D.
=18.= The investigation of intrinsic values is complicated by the fact that the value of a whole may be different from the sum of the values of its parts, 27
=19.= in which case the part has to the whole a relation, which exhibits an equally important difference from and resemblance to that of means to end. 29
=20.= The term ‘organic whole’ might well be used to denote that a whole has this property, since, of the two other properties which it is commonly used to imply, 30
=21.= one that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts, has no necessary relation to this one, 31
=22.= and the other, upon which most stress has been laid, can be true of no whole whatsoever, being a self-contradictory conception due to confusion. 33
=23.= Summary of chapter. 36
## CHAPTER II.
NATURALISTIC ETHICS.
=24.= This and the two following chapters will consider certain proposed answers to the second of ethical questions: What is _good in itself_? These proposed answers are characterised by the facts (1) that they declare some _one_ kind of thing to be alone good in itself; and (2) that they do so, because they suppose this _one_ thing to define the meaning of ‘good.’ 37
=25.= Such theories may be divided into two groups (1) Metaphysical, (2) Naturalistic: and the second group may be subdivided into two others, (_a_) theories which declare some natural object, other than pleasure, to be sole good, (_b_) Hedonism. The present chapter will deal with (_a_). 38
=26.= Definition of what is meant by ‘Naturalism.’ 39
=27.= The common argument that things are good, because they are ‘natural,’ may involve either (1) the false proposition that the ‘normal,’ as such, is good; 41
=28.= or (2) the false proposition that the ‘necessary,’ as such, is good. 44
=29.= But a _systematised_ appeal to Nature is now most prevalent in connection with the term ‘Evolution.’ An examination of Mr Herbert Spencer’s Ethics will illustrate this form of Naturalism. 45
=30.= Darwin’s scientific theory of ‘natural selection,’ which has mainly caused the modern vogue of the term ‘Evolution,’ must be carefully distinguished from certain ideas which are commonly associated with the latter term. 47
=31.= Mr Spencer’s connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to shew the influence of the naturalistic fallacy; 48
=32.= but Mr Spencer is vague as to the ethical relations of ‘pleasure’ and ‘evolution,’ and his Naturalism may be mainly Naturalistic Hedonism. 49
=33.= A discussion of the third chapter of the _Data of Ethics_ serves to illustrate these two points and to shew that Mr Spencer is in utter confusion with regard to the fundamental principles of Ethics. 51
=34.= Three possible views as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is proposed to confine the name ‘Evolutionistic Ethics.’ On any of these three views the relation would be unimportant, and the ‘Evolutionistic’ view, which makes it important, involves a double fallacy. 54
=35.= Summary of chapter. 58
## CHAPTER III.
HEDONISM.
=36.= The prevalence of Hedonism is mainly due to the naturalistic fallacy. 59
=37.= Hedonism may be defined as the doctrine that ‘Pleasure is the sole good’: this doctrine has always been held by Hedonists and used by them as a fundamental ethical principle, although it has commonly been confused with others. 61
=38.= The method pursued in this chapter will consist in exposing the reasons commonly offered for the truth of Hedonism and in bringing out the reasons, which suffice to shew it untrue, by a criticism of J. S. Mill & H. Sidgwick. 63
A.
=39.= Mill declares that ‘Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end,’ and insists that ‘Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof’; 64
=40.= yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which consists in (1) the fallacious confusion of ‘desirable’ with ‘desired,’ 66
=41.= (2) an attempt to shew that nothing but pleasure is desired. 67
=42.= The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely due to a confusion between the _cause_ and the _object_ of desire: pleasure is certainly not the sole _object_ of desire, and, even if it is always among the _causes_ of desire, that fact would not tempt anyone to think it a good. 68
=43.= Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to happiness is ‘part’ of happiness. 71
=44.= Summary of Mill’s argument and of my criticism. 72
B.
=45.= We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism as an ‘Intuition,’ as which it has been clearly recognised by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of _proof_ is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. 74
=46.= In thus beginning to consider what things are good in themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and enter on the second division of ethical questions. 76
=47.= Mill’s doctrine that some pleasures are superior ‘in quality’ to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must be ‘intuitions’; 77
=48.= and (2) that pleasure is _not_ the sole good. 79
=49.= Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusions made by Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely consider the question ‘Is pleasure the sole good?’ 81
=50.= Prof. Sidgwick first tries to shew that nothing outside of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting this. 81
=51.= He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. 85
=52.= But _pleasure_ must be distinguished from _consciousness of pleasure_, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished, _pleasure_ is not the sole good; 87
=53.= and (2) it may be made equally plain that _consciousness of pleasure_ is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. 90
=54.= Of Prof. Sidgwick’s two arguments for the contrary view, the second is equally compatible with the supposition that pleasure is a mere _criterion_ of what is _right_; 91
=55.= and in his first, the appeal to reflective intuition, he fails to put the question clearly (1) in that he does not recognise the principle of _organic unities_; 92
=56.= and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement, which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and those of Common Sense, only holds of _judgments of means_: hedonistic judgments of _ends_ are flagrantly paradoxical. 94
=57.= I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. 95