Chapter II

., “On Skilfullness.”

[f36] In this connection it may not be amiss to say a word about what is known in Buddhism as the “act of no-effort or no-purpose” (_anābhogacaryā_) or “the original vows of no-purpose” (_anābhogapraṇidhāna_). This corresponds, if I judge rightly, to the Christian idea of not letting the right hand know what the left hand is doing. When spirit attains to the reality of enlightenment and as a result is thoroughly purified of all defilements, intellectual and affective, it grows so perfect that whatever it does is pure, unselfish, and conducive to the welfare of the world. So long as we are conscious of the efforts we make in trying to overcome our selfish impulses and passions, there is a taint of constraint and artificiality, which interferes with spiritual innocence and freedom, and love which is the native virtue of an enlightened spirit cannot work out all that is implied in it and meant to be exercised for the preservation of itself. The “original vows” are the content of love and begin to be operative, anabhoga (un-purposely), only when enlightenment is really creative. This is where religious life differs from mere morality, this is where the mere enunciation of the Law of Origination (_pratītya-samutpāda_) does not constitute Buddhist life, and this is where Zen Buddhism maintains its reason of existence against the alleged positivism of the Hinayana and against the alleged nihilism of the Prajñā-pāramitā school.

[f37] _Dialogues of the Buddha_, Part III., p. 35.

[f38] _Dialogues of the Buddha_, Part I., p. 82.

[f39] The Pali text that will correspond to this Chinese Sutra in the Dīrgha-Āgama is the _Kevaddha Sutta_, but the passage quoted here is missing. See also the _Lohicca_ (_Lou-chê_) and _Sāmañña-phala_ in the Chinese Āgamas, in which the Buddha tells how essential the life of a recluse is to the realisation of enlightenment and the destruction of the evil passions. Constant application, earnest concentration, and vigilant watchfulness—without these no Buddhists are ever expected to attain the end of their lives.

[f40] The rendering is by Rhys Davids who states in the footnote: “The word I have here rendered ‘earnest contemplation’ is Samadhi, which occupies in the Five Nikayas very much the same position as faith does in the New Testament; and this section shows that the relative importance of Samādhi, Paññā, and Śīla played a part in early Buddhism just as the distinction between faith, reason, and works did afterwards in Western theology. It would be difficult to find a passage in which the Buddhist view of the relation of these _conflicting_ ideas is stated with greater beauty of thought, or equal succinctness of form.” But why conflicting?

[f41] One hundred and eight samadhis are enumerated in the _Mahāvyutpatti_. Elsewhere we read of “innumerable samadhis.” Indians have been great adepts in this exercise, and many wonderful spiritualistic achievements are often reported.

[f42] This series of dhyanas has also been adopted by Buddhists, especially by Hinayanists. No doubt the Mahayana conception of dhyana is derived or rather has developed from them, and how much it differs from the Hinayana dhyanas will be seen later as we go on. The detailed description of these dhyanas is given in the Agamas; see for instance the _Sāmañña-phala Sutta_ in which the fruits of the life of a recluse are discussed. These mental exercises were not strictly Buddhistic, they were taught and practised more or less by all Indian philosophers and mendicants. The Buddha, however, was not satisfied with them, because they would not bring out the result he was so anxious to have, that is, they were not conducive to enlightenment. This was the reason why he left his two old teachers, Arada and Udraka, under whom he first began his homeless life.

[f43] For example, the ten subjects for meditation are: Buddha, Dharma, Sangha, Morality, Charity, Heaven, Serenity, Breathing, Impermanence, and Death. The five subjects of tranquillisation are: Impurity, Compassion, Breathing, Origination, and Buddha. The four subjects of recollection are: Impurity of the Body, Evils of the Senses, Constant Change of Thought, and Transitoriness of Existence.

[f44] _Laṅkāvatāra_, Nanjo Edition, p, 77.

[f45] There is however a Sutra in the Saṁyukta Āgama, fas. XXXIII., p. 93b (Anguttara-Nikāya, XI., 10), dealing with true dhyana (_ājānīya-jhāna_) which is to be distinguished from untrained dhyana (_khaḷuṅka-jhāna_). The latter is compared to an ill-disciplined horse (_khaḷuṅka_) kept in the stable that thinks nothing of his duties but only of the fodder he is to enjoy. In a similar way dhyana can never be practised successfully by those who undertake the exercise merely for the satisfaction of their selfish objects; for such will never come to understand the truth as it is. If emancipation and true knowledge are desired, anger, sleepiness, worrying, and doubt ought to be got rid of, and then the dhyana can be attained that does not depend upon any of the elements, or space, or consciousness, or nothingness, or unthinkability—the dhyana that is not dependent upon this world or that world or the heavenly bodies, or upon hearing or seeing or recollecting or recognising—the dhyana that is not dependent upon the ideas of attachment or seeking—the dhyana that is not in conformity with knowledge or contemplation. This “true dhyana” then as is described in this Sutra in the Nikayas, is more of the Mahayana than of the Hinayana so called.

[f46] Kern’s translation,” Sacred Books of the East,” Vol. XXI., pp. 299–300.

[f47] For this and the following, see the Essay entitled, “History of Zen Buddhism from Bodhi-Dharma to Hui-nêng,” p. 151 ff.

[f48] The story of Enlightenment is told in the Dīgha-Nikāya, XIV., and also in the Introduction to the Jātaka Tales, in the Mahāvastu, and the Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI. and XXXVI., and again in the Samyutta-Nikāya, XII. In detail they vary more or less, but not materially. The Chinese translation of the _Sutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and Present_, which seems to be a later version than the Pali _Mahāpadāna_, gives a somewhat different story, but as far as my point of argument is concerned, the main issue remains practically the same. Aśvaghosha’s _Buddhacarita_ is highly poetical. The _Lalita-vistara_ belongs to the Mahayana. In this Essay I have tried to take my material chiefly from _The Dialogues of the Buddha_, translated by Rhys Davids, _The Kindred Sayings_, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Majjhima-Nikāya, translated by Sīlacāra, and the same by Neumann, the Chinese Āgamas and others.

[f49] The idea that there were some more Buddhas in the past seems to have originated very early in the history of Buddhism as we may notice here, and its further development, combined with the idea of the Jātaka, finally culminated in the conception of a Bodhisattva, which is one of the characteristic features of Mahayana Buddhism.

The six Buddhas of the past later increased into twenty-three or twenty-four in the _Buddha-vamsa_ and _Prajñā-pāramitā_ and even into forty-two in the _Lalita-vistara_. This idea of having predecessors or forerunners seems to have been general among ancient peoples. In China, Confucius claimed to have transmitted his doctrine from Yao and Shun, and Laotzŭ from the Emperor Huang. In India, Jainism which has, not only in the teaching but in the personality of the founder, many similarities to Buddhism, mentions twenty-three predecessors, naturally more or less corresponding so closely to those of Buddhism.

[f50] It is highly doubtful that the Buddha had a very distinct and definite scheme for the theory of Causation or Dependence or Origination, as the Paṭicca-samuppāda is variously translated. In the present Sutra, he does not go beyond Viññāna (consciousness or cognition), while in its accepted form now the Chain starts with Ignorance (_avijjā_). We have however no reason to consider this tenfold Chain of Causation the earliest and most authoritative of the doctrine of Paṭicca-samuppāda. In many respects the Sutra itself shows evidence of a later compilation. The point I wish to discuss here mainly concerns itself with the Buddha’s intellectual efforts to explain the realities of life by the theory of causation. That the Buddha regarded Ignorance as the principle of birth-and-death and therefore of misery in this world, is a well-established fact in the history of Buddhism.

[f51] Cakkhu literally means an eye. It is often found in combination with such terms as paññā (wisdom or reason), buddha, or samanta (all-round), when it means a faculty beyond ordinary relative understanding. As was elsewhere noticed, it is significant that in Buddhism, both Mahayana and Hinayana, seeing (_passato_) is so emphasised, and especially in this case the mention of an “eye” which sees directly into things never before presented to one’s mind is quite noteworthy. It is this cakkhu or paññā-cakkhu in fact that, transcending the conditionality of the Fourfold Noble Truth or the Chain of Origination, penetrates (_sacchikato_) into the very ground of consciousness, from which springs the opposition of subject and object.

[f52] Here as well as in the next verse, “the truth” stands for Dharma.

[f53] We have, besides this, another verse supposed to have been uttered by the Buddha at the moment of Supreme Enlightenment; it is known as the Hymn of Victory. It was quoted in my previous Essay on Zen Buddhism and the Doctrine of Enlightenment. The Hymn is unknown in the Mahayana literature. The _Lalita-vistara_ has only this:

“Chinna vartmopasanta rajāḥ sushkā āsravā na punaḥ sravānti; Chinne vartmani vartata duḥkhasyaisho ’nta ucyate.”[3.1]

[f54] _The Mahāvyutpatti_, CXLII., gives a list of thirteen terms denoting the act of comprehending with more or less definite shades of meaning: buddhi, mati, gati, mataṁ, dṛishtaṁ, abhisamitāvī, samyagavabodha, supratividdha, abhilakshita, gatiṁgata, avabodha, pratyabhijñā, and menire.

[f55] Franz Pfeiffer, p. 312, Martensen, p. 29.

[f56] Translated by Bhikkhu Sīlācāra. The original Pali runs as follows:

Sabbābhibhū sabbavidū ’ham asmi, Sabbesu dhammesu anūpalitto, Sabbaṁjaho tanhakkhaye vimutto, Sayaṁ abhiññāya kam uddiseyyaṁ. Na me ācariyo atthi, sadiso me na vijjati, Sadevakasmiṁ lokasmiṁ na ’tthi me paṭipuggalo. Ahaṁ hi arahā loke, ahaṁ satthā anuttaro, Eko ’mhi sammasambuddho, sītibhūto ’smi nibbuto. Dīgha-Nikāya, XXVI.

[f57] Ordinarily, the Chain runs as follows: 1. Ignorance (_avijjā_, _avidyā_), 2. Disposition (_sankhāra_, _saṁskāra_), 3. Consciousness (_viññāna_, _vijñāna_), 4. Name and Form (_nāmarūpa_), 5. Six Sense-organs (_saḷāyatana_, _saḍāyatana_), 6. Touch (_phassa_, _sparśa_), 7. Feeling (_vedana_), 8. Desire (_taṇhā_, _tṛshṇā_), 9. Clinging (_upādāna_), 10. Becoming (_bhāva_), 11. Birth (_jāti_), and 12. Old Age and Death (_jarāmaranaṁ_).

[f58] _The Buddhacarita_, Book XIV.

[f59] Nānañ ca pana me dassanaṁ udapādi akuppā me ceto-vimutti ayaṁ antimā jāti natthi dāni punabbhavo.

[f60] “Thus knowing, thus seeing,” (_evam jānato evam passato_) is one of the set phrases we encounter throughout Buddhist literature, Hinayana and Mahayana. Whether or not its compilers were aware of the distinction between knowing and seeing in the sense we make now in the theory of knowledge, the coupling is of great signification. They must have been conscious of the inefficiency and insufficiency of the word “to know” in the description of the kind of knowledge one has at the moment of enlightenment. “To see” or “to see face to face” signifies the immediateness and utmost perspicuity and certainty of such knowledge. As was mentioned elsewhere, Buddhism is rich in terminology of this order of cognition.

[f61] Tassa evam jānato evam passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati bhavāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamit ñāṇaṁ hoti. Khina jāti vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ kataṁ karanīyam nāparaṁ itthattāyāti pajānāti.

[f62] _The Brahmajāla Sutta_, p. 43. Translation by Rhys Davids.

[f63] The idea of performing miracles systematically through the power acquired by self-concentration seems to have been greatly in vogue in India even from the earliest days of her civilisation, and the Buddha was frequently approached by his followers to exhibit his powers to work wonders. In fact, his biographers later turned him into a regular miracle-performer, at least as far as we may judge by the ordinary standard of logic and science. But from the Prajñā-pāramitā point of view, according to which “because what was preached by the Tathagata as the possession of qualities, that was preached as no-possession of qualities by the Tathagata, and therefore it is called the possession of qualities,” (yaishā bhagavan lakshaṇasampat tathāgatena bhāshitā alakshaṇasampad eshā tathāgatena bhāshita; tenocyate lakshaṇasampad iti), the idea of performing wonders acquires quite a new signification spiritually. In the _Kevaddha Sutta_, three wonders are mentioned as having been understood and realised by the Buddha: the mystic wonder, the wonder of education, and the wonder of manifestation. The possessor of the mystic wonder can work the following logical and physical impossibilities: “From being one he becomes multiform, from being multiform he becomes one: from being visible he becomes invisible: he passes without hindrance to the further side of a wall or a battlement or a mountain, as if through air: he penetrates up and down through solid ground as if through water: he walks on water without dividing it, as if on solid ground: he travels cross-legged through the sky like the birds on wing: he touches and feels with the hand even the moon and sun, beings of mystic power and potency they be: he reaches even in the body up to the heaven of Brahma.” Shall we understand this literally and intellectually? Cannot we interpret it in the spirit of the Prajñā-pāramitā idealism? Why? Taccittam yacittam acittam. (Thought is called thought because it is no-thought.)

[f64] The questions are: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? _Potthapāda-Sutta_.

[f65] Cf. _Dhammapada_, v. 385. “He for whom there is neither this nor that side, nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brahman.”

[f66] _Sutta-nipāta_, v, 720. Sanantā yanti kussobbhā, tunḥī yāti mahodadhi.

[f67] The Majjhima-Nikāya, 140, _Dhātuvibhangasuttam_. Asmīti bhikkhu maññitam etaṁ; Ayam aham asmīti maññitam etaṁ; Bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Na bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Rūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Arūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Saññī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Asaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Nevasaññi-nasaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ.

[f68] Majjhima Nikāya, 22.

[f69] Cf. _Sutta-Nipāta_, v. 21. “By me is made a well-constructed raft, so said Bhagavat, I have passed over to Nirvana, I have reached the further bank, having overcome the torrent of passions; there is no further use for a raft: therefore, if thou like, rain, O sky!”

[f70] I left here “dharmas” untranslated. For this untranslatable term, some have “righteousness,” some “morality,” and some “qualities.” This is as is well known a difficult term to translate. The Chinese translators have rendered it by _fa_,[3.3] everywhere, regardless of the context. In the present case, “dharma” may mean “good conduct, “prescribed rules of morality,” or even “any religious teaching considered productive of good results.” In the _Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra_,

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