Part 4

"In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favorable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so."

[Sidenote: German torpedo attacks ineffective.]

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favored by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a "following" or "chasing" fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on _Marlborough_), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the purpose. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.

[Sidenote: _Marlborough_ hit by a torpedo.]

[Sidenote: Hits on enemy ships.]

The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.17 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle-cruisers and light-cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of _Marlborough_ was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the _Kaiser_ class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but we opened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the _Koenig_ class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the battle-fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. _Colossus_ was hit, but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.

[Sidenote: Range-taking difficult.]

In the Fourth Battle Squadron--in which squadron my flagship _Iron Duke_ was placed--Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading one of the divisions--the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of the _Koenig_ and _Kaiser_ class and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light-cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. _Iron Duke_, having previously fired at a light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the _Koenig_ class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target ship turned away.

[Sidenote: Firing at enemy battle cruisers.] The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle-cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the _Kaiser_ or _Koenig_ classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.

During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., with the addition of _Duke of Edinburgh_ of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle-cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.

The attached cruisers _Boadicea_, _Active_, _Blanche_ and _Bellona_ carried out their duties as repeating-ships with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.

[Sidenote: Light cruisers attack with torpedoes.]

The Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The _Calliope_ was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although I regret to say she had several casualties. The light-cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the _Kaiser_ class was seen at 8.40 p.m.

During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light-cruisers, and destroyers.

After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favored by the conditions of visibility.

[Sidenote: Enemy entirely out of sight.]

At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly man[oe]uvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships.

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawksley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B. Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.

[Sidenote: Severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla.]

It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of _Tipperary_, with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.

Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from _Spitfire_, and the other from either _Ardent_, _Ambuscade_, or _Garland_.

[Sidenote: An enemy ship torpedoed.]

The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light-cruisers, and comprised vessels of the _Kaiser_ class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack, made twenty minutes later by _Mænad_ on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.

The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light-cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the _Onslaught_ was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the _Onslaught_ Sub-Lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.

During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, _Castor_ leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat-destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports:--

[Sidenote: Engaging enemy destroyers.]

"The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in _Champion_, took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to _Petard_ and _Turbulent_, switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled _Turbulent_. At 3.30 a.m. _Champion_ was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. _Moresby_ reports four ships of _Deutschland_ class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by _Moresby_ and _Obdurate_.

[Sidenote: Battleship of the _Kaiser_ class alone.]

"_Fearless_ and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, _Fearless_ was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the _Kaiser_ class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after."

[Sidenote: Deeds of the destroyers.]

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light-cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about 15 minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light-cruisers, during which period _Southampton_ and _Dublin_ suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.

_Abdiel_, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterized her work.

[Sidenote: The Battle Fleet searches for enemy vessels.]

[Sidenote: _Marlborough_ sent to a base.]

[Sidenote: The enemy had returned into port.]

At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from _Marlborough_ to _Revenge_, as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. _Marlborough_ was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack en route. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battle-field and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.

[Sidenote: Large amount of wreckage.]

[Sidenote: _Warrior_ evidently foundered.]

The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers _Ardent_, _Fortune_, and _Tipperary_ were picked up, and the _Sparrowhawk_, which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for _Warrior_, which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of _Engadine_ on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light-cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

[Sidenote: Low visibility hinders accurate report of damage.]

The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.

[Sidenote: British ships lost in the battle.]

I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships:

1. _Queen Mary_, Battle-cruiser, 27,000 tons. 2. _Indefatigable_, Battle-cruiser, 18,750 tons. 3. _Invincible_, Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons. 4. _Defence_, Armored cruiser, 14,600 tons. 5. _Black Prince_, Armored cruiser, 13,550 tons. 6. _Warrior_, Armored cruiser, 13,550 tons. 7. _Tipperary_, Destroyer, 1,430 tons. 8. _Ardent_, Destroyer, 935 tons. 9. _Fortune_, Destroyer, 935 tons. 10. _Shark_, Destroyer, 935 tons. 11. _Sparrowhawk_, Destroyer, 935 tons. 12. _Nestor_, Destroyer, 1,000 tons. 13. _Nomad_, Destroyer, 1,000 tons. 14. _Turbulent_, Destroyer, 1,430 tons. Total, 113,300 tons;

[Sidenote: Distinguished officers who went down.]

[Sidenote: Gallantry of officers and men.]

and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.

[Sidenote: Fighting qualities of the enemy.]

The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light-cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.

[Sidenote: Heroism of the wounded.]

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld--whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light-cruisers, or destroyers--the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

[Sidenote: Work of the engine room department.]

[Sidenote: No failures in material.]

Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.

[Sidenote: Valuable work of artisans.]

The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.

[Sidenote: Success of the medical officers.]

The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

[Sidenote: Ships that sustained hardest fighting.]

It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armored than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, and the Flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions and the squadrons and Flotillas mentioned, as well as the individual vessels composing them, were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.

* * * * *

The campaigns carried on by Italy against Austria were, as had been noted in a former chapter, among the most difficult of the war. The Italian troops fighting with the greatest gallantry in a mountainous and, in places, an impassable country, continued to capture Austrian fortified places, along the entire Isonzo front. One of the most daring and most brilliant of their exploits is told in the following pages.

TAKING THE COL DI LANA

LEWIS R. FREEMAN

Copyright, World's Work, June, 1917.

[Sidenote: A hot wind from the Mediterranean.]

[Sidenote: Thaw and avalanches in the Alps.]

Once or twice in every winter a thick, sticky, hot wind from somewhere on the other side of the Mediterranean breathes upon the snow and ice-locked Alpine valleys the breath of a false springtime. The Swiss guides, if I remember correctly, call it by a name which is pronounced as we do the word _fun_; but the incidence of such a wind means to them anything but what that signifies in English. To them--to all in the Alps, indeed--a spell of _fun_ weather means thaw, and thaw means avalanches; avalanches, too, at a time of the year when there is so much snow that the slides are under constant temptation to abandon their beaten tracks and gouge out new and unexpected channels for themselves. It is only the first-time visitor to the Alps who bridles under the Judas kiss of the wind called _fun_.

[Sidenote: A hot wind in January.]

It was on an early January day of one of these treacherous hot winds that I was motored up from the plain of Venezia to a certain sector of the Italian Alpine front, a sector almost as important strategically as it is beautiful scenically. What twelve hours previously had been a flint-hard, ice-paved road had dissolved to a river of soft slush, and one could sense rather than see the ominous premonitory twitchings in the lowering snow-banks as the lapping of the hot moist air relaxed the brake of the frost which had held them on the precipitous mountain sides. Every stretch where the road curved to the embrace of cliff or shelving valley wall was a possible ambush, and we slipped by them with muffled engine and hushed voices.

[Sidenote: Skirting a lake.]

Toward the middle of the short winter afternoon the gorge we had been following opened out into a narrow valley, and straight over across the little lake which the road skirted, reflected in the shimmering sheet of steaming water that the thaw was throwing out across the ice, was a vivid white triangle of towering mountain. A true granite Alp among the splintered Dolomites--a fortress among cathedrals--it was the outstanding, the dominating feature in a panorama which I knew from my map was made up of the mountain chain along which wriggled the interlocked lines of the Austro-Italian battle front.

"Plainly a peak with a personality," I said to the officer at my side. "What is it called?"

[Sidenote: The Col di Lana an important position.]

"It's the Col di Lana," was the reply; "the mountain Colonel 'Peppino' Garibaldi took in a first attempt and Gelasio Caetani, the Italo-American mining engineer, afterward blew up and captured completely. It is one of the most important positions on our whole front, for whichever side holds it not only effectually blocks the enemy's advance, but has also an invaluable sally-port from which to launch his own. We simply _had_ to have it, and it was taken in what was probably the only way humanly possible. It's Colonel Garibaldi's headquarters, by the way, where we put up to-night and to-morrow; perhaps you can get him to tell you the story." . . .

[Sidenote: The story of the Col di Lana.]

By the light of a little spirit lamp and to the accompaniment of a steady drip of eaves and the rumble of distant avalanches of falling snow, Colonel Garibaldi, that evening, told me "the story:"

[Sidenote: _Légion Italienne_ withdrawn]

"The fighting that fell to the lot of the _Légion Italienne_ in January, 1915, reduced its numbers to such an extent that it had to be withdrawn to rest and reform. Before it was in condition to take the field again, our country had taken the great decision and we were disbanded to go home and fight for Italy. Here--principally because it was thought best to incorporate the men in the units to which they (by training or residence) really belonged--it was found impracticable to maintain the integrity of the fourteen battalions--about 14,000 men in all--we had formed in France, and, as a consequence, the _Légion Italienne_ ceased to exist except as a glorious memory. We five surviving Garibaldi were given commissions in a brigade of Alpini that is a 'lineal descendant' of the famous _Cacciatore_ formed by my grandfather in 1859, and led by him against the Austrians in the war in which, with the aid of the French, we redeemed Lombardy for Italy.

[Sidenote: Defensive and offensive advantages of the peak.]

[Sidenote: Bitter struggle for the Col di Lana.]