part iii

., quaest. 27, art. 2.

[8] Sess. v. _De peccato originale_.

[9] _P. G._, tom. cxvii. p. 1305.

IMMANENCE (from Lat. _in-manere_ to dwell in, remain), in philosophy and theology a term applied in contradistinction to "transcendence," to the fact or condition of being entirely within something. Its most important use is for the theological conception of God as existing in and throughout the created world, as opposed, for example, to Deism (q.v.), which conceives Him as separate from and above the universe. This conception has been expressed in a great variety of forms (see THEISM, PANTHEISM). It should be observed that the immanence doctrine need not preclude the belief in the transcendence of God: thus God may be regarded as above the world (transcendent) and at the same time as present in and pervading it (immanent). The immanence doctrine has arisen from two main causes, the one metaphysical, the other religious. Metaphysical speculation on the relation of matter and mind has naturally led to a conviction of an underlying unity of all existence, and so to a metaphysical identification of God and the universe: when this identification proceeds to the length of expressing the universe as merely a mode or form of deity the result is pantheism (cf. the Eleatics): when it regards the deity as simply the sum of the forces of nature (cf. John Toland) the result is naturalism. In either case, but especially in the former, it frequently becomes pure mysticism (q.v.). Religious thinkers are faced by the problem of the Creator and the created, and the necessity for formulating a close relationship between God and man, the Infinite and Perfect with the finite and imperfect. The conception of God as wholly external to man, a purely mechanical theory of the creation, is throughout Christendom regarded as false to the teaching of the New Testament as also to Christian experience. The contrary view has gained ground in some quarters (cf. the so-called "New Theology" of Rev. R. J. Campbell) so far as to postulate a divine element in human beings, so definitely bridging over the gap between finite and infinite which was to some extent admitted by the bulk of early Christian teachers. In support of such a view are adduced not only the metaphysical difficulty of postulating any relationship between the infinite and the purely finite, but also the ethical problems of the nature of human goodness--i.e. how a merely human being could appreciate the nature of or display divine goodness--and the epistemological problem of explaining how finite mind can cognize the infinite. The development of the immanence theory of God has coincided with the deeper recognition of the essentially spiritual nature of deity as contrasted with the older semi-pagan conception found very largely in the Old Testament of God as primarily a mighty ruler, obedience to whom is comparable with that of a subject to an absolute monarch: the idea of the dignity of man in virtue of his immediate relation with God may be traced in great measure to the humanist movement of the 14th and 15th centuries (cf. the Inner Light doctrine of Johann Tauler). In later times the conception of conscience as an inward monitor is symptomatic of the same movement of thought. In pure metaphysics the term "immanence-philosophy" is given to a doctrine held largely by German philosophers (Rehmke, Leclair, Schuppe and others) according to which all reality is reduced to elements immanent in consciousness. This doctrine is derived from Berkeley and Hume on the one hand and from Kantianism on the other, and embodies the principle that nothing can exist for the mind save itself. The natural consequence of this theory is that the individual consciousness alone exists (solipsism): this position is, however, open to the obvious criticism that in some cases individual consciousnesses agree in their content. Schuppe, therefore, postulates a general consciousness (_Bewusstsein überhaupt_).

IMMANUEL BEN SOLOMON (c. 1265-c. 1330), Hebrew poet, was born in Rome. He was a contemporary and friend of Dante, and his verse shows the influence of the "divine poet." Immanuel's early studies included science, mathematics and philosophy; and his commentaries on Proverbs, Psalms, Job and other Biblical books are good examples of the current symbolical methods which Dante so supremely used. Immanuel's fame chiefly rests on his poems, especially the collection (in the manner of Harizi, q.v.) entitled _Mehabberoth_, a series of 27 good-natured satires on Jewish life. Religious and secular topics are indiscriminately interwoven, and severe pietists were offended by Immanuel's erotic style. Most popular is an additional section numbered 28 (often printed by itself) called _Hell and Paradise_ (_ha-Tophet veha-Eden_). The poet is conducted by a certain Daniel (doubtfully identified with Dante) through the realms of torture and bliss, and Immanuel's pictures and comments are at once vivid and witty.

See J. Chotzner, _Hebrew Humour_ (Lond., 1905), pp. 82-102. (I. A.)

IMMERMANN, KARL LEBERECHT (1796-1840), German dramatist and novelist, was born on the 24th of April 1796 at Magdeburg, the son of a government official. In 1813 he went to study law at Halle, where he remained, after the suppression of the university by Napoleon in the same year, until King Frederick William's "Summons to my people" on March 17th. He responded with alacrity, but was prevented by illness from taking part in the earlier campaign; he fought, however, in 1815 at Ligny and Waterloo, and marched into Paris with Blücher. At the conclusion of the war he resumed his studies at Halle, and after being _Referendar_ in Magdeburg, was appointed in 1819 _Assessor_ at Münster in Westphalia. Here he made the acquaintance of Elise von Lützow, Countess von Ahlefeldt, wife of the leader of the famous "free corps" (see Lützow). This lady first inspired his pen, and their relationship is reflected in several dramas written about this time. In 1823 Immermann was appointed judge at Magdeburg, and in 1827 was transferred to Düsseldorf as _Landgerichtsrat_ or district judge. Thither the countess, whose marriage had in the meantime been dissolved, followed him, and, though refusing his hand, shared his home until his marriage in 1839 with a grand-daughter of August Hermann Niemeyer (1754-1828), chancellor and _rector perpetuus_ of Halle university. In 1834 Immermann undertook the management of the Düsseldorf theatre, and, although his resources were small, succeeded for two years in raising it to a high level of excellence. The theatre, however, was insufficiently endowed to allow of him carrying on the work, and in 1836 he returned to his official duties and literary pursuits. He died at Düsseldorf on the 25th of August 1840.

Immermann had considerable aptitude for the drama, but it was long before he found a congenial field for his talents. His early plays are imitations, partly of Kotzebue's, partly of the Romantic dramas of Tieck and Müllner, and are now forgotten. In 1826, however, appeared _Cardenio und Celinde_, a love tragedy of more promise; this, as well as the earlier productions, awakened the ill-will of Platen, who made Immermann the subject of his wittiest satire, _Der romantische Oedipus_. Between 1827 and 1832 Immermann redeemed his good name by a series of historical tragedies, _Das Trauerspiel in Tirol_ (1827), _Kaiser Friedrich II._ (1828) and a trilogy from Russian history, Alexis (1832). His masterpiece is the poetic mystery, _Merlin_ (1831), a noble poem, which, like its model, _Faust_, deals with the deeper problems of modern spiritual life. Immermann's important dramaturgic experiments in Düsseldorf are described in detail in _Düsseldörfer Anfänge_ (1840). More significant is his position as a novelist. Here he clearly stands on the boundary line between Romanticism and modern literature; his _Epigonen_ (1836) might be described as one of the last Romantic imitations of Goethe's _Wilhelm Meister_, while the satire and realism of his second novel, _Münchhausen_ (1838), form a complete break with the older literature. As a prose-writer Immermann is perhaps best remembered to-day by the admirable story of village life, _Der Oberhof_, which is embedded in the formless mass of _Münchhausen_. His last work was an unfinished epic, _Tristan und Isolde_ (1840).

Immermann's _Gesammelte Schriften_ were published in 14 vols. in 1835-1843; a new edition, with biography and introduction by R. Boxberger, in 20 vols. (Berlin, 1883); selected works, edited by M. Koch (4 vols., 1887-1888) and F. Muncker (6 vols., 1897). See G. zu Putlitz, _Karl Immermann, sein Leben und seine Werke_ (2 vols., 1870); F. Freiligrath, _Karl Immermann, Blätter der Erinnerung an ihn_ (1842); W. Müller, _K. Immermann und sein Kreis_ (1860); R. Fellner, _Geschichte einer deutschen Musterbühne_ (1888); _K. Immermann: eine Gedächtnisschrift_ (1896).

IMMERSION (Lat. _immersio_, dipping), the act of being plunged into a fluid, or being overwhelmed by anything; in astronomy, the disappearance of a heavenly body in the shadow of another, especially of a satellite in the shadow of its primary.

IMMIGRATION (from Lat. _in_, into, and _migrare_, to depart), the movement of population, other than that of casual visitors or travellers, _into_ one country _from_ another (see MIGRATION).

IMMORTALITY (Lat. _in_-, not, _mortalis_, mortal, from _mors_, death), the condition or quality of being exempt from death or annihilation. This condition has been predicated of man, both body and soul, in many senses; and the term is used by analogy of those whose deeds or writings have made a lasting impression on the memory of man. The belief in human immortality in some form is almost universal; even in early animistic cults the germ of the idea is present, and in all the higher religions it is an important feature. This article is confined to summarizing the philosophical or scientific arguments for, and objections to, the doctrine of the persistence of the human soul after death. For the Christian doctrine, see ESCHATOLOGY; and for other religions see the separate articles.

In the Orphic mysteries "the soul was regarded as a part of the divine, a _particula aurae divinae_, for which the body in its limited and perishable condition was no fit organ, but a grave or prison ([Greek: to sôma sêma]). The existence of the soul in the body was its punishment for sins in a previous condition; and the doom of its sins in the body was its descent into other bodies, and the postponement of its deliverance" (Salmond's _Christian Doctrine of Immortality_, p. 109). This deliverance was what the mysteries promised. A remarkable passage in Pindar (_Thren._ 2) is thus rendered by J. W. Donaldson (_Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes_, p. 372). "By a happy lot, all persons travel to an end free of toil. And the body, indeed, is subject to the powerful influence of death; but a shadow of vitality is still left alive, and this alone is of divine origin; while our limbs are in

## activity it sleeps; but, when we sleep, it discloses to the mind in many

dreams the future judgment with regard to happiness and misery."

The belief of Socrates is uncertain. In the _Apology_ he is represented as sure that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death," but as not knowing whether "death be a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or a change or migration of the soul from this world to the next" (i. 40, 41). In the _Phaedo_ a confident expectation is ascribed to him. He is not the body to be buried; he will not remain with his friends after he has drunk the poison, but he will go away to the happiness of the blessed. The silence of the _Memorabilia_ of Xenophon must be admitted as an argument to the contrary; but the probability seems to be that Plato did not in the _Phaedo_ altogether misrepresent the Master. In Plato's thought the belief held a prominent position. "It is noteworthy," says Professor D. G. Ritchie, "that, in the various dialogues in which Plato speaks of immortality, the arguments seem to be of different kinds, and most of them quite unconnected with one another." In the _Phaedrus_ (245 c) the argument is, that the soul is self-moving, and, therefore, immortal; and this argument is repeated in the _Laws_ (x. 894, 895). It is an argument that Plato probably inherited from Alcmaeon, the physician of Croton (Arist. _De An._ i. 2, § 17 405 A 29), whose views were closely connected with those of the Pythagoreans. In the _Phaedo_ the main argument up to which all the others lead is that the soul participates in the idea of life. Recollection (_anamnesis_) alone would prove pre-existence, but not existence after death. In the tenth book of the _Republic_ we find the curious argument that the soul does not perish like the body, because its characteristic evil, sin or wickedness does not kill it as the diseases of the body wear out the bodily life. In the _Timaeus_ (41 A) the immortality even of the gods is made dependent on the will of the Supreme Creator; souls are not in their own nature indestructible, but persist because of His goodness. In the _Laws_ (xii. 959 A) the notion of a future life seems to be treated as a salutary doctrine which is to be believed because the legislator enacts it (Plato, p. 146). The estimate to be formed of this reasoning has been well stated by Dr A. M. Fairbairn, "Plato's arguments for immortality, isolated, modernized, may be feeble, even valueless, but allowed to stand where and as he himself puts them, they have an altogether different worth. The ratiocinative parts of the _Phaedo_ thrown into syllogisms may be easily demolished by a hostile logician; but in the dialogue as a whole there is a subtle spirit and cumulative force which logic can neither seize nor answer" (_Studies in the Philosophy of Religion_, p. 226, 1876).

Aristotle held that the [Greek: nous] or active intelligence alone is immortal. The Stoics were not agreed upon the question. Cleanthes is said to have held that all survive to the great conflagration which closes the cycle, Chrysippus that only the wise will. Marcus Aurelius teaches that even if the spirit survive for a time it is at last "absorbed in the generative principle of the universe." Epicureanism thought that "the wise man fears not death, before which most men tremble; for, if we are, it is not; if it is, we are not." Death is extinction. Augustine adopts a Platonic thought when he teaches that the immortality of the soul follows from its participation in the eternal truths. The Apologists themselves welcomed, and commended to others, the Christian revelation as affording a certainty of immortality such as reason could not give. The Aristotelian school in Islam did not speak with one voice upon the question; Avicenna declared the soul immortal, but Averroes assumes only the eternity of the universal intellect. Albertus Magnus argued that the soul is immortal, as _ex se ipsa causa_, and as independent of the body; Pietro Pomponazzi maintained that the soul's immortality could be neither proved nor disproved by any natural reasons. Spinoza, while consistently with his pantheism denying personal immortality, affirms that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal" (_Eth._ v. prop, xxiii.). The reason he gives is that, as this something "appertains to the essence of the mind," it is "conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God."

Leibnitz, in accord with the distinctive principle of his philosophy, affirmed the absolute independence of mind and body as distinct monads, the parallelism of their functions in life being due to the pre-established harmony. For the soul, by its nature as a single monad indestructible and, therefore, immortal, death meant only the loss of the monads constituting the body and its return to the pre-existent state. The argument of Ernst Platner (_Philos. Aphor._ i. 1174, 1178) is similar. "If the human soul is a force in the narrower sense, a substance, and not a combination of substances, then, as in the nature of things there is no transition from existence to non-existence, we cannot naturally conceive the end of its existence, any more than we can anticipate a gradual annihilation of its existence." He adds a reason that recalls one of Plato's, "As manifestly as the human soul is by means of the senses linked to the present life, so manifestly it attaches itself by reason, and the conceptions, conclusions, anticipations and efforts to which reason leads it, to God and eternity."

Against the first kind of argument, as formulated by Moses Mendelssohn, Kant advances the objection that, although we may deny the soul extensive quantity, division into parts, yet we cannot refuse to it intensive quantity, degrees of reality; and consequently its existence may be terminated not by decomposition, but by gradual diminution of its powers (or to use the term he coined for the purpose, by _elanguescence_). This denial of any reasonable ground for belief in immortality in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ (_Transcendental Dialectic_, bk. ii. ch. i.) is, however, not his last word on the subject. In the _Critique of the Practical Reason_ (_Dialectic_, ch. i. sec. iv) the immortality of the soul is shown to be a postulate. _Holiness_, "the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law," demands an _endless progress_; and "this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an _endless_ duration of the _existence_ and _personality_ of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul)." Not demonstrable as a theoretical proposition, the immortality of the soul "is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law." The moral interest, which is so decisive on this question in the case of Kant, dominates Bishop Butler also. A future life for him is important, because our happiness in it may depend on our present conduct; and therefore our action here should take into account the reward or punishment that it may bring on us hereafter. As he maintains that probability may and ought to be our guide in life, he is content with proving in the first chapter of the _Analogy_ that "a future life is probable from similar changes (as death) already undergone in ourselves and in others, and from our present powers, which are likely to _continue_ unless death destroy them." While we may fear this, "there is no proof that it will, either from the nature of death," of the effect of which on our powers we are altogether ignorant, "or from the analogy of nature, which shows only that the _sensible proof_ of our powers (not the powers themselves) may be destroyed." The imagination that death will destroy these powers is unfounded, because (1) "this supposes we are compounded, and so discerptible, but the contrary is probable" on _metaphysical_ grounds (the indivisibility of the subject in which consciousness as indivisible inheres, and its distinction from the body) and also _experimental_ (the persistence of the living being in spite of changes in the body or even losses of parts of the body); (2) this also assumes that "our present living powers of reflection" must be affected in the same way by death "as those of sensation," but this is disproved by their relative independence even in this life; (3) "even the suspension of our present powers of reflection" is not involved in "the idea of death, which is simply dissolution of the body," and which may even "be like birth, a continuation and perfecting of our powers." "Even if suspension were involved, we cannot infer destruction from it" (analysis of chapter i. in Angus's edition). He recognizes that "reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked," but only "revelation teaches us that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice" (ch. ii. note 10). He does not use this general anticipation of future judgment, as he might have done, as a positive argument for immortality.

Adam Ferguson (_Institutes of Moral Philosophy_, p. 119, new ed., 1800) argues that "the desire for immortality is an instinct, and can reasonably be regarded as an indication of that which the author of this desire wills to do." From the standpoint of modern science John Fiske confirms the validity of such an argument; for what he affirms in regard to belief in the divine is equally applicable to this belief in a future life. "If the relation thus established in the morning twilight of man's existence between the human soul and a world invisible and immaterial is a relation of which only the subjective term is real and the objective term is non-existent; then I say it is something utterly without precedent in the whole history of creation" (_Through Nature to God_, 1899, p. 188, 189). Whatever may have been Hegel's own belief in regard to personal immortality, the logical issue of his absolute idealism has been well stated by W. Windelband (_History of Philosophy_, p. 633). "It became clear that in the system of perpetual Becoming and of the dialectical passing over of all forms into one another, the finite personality could scarcely raise a plausible claim to the character of a substance and to immortality in the religious sense." F. D. Schleiermacher applies the phrase "the immortality of religion" to the religious emotion of oneness, amid finitude, with the infinite and, amid time, with the eternal; denies any necessary connexion between the belief in the continuance of personal existence and the consciousness of God; and rests his faith on immortality altogether on Christ's promise of living fellowship with His followers, as presupposing their as well as His personal immortality. A. Schopenhauer assigns immortality to the universal will to live; and Feuerbach declares spirit, consciousness eternal, but not any individual subject. R. H. Lotze for the decision of the question lays down the broad principle, "All that has once come to be will eternally continue so soon as for the organic unity of the world it has an unchangeable value, but it will obviously again cease to be, when that is not the case" (_Gr. der Psy._ p. 74).

Objections to the belief in immortality have been advanced from the standpoints of materialism, naturalism, pessimism and pantheism. _Materialism_ argues that, as life depends on a material organism, thought is a function of the brain, and the soul is but the sum of mental states, to which, according to the theory of psychophysical parallelism, physical changes always correspond; therefore, the dissolution of the body carries with it necessarily the cessation of consciousness. That, as now constituted, mind does depend on brain, life on body, must be conceded, but that this dependence is so absolute that the function must cease with the organ has not been scientifically demonstrated; the connexion of the soul with the body is as yet too obscure to justify any such dogmatism. But against this inference the following considerations may be advanced: (1) Man does distinguish himself from his body; (2) he is conscious of his personal identity, through all the changes of his body; (3) in the exercise of his will he knows himself not controlled by but controlling his body; (4) his consciousness warrants his denying the absolute identification of himself and his body. It may further be added that materialism can be shown to be an inadequate philosophy in its attempts to account even for the physical universe, for this is inexplicable without the assumption of mind distinct from, and directive of, matter. The theory of psychophysical parallelism has been subjected to a rigorous examination in James Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_,