BOOK I.

I.--It very greatly concerns all men on whom a higher nature has impressed[151] the love of truth, that, as they have been enriched by the labour of those before them, so they also should labour for those that are to come after them, to the end that posterity may receive from them an addition to its wealth. For he is far astray from his duty--let him not doubt it--who, having been trained in the lessons of public business, cares not himself to contribute aught to the public good. He is no "tree planted by the water-side, that bringeth forth his fruit in due season." He is rather the devouring whirlpool, ever engulfing, but restoring nothing. Pondering, therefore, often on these things, lest some day I should have to answer the charge of the talent buried in the earth, I desire not only to show the budding promise, but also to bear fruit for the general good, and to set forth truths by others unattempted. For what fruit can he be said to bear who should go about to demonstrate again some theorem of Euclid? or when Aristotle has shown us what happiness is, should show it to us once more? or when Cicero has been the apologist of old age, should a second time undertake its defence? Such squandering of labour would only engender weariness and not profit.

[Footnote 151: "_In quos veritatis amorem natura superior impressit._" On the ancient idea (Aug. _De Trin._ iii. 4; Aquin. _Summ._ 1, 66, 3) of the influence or impression of higher natures on lower, cf. _Parad._ i. 103, x. 29.]

But seeing that among other truths, ill-understood yet profitable, the knowledge touching temporal monarchy is at once most profitable and most obscure, and that because it has no immediate reference to worldly gain it is left unexplored by all, therefore it is my purpose to draw it forth from its hiding-places, as well that I may spend my toil for the benefit of the world, as that I may be the first to win the prize of so great an achievement to my own glory. The work indeed is difficult, and I am attempting what is beyond my strength; but I trust not in my own powers, but in the light of that Bountiful Giver, "Who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not."

II.--First, therefore, we must see what is it that is called Temporal Monarchy, in its idea, so to speak, and according to its purpose. Temporal Monarchy, then, or, as men call it, the Empire, is the government of one prince above all men in time, or in those things and over those things which are measured by time. Three great questions are asked concerning it. First, there is the doubt and the question, is it necessary for the welfare of the world? Secondly, did the Roman people take to itself by right the office of Monarchy? And thirdly, does the authority of Monarchy come from God directly, or only from some other minister or vicar of God?

Now, since every truth, which is not itself a first principle, becomes manifest from the truth of some first principle, it is therefore necessary in every inquiry to have a knowledge of the first principle involved, to which by analysis we may go back for the certainty of all the propositions which are afterwards accepted. And since this treatise is an inquiry, we must begin by examining the first principle on the strength of which deductions are to rest. It must be understood then that there are certain things which, since they are not subject to our power, are matters of speculation, but not of action: such are Mathematics and Physics, and things divine. But there are some things which, since they are subject to our power, are matters of action as well as of speculation, and in them we do not act for the sake of speculation, but contrariwise: for in such things action is the end. Now, since the matter which we have in hand has to do with states, nay, with the very origin and principle of good forms of government, and since all that concerns states is subject to our power, it is manifest that our subject is not in the first place speculation, but action. And again, since in matters of action the end sought is the first principle and cause of all (for that it is which first moves the agent to act), it follows that all our method concerning the means which are set to gain the end must be taken from the end. For there will be one way of cutting wood to build a house, and another to build a ship. That therefore, if it exists, which is the ultimate end for the universal civil order of mankind, will be the first principle from which all the truth of our future deductions will be sufficiently manifest. But it is folly to think that there is an end for this and for that particular civil order, and yet not one end for all.

III.--Now, therefore, we must see what is the end of the whole civil order of men; and when we have found this, then, as the Philosopher[152] says in his book to Nicomachus,[153] the half of our labour will have been accomplished. And to render the question clearer, we must observe that as there is a certain end for which nature makes the thumb, and another, different from this, for which she makes the whole hand, and again another for which she makes the arm, and another different from all for which she makes the whole man; so there is one end for which she orders the individual man, and another for which she orders the family, and another end for the city, and another for the kingdom, and finally an ultimate one for which the Everlasting God, by His art which is nature, brings into being the whole human race. And this is what we seek as a first principle to guide our whole inquiry.

[Footnote 152: The common title for Aristotle from the first half of the thirteenth century. _Vide_ Jourdain, _Recherches sur les traductions d'Aristote_, p. 212, note.]

[Footnote 153: Arist. _Ethics_, i. 7.]

Let it then be understood that God and nature make nothing to be idle. Whatever comes into being, exists for some operation or working. For no created essence is an ultimate end in the creator's purpose, so far as he is a creator, but rather the proper operation of that essence. Therefore it follows that the operation does not exist for the sake of the essence, but the essence for the sake of the operation.

There is therefore a certain proper operation of the whole body of human kind, for which this whole body of men in all its multitudes is ordered and constituted, but to which no one man, nor single family, nor single neighbourhood, nor single city, nor particular kingdom can attain. What this is will be manifest, if we can find what is the final and characteristic capacity of humanity as a whole. I say then that no quality which is shared by different species of things is the distinguishing capacity of any one of them. For were it so, since this capacity is that which makes each species what it is, it would follow that one essence would be specifically distributed to many species, which is impossible. Therefore the ultimate quality of men is not existence, taken simply; for the elements share therein. Nor is it existence under certain conditions;[154] for we find this in minerals too. Nor is it existence with life; for plants too have life. Nor is it percipient existence; for brutes share in this power. It is to be percipient[155] with the possibility of understanding, for this quality falls to the lot of none but man, either above or below him. For though there are other beings which with him have understanding, yet this understanding is not, as man's, capable of development. For such beings are only certain intellectual natures, and not anything besides, and their being is nothing other than to understand; which is without interruption, otherwise they would not be eternal. It is plain, therefore, that the distinguishing quality of humanity is the faculty or the power of understanding.

[Footnote 154: "_Esse complexionatum._"]

[Footnote 155: "_Apprehensivum per intellectum possibilem._" _V. Aquin._ I. 79, 1, 2, 10.]

And because this faculty cannot be realised in act in its entirety at one time by a single man, nor by any of the individual societies which we have marked, therefore there must be multitude in the human race, in order to realise it: just as it is necessary that there should be a multitude of things which can be brought into being,[156] so that the capacity of the primal matter for being acted on may be ever open to what acts on it. For if this were not so, we could speak of a capacity apart from its substance, which is impossible. And with this opinion Averroes, in his comment on [Aristotle's] treatise on the Soul, agrees. For the capacity for understanding, of which I speak, is concerned not only with universal forms or species, but also, by a kind of extension, with particular ones. Therefore it is commonly said that the speculative understanding becomes practical by extension; and then its end is to do and to make. This I say in reference to things which may be _done_, which are regulated by political wisdom, and in reference to things which may be _made_, which are regulated by art; all which things wait as handmaidens on the speculative intellect, as on that best good, for which the Primal Goodness created the human race. Hence the saying of the Politics[157] that those who are strong in understanding are the natural rulers of others.

[Footnote 156: "_Generabilium._"]

[Footnote 157: Arist. _Polit._ i. 5, 6.--(W.)]

IV.--It has thus been sufficiently set forth that the proper work of the human race, taken as a whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of development: first in the way of speculation, and then, by its extension, in the way of action. And seeing that what is true of a part is true also of the whole, and that it is by rest and quiet that the individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and prudence; so the human race, by living in the calm and tranquillity of peace, applies itself most freely and easily to its proper work; a work which, according to the saying; "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels," is almost divine. Whence it is manifest that of all things that are ordered to secure blessings to men, peace is the best. And hence the word which sounded to the shepherds from above was not riches, nor pleasure, nor honour, nor length of life, nor health, nor strength, nor beauty; but peace. For the heavenly host said: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace to men of goodwill." Therefore also, "Peace be with you," was the salutation of the Saviour of mankind. For it behoved Him, who was the greatest of saviours, to utter in His greeting the greatest of saving blessings. And this custom His disciples too chose to preserve; and Paul also did the same in his greetings, as may appear manifest to all.

Now that we have declared these matters, it is plain what is the better, nay the best, way in which mankind may attain to do its proper work. And consequently we have seen the readiest means by which to arrive at the point, for which all our works are ordered, as their ultimate end; namely, the universal peace, which is to be assumed as the first principle for our deductions. As we said, this assumption was necessary, for it is as a sign-post to us, that into it we may resolve all that has to be proved, as into a most manifest truth.

V.--As therefore we have already said, there are three doubts, and these doubts suggest three questions, concerning Temporal Monarchy, which in more common speech is called the Empire; and our purpose is, as we explained, to inquire concerning these questions in their given order, and starting from the first principle which we have just laid down. The first question, then, is whether Temporal Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world; and that it is necessary can, I think, be shown by the strongest and most manifest arguments; for nothing, either of reason or of authority, opposes me. Let us first take the authority of the Philosopher in his Politics.[158] There, on his venerable authority, it is said that where a number of things are arranged to attain an end, it behoves one of them to regulate or govern the others, and the others to submit. And it is not only the authority of his illustrious name which makes this worthy of belief, but also reason, instancing particulars.

[Footnote 158: Arist. _Polit._ i. 5.]

If we take the case of a single man, we shall see the same rule manifested in him: all his powers are ordered to gain happiness; but his understanding is what regulates and governs all the others; and otherwise he would never attain to happiness. Again, take a single household: its end is to fit the members thereof to live well; but there must be one to regulate and rule it, who is called the father of the family, or, it may be, one who holds his office. As the Philosopher says: "Every house is ruled by the oldest."[159] And, as Homer says, it is his duty to make rules and laws for the rest. Hence the proverbial curse: "Mayst thou have an equal at home."[160] Take a single village: its end is suitable assistance as regards persons and goods, but one in it must be the ruler of the rest, either set over them by another, or with their consent, the head man amongst them. If it be not so, not only do its inhabitants fail of this mutual assistance, but the whole neighbourhood is sometimes wholly ruined by the ambition of many, who each of them wish to rule. If, again, we take a single city: its end is to secure a good and sufficient life to the citizens; but one man must be ruler in imperfect[161] as well as in good forms of the state. If it is otherwise, not only is the end of civil life lost, but the city too ceases to be what it was. Lastly, if we take any one kingdom, of which the end is the same as that of a city, only with greater security for its tranquillity, there must be one king to rule and govern. For if this is not so, not only do his subjects miss their end, but the kingdom itself falls to destruction, according to that word of the infallible truth: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation." If then this holds good in these cases, and in each individual thing which is ordered to one certain end, what we have laid down is true.

[Footnote 159: _Ibid._ i. 2, 6, quoting Hom. _Od._ ix. 114.--(W.)]

[Footnote 160: Ficinus translates: "Uno proverbio che quasi bestemmiando dice, _Abbi pari in casa_."]

[Footnote 161: "_Obliqua_" = [Greek: parekbaseis]. _V._ Arist. _Eth._ viii. 10; _Pol._ iii. 7.--(W.)]

Now it is plain that the whole human race is ordered to gain some end, as has been before shown. There must, therefore, be one to guide and govern, and the proper title for this office is Monarch or Emperor. And so it is plain that Monarchy or the Empire is necessary for the welfare of the world.

VI.--And as the part is to the whole, so is the order of parts to the order of the whole. The part is to the whole, as to an end and highest good which is aimed at; and, therefore, the order in the parts is to the order in the whole, as it is to the end and highest good aimed at. Hence we have it that the goodness of the order of parts does not exceed the goodness of the order of the whole, but that the converse of this is true. Therefore we find a double order in the world, namely, the order of parts in relation to each other, and their order in relation to some one thing which is not a part (as there is in the order of the parts of an army in relation to each other, and then in relation to the general); and the order of the parts in relation to the one thing which is not a part is the higher, for it is the end of the other order, and the other exists for the sake of it. Therefore, if the form of this order is found in the units of the mass of mankind, much more may we argue by our syllogism that it is found in mankind considered as a whole; for this latter order, or its form, is better. But as was said in the preceding chapter, and it is sufficiently plain, this order is found in all the units of the mass of mankind. Therefore it is, or should be, found in the mass considered as a whole. And therefore all the parts that we have mentioned, which are comprised in kingdoms, and the kingdoms themselves ought to be ordered with reference to one Prince or Princedom, that is, with reference to a Monarch or Monarchy.

VII.--Further, the whole human race is a whole with reference to certain parts, and, with reference to another whole, it is a part. For it is a whole with reference to particular kingdoms and nations, as we have shown; and it is a part with reference to the whole universe, as is manifest without argument. Therefore, as the lower portions of the whole system of humanity are well adapted to that whole, so that whole is said to be well adapted to the whole which is above it. It is only under the rule of one prince that the parts of humanity are well adapted to their whole, as may easily be collected from what we have said; therefore it is only by being under one Princedom, or the rule of a single Prince, that humanity as a whole is well adapted to the Universe, or its Prince, who is the One God. And it therefore follows that Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

VIII.--And all is well and at its best which exists according to the will of the first agent, who is God. This is self-evident, except to those who deny that the divine goodness attains to absolute perfection. Now, it is the intention of God that all created things should represent the likeness of God, so far as their proper nature will admit. Therefore was it said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." And though it could not be said that the lower part of creation was made in the image of God, yet all things may be said to be after His likeness, for what is the whole universe but the footprint of the divine goodness? The human race, therefore, is well, nay at its best state, when, so far as can be, it is made like unto God. But the human race is then most made like unto God when most it is one; for the true principle of oneness is in Him alone. Wherefore it is written: "Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God." But the race of man is most one when it is united wholly in one body, and it is evident that this cannot be, except when it is subject to one prince. Therefore in this subjection mankind is most made like unto God, and, in consequence, such a subjection is in accordance with the divine intention, and it is indeed well and best for man when this is so, as we showed at the beginning of this chapter.

IX.--Again, things are well and at their best with every son when he follows, so far as by his proper nature he can, the footsteps of a perfect father. Mankind is the son of heaven, which is most perfect in all its works; for it is "man and the sun which produce man," according to the second book on Natural Learning.[162] The human race, therefore, is at its best when it imitates the movements of heaven, so far as human nature allows. And since the whole heaven is regulated with one motion, to wit, that of the _primum mobile_, and by one mover, who is God, in all its parts, movements, and movers (and this human reason readily seizes from science); therefore, if our argument be correct, the human race is at its best state when, both in its movements, and in regard to those who move it, it is regulated by a single Prince, as by the single movement of heaven, and by one law, as by the single motion. Therefore it is evidently necessary for the welfare of the world for there to be a Monarchy, or single Princedom, which men call the Empire. And this thought did Boethius breathe when he said: "Oh happy race of men, if your hearts are ruled by the love which rules the heaven."[163]

[Footnote 162: Arist. _Phys. Ausc._ ii. 2.--(W.)]

[Footnote 163: _De Consol. Phil._ ii. met. 8.--(W.)]

X.--Wherever there is controversy, there ought to be judgment, otherwise there would be imperfection without its proper remedy,[164] which is impossible; for God and Nature, in things necessary, do not fail in their provisions. But it is manifest that there may be controversy between any two princes, where the one is not subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their subjects. Therefore between them there should be means of judgment. And since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may come. Either he will or he will not be a Monarch. If he is, we have what we sought; if not, then this one again will have an equal, who is not subject to his jurisdiction, and then again we have need of a third. And so we must either go on to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to that judge who is first and highest; by whose judgment all controversies shall be either directly or indirectly decided; and he will be Monarch or Emperor. Monarchy is therefore necessary to the world, and this the Philosopher saw when he said: "The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order; 'in a multitude of rulers there is evil, therefore let there be one prince.'"[165]

[Footnote 164: "_Sine proprio perfectivo._"]

[Footnote 165: Arist. _Metaphys._ xii. 10, who quotes from Hom. _Il._ ii. 204.--(W.)]

XI.--Further, the world is ordered best when justice is most paramount therein: whence Virgil, wishing to celebrate that age, which in his own time seemed to be arising, sang in his _Bucolics_:[166] "Now doth the Virgin return, and the kingdom of Saturn." For Justice was named "the Virgin," and also Astræa. The kingdom of Saturn was the good time, which they also called the Golden Age. But Justice is paramount only in a Monarchy, and therefore a Monarchy, that is, the Empire, is needed if the world is to be ordered for the best. For better proof of this assumption it must be recognised that Justice, considered in itself, and in its proper nature, is a certain rightness or rule of conduct, which rejects on either side all that deviates from it. It is like whiteness considered as an abstraction, not admitting of degrees. For there are certain forms of this sort which belong to things compounded, and exist themselves in a simple and unchanging essence, as[167] the Master of the Six Principles rightly says. Yet qualities of this sort admit of degrees on the part of their subjects with which they are connected, according as in their subjects more or less of their contraries is mingled. Justice, therefore, is strongest in man, both as a state of mind and in practice, where there is least admixture of its opposite; and then we may say of it, in the words of the Philosopher, that "neither the star of morning nor of evening is so admirable."[168] For then is it like Phoebe, when she looks across the heavens at her brother from the purple of the morning calm.

[Footnote 166: _Ecl._ iv. 6.]

[Footnote 167: Gilbert de la Porrée, [dagger symbol]1154. The "Six Principles" were the last six of the Ten Categories of Aristotle, and the book became one of the chief elementary logic-books of the Middle Ages. _Vide_ Hauréau, _Philosophie Scolastique_, 1e Partie, p. 452.]

[Footnote 168: From Arist. _Ethics_, v. 1.--(W.)]

Now Justice, as a state of mind,[169] has a force which opposes it in the will; for where the will of a man is not pure from all desire, then, though there be Justice, yet there is not Justice in all its ideal brightness; for there is in that man, however little, yet in some degree, an opposing force; and therefore they, who would work on the feelings[170] of a judge, are rightly repelled. But, in practice,[171] Justice finds an opposing force in what men are able to do. For, seeing that it is a virtue regulating our conduct towards other men, how shall any act according to Justice if he has not the power of rendering to all their due? Therefore it is plain that the operation of Justice will be wide in proportion to the power of the just man.

[Footnote 169: "_Quantum ad habitum._"]

[Footnote 170: "_Passionare._"]

[Footnote 171: "_Quantum ad operationem._"]

From this let us argue: Justice is strongest in the world when it is in one who is most willing and most powerful; only the Monarch is this; therefore, only when Justice is in the Monarch is it strongest in the world. This pro-syllogism goes on through the second figure, with an involved negative, and is like this: All B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B: or all B is A; nothing but C is A; therefore nothing but C is B.

Our previous explanation makes the first proposition apparent: the second is proved thus, first in regard to will, and secondly in regard to power. First it must be observed that the strongest opponent of Justice is Appetite, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book to Nicomachus.[172] Remove Appetite altogether, and there remains nothing adverse to Justice; and therefore it is the opinion of the Philosopher that nothing should be left to the judge, if it can be decided by law;[173] and this ought to be done for fear of Appetite, which easily perverts men's minds. Where, then, there is nothing to be wished for, there can be no Appetite, for the passions cannot exist if their objects are destroyed. But the Monarch has nothing to desire, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; and this is not the case with other princes, whose kingdoms are bounded by those of their neighbours; as, for instance, the kingdom of Castile is bounded by the kingdom of Aragon. From which it follows that the Monarch is able to be the purest embodiment of Justice among men.

[Footnote 172: _Eth._ v. 2.--(W.)]

[Footnote 173: _Rhetoric_, i. 1.--(W.)]

Further, as Appetite in some degree, however small, clouds the habit of Justice, so does Charity, or rightly-directed affection, sharpen and enlighten it. In whomsoever, therefore, rightly-directed affection may chiefly dwell, in him may Justice best have place: and of this sort is the Monarch. Therefore where a Monarch reigns Justice is, or at least may be, strongest. That rightly-directed affections work as we have said, we may see thus: Appetite, scorning[174] what in itself belongs to man, seeks for other things outside him; but Charity sets aside all else, and seeks God and man, and consequently the good of man. And since of all the good things that men can have the greatest is to live in peace (as we have already said), and as it is Justice which most chiefly brings peace, therefore Charity will chiefly make Justice strong, and the more so in proportion to its own strength.

[Footnote 174: "_Perseitas hominum_" = "_facultas per se subsistendi_."--DUCANGE.]

And it is clear that right affections ought to exist in a Monarch more than in any other man for this reason: the object of love is the more loved the nearer it is to him that loves; but men are nearer to a Monarch than they are to other princes; therefore it is by a Monarch that they are, or ought to be, most loved. The first proposition is manifest if the nature of activity and passivity are considered. The second is manifest because men are brought near to a Monarch in their totality,[175] but to other princes only partially; and it is only by means of the Monarch that men are brought near other princes at all. Thus the Monarch cares for all primarily and directly, whereas other princes only care for their subjects through the Monarch, and because their care for their subjects descends from the supreme care of the Monarch.

[Footnote 175: "_Secundum totum._"]

Again, a cause has the nature of a cause in proportion as it is more universal; for the lower cause is such only on account of the higher one, as appears from the Treatise on Causes.[176] And, in proportion as a cause is really a cause, it loves what it effects; for such love follows the cause by itself. Now Monarchy is the most universal cause of men living well, for other princes work only through the Monarch, as we have said; and it therefore follows that it is the Monarch who will most chiefly love the good of men. But that in practice the Monarch is most disposed to work Justice, who can doubt, except indeed a man who understands not the meaning of the word? for if he be really a Monarch he cannot have enemies.

[Footnote 176: A compilation from the Arabians, or perhaps Aristotle or Proclus, which, under various names, passed for a work of Aristotle, and is ascribed by Albert the Great to a certain David the Jew. It is quoted in the twelfth century, and was commented on by Albert and Thomas Aquinas. _Vide_ Jourdain, _Recherches sur les traductions d'Aristote_ (1842), pp. 114, 184, 193, 195, 445; _Philosophie de S. Thomas_ (1858), i. 94.]

The principle assumed being therefore sufficiently explained, the conclusion is certain, to wit, that a Monarch is necessary that the world may be ordered for the best.

XII.--Again, the human race is ordered best when it is most free. This will be manifest if we see what is the principle of freedom. It must be understood that the first principle of our freedom is freedom of will, which many have in their mouth, but few indeed understand. For they come so far as to say that the freedom of the will means a free judgment concerning will. And this is true. But what is meant by the words is far from them: and they do just as our logicians do all day long with certain propositions which are set as examples in the books of logic, as that, "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles."[177]

[Footnote 177: Cf. Arist. _Magna Moral._ i. 1: "It would be absurd if a man, wishing to prove that the angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, assumed as his principle that the soul is immortal."--WITTE.]

Therefore I say that Judgment is between Apprehension and Appetite. First, a man apprehends a thing; then he judges it to be good or bad; then he pursues or avoids it accordingly. If therefore the Judgment guides the Appetite wholly, and in no way is forestalled by the Appetite, then is the Judgment free. But if the Appetite in any way at all forestalls the Judgment and guides it, then the Judgment cannot be free: it is not its own: it is captive to another power. Therefore the brute beasts cannot have freedom of Judgment; for in them the Appetite always forestalls the Judgment. Therefore, too, it is that intellectual beings whose wills are unchangeable, and souls which are separate from the body, which have gone hence in peace, do not lose the freedom of their wills, because their wishes cannot change; nay, it is in full strength and completeness that their wills are free.[178]

[Footnote 178: Cf. _Purgatorio_, xviii. 22.--WITTE.]

It is therefore again manifest that this liberty, or this principle of all our liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed by God on mankind: by it alone we gain happiness[179] as men: by it alone we gain happiness elsewhere as gods.[180] But if this is so, who will say that human kind is not in its best state, when it can most use this principle? But he who lives under a Monarchy is most free. Therefore let it be understood that he is free who exists not for another's sake but for his own, as the Philosopher, in his Treatise of simple Being, thought.[181] For everything which exists for the sake of some other thing, is necessitated by that other thing, as a road has to run to its ordained end. Men exist for themselves, and not at the pleasure of others, only if a Monarch rules; for then only are the perverted forms of government set right, while democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies, drive mankind into slavery, as is obvious to any who goes about among them all; and public power[182] is in the hands of kings and aristocracies, which they call the rule of the best, and champions of popular liberty. And because the Monarch loves his subjects much, as we have seen, he wishes all men to be good, which cannot be the case in perverted forms of government:[183] therefore the Philosopher says, in his _Politics_:[184] "In the bad state the good man is a bad citizen, but in a good state the two coincide." Good states in this way aim at liberty, that in them men may live for themselves. The citizens exist not for the good of consuls, nor the nation for the good of its king; but the consuls for the good of the citizens, and the king for the good of his nation. For as the laws are made to suit the state, and not the state to suit the laws, so those who live under the laws are not ordered for the legislator, but he for them;[185] as also the Philosopher holds, in what he has left us on the present subject. Hence, too, it is clear that although the king or the consul rule over the other citizens in respect of the means[186] of government, yet in respect of the end of government they are the servants of the citizens, and especially the Monarch, who, without doubt, must be held the servant of all. Thus it becomes clear that the Monarch is bound by the end appointed to himself in making his laws. Therefore mankind is best off under a Monarchy, and hence it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

[Footnote 179: "_Felicitamur._"]

[Footnote 180: "_Ut Dii_;" cf. _Paradiso_, v. 19.--WITTE.]

[Footnote 181: _I.e._ _Metaphys._ 1, 2.--(W.)]

[Footnote 182: "_Politizant reges._"]

[Footnote 183: "_Oblique politizantes._"]

[Footnote 184: _Polit._ iii. 4.]

[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ iii. 16, 17.--(W.)]

[Footnote 186: "_Respectu viæ ... respectu termini._"]

XIII.--Further, he who can be best fitted to rule can best fit others. For in every action the main end of the agent, whether acting by necessity of nature or voluntarily, is to unfold his own likeness; and therefore every agent, so far as he is of this sort, delights in action. For since all that is desires its own existence, and since the agent in acting enlarges his own existence in some way, delight follows action of necessity; for delight is inseparable from gaining what is desired. Nothing therefore acts unless it is of such sort as that which is acted on ought to be; therefore the Philosopher said in his _Metaphysics_,[187] "Everything which becomes actual from being potential, becomes so by means of something actual of the same kind," and were anything to try to act in any other way it would fail. Hence we may overthrow the error of those who think to form the moral character of others by speaking well and doing ill; forgetting that the hands of Jacob were more persuasive with his father than his words, though his hands deceived and his voice spake truth. Hence the Philosopher, to Nicomachus: "In matters of feeling and action, words are less to be trusted than deeds."[188] And therefore God said to David in his sin, "What hast thou to do to declare my statutes?" as though He would say, "Thou speakest in vain, for thou art different from what thou speakest." Hence it may be gathered that he needs to be fitted for his work in the best way who wishes to fit others.

[Footnote 187: _Metaphys._ ix. 8.--(W.)]

[Footnote 188: Arist. _Eth._ x. 1.--(W.)]

But the Monarch is the only one who can be fitted in the best possible way to govern. Which is thus proved: Each thing is the more easily and perfectly qualified for any habit, or actual work, the less there is in it of what is contrary to such a disposition. Therefore, they who have never even heard of philosophy, arrive at a habit of truth in philosophy more easily and completely than those who have listened to it at odd times, and are filled with false opinions. For which reason Galen well says: "Such as these require double time to acquire knowledge."[189] A Monarch then has nothing to tempt appetite, or, at least, less than any other man, as we have shown before; whereas other princes have much; and appetite is the only corrupter of righteousness, and the only impediment to justice. A Monarch therefore is wholly, or at least more than any other prince, disposed to govern well: for in him there may be judgment and justice more strongly than in any other. But these two things are the pre-eminent attributes of a maker of law, and of an executor of law, as that most holy king David testified when he asked of God the things which were befitting the king, and the king's son, saying: "Give the king thy judgment, O God, and thy righteousness unto the king's son."[190]

[Footnote 189: _De cognosc. animi morbis_, c. 10.--WITTE.]

[Footnote 190: Cf. _Parad._ xiii. 95.--(W.)]

We were right then when we assumed that only the Monarch can be best fitted to rule. Therefore only the Monarch can in the best way fit other men. Therefore it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the best ordering of the world.

XIV.--And where a thing can be done by one agent, it is better to do it by one than by several, for this reason: Let it be possible to do a certain thing by means of A, and also by means of A and B. If therefore what is done by A and B can be done by A alone, it is useless to add B; for nothing follows from the addition; for the same end which A and B produced is produced also by A. All additions of this kind are useless and superfluous: all that is superfluous is displeasing to God and Nature: and all that is displeasing to God and Nature is bad, as is manifest. It therefore follows not only that it is better that a thing should be done by one than by many agents, if it is possible to produce the effect by one; but also that to produce the effect by one is good, and to produce it by many is simply bad. Again, a thing is said to be better by being nearer to the best, and the end has the nature of the best. But for a thing to be done by one agent is better, for so it comes nearer to the end. And that so it comes nearer is manifest; for let C be the end which may be reached by A, or by A and B together: plainly it is longer to reach C by A and B together than by B alone. But mankind may be governed by one supreme prince, who is, the Monarch.

But it must be carefully observed that when we say that mankind may be ruled by one supreme prince, we do not mean that the most trifling judgments for each particular town are to proceed immediately from him. For municipal laws sometimes fail, and need guidance, as the Philosopher shows in his fifth book to Nicomachus, when he praises equity.[191] For nations and kingdoms and states have, each of them, certain peculiarities which must be regulated by different laws. For law is the rule which directs life. Thus the Scythians need one rule, for they live beyond the seventh climate,[192] and suffer cold which is almost unbearable, from the great inequality of their days and nights. But the Garamantes need a different law, for their country is equinoctial, and they cannot wear many clothes, from the excessive heat of the air, because the day is as long as the darkness of the night. But our meaning is that it is in those matters which are common to all men, that men should be ruled by one Monarch, and be governed by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace. And the individual princes must receive this rule of life or law from him, just as the practical intellect receives its major premiss from the speculative intellect, under which it places its own particular premiss, and then draws its particular conclusion, with a view to action. And it is not only possible for one man to act as we have described; it is necessary that it should proceed from one man only to avoid confusion in our first principles. Moses himself wrote in his law that he had acted thus. For he took the elders of the tribes of the children of Israel, and left to them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself such as were more important, and wider in their scope; and the elders carried these wider ones to their tribes, according as they were applicable to each separate tribe.

[Footnote 191: _Eth._ v. 14.--(W.)]

[Footnote 192: Ptolemy, the mediæval authority on geography, divided the known world into [Greek: klimata], zones of slope towards the pole, or belts of latitude, eight of which from the equinoctial to the mouths of the Tanais and the Riphæan mountains. The seventh "clima" passed over the mouths of the Borysthenes. See Mercator's map in Bertius' _Theatrum Geographiæ Veteris_ (1618), art. "Ptolemy" in Smith's _Dictionary of Biography_, p. 577. Dictionary of Antiquities, art. "Clima."]

Therefore it is better for the human race to be ruled by one than by many, and therefore there should be a Monarch, who is a single prince; and if it is better, it is more acceptable to God, since God always wills what is best. And since of these two ways of government the one is not only the better, but the best of all, it follows not only that this one is more acceptable to God as between one and many, but that it is the most acceptable. Therefore it is best for the human race to be governed by one man; and Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

XV.--I say also that Being, and Unity, and the Good come in order after the fifth mode of priority.[193] For Being comes by nature before Unity, and Unity before Good. Where Being is most, there Unity is greatest; and where Unity is greatest, there Good is also greatest; and in proportion as anything is far from Being in its highest form, is it far from Unity, and therefore from Good. Therefore in every kind of things, that which is most one is best, as the Philosopher holds in the treatise about simple Being. Therefore it appears that to be one is the root of Good, and to be many the root of Evil. Therefore, Pythagoras in his parallel tables placed the one, or Unity, under the line of good, and the many under the line of Evil; as appears from the first book of the _Metaphysics_.[194] Hence we may see that to sin is nothing else than to pass on from the one which we despise and to seek many things, as the Psalmist saw when he said: "By the fruit of their corn and wine and oil, are they multiplied."[195]

[Footnote 193: Arist. _Categ._, _e.g._: Priority is said in five ways--1. First in _time_. 2. First in _pre-supposition_. 3. First in _order_. 4. First in _excellence_. 5. First in _logical sequence_.]

[Footnote 194: _V._ Arist. _Metaph._ 1, 5; _Ethics_ i. 4; cf. Ritter and Preller, _Hist. Philos._ sec. 105.]

[Footnote 195: Ps. iv. 8 (vulg.).]

Hence it is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason, that it consists in unity. And because concord is a good thing in so far as it is concord, it is manifest that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we find the real nature of concord. Concord then is the uniform motion of many wills; and hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of concord, nay, concord itself. For as we should say that many clods of earth are concordant, because that they all gravitate together towards the centre; and that many flames are concordant because that they all ascend together towards the circumference, if they did this of their own free will, so we say that many men are in concord because that they are all moved together, as regards their willing, to one thing, which one thing is formally in their wills just as there is one quality formally in the clods of earth, that is gravity, and one in the flame of fire, that is lightness. For the force of willing is a certain power; but the quality of good which it apprehends is its form; which form, like as others, being one is multiplied in itself, according to the multiplication of the matters which receive it, as the soul, and numbers, and other forms which belong to what is compound.[196]

[Footnote 196: On the scholastic doctrine of forms, _v._ Thom. Aquin. _Summ._ I. 105, art. 4.]

To explain our assumption as we proposed, let us argue thus: All concord depends on unity which is in wills; the human race, when it is at its best, is a kind of concord; for as one man at his best is a kind of concord, and as the like is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom; so is it of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will. But this cannot be unless there be one will to be the single mistress and regulating influence of all the rest. For the wills of men, on account of the blandishments of youth, require one to direct them, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book of his _Ethics_.[197] And this cannot be unless there is one prince over all, whose will shall be the mistress and regulating influence of all the others. But if all these conclusions be true, as they are, it is necessary for the highest welfare of the human race that there should be a Monarch in the world; and therefore Monarchy is necessary for the good of the world.

[Footnote 197: Arist. _Eth._ x. 5.--(W.)]

XVI.--To all these reasons alleged above a memorable experience adds its confirmation. I mean that condition of mankind which the Son of God, when, for the salvation of man, He was about to put on man, either waited for, or, at the moment when He willed, Himself so ordered. For if, from the fall of our first parents, which was the turning point at which all our going astray began, we carry our thoughts over the distribution of the human race and the order of its times, we shall find that never but under the divine Augustus, who was sole ruler, and under whom a perfect Monarchy existed, was the world everywhere quiet. And that then the human race was happy in the tranquillity of universal peace, this is the witness of all writers of history; this is the witness of famous poets; this, too, he who wrote the story of the "meekness and gentleness of Christ" has thought fit to attest. And last of all, Paul has called that most blessed condition "the fulness of the times." For then, indeed, time was full, and all the things of time; because no office belonging to our felicity wanted its minister. But how the world has fared since that "seamless robe" has suffered rending by the talons of ambition, we may read in books; would that we might not see it with our eyes. Oh, race of mankind! what storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things. Thou art sick in both thy faculties of understanding; thou art sick in thine affections. Unanswerable reasons fail to heal thy higher understanding; the very sight of experience convinces not thy lower understanding; not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms thy affections, when it breathes into thee through the music of the Holy Ghost: "Behold, how good and how pleasant a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity."[198]

[Footnote 198: Ps. cxxxii. 1.--(W.)]