CHAPTER XXII

Leyte Is Liberated

On 15 December, General MacArthur had directed General Eichelberger's Eighth Army to be prepared to assume control of nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26 December 1944 in order to relieve the Sixth Army for future operations. The Eighth Army was to relieve the Sixth of all duties and missions in the area except certain ones dealing with logistics and construction. These were assigned to the USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and Air Forces were directed to continue, in support of the Eighth Army, the missions which hitherto had been specified for the Sixth. [1189]

In furtherance of General MacArthur's instructions, General Krueger issued orders covering the transfer to Eighth Army control of certain Sixth Army units. On 21 December he named the units over which he was relinquishing control as of 0001, 26 December, and stated that the responsibility for continuing assigned duties and missions in the area would then pass from him to the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, the Commanding General, USASOS (SWPA), and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces. [1190]

General Eichelberger, also, prepared orders for the forthcoming transfer of authority. The supply and evacuation procedures of the Sixth Army would remain in effect. The X and XXIV Corps would "continue on their present assigned missions of destroying Japanese wherever found, and ... be prepared to conduct overland or amphibious shore to shore operations to seize enemy supply points and bases, and ports of entry." [1191]

On 25 December, when elements of the 77th Division had seized Palompon, the last important port on Leyte, General MacArthur declared that all organized resistance had ended. He said in a message to General Krueger: "Heartiest congratulations on capture of Palompon. This closes a campaign that has had few counterparts in the utter destruction of the enemy's forces with a maximum conservation of our own. It has been a magnificent performance on the part of all concerned." [1192]

The Eighth Army Assumes Control

On 26 December, General Eichelberger assumed control of all combat units in the Leyte-Samar area. It was not until the first part of January 1945 that the American troops secured the west coast of Leyte. Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.

Assembly of Japanese Forces

On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army, notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army commander, that he had written off the Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte would be self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte would be transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the island would be assembled at a point from which raiding operations could be conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December, he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of the orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu, in late January, but he was unable to obtain any further information for General Suzuki.

The decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte operation followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of December, he canceled an optimistic plan for an amphibious assault through the shallow waters of Carigara Bay against Carigara, an assault that had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the sighting of an Allied convoy en route to Mindoro. [1193] The convoy reached Mindoro and the troops landed successfully on 15 December. On 19 December, two days prior to the junction of the X and XXIV Corps on Highway 2, General Yamashita told General Suzuki that he could no longer send any reinforcements and supplies to Leyte and that the 35th Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same day, General Yamashita assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions that Imperial General Headquarters had earmarked for Leyte. Shortly afterward, at a conference with representatives from the Southern Army and Imperial General Headquarters, the representative from the latter told General Yamashita to forget the Leyte operation.

In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders to mean that units of the 35th Army would assemble at a common point at which they could be self-supporting. He had selected the western area of Matagob-Palompon in the vicinity of the road leading from Highway 2 at Libongao over the mountains to Palompon on the west coast. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. [1194] He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba.

The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." [1195] General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.

The units continued to straggle westward towards the selected area. By 1 January, most of them had taken up positions in the Balanac sector, which was about three and a half miles southeast of Villaba and overlooked the Palompon road. They had been hard pressed. The 68th Brigade and the 1st Division made contact and successfully concentrated south of Villaba in early January. The 12th Independent Regiment (the Imahori Detachment), the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment and the remaining troops of the 77th Infantry Regiment, which had been operating northeast of Ormoc, reached the southern Matagob area about the middle of January. It was not until the beginning of February that these units made contact with the 35th Army. The few remaining elements of the 16th Division stayed in the vicinity of Valencia until the end of February. The 26th Division also remained in this area until the middle of January, when it moved west and established contact with the 35th Army. [1196]

The 102d Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of forty to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with Lt. Gen. Shimpei Fukue, the commanding general of the 102d Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukue was planning to evacuate to Cebu. General Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukue "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He thereupon sent the following message to Fukue: "Lt. General Fukue and his headquarters will remain in Leyte and at the same time I am attaching other units and groups in the Visayan and Mindanao sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his Chief of Staff will report to me in person at Army Headquarters." The commander of the 102d Division did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." [1197]

General Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukue and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukue, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. This fact was communicated to General Suzuki by Tomochika, who states that "for several days I had a difficult time in consoling the general." [1198] The sequel to these events was that General Suzuki relieved General Fukue of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukue was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. General Suzuki asked Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo for authority to court-martial General Fukue; no reply was forthcoming. General Fukue was released and later returned to command of the 102d Division. [1199]

In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division, with a strength of approximately 2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of Libongao and reached the southern area of Matagob about 24 December. The troops failed to contact the 35th Army and after remaining for a short time at Matagob moved to the vicinity of Villaba.

The units that arrived on the west coast were much understrength and very poorly equipped. All artillery had been lost. There were only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to individual weapons. Each man had an average of sixty rounds of ammunition and several hand grenades.

On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the following message to General Suzuki:

Sixty days have already elapsed since the American forces invaded Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth Army, under the forceful leadership of its commander, has waged many a heroic battle against superior enemy forces and in the face of numerous difficulties. The Army gave a great blow to the enemy. Moreover, the Thirty-fifth Army by containing the opposing enemy for this long period of time deprived him of freedom of action for the coming operation, thereby facilitating the general conduct of our operations in this battle and rendering great services to our cause. I am deeply impressed, particularly with the fact that the Takachiho Unit captured the hostile airfield at BURAUEN after the Thirty-fifth Army, despite its inferiority in equipment and number of men, and the stoppage of supply, made a timely and resolute attack against the enemy with the commander himself leading them. However, the enemy, who has increased his material power and war potential, now threatens, solely on the strength of his material superiority, to bear down on Luzon Island despite the heroic and desperate efforts of our sea and air forces as well as of the Thirty-fifth Army. In view of the sudden change in the situation, we shall seek and destroy our enemy on Luzon Island, thereby doing our part in the heroic struggle of the Army and avenging many a valiant warrior who fell before the enemy. As munitions have not been supplied adequately, I cannot keep back tears of remorse for tens of thousands of our officers and men fighting in Leyte Island. Nevertheless, I must impose a still harder task upon you. Please try to understand my intentions. They say it is harder to live than to die. You officers and men, be patient enough to endure the hardships of life, and help guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne through eternal resistance to the enemy, and be ready to meet your death calmly for our beloved country. I sincerely instruct you as above. [1200]

General Suzuki took steps to make the force on Leyte self-supporting. In January 1945, he established two principles for his troops. First, the troops were to utilize as much of the local food and material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian corn. Second, all provisions in the area outside of the operation base were to be purchased. The execution of the first part of his first precept worked reasonably well but the constant American air raids and mopping-up operations prevented the Japanese from being too successful in planting and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They were also not very fortunate in purchasing supplies from outside the area, although some supplies were obtained each time the men could pass through the American protective screen.

The Japanese arrived on the western shores of Leyte at the end of the harvest season. They secured large quantities of provisions which the Filipinos had stored and also a great number of coconuts and sweet potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of the island as meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables, the army's chief reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild spinach.

In conclusion, "although there was not enough food to increase the fighting power of the Army, no one died of starvation and some units stored enough supplies for two to three months." [1201]

The Mop-up

By the end of December, most of the enemy troops were in northwest Leyte, west of Highway 2 and north of Palompon. Another large enemy concentration was located in the hills south of Palompon. [1202]

The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and unglamorous, but it is highly essential. The activities of the 7th Division on Leyte during January and February 1945 are typical of the large-scale mop-up in which many small units are sent out daily in all directions. This division was assigned all of the west coast area south of a line from Palompon to Valencia. Its records state that the division "sent out as many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt down and destroy thousands of Japanese stragglers wandering throughout the area." [1203]

Eight divisions were engaged in mopping up for varying lengths of time on Leyte, but only an outline of their activities will be attempted here. The operation may be divided into three phases: XXIV Corps

## activities from 1 January to 15 February 1945; X Corps activities

from 1 January to 24 February 1945; and Eighth Army Area Command operations from 24 February to 8 May 1945. [1204]

During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th Airborne Division encountered an enemy force well dug in on the southern slopes of Mt. Majunag, five miles northwest of Burauen. After much bitter hand-to-hand fighting the Japanese were destroyed. The 96th Division engaged in extensive patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division, and relieved the X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains. The 7th Division sent out numerous patrols in the southern part of the island, and sent out a reinforced battalion that destroyed all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. The 77th Division, which operated in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many pockets of enemy resistance.

In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar was cleared of Japanese troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which arrived on 24 January, extensively patrolled both the islands of Leyte and Samar.

During the Eighth Army Area Command phase, the constant searching out of isolated groups of enemy soldiers continued. In addition to the Americal Division, the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment patrolled Leyte. On 8 May, the control of the Eighth Army over the area came to an end. [1205]

The Japanese Withdrawal

At the time that General Suzuki made his plans for the units of the 35th Army on Leyte to become self-sufficient, he felt that there were too many soldiers on the island to make the plan fully effective. General Suzuki decided therefore to transfer to other islands those who, because of their good physical condition and morale, would be able to withstand the rigors of a long fight. Consequently the sick, weak, and wounded were dropped from the units that were to be withdrawn. [1206] General Suzuki also considered the selection of the location of the new headquarters for the 35th Army. Since there were 15,000 Japanese residents in and around Davao on Mindanao, it was finally decided to remove the army headquarters to Davao. As a preliminary step, the 1st Division was to be sent to Cebu. [1207]

General Suzuki had plans drawn up showing the order of precedence by which the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn and their destinations. All available landing barges on Leyte and additional vessels from Cebu and other areas would be used. The order of the proposed withdrawal and the destinations of the units were as follows:

1st Division northern Cebu and later to Negros 41st and 77th Infantry Regiments Mindanao 102d Division Visayan area 26th Division Bacolod sector of Negros Takahashi Detachment northern Cebu Units of the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade northern Cebu

General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would leave Leyte about the same time as the 26th Division. The 16th Division, the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and other small units were to remain on Leyte and would be under the command of Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, the 16th Division commander. [1208]

When these plans were announced Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, the commanding general of the 1st Division, suggested that as the 1st Division had lost so many men and officers in the Leyte operation it might be better to use the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, which had fresh troops and would be better suited for the assignment to Cebu. He was overruled. [1209] There were, however, other officers who were more anxious to leave Leyte. General Tomochika later wrote: "Many of the troops rushed to join this movement and Staff Officer Nakamura experienced difficulty in controlling them. However, quite a number of men succeeded in transferring without the commander's orders. The commander was displeased because only a small number of staff officers were willing to stay on Leyte." [1210]

On the morning of 12 January, four launches arrived at Abijao to begin evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans attacked and damaged the vessels, but three were repaired. By 2300, with the embarkation of the first party, composed of elements of the 49th Infantry and Division Headquarters, the evacuation got under way. This group left Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached Tabogon, in northern Cebu, about 0730. At about the same time, the remnants of the 57th Infantry reached Cebu. The rest of 1st Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry Regiment, and part of the 1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the 18th, and on the 20th the rest of the 49th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division Transport quitted the island.

Between the 13th and 20th of January the three launches, each carrying about seventy men, made four round trips. After the second trip, the Americans spotted the operation. The hiding place of the craft at Tabogon was frequently strafed by aircraft and shelled by submarines and motor torpedo boats, which kept the channel waters under sharp surveillance. On the night of the 20th, American aircraft sank three launches. Although additional craft were sent up from Liloan on Cebu, these were also sunk. It was impossible to evacuate any more personnel until the middle of March. [1211]

The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to Cebu was estimated to be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters, 73; 1st Infantry Regiment, 72; 49th Infantry Regiment, 208; 57th Infantry Regiment, 178; and 1st Transport Regiment, 212; a total of 743 men. The equipment evacuated included 332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 5 grenade launchers, and a small amount of small arms ammunition. [1212] In addition several hundred men obtained their own transportation and left for other islands in the Philippines.

The Road Ends

From 20 January on, the remaining Japanese forces stayed in the Villaba sector, hoping that succor would come. On 20 January General Tomochika "waited on the beach" for a boat that never came. The men were "plunged into the depths of despair." Time passed. On the evening of 17 March, two Japanese vessels appeared. General Suzuki and part of his staff boarded the craft and at 0030, 18 March, left the island of Leyte, For days the vessels sailed from island to island in the Visayas only to find that they were too late. The Americans were already in possession. On the evening of 16 April, the vessel bearing General Suzuki was bombed by American aircraft off the coast of Negros Island and Suzuki was killed [1213] The Leyte Campaign had ended.

The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no slight cost. During the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766 American Army, including Air Forces, troops on Leyte. [1214] The total Army casualties for the Leyte Campaign were over 15,500, including more than 3,500 killed and nearly 12,000 wounded. (Tables 4 and 5)

It is impossible, with data now available to determine with any degree of exactitude the number of Japanese who participated in the campaign or their casualties. The estimates of the Sixth and Eighth Armies vary greatly, as do those of the various Japanese sources. The Sixth Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men. [1215] and that as of 26 December 1944 when it relinquished control to Eighth Army about 5,000 of the Japanese remained on the islands of Leyte and Samar. [1216] The Eighth Army estimated that, for the mop-up period from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, it killed and found dead 24,294 and captured 439 Japanese. [1217] General Eichelberger stated that his forces killed "more than twenty-seven thousand Japanese." [1218]

Table 4--U. S. Army Battle Casualties at Leyte, 20 October 1944-8 May 1945

----------------------------+--------+-------+----------+--------- Organization | Total | Killed | Wounded | Missing ----------------------------+--------+--------+---------+--------- Total | 15,584 | 3,504 | 11,991 | 89 +--------+--------+---------+--------- Sixth Army Troops | 961 | 141 | 831 | [1219]7 Eighth Army Troops | 404 | 61 | 340 | 3 X Corps | 7,126 | 1,670 | 5,384 | 72 +--------+--------+---------+--------- Americal Div and 164th RCT | 731 | 162 | 566 | 3 24th Infantry Division | 2,342 | 544 | 1,784 | 14 32d Infantry Division | 1,949 | 450 | 1,491 | 8 38th Infantry Division | 272 | 68 | 171 | 33 1st Cavalry Division | 931 | 203 | 726 | 2 11th Airborne Division | 532 | 168 | 352 | 12 1st Filipino Division | 52 | 14 | 38 | 0 108th RCT | 53 | 14 | 39 | 0 112th RCT | 160 | 32 | 128 | 0 Corps Troops | 104 | 15 | 89 | 0 +--------+--------+---------+--------- XXIV Corps | 7,093 | 1,632 | 5,454 | 7 +--------+--------+---------+--------- 7th Infantry Division | 2,764 | 584 | 2,179 | 1 77th Infantry Division | 2,226 | 499 | 1,723 | 4 96th Infantry Division | 1,660 | 469 | 1,189 | 2 Corps Troops | 443 | 80 | 363 | 0 ----------------------------+--------+--------+---------+---------

Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals, Eighth U. S. Army, Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the Leyte-Samar Operation, p. 155.

The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate that the total strength of their army ground troops was 70,000 men. [1220] General Tomochika, the chief of staff of the 35th Army, was interrogated several times after the war. On one occasion he estimated that the total number of Japanese involved in the Leyte operation, including naval and air personnel and those who lost their lives in transports sunk en route to Leyte, was 59,400 men, approximately one fifth of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands. [1221] On another occasion General Tomochika estimated that 61,800 Japanese had been on Leyte, and that 13,010 were alive and 48,790 had been killed by 17 March 1945. [1222]

In the plan for the defeat of Japan the objective sought in reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos but also to cut off the Japanese from the rich empire that they had acquired in the Netherlands Indies, and at the same time to establish a base for the final assault on the enemy's homeland. As early as 1942 Allied submarines had begun to gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and its new empire, rich in rubber, tin, rice, and, above all, in oil, without which Japan could not remain in the war. By the fall of 1944 the submarines had virtually cut this lifeline, which ran past the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines to the Allies would finally sever it.

Table 5--Sixth Army Battle Casualties by Arm or Service, 20 October-25 December 1944

----------------+------+------+-------------+-------------+------------- | Killed | Wounded and| Missing | Total | | Injured | in Action | Arm or Service +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------ |Number| Per |Number| Per |Number| Per |Number| Per | | Cent | | Cent | | Cent | | Cent ----------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------ Infantry | 2,380| 82.42| 7,749| 78.61| 85 | 52.80|10,214| 79.14 Engineer | 132| 4.58| 762| 7.73| 46 | 28.57| 940| 7.28 Medical | 100| 3.47| 375| 3.80| 8 | 4.97| 483| 3.74 Field Artillery | 96| 3.33| 328| 3.33| 5 | 3.11| 429| 3.32 Coast Artillery | 47| 1.59| 248| 2.52| 1 | .62| 296| 2.30 Ordnance | 45| 1.56| 100| 1.01| 1 | .62| 146| 1.13 Quartermaster | 41| 1.42| 67| .68| 9 | 5.59| 117| .91 Signal | 12| .42| 76| .77| 0 | .00| 88| .68 Transportation | 7| .24| 73| .74| 1 | .62| 81| .63 Chemical Warfare| 13| .45| 44| .45| 0 | .00| 57| .44 Military Police | 13| .45| 27| .27| 4 | 2.48| 44| .34 Chaplain | 0| .00| 0| .00| 0 | .00| 0| .00 Miscellaneous | 2| .07| 9| .09| 1 | .62| 12| .09 +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------ Total | 2,888|100.00| 9,858|100.00| 161 |100.00|12,907|100.00 ----------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------

Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, p. 155.

The object of the Leyte Campaign had been to force an entry into the Philippines and establish a solid base for their reconquest. It had accomplished this object, though the base had not been secured and developed as promptly or as effectively as the planners had anticipated. The construction program on the island had been a disappointment. Leyte never became a major air base. But the campaign had other and more important effects that had not been foreseen when it was launched. In their determination to make Leyte the decisive battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had committed the major portions of their fleet and air force in a vain attempt to stay the American advance. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf the Japanese Navy suffered irreparable damage--all of the carriers were lost and most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now almost completely dependent upon the suicidal kamikaze pilot. Finally, the dispatch of reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had seriously crippled the defenses of Luzon--the strategic heart of the Philippine Archipelago.

The Americans had established an air base in the midst of the Japanese-held Philippine Islands--a base within medium bomber range of Luzon, the principal American target in the archipelago. [1223] As General Yamashita, commanding officer of all Japanese Army troops in the Philippines later said: "After the loss of Leyte ... I realized that decisive battle was impossible...." [1224]

Three years of hard fighting over jungle trails had finally brought the U. S. forces back to the Philippines. Ahead lay months of weary struggle but ultimate victory was no longer in doubt.

APPENDIX A

GHQ Operations Instructions Number 70, 21 September 1944

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

A. P. O. 500 21 September 1944.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 70

1. a. See current Intelligence Summaries and Annex No. 3--Intelligence. b. Allied Forces occupy the line: MARIANAS-ULITHI-PALAU-MOROTAI and control the approaches to the southern and eastern PHILIPPINES. c. The THIRD FLEET, Admiral W. F. Halsey commanding, covers and supports the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT Operations by:

(1) Containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet. (2) Destruction of hostile air and shipping in the FORMOSA, LUZON, VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas during the period A-9 through A-3 and from A Day through A+30 as necessary to maintain their continued neutralization. (3) Destruction of ground defenses and installations and shipping in the objective and adjacent enemy supporting areas from A-2 until the escort carriers assume the mission of direct support. (4) Providing direct support of the landing and subsequent operations by fast carrier aircraft as required.

d. Coordination of operations of THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Naval and Air Forces will be published later. e. I Time (Zone-9) of Z Time will be used during the operation.

2. a. Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, covered and supported by the THIRD FLEET, will continue the offensive to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES by seizing and occupying objectives in the LEYTE and western SAMAR areas, and will establish therein naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of subsequent operations. b. Target Date for A Day: 20 October 1944. c. Forces

(1) SIXTH US ARMY--Lt General Walter Krueger, US Army. As constituted, less elements assigned by subsequent orders to EIGHTH US ARMY. SIXTH US ARMY reserve:

77th US Infantry Division--GUAM 6th US Infantry Division--CAPE SANSAPOR, DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Forces allocated for the operation as designated in Annex No. 1. Tentative Troop List for the Operation. The exact composition of the landing force as designated by Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.

(2) FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY--Lt General V. A. H. Sturdee, CBE

As constituted.

(3) EIGHTH US ARMY--Lt General Robert L. Eichelberger, US Army.

As later specified.

(4) ALLIED NAVAL Forces--Vice Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, US NAVY.

As reinforced.

(5) ALLIED AIR Forces--Lt General George C. Kenney, US Army.

As constituted.

(6) USASOS--Maj General J. L. Frink, US Army.

As constituted.

3. a. The SIXTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces, will:

(1) By overwater operations seize and occupy:

(a) Objectives in the TACLOBAN and DULAG areas in LEYTE and such adjacent areas as are required to initiate and insure uninterrupted naval and air operations therefrom. (b) Objectives in the HOMONHON and DINAGAT ISLANDS and such adjacent areas prior to the main assault in LEYTE as will insure the uninterrupted access for amphibious shipping into LEYTE GULF. (c) Objectives in the PANAON STRAIT area that will permit passage of naval forces through the PANAON STRAIT for operations in the CAMOTES SEA. This objective will be secured simultaneously with (1) (a) above.

(2) Establish control of SAN JUANICO STRAITS in order to permit passage of naval forces through the SAN JUANICO STRAITS for operations in the SAMAR SEA. (3) In subsequent operations, establish control over the remainder of LEYTE ISLAND; occupy and consolidate the western portion of southern SAMAR to include the TAFT-WRIGHT Highway and seize objectives that will permit opening of SURIGAO STRAITS for naval operations. (4) Prepare to conduct such operations as may be later directed by this headquarters to:

(a) Complete the consolidation of SAMAR. (b) Destroy or contain hostile garrisons in the VISAYAS.

(5) Occupy and defend sites for radar and air warning installations as arranged with the Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces. (6) Assume control of and direct the operations of FILIPINO Forces of the 9th Military District (LEYTE-SAMAR). (7) Establish facilities for minor naval operations at the earliest practicable date in the LEYTE-SAMAR area as arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces and initiate the establishment of naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of subsequent operations to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES as directed in Annex No 4, Logistics, and Annex No 6, Engineer, and as later directed by this headquarters. (8) Establish air facilities in the LEYTE area with objectives as follows:

(a) First Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-38) Immediately following the 1 fighter gp (P-40) assault and by A+5 for: 1 night fighter sq (b) Second Objective: 1 tactical reconnaissance sq Additional by A+15. 1 photo sq 1 medium bomb gp plus 1 sq P. O. A. 3 PBY sqs (tender-based) 1 VMR sq (Marine) (c) Third Objective: 2 light bomb gps (A-20) Additional by A+30. 1 air-sea rescue sq 1 tactical reconnaissance sq 1 fighter gp (P-38) (d) Fourth Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-47) Additional by A+45. 1 PB4Y sq (Air Ech) 2 heavy bomb gps 1 LAB sq (e) Fifth Objective: 1 photo sq (F-5) Additional by A+60. 1 PB4Y sq (Air-Ech) 2 troop carrier gps 1 combat mapping sq (Air Ech) (f) As later designated.

b. The Commanding General EIGHTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will:

(1) Relieve the SIXTH US ARMY of missions in NEW GUINEA, the ADMIRALTIES, NEW BRITAIN, and the MOROTAI area as later directed by this headquarters. (2) Prepare to relieve the SIXTH US ARMY in the VISAYAN area as later directed by this headquarters. (3) Assist the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by training, staging and mounting units of the SIXTH US ARMY in the EIGHTH US ARMY area of responsibility as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.

c. The FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces, will continue:

(1) The defense of naval and air installations within assigned areas of combat responsibility. (2) The neutralization of Japanese forces within assigned areas, seizing every opportunity for the destruction of hostile forces.

d. The Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, while continuing present missions, will:

(1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore in the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY (2) Support the operations by:

(a) Providing air protection for convoys and naval task forces and direct air support for the landing and subsequent operations, supplemented as arranged with the Commander THIRD FLEET and the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces. (b) Arranging direct air support and cover with carrier aircraft for minesweeping and preliminary landings in the LEYTE GULF area during the period A-2 to the time escort carriers assume the mission of direct support on A Day. (c) Transporting supporting troops and their supplies as required to the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area in naval assault shipping. (d) Denying Japanese reinforcement of the LEYTE area from the SAMAR, western VISAYAS and northeastern MINDANAO areas. (e) Clearing the SURIGAO STRAIT area of hostile naval forces and shipping and sweeping the SURIGAO STRAIT to open it for naval operations and shipping in the CAMOTES SEA and adjacent waters, in conjunction with operations of the SIXTH US ARMY.

(3) Provide submarine offensive reconnaissance along probable routes of hostile naval forces and of water-borne reinforcements and supplies. (4) Provide lifeguard services as required. (5) Transfer to the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces the mission of direct air support when land-based fighters and light bombers are established in the LEYTE area, at a time as arranged with the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces. (6) Escort and protect shipping on the lines of communication into the LEYTE and SAMAR areas. (7) Establish in VISAYAN waters, naval forces required to support current and future operations.

e. The Commander ALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing present missions, will:

(1) Support the operation by:

(a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as required. (b) Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land-based aircraft of the THIRD FLEET, hostile naval and air forces in areas within range in the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, intensifying the neutralization in the western VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas from D-9 to cover the movement of naval forces, the landing and subsequent operations. (Cooperation of air operations of the THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces will be published later.) (c) Providing protection of convoys and naval forces and direct support of the landing and subsequent operations within capabilities and as requested by Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces. (d) Assuming the mission of direct support of the operations in the LEYTE-SAMAR area at the earliest practicable date after the establishment of fighters and light bombers in the LEYTE area, as arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

(2) Continuing the destruction of hostile naval and air forces and shipping in the ARAFURA and CELEBES SEA areas and by initiating strikes on northeastern BORNEO and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO at the earliest practicable date; denying use of naval facilities in the SULU ARCHIPELAGO to the Japanese and protecting the western flank of the operation. (3) Destroying hostile installations and sources of war materials in Eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. (4) Establishing and operating radar and air warning facilities as required in the LEYTE-SAMAR area, as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY. (5) Establishing air forces in the LEYTE area in the priority as listed in paragraph 3a (8).

x. (1) For the coordination of planning the Commander ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will cause their respective close support commanders to report to the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, who is charged with the coordination of plans. (2) A brief of the coordinated plan of operations will be furnished this headquarters by the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by 5 October 1944. (3) Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, will submit to this headquarters by 1 October 1944 their respective plans for general support to be afforded by their forces during the period of operations. (4) During the amphibious movement and landing, the Commander Naval Attack Forces is in command of the amphibious operations; his command continues until the landing forces are established ashore. Command of the forces ashore is then passed to the Landing Force Commanders. The exact time of transfer of command from the Commanders Landing Forces will be announced by radio. The controlling considerations for fixing the time when the landing forces are established ashore will be as agreed by the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces and the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, and will be announced by them to this headquarters and appropriate subordinates. (5) For coordination of land-based and naval aircraft in support of the operation, see Standing Operating Procedure Instructions Number 16/1, this headquarters, dated 10 August 1944. (6) To coordinate the attack of THIRD FLEET carrier aircraft, the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, in concert with the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces and Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, will furnish the Commander THIRD FLEET at the earliest practicable date the following:

(a) Schedule and tracks of echelons. (b) Target maps of air and surface bombardment. (c) Communication plans. (d) Naval gunfire plans. (e) Other plans and data necessary for the support of the operation by the fastcarrier forces.

(7) Areas of responsibility for naval and air operations of the THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces will be designated later. (8) Instructions for long range reconnaissance, and bombing and attack restrictions will be issued in subsequent Operations Instructions. (9) Annex No. 1 indicates the tentative troop list for the Operation, and Annex 2 indicates the troop movements for the concentration.

4. See Annex No. 4--Logistics. (to be issued later)

5. a. See Annex No. 5--Communications. b. Command Posts.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS--HAWAII THIRD FLEET--AFLOAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA--HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon--BRISBANE Advanced Echelon--LEYTE (date and hour of opening to be announced later)

SIXTH US ARMY--LEYTE (as announced by Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY)

Rear Echelon--HOLLANDIA

FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY--LAE EIGHTH US ARMY--HOLLANDIA ALLIED NAVAL FORCES--HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon--BRISBANE

ALLIED AIR FORCES--HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon--BRISBANE

UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY--HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon--BRISBANE

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: /s/ S. J. Chamberlin, S. J. CHAMBERLIN, Major General, G.S.C., Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3. ANNEXES: (Omitted)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA Antiaircraft AAF Army Air Forces Admin O Administrative Order AFPAC U.S. Army Forces, Pacific AGO Adjutant General's Office AGS SWPA Allied Geographic Section, Southwest Pacific Area AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department AIB GHQ SWPA Allied Intelligence Bureau, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area AKA Cargo Ship, attack Amph Amphibious, amphibian APA Transport, attack APH Transport for wounded Arty Artillery ASCOM Army Service Command ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Section BAR Browning automatic rifle Bn Battalion Br Branch Bull Bulletin Cav Cavalry CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CG Commanding General CINC Commander in Chief CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet CINCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area CINCSWPA Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area CM-IN Classified Message, incoming CM-OUT Classified Message, outgoing CO Commanding Officer CofS Chief of Staff Com3dFlt Commander, Third Fleet COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet CTF Commander, task force CTG Commander, task group CTU Commander, task unit CVE Aircraft carrier, escort Div Division DNI Division of Naval Intelligence DUKW Amphibian, 2 1/2-ton, 6 × 6 truck, used for short runs from ship to shore Engr Engineer ESB Engineer Special Brigade FA Field Artillery FE Far East FEAF Far East Air Forces FEC Far East Command Flt Fleet FM Field Manual FO Field Order G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff GHQ SWPA General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area Gp Group GS General Staff Hist History, historical Hq Headquarters HRS DRB AGO Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office Inf Infantry I&HS Information and Historical Service Instns Instructions Intel Intelligence JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff Jnl Journal LCI Landing craft, infantry LCI (R) Landing craft, infantry (rocket) LCM Landing craft, mechanized LCM (R) Landing craft, mechanized (rocket) Log Logistics LSD Landing ship, dock LSM Landing ship, medium LST Landing ship, tank Ltr Letter LVT Landing vehicle, tracked M29 Weasel MC Medical Corps MI Military Intelligence Mil Military Msg Message Mtg Meeting OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History OCNO Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Off Officer ONI Office of Naval Intelligence OP Observation post OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff Opns Operations PCE (R) Patrol craft, escort (rescue) POL Petrol oil and lubricants Prcht Parachute QM Quartermaster Rad Radiogram Rcds Records Regt Regiment Rpt Report S-2 Intelligence section of regimental or lower staff S-3 Operations section of regimental or lower staff Sec Section Ser Series Sq Squadron SSUSA Special Staff, U.S. Army Stf Staff SWPA Southwest Pacific Area Tel Conf Teletype Conference USA U.S. Army USASOS U.S. Army Services of Supply USMC U.S. Marine Corps USN U.S. Navy USNR U.S. Naval Reserve USSBS U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey WD War Department WDGS War Department General Staff Wkly Weekly

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Records and studies on the Leyte operation fall into eleven general classes: Joint Chiefs of Staff records, U.S. Army Air Forces records, U.S. Army records, U.S. Marine Corps records, U.S. Navy records, guerrilla records, Japanese studies, interviews, manuscript histories, special studies, and published works.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Records

The official records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, are now in the custody of the Research Analysis Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They consist primarily of the formal papers and minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An almost complete file of these JCS and CCS papers and minutes was kept for the Army during the wartime period by the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and is now in the possession of the G-3 Division, the successor to the Operations Division. This Army file contains plans for projected operations, the working papers of the Army planning personnel, and correspondence with officers in the Pacific theaters, as well as the copies of the JCS and CCS minutes and papers.

Army Air Forces Records

The archives of the United States Army Air Forces contain manuscript histories of the various units and commands, written during or shortly after the war. The quality of these varies considerably. The following histories are of especial value for a study of the Leyte Campaign: those of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Fighter Squadrons of the 49th Fighter Group, 86th Fighter Wing, V Fighter Command, Fifth Air Force; V Fighter Command; V Bomber Command; XIII Bomber Command; Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; and Far East Air Forces. Two studies are also useful: Far East Air Forces Staff Study Operation KING II, 12 July 44; and Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay Operation, file 731.326.

Army Records

The voluminous Army records on the Leyte Campaign vary considerably in quality and content. The documents range from messages between the Chief of Staff and theater commanders to company journals.

The Chief of Staff's Log, 1944, which is in the Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, contains the daily high level radiograms and telephonic communications between Washington and the theaters. These give a concise daily summary of the strategic situation throughout the world, shed considerable light on joint and combined command, and summarize important plans and decisions.

Most of the records of General MacArthur's headquarters are in Japan. Available in the Historical Records Section of the Adjutant General's Office is a nearly complete file of the G-3 journals for the entire war period. The "Top Secret" messages are not included. In addition there is a nearly complete file of Allied Translator Interpreter Section, GHQ SWPA, "Current Translations" and "Enemy Publications." The Allied Geographical Section, GHQ SWPA, made terrain studies of the geographical regions in the Southwest Pacific Area. Although they contain errors three of these were of value--Special Report 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and Roads, Samar, Leyte and Dinagat Group, 10 July 1944; Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 August 1944; and Terrain Handbook 34, Tacloban, 25 September 1944. The Military Intelligence Section prepared information bulletins on the guerrillas that were of some use. These are: The Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 October 1944, and The Resistance Movement on Samar Island, 10 October 1944.

The records of the Sixth Army for the campaign are very complete and in excellent condition. In addition to a fine operations report, there are complete G-2, G-3, and G-4 journals. These journals contain the daily messages, reports, and memoranda exchanged between Sixth Army, General Headquarters, responsible naval commanders, and subordinate units of the Sixth Army, as well as planning papers, periodic reports of Sixth Army and subordinate units, field and administrative orders, interrogations, and estimates of the enemy situation. For the period after 26 December 1944 the operations report of the Eighth Army is useful.

The operations report of the X Corps is helpful but too brief. The journals (G-2, G-3, and G-4) of the corps, however, are good. The XXIV Corps prepared an inadequate and incomplete operations report and its journals as a whole are inferior to those of the X Corps. The sections and sub-sections of the headquarters of the XXIV Corps completed "histories." These consist mainly of photographs of individuals and notations of changes in personnel. The "history" of the Sixth Army Service Command is poor and there are few records of ASCOM in the Historical Records Section, Adjutant General's Office.

The records of the 1st Cavalry Division and subordinate units are generally adequate, although those of the two brigades are inferior to those of the division and of the regiments. The narrative of the operations report of the 7th Division is inferior but the appendixes are excellent and very complete; the journals of the division are good. In general the operations reports and journals of the infantry regiments are very helpful. The operations report of the 32d Infantry is excellent and a model for a perfect regimental operations report. In contrast, the operations reports and journals of the 11th Airborne Division and subordinate units are very poor and incomplete. The 24th Infantry Division prepared a superb operations report and kept good journals. The records of the regiments of the division are sparse and incomplete and their operations reports are either inadequate or nonexistent. The records and operations reports of the 32d Division and its regiments are extremely sketchy and inexact. The 38th Division used Leyte as a staging area; when the Japanese parachuted into the Burauen airfields, its 149th Infantry was committed. The operations report of that regiment for the resultant action is far too brief. The 77th Infantry Division and its regiments have very good operations reports but their journals are inadequate. The operations reports and journals of the 96th Division are good. The journals and operations reports of the Americal Division are only fairly good. There are "histories" and operations reports of small independent or attached units, but these are frequently one to three pages in length and very incomplete. Finally, it should be noted that the operations reports of the various artillery units are in the main poor and incomplete and the journals are highly technical.

Marine Records

Special Action Report of Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps, 28 December 1944.

Navy Records

The naval records that were consulted include the operation plans and reports by naval commanders. Copies of most of these are among the records of the Historical Records Section, Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army. All of the documents are in the files of the Office of the Naval Records and Library, Department of the Navy.

Guerrilla Records

There is in the Office of the Chief of Military History a large, completely disorganized collection of heterogeneous materials by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. These are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands had no records and all that is known of others is from violently prejudiced sources. Some of the American guerrillas published books on their experiences. These are impressionistic, generally replete with derring-do, and consequently possess scant value as sources. The Combat History Division, G-1 Section, AFWESPAC, prepared a four-volume work--"Triumph in the Philippines," the third volume of which, entitled "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," is colorful, but poor history.

Japanese Studies

At the cessation of hostilities, General MacArthur ordered the former Japanese War and Navy Ministries to prepare studies on Japanese plans and operations in World War II. The resulting studies, translations and originals, of which those mentioned below deal with the Leyte Campaign, are on file with the Office of the Chief of Military History. Although there are errors in dates, designations of units, and frequently in facts, these are the best sources for information on Japanese plans and operations. An exception is the independent study by General Tomochika, which despite its garish title is very good and contains much human interest. Tomochika, evidently a man of strong prejudices, at times was unduly critical of some of his fellow officers. Japanese Studies used in this volume are:

Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu, The True Facts of the Leyte Operation, typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, 3 December 1946

Japanese Studies in World War II, 5, 4th Air Army Operations, 1914-45

----, 7, 14th Army Operations on Leyte

----, 11, 35th Army Operations, 1944-45

----, 14, Naval Operations in the Philippine Area, 1942-45

----, 21, History of the Southern Army, 1941-45

----, 72, History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45

----, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations, October 1944-December 1944, Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf

Interviews

The following U.S. Army officers furnished the author valuable information on the Leyte Campaign: Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Maj. Gen. George H. Decker, Col. W. J. Verbeck, Col. Fred Weber, Col. Sidney F. Mashbir, Col. John M. Finn, Capt. Francis Cronin, Capt. Robert Ross Smith, and 1st Lt. James J. Frangie. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Lt. Comdr. Henry M. Dater, Lt. Comdr. Russell L. Harris, Lt. Comdr. Philip A. Crowl and Lt. Roger Pineau of the U.S. Navy were very co-operative, helping to clear up moot points that arose. Capt. Samuel E. Morison furnished information on the Pearl Harbor Conference of July 1944.

Manuscript Histories

There are in the files of the Office, Chief of Military History, the following manuscript histories of certain phases of the campaign:

Dean, Captain Tucker--The Liberation of Leyte. A preliminary work based principally upon the earlier study by Capt. Russell A. Gugeler.

Gugeler, Captain Russell A.--The 7th Division on Leyte. A good study although poorly documented.

History of the Engineer Corps in the Southwest Pacific,