CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA
When Sir John Moore found that the transports were not ready on the twelfth, he had recognized that he might very probably have to fight a defensive action in order to cover his retreat, for two days would allow Soult to bring up his main-body. He refused to listen to the timid proposal of certain of his officers that he should negotiate for a quiet embarkation, in return for giving up Corunna and its fortifications unharmed[715]. This would have been indeed a tame line of conduct for a general and an army which had never been beaten in the field. Instead he sought for a good position in which to hold back the enemy till all his impedimenta were on shipboard. There were no less than three lines of heights on which the army might range itself to resist an enemy who had crossed the Mero. But the first two ranges, the Monte Loureiro just above the river, and the plateaux of Palavea and Peñasquedo two miles further north, were too extensive to be held by an army of 15,000 men. Moore accordingly chose as his fighting-ground the Monte Moro, a shorter and lower ridge, only two miles outside the walls of Corunna. It is an excellent position, about 2,500 yards long, but has two defects: its western and lower end is commanded at long cannon-range by the heights of Peñasquedo. Moreover, beyond this extreme point of the hill, there is open ground extending as far as the gates of Corunna, by which the whole position can be turned. Fully aware of this fact, Moore told off more than a third of his army to serve as a flank-guard on this wing, and to prevent the enemy from pushing in between the Monte Moro and the narrow neck of the peninsula on which Corunna stands.
[715] There can be no doubt that this strange suggestion was made, as Moore himself mentions it in his dispatch of Jan. 13, the last which he wrote.
Soult, even after he had passed the Mero and repaired the bridges, was very circumspect in his advances. He had too much respect for the fighting power of the English army to attack before he had rallied his whole force. When Delaborde’s division and a multitude of stragglers had joined him on the fifteenth, he at last moved forward and seized the heights of Palavea and Peñasquedo, overlooking the British position. There was some slight skirmishing with the outposts which had been left on these positions, and when the French brought down two guns to the lower slopes by Palavea, and began to cannonade the opposite hill, Colonel McKenzie, of the 5th Regiment, made an attempt to drive them off, which failed with loss, and cost him his life.
[Illustration: Battle of Corunna. January 16, 1809.]
As the French pressed westward along these commanding heights, Moore saw that he might very possibly be attacked on the following day, and brought up his troops to their fighting-ground, though he was still not certain that Soult would risk a battle. The divisions of Hope and Baird were ranged along the upper slopes of the Monte Moro: the ten battalions of the former on the eastern half of the ridge, nearest the river, the eight battalions of the latter on its western half, more towards the inland. Each division had two brigades in the first line and a third in reserve. Counting from left to right, the brigades were those of Hill and Leith from Hope’s division, and Manningham and Bentinck from Baird’s. Behind the crest Catlin Crawfurd supported the two former, and Warde’s battalions of Guards the two latter. Down in the hollow behind the Monte Moro lay Paget’s division, close to the village of Eiris[716]. He was invisible to the French, but so placed that he could immediately move out to cover the right wing if the enemy attempted a turning movement. Lastly, Fraser’s division lay under cover in Corunna, ready to march forth to support Paget the moment that fighting should begin[717]. Six of the nine guns (small six-pounders), which Moore had left on shore, were distributed in pairs along the front of Monte Moro: the other three were with Paget’s reserve.
[716] Paget had just lost his senior brigadier, Anstruther, who died of dysentery in Corunna that day. His second brigade was commanded by Disney.
[717] His two brigadiers were Beresford and Fane.
After surveying the British position from the Peñasquedo heights, Soult had resolved to attempt the manœuvre which Moore had thought most probable--to assault the western end of the line, where the heights are least formidable, and at the same moment to turn the Monte Moro by a movement round its extreme right through the open ground. Nor had it escaped him that the ground occupied by Baird’s division was within cannon-shot of the opposite range. He ordered ten guns to be dragged up to the westernmost crest of the French position, and to be placed above the village of Elvina, facing Bentinck’s brigade. The rest of his artillery was distributed along the front of the Peñasquedo and Palavea heights, in situations that were less favourable, because they were more remote from the British lines. The hills were steep, no road ran along their summit, and the guns had to be dragged by hand to the places which they were intended to occupy. It was only under cover of the night that those opposite Elvina were finally got to their destination.
Soult’s force was now considerably superior to that which was opposed to him, sufficiently so in his own estimation to compensate for the strength of the defensive positions which he would have to assail. He had three infantry divisions with thirty-nine battalions (Heudelet was still far to the rear), and twelve regiments of cavalry, with about forty guns[718]. The whole, even allowing for stragglers still trailing in the rear, and for men who had perished in the snows of the mountains, must have been over 20,000 strong. The cavalry had 4,500 sabres, and the infantry battalions must still have averaged over 500 men, for in November they had nearly all been up to 700 bayonets, and even the toilsome march in pursuit of Moore cannot have destroyed so much as a third of their numbers: only Merle’s division had done any fighting. It is absurd of some of the French narrators of the battle to pretend that Soult had only 13,000 infantry--a figure which would only give 330 bayonets to each battalion[719].
[718] The force stood as follows:--
Infantry--1st Division, Merle (Brigades Reynaud, Sarrut, Thomières). } Each of Merle’s regiments (of which 2nd Léger (three batts.) } three were originally two battalions 4th Léger (four batts.) } and one three battalions strong) had 15th of the Line (three batts.) } received an additional battalion from 36th of the Line (three batts.) } the dissolved corps of Junot, before } leaving Astorga.
2nd Division, Mermet (Brigades Gaulois, Jardon, Lefebvre). } The 47th had received two, and the 31st Léger (four batts.) } 31st Léger and 2nd Swiss each one 47th of the Line (four batts.) } battalion from Junot’s corps. The 122nd of the Line (four batts.) } 122nd was a new regiment, 2nd Swiss Regiment (two batts.) } consolidated from six battalions of 3rd Swiss Regiment (one batt.) } the ‘Supplementary Legions of } Reserve.’
3rd Division, Delaborde (Brigades Foy and Arnaud). } The 70th and 86th, from Portugal, 17th Léger (three batts.) } had each received a battalion from 70th of the Line (four batts.) } Merle’s division, where they had been 86th of the Line (three batts.) } serving in the autumn. The 17th 4th Swiss Regiment (one batt.) } Léger had been transferred from the } 6th Corps to the 2nd.
Cavalry--Lahoussaye’s Division of Dragoons (Brigades Marisy and Caulaincourt). 17th, 18th, 19th, and 27th Dragoons--four regiments.
Lorges’s Division of Dragoons (Brigades Vialannes and Fournier). 13th, 15th, 22nd, and 25th Dragoons--four regiments.
Franceschi’s Mixed Division (Brigades Debelle and Girardin [?]). 1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs, and Hanoverian Chasseurs--four regiments.
Artillery--600 men (?): exact figures not available.
[719] e.g. Le Noble in his _Campagne du Maréchal Soult_, 1808-9, p. 41.
Soult’s plan was to contain the British left and centre with two of his divisions--those of Delaborde and Merle--while Mermet and the bulk of the cavalry should attack Moore’s right, seize the western end of Monte Moro, and push in between Baird’s flank and Corunna. If this movement succeeded, the British retreat would be compromised: Delaborde and Merle could then assail Hope and prevent him from going to the rear: if all went right, two-thirds of the British army must be surrounded and captured.
The movement of masses of infantry, and still more of cavalry and guns, along the rugged crest and slopes of the Peñasquedo heights, was attended with so much difficulty, that noon was long passed before the whole army was in position. It was indeed so late in the day, that Sir John Moore had come to the conclusion that Soult did not intend to attack, and had ordered Paget’s division, who were to be the first troops to embark, to march down to the harbour[720]. The other corps were to retire at dusk, and go on shipboard under cover of the night.
[720] Blakeney, p. 114.
But between 1.30 and 2 o’clock the French suddenly took the offensive: the battery opposite Elvina began to play upon Baird’s division, columns descending from each side of it commenced to pour down into the valley, and the eight cavalry regiments of Lahoussaye and Franceschi, pushing out from behind the Peñasquedo heights, rode northward along the lower slopes of the hills of San Cristobal, with the obvious design of cutting in between the Monte Moro and Corunna.
Moore welcomed the approach of battle with joy: he had every confidence in his men and his position, and saw that a victory won ere his departure would silence the greater part of the inevitable criticism for timidity and want of enterprise, to which he would be exposed on his return to England. He rode up to the crest of his position, behind Baird’s division, took in the situation of affairs at a glance, and sent back orders to Paget to pay attention to the French turning movement, and to Fraser to come out from Corunna and contain any advance on the part of the enemy’s cavalry on the extreme right.
For some time the English left and centre were scarcely engaged, for Merle and Delaborde did no more than push tirailleurs out in front of their line, to bicker with the skirmishers of Hill, Leith, and Manningham. But Bentinck’s brigade was at once seriously assailed: not only were its lines swept by the balls of Soult’s main battery, but a heavy infantry attack was in progress. Gaulois and Jardon’s brigades of Mermet’s division were coming forward in great strength: they turned out of the village of Elvina the light company of the 50th, which had been detached to hold that advanced position, and then came up the slope of Monte Moro, with a dense crowd of tirailleurs covering the advance of eight battalion columns. Meanwhile the third brigade of Mermet’s division was hurrying past the flank of Bentinck’s line, in the lower ground, with the obvious intention of turning the British flank. Beyond them Lahoussaye’s dragoons were cautiously feeling their way forward, much incommoded by walls and broken ground.
All the stress of the first fighting fell on the three battalions of Bentinck, on the hill above Elvina. Moore was there in person to direct the fight: Baird, on whom the responsibility for this part of the ground would naturally have fallen, was wounded early in the day, by a cannon-ball which shattered his left arm[721], and was borne to the rear. When the French came near the top of the slope, driving in before them the British skirmishing line, the Commander-in-chief ordered the 42nd and 50th to charge down upon them. The 4th, the flank regiment of the whole line, could not follow them: it was threatened by the encircling movement of the French left, and Moore bade it throw back its right wing so as to form an angle _en potence_ with the rest of the brigade, while still keeping up its fire. The manœuvre was executed with such precision as to win his outspoken approval--‘That is exactly how it should be done,’ he shouted to Colonel Wynch, and then rode off to attend to the 50th and 42nd, further to his left.
[721] His dispatch to Castlereagh, of Jan. 18, proves that he was wounded before Moore fell.
Here a very heavy combat was raging. Advancing to meet the French attack, these two battalions drove in the tirailleurs with the crushing fire of their two-deep line, and then became engaged with the supporting columns on the slopes above Elvina. For some time the battle stood still, but Moore told the regiments that they must advance to make their fire tell, and at last Colonel Sterling and Major Charles Napier led their men over the line of stone walls behind which they were standing, and pressed forward. The head of the French formation melted away before their volleys, and the enemy rolled back into Elvina. The 42nd halted just above the village, but Napier led the 50th in among the houses, and cleared out the defenders after a sharp fight. He even passed through with part of his men, and became engaged with the French supports on the further side of the place. Presently Mermet sent down his reserves and drove out the 50th, who suffered very heavily: Charles Napier was wounded and taken, and Stanhope the junior major was killed[722]. While the 50th was reforming, Moore brought up the divisional reserve, Warde’s two magnificent battalions of Guards, each of which, in consequence of their splendid discipline during the retreat, mustered over 800 bayonets. With these and the 42nd he held the slope above Elvina in face of a very hot fire, not only from the enemy’s infantry but from the battery on the opposite heights, which swept the ground with a lateral and almost an enfilading fire. It was while directing one of the Guards’ battalions to go forward and storm a large house on the flank of the village that Moore received a mortal wound. A cannon-ball struck him on the left shoulder, carrying it away with part of the collar-bone, and leaving the arm hanging only by the flesh and muscles above the armpit[723]. He was dashed from his horse, but immediately raised himself on his sound arm and bade his aide-de-camp Hardinge see that the 42nd should advance along with the Guards. Then he was borne to the rear, fully realizing that his wound was mortal: his consciousness never failed, in spite of the pain and the loss of blood, and he found strength to send a message to Hope to bid him take command of the army. When his bearers wished to unbuckle his sword, which was jarring his wounded arm and side, he refused to allow it, saying ‘in his usual tone and with a very distinct voice, “It is well as it is. I had rather that it should go out of the field with me.”’ He was borne back to Corunna in a blanket by six men of the Guards and 42nd. Frequently he made them turn him round to view the field of battle, and as he saw the French line of fire rolling back, he several times expressed his pleasure at dying in the moment of victory, when his much-tried army was at last faring as it deserved.
[722] Every student of the Peninsular War should read Charles Napier’s vivid and thrilling account of the storm of Elvina. William Napier reprinted it in vol. i of his brother’s biography. Charles was within an ace of being murdered after surrender, and was saved by a gallant French drummer.
[723] Letter of his aide-de-camp Hardinge in James Moore’s _Life_, p. 220.
While Bentinck’s brigade and the Guards were thus engaged with Mermet’s right, a separate combat was going on more to the west, where Edward Paget and the Reserve division had marched out to resist the French turning movement. The instant that Moore’s first orders had been received, Paget had sent forward the 95th Rifles in extended order to cover the gap, half a mile in breadth, between the Monte Moro and the heights of San Cristobal. Soon afterwards he pushed up the 52nd into line with the riflemen. The other three battalions of the division moved out soon after. Paget had in front of him a brigade--five battalions--of Mermet’s division, which was trying to slip round the corner of Monte Moro in order to take Baird in the flank. He had also to guard against the charges of Lahoussaye’s cavalry more to his right, and those of Franceschi’s chasseurs still further south. Fortunately the ground was so much cut up with rough stone walls, dividing the fields of the villages of San Cristobal and Elvina, that Soult’s cavalry were unable to execute any general or vigorous advance. When the British swept across the low ground, Lahoussaye’s dragoons made two or three attempts to charge, but, forced to advance among walls and ravines, they never even compelled Paget’s battalions to form square, and were easily driven off by a rolling fire. The Reserve division steadily advanced, with the 95th and 52nd in its front, and the horsemen gave back. It was in vain that Lahoussaye dismounted the 27th Dragoons and ranged them as _tirailleurs_ along the lower slopes of the heights of San Cristobal. The deadly fire of Paget’s infantry thinned their ranks, and forced them back. It would seem that the 95th, 28th, and 91st had mainly to do with Lahoussaye, while the 52nd and 20th became engaged with the infantry from the division of Mermet, which was bickering with the 4th Regiment below the Monte Moro, and striving to turn its flank. In both quarters the advance was completely successful, and Paget pushed forward, taking numerous prisoners from the enemy’s broken infantry. So far did he advance in his victorious onslaught that he approached from the flank the main French battery on the heights of Peñasquedo, and thought that (if leave had been given him) he would have been able to capture it: for its infantry supports were broken, and the cavalry had gone off far to the right. But Hope sent no orders to his colleague, and the Reserve halted at dusk at the foot of the French position.
Franceschi’s horsemen meanwhile, on the extreme left of the French line, had at first pushed cautiously towards Corunna, till they saw Fraser’s division drawn up half a mile outside the gates, on the low ridge of Santa Margarita, covering the whole neck of the peninsula. This checked the cavalry, and presently, when Paget’s advance drove in Lahoussaye, Franceschi conformed to the retreat of his colleague, and drew back across the heights of San Cristobal till he had reached the left rear of Soult’s position, and halted in the upland valley somewhere near the village of Mesoiro.
We left Bentinck’s and Warde’s brigades engaged on the slopes above Elvina with Mermet’s right-hand column, at the moment of the fall of Sir John Moore. The second advance on Elvina had begun just as the British commander-in-chief fell: it was completely successful, and the village was for the second time captured. Mermet now sent down his last reserves, and Merle moved forward his left-hand brigade to attack the village on its eastern side. This led to a corresponding movement on the part of the British. Manningham’s brigade from the right-centre of the British line came down the slope, and fell upon Merle’s columns as they pressed in towards the village. This forced the French to halt, and to turn aside to defend themselves: there was a long and fierce strife, during the later hours of the afternoon, between Manningham’s two right-hand regiments (the 3/1st and 2/81st) and the 2nd Léger and 36th of the Line of Reynaud’s brigade. It was prolonged till the 2/81st had exhausted all its ammunition, and had suffered a loss of 150 men, when Hope sent down the 2/59th, the reserve regiment of Leith’s brigade, to relieve it. Soon afterwards the French retired, and the battle died away at dusk into mere distant bickering along the bottom of the valley, as a few skirmishers of the victorious brigade pursued the retreating columns to the foot of their position.
Further eastward Delaborde had done nothing more than make a feeble demonstration against Hope’s very strong position on the heights above the Mero river. He drove in Hill’s pickets, and afterwards, late in the afternoon, endeavoured to seize the village of Piedralonga[724], at the bottom of the valley which lay between the hostile lines. Foy, who was entrusted with this operation, took the voltigeur companies of his brigade, and drove out from the hamlet the outposts of the 14th Regiment. Thereupon Hill sent down Colonel Nicholls with three more companies of that corps, supported by two of the 92nd from Hope’s divisional reserve. They expelled the French, and broke the supports on which the voltigeurs tried to rally, taking a few prisoners including Foy’s brigade-major. Delaborde then sent down another battalion, which recovered the southern end of the village, while Nicholls held tightly to the rest of it. At dusk both parties ceased to push on, and the firing died away. The engagement at this end of the line was insignificant: Foy lost eighteen killed and fifty wounded from the 70th of the Line, and a few more from the 86th. Nicholls’s casualties were probably even smaller[725].
[724] Erroneously called in most British and French accounts Palavea Abaxo. The latter village is at the foot of the French line, a little to the north.
[725] For an account of this combat from the French side see Foy’s report to Delaborde, printed in Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie militaire du Général Foy_ (appendix), where the losses of the brigade are given. On the English side the 92nd lost three killed and five wounded (see Gardyne’s _History of the 92nd Regiment_). The 14th do not separate their battle-losses from those of the retreat in their casualty-returns. They had sixty-six dead and missing in the whole campaign, and put on board at Corunna seventy-two sick and wounded. Probably not more than ten of the former and thirty of the latter were hit in the battle; if the casualties were any larger on January 16 the losses in the retreat must have been abnormally small in the 14th Regiment.
Soult had suffered such a decided reverse that he had no desire to prolong the battle, while Hope--who so unexpectedly found himself in command of the British army--showed no wish to make a counter-attack, and was quite contented to have vindicated his position. He claimed, in his dispatch, that at the end of the engagement the army was holding a more advanced line than at its commencement: and this was in part true, for Elvina was now occupied in force, and not merely by a picket, and Paget on the right had cleared the ground below the heights of San Cristobal, which Lahoussaye had been occupying during the action. Some of the French writers have claimed that Soult also had gained ground[726]: but the only fact that can be cited in favour of their contention is that Foy was holding on to the southern end of Piedralonga[727]. All the eye-witnesses on their side concede that at the end of the action the marshal’s army had fallen back to its original position[728].
[726] Of course the untrustworthy Le Noble does so, and falsifies his map accordingly.
[727] Foy’s brigade engaged two battalions of the 70th Regiment, besides three companies of _voltigeurs_ of the 86th; this was all that Delaborde sent forward. There were two _chefs de bataillon_ among the wounded.
[728] ‘Chaque armée resta sur son terrain,’ says St. Chamans, Soult’s senior aide-de-camp (the man who so kindly entreated Charles Napier, as the latter’s memoirs show). ‘A la nuit, qui seule a pu terminer cette lutte opiniâtre, nous nous sommes retrouvés au point d’où nous étions partis à 3 heures,’ says Fantin des Odoards, of Mermet’s division (p. 200). ‘Nos troupes furent obligées, par des forces supérieures, de rentrer dans leurs premiers postes,’ says Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s dragoons (p. 46).
English critics have occasionally suggested that the success won by Paget and Bentinck might have been pressed, and that if the division of Fraser had been brought up to their support, the French left might have been turned and crushed[729]. But considering that Soult had fourteen or fifteen intact battalions left, in the divisions of Merle and Delaborde[730], it would have been well in his power to fight a successful defensive action on his heights, throwing back his left wing, so as to keep it from being encircled. Hope was right to be contented with his success: even if he had won a victory he could have done no more than re-embark, for the army was not in a condition to plunge once more into the Galician highlands in pursuit of Soult, who would have been joined in a few days by Heudelet, and in a week by Ney.
[729] Blakeney urges this very strongly (pp. 117, 118); Graham also.
[730] It would seem that only the 2nd Léger and 36th of the Line of Merle, and the 70th of Delaborde, had been seriously engaged.
The losses suffered by the two armies at the battle of Corunna are not easy to estimate. The British regiments, embarking on the day after the fight, did not send in any returns of their casualties till they reached England. Then, most unfortunately, a majority of the colonels lumped together the losses of the retreat and those of the battle. It is lucky, however, to find that among the regiments which sent in proper returns are nearly all those which fought the brunt of the
## action. The 50th and 42nd of Bentinck’s brigade were by far the most
heavily tried, from the prolonged and desperate fighting in and about Elvina. The former lost two officers killed and three wounded, with 180 rank and file: the Highland battalion thirty-nine rank and file killed and 111 (including six officers) wounded. The Guards’ brigade, on the other hand, which was brought up to support these regiments, suffered very little; the first battalion of the 1st Regiment had only five, the second only eight killed, with about forty wounded between them. In Manningham’s brigade the 81st, with its loss of three officers and twenty-seven men killed, and eleven officers and 112 men wounded, was by far the heaviest sufferer: the Royals may also have had a considerable casualty-list, but its figures are apparently not to be found, except confused with those of the whole retreat. Paget’s division in its flank march to ward off the French turning movement suffered surprisingly little: of its two leading regiments the 1/95th had but twelve killed and thirty-three wounded, the 1/52nd five killed and thirty-three wounded. The other three battalions, which formed the supports, must have had even fewer men disabled. Hope’s division, with the exception of the 14th and the 59th, was not seriously engaged: the few battalions which sent in their battle-losses, apart from those of the retreat, show figures such as six or ten for their casualties on January 16. Fraser’s whole division neither fired a shot nor lost a man. It is probable then that Hope, when in his dispatch he estimated the total loss of the British army at ‘something between 700 and 800,’ was overstating rather than understating the total.
Soult’s losses are even harder to discover than those of Moore’s army. His chronicler, Le Noble[731], says that they amounted to no more than 150 killed and 500 wounded. The ever inaccurate Thiers reduces this figure to 400 or less. On the other hand Naylies, a combatant in the battle, speaks of 800 casualties; and Marshal Jourdan, in his _précis_ of the campaign, gives 1,000[732]. But all these figures must be far below the truth. Fantin des Odoards has preserved the exact loss of his own corps, the 31st Léger, one of the regiments of Mermet’s division, which fought in Elvina. It amounted to no less than 330 men[733]. The other four regiments of the division were not less deeply engaged, and it is probable that Mermet alone must have lost over 1,000 in killed and wounded. Two of his three brigadiers went down in the fight: Gaulois was shot dead, Lefebvre badly hurt. Of Merle’s division, one brigade was hotly engaged in the struggle with Manningham’s battalions, in which our 2/81st lost so heavily. The French cannot have suffered less, as they were the beaten party. Lahoussaye’s dragoons must also have sustained appreciable loss: that of Delaborde (as we have already seen) was limited to about eighteen killed and fifty wounded. Of unwounded prisoners the British took seven officers and 156 men. If we put the total of Soult’s casualties at 1,500, we probably shall not be far wrong. All the later experience of the war showed that, when French troops delivered in column an uphill attack on a British position and failed, they suffered twice or thrice the loss of the defenders: we need only mention Vimiero and Busaco. On this occasion there was the additional advantage that Moore’s army had new muskets and good ammunition, while those of Soult’s corps were much deteriorated. A loss of 1,500 men therefore seems a fair and rational estimate. The impression left by the battle on Soult’s mind was such that, in his first dispatch to the Emperor, he wrote that he could do no more against the English till he should have received large reinforcements[734]. But two days later, when Hope had evacuated Corunna, he changed his tone and let it be understood that he had gained ground during the battle, and had so far established an advantage that his position forced the English to embark. This allegation was wholly without foundation. Hope simply carried out the arrangements which Moore had made for sending off the army to England, and his resolve was dictated by the condition of his troops, who urgently needed reorganization and repose, and not by any fear of what the Marshal could do against him.
[731] Belmas gives the same number, probably copying Le Noble.
[732] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 126.
[733] Fantin des Odoards, p. 201.
[734] See Marshal Jourdan’s very judicious remark on Soult’s bulletins in his _Mémoires militaires_ (p. 127). ‘His first dispatch was not that of a general who imagined that he had been successful.’
Moore, borne back to his quarters in Corunna, survived long enough to realize that his army had completely beaten off Soult’s attack, and had secured for itself a safe departure. In spite of his dreadful wound he retained his consciousness to the last. Forgetful of his own pain, he made inquiries as to the fate of his especial friends and dependants, and found strength to dictate several messages, recommending for promotion officers who had distinguished themselves, and sending farewell greetings to his family. He repeatedly said that he was dying in the way he had always desired, on the night of a victorious battle. The only weight on his mind was the thought that public opinion at home might bear hardly upon him, in consequence of the horrors of the retreat. ‘I hope the people of England will be satisfied,’ he gasped; ‘I hope my country will do me justice.’ And then his memory wandered back to those whom he loved: he tried in vain to frame a message to his mother, but weakness and emotion overcame him, and a few minutes later he died, with the name of Pitt’s niece (Lady Hester Stanhope) on his lips. Moore had expressed a wish to be buried where he fell, and his staff carried out his desire as far as was possible, by laying him in a grave on the ramparts of Corunna. He was buried at early dawn on the seventeenth, on the central bastion that looks out towards the land-side and the battle-field. Hard by him lies General Anstruther, who had died of dysentery on the day before the fight. Soult, with a generosity that does him much credit, took care of Moore’s grave, and ordered a monument to be erected over the spot where he fell[735]. La Romana afterwards carried out the Marshal’s pious intentions.
[735] The inscription was to run: ‘Hic cecidit Iohannes Moore dux exercitus Britannici, in pugna Ianuarii xvi, 1809, contra Gallos a duce Dalmatiae ductos.’
Little remains to be said about the embarkation of the army. At nine o’clock on the night of the battle the troops were withdrawn from the Monte Moro position, leaving only pickets along its front. Many regiments were embarked that night, more on the morning of the seventeenth. By the evening of that day all were aboard save Beresford’s brigade of Fraser’s division, which remained to cover the embarkation of the rest.
Soult, when he found that the British had withdrawn, sent up some field-pieces to the heights above Fort San Diego, on the southern end of the bay. Their fire could reach the more outlying transports, and created some confusion, as the masters hastily weighed anchor and stood out to sea. Four vessels ran on shore, and three of them could not be got off: the troops on board were hastily transferred to other ships, with no appreciable loss: from the whole army only nine men of the Royal Wagon Train are returned as having been ‘drowned in Corunna harbour,’ no doubt from the sinking of the boat which was transhipping them. General Leith records, in his diary, that on the vessel which took him home there were fragments of no less than six regiments: we can hardly doubt that this must have been one of those which picked up the men from the stranded transports.
Beresford’s brigade embarked from a safe point behind the citadel on the eighteenth, leaving the town in charge of the small Spanish garrison under General Alcedo, which maintained the works till all the fleet were far out to sea, and then rather tamely surrendered. This was entirely the doing of their commander, a shifty old man, who almost immediately after took service with King Joseph[736].
[736] St. Chamans calls him ‘un vieux faible et sans moyens, mené par une espèce de courtisane.’ Mr. Stuart (in a note to Vaughan) describes him as an ‘unscrupulous old rascal.’
The returning fleet had a tempestuous but rapid passage: urged on by a raging south-wester the vessels ran home in four or five days, and made almost every harbour between Falmouth and Dover. Many transports had a dangerous passage, but only two, the _Dispatch_ and the _Smallbridge_, came to grief off the Cornish coast and were lost, the former with three officers and fifty-six men of the 7th Hussars, the latter with five officers and 209 men of the King’s German Legion[737]. So ended the famous ‘Retreat from Sahagun.’
[737] Cf. for their losses the _Parliamentary Papers for 1809_ (pp. 8, 9), and Beamish’s _History of the German Legion_.
Moore’s memory met, as he had feared, with many unjust aspersions when the results of his campaign were known in England. The aspect of the 26,000 ragged war-worn troops, who came ashore on the South Coast, was so miserable that those who saw them were shocked. The state of the mass of 3,000 invalids, racked with fever and dysentery, who were cast into the hospitals was eminently distressing. It is seldom that a nation sees its troops returning straight from the field, with the grime and sweat of battle and march fresh upon them. The impression made was a very unhappy one, and it was easy to blame the General. Public discontent was roused both against Moore and against the ministry, and some of the defenders of the latter took an ungenerous opportunity of shifting all the blame upon the man who could no longer vindicate himself. This provoked his numerous friends into asserting that his whole conduct of the campaign had been absolutely blameless, and that any misfortunes which occurred were simply and solely the fault of maladministration and unwise councils at home. Moore was the hero of the Whig party, and politics were dragged into the discussion of the campaign to a lamentable extent. Long years after his death the attitude of the critic or the historian, who dealt with the Corunna retreat, was invariably coloured by his Whig or Tory predilections.
The accepted view of the present generation is (though most men are entirely unacquainted with the fact) strongly coloured by the circumstance that William Napier, whose eloquent history has superseded all other narratives of the Peninsular War, was a violent enemy of the Tory ministry and a personal admirer of Moore. Ninety years and more have now passed since the great retreat, and we can look upon the campaign with impartial eyes. It is easy to point out mistakes made by the home government, such as the tardy dispatch of Baird’s cavalry, and the inadequate provision of money, both for the division which started from Lisbon and for that which started from Corunna. But these are not the most important causes of the misfortunes of the campaign. Nor can it be pleaded that the ministry did not support Moore loyally, or that they tied his hands by contradictory or over-explicit orders. A glance at Castlereagh’s dispatches is sufficient to show that he and his colleagues left everything that was possible to be settled by the General, and that they approved each of his determinations as it reached them without any cavilling or criticism[738].
[738] In fairness to the government Castlereagh’s dispatches, 92-105 in the _Parliamentary Papers for 1809_, should be carefully studied.
Moore must take the main responsibility for all that happened. On the whole, the impression left after a study of his campaign is very favourable to him. His main conception when he marched from Salamanca--that of gaining time for the rallying of the Spanish armies, by directing a sudden raid upon the Emperor’s communications in Castile--was as sound as it was enterprising. The French critics who have charged him with rashness have never read his dispatches, nor realized the care with which he had thought out the retreat, which he knew would be inevitable when his movement became known at Madrid. He was never for a moment in any serious danger of being surrounded by the Emperor, because he was proceeding (as he himself wrote) ‘bridle in hand,’ and with a full knowledge that he must ‘have a run for it’ on the first receipt of news that Napoleon was upon the march. His plan of making a diversion was a complete success: he drew the Emperor, with the 70,000 men who would otherwise have marched on Lisbon, up into the north-west of the Peninsula, quite out of the main centre of operations. Napoleon himself halted at Astorga, but 45,000 men marched on after the British, and were engulfed in the mountains of Galicia, where they were useless for the main operations of the war. Spain, in short, gained three months of respite, because the main disposable field-army of her invaders had been drawn off into a corner by the unexpected march of the British on Sahagun. ‘As a diversion the movement has answered completely,’ wrote Moore to Castlereagh from Astorga[739], and with justice. That the subsequent retreat to Corunna was also advisable we must concede, though the arguments in favour of attempting a defence of Galicia were more weighty than has generally been allowed[740].
[739] Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.
[740] See the arguments stated on pp. 554-5.
But when we turn to the weeks that preceded the advance from Salamanca, and that followed the departure from Astorga, it is only a very blind admirer of Moore who will contend that everything was arranged and ordered for the best. That the army, which began to arrive at Salamanca on November 13, did not make a forward move till December 12 is a fact which admits of explanation, but not of excuse. The main governing fact of its inactivity was not, as Moore was always urging, the disasters of the Spaniards, but the misdirection of the British cavalry and artillery on the roundabout route by Elvas, Talavera, and the Escurial. For this the British general was personally responsible: we have already shown that he had good reasons for distrusting the erroneous reports on the roads of Portugal which were sent in to him, and that he should not have believed them[741]. He ought to have marched on Almeida, with his troops distributed between the three available roads, and should have had a compact force of all arms concentrated at Salamanca by November 15. Even without Baird he could then have exercised some influence on the course of events. As it was, he condemned himself--by the unmilitary act of separating himself from his guns and his horsemen--to a month of futile waiting, while the fate of the campaign was being settled a hundred and fifty miles away.
[741] See the facts stated on pp. 493-5.
The chance that Napoleon turned his whole army upon Madrid, and did not send a single corps in search of the British, gave Moore the grand opportunity for striking at the French communications, which he turned to such good account in the middle of December. But, though he so splendidly vindicated his reputation by this blow, we cannot forget the long hesitation at Salamanca by which it was preceded, nor the unhappy project for instant retreat on Portugal, which was so nearly put into execution. If it had been carried out, Moore’s name would have been relegated to a very low place in the list of British commanders, for he would undoubtedly have evacuated Lisbon, just as he had prepared to evacuate Corunna on the day before he was slain. We have his own words to that effect. On November 25 he put on paper his opinion as to the defence of Portugal. ‘Its frontier,’ he wrote, ‘is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The British must in that event immediately take steps to evacuate the country[742].’ It is fortunate that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not of this opinion, or the course of the Peninsular War, and of the whole struggle between Bonaparte and Britain, might have been modified in a very unhappy fashion.
[742] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Nov. 25.
So much must be said of Moore’s earlier faults. Of his later ones, committed after his departure from Astorga, almost as much might be made. His long hesitation, as to whether he should march on Vigo or on Corunna, was inexcusable: at Astorga his mind should have been made up, and the Vigo road (a bad cross-route on which he had not a single magazine) should have been left out of consideration. By failing to make up his mind, and taking useless half-measures, Moore deprived himself of the services of Robert Crawfurd and 3,500 of the best soldiers of his army. But, as we have shown elsewhere, the hesitation was in its origin the result of the groundless hypothesis which Moore had formed--one knows not from what premises--that the French would not be able to pursue him beyond Villafranca.
Still more open to criticism is the headlong pace at which Moore conducted the last stages of the retreat. Napier has tried to represent that the marches were not unreasonable: ‘in eleven days,’ he wrote, ‘a small army passed over a hundred and fifty miles of good road[743].’ But we have to deduct three days of rest, leaving an average of about seventeen miles a day; and this for January marching, in a rugged snow-clad country, is no trifle. For though the road was ‘good,’ in the sense that it was well engineered, it was conducted over ridge after ridge of one of the most mountainous lands in Europe. The desperate uphill gradients between Astorga and Manzanal, and between Villafranca and Cerezal, cannot be measured in mere miles when their difficulty is being estimated. The marching should be calculated by hours, and not by miles. Moreover, Moore repeatedly gave his men night-marches, and even two night-marches on end. Half the horrors of the dreadful stage between Lugo and Betanzos came from the fact that the army started at midnight on January 8-9, only rested a few hours by day, and then marched again at seven on the evening of the ninth, and through the whole of the dark hours between the ninth and tenth. Flesh and blood cannot endure such a trial even in good weather, and these were nights of hurricane and downpour. Who can wonder that even well-disposed and willing men lagged behind, sank down, and died by hundreds under such stress?
[743] Napier, i. 349.
All this hurry was unnecessary: whenever the rearguard turned to face the French, Soult was forced to wait for many hours before he could even begin an attempt to evict it. For his infantry was always many miles to the rear, and he could not effect anything with the horsemen of his advanced guard against Paget’s steady battalions--as Cacabellos sufficiently showed. Napier urges that any position that the British took up could be turned by side-roads: this is true, but the flanking movement would always take an inordinate time, and by the moment that the French had started upon it, the British rearguard could have got off in safety, after having delayed the enemy for the best part of a day. If, instead of offering resistance only at Cacabellos, Constantino, and Lugo, Moore had shown fight at three or four other places--e.g. at the narrow pass of Piedrafita, the passage of the Ladra, and the defile of Monte Falqueiro--he need not have hurried his main body beyond their strength, and left the road strewn with so many exhausted stragglers. French and English eye-witnesses alike repeatedly express their surprise that such positions were left undefended. While not disguising the fact that a great proportion of the British losses were due to mere want of discipline and sullen discontent on the part of the rank and file, we cannot fail to see that this was not the sole cause of the disasters of the retreat. The General drove his men beyond their strength, when he might, at the cost of a few rearguard skirmishes, have given them four or five days more in which to accomplish their retreat. Moore arrived at Corunna on January 11: it was January 16 before Soult had so far collected his army that he could venture to attack. At any other point, the result of offering battle would have been much the same. No excuse for Moore can be made on the ground of insufficient supplies: at Villafranca, Lugo, and Betanzos he destroyed enormous quantities of food, and often so imperfectly that the French succeeded in living for several days on what they could save from the flames.
In making these criticisms we are not in the least wishing to impugn Moore’s reputation as a capable officer and a good general. He was both, but his fault was an excessive sense of responsibility. He could never forget that he had in his charge, as was said, ‘not _a_ British army, but _the_ British army’--the one efficient force that the United Kingdom could put into the field. He was loth to risk it, though ultimately he did so in his admirably conceived march on Sahagun. He had also to think of his own career: among his numerous friends and admirers he had a reputation for military infallibility which he was loth to hazard. Acting under a strong sense of duty he did so, but all the while he was anxiously asking himself ‘What will they say at home?’ It was this self-consciousness that was Moore’s weak point. Fortunately he was a man of courage and honour, and at the critical moment recovered the confidence and decision which was sometimes wanting in the hours of doubt and waiting.
Few men have been better loved by those who knew them best. To have served in the regiments which Moore had trained at Shorncliffe in 1803-5, was to be his devoted friend and admirer for life and death. Handsome, courteous, just, and benevolent, unsparing to himself, considerate to his subordinates, he won all hearts. ‘He was a very king of men,’ wrote Charles Napier; and Charles’s more eloquent brother has left him a panegyric such as few generals have merited and fewer still obtained[744].
[744] ‘Thus ended the career of Sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism, more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth indicated a noble disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his mind were adorned by a subtle playful wit, which gave him in conversation the ascendency which he always preserved by the decisive vigour of his action. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering on fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him; he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.... If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!’ (_Peninsular War_, i. 333.)
APPENDICES
I
GODOY’S PROCLAMATION OF OCT. 5, 1806
ESPAÑOLES!
En circunstancias menos arriesgadas que las presentes han procurado los vasallos leales auxiliar á sus soberanos con dones y recursos anticipados á las necesidades; pero en esta prevision tiene el mejor lugar la generosa accion de súbdito hácia su señor. El reino de Andalucía privilegiado por la naturaleza en la produccion de caballos de guerra ligeros; la provincia de Extremadura que tantos servicios de esta clase hizo al señor Felipe V. ¿verán con paciencia que la caballería del rey de España esté reducida é incompleta por falta de caballos? No, no lo creo; antes sí espero que del mismo modo que los abuelos gloriosos de la generacion presente sirvieron al abuelo de nuestro rey con hombres y caballos, asistan ahora los nietos de nuestro suelo con regimientos ó compañías de hombres diestros en el manejo del caballo, para que sirvan y defiendan à su patria todo el tiempo que duren las urgencias actuales, volviendo despues llenos de gloria y con mejor suerte al descanso entre su familia. Entonces sí que cada cual se disputará los laureles de la victoria; cual dirá deberse á su brazo la salvacion de su familia; cual la de su gefe; cual la de su pariente ó amigo, y todos á una tendrán razon para atribuirse á sí mismos la salvacion de la patria. Venid pues, amados compatriotas, venid á jurar bajo las banderas del mas benéfico de los soberanos: venid y yo os cubriré con el manto de la gratitud, cumpliéndoos cuanto desde ahora os ofrezco, si el Dios de las victorias nos concede una paz tan feliz y duradera cual le rogamos. No, no os detendrá el temor, no la perfidia: vuestros pechos no abrigan tales vicios, ni dan lugar á la torpe seduccion. Venid pues y si las cosas llegasen á punto de no enlazarse las armas con las de nuestros enemigos, no incurriréis en la nota de sospechosos, ni os tildaréis con un dictado impropio de vuestra lealtad y pundonor por haber sido omisos á mi llamamiento.
Pero si mi voz no alcanzase á despertar vuestros anhelos de gloria, sea la de vuestros inmediatos tutores ó padres del pueblo á quienes me dirijo, la que os haga entender lo que debeis á vuestra obligacion, á vuestro honor, y á la sagrada religion que profesais.
EL PRÍNCIPE DE LA PAZ.
San Ildefonso, 5 de octubre de 1806.
II
THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU
TRAITÉ SECRET ENTRE S.M.I. NAPOLÉON, EMPEREUR DES FRANÇAIS, ROI D’ITALIE, ETC., ET SA MAJESTÉ CATHOLIQUE CHARLES IV, ROI D’ESPAGNE, ETC.
Art. 1er. La province entre Minhô et Duero, la ville d’Oporto y comprise, sera donnée en toute propriété et souveraineté à S. M. le roi d’Etrurie, avec le titre de roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale.
2. La province d’Alentéjo, et le royaume des Algarves, seront donnés en toute propriété et souveraineté au prince de la Paix, dont il jouira avec le titre de prince des Algarves.
3. Les provinces de Beira, Tras-los-Montes et de l’Estramadure portugaise, resteront en dépôt jusqu’à la paix générale, et alors on disposera d’elles selon les circonstances, et conformément à ce qui sera convenu entre les deux hautes parties contractantes.
4. Le royaume de la Lusitanie septentrionale sera possédé par les descendans de S. M. le roi d’Etrurie, héréditairement et suivant les lois de succession qui sont en usage dans la famille régnante de S. M. le roi d’Espagne.
5. La principauté des Algarves sera possédée par les descendans du prince de la Paix, héréditairement et d’après les lois de succession qui sont en usage dans la famille régnante de S. M. le roi d’Espagne.
6. A défaut de descendans ou héritiers légitimes du roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale ou du prince des Algarves, ces pays seront donnés moyennant l’investiture par S. M. le roi d’Espagne, pourvu qu’ils ne puissent jamais être réunis sous une seule personne, ni à la couronne d’Espagne.
7. Le royaume de la Lusitanie septentrionale, et la principauté des Algarves, reconnaîtront comme protecteur S. M. le roi d’Espagne, et les souverains de ces pays ne pourront jamais faire la paix ni la guerre sans le consentement du roi catholique.
8. Si les provinces de Beira, de Tras-los-Montes et de l’Estramadure portugaise, restant en dépôt, étaient rendues au tems de la paix générale à la maison de Bragance, en échange de Gibraltar, la Trinité, et d’autres colonies que les Anglais ont conquises sur l’Espagne et ses alliés, le nouveau souverain de ces provinces aurait à l’égard de S. M. C. le roi d’Espagne les mêmes soumissions que le roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale, et le prince des Algarves, et il possédera sous les mêmes conditions.
9. S. M. le roi d’Etrurie cède en toute propriété et souveraineté le royaume d’Etrurie à S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie.
10. Quand l’occupation définitive des provinces du Portugal sera effectuée, les différens princes qui doivent les posséder nommeront d’accord les commissaires pour fixer les limites naturelles.
11. S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, garantit à S. M. C. le roi d’Espagne la possession de ses états du continent d’Europe, situés au midi des Pyrénées.
12. S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, s’oblige à reconnaître S. M. C. le roi d’Espagne comme empereur des deux Amériques quand tout sera prêt, afin que S. M. puisse prendre ce titre, ce qui pourra arriver au tems de la paix générale, ou le plus tard, d’ici à trois ans.
13. Les hautes puissances contractantes accorderont les moyens de faire à l’amiable une division égale des îles, colonies et autres propriétés d’outre-mer du Portugal.
14. Le présent traité restera secret, il sera ratifié, et les ratifications seront échangées à Madrid dans vingt jours.
Fait à Fontainebleau, le 27 octobre 1807.
DUROC.
EUGENIO IZQUIERDO.
CONVENTION SECRÈTE.
Art. 1er. Un corps de troupes impériales françaises, de vingt-cinq mille hommes d’infanterie et de trois de cavalerie, entrera en Espagne, il fera sa jonction avec un corps de troupes espagnoles, composé de huit mille hommes d’infanterie, trois mille de cavalerie, et trente pièces d’artillerie.
2. Au même tems, une division de troupes espagnoles de dix mille hommes prendra possession de la province d’entre Minhô et Duero, et de la ville d’Oporto, et une autre division de six mille hommes, composée pareillement de troupes espagnoles, prendra possession de l’Alentéjo et du royaume des Algarves.
3. Les troupes françaises seront nourries et entretenues par l’Espagne, et leur solde payée par la France pendant tout le temps de leur passage en Espagne.
4. Depuis le moment où les troupes combinées seront entrées en Portugal, les provinces de Beira, Tras-los-Montes et l’Estramadure portugaise (qui doivent rester en dépôt), seront administrées et gouvernées par le général commandant des troupes françaises, et les contributions qui leur seront imposées seront au profit de la France. Les provinces qui doivent composer le royaume de la Lusitanie septentrionale et la principauté des Algarves seront administrées et gouvernées par les généraux commandant les divisions espagnoles qui en prendront possession, et les contributions qui leur seront imposées resteront au bénéfice de l’Espagne.
5. Le corps du centre sera sous les ordres du commandant des troupes françaises, aussi bien que les troupes espagnoles qui lui seront réunies. Cependant, si le roi d’Espagne ou le prince de la Paix trouvaient convenable et jugeaient à propos de s’y rendre, le général commandant des troupes françaises et elles-mêmes seront soumises aux ordres du roi d’Espagne ou du prince de la Paix.
6. Un autre corps de quarante mille hommes de troupes françaises sera réuni à Bayonne le 20 novembre prochain ou avant ce temps-là, et il devra être prêt à marcher sur le Portugal, en passant par l’Espagne, si les Anglais envoient des renforts et menacent d’attaquer le premier. Cependant, ce nouveau corps de troupes n’entrera que quand les deux hautes parties contractantes se seront mises d’accord pour cet effet.
7. La présente convention sera ratifiée, et l’échange des ratifications sera faite au même temps que le traité d’aujourd’hui.
Fait à Fontainebleau, le 27 octobre 1807.
DUROC.
EUGENIO IZQUIERDO.
III
PAPERS RELATING TO THE ‘AFFAIR OF THE ESCURIAL’
LETTER OF CHARLES IV TO NAPOLEON.
MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,
Dans le moment où je ne m’occupais que des moyens de coopérer à la destruction de notre ennemi commun; quand je croyais que tous les complots de la ci-devant reine de Naples avaient été ensevelis avec sa fille, je vois avec une horreur qui me fait frémir, que l’esprit d’intrigue le plus horrible a pénétré jusque dans le sein de mon palais. Hélas! mon cœur saigne en faisant le récit d’un attentat si affreux! mon fils aîné, l’héritier présomptif de mon trône, avait formé le complot horrible de me détrôner; il s’était porté jusqu’à l’excès d’attenter contre la vie de sa mère! Un attentat si affreux doit être puni avec la rigueur la plus exemplaire des lois. La loi qui l’appelait à la succession doit être révoquée: un de ses frères sera plus digne de le remplacer et dans mon cœur et sur le trône. Je suis dans ce moment à la recherche de ses complices pour approfondir ce plan de la plus noire scélératesse; et je ne veux perdre un seul moment pour en instruire V. M. I. et R., en la priant de m’aider de ses lumières et de ses conseils.
Sur quoi je prie Dieu, mon bon frère, qu’il daigne avoir V. M. I. et R. en sa sainte et digne garde.
CHARLES.
A St.-Laurent, ce 29 octobre 1807.
LETTER OF PRINCE FERDINAND TO CHARLES IV.
SEÑOR:
Papá mio: he delinquido, he faltado á V. M. como rey y como padre; pero me arrepiento, y ofrezco á V. M. la obediencia mas humilde. Nada debia hacer sin noticia de V. M.; pero fui sorprendido. He delatado á los culpables, y pido á V. M. me perdone por haberle mentido la otra noche, permitiendo besar sus reales pies á su reconocido hijo.
FERNANDO.
San Lorenzo, 5 de noviembre de 1807.
PROCLAMATION OF CHARLES IV, PARDONING THE PRINCE.
REAL DECRETO.
La voz de la naturaleza desarma el brazo de la venganza, y cuando la inadvertencia reclama la piedad, no puede negarse á ello un padre amoroso. Mi hijo ha declarado ya los autores del plan horrible que le habian hecho concebir unos malvados: todo lo ha manifestado en forma de derecho, y todo consta con la escrupulosidad que exige la ley en tales pruebas: su arrepentimiento y asombro le han dictado las representaciones que me ha dirigido.
En vista de ellos y á ruego de la reina mi amada esposa perdono á mi hijo, y le volveré á mi gracia cuando con su conducta me dé pruebas de una verdadera reforma en su frágil manejo; y mando que los mismos jueces que han entendido en la causa desde su principio la sigan, permitiéndoles asociados si los necesitaren, y que concluida me consulten la sentencia ajustada á la ley, segun fuesen la gravedad de delitos y calidad de personas en quienes recaigan; teniendo por principio para la formacion de cargos las respuestas dadas por el príncipe á las demandas que se le han hecho; pues todas estan rubricadas y firmadas de mi puño, asi como los papeles aprehendidos en sus mesas, escritos por su mano; y esta providencia se comunique á mis consejos y tribunales, circulándola á mis pueblos, para que reconozcan en ella mi piedad y justicia, y alivien la afliccion y cuidado en que les puso mi primer decreto; pues en él verán el riesgo de su soberano y padre que como á hijos los ama, y asi me corresponden. Tendreislo entendido para su cumplimiento.
San Lorenzo, 5 de noviembre de 1807.
YO EL REY.
IV
ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV
Como los achaques de que adolezco no me permiten soportar por mas tiempo el grave peso del gobierno de mis reinos, y me sea preciso para reparar mi salud gozar en un clima mas templado de la tranquilidad de la vida privada, he determinado despues de la mas seria deliberacion abdicar mi corona en mi heredero y mi muy caro hijo el príncipe de Asturias. Por tanto es mi real voluntad que sea reconocido y obedecido como rey y señor natural de todos mis reinos y dominios. Y para que este mi real decreto de libre y espontánea abdicacion tenga su éxito y debido cumplimiento, lo comunicareis al consejo y demas á quien corresponda.
Dado en Aranjuez, á 19 de marzo de 1808.
YO EL REY.
A Don Pedro Cevallos.
V
THE SPANISH ARMY IN 1808
[Mainly from the table in Arteche, vol. i, Appendix 9.]
N.B.--The numbers are taken from returns made on various days between March and June, 1808. They include only rank and file. The officers should have been ninety-eight to a regiment of guards, seventy to a line regiment, forty-one to a light battalion, thirty-four to a militia battalion, forty-two to a cavalry regiment. But most corps were under strength in officers, no less than in men, in June, 1808, and Arteche, giving every regiment of infantry a complete staff of officers, is clearly over-estimating them. He gives e.g. 2,450 officers of line infantry, the possible maximum, while the _Estado Militar_ for 1808 gives only 1,521 present; so with the militia he gives 1,887 officers, while apparently there were only 1,230 actually existing. It would seem that his gross total of 7,222 officers ought to be cut down to 5,911. For the rank and file we get:--
ROYAL GUARD.
CAVALRY. _Numbers._ _Quartered in_
Life Guards 615 } Old Castile Royal Carabineers 540 } and Madrid. ----- Total 1,155
INFANTRY. _Numbers._ _Quartered in_
Halberdiers } (one compy.) 152 } Madrid.
Spanish Guards } 1, 2 Barcelona. (three batts.) 3,294 } 3 New Castile.
Walloon Guards } 1 Madrid. (three } 2 Barcelona. batts.) 2,58 } 3 Portugal. ------ Total 6,029
INFANTRY OF THE LINE.
N.B.--Each regiment had three battalions of four companies, and should have numbered 2,186 bayonets.
_Numbers._ _Quartered in_
Africa 898 { 1, 3 Andalusia. { 2 S. Sebastian.
America 808 { 1 New Castile. { 2, 3 Valencia.
Aragon 1,294 Galicia.
Asturias 2,103 Denmark.
Borbon 1,544 Balearic Isles.
Burgos 1,264 Andalusia.
Cantabria 1,024 Ceuta (Africa).
Ceuta 1,235 ” ”
Cordova 793 Andalusia.
Corona 902 ”
España 1,039 Ceuta (Africa).
Estremadura 770 Catalonia.
Granada 1,113 Balearic Isles.
Guadalajara 2,069 Denmark.
Jaen 1,755 { 1, 2 Andalusia. { 3 Ceuta (Africa).
Leon 1,195 Galicia.
Majorca 1,749 { 1, 2 Portugal. { 3 Estremadura.
Malaga 854 Andalusia.
Murcia 1,762 { 1, 2 Portugal { 3 Andalusia.
Navarre 822 Galicia.
Ordenes Militares 708 } 1 Estremadura. } 2, 3 Andalusia.
Princesa 1,969 Denmark.
Principe 1,267 Galicia.
Reina 1,530 Andalusia.
{ 1 S. Sebastian. Rey 1,353 { 2 Portugal. { 3 Galicia.
Saragossa 1,561 { 1, 2 Portugal. { 3 Andalusia.
Savoia 936 Valencia.
Seville 1,168 Galicia.
Soria 1,311 Balearic Isles.
Toledo 1,058 { 1, 2 Galicia. { 3 Portugal.
Valencia 923 Murcia.
Volunteers of } ” Castile 1,487 }
Voluntarios de } 1 Portugal. la Corona 1,296 } 2, 3 Galicia.
Voluntarios del } Madrid. Estado 742 }
Zamora 2,096 Denmark. ------ Total 44,398
LIGHT INFANTRY.
N.B.--The regiment had only a single battalion of six companies. It should have numbered 1,200 bayonets.
_Numbers._ _Quartered in_
1st of Aragon 1,305 { Madrid and Saragossa.
2nd of Aragon 1,225 Balearic Isles.
Barbastro 1,061 { ½ Andalusia. { ½ Portugal.
1st of Barcelona 1,266 Denmark.
2nd of Barcelona 1,300 Balearic Isles.
Campo Mayor 1,153 { ½ Portugal. { ½ Andalusia.
1st of Catalonia 1,164 Denmark.
2nd of Catalonia 685 Galicia.
Gerona 1,149 { ½ Portugal. { ½ Andalusia.
Tarragona 1,142 { ½ Pampeluna. { ½ Estremadura.
Volunteers of { ½ Portugal. Navarre 963 { ½ Galicia.
Volunteers of { ½ Portugal. Valencia 1,242 { ½ Andalusia. ------ Total 13,655
FOREIGN INFANTRY.
N.B.--The Swiss Regiments had two battalions, the others three.
_Numbers._ _Quartered in_
IRISH.
Irlanda 513 { 1 Estremadura. { 2, 3 Andalusia.
Hibernia 852 { 1 Asturias. { 2, 3 Galicia.
Ultonia 351 Gerona.
ITALIAN.
Naples 288 Galicia.
SWISS.
1. Wimpfen 2,079 Catalonia.
2. Reding Senior 1,573 New Castile.
3. Reding Junior 1,809 Andalusia.
4. Beschard 2,051 Balearic Isles.
5. Traxler 1,757 Murcia.
6. Preux 1,708 Madrid. ------ Total 12,981
MILITIA.
N.B.--The four grenadier regiments had two battalions each, and should have been 1,600 strong; the rest one battalion, 600 strong.
_Numbers._ _Quartered in_
Prov. Gren. of Old Castile 1,605 Portugal. New Castile 1,430 Portugal. Andalusia 1,413 Andalusia. Galicia 1,377 { 1 Galicia. { 2 Portugal. Alcazar 595 Andalusia. Avila 574 Valencia. Badajoz 589 Andalusia. Betanzos 599 Galicia. Burgos 577 Andalusia. Bujalance 594 Andalusia. Chinchilla 558 ” Ciudad Real 575 ” Ciudad Rodrigo 585 ” Compostella 599 Galicia. Cordova 584 Andalusia. Cuenca 596 ” Ecija 589 ” Granada 553 ” Guadix 588 ” Jaen 584 ” Jerez 574 ” Laredo 571 Santander. Leon 591 Galicia. Logroño 558 Andalusia. Lorca 562 ” Lugo 589 Galicia. Majorca 570 Balearic Isles. Malaga 401 Andalusia. Mondoñedo 591 Galicia. Monterrey 591 ” Murcia 564 Murcia. Orense 584 Galicia. Oviedo 543 Asturias. Plasencia 593 Andalusia. Pontevedra 568 Galicia. Ronda 574 Andalusia. Salamanca 600 Galicia. Santiago 596 ” Segovia 591 ” Seville 547 Andalusia. Siguenza 579 ” Soria 582 Valencia. Toledo 579 Andalusia. Toro 553 ” Truxillo 567 ” Tuy 583 Galicia. Valladolid 562 ” ------ Total 30,527
CAVALRY.
N.B.--Each regiment had five squadrons, and should have numbered about 700 sabres.
1. HEAVY CAVALRY.
_Regiment._ _Numbers._ _Quartered in_
1st Rey 634 Denmark. 2nd Reina 668 Old Castile. 3rd Principe 573 New Castile. 4th Infante 615 Denmark. 5th Borbon 616 Catalonia. 6th Farnesio 517 Andalusia. 7th Alcantara 589 Portugal. 8th España 553 Andalusia. 9th Algarve 572 Denmark. 10th Calatrava 670 Andalusia. 11th Santiago 549 Portugal. 12th Montesa 667 Andalusia. ------ Total 7,232
2. LIGHT CAVALRY.
CAZADORES. _Numbers._ _Quartered in_
1st Rey 577 Madrid. 2nd Reina 581 Portugal. 3rd Almanza 598 Denmark. 4th Pavia 663 Andalusia. 5th Villaviciosa 628 Denmark. 6th Sagunto 499 Andalusia.
HUSSARS.
1st Numancia 630 Valencia. 2nd Lusitania 554 Madrid. 3rd Olivenza 558 Portugal. 4th Voluntarios } New Castile. de España 548 } 5th Maria Luisa 680 Estremadura. 6th Españoles 692 Balearic Isles. ------ Total 7,208
A scheme was on foot for converting eight of the light regiments into dragoons. Several of them are designated sometimes as dragoons, sometimes as cazadores or hussars.
N.B.--The 14,440 troopers had only 9,526 horses!
ARTILLERY.
1. FIELD.
_Numbers._ _Quartered in_
1st Regiment 1,143 Catalonia. 2nd ” 1,146 Valencia and Murcia. 3rd ” 1,078 Andalusia. 4th ” 1,043 Galicia. ------ Total 4,410
Each regiment consisted of ten batteries; of the whole forty, six were horse-artillery. 477 men (four batteries) were in Denmark.
2. GARRISON.
Two ‘Brigades’ and fifteen ‘Compañias Fijas’ at various places, in all 1,934.
Adding general staff, &c., the total of the artillery, field and garrison, was 292 officers and 6,679 men.
ENGINEERS.
169 officers and a battalion of sappers. The latter was quartered at Alcala de Henares, and had a strength of 922 men, besides 127 detached in Denmark.
GENERAL TOTAL (Rank and File only).
_Infantry._ _Cavalry._ _Artillery._ _Engineers._ Royal Guard 6,029 1,155 Infantry of the Line 44,398 Light Infantry 13,655 Foreign Infantry 12,981 Militia 30,527 Cavalry 14,440 Artillery 6,679 Engineers 1,049 -------- ------ ------ ------ 107,590 15,595 6,679 1,049 = 130,913
Add 5,911 officers, and we get a gross total of 136,824.
VI
THE FIRST FRENCH ‘ARMY OF SPAIN’
1. ‘1ST CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE’ [ARMY OF PORTUGAL].
Commander, General JUNOT. Chief of the Staff, General Thiébault.
_Men._ 1st Division, General DELABORDE (Brigades Avril and Brennier): 15th of the Line (3rd batt.), 1,033; 47th ditto (2nd batt.), 1,210; 70th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), 2,299; 86th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), 2,116; 4th Swiss (1st batt.), 1,190. Total, seven battalions 7,848
2nd Division, General LOISON (Brigades Charlot and Thomières): 2nd Léger (3rd batt.), 1,255; 4th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,196; 12th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,302; 15th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,314; 32nd of the Line (3rd batt.), 1,265; 58th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,394; 2nd Swiss (2nd batt.), 755. Total, seven battalions 8,481
3rd Division, General TRAVOT (Brigades Graindorge and Fusier): 31st Léger (3rd batt.), 653; 32nd ditto (3rd batt.) 983; 26th of the Line (3rd batt.), 537; 66th ditto (3rd and 4th batts.), 1,004; 82nd ditto (3rd batt.), 861; _Légion du Midi_ (1st batt.), 797; Hanoverian Legion, 703. Total, eight battalions 5,538
Cavalry Division, General KELLERMANN (Brigades Margaron and Maurin): 26th Chasseurs, 244; 1st Dragoons, 261; 3rd ditto, 236; 4th ditto, 262; 5th ditto, 249; 9th ditto, 257; 15th ditto, 245. Total seven squadrons 1,754
Artillery, Train, &c. 1,297 ------ Total of the Corps (twenty-two battalions, seven squadrons) 24,918
2. ‘2ND CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE.’
Commander, General DUPONT. Chief of the Staff, General Legendre.
_Men._ 1st Division, General BARBOU (Brigades Pannetier and Chabert): Garde de Paris (2nd batts. of 1st and 2nd Regiments), 1,454; 3rd Legion of Reserve (1st and 2nd batts.), 2,057; 4th ditto (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.), 3,084; Marines of the Guard, 532; 4th Swiss (2nd batt.), 709. Total, nine battalions 7,836
2nd Division, General VEDEL (Brigades Poinsot and Cassagne): 1st Legion of Reserve (three batts.), 3,011; 5th ditto (three batts.), 2,695; 3rd Swiss (1st batt.), 1,178. Total, seven battalions 6,884
3rd Division, General FRERE (Brigades Laval and Rostolland): 15th Léger (2nd batt.), 1,160; 2nd Legion of Reserve (three batts.), 2,870; 2nd Swiss (1st batt.), 1,174. Total, five battalions 5,204
Cavalry Division, General FRÉSIA (Brigades Rigaud and Dupré): 1st Provisional Cuirassiers, 778; 2nd ditto, 681; 1st Provisional Chasseurs, 556; 2nd ditto, 662; 6th Provisional Dragoons, 623. Total, fifteen squadrons 3,300
Artillery, Train, &c. 1,204 ------ Total of the Corps (twenty-one battalions, fifteen squadrons) 24,428
3. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE OCEAN COAST.’
Commander, Marshal MONCEY. Chief of the Staff, General Harispe.
_Men._ 1st Division, General MUSNIER (Brigades Brun and Isemburg): 1st Provisional Regiment of Infantry (four batts.), 2,088; 2nd ditto, 2,183; 3rd ditto, 2,118; 4th ditto, 2,232; Westphalian battalion, 1,078. Total, seventeen battalions 9,699
2nd Division, General GOBERT (Brigades Lefranc and Dufour): 5th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,095; 6th ditto, 1,851; 7th ditto, 1,872; 8th ditto, 1,921; Irish Legion, 654. Total, seventeen battalions 8,393
3rd Division, General MORLOT (Brigades Bujet and Lefebvre): 9th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,448; 10th ditto, 2,146; 11th ditto, 2,062; Prussian battalion, 493. Total, thirteen battalions 7,149
Cavalry Division, General GROUCHY (Brigades Privé and Wathier): 1st Provisional Dragoons, 660; 2nd ditto, 872; 1st Provisional Hussars, 597; 2nd ditto, 721. Total, twelve squadrons 2,850
Artillery, Train, &c. 1,250 ------ Total of the Corps (forty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons) 29,341
4. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE PYRENEES.’
Commander, Marshal BESSIÈRES. Chief of the Staff, General Lefebvre-Desnouettes.
_Men._ 1st Division, General MERLE (Brigades Darmagnac and Gaulois): 47th of the Line (1st batt.), 1,235; 86th ditto (two companies), 231; 3rd Swiss (2nd batt.), 721; 1st _Régiment de Marche_ (two batts.), 965; 1st Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of Reserve (two batts.), 2,096. Total, six and a quarter battalions 5,248
2nd Division, General VERDIER (Brigades Sabathier and Ducos): 17th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,110; 18th ditto, 1,928; 13th ditto, 2,185; 14th ditto, 2,295. Total, sixteen battalions 8,518
Cavalry Division, General LASALLE: 10th Chasseurs, 469; 22nd ditto, 460; _Escadron de Marche_ of Cuirassiers, 153. Total, seven squadrons 1,082
Artillery, Train, &c. 408
Detached troops belonging to the Corps of Bessières.
(1) Garrison of Pampeluna, General D’AGOULT: 15th of the Line (4th batt.), 435; 47th ditto (3rd batt.), 297; 70th ditto (3rd batt.), 488; 5th _Escadron de Marche_ of Cuirassiers, 329; Artillery, 63 1,612
(2) Garrison of San Sebastian, General THOUVENOT: 2nd Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of Reserve (4th batt.), 890; Dépôt Battalion, 1,240; Cavalry Dépôt, 60; Artillery, 28 2,218 ------ Total of the Corps (twenty-seven and a quarter battalions, nine squadrons) 19,086
5. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE EASTERN PYRENEES.’
Commander, General DUHESME. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Fabre.
_Men._ 1st Division, General CHABRAN (Brigades Goulas and Nicolas). 2nd of the Line (3rd batt.), 610; 7th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,785; 16th ditto (3rd batt.), 789; 37th ditto (3rd batt.), 656; 56th ditto (4th batt.), 833; 93rd ditto (3rd batt.), 792; 2nd Swiss (3rd batt.), 580. Total, eight battalions 6,045
2nd Division, General LECCHI (Brigades Milosewitz and ?): 2nd Italian Line (2nd batt.), 740; 4th ditto (3rd batt.), 587; 5th ditto (2nd batt.), 806; Royal _Vélites_ (1st batt.), 519; 1st Neapolitan Line (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,944. Total, six battalions 4,596
Cavalry Brigade, General Bessières: 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers, 409; 3rd Provisional Chasseurs, 416 825
Cavalry Brigade, General Schwartz: Italian Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, 504; 2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs, 388 892
Artillery, Train, &c. 356 ------ Total of the Corps (fourteen battalions, nine squadrons) 12,714
6. IMPERIAL GUARD.
Commander, General DORSENNE.
_Men._ 1st Fusiliers (three batts.), 1,570; 2nd ditto, 1,499; Marines of the Guard [detached to Dupont’s Corps]. Total, six battalions. 3,069
Dragoons, 252; Chasseurs and Mamelukes, 321; _Gendarmes d’élite_, 304; Polish Light Horse, 737; Guard of the Duke of Berg, 148 1,762
Artillery, &c. 1,581 ------ Total (six battalions, nine squadrons) 6,412
7. TROOPS WHICH ENTERED SPAIN AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, IN JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST.
_Men._ Division MOUTON (Brigades Rey and Reynaud): 2nd Léger (1st and 2nd batts.); 4th ditto (1st, 2nd, and 4th batts.); 12th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.); 15th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.); _Garde de Paris_ (one batt.) 5,100
Brigade of General BAZANCOURT: 14th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,488; 44th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,614 3,102
Polish Brigade (Colonel Chlopiski): 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the Vistula (each of two batts.) 3,951
Four _Bataillons de Marche_ (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7) 2,281
Division of General REILLE at Perpignan [for details see p. 320] 8,370
Division of General CHABOT (‘Reserve of Perpignan’) 2,667
Portuguese Troops, before Saragossa (two batts.) 553
National Guards of the Pyrenees, before Saragossa (two batts.) 971
General Dépôt at Bayonne 7,659
Battalions, companies, and smaller drafts sent to join their corps in June-August 8,687
_Escadrons de Marche_, Polish Lancers, Cavalry of the Imperial Guard 3,911
Artillery, drafts 851
Engineers, ditto 101 ------ Total 48,204
GENERAL TOTAL.
_Men._ Junot’s Corps 24,918 Dupont’s Corps 24,428 Moncey’s Corps 29,341 Bessières’ Corps 19,086 Duhesme’s Corps 12,714 Imperial Guard 6,412 Troops which entered Spain in June, July, and August 48,204 ------- 165,103
N.B.--The organization and the greater part of the figures come from the table at the end of vol. iv of Foy’s history of the Peninsular War. But a few corrections are made where more detailed information is available, especially in the seventh section, where Foy is incomplete (e.g. he omits one of Mouton’s brigades).
VII
PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREACHERY AT BAYONNE
PROTEST OF CHARLES IV AGAINST HIS ABDICATION.
Protesto y declaro que todo lo que manifiesto en mi decreto del 19 de marzo, abdicando la corona en mi hijo, fue forzado por precaver mayores males y la efusion de sangre de mis queridos vasallos, y por tanto de ningun valor.
YO EL REY.
Aranjuez, 21 de marzo de 1808.
LETTER OF NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND VII.
MON FRÈRE,
J’ai reçu la lettre de V. A. R. Elle doit avoir acquis la preuve, dans les papiers qu’elle a eu du roi son père, de l’intérêt que je lui ai toujours porté. Elle me permettra, dans la circonstance actuelle, de lui parler avec franchise et loyauté. En arrivant à Madrid, j’espérais porter mon illustre ami à quelques réformes nécessaires dans ses Etats, et à donner quelque satisfaction à l’opinion publique. Le renvoi du prince de la Paix me paraissait nécessaire pour son bonheur et celui de ses peuples. Les affaires du Nord ont retardé mon voyage. Les événemens d’Aranjuez ont eu lieu. Je ne suis point juge de ce qui s’est passé, et de la conduite du prince de la Paix; mais ce que je sais bien, c’est qu’il est dangereux pour les rois d’accoutumer les peuples à répandre du sang et à se faire justice eux-mêmes. Je prie Dieu que V. A. R. n’en fasse pas elle-même un jour l’expérience. Il n’est pas de l’intérêt de l’Espagne de faire du mal à un prince qui a épousé une princesse du sang royal, et qui a si long-temps régi le royaume. Il n’a plus d’amis; V. A. R. n’en aura plus, si jamais elle est malheureuse. Les peuples se vengent volontiers des hommages qu’ils nous rendent. Comment, d’ailleurs, pourrait-on faire le procès au prince de la Paix, sans le faire à la reine et au roi votre père? Ce procès alimentera les haines et les passions factieuses; le résultat en sera funeste pour votre couronne; V. A. R. déchire par là ses droits. Qu’elle ferme l’oreille à des conseils faibles et perfides. Elle n’a pas le droit de juger le prince de la Paix: ses crimes, si on lui en reproche, se perdent dans les droits du trône. J’ai souvent manifesté le désir que le prince de la Paix fût éloigné des affaires. L’amitié du roi Charles m’a porté souvent à me taire, et à détourner les yeux des faiblesses de son attachement. Misérables hommes que nous sommes! faiblesse et erreur, c’est notre devise. Mais tout cela peut se concilier. Que le prince de la Paix soit exilé d’Espagne, et je lui offre un refuge en France. Quant à l’abdication de Charles IV, elle a eu lieu dans un moment où mes armées couvraient les Espagnes; et, aux yeux de l’Europe et de la postérité, je paraîtrais n’avoir envoyé tant de troupes que pour précipiter du trône mon allié et mon ami. Comme souverain voisin, il m’est permis de vouloir connaître, avant de reconnaître, cette abdication. Je le dis à V. A. R., aux Espagnols, au monde entier: Si l’abdication du roi Charles est de pur mouvement, s’il n’y a pas été forcé par l’insurrection et l’émeute d’Aranjuez, je ne fais aucune difficulté de l’admettre, et je reconnais V. A. R. comme roi d’Espagne. Je désire donc causer avec elle sur cet objet. La circonspection que je porte depuis un mois dans ces affaires doit lui être garant de l’appui qu’elle trouvera en moi, si, à son tour, des factions, de quelque nature qu’elles soient, venaient à l’inquiéter sur son trône.
Quand le roi Charles me fit part de l’événement du mois d’octobre dernier, j’en fus douloureusement affecté, et je pense avoir contribué, par des insinuations que j’ai faites, à la bonne issue de l’affaire de l’Escurial. V. A. R. avait bien des torts; je n’en veux pour preuve que la lettre qu’elle m’a écrite, et que j’ai constamment voulu oublier. Roi à son tour, elle saura combien les droits du trône sont sacrés. Toute démarche près d’un souverain étranger, de la part d’un prince héréditaire, est criminelle. V. A. R. doit se défier des écarts et des émotions populaires.
On pourra commettre quelques meurtres sur mes soldats isolés, mais la ruine de l’Espagne en serait le résultat. J’ai déjà vu avec peine qu’à Madrid on ait répandu des lettres du capitaine-général de la Catalogne, et fait tout ce qui pouvait donner du mouvement aux têtes. V. A. R. connaît ma pensée toute entière: elle voit que je flotte entre diverses idées qui ont besoin d’être fixées. Elle peut être certaine que, dans tous les cas, je me comporterai avec elle comme avec le roi son père. Qu’elle croie à mon désir de tout concilier, et de trouver des occasions de lui donner des preuves de mon affection et de ma parfaite estime.
Sur ce, je prie Dieu qu’il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde.
NAPOLÉON.
Bayonne, le 16 avril 1808.
SECOND ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV.
Art. Ier. S. M. le roi Charles, n’ayant en vue pendant toute sa vie que le bonheur de ses sujets, et constant dans le principe, que tous les actes d’un souverain ne doivent être faits que pour arriver à ce but; les circonstances actuelles ne pouvant être qu’une source de dissensions d’autant plus funestes que les factions ont divisé sa propre famille, a résolu de céder, comme il cède par le présent, à S. M. l’empereur Napoléon, tous ses droits sur le trône des Espagnes et des Indes, comme au seul qui, au point où en sont arrivées les choses, peut rétablir l’ordre: entendant que ladite cession n’ait lieu qu’afin de faire jouir ses sujets des deux conditions suivantes:
1º. L’intégrité du royaume sera maintenue. Le prince que S. M. l’empereur Napoléon jugera devoir placer sur le trône d’Espagne sera indépendant, et les limites de l’Espagne ne souffriront aucune altération.
2º. La religion catholique, apostolique et romaine sera la seule en Espagne. Il ne pourra y être toléré aucune religion réformée, et encore moins infidèle, suivant l’usage établi jusqu’aujourd’hui.
II. Tous actes faits contre ceux de nos fidèles sujets, depuis la révolution d’Aranjuez, sont nuls et de nulle valeur, et leurs propriétés leur seront rendues.
III. Sa majesté le roi Charles ayant ainsi assuré la prospérité, l’intégrité et l’indépendance de ses sujets, Sa Majesté l’Empereur s’engage à donner refuge dans ses états au roi Charles, à la reine, à sa famille, au prince de la Paix, ainsi qu’à ceux de leurs serviteurs qui voudront les suivre, lesquels jouiront en France d’un rang équivalent à celui qu’ils possédaient en Espagne.
The remaining seven articles have reference to the estates and revenues in France, which the Emperor makes over to Charles IV and his family.
RESIGNATION OF HIS RIGHTS BY FERDINAND VII.
Art. I. Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies adhère à la cession faite par le roi Charles, de ses droits au trône d’Espagne et des Indes, en faveur de Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, et renonce, en tant que de besoin, aux droits qui lui sont acquis, comme prince des Asturies, à la couronne des Espagnes et des Indes.
II. Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, accorde en France à Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies le titre d’Altesse Royale, avec tous les honneurs et prérogatives dont jouissent les princes de son rang. Les descendans de Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies conserveront le titre de prince et celui d’Altesse Sérénissime, et auront toujours le même rang en France, que les princes dignitaires de l’Empire.
The remaining five articles have reference to the estates and revenues in France, which the Emperor makes over to Ferdinand.
VIII
THE CAPITULATION OF BAYLEN
1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF CASTAÑOS
N.B.--* marks an old regiment of the regular army; † a militia regiment; ‡ a regiment of new levies.
Commander-in-chief, Lieut.-General FRANCISCO XAVIER CASTAÑOS. Chief of the Staff, Major-General Tomas Moreno.
_Men._ 1st Division, General TEODORO REDING: *Walloon Guards (3rd batt.), 852; *Reina, 795; *Corona, 824; *Jaen, 922; *Irlanda, 1,824; *3rd Swiss, 1,100; *Barbastro (half batt.), 331; †Jaen, 500; ‡1st of Granada, 526; ‡Cazadores of Antequera, 343; ‡Tejas, 43 Total 8,453 Cavalry attached to the 1st Division: *Montesa, 120; *Farnesio, 213; *_Dragones de la Reina_, 213; *Numancia, 100; *Olivenza, 140; ‡Lancers of Utrera and Jerez, 114. Total 900 One horse-battery (six guns), one field-battery (four guns) 200 Two companies of sappers 166 ----- Total of the Division 9,719
2nd Division, Major-General Marquis COUPIGNY: *Ceuta, 1,208; *Ordenes Militares, 1,909; †Granada, 400; †Truxillo, 290; †Bujalance, 403; †Cuenca, 501; †Ciudad Real, 420; ‡2nd of Granada, 450; ‡3rd of Granada, 470; ‡Volunteers of Catalonia, 1,178. Total 7,229 Cavalry attached to 2nd Division: *Borbon, 401; *España, 120. Total 521 One horse-battery (six guns) 100 One company of sappers 100 ------ Total of the Division 7,950
3rd Division, Major-General FELIX JONES: *Cordova, 1,106; *Light Infantry of Valencia (half batt.), 359; *ditto of Campo-Mayor, 800; †Burgos, 415; †Alcazar, 400; †Plasencia, 410; †Guadix, 459; †Lorca, 490; †Seville, 267. Total 4,706 Cavalry attached to 3rd Division: *Calatrava, 222; *Santiago, 86; *Sagunto, 101; *Principe, 300. Total 709 ------ Total of the Division 5,415
4th Division (Reserve), Lieut.-General MANUEL LA PEÑA: *Africa, 525; *Burgos, 2,089; *Saragossa (3rd batt.), 822; *Murcia (3rd batt.), 420; *2nd Swiss, 243; *Marines, 50; †Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia, 912; †Siguenza, 502. Total 5,563 Cavalry attached to 4th Division: *Pavia, 541 541 Artillery, two horse-batteries (twelve guns) (?) 302 Sappers, one company 100 ------ Total of the Division 6,506
Total of the army, 29,590: viz. infantry, 25,951; cavalry, 2,671; artillery, 602; sappers, 366, with twenty-eight guns.
N.B.--The force of the two flying columns of Col. Cruz-Murgeon and the Conde de Valdecañas is not ascertainable. They were both composed of new levies: Arteche puts the former at 2,000 foot, and the latter at 1,800 foot and 400 horse. Other authorities give Cruz-Murgeon 3,000 men.
It should be noted that Castaños’ field-army does not comprise the whole number of men under arms in Andalusia. Most of the regular regiments had left behind their third battalion, which was being completed with recruits, and was not fit to take the field. Of all the regiments only Burgos, Irlanda, and Ordenes Militares seem to have gone forward three battalions strong.
2. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH GENERALS.
(_a._) GENERAL DUPONT TO GENERAL VEDEL.
Je vous prie, mon cher général, de vous porter le plus rapidement possible sur Baylen, pour y faire votre jonction avec le corps qui a combattu aujourd’hui à Mengibar et qui s’est replié sur cette ville. Le sixième régiment provisoire et deux escadrons, l’un de dragons et l’autre de chasseurs, sont réunis à votre division.
J’espère que l’ennemi sera rejeté demain sur Mengibar, au delà du fleuve, et que les postes de Guarraman et de la Caroline resteront en sûreté; ils sont d’une grande importance.
Lorsque vous aurez obtenu ce succès, je désire que vous réunissiez à Andujar une partie de vos forces, afin de combattre l’ennemi qui se trouve devant nous. Vous ne laisserez à Baylen que ce qui sera nécessaire pour sa défense.
Si l’ennemi occupe Baëza, il faut l’en chasser.
Recevez mes assurances d’amitié.
Le général DUPONT.
Andujar, le 16 juillet 1808.
(_b._) GENERAL VEDEL TO GENERAL DUPONT.
Mon général,
Il est huit heures et demie. J’arrive à Baylen, où je n’ai trouvé personne. Le général Dufour en est parti à minuit et a marché sur Guarraman. Comme il n’a laissé personne pour m’instruire des motifs de cette démarche, je ne puis rien dire de positif à cet égard; mais le bruit commun étant que les troupes ennemies, qui out attaqué hier le général Belair, se sont dirigées avec celles qui étaient à Ubeda, vers les gorges, par Linharès et Sainte-Hélène, on doit penser que le général Dufour s’est mis à leur poursuite, afin de les combattre.
Comme les instructions de Votre Excellence portent que je dois faire ma jonction avec le corps qui s’était replié sur Baylen, quoique harassé et fatigué, je partirai d’ici pour me rendre encore aujourd’hui à Guarraman, afin de regagner la journée que l’ennemi a sur moi, l’atteindre, le battre, et déjouer ainsi ses projets sur les gorges.
Je vais écrire au général Dufour, pour l’informer de mon mouvement, savoir quelque chose de positif sur sa marche et sur les données qu’il peut avoir de celle de l’ennemi.
· · · · · · · · ·
Le général de division,
VEDEL.
Baylen, le 17 juillet 1808.
(_c._) GENERAL DUPONT TO GENERAL VEDEL.
J’ai reçu votre lettre de Baylen; d’après le mouvement de l’ennemi, le général Dufour a très-bien fait de le gagner de vitesse sur la Caroline et sur Sainte-Hélène, pour occuper la tête des gorges; je vois avec plaisir que vous vous hâtez de vous réunir à lui, afin de combattre avec avantage, si l’ennemi se présente. Mais, au lieu de se rendre à Sainte-Hélène, l’ennemi peut suivre la vieille route, qui de Baëza va à Guëmada, et qui est parallèle à la grande route; s’il prend ce parti, il faut le gagner encore de vitesse au débouché de cette route, afin de l’empêcher de pénétrer dans la Manche. D’après ce que vous me dites, ce corps ne serait que d’environ dix mille hommes, et vous êtes en mesure de la battre complétement; s’il est plus considérable, manœuvrez pour suspendre sa marche, ou pour le contenir dans les gorges, en attendant que j’arrive à votre appui.
· · · · · · · · ·
Si vous trouvez l’ennemi à la Caroline, ou sur tout autre point de la grande route, tâchez de le battre, pour me venir rejoindre et repousser ce qui est devant Andujar.
· · · · · · · · ·
Mille amitiés.
Le général DUPONT.
Andujar, le 17 juillet 1808.
N.B.--It will be seen that by letter (_a_) Dupont deliberately divides his army into two halves. By letter (_b_) Vedel shows that he made no reconnaissances, but acted merely on ‘le bruit commun.’ By letter (_c_) Dupont accepts Vedel’s erroneous views without suspicion, and authorizes him to go off on the wild-goose chase which he was projecting.
3. CAPITULATION.
Leurs Excellences MM. le comte de Casa Tilly et le général don Francisco Xavier Castaños, commandant en chef l’armée d’Espagne en Andalousie, voulant donner une preuve de leur haute estime à Son Excellence M. le général comte Dupont, grand aigle de la Légion d’honneur, commandant en chef le corps d’observation de la Gironde, ainsi qu’à l’armée sous ses ordres, pour la belle et glorieuse défense qu’ils out faite contre une armée infiniment supérieure en nombre, et qui les enveloppait de toutes parts; sur la demande de M. le général de brigade Chabert, commandant de la Légion d’honneur, et chargé des pleins pouvoirs de Son Excellence le général en chef de l’armée française, en présence de Son Excellence M. le général comte Marescot, grand aigle de la Légion d’honneur et premier inspecteur du génie, ont arrêté les conventions suivantes:
Art. 1er. Les troupes françaises sous les ordres de Son Excellence M. le général Dupont sont prisonnières de guerre, la division Vedel et les autres troupes françaises en Andalousie exceptées.
2. La division de M. le général Vedel, et généralement toutes les troupes françaises en Andalousie, qui ne sont pas dans la position de celles comprises dans l’article 1er, évacueront l’Andalousie.
3. Les troupes comprises dans l’article 2 conserveront généralement tous leurs bagages, et, pour éviter tout sujet de trouble pendant la marche, elles remettront leur artillerie, train et autres armes, à l’armée espagnole, qui s’engage à les leur rendre au moment de leur embarquement.
4. Les troupes comprises dans l’article 1er du traité sortiront de leur camp avec les honneurs de la guerre; chaque bataillon ayant deux canons en tête; les soldats armés de leurs fusils, qui seront déposés à quatre cents toises du camp.
5. Les troupes de M. le général Vedel et autres, ne devant pas déposer les armes, les placeront en faisceaux sur le front de bandière; elles y laisseront aussi leur artillerie et leur train. Il en sera dressé procès-verbal par des officiers des deux armées, et le tout leur sera remis ainsi qu’il est convenu dans l’article 3.
6. Toutes les troupes françaises en Andalousie se rendront à San-Lucar et à Rota, par journées d’étape, qui ne pourront excéder quatre lieues de poste, avec les séjours nécessaires, pour y être embarquées sur des vaisseaux ayant équipage espagnol, et transportées en France au port de Rochefort.
7. Les troupes françaises seront embarquées aussitôt après leur arrivée. L’armée espagnole assure leur traversée contre toute agression hostile.
8. MM. les officiers généraux, supérieurs et autres, conserveront leurs armes, et les soldats leurs sacs.
9. Les logements, vivres et fourrages, pendant la marche et la traversée, seront fournis à MM. les officiers généraux et autres y ayant droit, ainsi qu’à la troupe, dans la proportion de leur grade, et sur le pied des troupes espagnoles en temps de guerre.
10. Les chevaux de MM. les officiers généraux, supérieurs et d’état-major, dans la proportion de leur grade, seront transportés en France, et nourris sur le pied de guerre.
11. MM. les officiers généraux conserveront chacun une voiture et un fourgon; MM. les officiers supérieurs et d’état-major, une voiture seulement, sans être soumis à aucun examen, _mais sans contrevenir aux ordonnances et aux lois du royaume_.
12. Sont exceptées de l’article précédent les voitures prises en Andalousie, dont l’examen sera fait par M. le général Chabert.
13. Pour éviter la difficulté d’embarquer les chevaux des corps de cavalerie et d’artillerie, compris dans l’article 2, lesdits chevaux seront laissés en Espagne, et seront payés, d’après l’estimation de deux commissaires français et espagnol, et acquittés par le gouvernement espagnol.
14. Les blessés et malades de l’armée française, laissés dans les hôpitaux, seront traités avec le plus grand soin, et seront transportés en France sous bonne et sûre escorte, aussitôt après leur guérison.
15. Comme, en diverses rencontres et particulièrement à la prise de Cordoue, plusieurs soldats, au mépris des ordres des généraux et malgré les efforts des officiers, se sont portés à des excès qui sont inévitables dans les villes qui opposent encore de la résistance au moment d’être prises, MM. les généraux et autres officiers prendront les mesures nécessaires pour retrouver les vases sacrés qu’on pourrait avoir enlevés, et les restituer, s’ils existent.
16. Tous les employés civils, attachés à l’armée française, ne sont pas considérés comme prisonniers de guerre; ils jouiront cependant, pour leur transport en France, de tous les avantages de la troupe, dans la proportion de leur emploi.
17. Les troupes françaises commenceront à évacuer l’Andalousie le 23 juillet, à quatre heures du matin. Pour éviter la grande chaleur, la marche des troupes s’effectuera de nuit, et se conformera aux journées d’étape qui seront réglées par MM. les officiers d’état-major français et espagnols, en évitant le passage des villes de Cordoue et de Séville.
18. Les troupes françaises, pendant leur marche, seront escortées par la troupe de ligne espagnole, à raison de trois cents hommes d’escorte par colonne de trois mille hommes, et MM. les officiers généraux seront escortés par des détachements de cavalerie et d’infanterie de ligne.
19. Les troupes, dans leur marche, seront toujours précédées par des commissaires français et espagnols, qui devront assurer les logements et les vivres nécessaires, d’après les états qui leur seront remis.
20. La présente capitulation sera portée de suite à Son Excellence M. le duc de Rovigo, commandant en chef les troupes françaises en Espagne, par un officier français qui devra être escorté par des troupes de ligne espagnoles.
21. Il est convenu par les deux armées qu’il sera ajouté, comme articles supplémentaires, à la capitulation, ce qui peut avoir été omis et ce qui pourrait encore augmenter le bien-être des troupes françaises pendant leur séjour en Espagne, et pendant la traversée.
_Signé_,
XAVIER CASTAÑOS. MARESCOT, Général de Division.
CONDE DE TILLY. CHABERT, Général de Brigade.
VENTURA ESCALANTE, Capitan-General de Granada.
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES OF AUGUST 6.
Art. 1er. On a déjà sollicité du roi d’Angleterre et de l’amirauté anglaise des passe-ports pour la sûreté du passage des troupes françaises.
2. L’embarquement s’effectuera sur des vaisseaux de l’escadre espagnole, ou sur tous autres bâtiments de transport qui seront nécessaires pour conduire le total des troupes françaises, au moins par division, à commencer par celle du général Dupont, et immédiatement après, celle du général Vedel.
3. Le débarquement s’effectuera sur les côtes du Languedoc ou de Provence, ou bien au port de Lorient, selon que le voyage sera jugé plus commode et plus court.
4. On embarquera des vivres pour un mois et plus, afin de prévenir tous les accidents de la navigation.
5. Dans le cas qu’on n’obtînt pas de l’Angleterre les passe-ports de sûreté qu’on a demandés, alors on traitera des moyens les plus propres pour le passage par terre.
6. Chaque division des troupes françaises sera cantonnée sur différents points, dans un rayon de huit à dix lieues, en attendant que le susdit embarquement ait son effet.
Ainsi fait à Séville, le 6 août 1808.
_Signé_,
XAVIER CASTAÑOS.
LETTER OF THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF ANDALUSIA, REPUDIATING THE CAPITULATION.
Monsieur le général Dupont,
Je n’ai jamais eu ni de mauvaise foi, ni de fausse dissimulation: de là vient ce que j’écrivis à V. E., sous la date du 8, dicté, d’après mon caractère, par la plus grande candeur, et je suis fâché de me voir obligé, par votre réponse en date d’hier, de répéter en abrégé ce que j’eus l’honneur de dire alors à V. E., et ce qui certainement ne peut manquer de se vérifier.
Ni la capitulation, ni l’approbation de la junte, ni un ordre exprès de notre souverain chéri, ne peuvent rendre possible ce qui ne l’est pas; il n’y a point de bâtiments, ni de moyens de s’en procurer pour le transport de votre armée. Quelle plus grande preuve que celle de retenir ici très-dispendieusement les prisonniers de votre corps, pour n’avoir point de quoi les transporter sur d’autres points hors du continent?
Lorsque le général Castaños promit d’obtenir des Anglais des passe-ports pour le passage de votre armée, il ne put s’obliger à autre chose qu’à les demander avec instance, et c’est ce qu’il a fait. Mais comment V. E. put-elle croire que la nation britannique accéderait à la laisser passer, certaine qu’elle allait lui faire la guerre sur un autre point, ou peut-être sur le même?
_Je me persuade que ni le général Castaños, ni V. E. ne crurent que ladite capitulation pût être exécutée: le but du premier fut de sortir d’embarras, et celui de V. E. d’obtenir des conditions qui, quoique impossibles, honorassent sa reddition indispensable. Chacun de vous obtint ce qu’il désirait, et maintenant il est nécessaire que la loi impérieuse de la nécessité commande._
Le caractère national ne permet d’en user avec les Français que d’après cette loi, et non d’après celle des représailles; V. E. m’oblige de lui exprimer des vérités qui doivent lui être amères. _Quel droit a-t-elle d’exiger l’exécution impossible d’une capitulation avec une armée qui est entrée en Espagne sous le voile de l’alliance intime et de l’union, qui a emprisonné notre roi et sa famille royale, saccagé ses palais, assassiné et volé ses sujets, détruit ses campagnes et arraché sa couronne?_ Si V. E. ne veut s’attirer de plus en plus la juste indignation des peuples, que je travaille tant à réprimer, qu’elle cesse de semblables et d’aussi intolérables réclamations, et qu’elle cherche, par sa conduite et sa résignation, à affaiblir la vive sensation des horreurs qu’elle a commises récemment à Cordoue. V. E. croit bien assurément que mon but, en lui faisant cet avertissement, n’a d’autre objet que son propre bien: le vulgaire irréfléchi ne pense qu’à payer le mal par le mal, sans apprécier les circonstances, et je ne peux m’empêcher de rendre V. E. responsable des résultats funestes que peut entraîner sa répugnance à ce qui ne peut manquer d’être.
Les dispositions que j’ai données à D. Juan Creagh, et qui ont été communiquées à V. E., sont les mêmes que celles de la junte suprême, et sont, en outre, indispensables dans les circonstances actuelles: le retard de leur exécution alarme les peuples et attire des inconvénients: déjà ledit Creagh m’a fait part d’un accident qui me donne les plus grandes craintes. _Quel stimulant pour la populace, de savoir qu’un seul soldat était porteur de 2,180 livres tournois!_
C’est tout ce que j’ai à répondre à la dépêche de V. E., et j’espère que celle-ci sera la dernière réponse relative à ces objets, demeurant, sur toute autre chose, dans le désir de lui être agréable, étant son affectionné et sincère serviteur,
MORLA.
IX
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA
1. DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.
The Generals commanding-in-chief of the British and French armies in Portugal having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22nd instant for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names: viz. on the part of the General-in-chief of the British army, Lieut.-Col. Murray, Quartermaster-General, and on the part of the French army, M. Kellermann, General of Division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a Convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. These two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow:--
I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the moment of the signature of the present Convention.
II. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage: they shall not be considered prisoners of war: and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.
III. The English Government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L’Orient inclusively.
IV. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery arms and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the Convention.
V. The French army shall carry away with it all its equipment, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army, that is to say its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital, or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account, as the Commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of all their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.
VI. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the Generals and other officers of all ranks: it is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance[745] for horses at the disposal of the British Commander-in-chief are very limited: some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon.
[745] Of transports fitted for carrying horses Dalrymple only had at this moment those which had brought 180 horses for the 20th Light Dragoons, 300 of the Irish commissariat, and 560 of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the German Legion, which had just arrived with Moore.
VII. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry and artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days from the ratification of the Convention, or sooner if possible.
VIII. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.
IX. All the French sick and wounded who cannot be embarked are entrusted to the British army.... The English Government shall provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of 150 or 200 men at a time[@ 746 repetido].
X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it ... every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay: they shall have security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port[746].
[746] These articles are shortened of some unimportant verbiage and details.
XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, or within a distance of about two leagues from it. The British army will approach to within three leagues of the capital, so as to leave about one league between the two armies.
XII. The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the Convention. Lisbon and its forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and the Fort St. Joseph on the other inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall be also the harbour and all the armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmella shall be given up so soon as British troops can arrive to occupy them: in the meantime the British General-in-chief will give notice of the present Convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops in front of them, in order to put a stop to further hostilities.
XIII. Commissaries shall be appointed on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.
XIV. Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of any article, it shall be explained favourably to the French army.
XV. From the date of the ratification of the present Convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, and claims of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops since December, 1807, which may not have been paid up are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, movable or immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to their proper owners.
XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected. Their property of every kind, movable and immovable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and of passing the sale[747] of it into France or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.
[747] The meaning of this odd and crabbed phrase is shown by the French duplicate of the Convention--‘d’en faire passer le produit en France.’ Murray should have written ‘the proceeds’ instead of ‘the sale.’
It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement; only, however, as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.
XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army. And all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French Government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders. They shall suffer no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French Government. They are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the sixteenth article.
XVIII. The Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon shall be given up to the General-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained[748] in Spain, without having been taken in battle or in consequence of military operations, but on the occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of May last, and the days immediately following.
[748] Murray’s English does not here translate Kellermann’s French: the latter has ‘détenus en Espagne,’ i.e. ‘at present prisoners in Spain,’ not ‘who may have been detained in Spain.’ For the persons intended were primarily General Quesnel, his staff, and escort, who had been seized in Portugal and then taken into Spain. The clause also covered some French officers and commissaries who had been seized at Badajoz and elsewhere while making their way to Lisbon, at the moment when the insurrection broke out.
XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.
XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present Convention.
The officer representing the British army to be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army, and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army[749].
[749] The hostage for the English army was Col. Donkin. I cannot find out who was the naval hostage.
XXI. It shall be allowed to the General-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present Convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to carry him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.
XXII. The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate His Excellency the Commander-in-chief[750] and the other principal French officers on board of ships of war.
[750] i.e. Junot and his chief officers preferred the hospitalities of a man of war to the hard fare of a transport.
Done and concluded at Lisbon this thirteenth day of August, 1808.
GEORGE MURRAY, Quar.-Mas.-Gen. KELLERMANN, Général de Division.
Three unimportant supplementary articles were added, one stipulating that French civilian prisoners in the hands of the English or Portuguese should be released, another that the French army should subsist on its own magazines till it embarked, a third that the British should allow the free entry of provisions into Lisbon after the signature of the Convention.
2. REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.
On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on Your Majesty’s arms.
All which is most dutifully submitted.
(Signed)
DAVID DUNDAS, General. MOIRA, General. PETER CRAIG, General. HEATHFIELD, General. PEMBROKE, Lieut.-Gen. G. NUGENT, Lieut.-Gen. OL. NICHOLLS, Lieut.-Gen.
Dec. 22, 1808.
3. LORD MOIRA’S ‘OPINION.’
I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the Convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the Officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. Military duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.
An Armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore’s division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the Armistice involved, and in fact established, the whole principle of the Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.
Sir Arthur Wellesley has stated that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4,000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Acland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir Arthur Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed.
It is urged, that, had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British Generals, namely, sending succours into Spain.
This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls ‘the critical and embarrassed state of Junot,’ before that General has been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alemtejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose, that Junot could have contemplated the measure, as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot’s opinion, arises from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiero, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource.
I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition.--Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot’s army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.
Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possibility of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the Convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts.
I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable Officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the Convention.
MOIRA, General.
December 27, 1808.
X
THE CENTRAL JUNTA OF REGENCY
LIST OF THE MEMBERS.
N.B.--The notes as to individuals are extracted from Arguelles.
1. For ARAGON. Don Francisco PALAFOX, Brigadier-General [younger brother of Joseph Palafox, the Captain-General]. Don Lorenzo CALVO DE ROZAS [Intendant-General of the Army of Aragon, long a banker in Madrid].
2. For ASTURIAS. Don Gaspar JOVELLANOS [Councillor of State, sometime Minister of Justice]. The Marquis of CAMPO SAGRADO, Lieut.-General.
3. For the CANARY ISLANDS. The Marquis of VILLANUEVA DEL PRADO.
4. For OLD CASTILE. Don Lorenzo BONIFAZ [Prior of Zamora]. Don Francisco Xavier CARO [a Professor of the University of Salamanca].
5. For CATALONIA. The Marquis of VILLEL [Grandee of Spain]. The Baron de SABASONA.
6. For CORDOVA. The Marquis DE LA PUEBLA [Grandee of Spain]. Don Juan RABE [a merchant of Cordova].
7. For ESTREMADURA. Don Martin GARAY [Intendant-General of Estremadura]. Don Felix OVALLE [Treasurer of the Army of Estremadura].
8. For GALICIA. The Conde de GIMONDE. Don Antonio ABALLE [an advocate].
9. For GRANADA. Don Rodrigo RIQUELME [Regent of the Chancellery]. Don Luis FUNES [Canon of Santiago].
10. For JAEN. Don Francisco CASTANEDO [Canon of Jaen]. Don Sebastian JOCANO [Accountant-General].
11. For LEON. Don Antonio VALDES [Bailiff of the Knights of Malta, sometime Minister of Marine]. The Vizconde de QUINTANILLA.
12. For MADRID. The Marquis of ASTORGA [Grandee of Spain]. Don Pedro SILVA [Patriarch of the Indies].
13. For the BALEARIC ISLES. Don Tomas VERI [Lieut.-Col. of Militia]. The Conde de AYAMANS.
14. For MURCIA. The Conde de FLORIDA BLANCA [sometime Secretary of State]. The Marquis DEL VILLAR.
15. For NAVARRE. Don Miguel BALANZA and Don Carlos AMATRIA [formerly representatives in the Cortes of Navarre].
16. For SEVILLE. The Archbishop of LAODICEA [Coadjutor-Bishop of Seville]. The Conde de TILLY.
17. For TOLEDO. Don Pedro RIVERO [Canon of Toledo]. Don José Garcia LATORRE [an advocate].
18. For VALENCIA. The Conde de CONTAMINA [Grandee of Spain]. The Principe PIO [Grandee of Spain and a Lieut.-Col. of Militia].
XI
THE SPANISH ARMIES, OCT.-NOV. 1808
N.B.--* signifies an old line or light regiment; † a militia battalion; ‡ a newly raised corps.
1. THE ARMY OF GALICIA [RETURN OF OCT. 31].
General BLAKE. _Officers._ _Men._ Vanguard Brigade, General MENDIZABAL: *2nd Catalonian Light Infantry (one batt.); *Volunteers of Navarre (one batt.); *two batts. of United Grenadiers; *Saragossa (one batt.); *one company of sappers 87 2,797
1st Division, General FIGUEROA: *Rey (two batts.); *Majorca (one batt.); *Hibernia (one batt.); *one batt. of united light companies; †Mondoñedo; ‡_Batallon Literario_; *one company of sappers 86 3,932
2nd Division, General MARTINENGO: *Navarre (two batts.); *Naples (two batts.); †Pontevedra; †Segovia; ‡‘Volunteers of Victory’ (one batt.); sappers, one company; Cavalry: *Reina (two squadrons); *Montesa (one squadron); and one detachment of mixed regiments. [The cavalry was 302 sabres in all.] 117 4,949
3rd Division, General RIQUELME: *Gerona Light Infantry (one batt.); *Seville (two batts.); *Marines (three batts.); †Compostella (one batt.); one company of sappers 119 4,677
4th Division, General CARBAJAL: *Barbastro Light Infantry (one batt.); *Principe (two batts.); *Toledo (two batts.); *two batts. of United Grenadiers; *Aragon (one batt.); †Lugo; †Santiago 143 3,388
5th Division [from Denmark], General Conde de SAN ROMAN: *Zamora (three batts.); *Princesa (three batts.); *1st Barcelona Light Infantry (one batt.); *1st Catalonian Light Infantry (one batt.); one company of sappers 159 5,135
Asturian Division: General ACEVEDO: *Hibernia (two batts.); †Oviedo; ‡Castropol; ‡Grado; ‡Cangas de Onis; ‡Cangas de Tineo; ‡Lena; ‡Luarca; ‡Salas; ‡Villaviciosa 233 7,400
Reserve Brigade, General MAHY: *Volunteers of the Crown (one batt.); *United Grenadiers (one batt.); †Militia Grenadiers (two batts.); ‡_Batallon del General_ (one batt.) 90 2,935
Detached Troops on the line of communications--Reynosa, Burgos, Astorga: *Saragossa (one batt.); *Buenos Ayres (one batt.); *Volunteers of the Crown (one batt.); †Santiago; †Tuy; †Salamanca; ‡_Batallon del General_ (one batt.); and seven detached companies of various corps 181 5,577
Detached troops left with the Artillery Reserve: †Betanzos; †Monterrey 40 900 Artillery Reserve (thirty-eight guns) 33 1,000 ----- ------ Total 1,288 42,690
N.B.--The four cavalry regiments from Denmark, Rey, Infante, Villaviciosa, and Almanza did not join Blake, being without horses, but marched on foot to Estremadura to get mounted. They had 147 officers and 2,252 men.
2. THE ARMY OF ARAGON.
General Joseph PALAFOX.
1st Division, General O’NEILLE: *Spanish Guards (one batt.), 609; *Estremadura (one batt.), 600; *1st Volunteers of Aragon (one batt.), 1,141; ‡1st Light Infantry of Saragossa, 614; ‡4th Tercio of Aragon, 1,144; ‡2nd of Valencia, 869; ‡1st Volunteers of Murcia, 1,029; ‡2nd ditto, 968; ‡Huesca, 1,219; ‡Cazadores de Fernando VII (Aragonese), 386; ‡Suizos de Aragon, 825; ‡Escopeteros de Navarra, 227; *Dragoons ‘del Rey,’ 169; artillery, 79; sappers, 47. Total 9,926 [From a return of Nov. 1, 1808, in the English Record Office.]
2nd Division, General SAINT MARCH: *Volunteers of Castile (three batts.); †Soria; ‡Turia (three batts.); ‡Volunteers of Borbon (one batt.); ‡Alicante (three batts.); ‡Chelva (one batt.); ‡Cazadores de Fernando VII (Valencian) (one batt.); ‡Segorbe (one batt.); *Dragoons of Numancia (620 sabres); one company of sappers. Total 9,060 [This total is from Vaughan’s diary. He was present when Palafox reviewed the division on Nov. 1, and took down the figures.]
3rd Division, General Conde de LAZAN [detached to Catalonia, Nov. 10]: ‡1st Volunteers of Saragossa, 638; ‡3rd Volunteers of Aragon, 593; ‡Fernando VII de Aragon, 648; ‡Daroca, 503; ‡La Reunion, 1,286; ‡Reserva del General, 934; artillery, 64; one troop of cavalry (Cazadores de Fernando VII), 22. Total 4,688 [The figures are from a table in Arteche, iii. 469.]
Reserve at Saragossa:
There was a mass of troops in the Aragonese capital which had not yet been brigaded, and in part had not even been armed or clothed in October. They included the following regiments _at least_: 2nd Volunteers of Aragon; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Tercios of Aragon; 2nd Light Battalion of Saragossa; and the battalions of Calatayud, Doyle, Barbastro, Jaca, Tauste, Teruel, and Torrero; besides (in all probability) some eight or ten other corps which are found existing in December, when the second siege began, though they cannot be proved to have existed in October. In that month, however, there must have been at least 10,000 armed men in the Aragonese reserve, perhaps as many as 15,000.
Total of the Army of Aragon, _at least_ 33,674 men, of which only 789 were cavalry.
3. ARMY OF ESTREMADURA.
General GALLUZZO [afterwards the Conde de BELVEDERE]. _Men._ 1st Division, Conde de BELVEDERE: [afterwards General DE ALOS] *Spanish Guards (4th batt.); *Majorca (two batts.); *2nd Light Infantry of Catalonia (one batt.); †Provincial Grenadiers (one batt.); one company of tirailleurs 4,160 Cavalry, *4th Hussars (‘Volunteers of Spain’) 360 Sappers, two companies; artillery, two batteries 408
2nd Division, General HENESTROSA: *Walloon Guards (4th batt.); ‡Badajoz (two batts.); ‡Valencia de Alcantara; ‡Zafra 3,300 Cavalry, 5th Hussars (Maria Luisa) 298 Sappers, two companies; artillery, two batteries 440
3rd Division, General TRIAS: †Badajoz; ‡Truxillo (one batt.); ‡Merida; ‡La Serena 3,580 Cavalry, 2nd Hussars (Lusitania) 300
Total of the Army, 12,846, of which 958 were cavalry.
[N.B.--From the _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 21, 1808, compared with the table in Arteche, iii. 496.]
4. ARMY OF THE CENTRE.
General CASTAÑOS. _Men._ 1st Division, Conde de VILLARIEZO: *Walloon Guards (two batts.); *Reina (three batts.); *Corona (two batts.); *Jaen (three batts.); *Irlanda (three batts.); *Barbastro (one batt.); †Jaen (about) 8,500 Out of these fifteen battalions nine were detached to the rear in or about Madrid, and were not present on the Ebro.
2nd Division, General GRIMAREST: *Ceuta (two batts.); Ordenes Militares (three batts.); †Truxillo; †Bujalance; †Cuenca; †Ciudad Real; ‡Tiradores de España; ‡Volunteers of Catalonia; ‡Tiradores de Cadiz; ‡Carmona (about) 6,000
3rd Division, General RENGEL: *Cordova (two batts.); *Volunteers of Valencia (one batt.); *Campo Mayor (one batt.); †Toledo; †Burgos; †Alcazar; †Plasencia; †Guadix; †Seville no. 1; †Lorca; †Toro. (about) 6,500 Out of these thirteen battalions four were detached to the rear, and were not present on the Ebro.
4th Division, General LA PEÑA: *Africa (two batts.); *Burgos (two batts.); *Saragossa (one batt.); *Murcia (two batts.); †Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia (two batts.); †Siguenza; ‡Navas de Tolosa; ‡Baylen; ‡5th Battalion of Seville (about) 7,500
5th [Murcian-Valencian] Division, General ROCA [_vice_ General LLAMAS]: *Savoya (two batts.); *Valencia (three batts.); *America (three batts.); †Murcia; †Avila; ‡Liria; ‡Cazadores de Valencia (three batts.); ‡Orihuela (two batts.); Tiradores of Xativa and Cartagena (two companies); ‡Peñas de San Pedro (about) 8,000 [One regiment was left at Aranjuez as guard to the Junta, with General Llamas in command.]
‘Army of Castile,’ General PIGNATELLI [after Oct. 30, General CARTAOJAL]: *Cantabria (two batts.); †Leon Militia; ‡Grenadiers ‘del General’; ‡Cazadores de Cuenca; ‡1st, 2nd, and 3rd Volunteers of Leon; ‡1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tercios of Castile; ‡Tiradores de Castilla; ‡Volunteers of Benavente; ‡Volunteers of Zamora; ‡Volunteers of Ledesma Total (about) 11,000
The first-named four corps were made into a detached brigade under Cartaojal on Oct. 30: the others (except ‡Benavente in garrison at Burgos) were dispersed among the Andalusian divisions for misbehaviour at Logroño on Oct. 26.
Cavalry: *Farnesio; *Montesa; *Reina; *Olivenza; *Borbon; *España; *Calatrava; *Santiago; *Sagunto; *Principe; *Pavia; *Alcantara. Very few of these regiments had more than three squadrons at the front, some only one. The total was not more than 3,500 sabres, even including one or two newly raised free-corps, of insignificant strength (about) 3,500
Total of the Army of the Centre, about 51,000 men, of whom only about 42,000 were on the Ebro: the remaining 9,000 were in or about Madrid, and were incorporated in San Juan’s ‘Army of Reserve.’
5. ARMY OF CATALONIA.
[Morning state of Nov. 5, 1808.]
General VIVES. _Men._ Vanguard Division, Brigadier-General ALVAREZ: *Ultonia, 300; *Borbon (one batt.), 500; *2nd of Barcelona, 1,000; *1st Swiss (Wimpfen) (one batt.), 400; ‡1st Tercio of Gerona, 900; ‡2nd ditto, 400; ‡Tercio of Igualada, 400; ‡ditto of Cervera, 400; ‡1st ditto of Tarragona, 800; ‡ditto of Figueras, 400 5,500 Cavalry, ‡Hussars of San Narciso 100
1st Division, General Conde de CALDAGUES: *2nd Walloon Guards (one batt.), 314; *Soria (two batts.), 780; *Borbon (detachment), 151; *2nd of Savoia (two batts.), 1,734; *2nd Swiss (detachment), 270; ‡Tercio of Tortosa, 984; ‡Igualada and Cervera (detachments), 245; *sappers, 50 4,528 Cavalry: *Husares Españoles (two squadrons), 220; ‡Cazadores de Cataluña, 180 400 Artillery, one battery (six guns) 70
2nd Division, General LAGUNA: †Provincial Grenadiers of Old Castile (two batts.), 972; †ditto of New Castile (two batts.), 924; ‡Volunteers of Saragossa, 150; sappers, 30 2,076 Cavalry, *Husares Españoles 200 Artillery, one battery (seven guns) 84
3rd Division, General LA SERNA: *Granada (two batts.), 961; ‡2nd Tercio of Tarragona, 922; ‡‘Division of Arzu,’ 325; ‡Compañias Sueltas, 250 2,458
4th Division, General MILANS: ‡1st Tercio of Lerida, 872; ‡ditto of Vich, 976; ‡ditto of Manresa, 937; ‡ditto of Vallés, 925 3,710
Reserve: *Spanish Guards, 60; *Grenadiers of Soria, 188; *ditto of Wimpfen, 169; General’s bodyguard, 340; sappers, 20 777 Cavalry, *Husares Españoles 80 Artillery (four guns) 50
Total of the Army, 20,033, of which 780 are cavalry.
These five armies formed the front line. Their total strength was 151,243, if the 9,000 men left behind at Madrid are deducted.
TROOPS IN THE SECOND LINE.
1. ARMY OF GRANADA [MARCHING TOWARDS CATALONIA].
General REDING. _Men._ 1st Division: *2nd Swiss (Reding), 1,000; ‡1st Regiment of Granada [alias Iliberia] (two batts.), 2,400; ‡Baza (two batts.), 2,400; ‡Almeria, (two batts.), 2,400 8,200 2nd Division: ‡Santa Fé (two batts.), 2,400; ‡Antequera (one batt.), 1,200; ‡Loxa (two batts.), 2,400 6,000 Cavalry, ‡Hussars of Granada 670 Artillery (six guns) 130 ------ Total of the Army 15,000
N.B.--This return is from a dispatch from Granada in the _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 28, corroborated by another of Nov. 5, announcing the arrival of the force at Murcia.
2. GALICIAN RESERVES. _Officers._ _Men._ Detached Troops in garrison in Galicia: *Majorca (one batt.); *Leon (one batt.); *Aragon (one batt.) 77 2,010 Detached troops on the Portuguese frontier: *Leon (one batt.); †Orense; and four detached companies 48 1,600 --- ----- 125 3,610
3. ASTURIAN RESERVES.
[N.B.--This force is exclusive of the troops under Acevedo in the Army of Blake. The numbers are from a morning state of December.]
_Men._ ‡Covadonga,360; ‡Don Carlos, 335; ‡Ferdinand VII, 316; ‡Gihon, 586; ‡Infiesto, 489; ‡Llanes, 420; ‡Luanco, 400; ‡Navia, 528; ‡Pravia, 581; ‡Riva de Sella, 685; ‡Siero, 585. Total 5,285
4. ARMY OF RESERVE OF MADRID.
N.B.--This force, which fought at the Somosierra, consisted of parts of the Armies of Andalusia and Estremadura; its numbers have already been counted among the troops of those armies.
General SAN JUAN. _Men._ From the 1st Division of Andalusia: *Walloon Guards (one batt.), 500; *Reina (two batts.), 927; *Jaen (two batts.), 1,300; *Irlanda (two batts.), 1,186; *Corona (two batts.), 1,039 4,952
From the 3rd Division of Andalusia: *Cordova (two batts.), 1,300; †Toledo, 500; †Alcazar, 500; ‡3rd of Seville, 400 2,700
From the Army of Estremadura: ‡Badajoz (remains of two batts.) 566
Castilian Levies: ‡1st Volunteers of Madrid (two batts.), 1,500; ‡2nd ditto, 1,500 3,000
Cavalry: *Principe, 200; *Alcantara, 100; *Montesa, 100; ‡Volunteers of Madrid, 200 600
Artillery (twenty-two guns) 300 ------ Total 12,118
N.B.--Of this force the following battalions fled to Madrid, and afterwards joined the Army of the Centre:--1st Volunteers of Madrid, Corona, half 3rd of Seville, Reina, Alcazar. The following fled to Segovia, and joined the Army of Estremadura:--Jaen, Irlanda, Toledo, Badajoz, 2nd Volunteers of Madrid, Walloon Guards, and half 3rd of Seville.
5. ESTREMADURAN RESERVES.
[Left in garrison at Badajoz, when the three divisions of Galluzzo marched to Madrid.]
_Men._ ‡Leales de Fernando VII (three batts.), 2,256; ‡Plasencia (one batt.), 1,200; ‡Badajoz (one batt.), 752 4,208
Cavalry: ‡Cazadores of Llerena, 200? Cazadores of Toledo, 200? 400 ------ Total 4,608
[For these forces compare _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 21, giving organization of the Army of Estremadura, with the list of troops which marched forward to Burgos in first section of this Appendix. The above regiments remained behind, and are found in existence in Cuesta’s army next spring. See Appendix to vol. ii giving his forces.]
6. BALEARIC ISLES.
There apparently remained in garrison in the Balearic Isles, in November, the following troops:--
_Men._ *4th Swiss (Beschard) (two batts.), 2,121; *Granada (one batt.), 222; *Soria (one batt.), 413; †Majorca, 604 Total 3,360
7. MURCIAN AND VALENCIAN RESERVES.
[Mostly on the march to Saragossa in November, 1808. The figures mainly from a return of Jan. 1 are too low for the November strength.]
_Men._ *5th Swiss (Traxler), 1,757; ‡1st Tiradores de Murcia, 813; ‡2nd ditto, 124; ‡3rd Volunteers of Murcia, 1,151; ‡5th ditto, 1,077; ‡Florida-Blanca, 352; ‡3rd of Valencia (figures wanting;? 500) Total 5,774
8. ANDALUSIAN RESERVES.
_Men._ *España (three batts.), 1,039; †Jerez, 574; †Malaga, 401; †Ronda, 574; †Ecija, 589 Total 3,177
‡2nd of Seville, 500; ‡4th ditto, 433; ‡Cazadores of Malaga (one batt.), 1,200; ‡Velez Malaga (three batts.), 2,400; ‡2nd of Antequera (one batt.), 1,200; ‡Osuna (two batts.), 1,061 Total 6,794
In addition, the following regular regiments had each, as it would seem, left the _cadre_ of one battalion behind in Andalusia to recruit, before marching to the Ebro to join Castaños:--Africa, Burgos, Cantabria, Ceuta, Corona, Cordova, Murcia. What the total of their numbers may have been in November and December, it is impossible to say--perhaps 400 each may be allowed, giving a total of 2,800. Of cavalry regiments there must have been in existence in Andalusia the nucleus of the following new regiments:--‡Tejas; ‡Montañas de Cordova; ‡Granada. Their force was trifling--a single squadron, or at most two. If we give them 600 men in all, we shall probably be not far wrong. Several regular cavalry regiments had left the _cadre_ of one or two squadrons behind.
The existence of all these regiments in November--December can be proved. The 2nd and 4th of Seville reached Madrid in time to join in its defence against Napoleon, and then fled to join the Army of the Centre. The figures given are their January strengths, when they had already suffered severely. The Malaga regiment’s figure is from _Madrid Gazette_ of Nov. 29, recording its march out to Granada. The militia battalions Jerez, Malaga, Ronda, Ecija were all in existence in June, they did not march to the Ebro, and are found in the Army of the Centre in the spring of 1809. España was apparently in garrison at Ceuta, and only brought up to the front early in 1809. Velez Malaga, 2nd of Antequera, and Osuna are first heard of under Del Palacio in January, 1809. They must have been raised by December at the latest.
The total of the Andalusian reserves accounted for in this table is 13,371, but no such number could have been sent forward in December, as many of the battalions were not properly armed, much less uniformed. But some of the volunteers, all the militia, and the regular regiment España--perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 in all--should have been at Madrid by Dec. 1. Only 1,000 bayonets actually reached it before Napoleon’s arrival.
It would seem then that the second line of the Spanish Army consisted of something like the following numbers:--
_Men._ Army of Reserve of Madrid 12,118 Reding’s Granadan Divisions 15,000 Galician Reserves 3,610 Asturian Reserves 5,285 Estremaduran Reserves 4,608 Balearic Isles Reserves 3,360 Murcian and Valencian Reserves 5,774 Andalusian Reserves 13,371 Cavalry from Denmark, in march for Estremadura 2,252 ------ Total 65,378
Some of the battalions (e.g. the Valencians and Murcians who went to Saragossa) must have been much stronger in December; on the other hand, others (e.g. the Estremadurans) are probably over-estimated: they showed no such figures as those given above, when they took the field early in 1809.
N.B.--In several armies, notably in those of Aragon and the Centre, there are doubtful points. It is impossible to speak with certainty of the number of battalions which some corps took to the front. It will be noted that all the numbers given are much larger than those attributed by Napier (i. 504) to the Spanish armies. I have worked from detailed official figures, the greater part of which seem perfectly trustworthy.
XII
THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN
IN NOVEMBER, 1808.
N.B.--The distribution of the regiments is that of November. The detailed strength of the corps, however, comes from an October return, and there had been several changes at the end of that month.
1ST CORPS. Marshal VICTOR, Duke of Belluno.
1st Division (Ruffin): 9th Léger, three batts. 24th of the Line, three batts. 96th ” four batts.
2nd Division (Lapisse): 16th Léger, three batts. 8th of the Line, three batts. 45th ” three batts. 54th ” three batts.
3rd Division (Villatte): 27th Léger, three batts. 63rd of the Line, three batts. 94th ” three batts. 95th ” three batts.
Corps Cavalry (Brigade Beaumont): 2nd Hussars. 26th Chasseurs.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,937 men, of whom 2,201 were detached, and 2,939 in hospital. The 4th Hussars, originally belonging to this corps, was transferred to the 3rd Corps by November.
2ND CORPS. Marshal BESSIÈRES: after Nov. 9, Marshal SOULT.
1st Division (Mouton, afterwards Merle): 2nd Léger, three batts. 4th ” three batts. 15th of the Line, three batts. 36th ” three batts. [Garde de Paris, one batt.]
2nd Division (Merle, afterwards Mermet): 31st Léger, three batts. 47th of the Line, two batts. 70th ” one batt. 86th ” one batt. 1st Supply. Regt. } of the Legions } = 122nd of the of Reserve } Line, four batts. 2nd ditto } 2nd Swiss Regiment, one batt. 3rd ” ” one batt.
3rd Division (Bonnet): 13th Prov. Regt. } = 119th of the 14th ” } Line, four batts.
17th ” } = 120th of the 18th ” } Line, four batts.
Corps Cavalry (Division Lasalle): 9th Dragoons (transferred from Milhaud). 10th Chasseurs. 22nd ”
Lasalle, with the 9th Dragoons and 10th Chasseurs, was detached after Gamonal (Nov. 10) and replaced by Franceschi’s division. The corps received in January a reinforcement of twenty-two battalions from the dissolved 8th Corps, which formed two new divisions under Delaborde and Heudelet.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,054 men, of whom 7,394 were detached and 5,536 in hospital.
3RD CORPS. Marshal MONCEY, Duke of Conegliano.
1st Division (Maurice Mathieu, afterwards Grandjean): 14th of the Line, four batts. 44th ” three batts. 70th ” one batt. 2nd of the Vistula, two batts. 3rd ” two batts.
2nd Division (Musnier): 1st Prov. Regt. } = 114th of the 2nd ” } Line, four batts.
3rd ” } = 115th of the 4th ” } Line, four batts. [One Westphalian batt.]
3rd Division (Morlot): 5th Prov. Regt. { = 116th of the { Line, two batts.
9th ” } = 117th of the 10th ” } Line, four batts. [One Prussian batt.] [One Irish batt.]
4th Division (Grandjean): 5th Léger, three batts. 2nd Legion of Reserve, four batts. 1st of the Vistula, two batts.
Corps Cavalry (Brigade Wathier): 1st Provisional Cuirassiers (= 13th Cuirassiers). 1st Provisional Hussars. 2nd Provisional Light Cavalry (Hussars and Chasseurs).
Grandjean’s division (No. 4) was afterwards absorbed in Morlot’s [December], with the exception of the 1st of the Vistula, sent to join Musnier. The cavalry was afterwards strengthened by the 4th Hussars from the 1st Corps. The 121st of the Line (four batts.) arrived in December, and joined Morlot. The battalions in square brackets were left behind in the garrisons of Biscay and Navarre.
The gross total of the corps on Oct. 10 was 37,690 men, of whom 11,082 were detached in garrisons, &c. and 7,522 in hospital.
4TH CORPS. Marshal LEFEBVRE, Duke of Dantzig.
1st Division (Sebastiani): 28th of the Line, three batts. 32nd ” three batts. 58th ” three batts. 75th ” three batts.
2nd Division (Leval): Nassau Contingent, two batts. Baden ” two batts. Hesse-Darmstadt ” two batts. Frankfort ” one batt. Dutch ” two batts.
3rd Division (Valence): 4th of the Vistula, two batts. 7th ” two batts. 9th ” two batts.
Corps Cavalry (Brigade Maupetit): 5th Dragoons. 3rd Dutch Hussars. Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 22,895 men, of whom 955 were detached and 2,170 in hospital.
5TH CORPS. Marshal MORTIER, Duke of Treviso.
1st Division (Suchet): 17th Léger, three batts. 34th of the Line, four batts. 40th ” three batts. 64th ” three batts. 88th ” three batts.
2nd Division (Gazan): 21st Léger, three batts. 28th ” three batts. 100th of the Line, three batts. 103rd ” three batts.
Corps Cavalry (Brigade Delaage): 10th Hussars. 21st Chasseurs.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 24,552 men, of whom 188 were detached and 1,971 in hospital.
6TH CORPS. Marshal NEY, Duke of Elchingen.
1st Division (Marchand): 6th of the Line, three batts. 39th ” three batts. 69th ” three batts. 76th ” three batts.
2nd Division (Lagrange, afterwards Maurice Mathieu): 25th Léger, four batts. 27th of the Line, three batts. 50th ” four batts. 59th ” three batts.
Corps Cavalry (Brigade Colbert): 3rd Hussars. 15th Chasseurs.
The gross total on Oct. 10 was 38,033 men, of whom 3,381 were detached and 5,051 in hospital. This total, however, includes a division under Mermet, whose battalions were transferred to the 2nd and 3rd Corps, when the campaign began in November. The 6th Corps, including its cavalry and artillery, had probably not more than 20,000 net when it took the field in its final form.
7TH CORPS. General GOUVION ST. CYR.
1st Division (Chabran): 2nd of the Line, one batt. 7th ” two batts. 10th ” one batt. 37th ” one batt. 56th ” one batt. 93rd ” one batt. 2nd Swiss, one batt.
2nd Division (General Lecchi): 2nd Italian Line Regt., one batt. 4th ” ” one batt. 5th ” ” one batt. Italian Chasseurs (_Velites_), one batt. 1st Neapolitan Line Regt., two batts.
3rd Division (Reille): 32nd Léger, one batt. 16th of the Line, one batt. 56th ” one batt. 113th ” two batts. Prov. Regt. of Perpignan, four batts. 5th Legion of Reserve, one batt. _Chasseurs des Montagnes_, one batt. Battalion of the Valais, one batt.
4th Division (Souham): 1st Léger, three batts. 3rd ” one batt. 7th of the Line, two batts. 42nd ” three batts. 67th ” one batt.
5th Division (Pino): 1st Italian Light Regt., three batts. 2nd ” ” three batts. 4th Italian Line Regt., two batts. 5th ” ” one batt. 6th ” ” three batts. 7th ” ” one batt.
6th Division (Chabot): 2nd Neapolitan Line Regt., two batts. Chasseurs of the Pyrénées Orientales, one batt.
Corps Cavalry: Brigade Bessières: 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers. 3rd ” Chasseurs.
Brigade Schwartz: Italian Chasseurs of the Prince Royal. 2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs.
Brigade Fontane: Italian Royal Chasseurs. 7th Italian Dragoons.
Unattached Regiment: 24th Dragoons.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 42,382 men, of whom 1,302 were detached and 4,948 in hospital. But this does not include several regiments which did not join St. Cyr from Italy till long after the date of the return. In January, 1809, he had 41,386 men present with the colours, and 6,589 in hospital, besides 543 prisoners. There had also been considerable losses in the fighting. Probably the corps in November--December was well over 50,000 strong.
8TH CORPS. General JUNOT, Duke of Abrantes.
Dissolved in December, 1808. The troops were drafted as follows:--
1st Division (Delaborde): 15th of the Line, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Merle’s Div., 2nd Corps. 47th ” two batts. ” Mermet’s ” 70th ” three batts., received one more batt. from Mermet’s Div. 86th ” two batts. ” ” ” 4th Swiss, one batt.
This division, therefore, in January, 1809, consisted of four battalions 70th, three battalions 86th, and one battalion 4th Swiss. It was sent to join Soult, and strengthened by three battalions of the 17th Léger, thus having eleven battalions at Corunna.
2nd Division (Loison): 2nd Léger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Merle’s Div., 2nd Corps. 4th ” one batt. ” ” ” ” 12th ” one batt. ” ” Dessolles’ Div. 15th ” one batt. 32nd of the Line, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Sebastiani’s Div., 4th Corps. 58th ” one batt. ” ” ” ” 2nd Swiss, one batt., drafted to join the batt. in Mermet’s Div., 2nd Corps.
The remaining battalion of this division, that of the 15th Léger, was drafted to join Heudelet’s Division, and became part of the 2nd Corps.
3rd Division (Heudelet): 31st Léger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Mermet’s Div. of 2nd Corps. 32nd ” one batt. 26th of the Line, two batts. 66th ” two batts. 82nd ” one batt. _Légion du Midi_, one batt. Hanoverian Legion, one batt.
N.B.--The last-named eight battalions, afterwards joined by one from Loison’s Division, were formed into the 4th Division of the 2nd Corps.
The whole corps cavalry of the 8th Corps was composed of provisional regiments, which were dissolved, and sent to join their units.
The 8th Corps on Oct. 10 had a gross total of 25,730 men, of whom 2,137 were detached, and 3,523 in hospital.
RESERVE.
(1) Independent Reserve Division (General DESSOLLES): 12th Léger, three batts. 43rd of the Line, three batts. 51st ” three batts. 55th ” three batts.
(2) Guards of the King of Spain (General SALIGNY): Four battalions of Infantry. One regiment of Cavalry. (Two regiments, mainly Spanish deserters, were added in January.)
The total is confused in the return of Oct. 10 with that of the Imperial Guard, and includes also some regiments left in garrison in the north, e.g. the 118th of the Line; including these the Reserve amounted to 13,000 men.
RESERVE OF CAVALRY.
Division of Dragoons, LATOUR-MAUBOURG: Brigades Oldenbourg, Perreimond, Digeon. 1st, 2nd, 4th, 14th, 20th, and 26th Dragoons. The gross total of the division on Oct. 10 was 3,695 sabres.
Division of Dragoons, MILHAUD: The 12th, 16th, and 21st Dragoons.
(The 5th and 9th Dragoons, originally belonging to this division, were transferred to Lefebvre and Lasalle respectively.)
The gross total of the division on Oct. 10 was 2,940 sabres, probably including one of the transferred regiments.
Division of Dragoons, LAHOUSSAYE: Brigades D’Avenay and Marisy. (On D’Avenay being transferred to an independent provisional brigade, Caulaincourt replaces him.) 17th, 18th, 19th, and 27th Dragoons.
The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 2,020 sabres.
Division of Dragoons, LORGES: Brigades Vialannes and Fournier. 13th, 15th, 22nd, and 25th Dragoons.
The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 3,101 sabres.
Division of Dragoons, MILLET (KELLERMANN after Jan. 1809): 3rd, 6th, 10th, and 11th Dragoons.
The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 2,903 sabres.
Division of Light Cavalry, FRANCESCHI: Brigades Debelle and Girardin (?). 8th Dragoons. 22nd _Chasseurs à Cheval_. ‘Supplementary Regiment’ of _Chasseurs à Cheval_. Hanoverian _Chevaux-Légers_.
The Provisional Chasseurs were dissolved in Jan. 1809, and replaced by the 1st Hussars. The 22nd belonged to the original corps-cavalry of Soult.
The numbers of this division (which had not yet been put together on October 10) seem unobtainable, save that the 1st Hussars was 712 strong. Probably Franceschi’s total would be about 2,400 sabres.
IMPERIAL GUARD.
Infantry:
Two regiments of Grenadiers (four batts.), two regiments of Chasseurs (four batts.), two regiments of Fusiliers (six batts.).
Cavalry:
One regiment each of _Chasseurs à Cheval_, Grenadiers, Dragoons, _Gendarmes d’élite_, Polish Light Horse, one squadron of Mamelukes. 36 guns.
The total was about 8,000 infantry and 3,500 horse, with 600 gunners.
N.B.--A few late-coming regiments, and a few units not attached to any division, are not included in the above tables, e.g. the 118th, 121st, and 122nd Regiments of the Line, and the 27th Chasseurs. Nor are there included the dépôt of undistributed conscripts at Bayonne, nor the battalions of National Guards forming movable columns inside the French frontier. But the 19,371 artillery of the army are included in the corps, divisions, and brigades.
GROSS TOTAL OF THE WHOLE ON OCTOBER 10.
_Total._ _Detached._ _Hospital or missing._ _Effective present._
1st Corps 33,937 2,201 2,939 28,797 2nd Corps 33,054 7,394 5,536 20,124 3rd Corps 37,690 11,082 7,522 19,086 4th Corps 22,895 955 2,170 19,770 5th Corps 24,552 188 1,971 22,393 6th Corps 38,033 3,381 5,051 29,601 7th Corps 42,382 1,302 4,948 36,132 8th Corps 25,730 2,137 3,523 20,070 Reserve Cavalry 17,059 } Imperial Guard 12,100 } 3,533 3,945 34,801 Reserve of Infantry } (Dessolles, Joseph’s } Guards, &c.) 13,120 } Troops on the march } from Germany not } 5,200 363 4,763 distributed to the } corps } Columns inside the } French frontier } 8,860 107 165 8,588 (National Guards) } ------- ------ ------ ------- 314,612 32,643 37,844 244,125
Exclusive of the dépôt of conscripts at Bayonne.
XIII
SIR JOHN MOORE’S ARMY:
ITS STRENGTH AND ITS LOSSES.
N.B.--The first column gives the strength of each of Baird’s regiments on Oct. 2, and of Moore’s regiments on Oct. 15, deducting from the latter men left behind in Portugal. The second column gives the men present with the colours on Dec. 19, but not those in hospital or ‘on command’ on that day. These last amounted on Dec. 19 to 3,938 and 1,687 respectively. The third column gives the numbers disembarked in England in January.
-----------------------+------------+-------------+-------------+------------- | _Total | _Effective | _Disembarked| |strength in | strength |in England in|_Deficiency._ |Oct. 1808._ | present on | Jan. 1809._ | | | Dec. 19, | | | | 1808._ | | -----------------------+------------+-------------+-------------+------------- Cavalry (Lord Paget).| | | | 7th Hussars | 672 | 497 | 575 | 97[751] 10th ” | 675 | 514 | 651 | 24 15th ” | 674 | 527 | 650 | 24 18th Light Dragoons | 624 | 565 | 547 | 77 3rd ” ” K.G.L. | 433 | 347 | 377 | 56 | ---- 3,078 | ---- 2,450 | ---- 2,800 | ---- 278 | | | | 1st Division (Sir | | | | D. Baird). | | | | Warde’s Brigade: | | | | 1st Foot Guards, | | | | 1st batt. | 1,340 | 1,300 | 1,266 | 74 ” ” | | | | 2nd batt. | 1,102 | 1,027 | 1,036 | 66 | | | | Bentinck’s Brigade: | | | | 4th Foot, 1st batt. | 889 | 754 | 740 | 149 42nd ” 1st batt. | 918 | 880 | 757 | 161 50th ” 1st batt. | 863 | 794 | 599 | 264 | | | | Manningham’s Brigade:| | | | 1st Foot, 3rd batt. | 723 | 597 | 507 | 216 26th ” 1st batt. | 870 | 745 | 662 | 208 81st ” 2nd batt. | 719 | 615 | 478 | 241 | ---- 7,424| ---- 6,712 | ---- 6,045 | ---- 1,379 | | | | 2nd Division (Sir J. | | | | Hope). | | | | Leith’s Brigade: | | | | 51st Foot | 613 | 516 | 506 | 107 59th ” 2nd batt. | 640 | 557 | 497 | 143 76th ” | 784 | 654 | 614 | 170 Hill’s Brigade: | | |[Estimate][752] 2nd Foot | 666 | 616 | 461 | 205 5th ” 1st batt. | 893 | 833 | 654 | 239 14th ” 2nd batt. | 630 | 550 | 492 | 138 32nd ” 1st batt. | 806 | 756 | 619 | 187 |---- 5,032 | ---- 4,482 | ---- 3,843 | ---- 1,189 Catlin Crawfurd’s | | | | Brigade: | | | | 36th Foot, 1st batt. | 804 | 736 | 561 | 243 71st ” 1st batt. | 764 | 724 | 626 | 138 92nd ” 1st batt. | 912 | 900 | 783 | 129 |---- 2,480 | ---- 2,360 | ---- 1,970 | ---- 510 | | | | 3rd Division | | | | (Lt.-Gen. Fraser). | | | | Beresford’s Brigade: | | | | 6th Foot, 1st batt. | 882 | 783 | 491 | 391 9th ” 1st batt. | 945 | 607 | 572 | 373 23rd ” 2nd batt. | 590 | 496 | 418 | 172 43rd ” 2nd batt. | 598 | 411 | 368 | 230 Fane’s Brigade: | | | | 38th Foot, 1st batt. | 900 | 823 | 757 | 143 79th ” 1st batt. | 932 | 838 | 777 | 155 82nd ” 1st batt. | 830 | 812 | 602 | 228 |---- 5,677 | ---- 4,770 | ---- 3,985 | ---- 1,692 | | | | Reserve Division | | | | (Maj.-Gen. E. Paget).| | | | Anstruther’s Brigade:| | | | 20th Foot | 541 | 499 | 428 | 113 52nd ” 1st batt. | 862 | 828 | 719 | 143 95th ” 1st batt. | 863 | 820 | 706 | 157 Disney’s Brigade: | | | | 28th Foot, 1st batt. | 926 | 750 | 624 | 302 91st ” 1st batt. | 746 | 698 | 534 | 212 |---- 3,938 | ---- 3,595 | ---- 3,011 | ---- 927 | | | | 1st Flank-Brigade | | | | (Col. R. Crawfurd).| | | | 43rd Foot, 1st batt. | 895 | 817 | 810 | 85 52nd ” 2nd batt. | 623 | 381 | 462 | 161 95th ” 2nd batt. | 744 | 702 | 648 | 96 |---- 2,262 | ---- 1,900 | ---- 1,920 | ---- 342 | | | | 2nd Flank-Brigade | | | | (Brig.-Gen. C. Alten).| | | | 1st Lt. Batt. K.G.L. | 871 | 803 | 708 | 163[753] 2nd ” ” | 880 | 855 | 618 | 262[754] |---- 1,751 | ---- 1,658 | ---- 1,326 | ---- 425 | | | | Artillery, &c. | 1,455 | 1,297 | 1,200 | 255[755] Staff Corps | 137 | 133 | 99 | 38 | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ Total | 33,234 | 29,357 | 26,199 | 7,035
[751] Includes fifty-six men drowned on return voyage to England.
[752] The 76th Regiment failed to send in its disembarkation return, so that its loss has to be averaged.
[753] Includes twenty-two men drowned on return voyage to England.
[754] Includes 187 men drowned on return voyage to England.
[755] Includes twenty-two drowned on return voyage to England, and nine drowned in Corunna harbour.
It will be noted that if to the 29,357 of the second column there are added the 3,938 sick and the 1,687 men ‘on command,’ the gross total of the army on Dec. 19 must have been 34,982, a figure which exceeds that at the bottom of the first column. It would seem, therefore, that about 1,748 men in small detachments joined the army at Salamanca and elsewhere before Dec. 19. They must represent drafts and convoy-escorts coming up from Portugal. The apparent deficiency for the campaign therefore is 8,783. But it must not be supposed that these 8,783 men were all lost between Salamanca and Corunna: from them we must deduct (1) the 296 casualties by shipwreck while returning to England; (2) 589 rank and file who escaped individually to Portugal, and were then enrolled (along with the convalescent sick left behind by Moore’s regiments) in the two ‘battalions of detachments’ which fought at Talavera; (3) the number of sick discharged from Salamanca on to Portugal in the convoys escorted by the 5/60th and 3rd Regiments. I can nowhere find the number of these invalids stated, but it must have been large, as the total of the sick belonging to the whole army was nearly 4,000 in December. It will be a very modest estimate if we give 1,500 for those of them who were at Salamanca, the head quarters hospital of the army, and were capable of being moved back to Portugal.
We may therefore deduct under these three heads about 2,385 men. This figure taken from 8,783 leaves 6,398 for the real loss in the campaign.
But even from this total 400 more must be deducted, for 400 British convalescents were released by the Galician insurgents from French captivity and sent back to Lisbon in the spring of 1809. [‘Further papers relative to Spain and Portugal,’ p. 7 in _Parliamentary Papers_ for 1809.]
On the whole, then, about 5,998 men were actually lost. Napier’s estimate of 3,233 (i. 502) for the total loss is certainly too low. Of these 2,189 were prisoners sent to France. [Schepeler, ‘Table of prisoners sent to France, 1809-13’ on p. 150.] The remaining 3,809 perished in battle, by the road, or in hospital.
INDEX
Acevedo, general, commands division under Blake, 408; wounded at Espinosa, 415; murdered by the French, 426.
Acland, brigadier-general, arrives at Peniche, 241; at Vimiero, 249-58; gives evidence before the Court of Inquiry, 294.
Afrancesados, party of the, in Spain, 97.
Alagon, Palafox defeated at, 145.
Alcedo, general, governor of Corunna, surrenders to Soult, 596.
Alcolea, combat of, 129.
Alexander, Emperor of Russia, his meeting with Napoleon at Erfurt, 377.
Andalusia, province of, rises against the French, 69; its geography, 74, 80.
Anstruther, brigadier-general, arrives in Portugal, 248; at Vimiero, 250-61; in command at Almeida, 494; dies at Corunna, 595.
Antonio, Don, brother of Charles IV, appointed head of the Junta of Regency, 48; goes to Bayonne, 62; at Valençay, 56.
Army, the Spanish, its character and organization, 89-95: _see_ also Tables and Appendices v, viii, &c.
Army of Spain, the French, character of the first, 103-7; of the second, 107-13: _see_ also Tables and Appendices vi, &c.
Artillery, the, of the Spanish army, 94, 95; of the French army, 112; tactics of the, 120-2.
Asturias, Prince of the: _see_ Ferdinand.
Asturias, province of the, declares war on France, 65; sends emissaries to England, 66; sends troops to Blake’s army, 382, 384.
Baget, Juan, leader of Catalan _miqueletes_, 318, 322, 328.
Baird, Sir David, general, lands at Corunna, 484, 491, 498; advances to Astorga, 500; joins Moore at Mayorga, 532; wounded at Corunna, 584, 589.
Barcelona, treacherously seized by Duhesme, 36; operations round, 302, 318.
Baylen, battle of, 187-92; Convention of, 197-9; text of the Convention, Appendix, 621-3.
Bayonne, French troops at, 6-12, 34; treachery of Napoleon at, 51-6.
Beauharnais, Marquis of, French ambassador at Madrid, his negotiations with Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, 19, 20; refuses to acknowledge Ferdinand as King, 43, 46.
Belesta, general, joins Blake with his division, 208.
Belvedere, Conde de, defeated at Gamonal, 421-3.
Bembibre, the British at, 566.
Benavente, combat of, 549-51.
Bentinck, Lord William, British military representative in Madrid, 365; endeavours to get information from the Junta, 488; his correspondence with Moore, 504; at Corunna, 584.
Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste, marshal, Prince of Ponte Corvo, in command on the Baltic, 368; tricked by La Romana, 373.
Bessières, Jean Baptiste, marshal, Duke of Istria, leads a _corps d’armée_ into Spain, 40; his first operations, 125, 126; operations in Northern Spain, 140, 142, 166-72; victory at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-72; represses rising in Biscay, 356; superseded by Soult, 418; pursues Infantado, 470.
Bessières, general, leads French cavalry in Catalonia, 309, 318.
Betanzos, the stragglers’ battle at, during Moore’s retreat, 579.
Bilbao, taken and sacked by Merlin, 356; taken by Blake, 383; taken by Lefebvre, 400.
Biscay, rising in, 355, 356.
Blake, Joachim, captain-general of the province of Galicia, 163; his differences with Cuesta, 165; defeated at Medina de Rio Seco, 168-72; his operations in Biscay, 382, 384, 400; defeated at Zornoza, 407; at Valmaceda, 411; at Espinosa, 413-6; escapes into the Asturian hills, 427; superseded by La Romana, 427.
Bonaparte, Joseph: _see_ Joseph Napoleon.
Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland, refuses the crown of Spain, 46.
Bonnet, general, at Gamonal, 422; occupies Santander, 429.
Bowes, general, B. F., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Roliça, 237; at Vimiero, 249-59.
Brennier, general, at Roliça, 239; at Vimiero, 253-9.
Burgos, taken and sacked by Napoleon, 424.
Burrard, Sir Harry, second in command of British troops in Portugal, 226; arrives at Maceira Bay, 250; assumes command at Vimiero and refuses to advance, 260, 261; joins in negotiations for the Convention of Cintra, 268; summoned before the Court of Inquiry, 294.
Cabezon, combat of, 141.
Cacabellos, combat of, 567-9.
Caldagues, Count of, leader of Catalan levies, 327; relieves Gerona, 328-30.
Canning, George, Foreign Secretary, gives assistance to the Asturians, 66; permits the embarkation of Dupont’s troops after Baylen, 202; his speech on the Spanish insurrection, 222; sends Robertson to La Romana, 371; his replies to the Notes of France and Russia, 378, 379.
Caraffa, general, arrested by Junot, 208, 209; released by Convention of Cintra, 273.
Carlos, Don, brother of Ferdinand VII, sent to Bayonne to meet Napoleon, 47, 48; confined at Valençay, 55.
Castaños, general, in command of Andalusian army, 127; opposes Dupont at Andujar, 177; receives capitulation of Dupont, 197; marches on Madrid, 346; commands the ‘Army of the Centre,’ 385-431; defeated at Tudela, 441-4; his retreat, 447-9; superseded, 449.
Castelar, Marquis of, defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463-9.
Castlereagh, Robert, Stewart, viscount, his policy, 221, 223, 224; his confidence in Wellesley, 225; commends Wellesley to Dalrymple, 263; receives Wellesley’s report on the Spanish War, 289, 290; his correspondence with Moore, 487, 493, 506, 518, 522, 529, 548, 554, 597, 599.
Castro Gonzalo, combat of, 548.
Catalonia, province of, revolts against the French, 70; geography of, 82, 303-6; the struggle in, 301-33.
Cavalry, tactics of, in the Peninsular War, 117-20; the Spanish, its weakness, 92, 93, 120; the French, 105.
Cervellon, Conde de, captain-general of Valencia, his incapacity, 134-9.
Cevallos, Don Pedro, minister of Foreign Affairs, accompanies Ferdinand VII to Bayonne, 48; his interview with Napoleon, 51, 52; takes office under Joseph, 174; reappointed minister by the Supreme Junta, 359.
Chabert, general, at Baylen, 187, 189; negotiates terms of surrender, 196, 197.
Chabran, general, his expedition to Tarragona, 309; recalled by Duhesme, 312; checked at Granollers, 319.
Charles IV, King of Spain, his character, 13; arrests Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, for high treason, 21; pardons him, 23; compelled to disgrace Godoy, 41; abdicates in favour of Ferdinand, 42; withdraws his abdication, 45; summoned to Bayonne by Napoleon, 53; abdicates in favour of Napoleon, 55.
Charlot, general, at Vimiero, 254, 255.
Charmilly, colonel, emissary sent by Frere to Moore, 520-3.
Cintra, Convention of, 268-72; its terms, 272-8; Court of Inquiry on, 291-300.
Claros, Don Juan, leader of Catalan _miqueletes_, 321, 328.
Cochrane, Lord, harasses Duhesme’s troops, 324, 331; blockades Barcelona, 327.
Colbert, general, at Tudela, 441-4; slain at Cacabellos, 569.
Colli, Baron, his attempt to release Ferdinand from Valençay, 18.
Collingwood, Lord, commanding Mediterranean Fleet, refuses to allow embarkation of Dupont’s troops, 201.
Constantino, combat of, 572-3.
Cordova, sack of, by Dupont’s troops, 130.
Cortes, proposal to summon the, 362.
Corunna, Baird lands at, 484, 491, 498; arrival of Moore at, 581; battle of, 583-95.
Cotton, admiral, resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 271, 272; concludes an arrangement with Siniavin, 284, 285.
Coupigny, general, commands a division in Castaños’ army, 177, 180; at Baylen, 187, 191; delegate to the Army of the Centre, 395.
Crawfurd, Catlin, colonel, commands a brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Vimiero, 249-58; at Corunna, 584.
Crawfurd, Robert, colonel commanding Light Brigade, blows up the bridge at Castro Gonzalo, 548; retreats to Vigo, 564; his excellent discipline, 565.
Cruz-Murgeon, colonel, at Baylen, 191; his defence of Lerin, 394.
Cuesta, Gregorio de la, captain-general of Old Castile, his reluctance to take arms against the French, 68; his character and capacity, 141; defeated at Cabezon, 141; at Medina de Rio Seco, 165-72; his extravagant claims, 347, 348, 357; removed from his command, 359.
Dalrymple, Sir Hew, governor of Gibraltar, receives command of British troops in Portugal, 226; arrives at Vimiero, 263; his lack of confidence in Wellesley, 263-5; negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 268-72; his want of consideration for Portuguese authorities, 279, 283, 285; his dilatoriness, 287; summoned before the Court of Inquiry, 294; censured by the Commander-in-chief, 299.
Debelle, general, surprised by Paget at Sahagun, 535, 536.
Delaborde, general, marches against Wellesley, 236; defeated at Roliça, 236-40; at Vimiero, 246-62; at Corunna, 586-91.
Despeña Perros, pass of, 79, 80.
Digeon, general, at Tudela, 441, 443.
Duhesme, general, leads an army into Catalonia, 36; at Barcelona, 302; failure of expeditions against Catalan insurgents, 310, 312; marches on Gerona, 314; his repulse and retreat, 316-8; besieges Gerona again unsuccessfully, 325-30; retreats on Barcelona, 331.
Dupont, general, leads Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde into Spain, 34; composition of his army, 104, 107, 126; his first operations, 127; combat of Alcolea, 129; sacks Cordova, 130; retreats to Andujar, 132; defeated at Baylen, 190-2; capitulates, 197; imprisoned by Napoleon, 335.
Echávarri, Don Pedro de, defeated by Dupont at Alcolea, 128, 129.
Escoiquiz, Juan, canon of Toledo, his influence on Ferdinand VII, 16, 17; prompts the negotiations with Napoleon, 19, 20; accompanies Ferdinand to Bayonne, 48; his interview with Napoleon, 52.
Escurial, the affair of the, 23.
Espinosa de los Monteros, battle of, 413-6.
Etruria, King of, evicted by Napoleon, 35; promised Northern Portugal, 9.
Evora, defeat of the Portuguese at, 218.
Fane, general, H., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Roliça, 237, 238; at Vimiero, 249-61.
Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, accused of treason, 12, 21; his character, 16-19; his intrigue with Napoleon, 20; his arrest and acquittal, 21, 23; pacifies the mob at Aranjuez, 41; becomes King on his father’s abdication, 42; enters Madrid, 43; his title not recognized by the French, 43, 46; tries to propitiate Napoleon, 47; meets Napoleon at Bayonne, 47-51; is forced to abdicate, 54; confined at Valençay, 55.
Ferguson, general, R., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Roliça, 237, 239; at Vimiero, 249-60; gives evidence before the Court of Inquiry, 294, 295.
Filanghieri, captain-general of Galicia, murdered by soldiery, 66, 67.
Florida Blanca, Count, political influence of, 345; president of the Junta General, 359.
Fontainebleau, treaty of, 8-11.
Foy, general, his opinion of English infantry, 115; of English cavalry, 119; at Vimiero, 255; at Corunna, 591.
Franceschi, general, scatters La Romana’s troops at combat of Mansilla, 552; in the pass of Foncebadon, 563; pursues Moore’s army at Betanzos, 579; at Corunna, 589.
Francisco, Don, younger brother of Ferdinand VII, arrested by Murat, 60.
Freire, Bernardino, general, appointed head of Portuguese armies, 212; quarrels with Wellesley, 233; resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 270, 277, 278.
Frere, John Hookham, British minister in Spain, brings subsidies to Corunna, 365, 499; urges Moore to advance, 506, 519, 520; his controversy with Moore, 523, 524.
Frère, general, meets Moncey with reinforcements, 138.
Galicia, province of, revolts against the French, 66; its importance, 69; geography of, 80, 81; military operations in, 163-75.
Galluzzo, captain-general of Estremadura, attacks French garrison at Elvas, 276; refuses to draw off his troops, 279; recalled to Aranjuez, 420; commands the army of San Juan, 481.
Gamonal, combat of, 422, 423.
George III, King, his reply to the Corporation of London about the Convention of Cintra, 293.
Gerona, fortress of, held by the Spanish, 70; besieged by Duhesme, 316, 317; second siege of, 325-31.
Gironde, First Corps of Observation of the, 6, 7 (_see_ Junot); Second Corps of Observation of the, 12 (_see_ Dupont).
Gobert, general, reinforces Dupont, 179; defeated and mortally wounded at Mengibar, 181, 182.
Godoy, Manuel, Prince of the Peace, prime minister of Charles IV of Spain, his proclamation of Oct. 5, 1806, 4; his part in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 9, 10; his character and policy, 12-5; his enmity to Prince Ferdinand, 20, 21; tries to propitiate Napoleon, 36; proposes the flight of the Spanish Court, 40, 41; disgraced and banished, 41; summoned to Bayonne by Napoleon, 53; his responsibility for the state of the Spanish army, 96-8.
Goulas, general, repulsed at Hostalrich, 325.
Graham, colonel, T., brings news of the fall of Madrid to Moore, 529.
Grimarest, general, at Tudela, 442, 443.
Guadarrama, the, Napoleon’s passage of, 543.
Heredia, Don Joseph, commands the Army of Estremadura, 452, 455, 471, 516.
Hill, general, R., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Roliça, 237, 238; at Vimiero, 249, 253; at Corunna, 591.
Hope, Sir John, general, his advance on Elvas, 280, 487; his circuitous march to join Moore, 510, 511; at Corunna, 584; takes command of the army on Moore’s death, 591.
Ibarnavarro, Justo, brings the news of the treachery at Bayonne to Madrid, 59.
Infantado, Duke of, confidant of Ferdinand VII in the affair of the Escurial, 19, 22, 23; in Biscay, 356; defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463.
Inquisition, the, Godoy’s attitude towards, 15; abolished by Napoleon, 474-6.
Izquierdo, Eugenio, agent of Godoy, draws up the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 8; sends disquieting reports from Paris, 36.
John, Prince-Regent of Portugal, compelled to submit to the Continental System, 7; attacked by Napoleon, 29; his flight from Lisbon, 30.
Jones, Felix, general, commands a division in Castaños’ army, 177.
Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte, accepts the crown of Spain, 46; enters Madrid, 173; his character, 174; his flight from Madrid, 175; at Miranda, 340; his return to Madrid, 479.
Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, marshal, commands the troops of King Joseph, 383, 384.
Jovellanos, Gaspar de, refuses the Ministry of the Interior under Joseph, 174; a member of the Junta General, 354; his Liberal views, 361, 362.
Junot, general, Duke of Abrantes, leads French army into Spain, 8; his invasion of Portugal, 26; his march on Lisbon, 27-30; his rule in Portugal, 206; his difficulties in Lisbon, 213, 214; defeated at Vimiero, 247-61; negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 266-72; evacuates Portugal, 280; retires to Spain, 450, 481.
Junta, or Council of Regency, appointed by Ferdinand VII, 48; its dealings with Murat, 58, 59; sends petition to Napoleon asking for Joseph Bonaparte as King, 63.
Junta General, creation of the, 352; its composition, 354; in session, 354-66; flies to Seville.
Juntas, the provincial: _see_ Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia, &c.
Keates, Sir Richard, admiral commanding the fleet in the Baltic, 370; effects the escape of La Romana and his troops, 374.
Kellermann, François Christophe, general, retires on Lisbon, 216; his success at Alcacer do Sal, 242; at Vimiero, 246-56; negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 266-72.
Kindelan, general, treachery of, 372, 374.
Lahoussaye, general, commands dragoons at Cacabellos, 569; at Constantino, 572, 573; at Corunna, 589.
Lake, colonel, killed at Roliça, 238.
Lannes, Jean, marshal, Duke of Montebello, wins battle of Tudela, 436-44.
Lapisse, general, at Espinosa, 414, 415; sent against Salamanca, 561.
Lasalle, general, at Cabezon, 141; at Medina de Rio Seco, 167-71; at Gamonal, 422.
Lazan, Marquis of, defeated at Tudela, 144, 145; at Mallen, 145; sent to Catalonia to oppose Duhesme, 387.
Lecchi, general, seizes fortress of Barcelona, 37; besieged in Barcelona by Palacio, 327, 328; with Duhesme at Barcelona, 318.
Lefebvre, Francis Joseph, marshal, Duke of Dantzig, defeats Blake at Zornoza, 407; at Valmaceda, 411.
Lefebvre, general, reinforces Bessières, 337; wounded at Corunna, 594.
Lefebvre-Desnouettes, general, sent against Saragossa, 125, 142; victorious at Mallen, 144, 145; his siege of Saragossa, 145-52; superseded by Verdier, 152; at battle of Tudela, 444; taken prisoner at Benavente, 550.
Leite, general, defeated by Loison at Evora, 218; his difficulties with Galluzzo, 279.
Leith, general, J., takes part in Blake’s retreat, 426-9; commands a brigade under Moore, 501, 528, 533.
Leith Hay, major, his views on Spanish patriotism, 505, 577.
Leopold, Prince, of Sicily, intrigues for the Regency of Spain, 350.
Liger-Belair, general, defeated at Mengibar, 181.
Lisbon, seized by Junot, 30, 31; its importance, 209; condition of, under Junot, 213, 214; surrendered to the British by the Convention of Cintra, 273.
Llamas, Valencian general, at the council of war in Madrid, 357; at Aranjuez, 385.
Loison, general, in Northern Portugal, 213; retires on Abrantes, 216; his victory at Evora, 218; recalled to Lisbon, 218; at Vimiero, 246-52.
Lopez, colonel, Spanish attaché with Moore, 488, 494.
Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, his intrigues about the Spanish Regency, 350.
Lugo, combat of, 574, 575.
Madrid, description of, 75; its lack of importance politically, 75; its advantages as a centre of roads, 86; Joseph Bonaparte enters, 173; abandoned by Joseph, 175; its resistance to Napoleon, 462-9; Napoleon at, 473-85.
Maison, general, at Espinosa, 415.
Malaspina, general, defeated by Sebastiani, 416.
Mansilla, combat of, 552.
Maransin, general, evacuates Algarve, 212; storms Beja, 215.
Margaron, general, at Vimiero, 246-52.
Maria Luisa, queen of Charles IV of Spain, her character, 14; intrigues with Murat against Ferdinand VII, 44, 45; at Bayonne, 53.
Mataro, stormed and sacked by Duhesme, 315.
Mathieu, Maurice, general, at Tudela, 441-3.
Medina de Rio Seco, battle of, 168-72.
Mengibar, combat of, 181.
Merle, general, sent against Santander, 125, 142; at Cabezon, 141; at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71; at Gamonal, 422; at Cacabellos, 569; at Constantino, 573; at Corunna, 586-90.
Milans, Francisco, leader of Catalan _somatenes_, repulses Chabran, 319; opposes Duhesme, 325, 328.
Milhaud, general, at Gamonal, 422.
_Miqueletes_, the, of Catalonia, 302, 306.
Moira, Francis Rawdon, Lord, on the Inquiry into the Convention of Cintra, 294-8.
Moncey, Bon Adrien Jeannot de, marshal, Duke of Conegliano, leads Corps of Observation of the Ocean Coast into Spain, 34; composition of his army, 126; his expedition against Valencia, 133; his repulse at Valencia, 136; retreats on Madrid, 138; at Tudela, 441.
Monteiro Mor, the (Conde de Castro Marim), resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 279, 283.
Montijo, Conde de, his operations on the Ebro, 381; field-deputy of the Junta, 395.
Moore, Sir John, general, returns from the Baltic, 224, 226; lands in Portugal, 270, 486; advances into Old Castile, 451, 485; his difficulties of transport, 486-91; at Salamanca, 486-512; resolves to retreat, 509, 510; his change of plans, 522, 523; his quarrel with Frere, 523, 524; advances to Sahagun, 537; his retreat before Napoleon, 538-59; is joined by La Romana at Astorga, 552; retreats before Soult, 556-88; wins battle of Corunna, 588, 589; his death and burial, 595; his character and achievements, 597-602.
Morla, Don Tomas de, general, repudiates the Capitulation of Baylen, 201; defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463; negotiates the surrender of the city, 469; takes office under Joseph, 472; his letter to Moore, 517, 518.
Mortier, Edouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph, Duke of Treviso, arrives in Spain, 481.
Mouton, general, at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71; at Gamonal, 422.
Munster, George Earl of, his opinion of the Spanish army, 98.
Murat, Joachim, Grand-Duke of Berg, commands French forces in Spain, 38; his character and capacity, 39; enters Madrid, 43; refuses to acknowledge Ferdinand VII as king, 43; intrigues with Charles IV and Maria Luisa against Ferdinand, 44; induces the old king to withdraw his abdication, 45; his dealings with the Junta at Madrid, 58, 59; quells insurrection in Madrid, 60, 61; leaves Spain, 123; his intrigues with Fouché and Talleyrand, 560.
Napier, Sir William, general, historian of the Peninsular War, his strictures on the Spaniards, 89, 499; errors in his estimates of numbers, 251, 421, 639; his testimony to the Catalans, 302; misinformed with regard to La Romana’s army, 416; his defence of Moore’s strategy, 497, 597, 600; his eulogy on Moore, 602.
Napier, Major Charles, wounded and taken prisoner at Corunna, 588.
Napoleon, his projects against Spain, 2-11; intrigues with Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, 20-3; his treachery at Bayonne, 51; offers Joseph Bonaparte the kingdom of Spain, 46; his original plan of campaign in Spain, 123-6; his wrath at the Capitulation of Baylen, 334, 335; his new scheme of operations in Spain, 337-40; his treaty with the Czar Alexander, 377; his letter to King George III, 378; arrives in Spain, 397, 417; defeats Belvedere at Gamonal, 422; advances on Madrid, 449; crosses the Somosierra, 453-61; enters Madrid, 466-9; his scheme of reforms for Spain, 475, 476; his pursuit of Moore, 538-47; halts at Benavente, 559; returns to France, 561.
Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, arrives in Spain, 341; fails to catch the retreating army of Castaños, 446, 448; joins in the pursuit of Moore, 545, 547, 561, 562.
Nightingale, general, M., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; at Roliça, 237; at Vimiero, 249-59.
O’Farrill, general, Spanish Minister of War, takes office under Joseph, 174.
O’Neille, general, his blunders at Tudela, 435-44.
Oporto, Bishop of, Dom Antonio de Castro, head of the Portuguese Junta, 211; his interview with Wellesley, 228; resents the Convention of Cintra, 277, 278; his letter of complaint, 291.
O’Sullivan, Manuel, captain, repulses Goulas from Hostalrich, 325.
Paget, Edward, general, commands Reserve Division of Moore’s army, 533, 564; his success at Cacabellos, 568; at Constantino, 573; at Corunna, 589.
Paget, Henry Lord, surprises the French at Sahagun, 536; at Benavente, 550, 551.
Palacio, Marquis del, leads troops from Balearic Isles to Catalonia, 323; Captain-General of Catalonia, 327; invests Barcelona, 327.
Palafox, Francisco, Deputy of the Supreme Junta, 355; usurps command of the army of Castaños, 433.
Palafox, Joseph, leads the revolt against the French in Saragossa, 67; Captain-General of Aragon, 69; his character, 143; his defence of Saragossa, 143, 153-62; defeated at Alagon, 145; at Epila, 151; his fantastic plans, 391, 434-5.
Pampeluna, citadel of, seized by D’Armagnac, 36.
Peña, Manuel La, general, commands division in Castaños’ army, 177; arrives at Baylen, 192; threatens Dupont, 195; his cowardice at Tudela, 442-5; escapes from Ney, 470.
Pignatelli, general, commands Army of Castile, 385; retreats before Ney, 393; removed from his command, 385.
Polish Light Horse, charge of the, at the Somosierra, 459.
Portland Cabinet, the, resolves to aid risings in Spain and Portugal, 221, 222.
Portugal, kingdom of, compelled to submit to the Continental System, 7; conquest of, by French troops, 26-32; its army dissolved, 31; insurrection of, 205-18; evacuated by the French, 279, 280.
Pradt, Mgr. de, Archbishop of Malines, his memoirs, 5, 16, 17, 459, 473.
Reding, Teodoro, general, commands division under Castaños, 177; at Mengibar, 181, 182; marches on Baylen, 185; at battle of Baylen, 187-91; marches for Catalonia, 387-8.
Reille, general, succours Duhesme, 319; repulsed from Rosas, 321.
Roads, the, of Spain, 78-85.
Robertson, Rev. James, emissary from Canning to La Romana, 371; success of his mission, 372.
Roca, general, commands Valencian division at Tudela, 441.
Roliça, combat of, 236-40.
Romana, La, Marquis of, sent to the Baltic with Spanish troops, 90, 367; escapes with his army on British vessels, 371-4; supersedes Blake in command of the army of Galicia, 427; proposes a junction with Moore, 515, 528, 533, 534; joins Moore at Astorga, 553; retreats through the pass of Foncebadon, 563.
Rosas, resists Reille’s attack, 321.
Sabathier, general, at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71.
Sahagun, combat of, 536.
St. Cyr, Laurent Gouvion, general, supersedes Duhesme in Catalonia, 332.
Saint March, general, at Tudela, 441.
San Juan, general, defeated at the Somosierra, 455-60; murdered by his own troops, 471.
San Roman, Count of, commands division from the Baltic at Espinosa, 413-6.
Santa Cruz, Marquis of, leads the revolt in the Asturias, 65.
Saragossa, first siege of, 145-62; story of the ‘Maid of,’ 154.
Savary, Anne Jean Marie Réné, general, Duke of Rovigo, at Madrid, 48; induces Ferdinand to meet Napoleon, 48; takes command at Madrid on Murat’s departure, 123, 166, 175; at the passage of the Somosierra, 456.
Schwartz, general, sent against Lerida, 309; retreats to Barcelona, 311.
Sebastiani, general, at Zornoza, 407; defeats Malaspina, 416.
Ségur, Philippe de, his description of the passage of the Somosierra, 459.
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, his speech on the Spanish insurrection, 222.
Siniavin, admiral commanding Russian fleet in the Tagus, refuses to aid Junot, 209; concludes terms with Admiral Cotton, 272, 284, 285.
Smith, Sir Sydney, admiral, blockades Lisbon, 29.
Solano, captain-general, murdered in Cadiz, 67.
Solignac, general, at Vimiero, 253-9.
_Somatenes_, irregular levies of Catalonia, 70, 306, 311.
Somosierra, combat of the, 456-60.
Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, arrives in Spain, 418; victorious at Gamonal, 422, 423; occupies Santander, 429; successful at Mansilla, 552; his pursuit of Moore, 557-83; refuses battle at Lugo, 574; fights at Corunna, 583-91; places inscriptions over Moore’s grave, 595.
Spencer, general B., brings division from Sicily and Gibraltar to join Wellesley, 230; his evidence at the Inquiry into the Convention of Cintra, 294, 295.
Strangford, Lord, British ambassador at Lisbon, 29, 30.
Stuart, Charles, British minister at Madrid, his remarks on the inactivity of the Supreme Junta, 365, 504; urges Moore to advance, 519; comes as emissary from Frere to Moore, 535.
Surtees, sergeant, his remarks on Spanish officers, 99.
Symes, colonel, M., his report on La Romana’s force, 534.
Tactics, the, of the French, 114-9; of the British, 114-22.
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Benevento, opposes the invasion of Spain, 11; receives Ferdinand VII, Don Carlos, and Don Antonio at Valençay, 55, 56.
Taylor, lieut.-colonel, commands the 20th Regt. at Vimiero, 256.
Thiébault, Paul, general, chief of the staff to Junot, at the council of war at Torres Vedras, 266; his interview with Napoleon, 269; his evidence about the French peculations at Lisbon, 281.
Thomières, general, at Vimiero, 254, 255.
Toreño, historian of the Peninsular War, goes to London as an emissary from the Asturias, 66.
Trant, colonel, commands division of Portuguese under Wellesley, 234; at Roliça, 237; at Vimiero, 249.
Tudela, combat of, 144, 145; battle of, 439-44.
Valdez, don Antonio, imprisoned by Cuesta, 359.
Valencia, massacre of the French colony in, 68; Moncey’s expedition against, 133-6.
Valmaceda, combat of, 411.
Vaughan, Charles, secretary to the British minister in Madrid, his papers, 24, 143, 154; his opinion of the Central Junta, 365; brings the news of Tudela to Moore, 508.
Vedel, general, reinforces Dupont, 176; marches on La Carolina, 183; arrives late at Baylen, 193; retreats on La Carolina, 198; returns to Baylen, 199.
Verdier, general, at the siege of Saragossa, 152; retreats to Tudela, 161.
Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, his operations against Blake, 409, 413; at Espinosa, 414-6.
Villatte, general, at Zornoza, 407; his escape from Acevedo, 410; at Espinosa, 414.
Villoutreys, captain, asks suspension of hostilities from Reding, 192; imprisoned by Napoleon, 335.
Vimiero, battle of, 247-61.
Vives, general, neglects to help Catalonia, 323.
Wellesley, general, Sir Arthur, disembarks at Figueira, 218; his interview with the Bishop of Oporto and the Supreme Junta, 228; at Roliça, 236-40; at Vimiero, 247-61; his differences with Burrard and Dalrymple, 260-5; his views on the future of the war, 288; returns to England, 290; summoned before the Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra, 294; his evidence against Burrard and Dalrymple, 295; returns to Lisbon, 300; his tactics, 114-22.
Wilson, Sir Robert, organizes the Lusitanian Legion, 280.
Zagalo, Bernard, the student, leader of revolt in Coimbra, captures Figueira, 217.
Zamora, resists Lapisse’s attack, 562.
Zornoza, battle of, 407.
END OF VOL. I
Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press, by HORACE HART, M. A.
[Illustration: Spain and Portugal, showing physical features and roads.]