Part 2

It is necessary that the law should, in the first place, establish what pertains to the gods, to dæmons and parents, and, in short, to what is beautiful and honourable. But in the second place, it should establish what pertains to things that are useful. For it is fit that minor concerns should be subsequent to such as are greater. Nor should the laws be contained in houses and gates, but in the manners of the citizens. For neither in Lacedæmon, which possesses the most excellent laws, is the city governed by a multitude of writings, but rather by the manners of the subjects. But it will be beneficial to the community, if law is not monarchical, and advantageous [only] to a private individual, but if it is generally useful, and extends to every one; and if it refers punishment to disgrace and ignominy, and not to the loss of property. For by punishing with disgrace, the citizens will endeavour in the most decorous and useful manner, to avoid the punishment ordained by the laws. But if the punishment is pecuniary, the citizens will value money immoderately, and will conceive it to be the greatest remedy of crimes. It will be best, therefore, for the whole city to be so arranged that it may not be in want of any thing external, either with respect to virtue or power, or any other cause. For thus the body, a family, and an army will be beautifully constituted, when each of these has the cause of safety in itself, and does not derive it externally. And this, indeed, will be the case with the body when it is strong, with a family when it is well composed, and with an army which neither consists of mercenaries, nor is unexercised. For these, when thus constituted, will be far more excellent than others, and will be free indeed, and foreign from every thing of a servile nature; and will not, for the purpose of endurance, be in want of many things, but of a few, and those easily procured. For thus he who is strong will not sink under burdens, and he who is thinly clothed will vanquish cold; since men are exercised by casualties and calamities. Indeed, to the man who is temperate, and who has laboured much both in body and soul, all meat and drink will appear to be agreeable; and a bed composed of leaves will be pleasant; but to him who has deliberately chosen a luxurious and Sybaritic life, even the apparatus of the great [or Persian] king would not be sufficiently pleasing. Hence it is necessary that the manners and pursuits of the citizens should be deeply tinctured with law: for this will cause them to be sufficient to themselves, and will be the means of distributing to each of them that which is due to him according to his desert. For thus, also, the sun, moving in a circle through the zodiac, distributes to every thing on the earth generation, nutriment, and an appropriate portion of life; administering, as if it were equitable legislation, the excellent temperature of the seasons. Hence, too, Jupiter is called _Nomios_, or _legal_; and _Nemeios_, or the _distributor_. He, likewise, who distributes nutriment to sheep, is called _Nomeus_, or a _shepherd_; and the songs of harpers are denominated _Nomai_. For these properly dispose the parts of the soul by harmony, rhythms, and measures.

ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.

Every thing mortal, by a necessity of nature, is conversant with mutations; some things, indeed, receiving a revolution from a worse to a better condition, but others from a better to a worse. For things that are generated, are increased; when increased, arrive at their acme: after this become old, and at length finally perish. And things, indeed, which are generated by nature, through the same nature terminate in the immanifest; and again from the immanifest accede to mortality, through a permutation of generation; and, by a reciprocation of corruption, form a circular retrogression. And some things, through human folly, from an ebullition of insolence and satiety, when both houses and cities have been exalted to the summit of human felicity, and been exuberantly rich, have perished, together with their much applauded possessions. Thus, also, it happens that every empire is bounded by three times: by one, indeed, and that the first, which comprehends in itself acquisition; by the second, which comprehends fruition; and by the last, which brings with it destruction. For empires at their commencement being destitute of the goods of fortune, are busied in acquisition; but afterwards becoming prosperous, they perish. Such things, therefore, as are under the dominion of the gods, being incorruptible, are preserved through the whole of time by incorruptible natures; but such things as are under the government of men, being mortal, receive from mortals a perpetually various mutation. For the end, indeed, of satiety and lascivious insolence is destruction; but a strenuous and worthy life is the end of poverty and narrow circumstances. Not only poverty, however, but many other things bring human life to an end.

FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.

A king should be one who is most just; and he will be most just who pays the greatest attention to the laws. For without justice no one will be a king; and without law there can be no justice. For that which is just is just through law, which is the effective cause of justice. But a king is either animated law, or a legal ruler. And hence it follows that he will be most just and most observant of the laws. There are, however, three peculiar employments of a king; viz. to lead an army, to administer justice, and to worship the gods. He will, therefore, be able to lead an army properly, if he knows how to carry on war in a becoming manner. But he will be skilled in administering justice, and in governing all his subjects, if he has well learned the nature of justice and law. And he will worship the gods in a pious and holy manner, if he has diligently considered the nature and virtue of God; so that a good king must necessarily be a good general, judge, and priest. For these are things consequent and suitable to the transcendency and virtue of a king. For it is the province of the pilot to preserve the ship, of the charioteer to preserve the chariot, and of the physician to save the sick; but it belongs to a king and to a general to save those who are in danger in battle. For of that of which any one is the leader, he is also the provident inspector and artificer. But to be conversant with judicial affairs is, indeed, a universal thing; but is particularly the proper work of a king; who, like a god, is a leader and protector in the world. And universally, indeed, it is fit that the whole polity should be coadapted to one ruler and empire; but, especially, that things which have the relation of parts should accord with the same harmony and supreme domination. Farther still, it is the province of a king to oblige and benefit his subjects, but this not without, justice and law. And the third thing which is adapted to the dignity of a king is the worship of the gods. For it is necessary that what is most excellent should be honoured by the most excellent; and that which is the leader and ruler, by that which leads and rules. Of things, therefore, which are by nature most honourable, God is the best; but of things on the earth, and pertaining to men, a king is the most excellent. As God also is to the world, so is a king to the city [which he governs]; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God. For a city, indeed, being coadapted from things which are many and different, imitates the coarrangement and harmony of the world; but a king who possesses an innoxious dominion, and who is himself animated law, exhibits the form of God among men.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able to govern his own passions.

But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches] in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational[15]. But ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul. Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity has given him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither appear to be rough to the multitude; nor may be contemptible; but may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short, from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous and confident to his friends.

It is necessary, however, that his gravity should have nothing in it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable, and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue. Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind, in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much concerning the venerable gravity of a king.

But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally, therefore, every king will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion, and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders. It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those of Jupiter, the ruler of all things. For he is venerable and honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is a God-resembling thing.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

It is requisite that a king should be a wise man: for thus he will be honoured analogously to the first God, of whom also he will be an imitator. For this god is by nature the first king and potentate; but a king is so by birth and imitation. And the former rules in the universe, and in the whole of things; but the latter in the earth. The former also governs all things eternally, and has a never-failing life, possessing wisdom in himself; but the latter acquires science through time. But a king will imitate the first God in the most excellent manner, if he acquires magnanimity, gravity, and the want of but few things; exhibiting to his subjects a paternal disposition. For on this account especially, the first God is conceived to be the father both of Gods and men, because he is mild to every thing which is in subjection to him, and never ceases to govern with providential regard. Nor is he alone satisfied with being the maker of all things, but he is the nourisher, the preceptor of every thing beautiful, and the legislator to all things equally. Such also ought the king to be who rules over men on the earth. Nothing however is beautiful which is deprived of a king and a ruler. But it is not possible for a king or a ruler [properly so called] to exist without wisdom and science. He, therefore, who is a wise man and a king, will be an imitator, and a legitimate minister of God.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent], and having such a colligation of its parts, it follows a series which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος _kosmos_, and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both from its native alliance to the world[16], and from participating of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended, forming the first and the greatest series[17]]. But in the sublunary region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter, but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fabricated him, by using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most sacred places, and the impure pollute those they may happen to meet. But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things; and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This, however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe] can be found without a ruler.

The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.