CHAPTER XVIII

Canadian ocean mail service (_cont._)--Series of disasters to Allan line steamers.

The year 1859 was a notable one in the history of transportation in Canada. In May, the steamers of the Allan line commenced their weekly trips between Liverpool and Quebec. In November, the completion of the Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence carried the lines of the eastern division of the Grand Trunk into Montreal, thus connecting by uninterrupted railway communication the cities of Quebec and Portland with the metropolis, and establishing a continuous line of railway from the Atlantic seaboard to the western boundary of the provinces. In the same month, also, the Grand Trunk extended its line across the border as far as Detroit, bringing, by means of allied systems in the United States, the cities of Chicago and New Orleans into communication with the eastern states and with Europe by the railway system along the shores of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence.

The system of land transportation between the ports of the Atlantic and the cities on the Mississippi being thus perfected, and available for the conveyance of mails between Europe and the heart of North America by practically continuous conveyance, the postmaster general of Canada, Sidney Smith, proceeded to Europe to improve, as far as possible, the communication between the important cities of Great Britain and the sailing ports of the Canadian vessels, and to arrange for the exploitation of this transportation system, in the interests of Canada.

Before leaving for England Smith paid a visit to Washington, and laid before the postmaster general there the advantages offered by the system under his control. He pointed out that, by the Grand Trunk railway, the journey between Portland and Chicago was made in forty-nine hours, and between Quebec and Chicago in forty-five hours, and, by making Cork a port of call for the mails, the voyage between land and land would be several hundred miles shorter than by any other route.

Smith's proposition was to convey the United States mails to and from Europe for the sea postage only, and to allow these mails to be carried across Canada without charge on the understanding that the Canadian mails to and from Great Britain should be carried free across the United States territory during the period of winter when the steamers called at Portland. The proposition was accepted by the postmaster general of the United States.

In London, where he arrived at the end of November, Smith submitted his scheme to the postmaster general,[309] who made the objection that the sailing arrangements interfered with the plans made for the other transatlantic mail steamers. Fortunately Smith had the support of the postmaster general at Washington, who was much impressed with the merits of the Canadian scheme, and who, in his annual report expressed the opinion that it would afford the most direct and probably the most expeditious communication between Chicago and Liverpool.

At the instance of the department at Washington, the general post office agreed to send by the Canadian steamers the correspondence for both the eastern and western States, and also agreed to Smith's request for special trains for the mail service from London to Cork. This special railway service, with its connecting mail boat service across the Irish Channel gave the British public a full business day more to prepare their correspondence for the States.

The mails had, in ordinary course, to be prepared in London early Wednesday morning to catch the outgoing steamer which left Liverpool the same evening, but the special train from Dublin to Cork enabled correspondents to hold over their urgent letters until Wednesday evening and send them by the evening mail to Ireland, where connection was made on Thursday morning with the steamer which had left Liverpool on the previous evening.

But this was not the only, or perhaps the greatest, of the advantages of the scheme. Transatlantic cables were still in the future, but the telegraphic systems on both sides of the Atlantic were fully developed, and messages for New York or Montreal could be addressed to the steamer, which would deliver them at Father Point, on its way up the St. Lawrence, from there they were sent by telegraph to their destination.

One of the leading London papers declared that the plan would save two full days for telegrams, and permit transactions on the stock exchange in London up to Thursday afternoon to be communicated to the stock exchanges in the United States on the Saturday of the following week, and the action taken in these centres transmitted to London by the Canadian steamers leaving Quebec the same day.

Having completed these arrangements in London, Smith next addressed himself to the postal administrations of France, Belgium and Prussia. In the month that had elapsed since the negotiations with London had been concluded, the steamers had crossed the Atlantic both ways, and the Canadian postmaster general was able to inform the continental administrations that on the first voyage the mails from Chicago had reached London in twelve days, and that the conveyance from New Orleans, in which France had a special interest, ought to be effected in less than fifteen days.

The French government, to whom Smith offered the same terms for conveyance by steamer and railway in Canada as had been accepted in the United States, immediately closed with Smith on these terms, subject to the consent of Great Britain. In a few days Belgium took similar action, while Prussia deferred acceptance until the postmaster general of Canada could confer with the United States.

Entirely satisfied with the success of his mission to the Continent, Smith returned to London to conclude the transaction by obtaining the permission of the British post office to act as intermediary for the payments which would be made by the French and other Continental governments to Canada for the conveyance of their mails to America.

The necessity for having Great Britain as the intermediary for the settlement of these accounts arose from the following considerations. Great Britain had open accounts with all these countries. The mails from these countries were carried to the United States by British steamers, for which they became indebted to the British government; while on the other hand mails from Great Britain for the countries of eastern Europe and for India, passed over one or other of these countries through their postal systems, which gave rise to an indebtedness on the part of Great Britain.

Under conventions with each of them, settlements were made from time to time. None of this accounting machinery existed between Canada and any of these countries. The only country in Europe with which Canada had an open account was Great Britain.

In consequence of Canada's isolation in this respect the only way these countries could settle their debts to Canada was by direct payments. This, however, would involve legislation, at least in the case of France, which would have delayed the beginning of the plans for many months. Canada, therefore, had but one way open, which was to ask the British post office to receive from France the amounts due by that country to Canada, and apply these sums to the account between Great Britain and Canada.

The favour to Canada appeared slight enough but the British post office refused to grant it. First, it objected that the arrangements would involve a great deal of trouble; and afterwards, when driven from that ground, it took an extraordinary position. The British post office declared that the British mails exchanged with the United States were treated in that office as mails carried by packets under contract with the United States, and that it would be inconvenient and objectionable to treat French mails, carried by the same Canadian vessels, as mails conveyed by British packets.

It maintained, furthermore, that the postmaster general of the United States, having entered into an agreement with the Canadian post office for the transmission of United States mails by the Canadian vessels, might very naturally object to any arrangement between the British and French post offices under which the French mails were paid for as mails conveyed by Great Britain's packets.

The pettifogging of disobliging illwill could go no further. In no single respect did the service rendered to the United States by the British government, in conveying the mails of that country to Great Britain, differ from the services rendered to the United States by the Canadian government in the conveyance of the United States mails to Great Britain by the steamers of the Canadian line. Both were paid by the United States for the service, and the fact that the British took pay from the United States no more rendered the Cunard an American line, than a similar fact regarding the Canadian government made the Canadian an American line.

Smith, in dwelling upon this point, affected to discover that the ground of the British official objection, was that the Cunard Company received a subsidy from the British government, while the Canadian Company did not. If this were indeed the difficulty at which the British office stumbled, and the Canadian line could be made British by granting a subsidy for its maintenance, it was important that it should have impressed upon it this distinctive mark of British nationality.

But these arguments fell upon deaf ears. The French office tried to make the British officials see reason, but their success was no better. The situation became one of real difficulty. The French could have invoked the assistance of the United States and asked that country to act as intermediary in the settlement of the account between France and Canada, but there would have been much delay, as the United States would almost certainly seek an explanation of the attitude of Great Britain toward her colony, and that would not have been easy to give.

The British post office, however, suggested a way out of the difficulty. Taking its stand on the ground that the Canadian steamers were part of the United States packet service, the British post office held that the proper course for France was to arrange the matter of payment with the United States post office. But as the negotiations between the United States and France might delay the start of the service, the British expressed its willingness as a temporary measure to take from the French government the sums due to Canada, and pay them over to whom? To the Canadian government to whom alone they belonged? Not at all. It would pay these sums to the postmaster general of the United States.

Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, contended no further. He thanked the postmaster general of England for his consideration, and addressed himself to the director of the French posts, and to the postmaster general in Washington. But the director was completely puzzled, and sought an explanation of the British post office. Disclaiming the right to interfere in any agreement between the British and Canadian offices, he declared himself unable to understand why this payment should be made to the United States, or how it could possibly happen that the United States should have any right to claim any sea rate. He set out all the facts of the case, and after looking them over carefully, he repeated that he did not understand why the amount paid by the French government to the British office for conveyance under the British flag by Canadian packets should be paid over to the United States office.[310]

By the middle of February 1860, Smith was back in the United States, and at Washington. Within a day he concluded arrangements by which, among the other matters, the United States post office agreed to accept the sums due to Canada by France and the other Continental countries. Provision was also made for the exceptional handling of correspondence for New Orleans and other southern cities by the officials of the Canadian service.

The matter of accounting having been arranged on this basis the Canadian line began to be employed extensively on both sides of the Atlantic. Two changes were made in 1860, which augmented its efficiency. As it was found that Cork was out of the way of steamers from Quebec to Liverpool, in May, Londonderry, at the north of Ireland was substituted as the last port of call.

This change had the additional advantage that it enabled the steamers to take a later mail from Scotland, and it avoided the rivalry with the Cunard and Inman lines, which made Cork their port of call in Ireland.

The other amelioration in this arrangement was the taking on and the disembarkation of mails at Riviere du Loup, a point on the St. Lawrence one hundred and twenty miles below Quebec. The extension of the Grand Trunk railway to this point shortened the sea-voyage by some hours, as the stretch of water between Quebec and Riviere du Loup present difficulties, and not infrequently dangers, which prevent rapid travel.

With the arrangements thus complete, the St. Lawrence route was much superior to any other as far as the Canadian mails were concerned. In 1863, four-fifths of the mail carried between Canada and Britain were carried by the Canadian steamers, the remainder being taken by the Cunards. In order to participate in the exchange between Great Britain and the United States, it was necessary to make its arrangements conform with the arrangements made by those countries.

Under this scheme, the week was divided into two parts, Great Britain providing for the total conveyance for one of the parts and the United States the other. Thus the United States took upon itself the accumulated mails for the first three days of the week from England, and the Cunard steamers, which left England on Saturday, took those of the last part.

There was an American steamer which sailed from Southampton on Wednesday, which took all the mails for the United States that could be gathered at that point until the time of its departure, and the Canadian steamer, which was adopted by the American post office, took those which could be gathered at Liverpool for the sailing from that point on Thursday and at Londonderry on the following day.

The Canadian steamers offered great advantages to northern England and to Ireland and Scotland. In the conveyance from this side of the Atlantic, the arrangements were reversed, the British steamers sailing from New York on Wednesday, and the American later in the week. The Allan Company were fortunate in securing Saturday as their sailing day from Quebec, as their steamers were able to take a large American mail as well as nearly all that from Canadian offices.

Most of the foreign correspondence of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota and Indiana were carried by the Canadian route, while, during the winter months, half the mail from New England and a large volume from New York were despatched by this line. By the arrangements with the post offices of France, Belgium and Prussia, a considerable quantity of mails were exchanged by this line between the United States and nearly every country in Europe.

The achievement of the Canadian steamship line, in the face of unusual difficulties, was a matter of pride to the people of Canada, and the postmaster general, who had exhibited noteworthy energy in exploiting the possibilities of the service, dwelt with much satisfaction, in his several reports to the legislature, on the measure of success attained in competition with the lines running to the ports of the United States.

But these successes were bought at a heavy price. In the weekly race across the Atlantic, much was sacrificed to speed. Risks were taken which, with the imperfect knowledge then existing of the sailing route, could lead to but one result. Vessel after vessel was lost under circumstances that excited a growing horror and resentment among all classes of the people. During the seven years between June 1, 1857, and February 22, 1864, no less than eight of the finest vessels in the service went down, carrying with them many hundreds of human beings.

The first mishap took place within six months of the commencement of the service by the Allan line. In November 1856, the "Canadian," in her course up the St. Lawrence, ran ashore, owing to either the negligence or the ignorance of the pilot. She was got off without injury. But the "Canadian" was less fortunate in June 1857, when, from the same cause, she again ran ashore. This time it was impossible to free her, and she had to be abandoned, a total loss. The year 1858 passed without trouble of any kind, and as the voyages were increased from fortnightly to weekly, confidence was high that the superiority of the Canadian line was to be demonstrated, and the supremacy of the Atlantic wrested from the Cunards.

But with the inauguration of the weekly service, and of the declared competition with the steamers sailing in and out of New York, a series of disasters commenced, which threw a shadow over the whole enterprise. In the five years following the establishment of weekly service, the Canadian line lost more first class vessels than all the other companies engaged in transatlantic conveyance, and during the same period, as if to remove any doubt as to the locality to which these disasters were attributed, every vessel lost went down on this side of the Atlantic.[311]

In the winter of 1859, two of the finest vessels of the line were lost, and with them a great number of lives. The winter route of the Allan steamers between Liverpool and Portland ran westward from Ireland to Cape Race, the south-eastern extremity of Newfoundland, thence to the waters between Sable Island and Nova Scotia, the coast of which the steamers skirted for its whole length. After getting clear of Cape Sable, the southerly point of Nova Scotia, vessels had a deep water passage for the rest of the voyage.

The Nova Scotia coast was a source of much anxiety to navigators. The "Columbia," the only vessel of the Cunard line which was lost until this time, was wrecked on this coast, as were also the "Humboldt" of the American line and the "City of Manchester" of the Inman line. It was on this coast also that the two Allan ships were wrecked. On the 29th of November, the "Indian," on her way out from Liverpool, ran ashore on the "Deal Ledges" near the fishing hamlet of Marie Joseph. Parting amidships, some sixty of her passengers were lost. It was made clear that the captain had taken every precaution after leaving Cape Race, but he had been misled by defective charts.

Three months later, on the 20th of February, 1860, the "Hungarian" went down among the rocks off Cape Sable, and not a soul on board was saved. This steamer was the pride of the fleet. She was a new vessel, and had a record of three consecutive passages in twenty-seven days and twenty-three hours. The facts disclosed by the investigation were few. But it did transpire that the captain was noted for a certain dash rather than for seamanly prudence. It was said that by his skill in shaving sharp corners and scudding over shoals, and by his recklessness in keeping up a head of steam, he had converted the slowest of the Canadian steamers into the fastest.

News of the disaster to the "Hungarian" soon reached Montreal. It was melancholy news for the city, and public grief was soon followed by popular anger with the Allan Company and with the postmaster general. Smith was denounced by the legislature as _particeps criminis_ in the destruction of the lives which had been lost on the "Hungarian."

A parliamentary investigation was ordered into the circumstances, and the report[312] of the committee is instructive in the information it gives on the coast lights, and on the problems, which the substitution of iron for wood in the construction of steam vessels raised for those dealing with questions of navigation.

Neither Sable Island nor Cape Sable, on the winter route, were provided with lighthouses; and the lower St. Lawrence was most inadequately furnished with the indispensable guides for sailing by night. From Forteau Bay on the straits of Belle Isle, a vessel ran four hundred and fifty miles before it passed a lighthouse, and it then entered a stretch of one hundred and twenty miles which it was obliged to make without the assistance of lights.

On the comparative merits of iron and wooden vessels, expert opinion was unanimous in favour of wooden vessels. It was considered that, in the event of a vessel being wrecked or stranded, there was less liability of loss of life in the wooden vessel. There was also the effect of the material of which the vessels were built on the working of the compass. In iron vessels, the compasses were a source of great and continued anxiety.

Before the vessels proceeded to sea, the local attraction from the ship was neutralized by magnets and, thus adjusted, the compasses acted with tolerable accuracy while the vessel was at sea and beyond the influence of land attraction. But when approaching the land the compasses were not to be depended upon. There was, it was asserted, an attraction from the land, but whether the mass of iron in the vessel was first acted upon by the land attraction, was a problem of which the existing state of science did not afford a solution.

The Cunard line at this time--1860--consisted of ten vessels. Only two were of iron; and it was noted that the irregular action of the compass on the iron vessel "Persia," after it left Cape Race, led the vessel into danger which was only averted by unusual care with the soundings. The committee of the legislature concluded by expressing a fear that, until new light had been thrown on the susceptibilities and workings of the mysterious magnetic forces, it might be necessary to abandon the construction of iron vessels.

Misfortune continued to dog the course of the Canadian steamers. In 1861 two more vessels were lost--both on the St. Lawrence route.

The "Canadian," the second of the name, launched in 1860, set out from Quebec for Liverpool on the 1st of June. Reaching the straits of Belle Isle two days later she encountered a heavy gale and great masses of ice. About eight miles from Cape Bauld, the northernmost point of Newfoundland, the vessel was struck by a sunken floe, which tore a hole in her side under the water-line, and she sank in two hours. Twenty-nine of the passengers and crew were drowned, including James Panton, the mail officer, who neglected the means of safety in his endeavours to save the mail.

The only criticism made by the board of trade court was that the straits route being a perilous one except at the height of the season, the sailing instructions which gave masters a discretion of taking this route after the 20th of May ought to be amended by fixing the earliest date at a month later.

At the end of the season--on the 5th of November--the "North Briton" ran ashore in an attempt to make the passage between the Island of Anticosti and the Mingan Islands. The circumstances that the vessel entered the passage an hour after midnight, with a heavy sea running, were noted by the marine court. But they confined themselves to a censure on the captain for some lack of vigilance, not considering it necessary to deprive him of his certificate.

Again there was a burst of public indignation, and a demand that the government should dissociate themselves from the contract. The postmaster general pleaded that such action would, in the eyes of the foreign governments, be tantamount to a confession that Canadians had lost faith in their route. He assured the legislature that he was bringing effective pressure on the Allan Company to compel them to perform their contract satisfactorily.

The complete immunity from accident during 1862 seemed to indicate that the measures forced upon the company by the postmaster general were successful. But the faith of the Canadian in the superior advantages of their route was soon to be put to further trials.

Between the 27th of April, 1863, and the 22nd of February, 1864--a scant ten months--three vessels of the line were lost. The first of these, the "Anglo-Saxon," which crashed into the rocky coast of Newfoundland, a few miles above Cape Race, gave some point to the observations of the commission as to the disturbing influences operating upon the compasses of vessels as they approached land.

The "Anglo-Saxon" left Liverpool on the 16th of April, and for the first nine days made an uneventful voyage. A clear, bright day on the 26th gave the captain an opportunity to make observations, and ascertain the ship's position; and as the weather was steady, he was able to run under full steam and sail.

Next morning it was foggy; and John Young--a former commissioner of public works, and one of the chief advocates of the Canadian ocean service--asked the captain if it was his intention to make Cape Race. The captain said it was not, as by noon they would be twenty miles south of the Cape. About eleven o'clock Young's attention was directed to what appeared to be a huge iceberg close at hand. He ran towards the deck, but before he could reach it the ship struck, and he found himself facing a precipitous mass of rock so lofty that in the fog he could not see the top of it.

Instead of being sixteen or seventeen miles south of Cape Race, the vessel was four miles above it. Though they were so close to land that many passengers saved themselves by creeping along the mast to the shore, 238 passengers were drowned, including the captain, whose faulty seamanship had brought about the calamity.

This shore is the most dangerous on the north Atlantic. Besides the magnetic influences, there is an underplay of powerful currents, which makes navigation in these waters difficult and dangerous. The Newfoundland government published a list in 1901 showing that seventy-seven vessels, great and small, had been lost on the Cape or within a few miles to the north or west of it.

Not quite two months later than the disaster of April 27, 1863, while excitement in Canada was still running high, the public were dumbfounded by the news of another disaster. The "Norwegian," a vessel built only two years, left Liverpool on the 4th of June. On the 10th she entered a dense fog which continued at short intervals until the 13th. At noon that day the fog lifted and the steamer put on full steam. At two o'clock in the morning land was sighted, which the captain took to be Newfoundland.

The ship's course was altered in accordance with that view, and although the fog fell densely, speed was not reduced. At seven o'clock there was a cry of breakers, and before the steamer could be checked or turned, she struck heavily upon the rocks of St. Paul's Island, a point in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, a few miles north of Cape Breton. The ship's position was so dangerous that the passengers were landed on the island. Afterwards the cargo and mails were secured.

The public were bewildered by the accumulation of disasters. The captain of the "Norwegian" was especially known as a careful and skilful navigator, and there was a persistent and vigorously expressed demand on the Allan Company for an explanation. To their plea of the danger of the route, the answer was that the "Hungarian," "Indian," and "Anglo-Saxon" were wrecked on a route over which the Cunard steamers had been passing in safety for years.

Iron vessels accordingly came in for condemnation. Except two, all the Cunard steamers were of wood, and these iron vessels were run only between Liverpool and New York, over a route all the way on the broad ocean.

The wreck of the "African" of the Cunard line on the coast of Newfoundland, which took place about this time, under circumstances similar to those attending the loss of the "Anglo-Saxon," showed, it was claimed, the superiority of the wooden vessels, when overtaken by accident. She was pierced in several places, but was not smashed as an iron hull would have been. Consequently, when the vessel got free of the rocks it was able to reach St. Johns where it put in for repairs.

The remainder of the summer of 1863 passed without incident, and a considerable part of the winter, when on the 22nd of February, 1864, the "Bohemian" in her passage to Portland, struck on Alden's Rock, close to her destination, and overturned, sinking within an hour and a half. The passengers and crew numbered 317 persons, and of these forty-three were drowned by the capsizing of one of the lifeboats. The court of inquiry attributed the catastrophe to the neglect of the captain to take the ordinary precautions, when confronted with a perilous situation, and he was deprived of his certificate for twelve months.

During the period between the wreck of the "Canadian" the first, in 1857, and the sinking of the "Bohemian" in 1864, there were thirteen vessels lost, of all lines engaged in the transatlantic trade, and of these eight were of the Canadian line.

The Canadian government and the Allan Company were subjected to a pitiless condemnation; and, with a change of administration in 1863, the new government lost no time in taking steps to end the contract.

Oliver Mowat, the new postmaster general, on the 12th of August, 1863, presented a report to the executive council recounting the attempts of the Canadian government to establish a Canadian line of steamers from 1853, when the first contract was made with the Liverpool firm of Mackeen, McLarty and Company. The contract with this firm called for a fortnightly service in summer and monthly in winter, with screw steamers of not less than 1200 tons, the subsidy from which was to be L24,000 a year.

In consequence of the default of the contractors, a new contract was made with Hugh Allan. The frequency of the service, and the amount of the subsidy remained unchanged, but Allan engaged to employ vessels of 1750 tons, instead of 1200.

On the 12th of October, 1857, a new contract was entered into with Allan for weekly service to commence on the 1st of May, 1859. The size of the vessels required was again increased, and the new steamers had to be built to 2000 tons. The subsidy was to be L55,000. By 1860, three vessels had been lost, and Allan, having found that the loss in carrying on the weekly service was far beyond his calculations, notified the government of his intention to terminate.

The government, believing that it was essential to hold public confidence in the route, and that this could be best done by enabling the contractor to provide larger and more powerful vessels to replace those which had been lost, determined to offer a much larger subsidy, and to stipulate for vessels of 2300 tons. A new contract embodying these conditions was made, and the compensation was fixed at L104,000.

In brief this was the situation when Mowat became postmaster general, though there had been negotiations between Smith and the Allan Company for a reduction of the subsidy. With the sanction of the government, Mowat cancelled the contract on April 1, 1864, and began negotiations for a new contract.

Mowat perceived that, unless there was to be a lapse in the service on the 1st of April, he must make his arrangements with Allan, since there was no other vessel owner in a position to take up the service on the termination of the contract. Mowat was the less reluctant to renew an engagement with Allan, as he recognized the courage, energy and perseverance of the latter, and was convinced that Allan's experience would give him a great advantage over any other contractor.

The new contract contained provisions which were a confession that the government had been far from blameless for the losses of the several vessels of the Allan line. The mail steamers were expressly forbidden to approach Cape Race when the weather was so foggy or tempestuous as to make it dangerous to do so; when the presence of fog or ice should render it perilous to run at full speed the captain was to be impressed with the duty of slackening speed or of stopping the vessel as the occasion dictated, and the time so lost was to be allowed to the contractor in addition to the time specified for the length of the voyage.

Other precautions were taken by the contractor. The first vessel lost--the "Canadian" in June 1857--was cast on shore by the incompetency of the pilot, and the contractor made it his business to secure the best pilots, instead of taking the first that presented himself, as the practice had been. Another vessel was wrecked on a dangerous shore of the Island of Anticosti. This channel was thereafter abandoned by the vessels of the line.

As a consequence of these provisions and precautions, aided, doubtless, by greater care on the part of the sailing masters, accidents to the vessels ceased altogether. During the twenty-five years that ensued there was but one vessel lost. The outstanding feature of the whole business was the dogged resolution of Allan to justify his faith in the possibility of the Canadian route, and in his ultimate success he rendered an incalculable service to Canada.

FOOTNOTES:

[309] _Sess. Papers_, Canada, 1860, No. 8, contain all the papers bearing on the continental negotiations narrated.

[310] A lengthy review of the papers included in the _Sess. Papers_, No. 8, of 1860, appears in the _Toronto Leader_, the leading government organ of March 8, 1860. The writer notes that "Lord Elgin and Rowland Hill seem to have been firmly convinced, in their own minds, that a Canadian steamer is an American steamer," and observes that "the English officials shifted the grounds of their objections several times, till finally, as rheumatism is said to do after shifting from one part of the body to the other, they vanished altogether before the force of Mr. Smith's arguments, till nothing but naked obstinacy remained."

[311] P.M.G.'s report to council, December 7, 1863 (_Sess. Papers_, Canada, 1864, No. 28).

[312] _Journals of Assembly_, Canada, 1860, App. 14.

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