II.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

1. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.

253.

This is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by its charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which is in keeping with our capacity for worship--which is continually _demonstrating_ itself--in small things or in large: this is the Christian standpoint which is common to us all.

But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our scientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth, which again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has grown ever less and less tenable for us.

The craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not only denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but also to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are satisfied with a _greater_ demand upon their credulity and faith, with a renunciation of all right to reason concerning the proof of their creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.

The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of the historical sense of a new _power_: "Spirit" itself is the "self-revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe that in the "process of, development" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is being manifested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in the _future_ into which all its noble needs are projected and in which they are being worshipped.

In short:--

(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement);

(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed meaning behind the historical movement).

It should be observed that criticism is _never_ levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy concerning the ideal--that is to say, why it has not yet been realised, or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great.

***

It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of distress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the utmost.

Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could remain when the sanctioning _deity_ is no longer present! The belief in a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be maintained.)

_Fundamental problem_: whence comes this almighty power of _Faith? Whence this faith in morality?_ (It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preservation": the Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and egotistic principles.)

254.

An inquiry into the _origin of our moral valuations_ and tables of law has absolutely nothing to do with the _criticism_ of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the _pudenda origo_ of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a critical attitude and spirit towards it.

What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws? _What is the outcome of their dominion?_ For whom? In relation to what?--answer: for Life. But _what is Life?_ A new and more definite concept of what "Life" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this concept is: Life is Will to Power.

_What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?_ Does it point back to another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed, who lived in a period which _preceded_ the great historical movement.) In short: _what is its origin?_ Or had it no human "origin"?--Answer: moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of ruling judgments. _What is it that interprets?_--Our passions.

255

All virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions_: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered necessary and good. All virtues are really refined _passions_ and elevated physiological conditions.

Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of sexual relations,--justice as the development of the passion for revenge,--virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,--honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.

256.

Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions of a creature's life.

257.

Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew."

258.

I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc.).

Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more

## particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a

disbelief in _Life,_ and of a preparation for pessimism.

My leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality._

What is the meaning of the fact that we have imagined a _contradiction_ in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???

259.

A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose: the _preservation_ of an individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, or a culture.--Thanks to the fact that people _forget_ that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and _therefore with a host of contradictory impulses._ This is the _expression of disease in man_ as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes.

This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates himself _to Justice_--that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles _beyond the valuations good and evil._

The wisest man would thus be the _richest in contradictions,_ he would also be gifted with mental antennæ wherewith he could understand all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in _splendid unison_--the rarest of _accidents_ even in us! A sort of planetary movement.

260.

"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis?

But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all _make_ a thing painful, by investing it with a valuation.

The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every mental impression. To us the world is _coloured_ by them.

We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this we possess an enormous fund of _latent power,_ but the study of _comparative_ values teaches us that values which were actually opposed to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been _many_ tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything _per se_).

The analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they were framed (often very badly) as the _conditions of existence_ for limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.

Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number of _very different_ values to hand, and that they no longer contain any creative power--the fundamental principle: "the condition of existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an _arbitrary_ matter. Chaos.

Who creates _the goal_ which stands above mankind kind and above the individual? Formerly morality was a _preservative_ measure: but nobody wants to _preserve_ any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we are reduced to an _experimental morality,_ each must _postulate_ a goal for himself.

261.

What is the _criterion_ of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: "This

## particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of

our existence." Immoral means "that which brings about ruin." Now all societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was the case, for instance, with "Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance, towards "the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their πολις.

262.

_The necessity of false values._--A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes.

The need of their _existence_ must be understood: they are the _result_ of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.

263.

To _see_ and _reveal_ the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.

264.

How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.

265.

There seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many _revolutions_ that have taken place in moral judgments, and of the number of times that "evil" has really and seriously been christened "good" and _vice versa._ I myself pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte."[3] Even conscience has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.

[Footnote 3: The morality of custom.]

266.

A. _Morality_ as the work of _Immorality._

1. In order that moral values may attain to _supremacy,_ a host of immoral forces and passions must assist them.

2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions and considerations.

B. _Morality as the work of error._

C. _'Morality gradually contradicts itself._ Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, έποχή, Judging. The "Immorality" of _belief_ in morality.

The steps:--

1. Absolute dominion of morality: all biological phenomena measured and _judged_ according to its values.

2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened scepticism: morality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of Life); many means are sought--even a transcendental one.

3. The _opposition of Life_ and _Morality._ Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.

D. To what extent was morality _dangerous_ to Life?

_(a)_ It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.

_(b)_ It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.

_(c)_ It checked the knowledge of Life.

_(d)_ It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.

E. Contra-account: the _usefulness_ of morality to Life.

(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "_tool_."

(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to "_mediocre people_."

(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the "_sufferers_."

(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "_lowly_."

267.

It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite, narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one";[4]--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists.--Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.

[Footnote 4: "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."]

268.

Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.

The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical _(Stoicism_ itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).

269.

I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a _riddle._ Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why _should_ my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself _should_ value his welfare differently from the way in which I value it--that is to say, why should precisely _my_ welfare be paramount in his mind? What is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers themselves?

The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they constitute a _community_ with one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.

My idea: goals are wanting, and _these must be individuals._ We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets--is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?

270.

How is it possible that a man can respect himself _only_ in regard to moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as, for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What is the meaning of the _moral idiosyncrasy_?--I mean this both in the psychological and physiological sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which _other_ great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and _could_ not have ...--is it not the result of a merely mechanical _moral interpretation_ of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form of _sensibility_ which does _not_ happen to _understand_ the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but _thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses?_ In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and _strength_ always appears under the optics of a "clean conscience," flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation.... Thus the _moral idiosyncratist_ has (1) _either_ acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: "the good fellow," "_the upright man_"--a sort of medium state of high respectability: _mediocre_ in all his abilities, but honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspirations; (2) _or,_ he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply because he cannot otherwise understand all his states--he is unknown to himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.--Morality is the only _scheme of interpretation_ by means of which this type of man can tolerate himself:--is it a form of vanity?

271.

_The predominance of moral values._--The consequence of this predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which is associated with it everywhere. What is the _meaning_ of this predominance? What does it point to?

To a certain _greater urgency_ of saying nay or yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of _imperatives_ have been used in order to make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they have been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of _society's preservative measures,_ for they are felt to be almost _beyond question._ The practice--that is to say, the _utility_ of being agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse reflection and criticism in this department--look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute "research" in these matters.

272.

_My desire_ is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of _perspective_; to show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same as that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics, both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater abundance of life necessarily Involves _progress_ in the realm _of immorality_. "Truth," that is the extent to which we _allow_ ourselves to comprehend _this_ fact.

273.

But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a parable:--

A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests. Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,--for morality is an illness,--and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course irrespective of the question whether we should be _able_ to do so--whether we can be _cured_ at all?

2. THE HERD.

274.

_Whose will to power is morality?_--The _common factor_ of all European history since the time of _Socrates_ is the attempt to make the _moral values_ dominate all other values, in order that they should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a _means_ thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore to be opposed and annihilated ...).--A similar movement to be observed _in China_ and _India._

What is the meaning of this _will to power on the part of moral values,_ which has played such a part in the world's prodigious evolutions?

_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it_; (1) The instinct of the _herd_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the instinct of all _sufferers_ and all _abortions_ opposed to the happy and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to the exceptions.--_Enormous advantage of this movement,_ despite the cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along (for the history of the _struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).

275.

The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed throughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned.

"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.

"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!

The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane; but--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed.

Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one's equal in its presence.

The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once and for all _fixed_: every individual must submit to this valuation."

We see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it. Thus--God speaks!

God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior, as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by means of which this view could be made logical.

Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: "the _gregarious instinct speaks._" This is what desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"--it will allow the individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns the hatred of all individuals against him.

276.

The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values _which are useful to the herd_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their own smallness and egregiousness. It is the _virtues_ of modern men which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples.)

_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it is condemned._

277.

The morality of _truthfulness_ in the herd. "Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify.--_Consequently_ thou must regard thyself as recognisable, thou mayest not remain _concealed_ from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever _changing_." Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the _recognisability_ and the _stability_ of the individual. As a matter of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain _definite dogma_ concerning the nature of man: education _first creates this dogma_ and thereupon exacts "truthfulness."

278.

Within the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, _inter pares,_ the _over-estimation_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man must not allow himself to be deceived--and _consequently_ he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the outside world caution and danger demand that he should _be on his guard against deception_: the first psychological condition of this attitude would mean that he is also on his guard against _his own people._ Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.

279.

_A criticism of the virtues of the herd._--Inertia is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful _no longer has anything revolting in it._ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level with all, to feel as all feel, and to _accept_ a belief which is already current; it is something passive beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness: people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to _create_ a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.

280.

The instinct of the herd values the _juste milieu_ and the _average_ as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd regards the _exception,_ whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants_: thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the _right_ existence; here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.

281.

If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the idealist of virtue, the _moralist,_ comes along and says: "God sees into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not _harm_ one another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take a particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same

## actions are directed against the enemies of our community--against

you, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the "attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also _moral_ in so doing.... Have you no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of morality?

282.

_The weakness of the gregarious animal_ gives rise to a morality which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the decadent man: they understand each other; they _associate_ with each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?

283.

_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit_: the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is enormous: it is right that one _should_ tremble and feel ill at ease," "Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even 'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).

It is again the _priests_ who exploit this condition, and who win the "people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against "paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the harmony of the soul).

_The hatred of the mediocre_ for the _exceptions,_ and of the herd for its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The revulsion of feeling _against_ "egotism": that only is worth anything which is done "for another." "We are all equal";--against the love of dominion, against "dominion" in general;--against privilege;--against sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers themselves--"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of morality, "general and universal."

284.

The qualities and tendencies which are _praised_: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.

We must ascertain to what extent _such qualities_ are conditioned as means to the attainment of certain desires and _ends_ (often an "_evil_" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, _intellectuality_): or as the expressions of certain states of need--that is to say, as _preservative measures_ (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc.).

In short, every one of them is not _considered "good" for its own sake,_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also as the result of an actual _gregarious instinct_ in the individual; these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is _fundamentally different_ from these _states of virtue._ For the herd is _antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless_ to the outside world; it is full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.

In the "herdsman" this _antagonism_ comes to the _fore_ he must have qualities which are _the reverse of_ those possessed by the herd.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all _order of rank_: its instinct is in favour of the _leveller_ (Christ). Towards all _strong individuals (the sovereigns)_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.

285.

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe, however, the _hatred of the herd_ for all truthful men.

286.

Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows thereby that he belongs to the _herd._ When a man is conscious of the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not belong to the herd.

287.

My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones or the beasts of prey, etc.

[Footnote 5: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE--Here is a broad distinction between Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.]

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.

288.

_Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride._--The "Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the right upon man to regard himself as the _cause_ of his highest states and actions: it is a form of the growing _feeling of pride._

Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a will behind these states--otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a _merely psychological point of view,_ based upon the false assumption that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard _one's self_ as a cause.

_Then comes the counter-movement_--that of the moral-philosophers. These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a _moral value_: thus morality becomes a _causa prima_; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as _prima causa._ The _arrière pensée_ is always this: If man is not a _causa prima_ through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he does not come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical....

In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.

289.

_Theatricalness_ regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a step in the _development of the feeling of power itself_ to believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's perfection) and to have _willed_ them....

(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. _Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness,_ as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any degree of consciousness renders perfection _impossible._ ... A form of _theatricalness_.)

290.

The _moral hypothesis,_ designed with a view to _justifying God,_ said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the _voluntariness of goodness_ might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an _object which is salvation_.

The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from a _good_ God.

The absolute dominion of moral valuations _over_ all others: nobody doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm--that is to say, perfection was understood merely as _moral_ perfection.

291.

How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also criminality....

The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the impossibility of _knowing_ that origin.

But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And finally, they would first of all have to know _what_ is useful; here also their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.

We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any value?

We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance: does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ... which it gives to the _composer._ ...) Obviously feelings of value must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence--for instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained life?--Maybe its _biological_ value is expressed in this way....

If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its value must be _x_ unknown....

292.

It amounts to a _denaturalisation of morality,_ to _separate_ an action from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe that there are actions which are good or bad in themselves.

The _re-establishment of_ "_Nature_": an action in itself is quite devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and the same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).

293.

The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: _one would not dare to eliminate it completely_; for everything is so bound up with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude the whole.

A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as a whole....

And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.--In all correlations of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says _yea_ by the very fact of its existence.

294.

_Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.--_Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an

## action because that action has been condemned for a long period of

time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing.... Self-contentment proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so as judges, but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an

## action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us

with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the result often is that we make _fools_ of ourselves ... they actually make fools of us.

295.

We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.

An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect, and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.

296.

The great _crimes_ in _psychology_:--

(1) That all _pain_ and _unhappiness_ should have been falsified by being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its innocence.)

(2) That all _strong emotions_ (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.

(3) That _feelings of weakness,_ inner acts of cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.

(4) That _greatness_ in man should have been given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people; that even in the scientist and the artist, the _elimination of the individual personality_ is presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability.

(5) That _love_ should have been twisted round to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the wealth of a given personality. Only the _wholest_ people can love; the disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of the "home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. (Egotism may be regarded as the _pre-eminence of the ego,_ altruism as the _pre-eminence of others_.)

(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.

_The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,_ a sort of _barricade_ built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of it, against the _strong_ (and finally _destroying_ them in their growth ...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.

297.

_The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature_ through moral transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism; the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, were the _result of disinterestedness_; the continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that _pseudo-justification_ of history, that refusal to see history as the pessimist _sees_ it).

298.

"_Morality for its own sake_"--this is an important step in the denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in which it _separates itself from_ religion, and in which no God is "moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is how the case stands at present.

"_Art for Art's sake_": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the slander of reality ("idealising" _into the hateful_). When an ideal is severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and calumniated. _"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," "Goodness for Goodness' sake"_--these are three forms of the evil eye for reality.

_Art, knowledge, and morality_ are _means_: instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the _opposite of Life_--with "_God_"--they have also been regarded as revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through them....

"_Beautiful_" and "_ugly_," "_true_" and "_false_," "_good_" and "_evil_"--these things are _distinctions_ and _antagonisms_ which betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a definite stand against their opponents. The _war_ which thus ensues is the essential factor: it is a means of _separating_ things, _leading to stronger_ isolation....

299.

_Moral naturalism_: The tracing back of apparently independent and supernatural values to their real "nature"--that is to say, to _natural immorality,_ to natural "utility," etc.

Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term _moral naturalism_: my object is to re-translate the moral values which have apparently become independent and _unnatural_ into their real nature--that is to say, into their natural "_immorality_."

_N.B._--Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is the same in regard to _the moral law which has been made sovereign,_ emancipated from its real _feature_ (until it is almost the _opposite_ of Nature).

The stages in the _denaturalisation of morality_ (or so-called "_Idealisation_"):--

First it is a road to individual happiness,

then it is the result of knowledge,

then it is a Categorical Imperative,

then it is a way to Salvation,

then it is a denial of the will to live.

(The gradual progress of the _hostility_ of morality to _Life_.)

300.

The suppressed and effaced _Heresy_ in morality.--Concepts: paganism, master-morality, _virtù_.

301.

_My problem_: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.

302.

Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right--as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (_Nil admirari_).

303.

Man, a small species of very excitable animals, which--fortunately--has its time. Life in general on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence, something which is of no importance whatever to the general character of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-consciousness--the worst kind of necessity--_foolish_ necessity.... Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to our hearts, "All this must be false because it is revolting.... Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words"----

4. HOW VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.

304.

_Concerning the ideal of the moralist._--In this treatise we wish to speak of the great _politics_ of virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue _is made to dominate._ I even intend to prove that in order to desire this one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!... And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the _dominion of virtue_ is absolutely attainable _only by the use of the same means_ which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case not _by_ means of virtue itself....

As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which is _pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté,_ is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never be achieved by man--the most he can do is to approximate it. Even in this narrower kind of politics--in the politics of virtue--the ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious _moralists_ (and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid their tribute to human weakness. _They all aspired_ to virtue on their own account--at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be an _immoralist in deeds._ That he must not exactly _appear to be the latter,_ is another matter. Or rather it is _not_ another matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality _and from truth_ when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making _morality dominate_--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the _attitudes of virtue,_ as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they _yield_ to virtue, when they lose control of virtue, when they themselves become _moral_ or _true._ A great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep his _esse_ and his _operari_ apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done _sub specie boni_--a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A _divine_ ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what He _is,_ the _good_ God....

305.

The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.

306.

The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral" means as any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.

307.

He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.

308.

Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of immorality.

The great _relief_ which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is _saved----_

309.

There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they say: "this is wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear concerning the _immorality_ of any particular thing which happens to come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.

310.

A. _The ways which lead to power_: the presentation of the new virtue under the name of an _old_ one,--the awakening of "interest" concerning it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and _vice versâ_),--artistic slandering of all that stands in its way,--the exploitation of advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,--the conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and separations,--symbolism _on a grand scale_.

B. _Power attained_: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.

311.

_By what means does a virtue attain to power?--_With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of acts of general "immorality."_

How does a _desire_ behave towards itself in order to become a _virtue_?--A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which _either_ triumphs _or_ perishes--one must be _unconscious and naïf_.

312.

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.

313.

We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such an aspirant for virtue was in need of _bad_ reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him. But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my _bad reasons,_--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,--you put obstacles in the way of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the _moralisation of the masses_."

314.

Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values, are _judgments emanating from our muscles._

315.

_Morality in the valuation of races and classes.--_In view of the fact that the _passions_ and _fundamental instincts_ in every race and class express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means:

That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their past.

It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from others.

It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, _that they are declining...._

It means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the _tyranny_ of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the "Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the _annihilation_ of a fundamentally different species (the undermining of its values and its happiness).

The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).

When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.

The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very

## particular kind of instinct--the _gregarious instinct._ "The equality

of men": this is what lies _concealed_ behind the tendency of _making_ ever more and more men _alike_ as men.

_The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people._ (The trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the positions of protectors of virtue.)

To what extent do all kinds of _business men_ and money-grabbers--all those who give and take credit--find it _necessary_ to promote the levelling of all characters and notions of value? the _commerce and the exchange of the world_ leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.

The _State_ exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; _science_ acts in the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its forces. And the _priesthood_ does the same.

Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous; and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but in accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes avail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so.

316.

Observe the hypocritical colour which all _civil institutions_ are painted, just as if they were _the offshoots of morality_--for instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and rights. But as they were all established in favour of the _most mediocre_ type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies.

317.

_Virtue_ must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal _for all_; they divest virtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness, its exceptional and non-average character--that is to say, of its _aristocratic charm._ A stand must also be made against those embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness--to _demand_ great and rare things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows, that they do not exist!--It is obvious, for instance, that a _marriage_ is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins--that is to say, that on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or registrar can make anything else of it.

_Virtue_[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is not profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to passion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character, the head, and the senses--always, of course, subject to the medium standard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the _lies_ which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and all reality--when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon _others,_ it is _the worst of vices_.

I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a _personal_ virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally _forbidden_: virtue as I understand it is the actual _vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtù_--free from all moralic acid....

[Footnote 6: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Virtue is used here, of course, in the sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian negative virtue.]

318.

In the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority over us; we should like to make you take _modesty_ a little more to heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are obliged to make,--that is to say, what your circumstances force you to _make,_--partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you. But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought _neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you_!... One is a _thoroughly puny kind of man_ when one is _only_ virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the _multitude_ are on your side: and because you _tyrannise_ over us, we shall fight you....

[Footnote 7: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian virtue which is negative and moral.]

319.

A _virtuous man_ is of a lower species because, in the first place, he has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he _must_ not be an individual.

Reckoning up the qualities of the _good_ man, why is it they appear pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, our good nature, and our levity, have a _good time._ This, our _feeling of well-being,_ is _what we project into_ the good man in the form of a _quality,_ in the form of a _valuable possession._

320.

Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day that everything is in good hands--that is to say, in "God's hands": and when it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as that with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others naturally refrain from contradiction.

Why disturb _this_ pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to do so, we shouldn't succeed. _In_ all things these people see the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the old God--_deus myops--_ still lives); we others see something else in everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper, more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.

321.

He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it--whither? Into devilry.

Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all fishhooks of knowledge!

322.

The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at last one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser, brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's melody....

323.

_The Patrons of Virtue._--Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely.

324.

_Virtue_ is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead; what is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the market in the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of dissipation. It exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers to allow of conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly, for people, without either consciences or scruples, this may constitute its new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice.

325.

Virtue is still the most expensive vice: _let_ it remain so!

326.

Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as qualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way; they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual needs--the determining factors of precisely _our_ existence and growth, which we recognise and acknowledge independently of the question whether others grow with us with the help of the same or of different principles. This view of the danger of the virtue which is understood as impersonal and _objective_ also holds good of modesty: through modesty many of the choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that they become _hard_ betimes.

327.

The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be drawn into the light of day and honoured, after they have lain all this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which one can dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a way as to be reminiscent of _virtù_--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from moralic acid. But for the moment--how remote this ideal seems!

_The reduction of the domain of morality_ is a sign of its progress. Wherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality, thinking has taken a _moral_ turn.

328.

After all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this wonderful result: I have lent new _charms_ to virtue--it now affects one in the same way as something _forbidden._ It has our most subtle honesty against it, it is salted in the "_cum grano salis_" of the scientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and to make them inquisitive--in short, it affects us like a vice. Only after we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and appearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this most beautiful of all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further reason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown virtue to be a _form of immorality_ do we again _justify it,_--it then becomes classified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the profound and general immorality of all existence, of which it is then shown to be a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order, the most arrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed it of its grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have delivered it from the importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and its hieratic muscles.

329.

And is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?... Just as little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been shot at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For thus it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This--I have done.

5. THE MORAL IDEAL.

A. _A Criticism of Ideals._

330.

It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away with the word "_Ideal_": a criticism of _desiderata._

331.

Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the standpoint of _desirability,_ in every "thus should it be, but it is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of opinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For there is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which is directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral norm--even as Kant understood it--is never completely fulfilled, and remains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling down to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning the whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: _whence does it get the right thereto?_ How does the part come to acquire this judicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared, this moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may perhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our species?--But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate; the point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding is part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just as every injustice and imperfection is--it is our very notion of "perfection" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires to be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the present state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host of dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away from reality "--that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is the conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all things? Is it--_deus_?

***

It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves of the notion of _the_ whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening it "God." The "All" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect for it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an imaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves. Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two things remain for ever worthy of honour" (at the close of his _Practical Reason_)--to-day we should prefer to say: "Digestion is more worthy of honour." The concept, "the All," will always give rise to the old problems, "How is evil possible?" etc. Therefore, _there is no "All",_ there _is no_ great _sensorium_ or _inventarium_ or power-magazine.

332.

A man as he _ought_ to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as: "A tree as it ought to be."

333.

Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability."--"Things _ought_ to be otherwise," "things _ought_ to become different": dissatisfaction would thus seem the heart of ethics.

One could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states in which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something should be otherwise than it is, means to desire that _everything_ should be different--it involves a damaging criticism of the whole. _But life itself consists in such desiring!_

To ascertain _what exists, how it exists_ seems an ever so much higher and more serious matter than every "thus should it be," because the latter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be condemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would fain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human well-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the accomplishment of that relationship.

On the other hand, this desire, "thus it ought to be," has only called forth that other desire, "_what exists?_" The desire of knowing what exists, is already a consequence of the question, "how? is it possible? Why precisely so?" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the expression, "thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our desire to overcome the world----

334.

To-day when every attempt at determining how man should be--is received with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite of all one only _becomes_ what one _is_(in spite of all--that is to say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, how to _reverse_ the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps distinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality. We no longer say, for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with virtue because it brings a long life and happiness." Our minds to-day are much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes but only _effects._ A man becomes a respectable member of society because he _was_ a respectable man from the start--that is to say, because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous propensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible of being improved--that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or the madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from physical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of the latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill.... Bad: this word here stands for a certain _lack of capacity_ which is related physiologically with the degenerating type--for instance, a weak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to resist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain constraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's will. Vice is not a cause; it is an _effect._ ... Vice is a somewhat arbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated.

335.

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; but when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most absurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his submissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just look at man's "_desiderata_" and his "ideals." Man, when he _desires, _ tries to recover from that which is eternally valuable in him, from his deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness, childishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of this resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal" is at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure which he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.--Should reality cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an "ideal" might even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The strongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition overtakes them: they _deify_ the cessation of work, of war, of passions, of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality "--in short, of the struggle for knowledge and of the _trouble_ of acquiring it.

"Innocence" to them is idealised stultification; "blessedness" is idealised idleness; "love," the ideal state of the gregarious animal that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and belittles man is elevated to an _ideal_.

336.

A desire _magnifies_ the thing desired; and by not being realised it grows--the _greatest ideas_ are those which have been created by the strongest and longest desiring. Things grow _ever more valuable_ in our estimation, the more our desire for them increases: if "moral values" have become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal is the one which has been _realised least_ (and thus it _represented the Beyond to all suffering,_ as a road to _blessedness_). Man, with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing _clouds_: and ultimately called his desperation and impotence "God."

337.

Think of the _naïveté_ of all ultimate "desiderata"--when the "wherefore" of man remains unknown.

338.

What is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should know what "good and evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that one would fain know that man actually _has_ a goal or a destiny.

The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general duty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a goal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid of it before it becomes a "fixed idea." ... But humanity does not constitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending and descending organisms--it knows no such thing as a state of youth followed by _maturity_ and then age. But its strata lie confused and superimposed--and in a few thousand years there may be even younger types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is refuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital processes; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.

Under the empire of Christian prejudice _this question was never put at all_: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the individual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end to come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual, _there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever._ ... The duty of every individual for the present was identical with what it would be in any sort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with God.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic, criminal.

The centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the _immortal_ soul! The most extreme form of _personalisation...._ For each soul there was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to salvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of _equal rights,_ associated with an optical magnification of individual importance to the point of megalomania.... Nothing but insanely important souls, revolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror....

***

Nobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer to-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt. Nevertheless the _optical habit_ survives, which would fain measure the value of man by his proximity to a certain _ideal maw._ at bottom the personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the _equality of rights as regards the ideal._ In short: people _seem to think that they know_ what _the ultimate desideratum_ is in regard to the ideal man....

But this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly _detrimental influence_ of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself every time he carefully examines the "ideal type." In the first place, it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable; _secondly,_ that this particular type is known; _thirdly,_ that every deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the spirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a state of affairs in which this _perfect_ man will be in the majority: our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not reached a higher level than this. In this way an _aim_ seems to have crept into the _evolution_ of man: at any rate the belief in a certain _progress towards an ideal_ is the only shape in which an _aim_ is conceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the "_Kingdom of God_" has been placed in the future, and has been given an earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the _old_ ideal is still maintained....

340.

_The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals._--The _insipid and cowardly notion "Nature"_ invented by Nature-enthusiasts (without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable, and the cynical element in even "the most beautiful" aspects), is only a sort of attempt at _reading_ the moral and Christian notion of "humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance, which took for granted that "Nature" meant freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice, and _Idylls,_ was nothing more at bottom than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from the poets in order to see _what_ they admired, in lofty mountains, for instance. What Goethe had to do with them--why he admired Spinoza. Absolute _ignorance_ concerning the reasons of this _cult...._

The _insipid and cowardly concept "Man"_ à la Comte and Stuart Mill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the Christian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the freethinkers--Guyau for example.

The _insipid and cowardly concept "Art"_ which is held to mean sympathy with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same thing happens to _history,_ cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the Christian moral ideal.

And now, as to the whole _socialistic ideal_: it is nothing but a blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.

341.

_The origin of the ideal._ The examination of the soil out of which it grows.

_A._ Starting out from those "æsthetic" mental states during which the world seems rounder, fuller, and _more perfect_: we have the pagan ideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (_people give of their abundance_). The highest type: the _classical_ ideal--regarded as an expression of the successful nature of _all_ the more important instincts. In this classical ideal we find _the grand style_ as the highest style. An expression of the "will to power" itself. The instinct which is most feared _dares to acknowledge itself._

_B._ Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed emptier, paler, and thinner, when "spiritualisation" and the absence of sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (_people calculate and select_): the "sage," "the angel"; priestliness = virginity = ignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the _anæmic_ ideal. Under certain circumstances this anæmic ideal may be the ideal of such natures as _represent_ paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" in Spinoza).

_C._ Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed more absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot even be imagined or desired in it (_people deny and annihilate_); the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, anti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the "impoverishment" of the world as a result of suffering: _people take, they no longer bestow_): the _anti-natural ideal._

(The _Christian ideal_ is a _transitional form_ between the second and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon inclining towards the latter.)

_The three ideals: A._ Either a _strengthening_ of Life (_paganism,_) or _B._ an _impoverishment_ of Life (_anæmia_), or _C._ a _denial_ of Life (_anti-naturalism_). The state of beatitude in _A._ is the feeling of extreme abundance; in _B._ it is reached by the most fastidious selectiveness; in _C._ it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.

342.

_A._ The _consistent_ type understands that even evil must not be hated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war against one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in positive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word and deed; that by means of a superfœtation of peaceful, kindly, conciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of the other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting _practice._ What is achieved thereby?--The Buddhistic type, or the _perfect_ cow.

This point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism prevails--that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account, but because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, work, care, complications, dependence).

This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the concept "sin," in fact, is entirely lacking.

_B._ The _inconsistent_ type. War is waged against evil--there is a belief that war waged _for Goodness' sake_ does not involve the same moral results or affect character in the same way as war generally does (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as _evil)._ As a matter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much more profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented and most anxious state of mind: thus "miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became _desirable_. ... The Christian type: or the _perfect bigot_.

_C._ The _stoical_ type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound quiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war--firmness of principles; the unity of _knowledge_ and _will_; great self-respect. The type of the anchorite. _The perfect blockhead._

343.

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to further its purpose _(a)_ by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin; _(b)_ by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already existing; _(c)_ by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; _(d)_ by the slander of its opponents' ideals; _(e)_ by a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God, etc.--Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.

Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby _refuted_? It has merely availed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows--they are all "immoral."

My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life are lying beneath the _ban of morality_: morality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.

344.

To _avoid_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark concerning these reasons also.

345.

_The tendency of moral evolution._--Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the _weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords.

The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons of power.

346.

(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly independent.

(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be done," are mere states of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.

347.

_Morality as a means of seduction._--"Nature is good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the 'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare with _Pascals_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).

Refer also to _Luther's_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge as a _moral and religious_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to _sanctify_ itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is the basis of the priest's powerful position).

Compare this with _Pauls_ logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of _Christ_ the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion. It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as _retributive Justice._

348.

_The incidents of the fight_: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the _exact opposite_ of himself--imaginatively, of course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the _good Cause_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the strongest means of defence and attack, _is the belief in himself,_ which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "_Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours._" War urges people to this _exaggerated self-esteem_....

349.

Whatever kind of _eccentric ideal_ one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_ ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.

How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the _majority_ acquiesce therein?--For instance, all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a _charitable movement,_ under the banner bearing the device "For others."

The _cleverness_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus "beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, _not_ in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... "I am thus; I will be thus--and you can go to the devil!"

350.

_Every_ ideal assumes _love, hate, reverence,_ and _contempt._ Either positive feeling is the _primum mobile,_ or negative feeling is. _Hatred_ and _contempt_ are the _primum mobile_ in all the ideals which proceed from resentment.

B. _A Criticism of the "Good Man" of the Saint, etc._

351.

The "_good man_" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.--In the opinion of every strong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be "idealistic"; it never doubts that in its concept of the "good man," it has found the highest desideratum. When aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over. It does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the second ought not _to be with us at all...._ What, as a matter of fact, is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men to this one-sided activity: and even to-day, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul." The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be harmful or _desire_ harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of resentment, and to establish "spiritual peace" as a chronic disease.

This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred, starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated as realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted--_but with this valuation Life is actually denied,_ for in all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.--It is possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief _in the science of psychology,_ has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is _not free,_ the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly life.

And even here, Life is still in the right--Life that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies, or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The Christian, for instance, hates "sin"!--and what on earth is there which he does not call "sin"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: _he denies Life,_ he sees how "good," as the highest value, _condemns_ Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive _another_ life!...

352.

Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to _harm_ as well as to _help._ This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races.

The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way morality becomes the poisoner of life.

353.

_A criticism of the good man._--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?

I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between the _ego_ and the _alter_ in the judgment: the question is, whether it is the _results_ of these qualities, either in regard to him who possesses them or in regard to environment, society, "humanity," which lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves.... In other words: is it _utility_ which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it _desirable_ that there should exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? _In any case, this is believed_.... But here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity of _narrow egoism._

Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just--so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct?

At bottom, this is a question of taste and of _æsthetics_: should we desire the most honourable types of men--that is to say, the greatest bores--alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?

If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the "others," even the just man himself ceases from having a right to exist,--he is, in fact, no longer necessary,--and in this way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an _insufferable_ virtue to a place of honour.

Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to the humble position of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal gregarious animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires _other qualities_.

354.

_The "good man" as a tyrant--_Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the _measure_ and standard of life;--instead of seeking the standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the _preservative measures_ of a very definite kind of life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind, and even become the standard of goals to him--that is to say, _a given species of man_ regards his means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," "goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to _tyrannise._ ... It is a _form of faith,_ of instinct, when a certain species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be master.

355.

"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.

* * *

"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.

356.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that men were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.

357.

_The metamorphoses of slavery_; its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.

358.

_The ideal slave_ (the "good man").--He who cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, instinctively honours the morality of _unselfishness._ Everything urges him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial.

***

_Atavism_: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.

***

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many _obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_ of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.

***

It is not a question of _going ahead_ (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is rather a matter of _getting along alone,_ of _being able to be another._

359.

We must realise _all_ that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral _idealism_: how almost _all other values_ have crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for _a very long time_ and with the _strongest passions_--and that it has not yet been attained: otherwise it would have _disappointed_ everybody (that is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation).

The _saint_ as the _most powerful type_ of man: _this_ ideal it is which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the _moral_ man is the most _powerful_ and most godly.--The conquest of the senses and the passions--everything inspired _terror_;--the unnatural seemed to the spectators to be _supernatural_ and _transcendental...._

360.

Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual hierarchy--"all alike before God."

Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus Aurelius!

361.

I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely _I_ related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals.... The _continuance_ of the Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in order to grow _strong_ themselves. That is why we immoralists require the _power_ of _morality,_ our instinct of self-preservation insists upon our opponents maintaining their strength--all it requires is to _become master of them_.

C. _Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities_.

362.

Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore _reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save egoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the strength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.

363.

Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as more important than his advantage.

364.

Egoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of "equality."

365.

The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity. The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.

366.

To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.

367.

_My "pity."_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind, I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving the fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not "mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.

368.

Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.

369.

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.

370.

The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.

371.

Our "ego"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_ no "_egoistic_" _actions_.

372.

Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is

## active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in

the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is "unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular --it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare of the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act counter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the _ego--_innocent in both cases!

373.

_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, something that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_ (for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which some one must be _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_ for it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.

374.

Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to _caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "_criminal._" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of values, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books becomes a caricature.

375.

All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.

376.

The _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.

377.

_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise in which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of falsity.

_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the _most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its self-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_ cause of falsity.

In both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_ even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a _broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression" ("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word, and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.

In the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_ is present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.

_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in supposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something quite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)

378.

"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_ with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.

People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but _only under certain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_ (_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once more inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the _unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar.")

379.

The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--

_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.

_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ ("the philosopher") can know the _truth_, "the true essence and nature of things."

_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive to further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in proportion as he effaces himself.

_(d)_ Art as the work of the "_pure free-willed subject_"; misunderstanding of "objectivity."

_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one. Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.

The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming known.

380.

1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a proof of the moral valuation:

_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a people and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people ("its culture") regarded as the result of high moral excellence.

2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great periods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.

381.

A great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the cause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.

382.

Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_ from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement, as the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective" contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the _will_....

Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different valuation._ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies _without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and fullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.

The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus ultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral values._

Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]). _Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a criticism of the saintly type.

Hegel's value: "Passion."

Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.

Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of _value_ in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and technology must be shown to be _morally valuable_ and _morally conditioned,_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"--a funny question, for the reverse is _obvious,_ and is a fact which speaks _in favour_ of civilisation.

[Footnote 8: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--This is doubtless a reference to a passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following words occur:--"_Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?--_("Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant; namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.]

383.

_Religious morality.--_Passion, great desire; the passion for power, love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.

The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a _good_ man....

This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the emasculated man is a good man.

Instead of making use of and of _economising_ the great sources of passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most corrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them _dry up._

384.

_Conquest over the passions?_--No, not if this is to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation. _They must be enlisted in our service_: and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.

385.

_Intolerance on the part of morality_ is a sign of man's _weakness_: he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must _deny_ his strongest _instincts,_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power is lacking that might become master here....

386.

There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in _rebus moralibus,_ that the "good man" alone and nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is in the highest degree an _uneconomical_ thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more than the expression of the _agreeableness_ which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one is able to take).

With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that is to say, an ever greater _dominion of evil,_ man's gradual emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the passions in one's service.

387.

The whole idea of the hierarchy of the _passions_: as if the only right and normal thing were to be led by _reason_--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end is concerned, nothing more than _desires for pleasure...._

Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the _motive force_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure....

The misinterpretation of passion and _reason,_ as if the latter were an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not possess its quantum of reason....

388.

How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic and _self-effacing morality,_ it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were necessarily misunderstood?

It is the _richness of a personality,_ the fullness of it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner certainty that one has a right to everything. The _opposite_ views, according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to protect or to support others....

How was it possible to _transform_ these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!

If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it is found in the fact that _God commanded it._--From this it follows that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to them only after having _denied_ them as an obedient worshipper of God. ... Pascal, the admirable _logician_ of Christianity, _went as far as this_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self loved," seemed Christian to him.

389.

Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists.")

The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.

The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an instrument).

Pangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the _gloominess_ of the world from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!

Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and religion.

Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish

## action out of consideration!

390.

My ultimate conclusion is, that the _real_ man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish _his_ measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a _desire_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," _worth of man_; that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced men to yearn for nonentity_....

D. _A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating._

391.

The standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to be determined.

The fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.

_Homo natura_: The "will to power."

392.

Moral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with _physiological_ values.

393.

Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the "desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "_improvement_" of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, _why_ necessarily "_improve!_" To what extent is it _desirable_ that man should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_ Granting that nobody yet _knows_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."

394.

The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called _moral improvement._

We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that other already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect is altered, but _not_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest _factum brutum_ that any one should cease from performing certain

## actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations.

Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain

## actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those

circumstances which make him _able_ to perform those actions: this is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out.... An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it believes in "influences" that do not exist--in divine influences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.

395.

"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement of mankind"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological _deterioration_?... It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us "man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which _it seems otherwise,_ all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided, however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving, and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the _great_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been _immoral_ in the deepest sense of the word?...

396.

The priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all ages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say, tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them"--that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must be good; that which is good cannot lie"--these are their inexorable conclusions--"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; there is no other criterion of truth." ...

But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the first to give a "good example" in this respect--birds of a feather flock together).

397.

One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called "priests."

***

Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this phenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and _recent_ miscarriage--the sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?

***

In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two _biological_ notions in its place: the _taming_ of the wild beasts, and the _rearing of a particular species._

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "_improve_" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. But he is less harmful....

398.

What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:--

_(a)_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds _rearing_ and _taming_: and these two things have always been confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already existing stem and growing _stronger_....

_(b)_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is an abstract thing: the object of _rearing,_ even in regard to the most individual cases, can only be the _strong_ man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

399.

These are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in this case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: "why precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"--for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive you: "why not?"--Before what tribunal?

400.

The three _postulates_:--

All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar man").

All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the physiologically botched).

All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the herd, of the "mediocre").

Thus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence.

From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), --hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes _conscious._

401.

_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_

Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist somewhere.

What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth, is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the _masters_....

Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions.

The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.

General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular instance of _immorality._

***

Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?

The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.

2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....

_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life on this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," "institutions." ...

3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our _science._

***

The _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of ascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the _will to life_!

Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even more dangerous?

Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?[9] ...

We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_" and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger is wrong."

We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the _stronger_.

If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.

[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._ He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of Christian values.]

402.

_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters.

403.

One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_ one.

Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved!_

_Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and "wild animals.")

B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.

404.

Morality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that _self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.

We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal. _Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.

405.

To what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "_yea_" is driving us forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our _strength_ no longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered, and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....