials insofar as the specialists were concerned. Some of them, of course, while in training, were not yet officials and others again were engaged merely as employees or, especially, as assistants.

DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me the approximate number of the members of the Gestapo towards the end of the war?

OHLENDORF: I estimate the total organization of the Gestapo, including the regional offices and the occupied territories, at about 30,000.

DR. MERKEL: There was therefore within the Gestapo a considerable percentage of officials who were merely administrative officials and had nothing to do with operational functions?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. MERKEL: And what was the percentage of these administrative officials who performed purely administrative functions?

OHLENDORF: We must, in the first instance, take into consideration that this number included the assistants, as well as the women; and I cannot give you any figures off hand. But it is certain that a proportion of one specialist to three or four persons not employed in a functional capacity could not be considered excessive.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about who was responsible for the direction and administration of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: It was Obergruppenführer Pohl.

DR. MERKEL: Did or did not the Gestapo have anything to do with the direction and with the administration of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: According to my knowledge, not.

DR. MERKEL: Therefore, no members of the Gestapo were active or in any way involved in the measures carried out in the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: As far as I could judge from a distance, only investigating officials of the State Police were active in the concentration camps.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Gestapo in any way participate in the mass executions undertaken by your Einsatzgruppe which you described this morning?

OHLENDORF: Only to the same extent as every other person present in the Einsatzgruppe.

DR. MERKEL: I ask the Tribunal to give me the opportunity of questioning this witness again after the return of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, since I am obliged to rely exclusively on information received from Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Tribunal will be prepared to allow you to put further questions at a later stage.

DR. MERKEL: Thank you.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for the General Staff and the High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, you mentioned the negotiations which took place in the OKW, which later led to an agreement between OKW and OKH on the one side, and the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) on the other. I am interested in this point: Can you assert that during the negotiations for this agreement there was mention of the extermination and the killing of Jews?

OHLENDORF: I cannot say anything concrete on this particular subject, but I do not believe it.

DR. EXNER: You do not believe it?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. EXNER: In addition you have told us that the Commanding General of the 11th Army knew about the liquidations, and I should like to ask you: Do you know anything regarding the commanding generals of the other armies?

OHLENDORF: In general they must have been informed through the speech of the Führer before the beginning of the Russian campaign.

DR. EXNER: That is a conclusion that you have drawn?

OHLENDORF: No, it is not a conclusion that I have drawn; it is merely a report on the contents of the speech which, according to Himmler’s statement, Hitler had made to the commanding generals.

DR. EXNER: Now you have spoken about directives given by the Commanding General of the 11th Army. What kind of directives were they?

OHLENDORF: I first spoke about the commanding general in the Nikolaiev incident, that is, about the order given at that time that the liquidations should take place 200 kilometers away from the headquarters of the High Command of the army. The second time, I did not speak about the commanding general of the army but about the High Command of the army at Simferopol, because I cannot say, with any certainty, who had requested the competent Einsatzkommando at Simferopol to speed up the liquidations.

DR. EXNER: That is the very question I should like to put to you: With whom in the 11th Army did you negotiate at that time?

OHLENDORF: I, personally, did not negotiate at all with anyone on this subject, as I was not the person directly concerned with these matters; but the High Command of the Army negotiated with the competent local Einsatzkommando either through the responsible army office, which at all times was in touch with the Einsatzkommandos, namely the I-C or the I-CAO, or else through the staff of the OQ.

DR. EXNER: Who gave you orders for the advance?

OHLENDORF: The orders for the advance came, as a rule, from the Chief of Staff.

DR. EXNER: From the Chief of Staff? The Commanding General of the army at the time referred to was Von Manstein. In this case was there ever an order signed by Von Manstein?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any such order; but when the advance was being discussed there were oral consultations with Von Manstein, the Chief of Staff, and me.

DR. EXNER: When the advance was being discussed?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. EXNER: You said that the Army was opposed to these liquidations. Can you state how this became evident?

OHLENDORF: Not the Army, but the leaders were inwardly opposed to the liquidations.

DR. EXNER: Yes; but I mean, how did you recognize that fact?

OHLENDORF: In our conversations. Not only the leaders of the Army were opposed to the liquidations but also most of those who had to carry them out.

DR. EXNER: I thank you.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Were you acquainted with the personal records on Reichsbank President Schacht kept in your department?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KRAUS: Do you know why, after the 20th of July 1944, the former Reichsbank President Schacht was arrested and interned in a concentration camp?

OHLENDORF: Probably the occasion of the 20th of July was favorable also for the conviction at last of Reichsbank President Schacht, who was known to be inimical to the Party, inasmuch as by means of witnesses or other methods he could be brought to trial in connection with the events of the 20th of July.

DR. KRAUS: Then Defendant Schacht was known to your people as being inimical to the Party?

OHLENDORF: Yes, at least from 1937-1938 on.

DR. KRAUS: Since the year 1937 or 1938? And you also suspected him of

## participating in Putsche?

OHLENDORF: Personally I did not suspect this, because I was not concerned with these matters at all. He was mainly under suspicion because of his well-known enmity. But, as far as I know, this suspicion was never confirmed.

DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, who caused Schacht to be arrested?

OHLENDORF: That I cannot say.

DR. KRAUS: Then you don’t know whether the arrest was ordered by the Führer, by Himmler, or by some subordinate authority.

OHLENDORF: I don’t think the order could possibly have come from any subordinate authority.

DR. KRAUS: Then you assume that it had been ordered by the Führer?

OHLENDORF: At least by Himmler.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said: At the beginning of 1933, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the Gestapo was created in Prussia; but before that time there had already existed in Prussia an organization with similar tasks, for instance at the Police headquarters in Berlin with Department IA, with the difference that this organization was opposed to National Socialism, whereas now the contrary is true. But its task was likewise to keep political opponents under observation and if need be to arrest them, and thus to protect the State from these political opponents.

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: You said further that in 1933, after the seizure of power, a political police with identical tasks was also instituted in all the other Länder.

OHLENDORF: Yes, in the year 1933-1934.

DR. STAHMER: This political police, which existed in the various Länder, was then centralized in 1934 and its direction handed over to Himmler?

OHLENDORF: It was not at first centralized, but Himmler did become Chief of Police of all the Länder.

DR. STAHMER: Now one more question. Did the Prussian Gestapo play a leading role, as far as the other Länder were concerned, as early as 1933 or only after Himmler took over the leadership in 1934?

OHLENDORF: I do not believe that the Prussian State Police, which after all was under the leadership of Reich Marshal Göring, became, at that time, the competent authority for the other Länder as well.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I am speaking as the representative of the counsel for Defendant Grossadmiral Raeder.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you just mentioned a speech of the Führer before the army commanders, in which the Führer is supposed to have given instructions to the commanders regarding the liquidation of Jews. Which conference do you mean?

OHLENDORF: A conference which must have taken place shortly before the Russian campaign with the commanders of the army groups and the armies at the Führer’s quarters.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the commanders of the various branches of the Armed Forces absent?

OHLENDORF: I do not know that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were you yourself present at this conference?

OHLENDORF: No. I have recounted this conference on the basis of a conversation I had with Himmler.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did this conversation with Himmler take place in a large circle of people or was it a private conversation?

OHLENDORF: It was a private conversation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you have the impression that Himmler stated facts, or do you consider it possible that he wished to encourage you in your difficult task?

OHLENDORF: No. The conversation took place much, much later and did not spring from such motives, but from resentment at the attitude of certain generals of the Armed Forces. Himmler wanted to say that these generals of the Armed Forces could not disassociate themselves from the events that had taken place, as they were just as responsible as all the rest.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And when did this conversation with Himmler take place?

OHLENDORF: In May 1945, at Flensburg.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, with regard to the command channels at the disposal of the RSHA for the execution of its orders and measures and for the transmission of these orders to tactical organizations, such as the SD and the concentration camps, did the RSHA possess its own command channels or did it rely on the channels of the Leadership Corps organization, that is, were these orders forwarded via the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung?

OHLENDORF: I know nothing about it. I consider it entirely out of the question.

DR. SERVATIUS: You consider it entirely out of the question that the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung had been informed? How was it, for instance . . .

OHLENDORF: One moment, please. You asked me whether these orders passed through these channels. You did not ask me whether they had been informed.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were these offices informed of the orders?

OHLENDORF: The inspectors, the Gestapo leaders, and the SD leaders were all considered as police or political agents (Referenten) of the Gauleiter or the Reichsstatthalter; and these office chiefs had to report to the Gauleiter on their respective fields of activity. To what extent this was done, I am unable to judge. It depends on the activities and on the degree of co-operation between the Gauleiter and these offices, but in any case it is inconceivable that the State Police could carry on these activities for any length of time without the knowledge of the responsible Party organizations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Does this also hold for reports from lower to higher units? For the activities of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: The concentration camps were not subordinate to the State Police. I am convinced, since these were purely affairs of the Reich, that there was no such close connection between the Gauleiter and the concentration camps as there was between the Gauleiter and the permanent

## activities of the State Police.

DR. SERVATIUS: I also represent the Defendant Sauckel. Do you know of the impressment of foreign workers by the SS? Foreign workers who, as a matter of fact, came from the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: Only superficially.

HERR BABEL: Witness, this morning you mentioned the figures of 3,000 and 30,000 for the Security Service. I should now like to know for certain how these figures are to be understood. Do the 3,000 members of the SD whom you mentioned this morning represent the entire personnel of the SD at that time, or did they represent only those members who were employed in the field with the mobile units also mentioned by you this morning?

OHLENDORF: No, it represented the total personnel including employees and women auxiliaries.

HERR BABEL: Including employees and women auxiliaries. And the 30,000 which we also discussed—were they honorary members (ehrenamtliche Mitglieder) employed only in the interior of Germany?

OHLENDORF: Yes; as a rule, in any case.

HERR BABEL: And who, for the most part, belonged neither to the SS nor to the Party?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

HERR BABEL: How large were the mobile units of the SD employed in these executions?

OHLENDORF: The SD had no mobile units but rather only individual members of the SD detailed to outside organizations. The SD, as a separate entity, did not act independently anywhere.

HERR BABEL: In your opinion and judging by your own experience, how many of these detailed personnel were there?

OHLENDORF: The figure was quite small.

HERR BABEL: Will you please give an approximate figure.

OHLENDORF: I place the figure at an average of about two to three SD experts per Einsatzkommando.

HERR BABEL: I should like to know the total strength of the SS. Do you know anything about that?

OHLENDORF: No, I have no idea at all.

HERR BABEL: No idea at all. Did any units of the Waffen-SS and other subordinate SS groups in any way participate in the Einsatzgruppen?

OHLENDORF: As I said this morning, in each Einsatzgruppe there was, or rather there should have been, one company of Waffen-SS.

HERR BABEL: One company. And what, at that time, was the exact strength of one company?

OHLENDORF: I do not know about the Waffen-SS serving with the other Einsatzgruppen, but I estimate that my particular group employed approximately 100 men of the Waffen-SS.

HERR BABEL: Were Death’s-Head Units (Totenkopf Verbände) also employed?

OHLENDORF: No.

HERR BABEL: Was the Adolf Hitler Bodyguard (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) employed in any fashion?

OHLENDORF: That was purely a matter of chance. I cannot name a single formation from which these Waffen-SS had been taken.

HERR BABEL: Another question that was touched upon this morning: When was the SD created and what, at first, were its duties?

OHLENDORF: As far as I know, the SD was created in 1932.

HERR BABEL: And what were its duties at that time?

OHLENDORF: It constituted, so to speak, the Intelligence Corps of the Party. They were supposed to give information about Party opponents and, if necessary, to thwart them.

HERR BABEL: Did these duties change in the course of time, and, if so, when?

OHLENDORF: Yes, after the seizure of power, the combatting of political opponents was, in certain spheres, one of their principal duties and supplying the required information on certain individuals was considered an important factor. At that time an intelligence service, in the true sense of the word, did not yet exist; the real evolution of the SD machine within the field of home intelligence service only followed as from 1936-1937. From that time on the work changed from the observation of individuals to technical matters. With the 1939 reorganization, when the Main Office of the SD was dissolved, the handling of political opponents was completely eliminated from the work of the SD, which work was thereafter limited to technical matters. Its duties now consisted in observing the effects of the measures carried out by the leading authorities of the Reich and the Länder and in determining how the circles affected reacted to them; in addition, they had to find out what the moods and attitude of the people and its various classes of society were during the course of the war. It was, as a matter of fact, the only authority offering criticism within the Reich and reporting facts from an objective point of view to top levels. It should also be pointed out that the Party did not, at any stage, legitimize this work until 1945. The only legitimation for this critical work came from Reich Marshal Göring, and that only after the war, for he could in this way draw the attention of the other departments, at meetings of the Reich Defense Council, to faulty developments. This expert critical work became, in fact, after 1939 the main function of the SD home intelligence service.

HERR BABEL: Another question. To what extent were units of the SD employed for duty in the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: I would ask you at all times to distinguish between the SD home service (SD-Inland) with the head office of Amt III, and the SD service board (SD-Ausland). I cannot give you any information about the SD service board; but the chief, Schellenberg, is present in this courthouse. As far as Amt III is concerned, I know of no single case in which the SD home service had representatives or anything at all to do with concentration camps.

HERR BABEL: Now, a question concerning you personally. From whom did you receive your orders for the liquidation of the Jews and so forth? And in what form?

OHLENDORF: My duty was not the task of liquidation, but I did head the staff which directed the Einsatzkommandos in the field, and the Einsatzkommandos themselves had already received this order in Berlin on the instructions of Streckenbach, Himmler, and Heydrich. This order was renewed by Himmler at Nikolaiev.

HERR BABEL: You personally were not concerned with the execution of these orders?

OHLENDORF: I led the Einsatzgruppe, and therefore I had the task of seeing how the Einsatzkommandos executed the orders received.

HERR BABEL: But did you have no scruples in regard to the execution of these orders?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

HERR BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these scruples?

OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state.

HERR BABEL: This is your own opinion. But this must have been not only your point of view but also the point of view of the majority of the people involved. Didn’t some of the men appointed to execute these orders ask you to be relieved of such tasks?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any one concrete case. I excluded some whom I did not consider emotionally suitable for executing these tasks and I sent some of them home.

HERR BABEL: Was the legality of the orders explained to these people under false pretenses?

OHLENDORF: I do not understand your question; since the order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality could not arise in the minds of these individuals, for they had sworn obedience to the people who had issued the orders.

HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the execution of these orders?

OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court-martial with a corresponding sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, do you wish to re-examine?

COL. AMEN: Just a very few questions, Your Honor.

[_Turning to the witness._] What organization furnished the supplies to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) furnished the equipment.

COL. AMEN: What organization furnished weapons to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The weapons were also furnished through the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: What organization assigned personnel to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The Organization and Personnel Department of the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: And all these activities of supplies required personnel in addition to the operating members?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: That will do; thank you.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: The next witness to be called by the Prosecution is Dieter Wisliceny. That witness will be examined by Lieutenant Colonel Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.

[_The witness, Wisliceny, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

DIETER WISLICENY (Witness): Dieter Wisliceny.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Please speak slowly and pause between questions and answers.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR. (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): How old are you?

WISLICENY: I am 34 years old.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you born?

WISLICENY: I was born at Regulowken in East Prussia.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the NSDAP?

WISLICENY: Yes, I was a member of the NSDAP.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Since what year?

WISLICENY: I entered the NSDAP first in 1931, was then struck off the list and entered finally in 1933.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the SS?

WISLICENY: Yes, I entered the SS in 1934.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: In 1934 I entered the SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What rank did you achieve?

WISLICENY: In 1940 I was promoted to SS Hauptsturmführer.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know Adolf Eichmann?

WISLICENY: Yes, I have known Eichmann since 1934.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under what circumstances?

WISLICENY: We joined the SD about the same time, in 1934. Until 1937 we were together in the same department.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How well did you know Eichmann personally?

WISLICENY: We knew each other very well. We used the intimate “du,” and I also knew his family very well.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was his position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann was in the RSHA, a section chief in Amt IV, Gestapo.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean Section IV or a subsection, and, if so, which subsection?

WISLICENY: He ran Section IVA4. This department comprised two subsections: one for churches and another for Jewish matters.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: You have before you a diagram showing the position of Subsection IVA4b in the RSHA.

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you prepare this diagram?

WISLICENY: Yes, I made the diagram myself.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Does it correctly portray the organizational setup showing the section dealing with Jewish problems?

WISLICENY: Yes, this was approximately the personnel of the section at the beginning of 1944.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring to this chart and the list of leading personnel as shown in the lower section of the paper, were you personally acquainted with each of the individuals named therein?

WISLICENY: Yes, I knew all of them personally.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the particular mission of IVA4b of the RSHA?

WISLICENY: This Section IVA4b was concerned with the Jewish question for the RSHA. Eichmann had special powers from Gruppenführer Müller, the Chief of Amt IV, and from the Chief of the Security Police. He was responsible for the so-called solution of the Jewish question in Germany and in all countries occupied by Germany.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were there distinct periods of activity affecting the Jews?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you describe to the Tribunal the approximate periods and the different types of activity?

WISLICENY: Yes. Until 1940 the general policy within the section was to settle the Jewish question in Germany and in areas occupied by Germany by means of a planned emigration. The second phase, after that date, was the concentration of all Jews, in Poland and in other territories occupied by Germany in the East, in ghettos. This period lasted approximately until the beginning of 1942. The third period was the so-called “final solution” of the Jewish question, that is, the planned extermination and destruction of the Jewish race; this period lasted until October 1944, when Himmler gave the order to stop their destruction.

[_A recess was taken._]

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you first become associated with Section IVA4 of the RSHA?

WISLICENY: That was in 1940. I happened to meet Eichmann . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was your position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann suggested that I go to Bratislava as adviser on the Jewish question to the Slovakian Government.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Thereafter how long did you hold that position?

WISLICENY: I was at Bratislava until the spring of 1943; then, almost a year in Greece and later, from March 1944 until December 1944, I was with Eichmann in Hungary. In January 1945 I left Eichmann’s department.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your official connection with Section IVA4, did you learn of any order which directed the annihilation of all Jews?

WISLICENY: Yes, I learned of such an order for the first time from Eichmann in the summer of 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you tell the Tribunal under what circumstances and what was the substance of the order?

WISLICENY: In the spring of 1942 about 17,000 Jews were taken from Slovakia to Poland as workers. It was a question of an agreement with the Slovakian Government. The Slovakian Government further asked whether the families of these workers could not be taken to Poland as well. At first Eichmann declined this request.

In April or at the beginning of May 1942 Eichmann told me that henceforward whole families could also be taken to Poland. Eichmann himself was at Bratislava in May 1942 and had discussed the matter with competent members of the Slovakian Government. He visited Minister Mach and the then Prime Minister, Professor Tuka. At that time he assured the Slovakian Government that these Jews would be humanely and decently treated in the Polish ghettos. This was the special wish of the Slovakian Government. As a result of this assurance about 35,000 Jews were taken from Slovakia into Poland. The Slovakian Government, however, made efforts to see that these Jews were, in fact, humanely treated; they particularly tried to help such Jews as had been converted to Christianity. Prime Minister Tuka repeatedly asked me to visit him and expressed the wish that a Slovakian delegation be allowed to enter the areas to which the Slovakian Jews were supposed to have been sent. I transmitted this wish to Eichmann and the Slovakian Government even sent him a note on the matter. Eichmann at the time gave an evasive answer.

Then at the end of July or the beginning of August, I went to see him in Berlin and implored him once more to grant the request of the Slovakian Government. I pointed out to him that abroad there were rumors to the effect that all Jews in Poland were being exterminated. I pointed out to him that the Pope had intervened with the Slovakian Government on their behalf. I advised him that such a proceeding, if really true, would seriously injure our prestige, that is, the prestige of Germany, abroad. For all these reasons I begged him to permit the inspection in question. After a lengthy discussion Eichmann told me that this request to visit the Polish ghettos could not be granted under any circumstances whatsoever. In reply to my question “Why?” he said that most of these Jews were no longer alive. I asked him who had given such instructions and he referred me to an order of Himmler’s. I then begged him to show me this order, because I could not believe that it actually existed in writing. He . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you at that time? Where were you at the time of this meeting with Eichmann?

WISLICENY: This meeting with Eichmann took place in Berlin, Kurfürstenstrasse 116, in Eichmann’s office.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Proceed with the answer to the previous question. Proceed with the discussion of the circumstances and the order.

WISLICENY: Eichmann told me he could show me this order in writing if it would soothe my conscience. He took a small volume of documents from his safe, turned over the pages, and showed me a letter from Himmler to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. The gist of the letter was roughly as follows:

The Führer had ordered the final solution of the Jewish question; the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and the Inspector of Concentration Camps were entrusted with carrying out this so-called final solution. All Jewish men and women who were able to work were to be temporarily exempted from the so-called final solution and used for work in the concentration camps. This letter was signed by Himmler himself. I could not possibly be mistaken since Himmler’s signature was well known to me. I . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom was the order addressed?

WISLICENY: To the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that is, to the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any other addressee on this order?

WISLICENY: Yes, the Inspector of Concentration Camps. The order was addressed to both these offices.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the order bear any classification for security purposes?

WISLICENY: It was classified as “secret.”

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the approximate date of this order?

WISLICENY: This order was dated April 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: By whom was it signed?

WISLICENY: By Himmler personally.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And you personally examined this order in Eichmann’s office?

WISLICENY: Yes, Eichmann handed me the document and I saw the order myself.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was any question asked by you as to the meaning of the words “final solution” as used in the order?

WISLICENY: Eichmann went on to explain to me what was meant by this. He said that the planned biological annihilation of the Jewish race in the Eastern Territories was disguised by the concept and wording “final solution.” In later discussions on this subject the same words “final solution” appeared over and over again.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was anything said by you to Eichmann in regard to the power given him under this order?

WISLICENY: Eichmann told me that within the RSHA he personally was entrusted with the execution of this order. For this purpose he had received every authority from the Chief of the Security Police; he himself was personally responsible for the execution of this order.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you make any comment to Eichmann about his authority?

WISLICENY: Yes. It was perfectly clear to me that this order spelled death to millions of people. I said to Eichmann, “God grant that our enemies never have the opportunity of doing the same to the German people,” in reply to which Eichmann told me not to be sentimental; it was an order of the Führer’s and would have to be carried out.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know whether that order continued in force and under the operation of Eichmann’s department?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How long?

WISLICENY: This order was in force until October 1944. At that time Himmler gave a counter order which forbade the annihilation of the Jews.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who was Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt at the time the order was first issued?

WISLICENY: That would be Heydrich.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the program under this order continue with equal force under Kaltenbrunner?

WISLICENY: Yes; there was no diminution or change of any kind.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: State, if you know, how long Kaltenbrunner knew Eichmann.

WISLICENY: From various statements by Eichmann I gathered that Kaltenbrunner and Eichmann had known each other for a long time. Both came from Linz, and when Kaltenbrunner was made Chief of the Security Police, Eichmann expressed his satisfaction. He told me at that time that he knew Kaltenbrunner very well personally, and that Kaltenbrunner was very well acquainted with his family in Linz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did Eichmann ever refer to his friendship or standing with Kaltenbrunner as being helpful to him?

WISLICENY: Yes, he repeatedly said that, if he had any serious trouble, he could at any time go to Kaltenbrunner personally. He did not have to do that very often, since his relations with his immediate superior, Gruppenführer Müller, were very good.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Have you been present when Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner met?

WISLICENY: Yes; once I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann. That was in February 1945 in Eichmann’s office in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner came to lunch every day at Kurfürstenstrasse 116; there the chiefs met for their midday meal with Kaltenbrunner; and it was on one such occasion that I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann and how he inquired after the health of Eichmann’s family in Linz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the administration of his office, do you know to what extent Eichmann submitted matters to Heydrich and later to Kaltenbrunner for approval?

WISLICENY: The routine channel from Eichmann to Kaltenbrunner lay through Gruppenführer Müller. To my knowledge, reports to Kaltenbrunner were drawn up at regular intervals by Eichmann and submitted to him. I also know that in the summer of 1944 he made a personal report to Kaltenbrunner.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you have an opportunity to examine files in Eichmann’s office?

WISLICENY: Yes; I frequently had occasion to examine the files in Eichmann’s office. I know that he handled with special care any files which had to do with questions concerning his own special task. He was in every respect a confirmed bureaucrat; he immediately recorded in the files every discussion he ever had with any of his superiors. He always pointed out to me that the most important thing was for him to be covered by his superiors at all times. He shunned all personal responsibility and took good care to take shelter behind his superiors—in this case Müller and Kaltenbrunner—when it was a question of responsibility for his actions.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the case of a typical report going from Eichmann’s department through Müller, Kaltenbrunner, to Himmler—have you seen copies of such reports in Eichmann’s file?

WISLICENY: Yes, of course there were many such copies in the files. The regular channel was as follows: Eichmann had a draft made by a specialist or he made it himself; this draft went to Gruppenführer Müller, his department chief; Müller either signed this draft himself or left the signing to Eichmann. In most cases, when reports to Kaltenbrunner and Himmler were concerned, Müller signed them himself. Whenever reports were signed by Müller without any alteration they were returned to Eichmann’s office, where a first copy and one carbon copy were prepared. The first copy then went back to Müller for his signature, and thence it was forwarded either to Kaltenbrunner or to Himmler. In individual cases where reports to Himmler were involved, Kaltenbrunner signed them himself. I myself have seen carbon copies with Kaltenbrunner’s signature.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to areas and countries in which measures were taken affecting the Jews, will you state as to which countries you have personal knowledge of such operations?

WISLICENY: First, I have personal knowledge of all measures taken in Slovakia. I also know full particulars of the evacuation of Jews from Greece and especially from Hungary. Further, I know about certain measures taken in Bulgaria and in Croatia. I naturally heard about the measures adopted in other countries, but was unable to gain a clear picture of the situation from personal observation or from detailed reports.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering the case of Slovakia, you have already made reference to the 17,000 specially selected Jews who were sent from Slovakia. Will you tell the Tribunal of the other measures that followed concerning Jews in Slovakia?

WISLICENY: I mentioned before that these first 17,000 laborers were followed by about 35,000 Jews, including entire families. In August or the beginning of September 1942 an end was put to this action in Slovakia. The reasons for this were that a large number of Jews still in Slovakia had been granted—either by the President or by various ministries—special permission to remain in the country. A further reason might have been the unsatisfactory answer I gave the Slovakian Government in reply to their request for the inspection of the Jewish camps in Poland. This state of affairs lasted until September 1944; from August 1942 until September 1944 no Jews were removed from Slovakia. From 25,000 to 30,000 Jews still remained in the country.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the first group of 17,000 specially selected workers?

WISLICENY: This group was not annihilated, but all were employed for enforced labor in the Auschwitz and Lublin Concentration Camps.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY: I know this detail because the Commandant of Auschwitz, Hoess, made a remark to this effect to me in Hungary in 1944. He told me at that time that these 17,000 Jews were his best workers in Auschwitz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the name of that Commandant?

WISLICENY: The Commandant of Auschwitz was Hoess.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the approximately 35,000 members of the families of the Jewish workers that were also sent to Poland?

WISLICENY: They were treated according to the order which Eichmann had shown me in August 1942. Part of them were left alive if they were able to work; the others were killed.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY: I know that from Eichmann and, naturally, also from Hoess, during conversations in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What proportion of this group remained alive?

WISLICENY: Hoess at that time, in a conversation with Eichmann at which I was present, gave the figure of the surviving Jews who had been put to work at about 25 to 30 percent.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring now to the 25,000 Jews that remained in Slovakia until September of 1944, do you know what was done with those Jews?

WISLICENY: After the outbreak of the Slovakian insurrection in the fall of 1944 Hauptsturmführer Brunner, one of Eichmann’s assistants, was sent to Slovakia. Eichmann refused to grant my wish to go to Slovakia. With the help of German police forces and also with forces of the Slovakian Gendarmerie, Brunner assembled these Jews in several camps and transported them to Auschwitz. According to Brunner’s statement, about 14,000 persons were involved. A small group which remained in Camp Szered was, as far as I know, sent to Theresienstadt in the spring of 1945.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to these Jews after they were deported from Slovakia, this group of 25,000?

WISLICENY: I assume that they also met with the so-called final solution, because Himmler’s order to suspend this action was not issued until several weeks later.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering now actions in Greece about which you have personal knowledge, will you tell the Tribunal of the actions there in chronological sequence?

WISLICENY: In January 1943 Eichmann ordered me to come to Berlin and told me that I was to proceed to Salonika to solve the Jewish problem there in co-operation with the German Military Administration in Macedonia. Eichmann’s permanent representative, Sturmbannführer Rolf Günther, had previously been to Salonika. My departure had been scheduled for February 1942. At the end of January 1942 I was told by Eichmann that Hauptsturmführer Brunner had been nominated by him for the technical execution of all operations in Greece and that he was to accompany me to Salonika. Brunner was not subordinate to me; he worked independently. In February 1942 we went to Salonika and there contacted the Military Administration. As first action . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Whom in the Military Administration did you deal with?

WISLICENY: War Administration Counsellor (Kriegsverwaltungsrat) Dr. Merten, Chief of the Military Administration with the Commander of the Armed Forces in the Salonika-Aegean Theater.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I believe you used 1942 once or more in reference; did you at all times refer to 1943 in dealing with Greece?

WISLICENY: That is an error. These events occurred in 1943.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What arrangements were made through Dr. Merten and what actions were taken?

WISLICENY: In Salonika the Jews were first of all concentrated in certain quarters of the city. There were in Salonika about 50,000 Jews of Spanish descent. At the beginning of March, after this concentration had taken place, a teletype message from Eichmann to Brunner ordered the immediate evacuation of all Jews from Salonika and Macedonia to Auschwitz. Armed with this order, Brunner and I went to the Military Administration; no objections were raised by the Military Administration, and measures were prepared and executed. Brunner directed the entire action in Salonika in person. The trains necessary for the evacuation were requisitioned from the Transport Command of the Armed Forces. All Brunner had to do was to indicate the number of railway cars needed and the exact time at which they were required.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were any of the Jewish workers retained at the request of Dr. Merten or the Military Administration?

WISLICENY: The Military Administration had made a demand for about 3,000 Jews for construction work on the railroad, which number was duly delivered. Once the work was ended, these Jews were returned to Brunner and were, like all the others, dispatched to Auschwitz. The work in question came under the program of the Todt Organization.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the number of Jewish workers retained for the Organization Todt?

WISLICENY: Three to four thousand.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any illness among the Jews that were concentrated for transport?

WISLICENY: In the camp proper, that is, the concentration camp, there were no special cases of illness; but in certain quarters of the city inhabited by the Jews typhus was prevalent and other contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis of the lungs.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What, if any, communication did you have with Eichmann concerning this typhus?

WISLICENY: On receipt of the teletype concerning the evacuation from Salonika, I got in touch with Eichmann on the telephone and informed him of the prevalence of typhus. He ignored my objections and gave orders for the evacuation to proceed immediately.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Altogether, how many Jews were collected and deported from Greece?

WISLICENY: There were over 50,000 Jews. I believe that about 54,000 were evacuated from Salonika and Macedonia.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What is the basis for your figure?

WISLICENY: I myself read a comprehensive report from Brunner to Eichmann on completion of the evacuation. Brunner left Salonika at the end of May 1943. I personally was not in Salonika from the beginning of April until the end of May, so that the action was carried out by Brunner alone.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How many transports were used for shipping Jews from Salonika?

WISLICENY: From 20 to 25 transport trains.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And how many were shipped in each train?

WISLICENY: There were at least 2,000, and in many cases 2,500.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What kind of railway equipment was used for these shipments?

WISLICENY: Closed freight cars were used. The evacuees were given sufficient food to last them for about 10 days, consisting mostly of bread, olives, and other dry food. They were also given water and various other sanitary facilities.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who furnished this railway transportation?

WISLICENY: Transport was supplied by the Transport Command of the Armed Forces, that is, the cars and locomotives. The food was furnished by the Military Administration.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What did the Subsection IVA4 have to do with obtaining this transportation, and who in that subsection dealt with transportation?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, you need not go into this in such great detail.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this particular question, I believe, will have a bearing on the implications involving the military; I can cut down on the other details.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you spent some considerable time in describing how many of them were concentrated. Whether it was 60,000 or how many were kept for the Todt Organization—all those details are really unnecessary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Very well, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I mean, you must use your own discretion about how you cut down. I don’t know what details or what facts you are going to prove.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness, as he has testified, is competent to cover practically all details in these Balkan countries. It is not our wish to add cumulative evidence, but his testimony does furnish a complete story from the Head Office of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt through the field operations to the final solution.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is he going to prove about these 50,000 Jews?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Their ultimate disposition at Auschwitz, as far as he knows.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on to what ultimately happened to them then.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] What was the destination of these transports of Jews from Greece?

WISLICENY: In every case Auschwitz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And what was the ultimate disposition of the Jews sent to Auschwitz from Greece?

WISLICENY: They were without exception destined for the so-called final solution.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the collection period were these Jews called upon to furnish their own subsistence?

WISLICENY: I did not quite understand the question.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, does it matter, if they were “brought to the final solution” which I suppose means death?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Your Honor, this witness will testify that 280,000,000 drachmas were deposited in the Greek National Bank for the subsistence of these people and that this amount was later appropriated by the German Military Administration. That is all I have hoped to prove by this question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Is that a correct statement of your testimony?

WISLICENY: Yes. The cash which the Jews possessed was taken away and put into a common account at the Bank of Greece. After the Jews had been evacuated from Salonika this account was taken over by the German Military Administration. About 280,000,000 drachmas were involved.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When you say the Jews taken to Auschwitz were submitted to the final solution; what do you mean by that?

WISLICENY: By that I mean what Eichmann had explained to me under the term “final solution,” that is, they were annihilated biologically. As far as I could gather from my conversations with him, this annihilation took place in the gas chambers and the bodies were subsequently destroyed in the crematories.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness is able to testify as to actions in Hungary, involving approximately 500,000 Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then. You must use your own discretion. I can’t present your case for you.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I have no desire to submit cumulative evidence.

[_Turning to the witness._] Turning to actions in Hungary, will you briefly outline the actions taken there and your participation?

WISLICENY: After the entry of the German troops into Hungary Eichmann went there personally with a large command. By an order signed by the head of the Security Police, I was assigned to Eichmann’s command. Eichmann began his activities in Hungary at the end of March 1944. He contacted members of the then Hungarian Government, especially State Secretaries Endre and Von Baky. The first measure adopted by Eichmann in co-operation with these Hungarian Government officials was the concentration of the Hungarian Jews in special places and special localities. These measures were carried out according to zones, beginning in Ruthenia and Transylvania. The action was initiated in mid-April 1944.

In Ruthenia over 200,000 Jews were affected by these measures. Consequently, impossible food and housing conditions developed in the small towns and rural communities where the Jews were assembled. On the strength of this situation Eichmann suggested to the Hungarians that these Jews be transported to Auschwitz and other camps. He insisted, however, that a request to this effect be submitted to him either by the Hungarian Government or by a member thereof. This request was submitted by State Secretary Von Baky. The evacuation was carried out by the Hungarian Police.

Eichmann appointed me liaison officer to Lieutenant Colonel Ferency, entrusted by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior with this operation. The evacuation of Jews from Hungary began in May 1944 and was also carried out zone by zone, first starting in Ruthenia, then in Transylvania, northern Hungary, southern, and western Hungary. Budapest was to be cleared of Jews by the end of June. This evacuation, however, was never carried out, as the regent, Horthy, would not permit it. This operation affected some 450,000 Jews. A second operation was then . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Before you go into that, please, will you tell the Tribunal what, if anything, was done about organizing an Einsatz group to act in Hungary on the Jewish question?

WISLICENY: At the beginning of March 1944 a so-called Einsatzgruppe, consisting of Security Police and SD, was formed at Mauthausen near Linz. Eichmann himself headed a so-called “Sonder-Einsatz-Kommando” to which he detailed everybody who had held any position in his department. This Special-Action Commando was likewise assembled at Mauthausen. All questions of personnel devolved on the then Standartenführer, Dr. Geschke, leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters Eichmann was subordinate only to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the meaning of the designation “Special-Action Commando Eichmann” in relation to the movement into Hungary?

WISLICENY: Eichmann’s activities in Hungary comprised all matters connected with the Jewish problem.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under whose direct supervision was Special-Action Commando Eichmann organized?

WISLICENY: I have already said that in all matters of personnel and economy Eichmann was subordinate to Standartenführer, Dr. Geschke, leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters he could give no orders to Eichmann. Eichmann likewise reported direct to Berlin on all the special operations undertaken by him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom?

WISLICENY: Either to Gruppenführer Müller, or, in more important cases, to the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that is, to Kaltenbrunner.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the period in which Hungarian Jews were being collected, what, if any, contact was made by the Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish Affairs with Eichmann’s representative?

WISLICENY: The Joint Distribution Committee made efforts to contact Eichmann and to try to ward off the fate of the Hungarian Jews. I myself established this contact with Eichmann, since I wanted to discover some means of protecting the half million Jews in Hungary from the measures already in force. The Joint Distribution Committee made certain offers to Eichmann and in return requested that the Jews should remain in Hungary. These offers were mainly of a financial nature. Eichmann felt himself, much against his will, obliged to forward these proposals to Himmler. Himmler thereupon entrusted a certain Standartenführer Becher with further negotiations. Standartenführer Becher then continued the negotiations with Dr. Kastner, delegate of the J.D.C. But Eichmann, from the very first, endeavored to wreck the negotiations. Before any concrete results were obtained he attempted to present us with a _fait accompli_; in other words, he tried to transport as many Jews as possible to Auschwitz.

THE PRESIDENT: Need we go into all these conferences? Can’t you take us on to the conclusion of the matter?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is inclined to be lengthy in his answers. That has been true in his pre-trial examination. I will try . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are examining him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

Was there any money involved in the meeting between Dr. Kastner and Eichmann?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How much?

WISLICENY: In the first conversation Dr. Kastner gave Eichmann about 3 million pengoes. What the sums mentioned in further conversations amounted to, I do not know exactly.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom did Dr. Kastner give this money and what became of it?

WISLICENY: It was given to Eichmann, who then turned it over to his financial agent; the sum was in turn handed to the commander of the Security Police and the SD in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: These actions that you have described, involving approximately 450,000 Jews being moved from Hungary—were there any official communications sent to Berlin concerning these movements?

WISLICENY: Yes, as each transport left, Berlin was informed by teletype. From time to time Eichmann also dispatched a comprehensive report to the RSHA and to the Chief of the Security Police.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Now with reference to the Jews that remained in Budapest, what, if any, action was taken against them?

WISLICENY: After Szalasi had taken over the Government of Hungary . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, we have not yet heard, have we, what happened to these Jews from Hungary? If we have, I have missed it.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I will ask that question now, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] What became of the Jews to whom you have already referred—approximately 450,000?

WISLICENY: They were, without exception, taken to Auschwitz and brought to the final solution.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean they were killed?

WISLICENY: Yes, with the exception of perhaps 25 to 30 percent who were used for labor purposes. I here refer to a previously mentioned conversation on this matter between Hoess and Eichmann in Budapest.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to the Jews remaining in Budapest, what happened to them?

WISLICENY: In October-November 1944 about 30,000 of these Jews, perhaps a few thousand more, were removed from Budapest and sent to Germany. They were to be used to work on the construction of the so-called Southeast Wall, a fortification near Vienna. They were mostly women.

They had to walk from Budapest to the German border—almost 200 kilometers. They were assembled in marching formations and followed a route specially designated for them. Their shelter and nutrition on this march was extremely bad. Most of them fell ill and lost strength. I had been ordered by Eichmann to take over these groups at the German border and direct them further to the Lower Danube Gauleitung for labor purposes. In many cases I refused to take over these so-called workers, because they were completely exhausted and emaciated by disease. Eichmann, however, forced me to take them over and in this case even threatened to turn me over to Himmler to be put into a concentration camp if I caused him further political difficulties. For this same reason I was later removed from Eichmann’s department.

A large proportion of these people then died in the so-called Lower Danube work camps from exhaustion and epidemics. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, was taken to Vienna and the surrounding area, and a group of about 3,000 was taken to Bergen-Belsen, and from there to Switzerland. Those were Jews who had been released from Germany as a result of the negotiations with the J.D.C.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Summarizing for the countries of Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia—approximately how many Jews were affected by measures of the Secret Police and SD in those countries about which you have personal knowledge?

WISLICENY: In Slovakia there were about 66,000, in Greece about 64,000, and in Hungary more than half a million.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the countries Croatia and Bulgaria, about which you have some knowledge, how many Jews were thus affected?

WISLICENY: In Bulgaria, to my understanding about 8,000; in Croatia I know of only 3,000 Jews who were brought to Auschwitz from Agram in the summer of 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were meetings held of the specialists on the Jewish problem from Amt IVA, whose names appear on this sheet to which we made reference earlier?

WISLICENY: Yes. Eichmann was accustomed to calling a large annual meeting of all his experts in Berlin. This meeting was usually in November. At these meetings all the men who were working for him in foreign countries had to report on their activities. In 1944, so far as I know, such a meeting did not take place, because in November 1944 Eichmann was still in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the Jews about whom you have personal knowledge, how many were subjected to the final solution, that is, to being killed?

WISLICENY: The exact number is extremely hard for me to determine. I have only one basis for a possible estimate, that is a conversation between Eichmann and Hoess in Vienna, in which he said that only a very few of those sent from Greece to Auschwitz had been fit for work. Of the Slovakian and Hungarian Jews about 20 to 30 percent had been able to work. It is therefore very hard for me to give a reliable total.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your meetings with the other specialists on the Jewish problem and Eichmann did you gain any knowledge or information as to the total number of Jews killed under this program?

WISLICENY: Eichmann personally always talked about at least 4 million Jews. Sometimes he even mentioned 5 million. According to my own estimate I should say that at least 4 million must have been destined for the so-called final solution. How many of those actually survived, I am not in a position to say.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you last see Eichmann?

WISLICENY: I last saw Eichmann towards the end of February 1945 in Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he would commit suicide.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did he say anything at that time as to the number of Jews that had been killed?

WISLICENY: Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical manner. He said he would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that he had 5 million people on his conscience would be for him a source of extraordinary satisfaction.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is available for other counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecuting counsel wish to examine the witness?

MR. G.D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I have no desire to ask any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

COL. POKROVSKY: At this stage the Soviet Union does not wish to ask any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you mentioned the impressment of the Jews for labor and named two cases, one of Jews from Slovakia who were brought to Auschwitz and put to work if they were fit for it; then later you spoke of those Jews who were brought from Hungary to the Southeast Wall. Do you know whether the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel had any connection with these actions, whether this happened on his orders, and whether he otherwise had anything to do with these matters?

WISLICENY: As far as the Jews from Slovakia were concerned, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had nothing to do with these matters. It was a purely internal affair for the Inspector of Concentration Camps who employed these Jews for his own purposes. Concerning the impressment of Jews for the construction of the Southeast Wall, I cannot definitely answer this question. I do not know to what extent the construction of the Southeast Wall was directed by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The Jews who came up from Hungary for this construction work were turned over to the Lower Danube Gauleitung.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other?

HERR BABEL: Witness, you mentioned measures taken by the Security Police and the SD; and you spoke about these organizations several times in your testimony. Is this merely an official designation or are we to conclude from your statement that the Security Service (the SD) as such,

## participated in some way?

WISLICENY: The actions mentioned were executed by Amt IV, that is, the Gestapo. If I mentioned the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, I did so because it was the correct designation of this office and not because I wished to mention the SD as such.

HERR BABEL: Did the SD then participate, in any way, in the measures against the Jews mentioned by you: 1) to what extent, and 2) in what manner?

WISLICENY: The SD as an organization was not involved. Some of the leaders, including me, who worked with Eichmann, came from the SD; but they had been detailed to Amt IV—to the Gestapo.

HERR BABEL: Did former members of the SS and SD who later became active in the Gestapo still remain members of their original organization, or were they now members of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: No, they still remained with the SD.

HERR BABEL: And were they acting as members of the SD or were they carrying out orders of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: We belonged to the Gestapo for the duration of our assignment. We merely remained on the SD payroll and were taken care of as members of their personnel. Orders were received exclusively from the Gestapo—from Amt IV.

HERR BABEL: In this connection I should like to ask one more question. Could an outsider ever know his way about in this maze of offices?

WISLICENY: No; that was practically impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other of the defendants’ counsel who wishes to cross-examine this witness? Colonel Amen, do you wish, or Colonel Brookhart, does he wish to re-examine the witness?

COL. AMEN: No further questions, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That will do.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: It will take about 10 minutes, Sir, to get the next witness up. I had not anticipated we would finish quite so quickly. Do you still want me to get him up this afternoon?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any other witnesses on these subjects?

COL. AMEN: Not on this subject, Sir. I have two very brief witnesses: one on the written agreement, concerning which testimony was given this morning, between the OKW and OKH and the RSHA—a witness who can answer the questions which the members of the Tribunal asked this morning, very briefly; and one other witness who is on a totally different subject.

THE PRESIDENT: On what subject is the other witness?

COL. AMEN: Well, he is on the subject of identifying two of the defendants at one of the concentration camps. I don’t like to mention these names to the Defense unless you wish me to.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will call those two witnesses tomorrow?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. I don’t think either of them will take more than 20 minutes apiece.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will go on with the evidence against the High Command?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY Friday, 4 January 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. AMEN: I would like to call as a witness for the Prosecution Walter Schellenberg.

[_The witness, Schellenberg, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Walter Schellenberg?

WALTER SCHELLENBERG (Witness): My name is Walter Schellenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

COL. AMEN: Speak slowly and pause between the questions and the answers.

Where were you born?

SCHELLENBERG: In Saarbrücken.

COL. AMEN: How old are you?

SCHELLENBERG: Thirty-five years.

COL. AMEN: You were a member of the NSDAP?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And of the SS?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; the SS also.

COL. AMEN: And of the Waffen-SS?

SCHELLENBERG: And the Waffen-SS.

COL. AMEN: And the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: And the SD.

COL. AMEN: What was the highest office you held?

SCHELLENBERG: The highest rank I held was that of SS Brigadeführer in the SS, and of major general in the Waffen-SS.

COL. AMEN: You were Chief of Amt VI?

SCHELLENBERG: I was Chief of Amt VI and Military.

COL. AMEN: During what period of time?

SCHELLENBERG: I was made Deputy Chief of Amt VI in July 1941, and the final confirmation of my appointment as Chief was in June of 1942.

COL. AMEN: State briefly the functions of Amt VI of the RSHA.

SCHELLENBERG: Amt VI was the political secret service of the Reich and worked principally in foreign countries.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of an agreement between OKW, OKH, and the RSHA concerning the use of Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos in the Russian campaign?

SCHELLENBERG: At the end of May 1941 conferences took place between the then head of the Security Police and the Quartermaster General, General Wagner.

COL. AMEN: And who?

SCHELLENBERG: The Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally attend those conferences?

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes of the final conferences.

COL. AMEN: Have you given us the names of all persons present during those negotiations?

SCHELLENBERG: The negotiations took place principally between Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who was then the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and the Quartermaster General of the Army.

COL. AMEN: Was anyone else present during any of the negotiations?

SCHELLENBERG: Not during the negotiations themselves, but at a later meeting other persons took part.

COL. AMEN: And did those negotiations result in the signing of an agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: A written agreement was concluded.

COL. AMEN: Were you there when the written agreement was signed?

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes and I saw both gentlemen sign.

COL. AMEN: By whom was this agreement signed?

SCHELLENBERG: It was signed by the then Chief of the Security Police, SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich, and the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original agreement, or any copy thereof, is located today?

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot say. I know nothing about that.

COL. AMEN: But you are familiar with the contents of that written agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; for the most part I recall that.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please tell the Tribunal exactly what was contained in that written agreement.

SCHELLENBERG: The first part of this agreement began with the quotation of a basic decree by the Führer. It read in the introductory clause somewhat as follows:

For the safety of the fighting troops in the Russian campaign that is now expected to start, all means are to be used to keep the rear safe and protected. On the basis of this consideration every means is to be used to break any resistance. In order to support the fighting units of the Army, the Security Police and the Security Service are also to be called in for this task.

If I remember correctly, as a special example of something to be protected, the safeguarding of the so-called great routes of supply, also called “Rollbahnen,” was mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall anything else contained in that agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: In the second part of this agreement the organization of the army groups was mentioned.

COL. AMEN: And what was said about that?

SCHELLENBERG: And the corresponding organization of the Einsatz groups and the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD. Four different sectors were mentioned.

I remember the following: First, the front area; second, the operational zone—it was also divided into an army group area and a rear army group area; third, the rear army area; and fourth, the area where the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) was to be set up.

In these different areas, the division of subordination and command was clearly defined. In the front areas or fighting areas, the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD were tactically and operationally under the command of the Army; that is, they were completely under the command of the Army.

In the operational zones only operational subordination should apply and this same rule should apply in the rear army area. In the zone intended for the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same conditions of subordination and command were to apply as in Reich territory.

In a third part it was explained what was meant by tactical and operational, or rather only the concept “operational” was explained in detail. By “operational” was meant the subordination to the branches of the Army in respect to discipline and supplies. Special mention was made of the fact that the operational subordination also included all supplies—especially supplies of gasoline, food, and the making available of technical routes for the transmission of intelligence.

COL. AMEN: Have you now told us everything which you recall about that agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; I cannot remember anything else contained in the agreement.

COL. AMEN: If Your Honor pleases, that is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the English Prosecution have any questions to ask?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecution have any questions to ask?

COL. POKROVSKY: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution have any questions to ask?

[_There was no response._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that Dr. Kaltenbrunner was your superior?

SCHELLENBERG: Dr. Kaltenbrunner was my immediate superior.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Until what time?

SCHELLENBERG: From the 30th of January of 1943 until the end.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude towards the main themes of National Socialism, for instance, the treatment of the Jews or the treatment of the Church?

SCHELLENBERG: I personally did not have a chance to converse with him on these problems. What I know about him is the result of my own few personal observations.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see original orders from Kaltenbrunner dealing with the execution of saboteurs, the confinement of people in concentration camps, and the like?

SCHELLENBERG: No. I heard him give only oral orders in respect to this—commands which he gave to the Chief of the State Police, the Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner ever indicate to you that he had agreed with Himmler that everything concerning concentration camps and the entire executive power was to be taken away from him and that only the SD, as an intelligence service, was to be entrusted to him and that he wanted to expand this intelligence service in order to supply the criticism that was otherwise lacking?

SCHELLENBERG: I never heard of any such agreement, and what I found out later to be the facts is to the contrary.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, since you have given a negative answer, I must ask you the following question, in order to make this one point clear: Which facts do you mean?

SCHELLENBERG: I mean, for instance, the fact that after the Reichsführer SS very reluctantly agreed, through my persuasion, not to evacuate the concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner—by getting into direct contact with Hitler—circumvented this order of Himmler’s and broke his word in respect to international promises.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any international decisions in respect to this—decisions which referred to existing laws or decisions which referred to international agreements?

SCHELLENBERG: I would like to explain that, if through the intermediary of internationally known persons, the then Reichsführer SS promised the official Allied authorities not to evacuate the concentration camps, owing to the general distress, this promise was binding according to human rights.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What do you mean by evacuate?

SCHELLENBERG: Arbitrarily to evacuate the camps before the approaching enemy troops and to scatter them to other parts of Germany still unoccupied by the enemy troops.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your opinion?

SCHELLENBERG: That no further evacuation should take place, because human rights simply did not allow it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That the camps should therefore be surrendered to the approaching enemy?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that your activity, too, could bring suffering to many people, to people who were _per se_ innocent?

SCHELLENBERG: I did not understand the question. Will you please repeat it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever think that your activity, too, and the

## activity of your fellow-workers was a cause for the great suffering of

many people—let us say Jews—even though these people were innocent?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot imagine that the activity of my office could cause any such thing. I was merely in an information service.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then your information service had no connection at all with such crimes.

SCHELLENBERG: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then Kaltenbrunner, too, would not be guilty in regard to this point?

SCHELLENBERG: Certainly; because he was, at the same time, the Chief of Amt IV of the State Police.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked “in regard to this point,” and by that I meant your sector.

SCHELLENBERG: I only represented the Sector Amt VI and Amt Military.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But Kaltenbrunner, at the same time, was Chief of Amt VI?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA. Eight departments, as you probably know, were under him. I was at the head of one or two of them, namely, Amt VI and Amt Military. These two offices had nothing to do with the executive power of the State Police.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, if your department . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What I understood you to say was that you were only in a branch which was an information center; is that right?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And that Kaltenbrunner was your immediate chief; is that right?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he was the Chief not only of your branch but of the whole organization.

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to question this witness later on, after I have talked with Kaltenbrunner.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the summer of 1943 were you in Ankara? And did you, on this occasion pay a visit to the German Embassy?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you during this visit criticize German foreign policy in various respects, and did you mention that it was absolutely advisable to establish better relations with the Holy See? Did Herr Von Papen then answer, “That would be possible only if, in accordance with the demands that I have made repeatedly, the Church policy is revised completely and the persecution of the Church ceases”?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, the gist of the conversation is correct; and I spoke with the then Ambassador Von Papen to this effect.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): You said a little while ago that, with respect to authority, the same regulations applied in the area of the civil administration as in the Reich.

SCHELLENBERG: I said they were to apply.

DR. THOMA: Please answer my question again.

SCHELLENBERG: I will repeat: I described the agreement which contained the provision that in the areas intended for civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same relations between the Army and the Security Police and the SD, in regard to subordination and command, were applicable as in the Reich.

DR. THOMA: Do you know how that was done in practice?

SCHELLENBERG: No, later on I did not concern myself with these questions any more.

DR. THOMA: Thank you.

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the SS and of the SD, and in leading positions . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state, for the purposes of the record, which organization you appear on behalf of?

HERR BABEL: I represent the organization of the SS and SD.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the RSHA there were departments of the Security Police and the SD. How were these two departments interrelated, and what was the purpose of the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: That is a question that I cannot answer with one sentence.

HERR BABEL: I can withdraw the question for the moment and ask a concrete one: Was the SD used with the “Einsatzgruppen” in the East? To what extent? And for what tasks?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that most of this work in the East was undertaken by the Security Police, that is, by the Secret State Police and the Criminal Police and that only supplementary contingents were formed from the personnel of the SD.

HERR BABEL: How large were these contingents? How large was the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that I can estimate the figures: Excluding female employees, the State Police—perhaps 40,000 to 45,000; the Criminal Police—15,000 to 20,000; the SD of the interior, that is, Amt III with its organizational subsidiaries—2,000 to 2,500; and the SD outside Germany, that is my Amt VI—about 400.

HERR BABEL: And how was the SD used in the East with the Einsatz groups.

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the particulars, as that was a concern of the personnel administration and it depended entirely upon the instructions of the then Chief of the Security Police.

HERR BABEL: Did the figures you mentioned include only the male members of the SD, or were the female employees also included?

SCHELLENBERG: Only male members. I excluded the female employees.

HERR BABEL: Yesterday a witness gave us approximately the same figure of 3,000, but he included the female employees in this figure.

SCHELLENBERG: I mentioned a figure of 2,000 to 2,500 for the SD in the interior.

HERR BABEL: What was the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS?

SCHELLENBERG: As for the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS, I cannot give you a detailed reply that is reliable as I did not deal with this question.

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the Waffen-SS and of the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: I was merely appointed a member of the Waffen-SS in January 1945, so to speak by higher orders, because I had many military units under my command and I had to be given a military rank through the Amt Military.

HERR BABEL: Do you know whether that also happened to a large extent in other cases?

SCHELLENBERG: That question is beyond me.

HERR BABEL: Thank you.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of any particular case in which Kaltenbrunner had ordered the evacuation of any one concentration camp, contrary to Himmler’s wishes?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal about that?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the beginning of April 1945. The son of the former Swiss President, Muesi, who had taken his father to Switzerland, returned by car to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, in order to fetch a Jewish family which I myself had set free. He found the camp in process of being evacuated under the most deplorable conditions. When he had, 3 days previously, driven his father to Switzerland, he was given definite assurance before he left that the camps would not be evacuated. Since this assurance was also intended for General Eisenhower, he was doubly disappointed at this breach of promise. Muesi, Jr., called on me personally at my office. He was deeply offended and reproached me bitterly. I could not understand what had happened; and I at once contacted Himmler’s secretary, protesting against this sort of procedure. Shortly after, it was admitted that the facts as depicted by Muesi, Jr., were true, although it was still incomprehensible, because Himmler had not given these orders. I was assured that everything would be done to put an immediate halt to the evacuations. This was confirmed on the telephone personally by Himmler a few hours later. I believe it was on the same day, after a meeting of office chiefs, that I informed Kaltenbrunner of the situation and expressed my profound concern at this new breach of international assurances. As I paused in the conversation, the Chief of the State Police, Gruppenführer Müller, interrupted and explained that he had started the evacuation of the more important internees from the individual camps 3 days ago on Kaltenbrunner’s orders. Kaltenbrunner replied with these words:

“Yes, that is correct. It was an order of the Führer which was also recently confirmed by the Führer in person. All the important internees are to be evacuated at his order to the south of the Reich.”

He then turned to me mockingly and, speaking in dialect, said:

“Tell your old gentleman (i.e. Muesi, Sr.) that there are still enough left in the camps. With that you too can be satisfied.”

I think this was on 10 April 1945.

COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say now what the functions of the RSHA were?

SCHELLENBERG: That I cannot answer in one sentence. I believe . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Be brief, be brief! What were the aims?

SCHELLENBERG: The RSHA was a comprehensive grouping of the Security Police, that is, the State Police . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We know about this organization on the basis of the documents which are at the disposal of the Court, but what were its functions?

SCHELLENBERG: I just wanted to explain its functions. Its functions consisted of security, that is, State Police activity, of Criminal Police activity, and of intelligence activity at home and abroad.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Would it be correct to formulate the functions as follows: To suppress those whom the Nazi Party considered its enemies?

SCHELLENBERG: No, I think this statement is too one-sided.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But all these functions were included?

SCHELLENBERG: They were, perhaps, a certain part of the activities of the State Police.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had this part of the functions, then, been changed after Kaltenbrunner took office?

SCHELLENBERG: No, there was no change.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had those functions, to which you referred just now, been changed since the time that Kaltenbrunner took office as Chief of the Security Police?

SCHELLENBERG: The functions, as I formulated them, did not change after Kaltenbrunner assumed office.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I have one more question: What were the aims and purposes of the Einsatz groups which were to have been created on the basis of the agreement between the SD and the High Command?

SCHELLENBERG: As I mentioned before, in the first part of the agreement made at that time it was laid down that the rear must be protected and all means used to repress any resistance.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): To repress or to crush resistance?

SCHELLENBERG: The words were, “All resistance is to be crushed with every means.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): By what means was the resistance to be suppressed?

SCHELLENBERG: The agreement did not mention or discuss this in any way.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But you know what means were used for that suppression, do you not?

SCHELLENBERG: Later I heard that because of the bitterness of the struggle, harsh means were chosen, but I know this only by hearsay.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does it mean more exactly?

SCHELLENBERG: That in partisan fighting and in encounters with the civilian population many shootings took place.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Including children?

SCHELLENBERG: I didn’t hear about that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You didn’t hear about it?

[_There was no response._]

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since Your Lordship was good enough to ask me whether I wanted to put any questions, I have had some further information and I should be very grateful if the Tribunal would be good enough to allow me to ask one or two questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] Would you direct your mind to a conversation between the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenführer Nebe, and Gruppenführer Müller, in the spring of 1944, in Berlin at Wilhelmstrasse 102.

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With what was that conversation concerned?

SCHELLENBERG: This conversation, as far as I could gather—for I took no

## part in it—concerned the subsequent covering for the shooting of about

50 English or American prisoners of war. The gist of the conversation was, as far as I remember, that there had evidently been an inquiry from the International Red Cross as to the whereabouts of 50 English and American prisoners of war. This request for information by the International Red Cross appears to have been passed on to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD by way of the Foreign Office. From the conversation I could . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was it already in the form of a protest against the shooting of prisoners of war?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe it was lodged in the form of a protest, since from fragments of this conversation I gathered that there was a discussion as to how the shooting of these prisoners of war, which had already taken place, could be covered up or disguised.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Kaltenbrunner discuss this with Müller and Nebe?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner discussed this matter with Müller and Nebe, but I heard merely fragments of the conversation. I heard, incidentally, that they meant to discuss the details in the course of the afternoon.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear any suggestion put forward as to what explanations should be given to cover the shooting of these prisoners?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, Kaltenbrunner himself offered these suggestions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What were the suggestions?

SCHELLENBERG: That the majority should be treated as individual cases, as “having perished in air raids”; some, I believe, because they “offered resistance,” that is, “physical resistance,” while others were “pursued when escaping.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean—shot while trying to escape?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, shot in flight.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And these were the excuses which Kaltenbrunner suggested?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, these were the excuses that Kaltenbrunner suggested.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember as well as you can about these prisoners. Does any number remain in your mind? Can you remember any number of prisoners that they were discussing or how these explanations arose? About how many?

SCHELLENBERG: I remember only that the number “50” was mentioned over and over again, but what the actual details were I cannot say because I just caught fragments of the conversation. I could not follow the whole conversation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the number “50” remains in your mind?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, I heard “50.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember anything of the place or the camp in which these people had been, who were said to have been shot?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot tell you under oath. There is a possibility that I might add something I heard afterwards. I believe it was Breslau, but I cannot say it exactly, as a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And can you remember anything of what service the people belonged to? Were they Air Force or Army? Have you any recollection on that point?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe they were all officers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were officers?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you cannot remember what service?

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot tell you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to the Tribunal for letting me ask these questions.

COL. AMEN: That is all for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the witness can go then.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: I wish to call as the next witness, Alois Höllriegel.

[_The witness, Höllriegel, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ALOIS HÖLLRIEGEL (Witness): Alois Höllriegel.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you want to.

COL. AMEN: What position did you hold at the end of the war?

HÖLLRIEGEL: At the end of the war I was Unterscharführer at Mauthausen.

COL. AMEN: Were you a member of the Totenkopf SS?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes; in the year 1939 I was drafted into the SS.

COL. AMEN: What were your duties at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard company, and I stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was detailed to the inner service of the concentration camp.

COL. AMEN: And you therefore had occasion to witness the extermination of inmates of that camp by shooting, gassing, and so forth?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I saw that.

COL. AMEN: And did you make an affidavit in this case to the effect that you saw Kaltenbrunner at that camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And that he saw and was familiar with the operation of the gas chamber there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you also have occasion to see any other important personages visiting that concentration camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember Pohl, Glücks, Kaltenbrunner, Schirach, and the Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither.

COL. AMEN: And did you personally see Schirach at that concentration camp at Mauthausen?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you remember what he looks like so that you could identify him?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I think that he has probably changed a little in recent times, but I would certainly remember him.

COL. AMEN: How long ago was it that you saw him there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: That was in the fall of 1942. Since then I have not seen him.

COL. AMEN: Will you look around the courtroom and see whether you can see Schirach in the courtroom?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Which person is it?

HÖLLRIEGEL: In the second row, the third person from the left.

COL. AMEN: The affidavit to which I referred was Exhibit Number USA-515.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?

COL. AMEN: 2753-PS.

[_Turning to the witness._] I now show you a copy of Document Number 2641-PS and ask you whether you can recognize the place where those individuals are standing?

HÖLLRIEGEL: As far as can be seen from the picture, it is a quarry. Whether it is at Mauthausen or not one cannot determine exactly, because the view is too small.

COL. AMEN: Would you repeat that answer please?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Certainly. As far as can be seen from this picture, it is not possible to say definitely if this is the Wiener-Graben quarry which adjoined Mauthausen. It might easily be another quarry. A larger range of vision is required. But I think that visits were often made there. I assume that this is the Wiener-Graben quarry.

COL. AMEN: Very good. Just lay the picture aside for the time being. Did you have occasion to observe the killing of inmates of the concentration camp by pushing them off a cliff?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what you saw with respect to that practice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember, it was in 1941. At that time I was with a guard company on the tower which closed off the area of the Wiener-Graben quarry. I was able to observe in the morning about six to eight prisoners who came with two SS men. One was Hauptscharführer Spatzenöcker and the other, Unterscharführer Edenhofer; they moved about and made strange gestures . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, you are going too fast. You should go slower.

HÖLLRIEGEL: I saw that they were approaching the precipice near the quarry. I saw from my watchtower that these two SS men were beating the prisoners and I realized immediately that they intended to force them to throw themselves over the precipice or else to push them over. I noticed how one of the prisoners was kicked while lying on the ground, and the gestures showed that he was supposed to throw himself down the precipice. This the prisoner promptly did under the pressure of the blows—presumably in despair.

COL. AMEN: How steep was the precipice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I estimate it to be 30 to 40 meters.

COL. AMEN: Was there a term used amongst you guards for this practice of having the prisoners fall from the top of the precipice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Mauthausen Camp they were called paratroopers.

COL. AMEN: The witness is available to other counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecutor or the French Prosecutor or any defense counsel have any questions?

DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am interested in the following points: You said just now that in 1939 you were taken into the SS?

HÖLLRIEGEL: That is true; on the 6th of September . . .

DR. SAUTER: One moment; please repeat your answer.

HÖLLRIEGEL: That is right. On the 6th of September 1939 I was taken into the SS at Ebersberg near Linz.

DR. SAUTER: Had you no connection at all with the Party before then?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. In April 1938 I enlisted in the civilian SS, because I was out of work during the entire previous period of the Schuschnigg Government and without any support, and consequently I thought, I would join the civilian SS; there I would get work in order to marry my wife.

DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understood you correctly, you were drafted into the SS in 1939, because you had already voluntarily enlisted in the civilian SS in the spring of 1938?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot say that exactly. Many were drafted into the Armed Forces, into the Air Force, and into the General SS.

DR. SAUTER: Are you an Austrian?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Then at that time you lived in Austria?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Graz.

DR. SAUTER: Then I should be interested in a certain point in regard to the Defendant Von Schirach. You saw the Defendant Von Schirach at Mauthausen. How often did you see him there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I can remember quite clearly—once.

DR. SAUTER: Once?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Was Von Schirach alone at Mauthausen, or was he together with other people?

HÖLLRIEGEL: No. Von Schirach was accompanied by other gentlemen. There was a group of about 10 people, and among them I recognized Von Schirach and Gauleiter Uiberreither.

DR. SAUTER: There are supposed to have been 20 persons at least and not 10 on that occasion.

HÖLLRIEGEL: I did not know at that time that I might have to use these figures; I did not count them.

DR. SAUTER: This point is important to me, because the Defendant Schirach told me it was a visiting inspection, an official inspection tour of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, as a result of a meeting of the economic advisors of all six Gaue of the Ostmark.

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I naturally did not know why he came to the camp, but I remember that this group came with Von Schirach and Schutzhaftlagerführer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bachmeyer. At any rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.

DR. SAUTER: Did you know that this inspection was announced in the camp several days before and that certain preparations were made in the camp because of this inspection?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember any specific preparations but I do remember it was in the evening. I can’t tell you the exact time; it was the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assembled for roll call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then this group came in.

DR. SAUTER: Did you or your comrades not know on the day before that this inspection would take place the very next day?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember that.

DR. SAUTER: And did it not strike you that certain definite preparations had been made in this camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember noticing that any preparations had been made.

DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions to ask this witness.

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness, you described an incident which, judged by the concepts of civilized people, cannot be termed anything but murder—that is, the hurling of people over the side of the quarry. Did you report this incident to your superiors?

HÖLLRIEGEL: These incidents happened frequently and one can take it that the chances were a thousand to one that the superiors knew about them.

DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you did not report this. Is it true that not only the internees but also the guards were forbidden under pain of death to report incidents of this sort to a third person?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: I have no other question.

COL. AMEN: Would you just look at that picture again?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you look at it carefully and tell me whether that is the quarry underneath the cliff which you have just described?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. As far as I can tell from this picture, and I assume with a 100 percent degree of accuracy that it is the quarry Wiener-Graben; but one would have to see more, more background, to decide whether it is really this quarry. One sees too little, but I think quite certainly . . .

COL. AMEN: Do you recognize the individuals whose faces appear in the picture?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal the ones which you do recognize?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I recognize of course Reichsführer SS Himmler first of all, next to him the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp Ziereis and way to the right I recognize Kaltenbrunner.

COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can go and we will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next and final subject of the criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Command, to be presented by Colonel Taylor.

COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal, the Indictment seeks a declaration of criminality, under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter, against six groups or organizations; and the last one listed in the Indictment is a group described as the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

At first sight these six groups and organizations seem to differ rather widely one from another, both in their composition and in their functions. But all of them are related, and we believe that they are logically indicted together before the Tribunal because they are the primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which the Nazi conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them were either established by, controlled by, or became allied with the Nazis; and they were essential to the success of the Nazis. They were at once the principal and indispensable instruments: The Party, the Government, the Police, and the Armed Forces. It is my task to present the case in chief against the General Staff and High Command group.

Now, in one respect this group is to be sharply distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which we have sought this declaration. For example, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party—of the NSDAP—is the Leadership Corps of the Party itself, the Party which was the embodiment of Nazism and which was the instrument primarily through which Hitlerism rode to full power and tyranny in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches—to be sure, large branches—of the Nazi Party. The German Police did, indeed, have certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism; but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi Party and the SS. The Reich Cabinet was in essence merely a committee or series of committees of Reich Ministers; and when the Nazis came to power, quite naturally these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All these groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Nazism or automatically became Nazified when Hitler came to power.

Now, that is not true of the group with which we are now concerned. I need not remind the Tribunal that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. One need not be a graybeard to have very vivid personal recollections of the war of 1914 to 1918, of the Kaiser, and of the “scrap of paper.” For these reasons I want to sketch very briefly, before going into the evidence, the nature of our case against this group, which is unique in the particulars I have mentioned.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and permissible scope of activities of the German Armed Forces were severely restricted. That these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism, the last few years have made abundantly apparent. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration; collaboration between the Nazis on the one hand and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

When Hitler came to power, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs. He found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history. The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men.

Now, needless to say, it is not the Prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the Prosecution’s position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that they were all equally culpable. But we will show that this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi objectives, but we will show that they furnished the one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany; and that was skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your Honors will see, as the proof is given, that the answer is very simple. The answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objectives of Hitlerism and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving these objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense of neighboring countries and were prepared to do so by force or threat of force. Force, armed might, was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: either to collaborate with and expand the small German Army, known as the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter and accordingly were the more inclined to collaborate. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that they wished to achieve by way of expanding German armies and German frontiers; and so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, as the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken for a ride by the Nazis.

Hitler, in short, attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically; and, as the war proceeded, they became his tools. But if these military leaders became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many of the crimes which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal. The willingness—and, indeed, the eagerness—of the German professional officer corps to become partners of the Nazis, will be fully developed.

Your Lordship, there will be three principal parts to this presentation. There will be first a description of the composition and functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment; next, the evidence in support of the charges of criminality under Counts One and Two of the Indictment; finally, the evidence in support of the charges under Counts Three and Four.

The members of the Tribunal should have before them three document books which have been given the designation “CC.” The first of these books is a series of sworn statements or affidavits which are available to the Tribunal in English, Russian, and French and which have been available to the defendants in German. The second and third books are the usual type of document books, separated merely for convenience of handling. The second book contains documents in the C- and L-series, and the third book, in the PS- and R-series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we have had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they will be referred to.

The Tribunal should also have one other document, and that is a short mimeographed statement entitled, “Basic Information on the Organization of the German Armed Forces.” That has also been handed up in English, Russian, and French and has been made available to the defendants’ Information Center in German.

So I turn first to the description of the group as defined in the Indictment.

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name, the German General Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the public mind; but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918; but there has, of course, been a group of men responsible for the policy and the acts of the German Armed Forces, and the fact that these men have no single collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. They cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies, not in the name you give it, but in the functions it performs; and the men comprised within the group as we have defined it in the Indictment do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and operations of the German Armed Forces.

Let us examine first the general structure and organization of the German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the group as specified in the Indictment. As I just mentioned, we have prepared a very short written exposition of the organization of the German Armed Forces, which we have handed up to the Tribunal. That document contains a short sketch setting forth the basic history and development of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces since 1933 and the structure as it emerged after its reorganization in 1938. It also contains a simple chart which, in a few moments, will be displayed at the front of the courtroom. It also contains a short glossary of German military expressions; and it contains a comparative table of ranks in the German Army and in the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army and the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy. I may say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the principal nations, but that by and large they follow the same general pattern and terminology.

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, who at that time was Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under Von Blomberg were the Chief of the Army Staff, who at that time was Von Fritsch, and of the Naval Staff, the Defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatever. The Army and Naval Staffs were renamed “High Command”—Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine—from which are derived the initials by which they are generally known, OKH and OKM.

In May 1935 at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices; but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal Von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the Armed Forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under Von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of the Defendant Göring who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

I will now ask that that chart be displayed, please.

This chart, Your Honors, has been certified and sworn to by three principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it will be introduced in a few moments. It shows the organization, the top organization, of the Armed Forces as it emerged in 1938 after the reorganization which I will now describe.

In February 1938 Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch were both retired from their positions and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. The War Ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmachtsamt, meaning the Armed Forces Department; and the function of that department had been to co-ordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority known as the High Command of the German Armed Forces—that is the box in the center, right under Hitler—known in German as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and usually known by the initials OKW.

Since the Air Force as well as the Army was subordinated to OKW, co-ordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was really Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. The Defendant Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW. The most important division of the OKW, shown just to the right, was the Operations Staff, of which the Defendant Jodl became the chief.

Now, this reorganization and the establishment of OKW was embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February 1938. This decree appeared in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I invite the Court’s attention to it by way of judicial notice (1915-PS). Copies are available; and I would like to read the decree, which is very short, into the transcript. I quote:

“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally.”

THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?

COL. TAYLOR: That is not a document, Your Honor, because it is a decree from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and subject to judicial notice; but copies are available here if the Tribunal cares to look at it.

I will continue with the second paragraph of this decree:

“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its functions becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces and comes directly under my command as my military staff.

“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His status is equal to that of a Reich Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as my representative, exercises the functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister. The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peacetime for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas according to my directives.”

Dated at Berlin, 4 February 1938; signed by Hitler, by Lammers, and by Keitel.

Underneath the OKW come the three supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force. The Air Force did not receive the official designation OKL until 1944. The Defendant Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, but Von Fritsch, as well as Blomberg, passed out of the picture; Von Fritsch being replaced by Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Göring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 Von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army—that is the first box in the left column—by Hitler himself; and in 1943 Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by the Defendant Dönitz. The Defendant Göring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war.

OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations. The three staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are the three boxes in a horizontal line next to the bottom. The staff of the OKW is the little box to the right at the top, bearing the names of Jodl and Warlimont.

In the case of OKH—that is the Army—the staff was known as the Generalstab or the General Staff. In the case of OKW, it was known as the Führungsstab or Operations Staff, but in all cases the functions were those of a general staff in military parlance.

It will be seen, therefore, that in this war there was no single German General Staff; but, rather, that there were four, one for each branch of the service and one for the OKW as the over-all inter-service Supreme Command.

So we come to the bottom line on the chart. Down to the bottom line we have been concerned with the central staff organization at the center of affairs. Now we pass to the field. Under OKH, OKM, and OKL come the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, respectively.

In the Army the largest army field formation was known to the Germans, as indeed it is among the nations generally, as an army group, or in German “Heeresgruppe.” Those are shown in the box in the lower left hand corner. An army group or Heeresgruppe controls two or more armies—in German, “Armeen.” Underneath the armies come the lower field formations, such as corps, divisions, and regiments, which are not shown on the chart.

In the case of the German Air Force, the largest formation was known as an air fleet or “Luftflotte,” and the lower units under the air fleet were called corps, “Fliegerkorps” or “Jagdkorps”; or divisions, “Fliegerdivisionen” or “Jagddivisionen.” These lower formations again we have not shown on the chart.

Under the OKM were the various naval group commands, which controlled all naval operations in a given area with the exception of the high seas fleet itself and submarines. The commanders of the fleet and the submarines were directly under the German Admiralty.

So we may now examine the group as defined in the Indictment; the group against which the Prosecution seeks the declaration of criminality. It is defined in Appendix B of the Indictment. The group comprises, firstly, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands which I have just described and, secondly, the officers who held the top field commands.

Turning first to the officers who held the principal positions in the supreme commands, we find that the holders of nine such positions are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, later Hitler; Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and later Dönitz; Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring, and later Von Greim.

Four other positions are those of the chiefs of the staffs to those four commanders-in-chief: The Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Jodl; the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder, and later others; the Chief of-the General Staff of the Air Force, Jeschonnek, and later others; the Chief of the Naval War Staff.

The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. Throughout most of the war that was General Warlimont, whose name is shown under Jodl’s on the chart. The particular responsibility of Jodi’s deputy was planning—strategic planning—and for that reason his office has been included in the group as defined in the Indictment.

The group named in the Indictment includes all individuals who held any of those nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which you see it there and in which it persisted up until the end of the war.

Twenty-two different individuals occupied those nine positions during that period, and of those 22, 18 are still living.

Turning next to the officers who held the principal field commands, the Indictment includes, as members of the group, all commanders-in-chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term “Oberbefehlshaber” rather defies literal translation into English. Literally, the components of the word mean “over-command-holder;” and we can perhaps best translate it as “commander-in-chief.”

In the case of the Army, commanders of the army groups and armies always had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the Air Force the commanders-in-chief of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, although they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy officers holding the senior regional commands and, therefore, in control of all naval operations in a given sector had the status of Oberbefehlshaber.

Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question. All but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff and High Command group, as defined in the Indictment, comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be still living. These figures, of course, are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the 7 years and 3 months from February 1938 to May 1945.

The number of active members of the group at any moment is, of course, much smaller. It was about 20 at the outbreak of the war and it rose to about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any one moment of time in 1944 the group—the active group—would have consisted of the nine individuals occupying the nine staff positions and about 41 Naval, Air Force, or Army commanders-in-chief.

The structure and the functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are included in Volume I of Document Book CC. I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.

In the first place two American officers who were selected for their ability and experience in interviewing high-ranking German prisoners of war were briefed by an intelligence officer and by the Trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the organizational side of the German Armed Forces. These officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German. It was emphasized that the function of these interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the organization of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the Prosecution wanted to be accurately informed.

The German generals to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we could.

I will take up these affidavits one by one, and I think the members of the Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prosecution’s description of the group and conclusively establish that this group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The Soviet and French Judges have copies in French and Russian, and the Defense has copies in German.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder, who held the rank of “Generaloberst” or colonel general—the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be Exhibit Number USA-531 (Document 3702-PS). Halder was Chief of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left-hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September 1938 to September 1942. He is, accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read it in full:

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the head of the State, who prior to the 2d of August 1934, was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter, until 1945, was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision on the basis of their official instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations, of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group, according to the instructions of the OKW, in the name of their respective commanding officers and were presented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time the head of the State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields, and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, the respective members of this group were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.

“The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. Signed: Halder.”

The chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the front of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are covered by documents which will be introduced subsequently.

I next offer a substantially identical statement by Von Brauchitsch, which will be Exhibit Number USA-532 (Document 3703-PS). Von Brauchitsch held the rank of field marshal and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941—therefore also a member of the group. I need not read his statement, since it is practically the same as that given by Halder; but I will ask that it be set forth in full in the transcript at this point. The only difference between the two statements is in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, “In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” Otherwise, the two statements are identical.

[_The document referred to above is as follows_:]

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State), that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision on the basis of their official instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as might possibly be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.

“The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.”—Signed— “Von Brauchitsch.”

Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before Von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by Von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)—and I shall read it in full into the transcript:

“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but, in the planning and conduct of military affairs, they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.

“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff of the Army; and in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force).

“Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff. Signed: Halder.”

The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities.

I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower-right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Göring as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads as follows:

“Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

“They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehlshaber and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities that they previously had.”

Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition of the group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me 2 days ago.

The first is from Hofrat Düllmann, and he has asked whether the group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or “Generaloberst.”

The answer to that is clearly “no.” As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one’s rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.

He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called General Staff Corps. The answer to that is “no.” There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, “Colonel in Generalstab.” They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them—two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.

The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown on the chart.

Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a

## particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest

level; and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign; and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans.

The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal’s attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:

“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial executive power. It had a relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group, who exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch.”

There follows:

“Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945:

“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command. Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved.

“Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders. During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them.

“In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for report. Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial executive power from the OKH directly to the armies. Signed: Von Brauchitsch.”

The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore—and in the case of the Army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies—participated in planning and directing the execution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshaber were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection I invite the Court’s attention to Document 447-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-135, this being a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later on 22 June. The documents, Your Honor, are in numerical order in Document Books II and III. Document Book II contains C and L; Document Book III contains PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book III in numerical order within the PS’s. And within that Document, under Paragraph I, the paragraph entitled “Area of Operations and Executive Power” (“Vollziehende Gewalt”), the Tribunal will find Subparagraph 1, in which the following appears—that is Page 1 of the translation, Paragraph 2:

“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the Government General an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Führer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief”—that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber—“of the army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all other obligations and over orders issued by civilian agencies.”

Your Honors will see that this executive power, with priority over civilian agencies, was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies—to the members of the group as defined in the Indictment.

Further on in the document, under Subparagraph 2(a), the document states—that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the document:

“The area of operations of the Army created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power”—vollziehende Gewalt—“in this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief”—Oberbefehlshaber—“of the army groups and armies.”

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed session to consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore be no public session tomorrow.

COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document dealing with this subject of the structure of the group before passing on to the substantive charges of criminality.

This document is C-78, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-139. That will be found in Volume II of the document book. This document is the official command invitation to participate in the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, 8 days prior to the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the meetings that was referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder and Von Brauchitsch, which were read into the record this morning. It is signed by Colonel Schmundt, the chief Wehrmacht adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941. It begins:

“In re: Conference Barbarossa”—that being the code for the attack on the Soviet Union—“the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of army groups and armies and naval and air commanders of equal rank.”

That is, as the Tribunal will see once again, the very group specified in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, army groups, armies, naval, and air commanders of similar rank.

This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this conference, and I would just like in closing on this subject to run through that list to point out who the participants in this conference were and how closely they parallel the structure of the group as we find it in the Indictment. The Tribunal will see that the list of

## participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation:

General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a member of the group; General Halder, who was Chief of the Army Staff and a member of the group; then three subordinates, who were not members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt.

Navy: Captain Wagner, who was Chief of the Operations Staff, Operations Division of the naval war staff, not a member of the group. On the air side: General Milch, State Secretary and General Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group; Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants.

Passing over the page to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff.

Then four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the group.

Then we pass to the officers from the field commands: General Von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stülpnagel, Schober, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group.

Air Force: General Löhr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group. General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the home forces, commander of the home forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply, G.A.F.

The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the naval war staff, and a member of the group; and a personal assistant who was not a member; Carls, Naval Group North, a member of the group, likewise Schmundt.

Then from the Army: Leeb, Busch, Küchler, all members of the group as Oberbefehlshaber; Keller, a member of the group; Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group.

And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group as defined in the Indictment and that in fact the participants included almost all the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operation against the Soviet Union.

I have now concluded the first part of the presentation, to wit, the description of the General Staff and High Command group and its composition and structure and general manner of functioning. I turn now to the charges levelled against this group in the Indictment.

Appendix B charges that this group had a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of the illegal wars set forth in Counts One and Two and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity detailed in Counts Three and Four.

In presenting the evidence in support of these charges we must keep in mind that under the Charter the group may be declared criminal in connection with any acts of which an individual defendant who was a member of the group may be convicted.

The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the individual defendants in this case. Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter of the individuals here, are members of the group.

Taking them in the order in which they are listed, the first is the Defendant Göring. Göring is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air Force first came into the open and was officially established until about 1 month prior to the end of war. During the last month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by Von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Göring is charged with crimes under all Counts of the Indictment.

The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants are, all four of them, in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them are professional soldiers or sailors.

Keitel was made chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, or OKW, when the OKW was first set up in 1938 and he remained in that capacity throughout the period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshal throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of the OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four Counts.

The Defendant Jodl was a career soldier. He was an Oberstleutnant, or lieutenant colonel, when the Nazis came to power and ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst or colonel general. He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht and continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four counts.

The other two defendants who are members of this group are on the nautical side. The Defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, Grossadmiral. He retired from the Supreme Command of the Navy in 1943, in January, and was replaced by Dönitz. Raeder is charged under Counts One, Two, and Three of the Indictment.

The last of the five defendants, Dönitz, was a relatively junior officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime, he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. He then became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Dönitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German Government. He is charged under Counts One, Two, and Three of the Indictment.

Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a whole. We must except the Defendant Göring who is primarily a Nazi Party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the other four made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among the early Party members. They differ in no essential respects from the other 125 members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects. They rose to the highest position in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained highest rank.

But they will serve as excellent case studies and as representatives of the group, and we can examine their ideas as they have expressed them in these documents and their actions, with fair assurance that these ideas and actions are characteristic of the other group members.

I turn first to the criminal activities of the General Staff and High Command group under Counts One and Two of the Indictment, their

## activities in planning and conspiring to wage illegal wars. Here my task

is largely one of recapitulation. The general body of proof relating to aggressive war has already been laid before the Tribunal by my colleague, Mr. Alderman, and the distinguished members of the British Delegation.

Many of the documents to which they drew the Tribunal’s attention showed that the defendants here who were members of the General Staff and High Command group participated knowingly and wilfully in crimes under Counts One and Two. I propose to avoid referring again to that evidence so far as I possibly can, but I must refer to one or two of them again to focus the Tribunal’s attention on the part which the General Staff and High Command group played in aggressive War Crimes.

Now it is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with the preparation of plans for attack or defense based on hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on these exercises or preparing these plans. That is not what the defendants and this group are charged with.

We will show that the group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by threat of force or force itself, and that they joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might for this purpose. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things we believe to be criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.

Aggressive war cannot be prepared or waged without intense activity on the part of all branches of the armed forces, and particularly by the high-ranking officers who control these forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparation for and the waging of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, or are already proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated therein.

This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain German military leaders to insist that until the troops marched they lived in an ivory tower unwilling to see the direction to which their work led.

The documents to which I will refer fully refute this, and moreover some of these men now fully admit they participated gladly with the Nazis, because the Nazi aims coincided closely with their own.

I think that the documents which Mr. Alderman read into the transcript already adequately reflect the purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria. During this period occurred, as is charged in the Indictment, firstly, secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions, and building of an air force; secondly, the Göring announcement on 10 March 1935 that Germany was building a military air force; thirdly, the law for compulsory military service of 16 March 1935, fixing the peacetime strength of the German Army at 500,000; and finally, and fourthly, the reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.

Those particular facts do not require judicial proof. They are historical facts, and likewise the fact that it would have been impossible for the Nazis to achieve these things without co-operation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.

Mr. Alderman described to the Tribunal and read from numerous documents which illustrate these events. He included numerous documents concerning the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of the Defendant Raeder.

He also read the secret Reich Defense Law, Document 2261-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-24, which was adopted on the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. He read Von Blomberg’s plan, dated 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland—that is Document C-159, Exhibit Number USA-54—and Blomberg’s orders under which the reoccupation was actually carried out.

All these events, by obvious inference, required the closest collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis. I need not labor that point further.

But it is worth while, I think, to re-examine one or two of the documents which show the state of mind and the objectives of the German military leaders during this early period. One document read from by Mr. Alderman which reflects the viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Nazism accorded for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force is a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937, entitled _The Fight of the Navy against Versailles_. That is Document C-156, Exhibit Number USA-41. The Tribunal will recall that this memorandum, this official publication of the German Navy, stated that only with the assistance of Hitler had it been possible to create the conditions for rearmament. The Defendant Jodl has stated this, better than I could possibly put it, in his speech to the Gauleiter on 7 November 1943. That is in Document L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, from which Mr. Alderman read at length.

Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. I invite the Court’s attention to Document C-23, which is already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-49. This consists of some notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938. These notes were written by Admiral Carls by way of comment on a “Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England” and they read in part as follows—that will be found, Your Lordship, on Page 3 of the translation of Document C-23:

“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

“1. If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a position as a world power guaranteed by its own strength, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

“2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding preparations for war.

“3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas; in fact, against one-half to one-third of the whole world.

“It can be justified and have a chance of success only if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.”

Let us turn to the Air Force, having seen what the viewpoint of the Navy was. Parts of the German Air Staff during this pre-war period were developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. Document L-43, Exhibit Number GB-29, is a study prepared by the chief of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the Organization Staff. The study in question is a recommendation for the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950. The recommendation is based on certain assumptions, and one assumption was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which was attached as an enclosure to this study. There is only one copy of the map available, Your Honor.

The Court will note on this map that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. The Court will also note, at Page 2 of the Document itself—that is L-43—that the author envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven group commands, four of which lie within the borders of Germany proper at Berlin, Braunschweig, Munich, and Königsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.

Before turning to particular acts of aggression by the German Armed Forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection I want to direct the Tribunal’s attention to an affidavit Number 3 in Document Book I, which will be Document 3704-PS, Exhibit Number USA-536, by Von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshal, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces until February 1938.

I will read the affidavit into the transcript:

“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three essential territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.

“I, myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About 90 percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the outrage perpetrated by the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia, surrounded by Poland and Lithuania, was regarded as a sacred duty, though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about 10 years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.

“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler, since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However, they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.

“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Göring, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was not replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by any officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a _chef de bureau_. As far as I know, he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘chief of staff’ under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War.

“At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegsminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.

“As far as I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his decisions.

“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”

The statement by Von Blomberg which I have just read is paralleled closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz. That is Affidavit Number 5 in Volume I of the document book Exhibit Number USA-537. Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France and at the end of the war he was in command of Army Group H, which had retreated beyond the Rhine. The first three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the first three paragraphs of Von Blomberg’s; and since they are available in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with Paragraph 4, where the affidavit is on a different subject:

“After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to nothing the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself but also with the Western Powers.

“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Führer’s speech on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategical, and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army during the planned Polish campaign.

“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; and he, as well as the Führer, visited my headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field, so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.”

The Tribunal will note that the latter part of this affidavit, like those of Halder and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the Prosecution. The Tribunal will also note that the Von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Blaskowitz affidavit make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives which they had in mind are obvious, and in these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany, in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression. We turn now to an examination of those

## particular acts of aggression which have already been described to the

Tribunal in general, with the particular purpose of noting participation in these criminal acts by the General Staff and High Command group.

I may say, Your Lordship, that in going over this material, in order to save time I propose to read from a very few documents. There are large numbers of documents. Accordingly, when I cite them I think there is probably no need for the Tribunal to try to find them in the documents before it. Most of them are documents already in evidence and I propose to cite them for purposes of recapitulation, without reading very much.

The Tribunal will recall that Mr. Alderman read into the transcript portions of a document, 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25, consisting of notes by Colonel Hossbach on a conference which was held in the German Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th of November 1937. Hitler presided at this conference, which was a small and highly secret one; and the only other participants were the four principal military leaders and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Defendant Neurath. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister of War, and the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces: Von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Göring for the Air Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany’s diplomatic and military policy and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the improvement of our military and political position” and “in order to remove any threat from the flanks.”

The military and political advantages which were envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Blomberg and Von Fritsch joined in the discussion and Von Fritsch stated that he was making a study to investigate “the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration for the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications.”

The following spring, in March 1938, the German plans with respect to Austria came to fruition. Mr. Alderman has already read into the record portions of the diary kept by the Defendant Jodl. The portion here in question, Document 1780-PS, Exhibit Number USA-72, of this diary shows the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of Austria. As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February 1938, the Defendant Keitel and two other important generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and the purpose is shown clearly by the entry which recites that:

“. . . in the evening and on 12 February General Keitel with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg, Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.”

The General Von Reichenau referred to there was at that time the head commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts into which Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the 10th Army in Poland and the 6th Army in France and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. Sperrle, who was in Spain during the civil war and then commanded Luftflotte 3, the 3rd German Air Fleet, practically throughout the war, was also a member of the group. Two days later Keitel and other military leaders were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna.

These proposals are embodied in a document dated February 14, 1938, 1775-PS, Exhibit Number USA-73, and signed by Keitel. Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Führer are as follows:

“1) Take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2) Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria: a) through V-men”—that means agents—“in Austria, b) through our customs personnel at the frontier, c) through travelling agents.”

Going down the document to 4), Keitel proposed:

“4) Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

“5) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the mountain troops near the frontier.

“6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14 in the Service Command Headquarters VII in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.”

As Jodl’s diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these deceptive maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the impression that these threats of force might be expected to create. About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans for the invasion of Austria, these plans being known as “Case Otto,” in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl’s diary under the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us as follows on Page 2:

“By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

“Führer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General Von Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von Schober is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with Gauleiter Bürckel in the Palatinate.”

The General Von Schober referred to succeeded General Von Reichenau as Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and later was Commander of the 11th Army in Russia and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment.

The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event, that being Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But, although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages.

At the small policy meeting of November 1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary.

In February Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were all present to help subject Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the actual invasion took place, it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the Armed Forces, and we are indebted to the Defendant Jodl for a clear statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence.

In his lecture in November 1943 to the Gauleiter, which appears in Document L-172, which is Exhibit Number USA-34, Jodl explained—this is Page 5, Paragraph 3 of the translation:

“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and air base for the Allies, in particular Russia) Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any vigorous attack before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.”

The foregoing extract from Jodl’s speech makes a good transition to the case of Czechoslovakia—“Case Green,” or “Fall Grün.” I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group.

Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25, may be called to mind. Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the most proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the Armed Forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. From this point on nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl’s diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians, that they were not interested in or not informed about political and diplomatic considerations—that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, that they carried out politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched were aggressive or not.

When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respectfully suggest: Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl’s diary. They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals, that the military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions and fully informed on the political and diplomatic developments, that, indeed, German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings; and indeed, if the documents did not show these things, a moment’s thought must show them to be true.

A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone; and this is no doubt true, but it is equally true that an aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and support, and no doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl’s diary which has not yet been read.

That is Document 1780-PS again—the entry for 10 August 1938. It appears on Page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS:

“10 August 1938. The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Führer makes a speech lasting for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Führer’s attention to the defects of our preparations, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remarks of General Von Wietersheim, in which, to top it off, he claims to quote from General Adams that the Western fortifications can be held for only 3 weeks. The Führer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.’

“The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it”—the General Staff—“is prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for political decisions instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Führer. One does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the generals’ opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will encourage the Führer enormously when the right moment comes.”

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for 10 minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. TAYLOR: The extract from the Jodl diary from which I have just read may indeed show that some of the German generals at that time were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously; but, nonetheless, the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in these years from 1938 to 1942.

So, if we are told that German military leaders did not know that German policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive or based on force or threat of force, let us remember that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a most secret directive to Keitel—already in the transcript, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26—in which he stated clearly his unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.

The Defendant Jodl was in no doubt what that directive meant. He noted in his diary, the same day, that the Führer had stated his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and had initiated military preparation all along the line.

And the succeeding evidence, both in the Schmundt file and in the Jodl diary, shows how these military preparations went forward. Numerous examples of discussions, plans, and preparations during the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff, in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary and the later items in the Schmundt file. The day the Munich Pact was signed, the 29th of September, Jodl noted in his diary—Document 1780-PS—the entry for 29 September:

“The Munich Pact is signed, Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2d and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Führer and his determination not to shun even a world war have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.”

Plans for the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich. Ultimately the absorption of the remainder was accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the Defendant Keitel

## participated, for the usual purpose of demonstrating that German armed

might was ready to enforce the threats—as shown by two documents already in, and which I need not read: Document 2802-PS, Exhibit Number USA-117; and 2798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-118.

And once again the Defendant Jodl, in his 1943 lecture, Document L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, tells us clearly and in one sentence why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazi:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.”

And this serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg and Blaskowitz, from which I have already read. The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor “would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms,” they told us. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired,” they have told us.

I turn now to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a particularly interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and High Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature of the attack have already been introduced by Colonel Griffith-Jones of the British Delegation. I propose to approach it from a slightly different angle, inasmuch as these documents serve as an excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment.

This attack was carefully timed and planned, and in the documents one can observe the staff work step by step. Colonel Griffith-Jones read from a series of directives from Hitler and Keitel, embodied in Document C-120, Exhibit Number GB-1, involving “Fall Weiss”, which was the code word for the plan of attack on Poland. That is a whole series of documents, and the series starts—C-120—with a reissuance of a document called, “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces.”

We have encountered this periodically reissued directive previously. That was a sort of form for standing instructions to the Armed Forces laying out what their tasks during the coming period would be.

In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly, indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and they strongly demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning.

Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April 1939, in which the preparation of the plans for the Polish war is ordered. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to Brauchitsch at OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Göring at OKL; and two to Warlimont in the planning branch of OKW.

Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by 1 September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by a part of one of these documents which has not previously been read; that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and it is to be found at Page 4. The sub-heading is “Political Requirements and Aims”:

“German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

“The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

“Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do this, cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.

“The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

“On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.”

Sub-heading 2, “Military Conclusions”:

“The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western Democracies. Fall Weiss constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.”

Let no one suggest that these are hypothetical plans or that the General Staff and High Command group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are no war game. But, to clinch this point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman’s so-called “pin-up” document on Poland, Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. These are Schmundt’s notes on the conference in Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939, when Hitler announced—and I quote just one sentence:

“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.”

Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides: The Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; the Defendant Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel, OKW; Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Colonel General Milch, who was State Secretary of the Air Ministry and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe; General Bodenschatz, Göring’s personal assistant; Rear Admiral Schniewind, Chief of the naval war staff; Colonel Jeschonnek, Chief of the Air Staff; Colonel Warlimont, Planning Staff. All of them, except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants, are members of the group.

So far these documents have shown us the initial and general planning of the attack on Poland. These general plans, however, had to be checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out the attack.

I offer Document C-142, which will be Exhibit Number USA-538. This document was issued in the middle of June 1939, and in this document Von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, passed on the general outlines of the plan for the attack on Poland to the field commanders-in-chief—to the Oberbefehlshaber of army groups and armies—so that the field commanders could work out the actual preparation and deployment of troops in accordance with the plans. This is from Page 1 of the translation, and I quote:

“The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy . . . the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev Line.”

I skip to the next paragraph:

“The army group commands and the army commands will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned. These will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis; they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent that in case of an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army they can be carried out quickly.”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that document?

COL. TAYLOR: The date of that document is the middle of June 1939; I believe it is the 15th or 14th of June 1939. The date is on the original.

The next document is 2327-PS, which will be Exhibit Number USA-539. It is signed by Blaskowitz. It is dated 14 June 1939, and it shows us an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning an attack. Blaskowitz at that time was Commander of the 3rd Army Group and he became Commander-in-Chief of the German 8th Army during the Polish campaign. I read some extracts from this document found on Page 1 of the translation:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes into account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.

“The order of deployment by the High Command of the Army, known as Fall Weiss, authorizes the 3rd Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for Fall Weiss.”

I skip to Paragraph 7 on Page 1:

“The whole correspondence on Fall Weiss has to be conducted under the classification ‘top secret.’ This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command, is harmless in every way—even in connection with other documents.

“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details of the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to 3rd Army Group before 10 July.”

That is signed, “The Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army Group, F. Blaskowitz.”

I skip to Page 2 to read one further extract under the title at the top of Page 2 of the translation, “Aims of Operation Fall Weiss”:

“The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier guards and surprise, both of which can be expected with certainty, are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the Army as well as by counteracting the marching up of the Polish Army.

“Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.”

Finally, a week before the actual attack on Poland, and when all the military plans are laid, we find the group as defined in the Indictment all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August 23 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation of the timing of the attack and for political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State. This speech has already been read from at length. It is found in Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29; and I pass over it, except to note and emphasize that it is addressed to the very group defined in the Indictment as the General Staff and High Command group. It is, incidentally, the second of the two examples referred to in the affidavits by Halder and Brauchitsch, Numbers 1 and 2, which I read previously.

We have now come to the point where Germany actually launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the Western Front, Poland was overrun and conquered; German losses were insignificant.

The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blomberg and Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Corridor had been annexed. And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part of the Reich; Czechoslovakia occupied; all of western Poland in German hands. Germany was superior in arms and in experience to her Western enemies, France and England.

Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941, when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Italy became an ally of Germany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the western part of the Soviet Union overrun.

I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June of 1941. In this period occurred the aggressive wars in violation of treaties, as charged in the Indictment, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these matters by the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving Crimes against Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to review this period briefly from the military standpoint and view it as the German military leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may be sure: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war of conquest, a war for the conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties, non-aggression pacts—these were not the major considerations. They were annoying obstacles, and devices had to be formed and excuses manufactured to fit the circumstances.

Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read, that after 1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler’s methods and lost confidence in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods some of the generals condemned is not stated, but I think the Tribunal will not hear any substantial evidence that many of the generals condemned the march of conquest during the years 1939 to 1941. In fact the evidence is rather that most of the generals were having the time of their lives during those years.

Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued a memorandum and directive for the conduct of the war in the West. This is Document Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Number USA-540. It is not signed. It was distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Göring, and Raeder. From the wording there is every indication that it was issued by Hitler. I will read the pertinent extracts, starting with Page 2 of the document, about two-thirds of the way down in the first paragraph, starting with the words, “The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war”:

“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million-state”—meaning Germany—“again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words, the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty.

“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”

I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading “Reasons”:

“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all, or at any rate too soon. The following is to be, firmly borne in mind. . . .”

At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of references to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the foot of Page 3:

“Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both countries are dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany.”

The final paragraph to be read is as follows:

“The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.”

Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, our group as defined in the Indictment—the Oberbefehlshaber—again assembled, as found in Document Number 789-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-23, and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs. This speech, part of which is already in the record, contains other portions, not previously read, which are now of interest; and the first extract which I would like to read is on Page 2 of the translation, about half-way down in Paragraph 1, starting with the words, “For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front . . .” I quote:

“For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front; the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike first in the East and then in the West. In principle I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Sooner or later I wanted to solve the problem. Inevitably it was decided that the East was to be annihilated first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our Armed Forces. The most glorious experience in our history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the Eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: How long can we endure this situation?”

Passing to Page 3 of that document, line 3:

“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more.”

The final passage on Page 4 of the translation, in the long paragraph about half-way down, beginning, “England cannot live without its imports. We can feed . . .”:

“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can occur only if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I risk the loss of this achievement. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there, the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. The arguments we will choose for the breach of neutrality shall not be as idiotic as they were in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful, no one can answer. Everything depends upon favorable providence.”

Thereafter the winter of 1939 and 1940 passed quietly, the winter of so-called “phony war.”

The General Staff and High Command group all knew what the plan was—they had all been told. To attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity; to smash the French and English forces; to pay no heed to treaties with, or neutrality of, the Low Countries. “Breaking of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.” That is what Hitler told the Oberbefehlshaber. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.

Now it is not true that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. To show this we need only hark back for a moment to what Major Elwyn Jones told the Tribunal about the plans for the invasion of Denmark and Norway.

The Tribunal will recall that Hitler’s utterances in October and November, which I have just read, although they are full of threatening comments about France and England and the Low Countries, contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9 October, from which I read Document L-52, affirmatively indicates that Hitler saw no reason to disturb the situation to the north, because he said that unless unforeseen factors appeared the neutrality of the northern states could be assumed. Trade could be continued with those countries even in a long war. But a week previously, on the 3rd of October 1939, the Defendant Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval Staff seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark. That document is C-122, Exhibit Number GB-82. And another document introduced by Major Elwyn Jones, Document C-66, which is Exhibit Number GB-81, shows that Raeder was prompted to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. Admiral Carls, Rolf Carls, later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet and commanded Naval Group North and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, as well as Raeder.

The Tribunal will also recall that the Defendant Dönitz, who at that time was flag officer of submarines, replied to the questionnaire from Raeder on 9 October 1939. The document in question is Document C-5, Exhibit Number GB-83. And Dönitz replied that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met the requirements for a submarine base, that Trondheim was better, and that he proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there. The next day Raeder visited Hitler, and this visit and certain subsequent events are described in a document which has not previously been introduced.

Now, Your Honors, owing to a confusion in numbering, the German document is C-71, but the translation appears in your books in Document L-323, and that will be Exhibit Number USA-541. The translation will be found in L-323, the middle of the page, entitled, “Entry in the War Diary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, naval war staff, on ‘Weserübung’,” that being the code name for the operation against Norway and Denmark. Diary entry for 10 October 1939:

“First reference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, when visiting the Führer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare. The Führer intends to give the matter consideration.

“12 December 1939. Führer received Q and H”—those being presumably Quisling and Hagelin.

“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is having an essay prepared which will be ready in January.”

I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence is somewhat in error and should read:

“With reference to this essay Kapitän zur See Krancke is working on ‘Weserübung’ at OKW.”

“During the time which followed H”—Hagelin—“maintained contact with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. His aim was to develop the Party Q”—Quisling—“with a view to making it capable of action and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on the political developments in Norway and military questions. In general he pressed the speeding up of preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the organization.”

I think that is all I need read of that.

Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86, already in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler—I am not going to read from that document, Your Honors—at a meeting which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl also attended. In the meantime Raeder was in touch with the Defendant Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling; and Major Elwyn Jones very properly pointed out to the Tribunal the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians. As a result of all this, on Hitler’s instructions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940 stating that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake charge of preparations for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name Weserübung.

On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is Document C-174, Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones put in the record. The directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke, who at that time was head of the operations division of the naval war staff and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the naval war staff and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on the contrary, it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command group as to the Nazis.

As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will remember that at a conference between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, already in the record, when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler, in discussing the possibility of war with England, said that the Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. “Declarations of neutrality will be ignored.” And later, in his speech to the Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939, Hitler said that they must first invade the Low Countries and “no one will question that when we have won.”

Accordingly, one can well imagine that the winter of 1939 and 1940 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of very intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries had to be planned and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. The Defendant Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940, Document 1809-PS, Exhibit Number GB-88, contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. Some of the entries have been read into the record and others are now of interest.

The Tribunal will see from these entries which have already been read that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But the Tribunal will not find a single entry which reflects any hesitancy from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions, to overrun these countries.

I will make several references now to Document 1809-PS and several of the entries in it. I do not plan to quote verbatim from any one of them. The Court will note that on 1 February 1940 General Jeschonnek, the Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, visited Jodl and made a suggestion that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would offer a tremendous improvement for Germany’s aerial warfare.

On 6 February Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Colonel Von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting: That the Germans should carry out only “Action H” (Holland) and the Weser Exercise (Norway and Denmark) and should guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.

I suppose the German Air Force may have felt that the occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the German bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British should attack through Holland and Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not this new idea made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the neutrality of three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the “new idea” projected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary combination of cynicism and naïveté.

In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel. On 21 February Hitler put General Von Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly.”

On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days later.

So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack of the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian _coup d’état_ of 26 March 1941 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore, and there is little that I need to add for my present purpose. The decisions were made; the Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in Document R-95, Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before. Two extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short:

“The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

“The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.”

And turning to Paragraph Number 5, the “Timetable for the Operations”:

“On 5 April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.”

The German attack on the Soviet Union I have little more to say about. The documents showing the aggressive nature of the attack have been put in by Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command group opposed Barbarossa as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. The Defendant Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944, Document C-66, Exhibit Number GB-81. C-66 is the translation and the only document I propose to read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of interest. The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:

“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that further warnings, if no new situation had arisen, were found to be, according to previous experiences, completely useless. As Chief of naval war staff I was never convinced of the ‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”

And passing to the third paragraph:

“The Führer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia; doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-1940 probably further strengthened him in this idea.”

And passing to the very end of the document, Paragraph 7, Page 4:

“As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If thereby a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself”—that, if I may interpolate, is a division of the naval war staff having to do with operations—“it is perhaps because the arguments the Führer used on such occasions (dinner speech in the middle of July to the officers in command) to justify a step he had planned usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the inner circle than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Führer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical.”

That, to be sure, indicates division of opinion as to the military chances of a rapid success, but the part last quoted indicates that other members of the group favored Barbarossa and Raeder’s memorandum actually says and substantiates what Blomberg’s affidavit says: That some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command took no stand against Hitler on Barbarossa and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have all been read and cited to the Court previously.

That concludes the evidence on the criminal activities of the group under Counts One and Two. The documents written by the military leaders are not the writings of men who were reluctant to plan and execute these manifold wars.

I want to make clear again the nature of the accusations against this group under Counts One and Two. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused merely for doing the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as making military plans and commanding troops. It is, I suppose, among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences, to write notes and _aide-memoire_, to entertain at dinner parties, and cultivate good will toward the government he represents. The Defendant Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to draft regulations and decrees, to make speeches. The Defendants Hess and Frick are not indicted for doing those things.

It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith; but it is none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge under Counts One and Two against the defendants and the General Staff and High Command group. The charge is that, in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired, and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage illegal wars and thereby committed crimes under Article 6 (a) of the Charter.

It is no defense for those who committed such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, and such plans may legally be drawn whether they are offensive or defensive in a military sense. It is perfectly legal for military leaders to carry out such plans and engage in war, if in doing so they do not plan and launch and wage wars which are illegal because they are aggressive and in contravention of the Charter.

I am very far from saying that there may not be individual cases, involving some individual members of this group, where drawing the line between legal and illegal behavior might involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But I do not believe that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before this Tribunal, as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command group as a group under Counts One and Two, or as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the group.

In the case of the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is more or less constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Dönitz is less voluminous for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war.

But numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command group, including its other leaders, are shown to have participated knowingly and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars: Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl. In the nature of things these men knew all that was going on and participated fully, as the documents show. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau, and Von Schober, together with Göring, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At a later date we have seen Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field, knowingly preparing for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; Von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepting the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek has been recorded proposing that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland and simultaneously assuring Belgium that there is nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls, member of the group, foresees at an early date that German policy is leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark is his brainchild; Krancke, later one of the group, is one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewind is in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for Weserübung and a few months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage.

Most of the 19 officers I have mentioned were at that time members of the group, as defined, and the few who were not, subsequently became members. At the final conference for Barbarossa 17 additional members were present and at the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants will perhaps argue that they are pure technicians. This amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others, incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.

What we are discussing here is the crime of planning and waging aggressive war. It stands to reason that that crime is committed most consciously and culpably by a nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity which are necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed by propagandists and publicists. It is committed by political leaders, by diplomats, by the chief ministers, by the principal industrial and financial leaders. It is no less committed by the military leaders.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside or resist or fail to co-operate, then the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as well as in other fields, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.

I do not think that the responsible military leaders of any nation will be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, or custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put.

The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling, if not a fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.

Such is certainly not the view of the United States. The Prosecution here representing the United States believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished profession. We believe that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. We believe that, in consulting and planning with the leaders in other fields of national

## activities, the military leaders must act in accordance with

international law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern society, but in accordance with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders. I use the word “share” advisedly. Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the criminal holocaust which was committed. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and, if necessary, to resort to war for that purpose.

As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening statement, the German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.

Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence under Counts One and Two, and if this would be a convenient stopping point . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You have another branch of the argument?

COL. TAYLOR: Counts Three and Four, Your Honor, which will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY Monday, 7 January 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. TAYLOR: May it please the Court, Sir, when the Court rose on Friday I had completed that part of the presentation on Counts One and Two. I now turn to that part of the Indictment which charges that the General Staff and High Command group had a major responsibility for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the execution of the Common Plan or Conspiracy set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment. For purpose of brevity I shall refer to these crimes simply as War Crimes.

The presentation of the documents under this part of the case should take all or the better part of the morning session. At the conclusion of that, I propose to call a single witness, one witness, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, whose testimony on direct examination should not exceed 25 or 30 minutes. After that, I shall take possibly 10 minutes to conclude, and that will be the entire presentation.

On this part of the case I propose to show that members of the General Staff and High Command group, including the defendants who are members of the group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes, and thereby participated in the commission of War Crimes in their official capacity as members of the group. I also propose to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of War Crimes by members of the German Armed Forces as a result of these orders or as a result of other orders and arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command group which controlled the German Armed Forces. However, I do not propose to make a full showing of War Crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of the evidence under Counts Three and Four will be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet Delegations, and a substantial amount of the evidence to be presented by them will be relevant to the charges against the General Staff and High Command group.

We will at this time show the Tribunal that the General Staff and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, and we will present the

## activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated

among the members of the group. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces, where, for example, prisoners of war were handed over to and mistreated by the SS or SD, we will show that in those cases members of this group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of War Crimes. We will show that many crimes committed by the SS and SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command group.

The first matter which I will take up relates to the killing, in violation of international law and the rules of war, of Allied commandos, paratroopers, and members of military missions, and the first document to which I wish to refer is 498-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-501.

This story starts with the order embodied in that document, which is an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and which Mr. Storey has already mentioned in the presentation of charges against the Sicherheitsdienst. The order begins with a recital that Allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Convention, and thereafter proceeds to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against Allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos.

This order is one of the two basic documents in the story. I will read it in full:

“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter, as prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purpose or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

“2. For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum to the Armed Forces communiqué of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of the sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

“3. I therefore order:

“From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their

## actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these

individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the communiqué of the Armed Forces.

“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the Armed Forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories, for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades, for instance, _et cetera_, is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive

## actions, landing operations, and airborne operations, are

captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after air battles.

“6. I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order when it was to be executed.”

It is signed Adolf Hitler, and the Tribunal will note that this order was issued by OKW in 12 copies, and the distribution shown on the second page included the three Supreme Commands, Army, Sea, and Air, and the principal field commands.

Now, the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order, that is, Document 503-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-542. This was issued for the purpose of explaining the reasons why the basic order was issued. In this explanation, Hitler gave a rather different set of reasons for the issuance of the order and pointed out that Allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidating laborers, and destroying important war plants in occupied areas. This is the other basic document; and while I need not read it in full, I would like to read substantial excerpts, starting with the first paragraph at the top of the page:

“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops”—then in parentheses was a cross reference to the order which I have just read—“a supplementary order of the Führer is enclosed.

“This order is intended for commanders only and must not, under any circumstances, fall into enemy hands.

“The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.

“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible for the return and destruction of all distributed copies of this order and copies made thereof.”

It is signed, “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order of Jodl.”

Thereafter follows a distribution list and then the supplementary order itself, signed by Hitler. I will start reading the first two paragraphs of the supplementary order which appear at the bottom of Page 1 of the translation:

“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.”

I propose to skip to the bottom of Page 2, the last two paragraphs on Page 2 of the translation:

“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the homeland as well as to bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders ruthlessly to remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.

“England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is successfully to commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other installations and, upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to the rules of the Geneva Convention. It must, under all circumstances, be ruthlessly exterminated.

“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinate to them, as well as individual commanders, not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail or, if the circumstances require it, e.g. if danger is imminent, to be at once made strictly accountable. The homeland, as well as the fighting soldier at the front, has the right to expect that behind their backs the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply with war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

“These are the reasons for the issuance of my decree.

“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, initially to spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.”

Your Lordship, the next is Document C-179, which will be Exhibit USA-543. As this document shows, 10 days later on 28 October 1942 and while the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the naval war staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the naval war staff show clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order; and I read the first sheet of this document only, the cover sheet:

“Enclosed please find an order of the Führer regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section commanders, or officers of this rank. After verbal notification to subordinate sections, the above officers must hand this order over to the next higher section, which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.”

Passing over to Page 3 of this document, at the very end we find a similar admonition in the notice for distribution, at the very end of the document; I read:

“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the battalions and the corresponding staffs of the other services. After notification, those copies distributed over and above the regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must be withdrawn and destroyed.”

The next document, Your Lordship, is C-178, which becomes Exhibit USA-544. This document is dated 11 February 1943, which was 12 days after the Defendant Dönitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. On that day, this memorandum was circulated within the naval war staff in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942. This document, of which I will read the first four paragraphs, indicates why the earlier order had been treated as such a secret matter and also directs that all naval commanders and officers who failed to carry out the order, or to instruct their units concerning the order, would run the risk of serious court-martial penalties. I’ll read the first four paragraphs only:

“From the notice given by the 3rd Section of the Naval Operations Staff on 1 February 1943 it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at the 3rd Section of the Operations Staff proved that this naval authority was not correctly informed either.

“In view of this situation, reference is made to Paragraph 6 of the Führer Order of 18 October 1942”—and then a cross-reference—“according to which all commanders and officers who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened with punishment by court-martial.

“The first Führer order concerning this matter of 18 October 1942 was given the protection of top secret merely because it stated therein (1) that according to the Führer’s views, the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and West may have tremendous consequences for our whole conduct of the war, and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret; but on the contrary, to be currently published in the OKW reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if those taking part in enemy commando operations would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of questions, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered.”

I will call the Tribunal’s attention to the two reasons given in that quotation for keeping secret from the public knowledge of the fact that uniformed prisoners would be shot, even after they had surrendered and asked for pardon. This shows a clear awareness that that was in direct contravention of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read the paragraph beginning, “Practical difficulties . . .”?

COL. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. I’ll read that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should.

COL. TAYLOR: “Practical difficulties may develop because of the definition of the term ‘sabotage units.’ The annihilation and destruction, according to Paragraph 5 of the Führer Order of 18 October 1942, do not apply to troops participating in large-scale landing operations and large-scale airborne operations. The criterion is to be found in that, in the latter case, an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people who land by sea or air, or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge, or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated.”

The next document, Your Honor, is 508-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-545. Now, the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances, of which we have the documentary proof for several. Document 508-PS shows that during the night of 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund, in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom three were apparently killed in the crash. All were in British uniform. Fourteen survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler Order the evening of 20 November. In proof of this I will read certain extracts from 508-PS, beginning on Page 1 of the translation, the paragraph numbered “1)”:

“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Egersund in the night of . . .”

It reads November 11 in the translation, but I believe in the original it was November 20; that is a typographical error.

“a) No firing on the part of the German defense.

“b) The towing plane (Wellington) crashed after touching the ground; 7-man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed; of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Führer Order has been carried out.”

I pass to Page 3 of the translation, on which page appear two teletype messages. I wish to read the first two paragraphs at the top of the page:

“On 20 November 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 kilometers northeast of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17-member crew three are dead, six are severely, the others are slightly, wounded.

“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve insignia. Furthermore, following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis, and radiosender, exact number still unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund.”

Passing to the second teletype message, the first paragraph:

“Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered the execution of the action according to the Führer Order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers.”

I pass to the last paragraph of that teletype, at the foot of Page 3 of the translation:

“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2”—that was I. C. in the German—“and by BDS”—police—“are important before the execution of the Führer Order; in case of Paragraph Number 4 of the Führer Order, the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.”

Your Lordship, the next document is 512-PS, Exhibit USA-546. This document recites three specific instances where the Hitler Order was carried out in Norway and especially emphasizes the desirability of taking individual commandos prisoner for interrogation. I read from Document 512-PS, dated 13 December 1942:

“According to the last sentence of the Führer Order of 18th October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proved in the cases of the Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were obtained; therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to the above-mentioned last sentence of the Führer Order calling for liquidation only after a short interrogation.”

One final document from the Norwegian Theater of War is relative.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, what does “RK” in the last paragraph mean? The first words of the last paragraph?

COL. TAYLOR: Red Cross (Rotes Kreuz).

THE PRESIDENT: So they had a protest from the Red Cross?

COL. TAYLOR: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: And “BDS”?

COL. TAYLOR: That is “Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo).”

Document 526-PS which is Exhibit USA-502, dated 10 May 1943, Colonel Storey has already brought to the Tribunal’s attention in connection with the presentation against the Sicherheitsdienst. I will first read the opening sentences:

“On 30 March 1943, in Toftefjord (degree of latitude 70), an enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by enemy.

“Crew: 2 dead and 10 taken prisoners.

“Cutter sent from Scalloway (Shetland Isles) by the Norwegian Navy.”

Passing to the word “Purpose”:

“Purpose: Building of an organization for the sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.

“Assigner of mission in London: Norwegian Major Munthe.

“Führer Order executed by Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service).

“Wehrmacht communiqué of 6 April announces the following about it: ‘In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.’”

Now, shifting to the Italian Theater of War, I call the Court’s attention to 509-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-547. This document is dated 7 November 1943; and is a telegram from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW; and it shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos, taken prisoner near Pescara in Italy, were given “special treatment” (sonderbehandelt), which as the Court knows from previous evidence in the case, meant death. What happened to the nine remaining prisoners of war in the hospital, we do not know.

I have one more document from the Italian Theater, 2610-PS, Exhibit USA-548. This specifically shows the carrying out of Hitler’s orders. It consists of an affidavit, dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a major in the Army of the United States. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. I will read from this affidavit:

“Frederick W. Roche, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

“I am a major in the Army of the United States. I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of 15 United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’ This Military Commission, consisting of five officers, was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Order, Number 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945, and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States _versus_ Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed 4 days, and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as follows:

“Charge: Violation of the law of war.

“Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then general, commanding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel consisting of two officers and 13 enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said 15 members of the Army of the United States. . . .”—and a list of names follows.

“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the testimony and I am familiar with the records in this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows:

“On the night of 22 March 1944 two officers and 13 enlisted men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men were members of the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When they landed on the Italian coast, they were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used by the German forces to supply their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All 15 men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944, when they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then general commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified, by way of defense, that he ordered the 15 American soldiers to be shot pursuant to the Hitler Order of 18 October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject to court-martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler Order.

“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the United States against Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy, on 12 October 1945:

“Findings: General Dostler, as President of this Commission it is my duty to inform you that the Commission, in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the Commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge: Guilty.

“Sentence: And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the Commission concurring, sentences you: To be shot to death by musketry.”

Now the order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as we know, until the end of the war. I wish to offer 506-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-549. This document is dated 22 June 1944. It is initialed by Warlimont, and in it the OKW made it where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person. I will read the single paragraph of the order:

“The Operations Staff agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge to the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 1944. The Führer Order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of

## participants in a commando operation is that such operations do

not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of warfare.”

The Allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of which large-scale airborne operations took place, raised among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler Order would be applied in Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. I direct the Court’s attention to Document 531-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-550. The memorandum is dated 23 June 1944 and is signed by Warlimont. Warlimont’s memorandum starts by quoting a teletype received from the Supreme Command in the West, inquiring what should be done about applying the Hitler Order to airborne troops and commandos.

I would like to read a small part of the teletype, beginning at the beginning:

“Supreme Command West; teletype message Number 1750/44; top secret; 23 June 1944.

“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to.”

If I may interpolate here, the order referred to is shown in the cross-reference to the Führer Order of 18 October 1942.

“With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs, in Paragraph 5, that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (such as large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to Paragraphs 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat operations, _et cetera_’ is to be extended.”

Then I pass down to Subparagraph D and read the first sentence of that subparagraph.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read the latter part of “C.”

COL. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think it is all summarized in the one sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence is the one that I mean.

COL. TAYLOR: “Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents become known.”

Then, continuing with “D”:

“The application of Number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform penetrating from the outside into the occupied western territories is held by the Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution.”

Accordingly, as it is there shown, the Supreme Command in the West directed that Paragraph 5, which is the paragraph under which the orders for execution are not to be applied, should be utilized in the West.

At the foot of the page is the position taken by the Armed Forces Operational Staff, the recommendation they were making:

“1. The Commando Order remains basically in effect, even after the enemy landing in the West.

“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.

“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases, enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the Commando Order is to be applied or not.

“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 October 1942, along with the above explanation.”

The final document on this episode, or inquiry, is 551-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-551, and this is the actual order of 25 June 1944, constituting OKW’s reply to the inquiry from the Supreme Command West, signed by Keitel, initialed by Warlimont and Jodl. I will read beginning with:

“Subject: Treatment of commando participants.

“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Führer on the annihilation of terror and sabotage units of 18 October 1942 remains fully in force.

“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines, as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands, according to Number 5 of the basic order of 18 October 1942, remain exempted.

“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

“3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly, according to the directives issued for it.

“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communiqué to exercise a frightening effect, as had already been done toward previous commando undertakings in the same manner.”

Your Lordship, there is just one further development in connection with this order, this basic order, and that was that in July 1944. The question was then raised within the German High Command as to whether the order should be applied to members of foreign military missions with special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions which were co-operating with Allied Forces in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont, which is 1279-PS, and becomes Exhibit USA-552, embodies the discussions which were had at OKW. I think I need not read from this document, and merely wish to point out that the Armed Forces operational staff recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft to this effect. I would, however, like to read 537-PS, which is Exhibit USA-553. This is the order which actually resulted from these discussions. It is dated 30 July 1944. I will read that in full:

“Subject: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions’ captured together with partisans.

“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest, members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as specified in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as prisoners of war but in conformity with the Führer’s order concerning the annihilation of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942.

“This order shall not be transmitted to units subordinate to the corps commands and the equivalent staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces, and is to be destroyed after being made known.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel.”

Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an Allied military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945, as is shown by Document L-51, which is already in the record as Exhibit USA-521, and which has been read in full by Lieutenant Harris. I will not read it again.

This concludes the presentation of documents with respect to the order of the 18th of October 1942 and its subsequent enforcement and application. I can pass from here to another subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes now.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the order I have just been discussing operated chiefly in the Western Theater of War. This was natural, since Germany occupied almost the entire western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations.

I want to pass now to the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union, from 1941 on. Here the German forces were fighting among a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. I propose to show here that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and against other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies and a vehicle for the massacre of Jews and numerous segments of the Slav population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. I will show that it was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories; and that its military operations, particularly against partisans, were so conducted as to advance the Nazi policies to which I have referred.

I will show that the Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in co-operation with the SS groups to which reference has been made in the presentation by Major Farr and Colonel Storey.

I do not plan to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes on the Eastern Front. That will be done by the Soviet Delegation. Nor do I plan to retrace the ground covered by Colonel Storey and Major Farr during their presentation of the evidence against the SS, SD, and Gestapo, except to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

The first document to which I will make reference is Document C-50, which will be Exhibit USA-554; and it will show that these policies of severity were determined upon and made official even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. This document consists of an order by Hitler dated 13 May 1941 and two covering transmittal sheets of subsequent date. I ask the Tribunal to note on Page 4 of the translation that the order is signed by Keitel, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and also to note the distribution, which appears at the foot of the second sheet, showing the distribution to the principal staff sections. The order itself begins on the third page, and that is where I propose to read. The document is entitled, “Order concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures”:

“The application of martial law aims, in the first place, at maintaining discipline.

“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

“This is possible only if the troops themselves take ruthless

## action against any threat from the enemy population.

“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, Army rear area, and area of political administration):

“I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians.

“1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members, and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.

“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a battalion commander, collective drastic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

“5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

“6. The commanders of the army groups may, by agreement with the competent naval and air force commanders, reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians in areas which are sufficiently pacified.

“For the area of the political administration this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

“II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.

“1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offense.

“2. When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people, and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevistic influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

“3. Therefore, the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal proceedings are necessary. In the case of offenses against inhabitants it will order a court-martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the forces call for such a measure. This applies, for instance, to serious offenses originating in lack of self-control in sexual matters or in a criminal disposition and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material, to the disadvantage of our forces, should as a rule be judged no less severely.

“The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the judicial authority.

“4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

“III. Responsibility of military commanders of the troops. Within their sphere of competence military commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:

“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I, above.

“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to the commanders-in-chief.

“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

“IV. Security. Once the camouflage is lifted, this decree will be treated as ‘most secret.’”

Your Lordship, the next document will be C-148, Exhibit USA-555. Less than 3 months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the instructions which I have just read were amplified and made even more drastic. Document C-148 is an order dated 16 September 1941, signed by Keitel, widely distributed, as is shown on the second sheet where the distribution is listed. This order is of general application in all theaters of war, but from its contents it is clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front. I read, beginning at the start of the order:

“Subject: Communist insurrection in occupied territories.

“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the area occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

“It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.

“In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.

“This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.

“2. The measures taken up to now to deal with this general Communist insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Führer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means, in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time. Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.

“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:

“a. It should be inferred in every case of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.

“b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud the most drastic measures should be taken immediately and on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying forces may be maintained and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in the countries concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s death. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.

“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures does not accord with these principles and shall not be followed.”

Unless the Court desires the next paragraph read, I will pass to Page 2, at the very end of the document, Paragraph Number 4:

“The commanding officers in the occupied territories shall see to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection”—Signed—“Keitel.”

Your Lordship, the next document will have the Exhibit Number USA-556, and it has been given the number D-411. It also has the designation UK-81. It is the last document in Document Book 2. This is a set of documents which includes a directive, dated 10 October 1941, by Field Marshal Von Reichenau, who was the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 6th Army then operating on the Eastern Front. Reichenau, who died in 1942, was therefore a member of the group as defined in the Indictment; and here is what he had to say. I begin reading at Page 5 of the translation:

“Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.

“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern Territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

“Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, that is the annihilation of revolts in the hinterland, which as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war; and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the command to the front under great difficulties should not be given to the enemy by the soldier, not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former Bolshevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the Eastern Territories.

“The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative, considering the long and vulnerable lines of communication. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation, the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous allegedly anti-Soviet elements, which originates from a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and treated as a member of the Soviet system.

“The fear of the German counter measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future, the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:

“1. Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

“2. The pitiless extermination of alien treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of German military personnel in Russia.

“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once and forever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger. Signed: Von Reichenau, Oberbefehlshaber.”

The Tribunal will note the sheet immediately preceding Reichenau’s order. That is Sheet Number 4 of the translation, which is a memorandum dated 28 October 1941. It shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army.

The Tribunal will also note from the first sheet, the very top sheet in the several ensuing, that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th German Infantry Division on 27 November 1941.

These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the monstrous behavior and activities of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front.

Colonel Storey described to the Tribunal the formation of units known as Einsatzgruppen by the Sipo and SD, which were sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat

## partisans and to cleanse and pacify the civilian population. Major Farr

and Colonel Storey both presented to the Tribunal a large amount of evidence showing the manner in which these units operated.

I want to refer back briefly to a few of these documents in order to trace the participation of the Armed Forces in those circumstances.

Colonel Storey read at length from 3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190, dated 19 March 1943. It is a directive from the commanding officer of one of these groups. This directive praised and justified such

## activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, shooting of children, and

the total burning of villages and directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, “as a rule no more children will be shot.”

Major Farr read from R-102, which is Exhibit USA-470, a report covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941. This report states cynically on Page 7:

“Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded on account of the lack of adequate instructions.”

It shows as clearly as the human eye can see that pacification and anti-partisan activities became mere code words for the extermination of Jews just as much as Weserübung was the code word for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.

We have seen from the documents quoted a few moments ago that the German Army received some similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that in the field the Army and the SS worked hand in glove.

The Tribunal will recall the document quoted by Major Walsh, 1061-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit USA-275. It describes the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto; and at this time I merely want to call attention to one paragraph appearing at Page 6 of the translation, the third paragraph from the bottom of the page, where the author of the document stresses the close co-operation between the SS and the Army. I read that one paragraph and quote:

“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their combat duty often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.”

To the same general effect is R-135, Exhibit USA-289, which is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk. Major Farr read from this report, describing an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 enemies were killed: 5,000 suspected partisans and 59 Germans. The co-operation by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt, and I will begin reading at the bottom of Page 3 of the translation:

“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.

“By order of the chief of anti-partisan units, SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, units of the Wehrmannschaften have also participated in the operation. SA Standartenführer Kunze was in command of the Wehrmannschaften, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District Commissariat of Minsk. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses.”

I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again the

## participation of the Armed Forces personnel.

The SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, referred to in this quotation, will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection I want to call the Court’s attention to 1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170, which is Himmler’s speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS generals at Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment of Von dem Bach to be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I would like to read one paragraph from Page 3 of the document merely for purpose of identification of the witness:

“Chief of the anti-partisan combat units:

“In the meantime I have also set up the department of the Chief of the anti-partisan combat units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan combat units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action in this struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.”

There is one further document which has already been introduced from which I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA-276. It is the report of Einsatzgruppe A, covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the excerpts which I will read will make clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in the activities of these Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the translation, the top of the page:

“Einsatz Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action, proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer Group 4, had started the advance the day before. Our task was to establish hurriedly personal contact with the commanders of the armies and with the commander of the army rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that co-operation with the Armed Forces was generally good; in some cases, for instance with Panzer Group 4 under Colonel General Höppner, it was very close and almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days were cleared up mainly through personal discussions.”

This ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts, of which the first is at the bottom of Page 2:

“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after the entry, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period.”

Next I pass to Page 4 of the translation, about half way down the page, the middle of the first complete paragraph:

“After the failure of purely military activities, such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Einsatz group undertook the search for new methods as an essential task. Soon, therefore, the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”

I pass next to Page 6 under “Instigation of self-cleansing actions”:

“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R., it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It had to be the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important, in view of the future, to establish the unshakeable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.

“In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan

## activities in Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy, at first,

to set in motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment

## acting in Kovno and in such a way that no German order or German

instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.

“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.”

I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom under “Other jobs of the Security Police”:

“Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police.”

Passing to the next paragraph:

“In some cases authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out, in a similar way, other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own forces.”

I pass on to Page 17 of the translation, the paragraph at the top of the page: “But it was decided . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read Paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?

COL. TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10? I read the first passage, Your Honor. If you would like it in full . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.

COL. TAYLOR: “Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona (Lithuania) 544 lunatics, in Mariampol (Lithuania) 109 lunatics, and in Mogutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated.”

Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:

“When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941, to parts of Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 and to the staff of the group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Einsatz Group A, which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer Group 4.”

The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:

“Einsatzkommandos of Einsatz Group A of the Security Police

## participated from the beginning in the fight against the

nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”

Now, in the light of these documents, I would like to turn to some of the remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in Document Book I. These affidavits have been furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS and fill in much of the background for the documents.

Affidavit Number 12 is an affidavit by Schellenberg, which in view of the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg’s and Ohlendorf’s testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much of the same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the Tribunal by reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject to the usual rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters by the Defense. The affidavit itself is available in French and Russian as well as in English and in German for the Defense, so I will pass over that one.

I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be Exhibit USA-558, Document Number 3711-PS. Schellenberg’s affidavit will be Exhibit USA-557, Document Number 3710-PS; Number 13 is 558. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army, who worked in the War History Section of the OKW from 1941 to 1945. It sheds considerable light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top with respect to anti-partisan warfare. I will read the affidavit:

“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.

“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Führer’s headquarters with Major General Walter Scherff, the Führer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.

“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to handle this matter.

“In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it special attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW, a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special task. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian, as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period causing among other things the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.

“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was well known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.

“I remember that, at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS Gruppenführer Fegelein reported to Colonel General Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”

Now, the foregoing documents and the testimony of Ohlendorf and Schellenberg relate to the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH, and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that these arrangements were made jointly and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of, but was an active participant in, these plans.

Turning now to the field, I would like to read three statements by General Hans Röttiger, which will be Affidavits Numbers 15 and 16: Exhibit USA-559, Document Number 3713-PS; and USA-560, Document Number 3714-PS. General Röttiger attained the rank of general of panzer troops, the equivalent of a lieutenant general in the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.

The first statement is as follows:

“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. For the execution of these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the army group and of the army, as, for example, security battalions.

“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders Jews, political commissars, and agents were delivered up to the SD.

“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from the highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can only have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the Army against the partisans.”

The second statement:

“Supplementary to my first declaration of 8 December 1945, I declare:

“As I stated orally on 28 November 1945, my then commander of the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners, since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.

“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans, there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women, too, were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the

## partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring

of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of

## partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from time to

time, were partisans in evidence when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account, on the orders of Army Group Center, to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.”

The third statement by Röttiger, Number 16:

“During my period of service, from May 1942 to June 1943, as Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear later on that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population, with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander of the Army Group, Field Marshal Von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the army in its combat areas because of the infuriated civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible because of the danger which existed for our troops, as I have mentioned above.”

I would like now to offer one final document, the last document, 1786-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-561. This is an extract from the war diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, dated 14 March 1943. I propose to read the last two paragraphs, which deal with the problem of shipping of suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany.

The Tribunal will see, from the extracts which I will read, that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.

I will read the last two paragraphs:

“The Quartermaster General, together with the Economic Staff East, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to reformatory labor camps in their own area and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.

“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the ‘peaceful population’ which has been called upon to work. He recommends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsführer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader, and orders that the difference between ‘punitive labor’ and ‘being set to labor in Germany’ be made clear to the population.”

Finally, I would like to offer a group of four affidavits which show that the anti-partisan activities on the Eastern Front were under the command of and supported by the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of these

## activities was fully known to the Wehrmacht.

The first of these is Affidavit Number 17, Exhibit USA-562, Document Number 3715-PS by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadeführer and major general of the Police, and was a member of Himmler’s personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:

“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly Chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsführer SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS Obergruppenführer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Major General of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish the forces necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the Higher SS and Police Leaders and to guarantee the support of Army Forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General Von Buttlar, Colonel General Guderian, Colonel General Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and later, Colonel Von Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective army group commander in operational areas—for instance, in Army Group Center under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch—and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reich Commissariats, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the Army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and Police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichskommissariate to support the army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such transfers were frequent and therefore resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichskommissariate. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKW and OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an Army general could have SS and Police under him; and, on the other hand, that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and Police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944, mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmüller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned for compliance.

“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and Police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as were those of the SS and Police.

“As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Hitler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this, the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced which directed that all captured partisans, for instance, such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above-named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme, I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the 38th Army Corps, and with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.”

Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said “Hitler” instead of “Himmler”.

I next wish to offer another and shorter statement by Rode, which shows that the SD Einsatzgruppen were under Wehrmacht command. This is Number 18, Exhibit USA-563; Document Number 3716-PS:

“As far as I know, the SD Einsatz groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because, apparently, they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents, and commissars, who were handed over to the SD, underwent the same cruel death as victims of so-called purifications, is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mentions of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH; and they were condemned by most SS and Police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.”

I would like next to read the final affidavit, Number 24, in Document

## Book I.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, unless you are going to conclude this

## particular part, I think we had better adjourn now.

COL. TAYLOR: I will conclude with two affidavits, Your Honor, but it will take probably 10 minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that will conclude it, go on.

COL. TAYLOR: It will conclude it. Firstly, Affidavit Number 24, which becomes Exhibit USA-565, Document Number 3718-PS. This is by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who, at the beginning of the Russian campaign, was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division:

“At the beginning of the Russian campaign, I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug, north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received, through channels from the OKW, a written order of the Führer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture without judicial process immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the commanding general of the 37th Panzer Corps—General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen—forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.”

That brings us to the final affidavit, Number 20, Exhibit USA-564, Document Number 3717-PS, which is by Adolf Heusinger, Generalleutnant in the German Army, and from 1940 to 1944 Chief of the Operations Section at OKH. I read:

“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940, I was I-a of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

“This made the Chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the East, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance all troops—security units, SS units, Police—stationed in the Reich commissariats.

“All Police and SS units in the Reich commissariats were also subordinate to the Reichsführer SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas this had to be done by order of the Chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

“The Higher SS and Police Leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and Police units within operational areas, a higher commander of the Army could be designated commander of the operation.

“During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the commander of the respective army group.

“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW—Keitel—to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance, such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and Communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts-martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace, as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General of the OKH.

“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely, the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.”

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until a quarter past 2.

[_A recess was taken until 1415 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

COL. TAYLOR: Will Your Lordship swear the witness?

THE PRESIDENT: What is his name?

COL. TAYLOR: Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski.

[_The witness, Von dem Bach-Zelewski, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ERICH VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI (Witness): Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

COL. TAYLOR: May I remind the witness to speak very slowly, and to keep his answers as short as possible? Can you hear me?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Were you a member of the SS?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: What was the last rank you held in the SS?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you serve in the 1914-18 war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes. I was at the front from 1914 to 1918, was wounded twice, and received the Iron Cross, First and Second Class.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you remain in the army after the end of the last war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I stayed in the 100,000-man army.

COL. TAYLOR: How long did you remain in the army?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Till 1924, when I took my discharge.

COL. TAYLOR: Did your military activities then stop?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I was battalion leader in the Border Defense, and subsequently I took part in maneuvers with the Wehrmacht until the campaign against Poland.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you join the Nazi Party?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: In what year?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In the year 1930.

COL. TAYLOR: What branch of the party did you join?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The Allgemeine-SS.

COL. TAYLOR: What were your activities in the SS prior to the outbreak of the war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I established the Allgemeine-SS Border Defense in the districts of Schneidemühl and Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, and from 1934 I was Oberabschnittsführer in East Prussia and afterwards in Silesia.

COL. TAYLOR: Were you a member of the Reichstag during this period?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I was a member of the Reichstag from 1932 right up to the end.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you take any active part during this war, before the campaign against the Soviet Union?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, not before the campaign against Russia.

COL. TAYLOR: What was your rank at the beginning of the war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: At the beginning of the war I was SS Gruppenführer and lieutenant general.

COL. TAYLOR: And when were you promoted?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was promoted on 9 November 1941 to SS Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS.

COL. TAYLOR: What was your position after the beginning of the campaign against the Soviet Union?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Would you please repeat the question; it was not quite clear.

COL. TAYLOR: What was your position, your function, at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: At the beginning of the campaign against Russia I served as Higher SS and Police Leader in the central sector of the Russian Front, in the rear zone of Army Group Center.

COL. TAYLOR: Was there a similar SS official in the rear zone of each army group?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI; Yes, in each army group, North, Center, and South, there was a Higher SS and Police Leader.

COL. TAYLOR: Who was the commander of Army Group Center?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The commander of Army Group Center was, in the beginning, General Field Marshal Von Bock, and later General Field Marshal Kluge.

COL. TAYLOR: Who was the Armed Forces commander in the rear zone of Army Group Center?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: General of the Infantry Von Schenkendorff.

COL. TAYLOR: Was he directly subordinate to the commander of the army group?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Who was your immediate superior in the SS?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Heinrich Himmler.

COL. TAYLOR: And who was your immediate superior in the rear zone of the army?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: General Von Schenkendorff.

COL. TAYLOR: What was your principal task as Higher SS and Police Leader in central Russia?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: My principal task was fighting partisans.

COL. TAYLOR: Are you generally familiar with the operations of the so-called Einsatzgruppen of the SD?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Did these units play any important part in large-scale anti-Russian operations?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

COL. TAYLOR: What was the principal task of the Einsatzgruppen?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The principal task of the Einsatzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei was the annihilation of the Jews, gypsies, and political commissars.

COL. TAYLOR: Then what forces were used for large-scale anti-partisan operations?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: For anti-partisan activities formations of the Waffen-SS, of the Ordnungspolizei, and above all, of the Wehrmacht were used.

COL. TAYLOR: Please describe the nature of these regular army units that were used for anti-partisan operations.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: These units of the Wehrmacht were composed, in the first place, of the security divisions in the rear zone, just behind the battle front; then there were the so-called Landesschützen battalions which were independent units under the orders of the Wehrmacht commanders; and there were also Wehrmacht formations used for the defense of certain installations such as railways and landing grounds and other military objectives. Moreover, as from 1943 or 1942, there were the so-called “alarm units” composed of formations in the rear zone.

COL. TAYLOR: Until what date did you remain Higher SS and Police Leader for central Russia?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was Higher SS and Police Leader for central Russia until the end of 1942, with occasional interruptions when I was at the front and with one interval of about 6 months when I had an illness. At the end of 1942 I was appointed Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units.

COL. TAYLOR: Was this position of Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units created specially for you?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: To whom were you directly subordinate in this new capacity?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Heinrich Himmler.

COL. TAYLOR: Were your functions in this new capacity restricted to any

## particular part of the Eastern Front?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. My sphere of activity comprised the entire Eastern zone.

COL. TAYLOR: What was the general nature of your duties as Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: First of all, I had to establish an intelligence center at Himmler’s headquarters to which all reports in connection with

## partisan activities were dispatched, where they were evaluated, and then

forwarded to the competent authorities.

COL. TAYLOR: In the course of your duties did you confer with the commanders of army groups and armies on the Eastern Front?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: With the commanders of the army groups, not of the armies, and with the district commanders of the Wehrmacht.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you advise these commanders with respect to the methods which should be employed to combat partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Will you name some of the commanders with whom you personally conferred?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am quoting from memory, without giving a complete list: General of Cavalry Bremer, Wehrmacht commander in the East; General Field Marshal Küchler, commanding general of Army Group North; the commanding generals of Army Group Center, Kluge and Busch; the Wehrmacht commander in the Ukraine, General of the Luftwaffe Kitzinger; General Field Marshal Freiherr von Weichs, commanding general in Serbia, at Belgrade; and General Kügler, Wehrmacht commander in the Trieste area.

COL. TAYLOR: What proportion of Wehrmacht troops was used in anti-partisan operations as compared to Police and SS troops?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Since the number of Police and SS troops was very small, anti-partisan operations were undertaken mainly by Wehrmacht formations.

COL. TAYLOR: Were the anti-partisan troops usually commanded by Wehrmacht officers or by SS officers?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: It varied, depending mostly on the individual area; in the operational areas Wehrmacht officers nearly always commanded, but an order existed to the effect that the formation, be it Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS or Police, which supplied the most troops for a

## particular operation, had command of it.

COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military leaders issue instructions that anti-partisan operations were to be conducted with severity?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military authorities issue any detailed instructions as to the methods to be used in anti-partisan operations?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

COL. TAYLOR: What was the result, in the occupied territories, of this lack of detailed directives from above?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This lack of detailed directives resulted in a wild state of anarchy in all anti-partisan operations.

COL. TAYLOR: In your opinion, were the measures taken in anti-partisan operations far more severe than the circumstances warranted, or were they not?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Since there were no definite orders and the lower commanders were forced to act independently, the operations varied according to the character of the officer in command and the quality of the troops. I am of the opinion that the operations often not only failed in their purpose but even overshot their mark.

COL. TAYLOR: Did these measures result in the unnecessary killing of large numbers of the civilian population?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. TAYLOR: Did you report these excessive measures to the commanders of the army groups and other Wehrmacht officers with whom you worked?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This state of affairs was generally known. There was no necessity to make a special report about it, since every operation had immediately to be reported in all detail, and was known to every responsible leader.

COL. TAYLOR: Were any effective steps taken by the higher military authorities or by the commanders of army groups to stop these excesses?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I remember that General Von Schenkendorff in

## particular made innumerable reports in this connection and discussed

them with me; both of us forwarded them through our service channels.

COL. TAYLOR: Did these reports by General Von Schenkendorff have any effect?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

COL. TAYLOR: Why not?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Quartermaster General Wagner certainly attempted to effect a change by suggesting that more rigid supervision be imposed on the troops, but he did not succeed in his purpose.

COL. TAYLOR: Was an order ever issued by the highest authorities, that German soldiers who committed offenses against the civilian population were not to be punished in the military courts?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, this order was issued.

COL. TAYLOR: Was this order an obstacle to correcting the excesses of the troops?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in my opinion this order prevented the orderly conduct of operations, since one can train troops only if one has adequate disciplinary powers and jurisdiction over them and is able to check excesses.

COL. TAYLOR: What decorations did you win during the war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In this war I received the clusters to the Iron Cross I and II, the German Cross in gold, and the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross.

COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the witness is available for examination by others.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission, I wish to ask a series of questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] What forces of the Police and SS were at your disposal in 1941 and 1942, when you were Chief of the Police and SS in the rear zone of Army Group Center?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Directly under my command in 1941 were one police regiment of the Regular Police, and occasionally, for about 2 or 3 months at a time, one SS cavalry brigade.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Einsatzgruppe B, headed by Nebe, under your command?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you or did you not receive Nebe’s reports?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Not directly, but I managed to see them.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you know of the activities of Einsatzgruppe B?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Einsatzgruppe B was located in Smolensk, and operated in precisely the same way as all the other Einsatzgruppen. One heard everywhere in conversation that the Jews were being rounded up and sent to ghettos.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you report to the commands of the operational groups on the activities of Einsatzgruppe B?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I asked for information on the activities of Einsatzgruppe B directly through Schenkendorff, from the I. C. of Army Group Center.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you know of the order issued by the commander of the 6th Army, General Reichenau, regarding the partisan movement?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Would you be good enough to repeat the name; was it General Von Reichenau?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I know of that. I think it was in 1941, but I am not certain—it might have been in 1942—when General Von Reichenau sent to all the Wehrmacht commanders an order approving the actions taken against the Jews and partisans.

COL. POKROVSKY: In 1943 or later were there, under your command, units or companies specially selected to combat the partisan movement?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In 1943, as Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units, I had no direct authority to issue orders, since I was head of the central office, but I did lead some operations wherever the authority of two commanders overlapped.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know anything about the existence of a special brigade consisting of smugglers, poachers, and persons released from prison?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: When all the troops really suitable for anti-partisan warfare had been withdrawn, an anti-partisan battalion under the command of Dirlewanger was formed and attached to Army Group Center at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. This battalion was gradually strengthened by the addition of reserve units until it reached the proportions, first, of a regiment and, later, of a brigade. This “Dirlewanger Brigade” consisted for the most part of previously convicted criminals; officially it consisted of so-called poachers, but it did include real criminals convicted of burglary, murder, _et cetera_.

COL. POKROVSKY: How do you explain the fact that the German Army Command so willingly strengthened and increased its forces by adding criminals to them and then using these criminals against the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am of the opinion that this step was closely connected with a speech made by Heinrich Himmler at Wezelsburg at the beginning of 1941, prior to the campaign against Russia, when he spoke of the purpose of the Russian campaign, which was, he said, to decimate the Slav population by 30 million, and that it was in order to achieve this purpose that troops of such inferior caliber were introduced.

COL. POKROVSKY: Is it correct then to say that the character of the troops used by the commanders to fight the partisans had been given careful consideration? Did they receive precise instructions how to treat the population and how to fight against the partisans? I am now referring to the proposed and officially sanctioned extermination of the population.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I think this purpose was a decisive factor in the selection of certain commanders and formations.

COL. POKROVSKY: By what means and by what measures were Wehrmacht units brought in to fight the partisans? Were they specially recruited or were they used from time to time according to some set plan?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think that on the whole there was no definite set plan. So-called large-scale operations were initiated, planned, and executed by headquarters. Anti-partisan fighting, however, was mostly of a spontaneous nature, since every lower commander was obliged to keep his own area free of partisans and thus had to act on his own initiative.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that in very many cases generals and officers of the Wehrmacht personally headed the operations against the partisans. Can you give us some concrete facts and the names of some of the generals and officers?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I didn’t fully understand the meaning of the question. The names of commanders?

COL. POKROVSKY: You have told us that certain operations during the struggle against the partisans were conducted by officers and generals of the Wehrmacht, and I now ask you if you can name some of the officers and generals?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, some of the generals I have already mentioned. In addition I remember Major General Hartmann, in central Russia. One large-scale anti-partisan operation was either led by him or at least directed by him from his headquarters. I also remember Colonel General Reinhardt in whose rear zone there were important partisan groups. I might even say that there was not a single general in the rear zone who did not participate in the struggle against the partisans. I cannot, of course, remember all the names; but if I hear them mentioned, I can tell you whether or not they participated.

COL. POKROVSKY: Could you tell us what undertaking was commanded by General Ackmann?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I cannot remember that.

COL. POKROVSKY: Were there any general orders relating to prisoners of war, the civilian population, or the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Unfortunately there were no general instructions which clearly stated how the partisans or the population were to be treated. That was the complaint I made: That no instruction was issued on the treatment of the partisans and that we were not even told who was to be considered a partisan. When anything happened and the German Wehrmacht was attacked, there were never clear orders on what was to be done by way of reprisals.

COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that in the absence of direct orders commanders were given a clear field and had the right to declare any person they wished a partisan and treat him accordingly?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The commanders certainly had to and could act and decide independently. No precise control was possible in individual cases, but the activities of all the troops used were always clearly known to the High Command, because the individual reports of the troops contained all details of the counter measures taken against the

## partisans—that is, they had to contain the number of partisans killed

in combat, the number of partisans shot, of partisan suspects shot, and the number of our own losses. At the same time captured weapons had to be listed in detail, so that each leader could therefore see clearly how an operation worked out in practice.

COL. POKROVSKY: That means that each commander decided for himself whether there was any reason to suspect a man and to execute him?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know of any order prescribing the seizure of hostages and the burning of villages as a reprisal for abetting the

## partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. I do not think that written orders to that effect were ever issued, and it is precisely this lack of any orders which I considered a mistake. It should, for instance, have been definitely stated how many people could be executed as a reprisal for the killing of one, or of 10 German soldiers.

COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that if certain commanders burned villages as a punitive measure against the local population, they, the commanders, would be acting on their own initiative?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes. These steps would be taken by a commander on his own initiative. Nor could his superior officers do anything against it, since orders emanating from the highest authorities definitely stated that if excesses were committed against the civilian population in the partisan areas, no disciplinary or juridical measures could be taken.

COL. POKROVSKY: And can we assume that the same applied to the seizure of hostages?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Well, I think that the question of hostages did not arise at all in the anti-partisan struggle. The hostage system was more common in the West. At any rate the term “hostage” was not used in anti-partisan warfare.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know anything about the forcible abduction and deportation to Germany of minors between 14 and 18 years of age?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Naturally, I do not remember details such as the age groups, but when I was appointed Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units, I welcomed an order, issued at my suggestion, forbidding indiscriminate reprisals of the troops and decreeing that in future captured partisans and partisan suspects would no longer be shot but would be brought to the Reich by the Sauckel organization.

COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood you correctly, you replied to a question of my colleague, the American Prosecutor, by saying that the struggle against the partisan movement was a pretext for destroying the Slav and Jewish population?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Wehrmacht Command aware of the methods adopted for fighting the partisan movement and for destroying the Jewish population?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The methods were known generally, and hence to the military leaders as well. I do not, of course, know whether they were aware of the plan mentioned by Himmler.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you personally take part in any conferences with generals of the Wehrmacht during which the methods of anti-partisan warfare were clearly and plainly discussed?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The methods as such were discussed in detail and knowledge of them was taken for granted, but it was not mentioned at these discussions that such and such a number of persons were to be shot. That would be a wrong conclusion.

COL. POKROVSKY: You have told us that the Germans intended to destroy the Slav population in order to reduce the number of Slavs to 30 million. Where did you get this figure and this order?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I must correct that: Not to reduce to 30 million, but by 30 million. Himmler mentioned this figure in his speech at the Wezelsburg.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you confirm the fact that actually all the measures carried out by the German commanders and by the Wehrmacht in the occupied Russian territories were directed to the sole purpose of reducing the number of Slavs and Jews by 30 million?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The meaning of that is not quite clear to me. Did the Wehrmacht know that the Slav population was to be diminished by 30 million? Would you please repeat the question, it wasn’t quite clear?

COL. POKROVSKY: I asked: Can you actually and truthfully confirm that the measures taken by the Wehrmacht Command in the district administrative areas then occupied by the Germans were directed to the purpose of diminishing the Slavs and Jews by 30 million? Do you now understand the question?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I believe that these methods would definitely have resulted in the extermination of 30 million if they had been continued, and if developments of that time had not completely changed the situation.

COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Defense have any questions?

DR. EXNER: Witness, you said you were chief of anti-partisan operations, didn’t you?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units.

DR. EXNER: Well, if such chaotic conditions really existed, why didn’t you alter the system?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Because I was never given the requisite authority.

DR. EXNER: I beg your pardon?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Because I was never given authority. I could not issue orders, I had no disciplinary powers, and I was not an appointing authority for military courts.

DR. EXNER: Then did you make a report on the existing conditions to your superior officers?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Every day. I had a permanent staff at Himmler’s headquarters.

DR. EXNER: Did you suggest any changes?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Persistently.

DR. EXNER: And why were these changes never realized?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think I have already expressed myself quite clearly on this point: because I think that these changes were not desired.

DR. EXNER: You also, as you have informed us, reported to your superior authorities on the number of enemy dead, wounded, and prisoners after each operation. Tell me what, approximately, was the proportion of enemy prisoners to the enemy dead?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The figures varied in each case. I cannot generalize, but it was a fact that prisoners usually far outnumbered the enemy dead.

DR. EXNER: The prisoners outnumbered the dead?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, but only in the years after the order allowing prisoners to be taken.

DR. EXNER: The system was harsher at first, you say, and milder later on?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, it was milder insofar as we now had definite orders stating where the prisoners were to be brought and to whom they were to be turned over. There were no such orders in the beginning.

DR. EXNER: Can you name any orders which you received from military authorities, dealing in any way with the annihilation of millions of Slavs?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I already gave my answer to that question to the prosecutor when I said that a written order to that effect did not exist.

DR. EXNER: Do you know that the reports which you sent to Himmler on the

## actions which you had carried out were submitted by Himmler directly to

the Führer?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: May I reply to that in some detail? At first I had a permanent staff at Himmler’s headquarters. My chief of staff was there permanently while I was at the front. Between the Wehrmacht offices—that is, OKW and OKH—and my own staff there was constant and organized interchange of reports, for reports on partisan activities did not always reach me first, since from some operational areas the channel for reports was through the OKH. Therefore the Wehrmacht sent me as many reports as I sent to the Wehrmacht. These reports were collected in my staff, and were daily sent to Himmler who forwarded them again.

DR. EXNER: To whom?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The gentlemen of the Wehrmacht have confirmed to me, here in prison, that these reports were submitted during strategic conferences.

DR. EXNER: Can you tell me whether Jews participated in the partisan groups?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: There is no question but that in individual

## partisan groups Jews did participate, in numbers corresponding to the

size of the Jewish population.

DR. EXNER: In individual groups? Was it not more in the nature of an exception?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, it was definitely an exception.

DR. EXNER: That is why I do not quite understand how actions taken against the partisans were to lead to the extermination of the Jews.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I did not say that; I was speaking earlier of the Einsatzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei.

DR. EXNER: Oh, I see, that is different. Do you know anything about the Dirlewanger regiment?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: That was the Dirlewanger Brigade, which I described in detail to the prosecutor a short time ago.

DR. EXNER: Yes. Was that brigade at any time under your command?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in 1941.

DR. EXNER: Was it a formation of the Army or the SS?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, it was not a formation of the Waffen-SS; it was supplied by the Allgemeine SS, that is, by the Berger office.

DR. EXNER: Can you tell me who was present at Himmler’s speech at the Wezelsburg?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: About 12 Gruppenführer were present, I can name them if you like.

DR, EXNER: You mean Gruppenführer . . .

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Gruppenführer of the SS.

DR. EXNER: Were any officers of the Wehrmacht present?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

DR. EXNER: Thank you very much.

DR. KRAUS: You were present in Königsberg on the 18th of August 1935 when the former President of the Reichsbank, Schacht, made a speech at the Eastern Fair (Ostmesse)?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. KRAUS: What was your position at that time?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was Oberabschnittsführer.

DR. KRAUS: Were you present at the speech in your official capacity?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, as Oberabschnittsführer of the SS.

DR. KRAUS: And you suddenly left the room in the middle of the speech, as a protest?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in the middle of the speech I left the room.

DR. KRAUS: In protest?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. KRAUS: Then you did not agree with the speech?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I did not leave on account of the speech but as a protest.

DR. KRAUS: As a protest against the contents of the speech?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

DR. KRAUS: May I ask, then, why you protested?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: It is well known that in East Prussia I conducted a violent campaign against the then Gauleiter Koch, which, led to his suspension. Koch and I were bitterly opposed and I could not therefore understand why Reich Minister Schacht, who God knows did not belong to Koch’s school of thought, should take pains to pay compliments to this man, whom I knew to be corrupt.

DR. KRAUS: Were you protesting, then, against the attitude of Herr Schacht or that of Herr Koch?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think Herr Schacht must have known that it was a protest against Koch. In any case I had it explained to him later, and we finally settled the matter amicably through mediators.

DR. KRAUS: I see. Thank you.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you said that a change was made regarding the treatment of partisans, and that it was ordered that the partisans were to be placed into the labor service. Where did this order originate?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I cannot give you detailed information about this, I only know that Herr Sauckel himself went around in the East and made long speeches to the effect that it would be best if these men who were captured in partisan warfare were placed in the labor service through his organization.

DR. SERVATIUS: I asked where this order originated. Did it originate with Himmler or, as you described it, with the Sauckel organization?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. The Sauckel organization could, of course, never issue orders relating to partisan warfare. I presume that the Sauckel organization suggested the order, but of course it had to originate with Himmler or the OKW.

DR. SERVATIUS: What do you know of the Sauckel organization? Where did it exist?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I know only what was generally known: namely, that this organization existed for the purpose of bringing manpower into the Reich for work in the armament industry.

DR. SERVATIUS: You spoke of an organization; but you don’t know anything about this organization, do you?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I don’t mean it in your sense, a large independent organization; that is not what I mean. But it was obvious that a man who was responsible for the whole of manpower must have an organization at his disposal. I beg your pardon, it was a mistake on my part.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then you do not know that Sauckel had no executive power at all and that he was not provided with an administrative machine of his own.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I don’t know that.

THE PRESIDENT: I want the attention of the defendants’ counsel. What I want to say is this, that unless counsel and the witnesses speak slowly and make adequate pauses between the questions and the answers, it is impossible for the interpreters to interpret properly, and the only result is that the questions and answers do not come through to the Tribunal, nor do the defendants’ counsel get the benefit of the true meaning of the answers which have been given in the examination-in-chief, and everything that you may think you gain by rapidity of cross-examination, you lose by the inadequacy of the translation. I will repeat, that you should pause at the end of your sentences and at the end of your questions, so as to give the interpreter’s voice time to come through.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, you said that from 1942 onwards you were Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units. As such, it was your duty to fight the

## partisans in the East?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, that is correct, in the East.

DR. STAHMER: Now, you said that it was not quite clear what was to be understood by the term “partisan”; the concept of “partisan” was never during the entire period clearly defined. Is that correct?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, the sense of that is correct. In my opinion a distinction should be drawn between partisans and partisan suspects. The troops did not always make this distinction. A partisan was a man carefully selected and trained by the enemy. He was also very well armed. I always insisted that this concept was not vague, but concrete. If fire is opened from a wood, a house, or a village, it is not correct to say that everyone in the wood, house, or village is a partisan; for this reason: The tactics of the partisans were to disappear rapidly after a successful action; they relied on the element of surprise inherent in this method of warfare. If the troops took their counter measures without being specially trained and without exact knowledge of this concept of “partisan,” then they would conclude from the fact that they had been fired on from a village, that all the inhabitants were

## partisans. In my view, a partisan can be considered as such only if he

is encountered or captured with a weapon in his hand. If he has no weapon, he cannot be considered a partisan.

DR. STAHMER: Now, what did you do in a positive way to clarify this concept of “partisan”?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: As I have already said, ever since 1941, even before I was Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units, not only I but also General Von Schenkendorff, continually sent numbers of memoranda containing suggestions. Moreover, in the Russian Army Group Center, for instance, we organized schools for fighting partisans, where the troops were to be trained along these lines. Schenkendorff and I, together, worked out a series of regulations for fighting partisans, but they were never published. Immediately after I was appointed Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units, that is, in the beginning of 1943, my staff began to prepare a new series of regulations for fighting partisans. Many months passed, however, before these regulations were finally published, in 1944, when they were already practically useless.

DR. STAHMER: Who issued these regulations?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: These regulations were published by the Wehrmacht, in the form of an ordinary Wehrmacht directive.

DR. STAHMER: They were issued by the Wehrmacht?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They came out in 1944.

DR. STAHMER: What were their contents?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They were entitled, _Regulations for the Fighting of Partisans (Bandenkampfvorschrift)_.

DR. STAHMER: What were their contents?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They comprised the whole of partisan warfare; thus they contained reconnaissance, operational details, differences between small-scale, medium-scale, and large-scale operations.

DR. STAHMER: Since these partisan combat regulations did not appear before 1944, was it not your task, as you had all anti-partisan forces in the whole East, to instruct your forces directly on their conduct?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In the first place, as I have said, I had no authority to issue orders. Consequently, I could only make suggestions. Secondly, closely organized anti-partisan forces never existed; it was an empty name which they were given. Any kind and number of formations would be assigned for anti-partisan warfare whenever necessary. It is wrong to say that I had troops at my disposal for the sole purpose of fighting the partisans. Moreover—and I should like to emphasize that—the document appointing me Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units stated as follows: Anti-partisan operations will be commanded either by the Higher SS and Police Officer, or the competent Wehrmacht commander in their respective areas. According to that directive, my own task was only that of an inspector, in spite of my continuous request for authority to issue orders.

DR. STAHMER: I don’t quite understand . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You must go slowly and you must pause between your sentences.

DR. STAHMER: As general of the Waffen-SS you must have had power to issue orders?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I had authority only to issue orders when I personally conducted an operation.

DR. STAHMER: But you were appointed, as you said, to fight the partisans and you must have had combat units for the purpose?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I had no such units.

DR. STAHMER: Then how did you conduct your fight against the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In each case, I went to the respective commander, discussed the operation with him and asked for the necessary troops, unless they were put at my disposal, as it often happened, by the OKW or the OKH directly.

DR. STAHMER: You asked for troops, unless they were put at your disposal. But then these troops assigned to you were under your command, were they not?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, only if I personally commanded the operation. Otherwise, as I said, either the competent general of the Wehrmacht or, in the area of the civil government, the higher SS and police Leader commanded the operation. It was expressly noted in the directive containing my appointment as Chief of the Anti-Partisan Combat Units, that I could request authority to command an operation only if the authority of two higher SS and police leaders or of two Wehrmacht commanders overlapped, thus calling for a higher authority to handle the conflicting responsibilities.

DR. STAHMER: Did you never personally command an operation?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I conducted one operation in 1943.

DR. STAHMER: In what way?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This undertaking took place in the fall of 1943, in the region of Idrizza Polotsk. I first flew to the Army Group Center and talked the matter over with the then chief, General Krebs. Then I went on to Army Group North and discussed the same matter with Field Marshal Küchler. Küchler organized all the troops of the SS and Police and also the Wehrmacht formations in the rear areas into a so-called corps under the command of Jaeckel. The Army Group Center did the same with its own forces, and also formed a corps under the command of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the area. I myself, with my staff, was in command of both, and Colonel Von Mellenthin of the OKH was assigned to me as liaison officer. Then I conducted the enterprise personally. In the meantime the front had been broken through in foggy weather, and I made the independent decision of turning against the Red Army forces which had broken through; thus my units became the front line.

DR. STAHMER: You said a little while ago that you had been decorated with the Knight’s Cross. Did you receive this decoration for this undertaking alone?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, as I said before, I was already at the front in the year 1941. Again and again I was with the fighting units: In 1941 at Moscow, in 1942 at Velikie-Luki, and later at Koebel, at Warsaw during the uprising in Warsaw; and from 1944 onwards I commanded an SS corps.

DR. STAHMER: Did you not know that you were particularly commended by Hitler and Himmler and decorated mainly for your ruthless and efficient

## actions in the war against the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. I received no decoration for the war against the partisans. I received all my decorations, beginning with the clusters to the Iron Cross II, at the front and from the Wehrmacht. I will gladly give you names.

DR. STAHMER: The Brigade Dirlewanger was an SS brigade, wasn’t it?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The Brigade Dirlewanger did not belong to the Waffen-SS. It was an organization which could possibly be classified as part of the Allgemeine-SS. It was not supplied and kept up by the Waffen-SS, but by the Berger office.

DR. STAHMER: Was the commander of the Brigade Dirlewanger a member of the SS?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Didn’t you yourself suggest that criminals should be organized and used for fighting the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

DR. THOMA: Witness, do you know that the civil government in White Ruthenia often protested against the manner in which the anti-partisan

## activities were carried on?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. THOMA: The civil authority was subordinate to the Reich Commissioner, and he in turn was subordinate to Rosenberg as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, is that correct?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. THOMA: If I understood you correctly, you disapproved of the manner in which the fighting against partisans was carried on, involving many innocent people; and you disapproved also of the existence of the Dirlewanger Regiment and of the speech of Reichsführer SS Himmler?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

DR. THOMA: How could you then reconcile it with your conscience to remain chief or inspector of anti-partisan units and also head of such Einsatzgruppen?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was never chief of Einsatzgruppen.

THE PRESIDENT: The question had not come through then on the interpreter’s voice before you began to answer. You must give greater pauses between the question and answer.

DR. THOMA: How did you reconcile it with your conscience to remain inspector of the anti-partisan forces in the East?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Not only could I reconcile that with my conscience, but I actually strove to obtain this position because in the years 1941 and 1942 I saw, together with Schenkendorff, that things could not continue as they were. General Schenkendorff, my immediate superior, recommended me for the position.

DR. THOMA: But you knew that you could not achieve anything with these suggestions?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I couldn’t know that. What I realize and acknowledge today, I could not possibly have known then.

DR. THOMA: At any rate, you achieved nothing?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I don’t think that; my opinion is rather that if someone else had been in my position, the disaster would have been greater.

DR. THOMA: Do you believe that Himmler’s speech, in which he demanded the extermination of 30 million Slavs, expressed only his personal opinion; or do you consider that it corresponded to the National Socialist ideology?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Today I believe that it was the logical consequence of our ideology.

DR. THOMA: Today?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Today.

DR. THOMA: What was your own opinion at that time?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: It is difficult for a German to fight through to this conviction. It took me a long time.

DR. THOMA: Then how is it that a few days ago a witness, namely, the Witness Ohlendorf, appeared here and admitted that through the Einsatzgruppen he had killed 90,000 people, but told the Tribunal that this did not harmonize with the National Socialist ideology?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am of a different opinion. If for years, for decades, a doctrine is preached to the effect that the Slav race is an inferior race, that the Jews are not even human beings, then an explosion of this sort is inevitable.

DR. THOMA: Nevertheless the fact remains that, together with whatever attitude towards life you had at that time, you also had a conscience?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: And today, too—for that reason I am here.

[_Dr. Exner approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, are you cross-examining on behalf of some other defendant, or what?

DR. EXNER: I should like to ask two or three questions which my client put to me as important during the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: You have already cross-examined, have you not?

DR. EXNER: Yes, but I now have three new questions. We were not able to prepare ourselves for this cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.

DR. EXNER: Witness, you said an order was issued in the year 1944 regarding anti-partisan warfare. During the recess, I found in the document book of the Prosecution, under 1786-PS, mention of a combat directive on partisan warfare, dated 27 November 1942. Do you know of this?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

DR. EXNER: But it must exist, since it is mentioned here.

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I don’t know it.

DR. EXNER: Do you know of a Russian directive for partisan warfare?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, that existed.

DR. EXNER: Could you give us information on the contents of this directive? What were the combat methods prescribed?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I no longer remember it.

DR. EXNER: Do you know where this directive is available?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.

DR. EXNER: Thank you.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): One moment. Do you know how many members of the Wehrmacht were used at any one time in this anti-partisan activity? What was the largest number of the troops?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Large-scale undertakings were those carried out with one division or more. I believe the largest number of troops for a single operation might have been three divisions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean all the troops on the Eastern Front at any one time used in these anti-partisan activities?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I cannot answer that, because these troops were never together under my direction. Operations were conducted simultaneously, large-, small-, and medium-scale operations were being carried out everywhere at the same time. Reports of such operations came in every day.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many Einsatzgruppen were used?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I know of three, one for each army group.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To Colonel Taylor._] You don’t want to re-examine?

COL. TAYLOR: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may go.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence under Counts Three and Four of the Indictment and I have only a few more words by way of general conclusion.

I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered and utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and they have survived through a singular durability.

An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written, and I quote from his book _The Time for Decision_, Page 261:

“. . . that the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of today, but the German General Staff. Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff.”

I think that this emphasizes the historical importance of the decision which this Tribunal is called on to make. But we are not now indicting the German General Staff at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against international law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind, as embodied in the Charter which governs this Court.

The picture we have seen is that of a group of men with great power for good or evil, who chose the latter, who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world, and who gladly joined forces with the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired,” we are told by Blomberg and Blaskowitz, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and the might which were necessary to his survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seemed to us so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.

I have said that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough that the generals should be his voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill and principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg, in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man—Adolf Hitler. Later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform, the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.

We will no doubt hear the generals ask what they could have done about it. We will hear that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and families and lives, they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No doubt this became true, but the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow conspirators threatened him with harm, should he withdraw from the plot.

In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations before this Court. They are the bearers of a tradition not devoid of valor and honor; but they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated partly because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies and partly because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.

Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel house and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices, foully executed, of terror, pillage, and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be a cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which their actions were a disgrace.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal pleases, the next subject will be the presentation of supplemental evidence concerning the persecution of the churches as presented by Colonel Wheeler.

COLONEL LEONARD WHEELER, JR. (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): Your Honors, the material now to be submitted comprises, first, supplemental proof on the suppression of the churches within Germany: the Evangelical churches, the Catholic Church, and the Bibelforscher (or Bible students); and second, acts of suppression in the annexed and occupied territories, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A large part of this proof will be from the official files of the Vatican.

I now submit to the Court United States Trial Brief H (supplemental), on “Suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany and in the Occupied Territories,” and Document Book H (supplemental), containing English translations of all the documents referred to in the supplemental brief, or to be referred to in my oral presentation. I shall take up first the supplemental proof on the suppression of the churches in Germany.

Hitler announced in March 1933 a distinction in his policy toward politics and morals on the one hand and religion on the other. I offer in evidence Document Number 3387-PS, Exhibit Number USA-566. This is a speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on March 23, 1933, quoted in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, for March 24, 1933, Page 1, Column 5 of the German newspaper. I quote from this speech:

“While the Government is determined to carry through a political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating and insuring the requisites of a truly religious life. The Government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most important for the maintenance of our Volkstum. It will respect agreements concluded between them and the Länder. However, it expects that its work will meet with like appreciation. The Government will treat all other denominations with objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging to a certain denomination or to a certain race should be regarded as a license for the commission or toleration of crime. The Government will devote its care to harmony between Church and State.”

Toward the Evangelical churches, the Nazi conspirators proceeded at first with caution, and an appearance of legality. They set up a new constitution of the German Evangelical Church, which introduced the innovation of a single Lutheran Reich Bishop, who assumed all the administrative functions of the old agencies of the churches. I refer to Document Number 3433-PS, the Decree concerning the Constitution of the German Evangelical Church, dated July 14, 1933, appearing in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, Page 471, and request that the Court take judicial notice of it.

It is too well known to require documentation that the new Reich Bishop, Bishop Müller, heeded the voice of his Nazi masters. One of his first steps was to maneuver the Evangelical Youth Association into the Hitler Jugend under the Defendant Von Schirach in December 1933. In proof of this I refer to Document Number 1458 (a)-PS, already in evidence as part of Document Book D. This is an excerpt from Von Schirach’s book, _The Hitler Youth—Idea and Formation_.

By 1935 it had become evident that more than persuasion by the Reich Bishop was necessary. Consequently the Nazi conspirators promulgated a number of public laws which, under innocent sounding titles, gradually wove a tight net of state control over all the affairs of the Evangelical churches. We ask that the Court take judicial notice of these laws published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. These may be briefly summarized as follows:

3434-PS, “Law concerning Procedure for Decisions in Legal Affairs of the Evangelical Church,” dated 26 June 1935, signed by Hitler and Frick, appearing in 1935 in _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 774. This gave the Reich Minister of the Interior, the Defendant Frick, when question was raised in a civil lawsuit, sole authority to determine the validity of measures taken in the Evangelical state churches, or in the German Evangelical Church since May 1, 1933.

3435-PS, “First Ordinance for Execution of the Law concerning Procedure for Decisions in Legal Affairs of the Evangelical Church,” dated July 3, 1935, appearing in 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 851. This implemented the earlier law, by setting up an Office for Decisions with three members appointed by the Reich Minister of the Interior.

3466-PS, “Decree to Unite the Competences of Reich and Prussia in Church Affairs,” dated July 16, 1935, signed by Hitler, published in 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1029. This transferred to Reich Minister without Portfolio Kerrl the Church Affairs hitherto handled by the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior and for Science, Education, and Training of the Population.

3436-PS, “Law for the Safeguarding of the German Evangelical Church,” dated 24 September 1935, published in the 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1178, signed by Hitler and the Minister for Church Affairs, Dr. Kerrl. This empowered the Reich Minister of Church Affairs to issue ordinances with binding legal force.

3437-PS, “Fifth Decree for Execution of the Law for the Safeguarding of the German Evangelical Church,” dated 2 December 1935, published in 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1370. This prohibited “Organs of Church Leadership” in the Evangelical churches from filling pastorates, engaging clerical assistants, examining and ordaining candidates of the state churches, visitation, publishing of the banns, and collection and administration of church dues and assessments.

This series of laws culminated on June 26, 1937, in Document Number 3439-PS, the “Fifteenth Decree for the Execution of the Law for Security of the German Evangelical Church,” dated June 25, 1937, published in 1937 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 697. By this, the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, established a finance department for the churches to supervise the administration of all church property, the budget, and the use of budget funds and to regulate salaries and allowances of officials, clergy, and employees. Thus, before the outbreak of the war, the Nazi conspirators had the Evangelical churches tied hand and foot physically and administratively, if not spiritually.

Against the Catholic Church with its international organization the Nazi conspirators launched a most vigorous and drastic attack—again at first, however, cloaked under a mantle of co-operation and legality. A concordat signed by the Defendant Von Papen, one of the foremost Catholic laymen in Germany, was concluded between the Reich Government and the Vatican on July 20, 1933. It is printed in the 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part II, Page 679 to Page 690, and contained in Document Number 3280 (a)-PS. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. I quote Article 1:

“The German Reich guarantees freedom of profession and public practice of the Catholic religion.

“It acknowledges the right of the Catholic Church, within the limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to manage and regulate its own affairs independently and, within the framework of its own competence, to publish laws and ordinances binding on its members.”

Other articles which, being matters of common knowledge, I assume need not be read into the record, formulated basic principles such as freedom of the Catholic press, of Catholic education, and of Catholic charitable, professional, and other organizations.

The proposal for the concordat came from the Reich, and not from the Vatican. I refer to Document Number 3268-PS, Exhibit Number USA-356, excerpts from the Allocution of Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College on June 2, 1945, already read into evidence. I quote from Page 1 of the English mimeographed excerpts, Page 1 of the German translation, third paragraph, which has not previously been read, “In the spring of 1933 the German Government asked the Holy See to conclude a concordat with the Reich.”

The present Pope, Pope Pius XII, then Cardinal Pacelli, negotiated and signed the concordat on behalf of the Vatican. As Archbishop Pacelli he had previously been Papal Nuncio in Germany for 12 years.

Relying upon the Nazis’ assurances, particularly Hitler’s speech of March 23, 1933 above quoted (3387-PS), the Catholic hierarchy revoked its previous opposition against Catholics becoming members of the National Socialist Party. I offer in evidence Document Number 3389-PS, Exhibit USA-566, a pastoral letter, dated March 23, 1933, from the Bishop of Cologne, and I quote from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ for March 29, 1933 Page 2 Columns 2 and 3:

“The Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Schulte, announces to the Archdiocese of Cologne a declaration of the Bishops’ Conference at Fulda, which states:

“The bishops of the diocese of Germany, in their dutiful solicitude to keep the Catholic faith pure and to protect the inviolable aims and rights of the Catholic Church, have adopted, for weighty reasons during the last years, an attitude of opposition toward the National Socialist movement, through prohibitions and warnings, which were to remain in effect as long and as far as those reasons remained valid.

“It should now be recognized that there are public and solemn declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich Government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the teachings of the Catholic faith and the unswerving mission and rights of the Church and which expressly guarantee the full validity of the legal pacts concluded between the several German Länder and the Church.

“Without lifting the condemnation, implied in our previous measures, of certain religious and ethical errors, the Episcopate now believes it can be confident that those general prohibitions and warnings prescribed need no longer be regarded as necessary.”

The Catholic Center Party, yielding to these assurances and to pressure, was dissolved on July 5, 1933. I refer to Document Number 2403-PS, already in evidence as part of U.S. Document Book B, an excerpt from _Documents of German Politics_, the official Nazi publication, a document of which the Court can take judicial notice; and I quote from the last five lines of Page 1 of the English translation, appearing on Page 55 of the original German text, which states:

“Also the parties of German Catholicism which were supposed to be most deeply rooted, had to bow to the law of the New Order. On July 4, 1933, the Bavarian People’s Party (Document 27), and on July 5, 1933, the Center Party (Document 29), published an announcement of their dissolution.”

In spite of these evidences of confidence and co-operation or submission on the part of the Catholics, the Nazi conspirators almost immediately commenced a series of violations of the concordat. I offer in evidence Document Number 3476-PS, Exhibit USA-567, being the Papal Encyclical, “Mit brennender Sorge”—in German—by Pope Pius XI on March 14, 1937, and also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all of it. I quote from, the one-page English excerpt . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 3476 or 3466?

COL. WHEELER: 3476.

THE PRESIDENT: We don’t seem to have that.

COL. WHEELER: That may be a mistake, Sir, for 3563; the number was changed. The part of it which is in English in the Document Book, Sir, is under 3280-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: 3280?

COL. WHEELER: The difficulty is that the German original came in after the translation had been made from another source.

THE PRESIDENT: 3280(a)-PS?

COL. WHEELER: 3280 without the (a). It’s just a couple of paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes; I see.

COL. WHEELER: These are found on Page 2, Paragraph 2, of the German original, which is in evidence now, which was secretly reproduced at Fulda from copies smuggled into Germany from Rome, and read definitely from pulpits all over Germany. I quote:

“It discloses intrigues which from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others, like the enemy in Holy Scripture (Matt. xiii, 25), sowed the tares of suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny, of secret and open fundamental hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and making use of every available means. On them and on them alone and on their silent and vocal protectors rests the responsibility for the fact that now, on the horizon of Germany, there is to be seen, not the rainbow of peace, but the threatening storm clouds of destructive religious strife.

“Anyone who has even a grain of a sense of truth left in his mind and even a shadow of a feeling of justice left in his heart will have to admit that, in the difficult and eventful years which followed the concordat, every word and every action of ours was ruled by loyalty to the terms of the agreement; but also he will have to recognize with surprise and deep disgust that the unwritten law of the other party has been arbitrary misinterpretation of agreements, circumvention of agreements, weakening of the force of agreements and, finally, more or less open violation of agreements.

“Only 10 days after the Concordat was signed. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: None of this is in our book.

COL. WHEELER: That’s not in your book?

THE PRESIDENT: Not what you’ve been reading. The first paragraph, down to the words “destructive religious wars” is in our book. The rest isn’t in it.

COL. WHEELER: I think there must have been an error today then, Sir. There was a second edition of that 3280, which contains the second paragraph. I’ll have that substituted as soon as this is over.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): The United States Prosecution said earlier in the proceedings that a certain part of the material now being presented as evidence in the question of the opposition to the churches was made available by the Vatican. The Defendant Hans Frank has just sent me some questions which I do not want to withhold from the Tribunal. The questions are these:

1. Is the Vatican a Signatory to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal?

2. Did the Vatican deliver the material in an accusatory capacity?

3. Has the Vatican, acting as a co-prosecutor, identified itself with the principles of these proceedings?

The Defendant Hans Frank adds by way of explanation that his continued membership in the Roman Catholic Church depends on the reply to these questions.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it desirable that the Tribunal understand your objections. The first question that you ask is: Is the Vatican a Signatory to the Charter? Is that right?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Your second question was what? What was your second question?

DR. SEIDL: The second question is: Whether the Vatican submitted the material which is now being presented, acting as co-prosecutor?

THE PRESIDENT: And your third?

DR. SEIDL: The third question is—and it is addressed directly to the Prosecution—whether the Vatican, as prosecutor, has identified itself with the principles upon which this Trial is being conducted?

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]

THE PRESIDENT: In the opinion of the Tribunal the observations which have just been made by counsel on behalf of the Defendant Frank are entirely irrelevant, and any motion which they were intended to support is denied. The Prosecution will therefore continue.

COL. WHEELER: I now offer in evidence the first of a number of documents which the Vatican has supplied to the Prosecution in this case from its own files and which authoritatively state the acts of suppression of the Church by the Nazi conspirators. This first Vatican document, which deals in part with acts of suppression within Germany, is Document Number 3261-PS, Exhibit Number USA-568, a verbal note of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness the Pope to the German Embassy, dated January 18, 1942. I read the certificate accompanying this document:

“The Vatican, November 13th, 1945.

“I, Domenico Tardini, Secretary of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of nine printed pages and entitled, ‘Verbal note of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness to the German Embassy,’ January 18th, 1942, Pages 3-11, is a true and correct translation into the English language from the Italian language of a carbon copy of a document now in the possession of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness, the original of which was dispatched to the German Embassy.”—Signed—“Domenico Tardini.”

The paper in the document book, Your Honors, is a mimeographed copy of the same printed document which we received from the Vatican. We did not have enough printed documents to make them in the document books.

On Page 2 of the English mimeographed text of this verbal note, Paragraphs 3 and 4—appearing on Page 2 of the German translation, Paragraphs 3 and 4—the Papal Secretary of State describes, I quote:

“Measures and acts which gravely violate the rights of the Church, being contrary not only to the existing concordats but to the principles of international law ratified by the Second Hague Conference . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say you were reading the third paragraph?

COL. WHEELER: Yes, Your Honor. It is the third full paragraph on Page 2. It starts in the middle of the paragraph with the last word on the seventh line of the third paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: It is very difficult for us to find it if you don’t tell us it begins in the middle of the paragraph.

COL. WHEELER: The last word of that line is “measures”. It’s the seventh line of the paragraph beginning “Yet, despite this keen desire,” Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

COL. WHEELER: “. . . but often—and this is much more grave—to the very fundamental principles of Divine Law both natural and positive.”

The next paragraph specifies these measures. I quote:

“Let it suffice to recall in this connection, among other things, the changing of the Catholic state elementary schools into undenominational schools; the permanent or temporary closing of many minor seminaries, of not a few major seminaries, and of some theological faculties; the suppression of almost all the private schools and of numerous Catholic boarding schools and colleges; the repudiation, decided upon unilaterally, of financial obligations which the State, municipalities, and so forth, had towards the Church; the increasing difficulties put in the way of the activity of the religious orders and congregations in the spiritual, cultural, and social field, and above all the suppression of abbeys, monasteries, convents, and religious houses in such great numbers that one is led to infer a deliberate intention of rendering impossible the very existence of the orders and congregations in Germany.”

The Nazis did not overlook other sects or denominations in their efforts to suppress Christian religion in Germany. They persecuted the “Bibelforscher” or Bible students . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, if you are going on to another church, it would be better to break off until tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-NINTH DAY Tuesday, 8 January 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. WHEELER: The Nazis did not overlook other sects or denominations in their efforts to suppress Christian religion in Germany. They persecuted the Bibelforscher or International Bible Students as well. There has already been introduced and read into evidence Document Number D-84, Exhibit Number USA-236, showing that members of this sect were not only prosecuted in the courts, but also seized and sent to concentration camps, even after serving or remitting of their judicial sentences.

In Document Number 2928-PS, Exhibit Number USA-239, included in U.S. Document Book A, further evidence of persecution of Bibelforscher appears.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little bit fast. We are not going to refer to D-84?

COL. WHEELER: I am not going to read from it, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you go to 2928-PS?

COL. WHEELER: 2928-PS; it is in the document book, Sir. This document is an affidavit by Matthias Lex, Vice President of the national union of shoemakers. In describing his experience in Dachau Concentration Camp he says, and I quote from the third page of his affidavit:

“I include in the political prisoners the International Bible Students”—Bibelforscher—“whose number I estimate at over 150.”

I want to read further from the last line of that page and the next few lines of the next page:

“The following groups were kept entirely isolated: The members of the so-called ‘punishment companies,’”—Strafkompanien—“those who were in a concentration camp for a second time, and after about 1937 also the ‘Bibelforscher’. Members of the ‘punishment companies’ were such prisoners who had committed disciplinary or slight offenses against the camp regulations. The following groups lived separately but could mix with the other groups during the day, either while working or while strolling through the camp:

“Political prisoners, Jews, anti-socials, gypsies, felons, homosexuals, and, before 1937, also the International Bible Students.”

I refer also to Document Number 1531-PS—this is not in the document book—Exhibit Number USA-248, which is already in evidence. This was an order by the RSHA in 1942 authorizing third-degree methods against Jehovah’s Witnesses. That was read by Colonel Storey.

I now turn to acts of suppression in the annexed and occupied territories. In Austria Bishop Rusch of Innsbruck has written an illuminating report on this subject. I offer this sworn statement in evidence, Document 3278-PS, Exhibit Number USA-569. This is a report on the fighting of National Socialism in the Apostolic Administration of Innsbruck-Feldkirch, of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. In this the Bishop declares, and I start on the first page of the English text, and of the German translation:

“After having seized power, National Socialism immediately showed the tendency to exclude the Church from publicity.”

The expression “publicity”—this was written in English by the Bishop—evidently means “public activities.” I continue with the quote:

“At Corpus Christi in 1938 the customary solemn procession was forbidden. In the summer of the same year all ecclesiastical schools and kindergartens were disbanded. Daily newspaper and weekly reviews of Christian thinking were likewise removed. In the same year all kinds of ecclesiastical organizations, especially youth organizations such as Boy Scouts, were disbanded, all activity forbidden.

“The effect of these prohibitions came soon: The clergy took opposition against them, they could not do otherwise. Then a great wave of priest arrests followed. About a fifth of them were eventually arrested. Reasons for arrests were:

“1. The ‘pulpit-paragraph.’ When Party actions were mentioned or criticized even in the humblest manner.

“2. The practice of taking care of young people. A specially heavy prohibition was given in November 1939. Children’s or youth’s mass or services were forbidden. Religion or faith lessons were not allowed to be given in the church except lessons of preparing for first Communion or confirmation. Teaching of religion at school was very often forbidden without any reason.

“The priest, according to his conscience, could not follow this public proscription and this explained the great number of arrests of priests. Finally, the priests were arrested on account of their ‘caritative’ work. It was, for instance, forbidden to give anything to foreigners or prisoners. A priest was arrested because he gave a cup of coffee and bread to two hungry Dutchmen. This ‘caritative’ act was seen to favor elements foreign to the race.

“In 1939 and 1940 a new activity began. Cloisters and abbeys were seized, disbanded, and many churches belonging to them closed. Among these two convents were disbanded: the cloister of the Dominican Sisters of Bludenz and that of the ‘Perpetual Adoration’ of Innsbruck. In the latter the Sisters were dragged, one by one, out of the cloister by the Gestapo. In the same way ecclesiastical property such as association-houses, parish and youth homes were seized. A list of these closed churches, disbanded cloisters, and ecclesiastical institutions is attached.

“Despite all these measures the results were not satisfactory. Then priests were not only arrested, but also deported to concentration camps. Eight priests of Tyrol and Vorarlberg have been imprisoned, among them the Provicar Monseigneur Dr. Charles Lampert. One died there on account of the ill-treatment, the others returned. Provicar Lampert was released but required to remain in Stettin, where later he was re-arrested and executed in November 1944, after having been condemned to death by secret proceedings.”

There is attached to this report a three-and-a-half-page list entitled, “List of churches, convents, monasteries, and ecclesiastical objects of Tyrol and Vorarlberg seized—that is, confiscated—and of the institutions, confessional schools, _et cetera_, disbanded.” Unless the Tribunal requires it, I shall not read these names.

I offer in evidence Document 3274-PS, Exhibit Number USA-570, received from Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna and authenticated by him. This is the first joint pastoral letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of Austria after liberation, dated October 17, 1945. I quote from Page 1, second paragraph of the English and German texts, which sums up the Nazi conspirators’ campaign in Austria:

“A war which has raged terribly and horribly, like none other in past epochs of the history of humanity is at an end. . . . At an end also is an intellectual battle, the goal of which was the destruction of Christianity and Church among our people; a campaign of lies and treachery against truth and love, against divine and human rights, and against international law.”

I quote further from the fourth and following paragraphs:

“Direct hostility to the Church was revealed in regulations against orders and monasteries, Catholic schools and institutions, against religious foundations and activities, against the ecclesiastical recreation centers and institutions; without the least rights to defend themselves they were declared enemies of both people and state and their existence destroyed.

“Religious instruction and education of children and adolescents were purposely limited, frequently entirely prevented. They encouraged in every manner all efforts hostile to religion and the Church and thus sought to rob the children and youth of our people of the most valuable treasure of holy faith and of true morality born of the Spirit of God. Unfortunately the attempt succeeded in innumerable cases to the permanent detriment of young people.

“Spiritual care of souls in churches and ecclesiastical houses, in hospitals and other institutions was seriously obstructed. It was made ineffectual in the Armed Forces and in the Labor Service, in the transfer of youth to the country and, beyond that, even in individual families and among numerous persons, to say nothing of the prohibition of spiritual ministration to people of another nationality and of other races.

“How often was the divine service as such, also sermons, missions, Communion days, retreats, processions, pilgrimages, restricted for the most impossible reasons and made entirely impossible!

“Catholic literature, newspapers, periodicals, church papers, religious writings were stopped, books and libraries destroyed.

“What an injustice occurred in the dissolution of many Catholic societies, in the destruction of numerous church activities!

“Individual Catholic and Christian believers, whose religious confession was allegedly free, were spied upon, criticized on account of their belief, scorned on account of their Christian

## activity. How many religious officials, teachers, public and

private employees, laborers, businessmen, and artisans, indeed, even peasants were put under pressure and terror! Many lost their jobs, some were pensioned off, others dismissed without pension, demoted, deprived of their real professional activity. Often enough such people who remained loyal to their convictions were discriminated against, condemned to hunger or tortured in concentration camps. Christianity and the Church were continually scorned and exposed to hatred.

“The apostasy movement found every assistance. Every opportunity was used to induce many to withdraw from the Church.”

In assessing responsibility for these acts of suppression in Austria, the Court will recall that the Defendant Von Schirach was Gauleiter of Vienna from 1940 to 1945.

I now come to the acts of suppression in Czechoslovakia, where, the Court will recollect, the Defendant Von Neurath was Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia from 1939 to 1943 and was succeeded by the Defendant Frick. These acts have been summarized in an official Czech Government report. I refer to Document 998-PS, Exhibit Number USA-91, already in evidence. These are excerpts not previously read or referred to from the “Czech Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Established according to the Agreement of the Four Great Powers, of August 8, 1945.” Since this is an official government document or report of one of the United Nations, I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of it under Article 21 of the Charter and I suggest that I be permitted to summarize rather than read it.

It describes the maltreatment of Catholic priests—487 of whom were sent to concentration camps as hostages—dissolution of religious orders, suppression of religious instruction in Czech schools, suppression of Catholic weeklies and monthlies, dissolution of the Catholic gymnastic organization of 800,000 members, and seizure of Catholic Church property. It describes the entire prohibition of the Czechoslovak National Church and confiscation of all its property in Slovakia and its crippling in Bohemia.

The report describes the severe restriction on freedom of preaching by the Protestants and the persecution and imprisonment and execution of ministers and the suppression of Protestant Church youth organizations and theological schools and shows the complete subordination and later dissolution of the Greek Orthodox Church. It states that all Evangelical education was handed over to the civil authorities and many Evangelical teachers lost their employment.

The repressive measures adopted by the Nazi conspirators in Poland against the Christian Church were even more drastic and sweeping.

The Vatican documents now to be introduced describe persecutions of the Catholic Church in Poland in three areas: First, the incorporated territories, especially the Warthegau; second, the Government General; and third, the incorporated Eastern territories.

The Court will recall that the incorporated territories comprised territories adjacent to the old Reich, chiefly the Reich District Wartheland or Warthegau, which included particularly the cities of Poznan and Lodz and the Reich district Danzig-West Prussia.

The occupied Polish territories which were organized into the Government General comprised the remainder of Poland, seized by the German forces in 1939 and extending to the new boundary with the Soviets formed at that time. This included Warsaw and Kraków. After the Nazis attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in June 1941, the parts of old Poland lying farther to the east and then overrun were included in the so-called Occupied Eastern Territories.

For the purpose of tying the defendants’ responsibility for the persecutions occurring in their respective areas, the Court will bear in mind that the Defendant Frick was the official chiefly responsible for the reorganization of the Eastern territories. The Defendant Frank was head of the Government General from 1939 to 1945. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart was Deputy Governor General there from 1939 to 1940. And the Defendant Rosenberg was Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories from July 17, 1941 to the end.

I now offer in evidence Document Number 3263-PS, Exhibit Number USA-571, headed, “Memorandum of the Secretariat of State to the German Embassy regarding the religious situation in the ‘Warthegau,’ October 8, 1942.” This document bears a certificate of authenticity from the Vatican signed by the Papal Secretary of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs corresponding to that accompanying Document 3261-PS, read in evidence a few minutes ago. Unless the Court requires otherwise, I suggest that it is not necessary to read each of these certificates, which are all similar one to another. I quote from Document 3263-PS, the first paragraph:

“For quite a long time the religious situation in the region called ‘Warthegau’ gives cause for very grave and ever-increasing anxiety. There, in fact, the Episcopate has been little by little almost completely eliminated; the secular and regular clergy have been reduced to proportions that are absolutely inadequate, because they have been in large part deported and exiled; the education of clerics has been forbidden; the Catholic education of youth is meeting with the greatest opposition; the nuns have been dispersed; insurmountable obstacles have been put in the way of affording people the help of religion; very many churches have been closed; Catholic intellectual and charitable institutions have been destroyed; ecclesiastical property has been seized.”

On March 2, 1943 the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Reich, a note setting forth in detail the persecution of bishops, priests, and other ecclesiastics and the suppression of the exercise of religion in the occupied Polish provinces. This document is so explicit and so authoritative that it deserves extensive quotation. I accordingly offer it in evidence: Document Number 3264-PS, Exhibit Number USA-572. It is headed, “A Note of His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of the Reich about the religious situation in the ‘Warthegau’ and in the other Polish provinces subject to Germany.” It bears a Vatican certificate of authenticity like that of Document 3261-PS. It is signed, “L. Card. Maglione,” meaning “Luigi Cardinal Maglione.” I quote from this note, starting with Page 1, the third paragraph of the English mimeographed text and of the German translation:

“The place where, above all, the religious situation, by its unusual gravity, calls for special consideration is the territory called the ‘Reichsgau Wartheland.’

“Six bishops resided in that region in August 1939; now there is left only one. In fact, the Bishop of Lodz and his auxiliary were, in the course of the year 1941, confined first in a small district of the diocese and then expelled and exiled in the ‘Generalgouvernement.’

“Another bishop, Monseigneur Michael Kozal, Auxiliary and Vicar General of Wloclawek, was arrested in the autumn of 1939, detained for some time in a prison in the city and later in a religious house in Lad, and finally was transferred to the concentration camp at Dachau.

“Since His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznan and the Bishop of Wloclawek, who had gone away during the period of military operations, were not allowed to return to their Sees, the only bishop who now remains in the ‘Warthegau’ is His Excellency Monseigneur Valentine Dymek, Auxiliary of Poznan; and he, at least up to November 1942, was interned in his own house.”

I pass now to Page 2, fourth paragraph of the English text, the fifth paragraph of the German text:

“If the lot of their Excellencies the Bishops has been a source of anxiety for the Holy See, the condition of an immense number of priests and members of religious orders has caused it, and still causes it, no less grief.

“In the territory now called ‘Warthegau’ more than 2,000 priests exercised their ministry before the war; they are now reduced to a very small number.

“According to accounts received from various quarters by the Holy See, in the first months of the military occupation not a few members of the secular clergy were shot or otherwise put to death, while others—some hundreds—were imprisoned or treated in an unseemly manner, being forced into employments unbecoming their state and exposed to scorn and derision.

“Then, while numbers of ecclesiastics were exiled or constrained in some other way to take refuge in the ‘Generalgouvernement,’ many others were transferred to concentration camps. At the beginning of October 1941 the priests from the dioceses of the ‘Warthegau’ detained in Dachau already numbered several hundreds; but their number increased considerably in that month following a sharp intensification of police measures which culminated in the imprisonment and deportation of further hundreds of ecclesiastics. Entire ‘Kreise’ (districts) remained thus completely deprived of clergy. In the city of Poznan itself the spiritual care of some 200,000 Catholics remained in the hands of not more than four priests.

“No less painful was the fate reserved for the regular clergy. Many religious were shot or otherwise killed; the great majority of the others were imprisoned, deported, or expelled.

“In the same way far-reaching measures were taken against the institutions preparing candidates for the ecclesiastical state. The diocesan seminaries of Gniezno and Poznan, of Wloclawek, and of Lodz were closed. The seminary in Poznan for the training of priests destined to work among Polish Catholics abroad was also closed.

“The novitiates and houses of formation of the religious orders and congregations were closed.

“Not even the nuns were able to continue their charitable

## activities without molestation. For them was set up a special

concentration camp at Bojanowo, where towards the middle of 1941 about 400 sisters were interned and employed in manual labor. To a representation of the Holy See made through the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin (Memorandum N. 40.348 of June 11th, 1941) your Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied in the Memorandum Pol. III 1886 of September 28 of the same year that it was only a question of a temporary measure, taken with the consent of the Reich lieutenant for Wartheland, in order to supply the lack of housing for Polish Catholic sisters. In the same memorandum it was admitted that as a result of reorganization of charitable institutions many Catholic sisters were without employment.

“But, in spite of the fact that this measure was declared to be temporary, it is certain that towards the end of 1942 some hundreds of nuns were still interned at Bojanowo. It is established that for some time the religious were deprived even of spiritual help.

“Likewise in the matter of education and religious instruction of youth no attention was paid in the ‘Warthegau’ to the rights of the Catholic Church.

“All the Catholic schools were suppressed.”

THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Foreign Minister of the Reich at the time that document was sent?

COL. WHEELER: It was the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.

I turn to Page 4, the 10th paragraph of the English text, Page 5, 4th paragraph of the German text:

“The use of the Polish language in sacred functions, and even in the Sacrament of Penance, was forbidden. Moreover—and this is a matter worthy of special mention and is at variance with the natural law and with the dispositions accepted by the legal systems of all nations—for the celebration of marriage between Poles the minimum age limit was fixed at 28 years for men and 25 years for women.

“Catholic Action was so badly hit as to be completely destroyed. The National Institute, which was at the head of the whole Catholic Action movement in Poland, was suppressed; as a result all the associations belonging to it, which were flourishing, as well as all Catholic cultural, charity, and social service institutions, were abolished.

“In the whole of the ‘Warthegau’ there is no longer any Catholic press and not even a Catholic bookshop.

“Grave measures were repeatedly taken with regard to ecclesiastical property.

“Many of the churches closed to public worship were turned over to profane uses. From such an insult not even the Cathedrals of Gniezno, Poznan, Wloclawek, and Lodz were spared. Episcopal residences were confiscated, the real estate belonging to the seminaries, convents, diocesan museums, libraries, and church funds were confiscated or sequestered.”

I pass now to the third full paragraph on Page 5, a two-line paragraph:

“Even before ecclesiastical property was affected, the allowances to the clergy had been abolished.”

Now, reading from Page 6, the fourth full paragraph of the English text:

“The administrative regulations published by the lieutenant’s office for the application of the ordinance of September 13th, 1941 made the situation of the Catholics in that region, still more difficult.

“For example, on November 19, 1941 came a decree of the Reich lieutenant by which among other things it was set forth that, as from the previous September 13th, the property of the former juridical persons of the Roman Catholic Church should pass over to the ‘Römisch-katholische Kirche deutscher Nationalität im Reichsgau Wartheland’ insofar as, on the request of the above-mentioned ‘Religionsgesellschaft’ such property shall be recognized by the Reich lieutenant as non-Polish property.’ In virtue of this decree practically all the goods of the Catholic Church in the ‘Warthegau’ were lost.”

Now I pass to Page 7, the second full paragraph:

“If we pass from the ‘Warthegau’ to the other territories in the East, we unfortunately find there, too, acts and measures against the rights of the Church and of the Catholic faithful, though they vary in gravity and extension from one place to another.

“In the provinces which were declared annexed to the German Reich and joined up with the Gaue of East Prussia, of Danzig West Prussia and of Upper Silesia, the situation is very like that described above in regard to seminaries, the use of the Polish mother-tongue in sacred functions, charitable works, associations of Catholic Action, the separation of the faithful according to nationality. There, too, one must deplore the closing of churches to public worship, the exile, deportation, the violent death of not a few of the clergy (reduced by two-thirds in the diocese of Culma and by at least a third in the diocese of Katowice), the suppression of religious instruction in the schools, and above all the complete suppression in fact of the Episcopate. Actually, after the Bishop of Culma, who had left during the military operations, had been refused permission to return to his diocese, there followed in February 1941 the expulsion of the Bishop of Plock and his auxiliary, who both died later in captivity; the Bishop, the venerable octogenarian Monseigneur Julian Anthony Nowowiejski, died at Dzialdowo on May 28th, 1941, and the auxiliary, Monseigneur Leo Wetmanski, ‘in a transit camp’ on October 10th of the same year.

“In the territory called the ‘Generalgouvernement,’ as in the Polish provinces which had been occupied by Soviet troops in the period between September 1939 and June 1941, the religious situation is such as to cause the Holy See lively apprehension and serious preoccupation. Without pausing to describe the treatment meted out in many cases to the clergy (priests imprisoned, deported, and even put to death), the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the closing of churches, the suppression even of associations and publications of simply and exclusively religious character, the closing of the Catholic secondary and higher schools and of the Catholic University of Lublin, let it suffice to recall two series of specially grave measures: those which affect the seminaries and those which weigh on the Episcopate.

“When the buildings of the various seminaries had been completely or in part occupied, the intention for some time (November 1940-February 1941) was to reduce these institutions for the training of priests to two—those of Kraków and Sandomierz; then the others were permitted to reopen, but only on condition that no new students were admitted, which in practice inevitably means that all these institutions will soon be closed.”

I skip one paragraph here.

“Mention has several times been made of ecclesiastics deported or confined in concentration camps. The majority of them were transferred to the Altreich, where their number already exceeds a thousand.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the “Altreich”?

COL. WHEELER: The Altreich is the Old Reich of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. WHEELER: “When the Holy See asked that they should be liberated and be permitted to emigrate to neutral countries of Europe or America (1940), the petition was refused; it was only promised that they should all be collected in the concentration camp at Dachau, that they should be dispensed from too hard labor, and that some should be permitted to say Mass, which the others could hear.

“The treatment of the ecclesiastics interned at Dachau, which, for a certain time in 1941 was in fact somewhat mitigated, worsened again at the end of that year. Particularly sorrowful were the announcements which for many months in 1942 came from that camp of the frequent deaths of priests, even of some young priests among them.”

I pass by two paragraphs.

“Polish Catholics are not allowed to contract marriage in the territory of the Altreich; just as requests for religious instruction or instruction in preparation for confession and Holy Communion for the children of these workers are, in principle, not accepted.”

What happened to complaints—even from the Vatican—as to religious affairs in the overrun territories is disclosed in Document Number 3266-PS, Exhibit Number USA-573, which I now offer in evidence. This is a letter from the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau to the Papal Secretary of State, dated December 7, 1942. It bears a Vatican authentication similar to those already read.

This letter lays at the door of the Party Chancellery the responsibility for determining the policy and exercising final authority on religious questions in the occupied territories. I quote from Page 1, the first paragraph of this letter, and remind the Court that the Defendant Bormann was at that time Chief of the Nazi Party Chancellery and that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the RSHA. I quote from Document 3266-PS, beginning with the sixth line:

“About some of the gravest injuries inflicted on the Church, I not only protested on each occasion as the individual incident occurred, but I also made a most formal protest about them _in globo_ in a document which, as spokesman of the Hierarchy, I sent to the supreme ruler of the State and to the ministries of the Reich on December 10th, 1941. Not a word by way of answer has been sent to us.

“Your Eminence knows very well the greatest difficulty in the way of opening negotiations comes from the overruling authority which the ‘National Socialist Party Chancery’ exercises in relation to the Chancery of the Reich and to the single Reich ministries. This ‘Parteikanzlei’ directs the course to be followed by the State, whereas the ministries and the Chancellery of the Reich are obliged and compelled to adjust their decrees to these directions. Besides, there is the fact that the ‘supreme office for the security of the Reich,’ called the ‘Reichssicherheitshauptamt’ enjoys an authority which precludes all legal action and all appeals. Under it are the ‘secret offices for public security,’ called ‘Geheime Staatspolizei’ (a title shortened usually to Gestapo), of which there is one for each province. Against the decrees of this central office and of the secret offices there is no appeal through the courts, and no complaint made to the ministries has any effect. Not infrequently the councillors of the ministries suggest that they have not been able to do as they would wish to because of the opposition of these Party offices. As far as the executive power is concerned, the organization called the SS, that is, ‘The Schutzstaffeln der Partei,’ is in practice supreme. . . .

“On a number of very grave and fundamental issues we have also presented our complaints to the supreme leader of the Reich, the Führer. Either no answer is given, or it is apparently edited by the above-mentioned Party Chancery, which does not consider itself bound by the Concordat made with the Holy See.”

I now offer in evidence Document Number 3279-PS, Exhibit Number USA-574. This is an excerpt from Charge Number 17 against the Defendant Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, entitled, “Maltreatment and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in the Western Provinces,” submitted by the Polish Government under the terms of Article 21 of the Four-Power-Agreement of August 8, 1945. This gives further figures indicating the extent of the persecution of priests. I quote:

“The extract attached hereto and dealing with the ‘General Conditions and Results of the Persecution’ is taken from the text of Charge 17, Page 5, Paragraph IV, of the Polish Government against the defendants named in the Indictment before the International Military Tribunal, subject: ‘Maltreatment and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in the Incorporated Western Provinces of Poland.’ It is a true translation into English of the original Polish.

“It is submitted herewith to the International Military Tribunal in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter of the Court.”

Signed: “Dr. Tadeusz Cyprian, Polish Deputy Representative on the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, signing on behalf of the Polish Government and of the Main Commission for Investigation of German War Crimes in Poland, whose seal I hereby attach.”

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read such certificates as that.

COL. WHEELER: This is the only one, Sir, that I have. I now read from this extract:

“General Conditions and Results of the Persecution:

“11. The general situation of the clergy in the Archdiocese of Poznan in the beginning of April 1940 is summarized in the following words of Cardinal Hlond’s second report:

“Five priests shot; 27 priests confined in harsh concentration camps at Stutthof and in other camps; 190 priests in prison or in concentration camps at Bruczkow, Chludowo, Goruszki, Kazimierz, Biskupi, Lad, Lubin, and Puszczykowo; 35 priests seriously ill in consequence of ill-treatment; 122 parishes entirely left without priests.

“12. In the Diocese of Chelmno, where about 650 priests were installed before the war, only 3 percent were allowed to stay, the 97 percent of them were imprisoned, executed, or put into concentration camps.

“13. By January 1941 about 700 priests were killed, 3,000 were in prison or concentration camps.”

I refer also to Document Number 3268(a)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-356, excerpts from the allocution of Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College June 2, 1945, which has already been introduced into evidence and read from extensively. I shall not read from that again. This gives some very revealing figures concerning the priests and lay brothers confined in the concentration camp at Dachau.

The Tribunal will recall, from the previous reading of this document, the imprisonment of 2,800 priests and lay brothers in Dachau alone from 1940 to 1945, of whom all but about 800 were dead by April 1945, including an auxiliary bishop.

This document presents a forceful summary of the principal steps in the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Catholic Church.

In summation the Prosecution submits that the evidence presented to the Court proves that the attempted suppression of the Christian churches in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was an integral part of the defendants’ conspiracy to eliminate internal opposition and otherwise to prepare for and wage aggressive war and shows the same conspiratorial pattern as their other War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, before we present the subject of individual defendants, by agreement with our British colleagues, Major Elwyn Jones will now present a brief subject entitled, “Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea.”

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is now my duty to draw to the Tribunal’s attention a document which became the statement of faith of these defendants. I refer to Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_. It is perhaps appropriate that this should be considered at this stage of the Trial just before the Prosecution presents to the Tribunal the evidence against the individual defendants under Counts One and Two of the Indictment, for this book, _Mein Kampf_, gave to the defendants adequate foreknowledge of the unlawful aims of the Nazi leadership. It was not only Hitler’s political testament; by adoption it became theirs.

This book, _Mein Kampf_, might be described as the blueprint of Nazi aggression. Its whole tenor and content enforce the Prosecution’s submission that the Nazi pursuit of aggressive designs was no mere accident arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe and the world which existed during the period of Nazi power. _Mein Kampf_ establishes unequivocally that the use of aggressive war to serve their aims in foreign policy was part of the very creed of the Nazi Party.

A great German philosopher has said that “ideas have hands and feet.” It became the deliberate aim of these defendants to see to it that the ideas, doctrines, and policies of _Mein Kampf_ should become the active faith and guide for action of the German nation, and particularly of its malleable youth.

As my American colleagues have already submitted to the Tribunal, from 1933 to 1939 an extensive indoctrination in the ideas of _Mein Kampf_ was pursued in the schools and universities of Germany, as well as in the Hitler Youth under the direction of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach and in the SA and SS and amongst the German population as a whole by the agency of the Defendant Rosenberg.

A copy of this book _Mein Kampf_ was officially presented to all newly married couples in Germany, and I now hand to the Tribunal such a wedding present from the Nazis to the newlyweds of Germany and for the purposes of the record it will be Exhibit GB-128 (Document Number D-660). The Tribunal will see that the dedication on the flyleaf of that copy reads:

“To the newly-married couple, Friedrich Rosebrock and Else née zum Beck, with best wishes for a happy and blessed marriage. Presented by the Communal Administration on the occasion of their marriage on the 14th of November 1940. For the Mayor, the Registrar.”

The Tribunal will see, at the bottom of the page opposite to the contents page, that that edition of _Mein Kampf_, which was the 1940 edition, brought the number of copies of _Mein Kampf_ published to 6,250,000. This was the scale upon which this book was distributed. It was blasphemously called “the bible of the German people”.

As a result of the efforts of the defendants and their confederates, this book poisoned a generation and distorted the outlook of a whole people.

As the SS General Von dem Bach-Zelewski indicated yesterday, if you preach for years, as long as 10 years, that the Slav peoples are inferior races and that the Jews are subhuman, then it must logically follow that the killing of millions of these human beings is accepted as a natural phenomenon.

From _Mein Kampf_ the way leads directly to the furnaces of Auschwitz and the gas chambers of Maidanek.

What the commandments of _Mein Kampf_ were I shall seek to indicate to the Tribunal by quotations from the book, which are set out in the extracts which I trust are now before the Tribunal. Those extracts are set out in the order in which I shall, with the Tribunal’s permission, refer to them.

Now these quotations fall into two main categories. The first category is that of general expression of Hitler’s belief in the necessity of force as the means of solving international problems. The second category is that of Hitler’s more explicit declarations on the policy which Germany must pursue.

Most of the quotations in the second category come from the last three Chapters, 13, 14, and 15 of Part II of _Mein Kampf_, in which Hitler’s views on foreign policy were expounded. The significance of that fact will be realized if the Tribunal looks at the German edition of _Mein Kampf_. The Tribunal will observe that Part II of _Mein Kampf_ was first published in 1927, that is to say, less than 2 years after the Locarno Pact and within a few months of Germany’s entry into the League of Nations. The date of the publication of these passages, therefore, brands them as a repudiation of the policy of international co-operation embarked upon by Stresemann and as a deliberate defiance of the attempt to establish, through the League of Nations, the rule of law in international affairs.

First I place before the Tribunal some quotations showing the general views held by Hitler and accepted and propagated by the defendants about war and aggression generally. The first quotation, from Page 556 of _Mein Kampf_, reads:

“The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven on our forefathers. But they had to conquer it by risking their lives. So also in the future our people will not obtain territory and therewith the means of existence as a favor from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword.”

On Page 145 Hitler revealed his own personal attitude to war. Of the years of peace before 1914 he wrote:

“Thus I used to think it an ill-deserved stroke of bad luck that I had arrived too late on this terrestrial globe, and I felt chagrined at the idea that my life would have to run its course along peaceful and orderly lines. As a boy I was anything but a pacifist and all attempts to make me so proved futile.”

Generally, Hitler wrote of war in this way. On Page 162 we find:

“In regard to the part played by humane feeling, Moltke stated that in time of war the essential thing is to get a decision as quickly as possible and that the most ruthless methods of fighting are at the same time the most humane. When people attempt to answer this reasoning by ‘highfalutin’ talk about aesthetics, _et cetera_, only one answer can be given. It is that the vital questions involved in the struggle of a nation for its existence must not be subordinated to any aesthetic consideration.”

How faithfully these precepts of ruthlessness were followed by the defendants the Prosecution will prove in the course of this Trial.

Hitler’s assumption of an inevitable law of struggle for survival linked up in