Part 1

# Sexual ethics ### By Forel, Auguste

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SEXUAL ETHICS

SEXUAL ETHICS

BY

AUGUST FOREL, M.D., PH.D., LL.D.

FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY AT AND DIRECTOR OF THE INSANE ASYLUM IN ZURICH (SWITZERLAND)

WITH INTRODUCTION

BY

Dr. C. W. SALEEBY, F.R.S. Edin.

[Illustration]

LONDON THE NEW AGE PRESS 140 FLEET STREET 1908

_Translated from the German by Ashley Dukes_

INTRODUCTION

By Dr. C. W. SALEEBY, F.R.S. Edin.

There is something absurd, as such, in a request for an introduction by any one to the work of one of the greatest of living thinkers, and something still more absurd in the fact that Professor Forel should, at this date, need an introduction to any intelligent audience in any civilised country, as it seems he does to English readers; but if compliance with that request is at all likely to increase, even by one, the number of his readers, it is a duty to comply with it.

Not to consider his treatises on philosophy and psychology, nor his long series of original and important researches on the senses and lives of the social insects, Professor Forel has already given to the world a volume entitled _Die Sexuelle Frage_――this has now been published in English[A]――which is by far the best work on the sex question in any language, and has actually received on the Continent something like the recognition which is its due. The gist of its teaching is to be found in this little treatise on Sexual Ethics, and the reader who may find himself or herself unconvinced, or even repelled, by the brief and dogmatic theses of the following pages, may be earnestly counselled to read the larger work. Here, and in that, Professor Forel deals――always from the loftiest moral standpoint, the interests of human life at its highest――with the question which must remain fundamental for man so long as he is mortal, and with which the statesmen of the future will primarily concern themselves, realising as they will, and as the “blind mouths” called statesmen to-day cannot, that there is no wealth but life, that the culture of the racial life is the vital industry of any people, and must so remain so long as three times in every century the only wealth of nations is reduced to dust and raised again from helpless infancy. Professor Forel sees this question from the only standpoint that is worthy of it. The sexual question is concerned with nothing less than the life of this world to come. It is for this reason that every productive sexual union should be a sacrament; it involves nothing less than the creation of a human life――the most tremendous act of which man or woman can be capable. It is the no less than sacred cause of Eugenics or Race-Culture that gives the sexual life its meaning and the dignity which it may rightly claim, and it is just because the Swiss thinker sees this and never loses sight of it that his work is so immeasurably raised above the ordinary discussions of marriage, prostitution, venereal disease, and the like. His claim for posterity on the ground of our debt to the past may be amplified by the reflection that, in serving the racial life, and in making its welfare the criterion of our sexual ethics, we are serving human beings as real as we are ourselves, and tens or hundreds for units whom we can serve to-day. There is always an interval――nine months at least――and no one expects babies or politicians to associate cause and effect over such abysses of time; but there are others who are learning to think in generations, and Professor Forel will yet add to their number.

[A] _The Sexual Question._ Rebman, Ltd.

In his criticisms of alcohol and the abuse of capital, Professor Forel opposes himself to the most powerful of vested interests. Well, if you invest your interests in any other bank than that of the laws of life, you or your heirs will find that theirs is but a rotten concern. The history of organic evolution is proof enough that the higher life and the things which buttress it, “sagging but pertinacious,” will always win through in the long run. As a direct enemy of human life, and notably through its influence upon the sexual instinct, alcohol is certainly doomed. If life is the only wealth, the manufacture of _illth_ is a process too cannibal to be permitted for ever.

Professor Forel speaks of subduing the sexual instinct. I would rather speak of transmuting it. The direct method of attack is often futile, always necessitous of effort, but it is possible for us to transmute our sex-energy into higher forms in our individual lives, thus justifying the evolutionary and psychological contention that it is the source of the higher activities of man, of moral indignation and of the “restless energy” which has changed the surface of the earth. As directly interfering with this transmutation, the extent of which probably constitutes the essential difference between civilised and savage man, alcohol is the more to be condemned.

In what Professor Forel has to say regarding prostitution and the ideal of marriage, he will win assent from all except the profligate and those medical men who, in hideous alliance with the _protozoon_ of syphilis and the _coccus_ of gonorrhœa, defend prostitution and even acclaim it as the necessary complement to marriage. If there is a stronger phrase than most damnable of lies to apply to such teaching, here is certainly the time for its employment. On this subject of prostitution, Professor Forel has said the last word in a masterly chapter of _Die Sexuelle Frage_. In his praise of monogamy, he is only echoing the stern verdict of the ages――delivered a thousand æons before any existing religion was born or thought of, and likely to outlast a whole wilderness of their dogmas. The essence of marriage I would define as _common parental care of offspring_, and its survival-value as consisting in the addition of the father’s to the mother’s care. In the absence of parenthood, a sexual association between man and woman is on the same plane as any other human association; it means neither more nor less, and must be judged as they are judged. It is when the life of the world to come is involved that new questions arise――questions as momentous as is the difference between the production of human life at its best and of a child rotten with syphilis, or permanently blinded to the light as it opens its eyes for the first time, or doomed to intelligence less than a dog’s.

I, for one, have no shadow of doubt that the ideal of sexual ethics will some day be realised, that pre-eminently preventable――because contagious――diseases like syphilis and gonorrhœa will be made an end of, that prostitution will disappear with its economic cause, that we shall make parenthood the privilege of the worthy alone, and thus create on earth a better heaven than ever theologians dreamed of in the sky. “There are many events in the womb of Time which will be delivered.” Individuals are mortal, and churches, and creeds, but Life is not. Already the gap between moss or microbe and man is no small one, and the time to come is very nearly “unending long.” Uranium and radium will see to that.

C. W. SALEEBY.

SEXUAL ETHICS

The two conceptions of morality and sexual life are frequently confounded and expressed by the same term in the popular usages of speech. The word “moral” is commonly used to mean sexually pure, that is to say, continent; while the word “immoral” suggests the idea of sexual incontinence and debauch. This is a misuse of words, and rests upon a confusion of ideas, for sexuality has in itself nothing to do with morality. It points, however, to the undoubted fact that the sexual impulse, since it has other human beings as its object, easily leads to moral conflicts within the breast of the individual.

It will be convenient to discuss our subject under the two heads: I. Of ethics in general; and II. Of sexual ethics in particular.

I. ETHICS

Ethics is the science of morals. Morals may be said to consist of two very distinct factors, which we will attempt to analyse:――

1. An instinctive sense, the conscience, sense of duty, or ethical impulse, which says to us: “This shalt thou do, and that shalt thou leave undone.” A person in whom it is highly developed experiences satisfaction if he obeys the “voice of conscience,” and remorse if he fails to do so.

2. The second factor of morals includes the objects of conscience, that is, the things which conscience commands or forbids.

The great philosopher Kant founded upon the instinct of conscience his Categorical Imperative, and held the further investigation of its causes to be unnecessary. If the conscience says “Thou shalt,” one must simply act accordingly. This is, in Kant’s opinion, the absolute moral law, which bids or forbids an action independently of any other consideration.

The further they progress, however, the more do reason and science rebel against the conception of the Categorical Imperative. Kant, great as he was, was not infallible. The imperative of the conscience is in itself no more categorical and absolute than that of the sexual impulse, of fear, of maternal love, or of other emotions and instincts.

In the first place daily observation shows us the existence of people born conscienceless, in whom the sense of duty is lacking, who are aware of no “Thou shalt,” and in whose eyes other individuals are merely welcome objects for plunder or inconvenient hindrances. For these “ethically defective” persons there can be no categorical imperative, because they have no conception of duty.

The ethical sense may exist in varying degrees of intensity. In some persons the conscience is weak, in others strong; and there are cases in which it is developed to an exaggerated and morbid extent. People of this type suffer pangs of conscience over the merest trifle, reproach themselves for “sins” which they have never committed, or which are no sins at all, and make themselves and others miserable. How can all this be reconciled with the absolute moral law as stated by Kant?

The theory of the Categorical Imperative becomes even more absurd when we consider the actions to which men are guided by their consciences. The same habit――the drinking of wine, for instance――may be for one man a matter of duty (for a Christian at the Eucharist or for an officer at the toast of the King); for another (the Mohammedan) it may be forbidden as a deadly sin. Murder, which is certainly almost universally prohibited by conscience, is a “duty” in time of war, and even for certain persons in the duel. Such instances could be multiplied indefinitely.

We will presently state the profounder reasons which prove Kant’s error; but we must first mention another source of pretended ethical commandments. The _religions_ exhibit a remarkable medley of various products of human mystical phantasy and human emotions which have crystallised and formed themselves into legends and dogmas, and these latter have become interwoven with human morals in such a fashion that they seem at first inextricable.

The instinct of fear and the lust for power, the hypertrophy of the Ego and the ethical sentiments have here intermingled in a thousand different ways. More especially we may mention the fear of the unknown, of darker powers, and of death; the expansion of the beloved Ego, which becomes idealised in the conception of godhead, and then immortalised; the feelings of sympathy, antipathy and duty towards other individuals, and so forth. The mysterious powers which move the universe are then conceived as anthropomorphic (personal) gods, or as one such God.

The next stage is the attribution of godlike qualities to man, which flatters his vanity considerably, and gives him a sense of satisfaction.

As a result of this habit of thought, and assisted by the hallucinations of highly imaginative, hysterical, or insane individuals, there have developed the various conceptions of a direct intercourse between the Godhead and man. Hypnotism and psychiatry, in the respective cases of the sane and the insane, teach us how extraordinarily sensitive the human brain is to such impressions.

In this way the legendary revelations, according to which God has manifested himself directly and personally to certain individuals, and dictated to them commandments for the guidance of Humanity, have resulted.

In this, and in no other way, has come into existence the social tyranny of religious dogmas. Certain men have made God in their own image, and have, in the course of centuries, imposed their own handiwork upon whole nations, mainly by means of the organising ability of their more ambitious successors. Even to-day such prophets frequently arise, both within and without the walls of lunatic asylums. Each one declares that he alone possesses the true revelation.

The divine injunctions vary considerably according to the different religions, and are often mutually contradictory. Among them are commandments relating to the Godhead which have nothing to do with natural moral law, and yet are amalgamated with it. Some of these are from the human point of view frankly immoral. Many, on the other hand, represent the precepts of a more or less suitable moral code, which varies according to the personal views of the founder of the religion.

The Koran ordains polygamy and forbids the use of wine, while modern Christianity allows the latter and ordains monogamy. Both Moses and Mohammed, however, regard woman as subordinate to man, and as his private property; a view which contradicts a higher and at the same time a more natural moral law.

Mental science has now the hardihood to maintain, Kant and the religious dogmas notwithstanding, that the moral law is completely accessible to its investigations; that true human ethics can be founded upon human nature alone; that the dogmas and commandments of pretended revelation serve only to check a progressively higher development of morals; and that the dogma which holds out promises of heaven or threats of hell in the hereafter is in its effect actually immoral, inasmuch as it seeks to regulate the moral conduct of men by purely selfish motives――by the aid of a bill of exchange upon the future life, so to speak.

* * * * *

In order to understand natural human ethics we must consider its natural source, that is to say, the origin of the sense of duty or social conscience.

The sense of duty is, as an inclination, inborn, and therefore hereditary. It can indeed be developed or dulled by education, but it cannot be acquired; and only diseases of the brain can destroy it where it once clearly exists. What is actually inculcated or acquired, as the case may be, is not the conscience, but the object towards which it is directed, as is the case with the feeling of shame or modesty. Just as the European woman is ashamed to exhibit her bare legs, but not her face, while with the Turkish woman the reverse holds true, so the objects of the conscience, according to acquired local customs, can be absolutely opposed to one another, or at least very different in their nature. They have, however, for the most part certain features in common, which are suited to the requirements of human nature. The reason for this we shall see below.

* * * * *

From what does conscience, or the sense of duty, arise? First of all from a conflict between two groups of instinctive emotions allied with instinctive impulses: (1) the group of so-called egoistic feelings and impulses, directed towards self-preservation and self-gratification; and (2) the group of sympathetic or altruistic impulses directed towards the preservation and well-being of others.

If I feel sympathy or love for a person, an animal, or an object, I suffer personally and feel displeasure as soon as the object of my sympathy suffers or is endangered. Hence the words compassion and sympathy (suffering with). I therefore seek to help the object of my sympathy, to save him even at the risk of personal injury; and thence the conflict arises. If my egotism triumphs I do not come to his aid, or at most only do so if I risk nothing thereby. If, on the other hand, my sense of sympathy is victorious, I sacrifice myself.

In the former instance I experience a feeling of dissatisfaction, the feeling of neglected duty and of remorse; in the latter I have the pleasurable sensation of duty fulfilled. And yet the nature of the object matters little. Only the intensity of the sympathy, together with the individual development of the conscience, determine the intensity of the sense of duty in any given case. An insane person can feel the most vehement sense of duty or remorse without any real object, or as the result of entirely perverted conceptions.

As every living creature, particularly if it possesses a separate nervous system, has the instinct of self-preservation, the conscience therefore results directly from the conflict between this instinct and the secondary emotions of altruistic sympathy. These latter are of later origin, and have for the most part been evolved from the attraction between the sexes (sexual love), or from the relationship of parents to the offspring dependent upon them (parental love).

The first feelings of duty and of sympathy in the animal kingdom are therefore confined to the family, and adapted to the preservation of the species. They are also exclusive, and may only persist for a short time (as in the case of cats), but frequently they are of lifelong duration. The conjugal fidelity of certain apes and parrots is exemplary.

But the necessity of protection against common foes brought about in the case of many animals a ripening of the sense of sympathy, and it became extended to whole groups, so that here and there free communities (swallows, buffaloes, monkeys) have resulted. Finally certain species have developed the senses of sympathy and duty to such an extent that they have led to a complete anarchistic Socialism, as is the case among wasps, bees, and ants. Here the social sense has so far overcome both egotism and altruism limited to a few individuals that it wholly dominates them. The individual devotes his whole energy and labour to the communal existence, and even sacrifices his life for this object. He never, however, sacrifices his life for another single member of the community, unless the latter is of primary importance for the maintenance of the species. One worker-bee does not immolate itself for another, but does so without hesitation for the queen and the hive. It will even empty the whole contents of its stomach into the queen bee’s mouth and starve in order to save her. The altruism of the ants and the bees knows nothing of family affection or sexual love; it is confined absolutely to the hive or nest. Different beehives or ants’ nests are either inimical or indifferent to one another.

Nearer to man stand the higher mammals. Every one is aware of the sentiments of sympathy and duty in the dog, for instance. In man himself these affections are pre-eminently domestic, as may be seen in the love of mother and child, husband and wife, father and son, and in all the obligations thus contracted. But they also have a considerable tendency to extend to other intimate objects or persons with whom the individual frequently comes into contact――to friends, animals, etc.

We can also observe this inclination among bees and ants, where strangers are received into the hive or nest after a short period of familiarisation. But among mankind the tendency always maintains a strongly individual character. The result is on the one hand a grouping into communities, such as castes, tribes, and nations; and on the other a host of individual friendships and enmities.

This fundamentally individual character of the human sense of sympathy rests primarily upon the fact that our nearest ancestors in the animal world, the parents of the existing anthropoid apes, were domestic and solitary, while our primeval ancestors lived in numberless tiny communities, inimical to one another.

In this way there appeared among mankind instinctive and exclusive impulses of sympathy and of duty, combined with intensely selfish predatory desires. The extraordinary complexity of the human brain is responsible for the strange many-sidedness of character which resulted. For example, crime and heroism developed side by side; child murder, parricide, rapine and robbery, slavery, war, and in particular the vilest subjugation of woman as an article of commerce or a beast of burden――these represent the fruits of egotism and its attendant cunning and meanness. On the other hand we see self-sacrifice, valour, heroic martyrdom, patriotism, sense of justice, asceticism, pity for the weak, and persistent labour for the family and the State, resulting as the fruits of the instinct of sympathy and the social sense.

The primitive sense of duty, which arose from direct assistance rendered to the object of sympathy, is now being enlarged by a higher racial and individual development, and is, indeed, resolving itself into a universal inclination to subdue egoistic instincts and passions.

If from a sense of duty I do something which is wearisome or dangerous, it is for the most part no longer out of direct sympathy with the

## particular object. The primeval impulse (which led to conflict)

is becoming independent, and is taking the form of a higher and secondary instinct, tending towards the suppression of baser desires and weaknesses. And yet it is necessary, in order to prevent the degeneration of this instinct, that the objects towards which it is directed shall be ever more adequately and better suited to the social welfare of the community.

* * * * *

From the above brief sketch, which is based upon the theory of evolution and the researches of science, it is clear as the day that moral laws can only be relative. They were always relative to the family, to the tribe, to the fatherland; they must become relative to mankind. The racial (that is, inherited and instinctive) social sense in man is unfortunately very variable in individual cases. In the average it is extremely weak and chiefly directed towards a few individuals. Moreover, as the result of centuries of bad habits and ancient prejudices, its objects are falsely or unsuitably taught in process of educating children. Instead of the child’s sense of duty being directed to the necessity of labour and social sacrifice for mankind as a whole and posterity in particular, it is directed towards false codes of honour, local patriotism, family exclusiveness, private property, pretended divine commandments, and so forth.

The Earth is small, and human intercourse becomes more extensive every year; the union of all civilised peoples into a single great civilised community is _inevitable_. Ethics must, therefore, as far as reason permits, be directed towards this object. We require animals and plants in order to live, so that we can further extend our altruism at most to a moderate protection of other animals, if we are to avoid injury to our own race. We may remark in passing that the altruism of many lovers of animals, who prefer their favourite pets to human beings and to the social welfare, is typical of the exclusiveness and stupidity of misdirected impulses of sympathy.

Morality must therefore in the future consist of a common social impulse――it must itself become social. This impulse must overthrow not only egotism, but also the exclusiveness of individual sympathies. We are still, alas, far from this goal! The family is often a thieves’ kitchen; patriotism is a prolific parent of wars; while communities and societies, however noble their objects may be, readily degenerate into petty sects and cliques.