Part 2

, ch. 16), Hildreth's tr., p. 309.

41/2 General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 99.

43/1 Wharton, Crim. Law, (8th ed.) Section 8, n. 1.

43/2 Ibid., Section 7.

43/3 Even the law recognizes that this is a sacrifice. Commonwealth v. Sawin, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 547, 549.

47/1 Cf. 1 East, P.C. 294; United States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1; 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Sections 347-349, 845 (6th ed.); 4 Bl. Comm. 31.

51/1 Art. 223.

51/2 General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 116.

53/1 Harris, Criminal Law, p. 13.

53/2 Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, Art. 223, Illustration (6), and n. 1.

56/1 4 Bl. Comm. 192.

57/1 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 197.

58/1 Reg. v. Hibbert, L.R. 1 C.C. 184.

59/1 Reg. v. Prince, L.R. 2 C.C. 154.

59/2 Commonwealth v. Hallett, 103 Mass. 452.

60/1 Stephen, Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 223, Illustr. (5); Foster, 294, 295.

60/2 Cf. Gray's case, cited 2 Strange, 774.

60/3 Steph. Dig., Art. 223, Illustr. (1).

60/4 Steph. Dig., Art. 223, Illustr. (8).

60/5 Rex v. Mastin, 6 C.&P. 396. Cf. Reg. v. Swindall, 2 C. & K. 230.

60/6 4 Bl. Comm. 192.

62/1 Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 225.

62/2 Rex v. Shaw, 6 C.&P. 372.

62/3 Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773.

62/4 Rex v. Hayward, 6 C.&P. 157.

63/1 Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 558. Cf. Steph. Gen. View of the Crim. Law, 84.

64/1 2 Bishop Crim. Law, Section 14 (6th ed.).

64/2 Glanv., Lib. XIV. c. 4.

64/3 Bract., fol. 146b.

64/4 Ibid.

64/5 2 East, P.C., c. 21, Sections 7, 8, pp. 1027, 1031.

66/1 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Section 735 (6th ed.).

66/2 Reg. v. Dilworth, 2 Moo. & Rob. 531; Reg. v. Jones, 9 C.&P. 258. The statement that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts is a mere fiction disguising the true theory. See Lecture IV.

67/1 Reg. v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511.

67/2 Reg. v. Roberts, 25 L. J. M. C. 17; S.C. Dearsly, C., C. 539.

68/1 Lewis v. The State, 35 Ala. 380.

69/1 See M'Pherson's Case, Dearsly & Bell, 197, 201, Bramwell, B.

69/2 Cf. 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Sections 741-745 (6th ed.).

71/1 2 Bishop, Crim. Law, Section 758 (6th ed.).

73/1 Cf. Stephen, General View of Criminal Law of England, 49 et seq.

73/2 Cf. Stephen, General View, 49-52; 2 East, P.C. 553.

74/1 Rex v. Cabbage, Russ. & Ry. 292.

74/2 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 224; Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, Arts. 316, 319.

74/3 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 227, 228.

75/1 1 Starkie, Cr. Pl. 177. This doctrine goes further than my argument requires. For if burglary were dealt with only on the footing of an attempt, the whole crime would have to be complete at the moment of breaking into the house. Cf. Rex v. Furnival, Russ. & Ry. 445.

81/1 See Lecture VII.

82/1 Austin, Jurisprudence (3d ed.), 440 et seq., 474, 484, Lect. XX., XXIV., XXV.

84/1 Lib. I. c. 2, ad fin.

85/1 Hist. English Law, I. 113 (bis), n.a; Id., ed. Finlason, I. 178, n. 1. Fitzherbert (N.B. 85, F.) says that in the vicontiel writ of trespass, which is not returnable into the king's court, it shall not be said quare vi et armis. Cf. Ib. 86, H.

85/2 Milman v. Dolwell, 2 Camp. 378; Knapp v. Salsbury, 2 Camp. 500; Peafey v. Walter, 6 C.&P. 232; Hall v. Fearnley, 3 Q.B. 919.

85/3 Y.B. 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18, A.D. 1466; cf. Ames, Cases in Tort, 69, for a translation, which has been followed for the most part.

87/1 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 27, pl. 5, A.D. 1506.

87/2 Cf. Bract., fol. 136 b. But cf. Stat. of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I. c. 9; Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 8, by Thirning; Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, 276.

87/3 Hobart, 134, A.D. 1616.

87/4 Sir T. Jones, 205, A.D. 1682.

87/5 1 Strange, 596, A.D. 1723.

87/6 2 Keyes, 169, A.D. 1865.

88/1 Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 10, A.D. 1582.

88/2 Sir T. Raym. 467, A.D. 1682.

88/3 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. B1. 892, A.D. 1773.

88/4 3 East, 593. See, further, Coleridge's note to 3 Bl. Comm. 123; Saunders, Negligence, ch. 1, Section I; argument in Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H.&C. 774, 783; Lord Cranworth, in S.C., L.R. 3 H. L. 330, 341.

90/1 Ex. gr. Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193. See M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106, 108.

91/1 1 Ld. Raym. 38; S.C. Salk. 637; 4 Mod. 404; A.D. 1695.

92/1 2 Wm. Bl. 892. Cf. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q.B.D. 327, 330, 338.

92/2 7 Vt, 62.

93/1 Smith v. London & South-Western Railway Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 14, 21. Cf. S.C., 5 id. 98, 103, 106.

93/2 Sharp v. Powell, L.R. 7 C.P. 253. Cf. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q.B.D. 327, 336-338. Many American cases could be cited which carry the doctrine further. But it is desired to lay down no proposition which admits of controversy, and it is enough for the present purposes that Si home fait un loyal act, que apres devint illoyal, ceo est damnum sine injuria. Latch, 13. I purposely omit any discussion of the true rule of damages where it is once settled that a wrong has been done. The text regards only the tests by which it is decided whether a wrong has been done.

94/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Ventris, 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev. 172. Compare Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588; infra, p. 158.

95/1 Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Denio, (Lalor,) 193.

95/2 See Lecture II. pp. 54, 55.

97/1 cf. Hobart v. Hagget, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 67.

98/1 See Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, Coleridge, J., at p. 640.

99/1 3 Levirtz, 87, A.D. 1681.

99/2 Compare the rule as to cattle in Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24, stated below, p. 118.

100/1 Disc. 123, pr.; 124, Sections 2, 3. As to the historical origin of the latter rule, compare Lecture V.

101/1 Lecture I, pp. 3, 4.

101/2 Lib. I. c. 2, ad. fin.

101/3 Fol. 155.

101/4 Bro. Trespass, pl. 119; Finch, 198; 3 Bl. Comm. 118, 119.

101/5 See Brunner, Schwurgerichte, p. 171.

101/6 An example of the year 1195 will be found in Mr. Bigelow's very interesting and valuable Placita Anglo-Normanica, p. 285, citing Rot. Cur. Regis, 38; S.C. ? Abbr. Plac., fol. 2, Ebor. rot. 5. The suit was by way of appeal; the cause of action, a felonious trespass. Cf. Bract., fol. 144 a.

102/1 An example may be seen in the Year Book, 30 & 31 Edward I. (Horwood), p. 106.

103/1 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18.

103/2 Popham, 151; Latch, 13, 119, A.D. 1605.

104/1 Hobart, 134, A.D. 1616.

104/2 3 East, 593.

105/1 1 Bing. 213, A.D. 1823.

105/2 6 Cush. 292.

106/1 Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 84 et seq., A.D. 1864.

106/2 Nitro-glycerine Case (Parrot v. Wells), 15 Wall. 524, 538.

106/3 Hill & Denio, (Lalor,) 193; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 489.

107/1 Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62. See, further, Clayton, 22, pl. 38; Holt, C.J., in Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149; Lord Hardwicke, in Williams v. Jones, Cas. temp. Hardw. 298; Hall v. Fearnley, 8 Q.B. 919; Martin, B., in Coward v. Baddeley, 4 H.&N. 478; Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442.

107/2 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, 784; Smith v. London & South-Western Ry. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98, 102. Compare Campbell, Negligence, Section 1 (2d ed.), for Austin's point of view.

109/1 cf. Bro. Corone, pl. 6; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 442; D. 9. 2. 5, Section 2; D. 48. 8. 12.

113/1 I Thorpe, p. 85; cf. LL. Hen. I., c. 88, Section 3.

113/2 Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176.

114/1 See 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 43 Edw. III. 33, pl. 38. The plea in the latter case was that the defendant performed the cure as well as he knew how, without this that the horse died for default of his care. The inducement, at least, of this plea seems to deal with negligence as meaning the actual state of the party's mind.

115/1 Hobart, 134.

115/2 See Knight v. Jermin, Cro. Eliz. 134; Chambers v. Taylor, Cro. Eliz. 900.

115/3 32 Conn. 75, 89, 90.

116/1 Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII. 2 b, Pl. 2.

116/2 Keilway, 46 b.

116/3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339; L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-282; 4 H.&C. 263; 3 id. 774.

117/1 See Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 633, 634.

117/2 See Lecture I. p. 23 and n. 3.

117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136; S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245.

118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.

118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11, pl. 10.

118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled.

118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.

118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co. Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; S.C., 3 Salk. 169; S.C., nom. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Strange, 264; May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101; Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622.

119/1 12 Mod. 335. See Andrew Baker's case, 1 Hale, P.C. 430.

119/2 Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.&F. 92.

119/3 See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 281, 282; Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 441; Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245, 260; Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. N.S. 722; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 10; 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 10; 13 Hen. VII. 15, pl. 10; Keilway, 3 b, pl. 7. Cf. 4 Kent (12th ed.), 110, n. 1, ad fin.

120/1 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 13 Am. L.R. 609.

120/2 See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 612, 614.

120/3 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383.

121/1 L.R. 1 C.P. 300.

121/2 See Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 239, bottom.

121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487.

122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107; Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149.

123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 120.

123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p. 488.

124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197.

125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759.

125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722.

125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594.

127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873.

128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401.

128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567.

128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557.

128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465.

128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20 Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165.

135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446.

136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, 243.

138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.

141/1 Cf. Knight v. German, Cro. Eliz. 70; S.C., ib. 134.

141/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 594; Turner v. Ambler, 10 Q.B. 252, 257, 261.

142/1 Redfield, C. J. in Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 197.

142/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 595.

143/1 See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151.

144/1 Rolfe, B. in Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 540.

145/1 Supra, pp. 115 et seq.

147/1 See, e.g., Cooley, Torts, 164.

147/2 Rex v. Dixon, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 11, 15; Reg. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; 5 C.&P. 266, n.

148/1 Aleyn, 35; Style, 72; A.D. 1648.

149/1 1 Kent (12th ed.), 467, n. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 723-725; 7 id. 652.

149/2 2 Wm. Bl. 892, A.D. 1773; supra, p. 92; Addison on Torts (4th ed.), 264, citing Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 37, pl. 26, which hardly sustains the broad language of the text.

151/1 Compare Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co., 14 C.B. 255, 283; Calye's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32; Co. Lit. 89 a, n. 7; 1 Ch. Pl. (lst ed,), 219, (6th ed.), 216, 217; 7 Am. Law Rev. 656 et seq.

151/2 But cf. The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.

151/3 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 398, 399; Barnett v. Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630, 665; Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym. 360.

151/4 Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132; Wegerstoffe v. Keene, 1 Strange, 214, 216, 223; Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 124.

155/1 Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 634. Cf. Austin (3d ed.), 513.

156/1 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; supra, p. 116.

156/2 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. (9 Vroom), 339; 2 Thompson, Negligence, 1234, n. 3.

157/1 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; supra, p. 117.

158/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev. 172; supra, p. 94.

158/2 Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588.

166/1 Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, Section 16, pp. 108 et seq.; Heusler, Gewere, 487, 492. These authors correct the earlier opinion of Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 37, pp. 313 et seq., adopted by Sohm in his Proc. d. Lex Salica, Section 9. Cf. the discussion of sua in writs of trespass, &c. in the English law, at the end of Lecture VI. Those who wish short accounts in English may consult North Amer. Rev., CX. 210, and see Id., CXVIII. 416; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 212 et seq. Our knowledge as to the primitive form of action is somewhat meagre and dependent on inference. Some of the earliest texts are Ed. Liutpr. 131; Lex Baiw., XV. 4; L. Frision. Add. X.; L. Visig., V.5. I; L. Burg., XLIX. I, 2. The edict of Liutprand, dealing with housebreaking followed by theft of property left in charge of the householder, lays down that the owner shall look to the bailee alone, and the bailee shall hold the thief both for the housebreaking and for the stolen goods. Because, as it says, we cannot raise two claims out of one causa; somewhat as our law was unable to divide the severing a thing from the realty, and the conversion of it, into two different wrongs. Compare, further, Jones, Bailm. 112; Exodus xxii. 10-12; LL. Alfred, 28; I Thorpe, Anc. L., p. 51; Gaii Inst., III. Sections 202-207.

167/1 XXXI. 16.

168/1 "Peterit enim rem suam petere [civiliter] ut adiratam per testimonium proborum hominum, et sic consequi rem suam quamvia furatam. . . Et non refert utrum res que ita subtracta fuit extiterit illius appellantis propria vel alterius, dum tamen de custodia sua." Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; Britton (Nich. ed.), I. 59, 60 [23 b], De Larcyns; cf. ib. 67 [26 b]; Fleta, fol. 5i, L. I. c. 38, Section 1.

169/1 Y.B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 466-468, noticed in North Amer. Rev., CXVIII. 421, n. (So Britton [26 b], "Si il puse averreer la perte.") This is not trover. The declaration in detinue per inventionem was called "un newfound Haliday" in Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 26, 27; cf. 7 Hen. VI. 22, pl. 3; Isack v. Clarke, I Rolle, R. 126, 128.

169/2 Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 4, 5, pl. 9; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Bro. Trespass, pl. 216, 295.

169/3 2 Wms. Saund. 47, n. 1. See above, p. 167.

170/1 Notes to Saunders, Wilbraham v. Snow, note (h).

170/2 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24. See, further, Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 5; 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16; 20 Hen. VII. 1, pl. 1; 21 Hen. VII. 14 b, pl. 23; 13 Co. Rep. 69; 1 Roll. Abr. 4(I), pl. I; F. N. B. 86, n. a; supra, p. 167.

170/3 Fitz. Abr. Barre, pl. 130; Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 12 Am. Law Rev. 694.

171/1 2 Steph. Comm. (6th ed.), 83, cited Dicey, Parties, 353; 2 Bl. Comm. 453; 2 Kent, 585. As the bailee recovered the whole value of the goods, the old reason, that he was answerable over, has in some cases become a new rule, (seemingly based on a misunderstanding,) that the bailee is a trustee for the bailor as to the excess over his own damage. Cf. Lyle v. Barker, 5 Binn. 457, 460; 7 Cowen, 68l, n.; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305; in the order cited. (Thence the new rule has been extended to insurance recovered by a bailee. 1 Hall, N. Y. 84, 91; 3 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 371, 376, n. 1 (a).) In this form it ceases to be a reason for allowing the action.

171/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl. 8; Bro. Trespass, pl. 67. Cf. 1 Britton (Nich. ed.), 67 [26 b]; Y.B. 6 Hen. VI1. 12, pl. 9; 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9; 12 Am. Law Rev. 694.

172/1 Y.B. 22 Ed. IV. 5, pl. 16.

172/2 2 Rolle, Abr. 569, Trespass, 5. Cf. Y.B. 20 Hen. VII. 5, pl. 15; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Clayton, 135, pl. 243; 2 Wms. Saund. 47 e (3d ed.).

172/3 Bro. Trespass, pl, 67 in marg.; cf. Ed. Liutpr. 131, cited supra, p. 166, n.

172/4 In one instance, where, against the opinion of Brian, the bailor was allowed to sue for damage to the chattel by a stranger, the action seems to have been case. Y.B. 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9; cf. the margin of the report.

173/1 Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9; Lord v. Price, L. IL 9 Ex. 54; Muggridge v. Eveleth, 9 Met. 233. Cf. Clayton, 135, pl. 243.

173/2 Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v. Williams, 4 Exch. 339, 343, 344; Morgan v. Ide, 8 Cush. 420; Strong v. Adams, 30 Vt. 221, 223; Little v. Fosseft, 34 Me. 545.

173/3 2 Camp. 464; cf. Mears v. London & South-Western Railway Co., 11 C.B. N.S. 849, 854.

173/4 Addison, Torts (4th ed.), 364.

174/1 Wms. Pers. Prop., 26 (5th ed.), 27 (7th ed.).

174/2 Booth v. Wilson, I B. & Ald. 59; Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl. 8; 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39; 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24, pl. 46 (Tre. "ou d'apprompter"); 21 Hen. VII. 14b, pl. 23; Godbolt, 173, pl. 239; Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302, 309; Burton v. Hughes, 2 Bing. 173; Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v. Williams, 4 Exch. 339, 343, 344; 2 Wms. Saund., note to Wilbraham v. Snow; 2 Kent, 585, 568, 574; Moran v. Portland S. P. Co., 35 Me. 55. See, further, Lecture VI. ad fin.

175/1 Cf. Lord v. Price, L.R. 9 Ex. 54, 56, supra, p. 172.

175/2 Supra, p. 167.

175/3 Lib. X. c. 13; cf. I., c. 8.

175/4 "Is qui rem commodatam accepit, ad ipsam restituendam tenetur, vel ejus precium, si forte incendio, ruins, naufragio, ant latronum, vel hostium incursu, consumpta fuerit vel deperdita, substracts, vel ablata." Fol. 99 a, b. This has been thought a corrupt text (Guterbock, Bracton, by Coxe, p. 175; 2 Twiss, Bract. Int. xxviii.), but agrees with Glanvill, supra, and with Fleta, L. II. c. 56, Section 5.

175/5 Bract., fol. 62 b, c. 28, Section 2; Fleta, L. II. e. 59, Section 4, fol. 128. Cf. Just. Inst. 3. 24, Section 5; ib. 15, Section 2.

176/1 Y.B. 8 Ed. II. 275; Fitz. Detinue, pl. 59.

176/2 2 Ld. Raym. 909.

176/3 Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, pl. 5. See Lecture VI.

176/4 29 Ass. 163, pl. 28.

176/5 Cf. Ratcliff v. Davis, Yelv. 178; Cro. Jac. 244; Noy, 137; 1 Bulstr. 29.

176/6 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3. This case is cited and largely relied on in Woodlife's Case, infra; Southcote v. Bennett, infra; Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132 (24 Car. I., covenant on a charter-party); and Morse v. Slue, infra; in short, in all the leading cases on bailment.

177/1 Cf. Abbreviatio Plaeitorum, p. 343, col. 2, rot. 87, 17 Ed. II.

178/1 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 2 Ed. IV. 15, pl. 7. It is proper to add, that in the latter case Littleton does not seem to distinguish between servants and bailees.

178/2 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV, 40, pl. 22. So Brian, in 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 10, ad fin.

178/3 Y.B. 10 Hen. VII. 25, 26, pl. 3.

178/4 Cf. L. Baiw., XV. 5; Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

178/5 Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9; Bro. Detinue, pl. 37; 10 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 69.

178/6 Y.B. 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16. Cf. 10 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 69.

178/7 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24; 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9.

178/8 Cro. Eliz. 815; 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Co. Lit. 89; 2 BI. Comm. 452.

180/1 Savile, 133, 134. Cf. Bro. Accion sur le Case, pl. 103; Dyer, 161 a, b.

180/2 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 19, Brett, J., at p. 28.

180/3 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 423, Cockburn, C. J., at p. 428.

181/1 Moore, 462; Owen, 57.

181/2 Dial. 2, ch. 38, A.D. 1530.

182/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); cf. ib. 77b (21 Hen. VII.).

182/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

182/3 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Cro. Eliz. 815.

183/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2.

183/2 Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49, ad fin. Cf. Mulgrave v. Ogden, Cro. Eliz. 219; S.C., Owen, 141, 1 Leon. 224; with Isaack v. Clark, 2 Bulstr. 306, at p. 312, Coke, J.

183/3 See Lecture VII.

184/1 Paston, J., in Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49. See, also, Rogers v. Head, Cro. Jac. 262; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330, which will be mentioned again. An innkeeper must be a common innkeeper, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 45. See further, 3 Bl. Comm. 165, where "the transition from status to contract" will be found to have taken place.

184/2 F. N. B. 94 D; infra, p. 203.

184/3 Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9, 10; Dyer, 22 b.

184/4 The process may be traced by reading, in the following order, Y.B. 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, ad fin. (21 Hen. VII.); ib. 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); Drake v. Royman, Savile, 133, 134 (36 Eliz.); Mosley v. Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 5; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330 (11 Jac. I.).

185/1 Cro. Jac. 262 (8 Jac. I.). Compare Maynard's argument in Williams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Symons v. Darknoll, ib. 523, and other cases below; 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 3. Mosley v, Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); an obscurely reported case, seems to have been assumpsit against an agistor, for a horse stolen while in his charge, and asserts obiter that "without such special assumpsit the action does not lie." This must have reference to the form of the action, as the judges who decided Southcote's Case took part in the decision. See, further, Evans v. Yeoman, Clayton, 33.

186/1 See Symons v. Darknoll, and the second count in Morse v. Slue infra. (The latter case shows the averment of negligence to have been mere form.) Cf. I Salk. 18, top.

187/1 Supra, p. 179.

187/2 Boson v. Sandford, Shower, 101; Coggs v. Bernard, infra.

187/3 Symons v. Darknoll, infra.

188/1 Reg. Brev. 92b, 95a, 98a, 100b, 104a; cf. Y.B. 19 Ed. II. 624; 30 Ed. III. 25, 26; 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6; 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; 32 & 33 Ed. I., Int., xxxiii.; Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 177; id. Franzosische, Inhaberpapier, 9, n. 1.

188/2 12 Co. Rep. 64.

188/3 See, besides the following cases, the declaration in Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.), and note especially the variations of statement in Morse v. Slue, set forth below, in the text.

189/1 Hobart, 17; Cro. Jac. 330. See also George v. Wiburn, 1 Roll. Abr. 6, pl. 4 (A.D. 1638).

190/1 The use which has been made of this case in later times shows the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between principles of substantive law and rules relating only to procedure, in the older books.

190/2 Y.B. 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; supra, p. 188, n. 1.

191/1 Palmer, 523.

191/2 Palmer, 548.

191/3 Aleyn, 93.

191/4 1 Sid. 36.

192/1 1 Sid. 244. Cf. Dalston v. Janson, 1 Ld. Raym. 58.

192/2 2 Keb. 866; 3 id. 72, 112, 135; 2 Lev. 69; I Vent. 190, 238; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.

193/1 2 Keb. 866. See 3 Keb. 74; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.

193/2 2 Keb. 72.

193/3 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1; supra, p. 177.

193/4 3 Keble, 73. This is the main point mentioned by Sir T. Raymond and Levinz.

193/5 Cf. 1 Mod. 85.

194/1 1 Ventris, 238, citing Southcote's Case in the margin. Cf. 3 Keble, 135.

194/2 Aleyn, 93; supra, p. 191.

194/3 See also 1 Hale, P.C. 512, 513.

195/1 King v. Viscount Hertford, 2 Shower, 172, pl. 164; cf. Woodlife's Case, supra.

195/2 Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101 (2 W. & M.). See above, pp. 183,185; below, p. 197. Modern illustrations of the doctrine will be found in Fleming v. Manchester, Sheffield, & Lincolnshire Railway Co., 4 Q.B.D. 81, and cases cited. In Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B.511, 526, the reader the primitive assumpsit, which was the inducement to a declaration in tort, interpreted as meaning contract in the modern sense. It will be seen directly that Lord Holt took a different view. Note the mode of dealing with the Marshal's case, 33 Hen; VI. 1, in Aleyn, 27.

196/1 See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Shower, 127 (32 Car. II.); Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.); Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101, citing Southcote's Case (2 W. & M.); Upshare v. Aidee, 1 Comyns, 25 (8 W. III.); Middleton v. Fowler, I Salk. 288 (10 W. III.).

196/2 12 Mod. 472.

196/3 2 Ld. Raym. 909.

197/1 Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5 (39 Eliz.). Cf. Keilway, 160.

197/2 2 Ld. Raym. 919. See Lecture VII. How little Lord Holt meant to adopt the modern view, that delivery, being a detriment to the owner, was a consideration, may be further seen by examining the cases put and agreed to by him from the Year Books.

199/1 2 Kent, 598; 1 C.P. D. 429.

199/2 Palmer, 523. See too Keilway, 77 b, and 160, pl. 2, where the encroachment of case on detinue, and the corresponding confusion in principle, may be pretty clearly seen taking place. But see p. 175, supra.

200/1 2 Kent, 597; Forward v. _Pittard, 1 T. R. 27.

200/2 Cf. Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, 160, pl. 2, and other cases already cited.

200/3 Y.B. 41 Ed. III. 3, pl. 8.

200/4 Y.B. 33 Hen. YI. 1, pl. 3.

200/5 Reg. Brev. 107 a, 108 a, 110 a, b; entries cited 1 T. R. 29.

200/6 See above, pp. 167, 175 et seq.; 12 Am. Law Rev. 692, 693; Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 11, pl. 13; 42 Ass., pl. 17.

201/1 1 Wilson, 282; cf. 2 Kent (12th ed.), 596, n. 1, b.

201/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

202/1 Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63.

202/2 Bird v. Astcock, 2 Bulstr. 280; cf. Dyer, 33 a, pl. 10; Keighley's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 139 b, 140.

202/3 Y.B. 40 Ed. III. 5, 6, pl. 11; see also Willams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Shep. Touchst. 173.

203/1 See Safe Delcosit Company of Pittsburgh v. Pollock, 85 Penn. 391.

203/2 Paston, J., in Y.B. 21 Hen. VI. 55; Keilway, 50 a, pl. 4; Hardres, 163.

203/3 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 654; 1 Salk. 18; 12 Mod. 484.

204/1 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, 83.

205/1 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465.

207/1 Possession, Section 6, Eng. tr., pp. 27, 28.

207/2 R. d. Besitzes, 487.

208/1 R. d. Besitzes, 490, 491.

208/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 415; Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6. Further Hegelian discourse may be found in Dr. J. Hutchison Sterling's Lectures on the Philosophy of Law.

208/3 Institutionen, Sections 224, 226; Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6.

208/4 Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6.

208/5 Besitzklagen, 276, 279.

209/1 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 499.

209/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 2, pp. 5 et seq.; Puchta, Besitz, in Weiske, Rechtslex.; Windscheid, Pand. Section 154, pp. 461 et seq. (4th ed.).

209/3 D. 41.2.3, Section 20; 13.6.8 & 9. Cf. D. 41.1.9, Section 5.

210/1 But see Ihering, Geist d. Rom. R., Section 62, French tr., IV. p. 51.

210/2 Heusler thinks this merely a result of the English formalism and narrowness in their interpretation of the word suo in the writ (disseisivit de teuemento suo). Gewere, 429-432. But there was no such narrowness in dealing with catalla sua in trespass. See below, p. 242.

210/3 See, further, Bracton, fol. 413; Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 9, pl. 4.

211/1 Infra, p. 243.

211/2 R. d. Besitzes, 494.

212/1 Rogers v. Spence, 13 M. & W. 579, 581.

212/2 Webb v. Fox, 7 T. R. 391, 397.

212/3 Fennings v. Lord Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241; Littledale v. Scaith, ib. 243, n. (a); cf. Hogarth v. Jackson, M. & M. 58; Skinner v. Chapman, ib. 59, n.

212/4 Swift v. Gifford, 2 Lowell, 110.

212/5 1 Taunt. 248.

213/1 Cf. Wake, Evolution of Morality,