part I
have been a long time a disbeliever of the intelligence; but so many letters came to hand that at length I was forced to take the general opinion about their intended expedition. But, tho' I wrote you in the morning, I know you are anxious of hearing often from this quarter, and will therefore desire General Heath to send an other express.
Nothing as yet (the ships of war excepted) has come in sight; but the French Generals who have not the smallest doubt about their coming, are hurrying their preparations of defence.
General Heath and myself were invited to a meeting of the French General Officers, wherein, to my great satisfaction, the idea of holding both Connecticut and Rhode Island was abandoned, as it is assured that from the first one the enemy cannot annoy our shipping, if in a certain position. Count de Rochambeau, Chevalier de Chattelux, and myself, went afterwards to dine with the Admiral, and the two French Commanders have agreed to the following plan:
The transports to be put in the harbour of Newport; the shipping to anchor along the shore from Brenton's Point, going Northward, where they are protected by batteries, a frigate and a cutter to be stationed in Sekonnet Passage; the army to encamp at its usual place, but upon the appearance of the enemy, to be in readiness to attack them at any point where they may disembark, and, if unsuccessful, to retire to the position which was once occupied by the enemy. There they want also to place some militia. Count de Rochambeau cannot hear of the idea of evacuating the island, and says he will defend this post to the last man. I could not help advising him very strongly and very often to erect works, and keep a communication open with the Continent by Howland's Ferry or Bristol Point, that matter will, I hope, be attended to in the course of the next day.
General Heath will inform you of the measures he has taken, in which, as the second officer, I am only to help him to the best of my power. The Count's urging request, made it, I think, necessary to call for Militia.
The number of sick is such that by the return given before me to Count de Rochambeau, it appears they will have but three thousand six hundred men fit for duty if they are attacked within a few days. The fleet has a great proportion of sick men and the ships are therefore poorly manned for the present.
Count de Rochambeau asked me so often if you would not send a body of Continental troops to their relief; if, in the course of twelve days from this they could not be arrived, or that I knew he wanted me to write to you about it, and at length he told me he did not want it. But this must be _between us_. The Count says he will stand a storm; but if the enemy wanted to make a long work of it that a corps of Continental troops in their rear would have the best effects. That in this case the enemy would be much exposed on the Island, and that the circumstances which would follow their re-embarking, would be so fatal to them as to facilitate our operations for the campaign. All this, my dear General, I was in a private manner desired to hint to you.
We could not speak of our grand operations, and they are wholly taken in their expectations of the enemy. But what might be an inducement to send a corps this way is, that in any case the French will not be able to march before the 15th of August.
A return of the clothing has been promised to me for this evening, but tho' I am sorry to be the news-bearer of so many disappointments, I must tell you that from what they said to me nothing but a small part of the clothing has been intrusted to them, and that not only nothing new has been done, but what I had settled has been undone by those arrangements of the alliance which I can't conceive. In case you was to send troops this way, I think their route to Providence should be known, so that they might meet the clothing on the way. What you will do, my dear General, I don't know, but it seems Count de Rochambeau is determined to defend Newport, at all events.
With the most perfect respect and tender sentiments, I have the honor to be, Yours, &c.
Footnote:
1. For the answer to this letter, See Spark's Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p.128.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Newport, July the 29th, 1780.
My Dear General,--Your letter of the 22d~[1] came to hand last evening, and I hasten to answer at least to a part of its contents. I shall begin by the disagreeable disappointment I met with on account of our clothing. Inclosed, my dear General, you will find the return of what has been put on board of the fleet, which I have sent by a vessel to Providence, and which will be forwarded to head-quarters. I can't tell you how much I feel for that shoking arrangement of clothing, but as it is not quite so essential to arms and powder, if we have no clothing. I shall be the forwardest to advise our acting without it. I am apt to blush for neglecting improvements that are within my reach, but I readily do without those which are not in our power.
As to the affair of arms I spoke this morning to the Count, and am sorry to find that he has but the most necessary articles of exchange which are to answer to the daily broken arms, &c., his superfluous armament is coming in the second division, and for the present there is nothing to expect from that quarter. The only way, my dear General, will be to request the States to pick up arms for their recruits. Governor Trumbull, (as you may have seen by my letter from Lebanon,) thinks there is a great deal of difficulty in this matter; but many other Gentlemen from the State assure that it can be done. I will desire Colonel Wadsworth to manage that affair with the Governor, and I will also write a private letter to Mr. Bowdoin and Governor Greene.
As to the powder, my dear General, I hope the Navy will give us some, not however a great deal. You cannot conceive how difficult it is for the present to speak with them on offensive plans. They expect Clinton at every minute, and say his success will decide our operations, I had however this morning a conversation with the Land General, and was to see in the evening the Admiral, who, I am told, cannot come, so that I must delay it to be done to-morrow.
Connecticut will, I think, furnish you with a much greater quantity than you expected. How far it will fulfil your purpose I hope to hear from you; but I cannot flatter you to get so much from the fleet as two hundred, even as hundred tons.
I have fully considered, my dear General, the idea of those French Generals, and made myself acquainted with every thing that has past since my departure from France. A great mismanagement in the affair of transports, has prevented the whole coming here at once; but as the French and Spaniards have a superiority, there is no doubt but that if they join together as was intended, the second division will be here in less than three of four weeks. The fleet on this Continent will, I hope, be commanded by Mr. Duchoffaut, and will be very superior to that of the enemy. If by an unlucky chance the junction was prevented, the second division would yet certainly come in the autumn, and be in a situation to act during the winter; but I have all reasons to believe that they will be here in three weeks, and you may depend upon it that they will at all events be here for the winter. From what I have been intrusted with I have a pretty certain ground to hope that my letter will produce upon Count de Guichen, the desired effect, and after an expedition which I can't trust to paper, will be concluded, you may, I think, depend upon his coming this way with a good part of his fleet.
In a word, the French Ministry are determined to keep here during the war a land and naval force which will act on the Continent till a peace is concluded, and to support it with all their power. They look upon Rhode Island as a point to be kept for receiving their fleets and their reinforcements of troops, and want the defence of it to be such an object as will insure the basis of our operations.
Before settling any thing the French Generals want to hear from their second division. _Don't fear by any means_ their acting rashly, and be assured that you may very far depend on their _caution_; but our wants of arms and ammunition have made me also very cautious. If the States furnish us with a sufficiency of the first article, and almost a sufficiency of the second, which we will make up with the fleet, then I am most strongly of opinion that waiting for the second division is all together wrong and unwarrantable.
I have, however, brought Count de Rochambeau to this, viz.:--That if the second division comes we must attack. That in all cases, if we are masters of the water, we may attack; and that we may do it if the Admiral thinks that we can secure the passage by batteries, and if each
## part is equal to the whole of the enemy.
We must now see what the Admiral has to say. What he wrote about the harbour of New York don't please me. If Duchoffaut comes, I answer for anything you wish. To-morrow I will speak with the two Gentlemen, so at least I hope, and will let you know their answers.
If the second division comes in time we shall certainly act and succeed. Then we will have our arms, powder, clothing, &c.
I never thought, my dear General, that Clinton would come this way; nor do I think it now, but every body says he is coming. Governor Clinton has it as a certainty, and upon his letter received this morning they have altered the arrangement; I had settled to dismiss the extraordinary militia. I hate troubling all these people, and taking them away from their harvest. Gen. Heath is of my opinion, but the intelligences are so
## particular, so authentic, that he dares not to neglect to gather as many
men as possible. Before you receive this you will certainly know the truth of those reports.
If you think, my dear General, that Clinton is coming, and if he disembarks upon Rhode Island, I am clearly of opinion that three or four thousand Continental troops and the militia landing on his rear, while the Count would sally from Newport, would ruin the British army, and that the taking of New York would be but a trifle after such a stroke.
In case you adopt the measure, I think that the communication with the main is very important. I went yesterday to the North end of the Island, and had the works repaired in such a way (at least they will be soon so) as to keep up a communication by Howland's Ferry for eight or ten days after the enemy will possess the Island. I have also desired Colonel Greene, in case they appear, to run up the boats to Slave Ferry. Signals have been established from Watch Point to Connanicut; all those arrangements I have made with the approbation and by the orders of General Heath.
You will by this express receive a letter from Genl. Heath, who applies for, and most ardently wishes a leave of repairing to his command in the grand army. For my part, my dear General, I will, I think, wait your answer to this, and want to know if by the situation of your arms and ammunition, there is a possibility of your acting before the second division comes. If from the answers of the States you think _such a proportion_ of powder from the fleet will be sufficient; then I will be more positive. If, however, after my conversations, I was to see that the second division must be waited for at all events, then I need not be waiting for your answer to this. I will, therefore, my dear General,
1st, Or arrange with them a beginning of operations before the second division comes, and then wait for your answer about arms and ammunition, or the prospects I may have by myself to fix it entirely.
2d, Or fix our plans for the moment the second division comes, and then I will, as soon as possible, repair to head-quarters.
They seem rather doubtful of the possibility of landing safely, and having a sufficiency of boats to carry them under the protection of our Westchester batteries, and I beg you will give me such a note about it as I might show to them.
With the highest respect and most tender friendship, I have the honor to be, dear General,
Yours, &c.
All the officers and soldiers of the army have a great desire to join the grand army, and hate the idea of staying at Rhode Island.
Footnote:
1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL)
Newport, July the 31st, 1780,
My Dear General,--In consequence of a note from me the Admiral came to last evening, and defensive ideas gave way to offensive plans. Our conversation was long, and it is not yet ended, but I hasten to write you a summary report of what past between the Count, the Chevalier, and myself.
I first began, in my own name, to give them a pretty exact account of the situation we were in three months ago, of the supernatural efforts which the country had made for the purpose of an immediate co-operation. I told them that by the 1st of January our army would be dismissed; that the Militia was only to serve for three months. I added, that for the defensive they were useless to us, nay, they were hurtful, and that I thought it necessary to take New-York before the winter. All that, my dear General, was said in my own name, and therefore in a less delicate way than when I am your interpreter.
I then told them that I was going to speak of you, and after many compliments, assurances of confidence, &c., I went on with your plan, beginning with the importance of possessing the harbour, and going on about the three ways which you have directed me to point out as to be hereafter regulated by circumstances.
As to the possessing of the harbour the Chevalier told that he did not believe his ships might go in; but that if superior at sea, he would answer by cruising off to protect the landing, the transportation, and prevent an evacuation; indeed to blockade the harbour.
The French General, with the advice of the Naval commander did not hesitate to prefer the going in transports to the point you know of. Both were of opinion that nothing could be undertaken unless we had a naval superiority, and as I know it is your opinion also, (tho' it is not mine,) I durst not insist on that article.
There was another reason which made me wait for the reinforcement. I knew we had neither arms nor powder. I know we would be at least a long time to get them; but as they did not think of making me the objection I put my assent to the others on the account of my private confidence in their superior abilities; told them that you also thought we should have a naval superiority, and added, in my own name, that however we must, any how, act before the winter, and get rid of a shameful defensive.
The summary of the arrangement will, I presume, be this: That as soon as we hear of a naval reinforcement we go where you know, and establish what you intend to fix; that, if possible, we get where I want you to be; that immediately the French will embark and go where you wish them to be, or thereabout; that a number equal to the enemy's whole force be stationed in that part; that they don't want there more than ten pieces of our heavy cannon; that after every thing will be disembarked, three weeks, in their opinion, will do the business on their side; that proper means will be taken by sea to keep up the communication and prevent an evacuation; that we must not give up that plan if we may begin in August or September; that fascines and other apparatus must be ready on the opposite shore; that they will take for us all the boats belonging to the Continent which will be at Providence; that as soon as our clothing, &c., arrive, it will without entering any harbour be sent to W.C. or thereabout.
Their superiority at sea, will, I think, take place in the course of this month; they have two ways to depend upon it:--1st, Unless of an absolute impossibility the second division, consisting of four other regiments and the remaining part of Lauzun's, with the Alliance and all other stores, and with a strong convoy of ships of the line, will be here very soon. When they will be heard of on the coast, Chevalier de Tergay will, at all events, go out and meet them. 2dly, the Gentleman I wrote to on my arrival has full liberty to send here reinforcements, the Admiral has already applied to him, but I am going to make him write other letters _in my way_, and will send them to-morrow or the day after to Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I beg you will immediately desire to secure three fast sailing vessels for the West Indies.
I am going this evening to fix plans with Pilots, and also to speak of the entrance of the harbour. Dobs and Shaw are here, and I will have a full conversation with them and the Admiral, both for the entrance of the harbour and the navigation of the Sound. To-morrow I call, with as much secrecy as possible, a number of Pilots for the harbour of Halifax and River St. Laurence.
Inclosed, you will find a letter from Count de Rochambeau. He requests you will have the goodness of letting the Minister know what the French army is about, as he had no time of writing to him; it is, I believe, very important. 1st, To send every where to meet the reinforcement, and give them proper directions. 2dly, To have some vessels ready for the West Indies.
The French set more value upon Rhode Island than it is worth. I however got them to promise that in case of an operation they will not leave here a Garrison, and that their Magazines would be sent to Providence.
You know, my dear General, I did not expect Clinton, and tho' I could not stand alone in my opinion, I ever lamented the calling out of the Militia. I am happy to inform you that they have been dismissed. Nothing can equal the spirit with which they turned out, and I did not neglect letting the French know that they have done more for their allies than they would have done for the security of their own continental troops on a similar occasion.
As to the three month men, the French General wants them to establish the communication with the main; but I will soon request him to let them go to the grand army, and will, in the same time, get from this State as many arms and powder as possible. I have written to Massachusetts for the same purpose.
After I will have sent the Pilots, and made calculations with the Commander of the Artillery and the first Engineer whom the Count will consult, I shall draw a plan which I will get their answer to, and repair with it to head-quarters. In the meantime I will receive answers from Boston and from Governor Greene.
The Admiral cannot send to us more than thirty thousand of powder. But you see that their demands as to heavy pieces are small; they indeed say they do not want any on the Island, and that their twenty-ones will be sufficient. All that, my dear General, I will be more positive upon after the Commanders of Artillery and Engineers will have made with us their calculations.
I hope, my dear General, that by the 5th or 6th of August, I will have nothing more to do in this place. The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you; they swear at those that speak of waiting for the second division; they are enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to the dispositions of the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the Militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts that came on Connecticut without provisions or tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him and divided their bed and their supper in the most friendly manner.
The patience and sobriety of our Militia is so much admired by the French Officers, that two days ago a French Colonel called all his officers together to desire them to take the good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. So far are they gone in their admirations that they find a great deal to say in favor of General Varnum, and his escort of Militia Dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other hand, the French discipline is such, that chiken and pigs walk between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a cornfield, from which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories don't know what to say to it.
Adieu, my dear General. To-morrow, I hope having the pleasure of writing you another letter, and am with the most tender friendship, dear General,
Your most obedient humble servant, &c.
I beg, my dear General, you will present my compliments to the family. ~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117. The answer to this letter appears in Spark's Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 135.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Newport, August the 1st, 1750.
My Dear General,--Your letter to Count de Rochambeau~[1] mentioning the enemy's embarkation, and your future movements against New-York, a positive letter from Governor Trumbull, and a positive one from General Parsons, have once more altered the dispositions, and such of the Militia as had been dismissed have been again sent for.
In consequence of these expectations my offensive arrangements have been entirely cut short, they are wholly taken in their preparations. My letter of yesterday has been detained with the hope that some intelligence might be added to it; but I will send it this morning, and if it is possible to obtain from the Admiral some hour's conversation with Captains Dobs and Shaw I shall to-morrow morning dispatch another express.
The dispositions of defence are, I believe, these; the French to occupy the English lines; General Heath to command a corps of militia on the Tivertown side; I to have his van-guard on the Island, and to watch the enemy's motions almost all around the Island, which is not a small affair.
If the enemy land I will try to oppose it, and the French will come in columns to attack them with fixed bayonets. If this attack do not succeed they will retire behind the lines, and take with them fifteen hundred Militia, when with the few ones that may stay, I will retire to Butt's Hill, and secure the communication with General Heath.
As you did not write to me, my dear General, I could not know what you want me to do. If you think seriously of entering on the Island of New-York, I am extremely sorry to stay here. If on the contrary you send troops this way, (which, if the enemy land, would be fatal to them,) I will not be to lament my being away from the army. I shall feel very unhappy to be with some Militia while the Light Infantry is acting under you, and had I been sent for, I would have joined you very fast; but if you can take New-York I will heartily forget that I could have been there, and feel nothing but joy; if, however, there was time enough, I'd beg you will send for me. If you send troops this way I believe they may strike a great blow.
The wind is against them, so that they won't be here before the day after to-morrow. Adieu, my dear General, with the highest respect I have the honor to be,
Your's, &c.~[2]
Footnotes:
1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 126.
2. For the answer to the above, approving the measures of Lafayette, See Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.7, p.147.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Elizabeth Town, October the 27th, 1780.
My Dear General.--From what you have heard from Dr. Hagen about the boats when on your way to head-quarters, I don't believe that you may have kept any hope for our success. The boats have been, it seems, reduced to five, and from the time when they were yet at the Little Falls you may see that they could not be here at the appointed hour.
I will not permit myself to reflect on this moment upon the many blunders committed on that affair by the Quarter-General's department. I was too certain of some brilliant success, and military glory is too much idolized by me; not to be rather severe on the occasion. I will content myself to say that from the report and common agreement of all the spies and guides collected together by Major Lee, from the negligence of the enemy, the circumstances of the tide and a thick foggy weather, not one of those whom I led into the matter had the least doubt upon your success.
The only advantage I have got from it has been to convince myself that our troops are particularly fit for such an expedition, on account of their patience and silence; and that if the other business could be supported upon a large scale, I would answer to carry it. I have written upon both roads to the commanding officer of the brigade of the line that our expedition was relinquished, and that I would advise him not to give to his men the trouble of going farther. I have also requested him to speak of this movement as if it had taken place on account of some intelligence that the enemy meant to come out into the Jersey's to attack us.
I have taken my position between Elizabethtown and Connecticut Farms. General Clinton has not the time of making any disposition against us. To-morrow at nine or ten I will march to our position of Crane's Town, and the day after to-morrow to Cotawa, unless I receive contrary orders.
Newark Mountain was rather too far to march it this night, and too near for to-morrow, because our men being in want of blankets will like better to join their tents again.
If your Excellency approves of this arrangement, I beg, you will order our baggage to wait for us on our position of Crane's Town; if you dislike the disposition your orders may reach us on the road.
I beg, my dear General, you will please to communicate our ill success and disgraceful disappointment to the Minister, who said he would not leave Morris Town until he hears from me.
Had I any thing to reproach to myself on the occasion, I would be inconsolable. I undertook the business because I thought myself equal to it; I wish the people in the Quarter Master's Department had done the same for their plans.
I am, my dear General, your's, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Light Camp, October 27th, 1780.
My Dear General,--I am sorry to hear from Major Gibbs that my letter of last night did not reach you before your departure from head quarters. It had been written at one o'clock, as soon as I took my position for the night, and intrusted to Colonel Ogden, who promised to send it by an officer acquainted with the roads.
Depending upon your communication of the sad intelligence to Chevalier de la Luzerne, I did not send to Morristown where he was to wait for the news of the success.
Among the many blunders which have been committed, I shall extract from that complete assortment some instances (not for this glorious occasion that is forever lost) but on any future one.
You may remember that after a long time Colonel Pickering assured to you that the boats were in complete readiness whilst they had no oars,--he afterwards positively told that he had only three boats with him at Camp when two hours before I had seen five of them with my own eyes. The sending of those five boats two hours after that which you had appointed, you have been early apprized of, but you don't perhaps know that instead of being at Dod's the night before last the boats from Suffrans arrived there last evening about sunset, to this report the man who received them eight miles this side of Suffrans adds that they wanted their double trees and spread chains, so that he was obliged to lose about two hours in taking those things from Continental wagons and the inhabitants; when our affairs will be thus managed your best projects cannot fail of being defeated.
Had Mr. Pickering followed the example of General Knox, every thing would have been here in proper time and proper order, as was the artillery from the Park.--I confess, my dear General, that I cannot reconcile my feelings to the idea that by this neglect I have lost a most happy opportunity, blessed with all the little circumstances which may insure success. Our expedition has taken the most foolish turn in the eyes of any one who is unacquainted with this circumstance of the boats.
When I was in hopes of seeing in time at least five of them, I gave up the watering place to think only of Richmond; but when I saw that we could not be there before the break of the day, I did not hesitate to relinquish an expedition which on that footing would have occasioned a great profusion of blood for little or no purpose, but you will easily guess what I have felt on the occasion. I never have been so deeply wounded by any disappointment.
By Mercereau and Colonel Ogden, I hear that the enemy are collecting boats and intend a forage into the Jerseys. I would be very happy to know if you have got the like intelligence. Suppose they were to come out in force and at a distance from us, would not this be an opportunity to execute your grand plan?
I beg you will let me know this evening if I am to march to-morrow to our old ground to Cotawa; if the enemy were likely to come out, or if you thought of a certain plan, I would advise to keep Major Lee for some days, as in both cases he will be a capital man,--he is a most charming officer.
Arnold has issued a second proclamation wherein he invites the officers and soldiers of our army to join him, promising to them equal ranks to those they hold in the American service.
I am told expresses were sent to me to acquaint me of the delay of the boats; but excepting Doctor Pagen I have not seen one of them,--the boats have been sent to the two bridges by Major Gibbs, I had brought them up with me, and in passing by them both conductors and wagoners have received the curses of every officer and soldier in the division. The men marched last night very fast with such silence, good order and desire of fighting as would have highly pleased you. The activity and resources of Major Lee have been on that occasion displayed in such a way as entitles him to my eternal esteem and gratitude. I felt not only for me but for all the officers and men who had promised themselves so much glory on the occasion.
With the most tender affection and high respect I have the honor to be, my clear general, yours, &e,
Colonel Ogden has remained behind to get inteligences; so that being uncertain if my first letter has reached you, I would be happy to know in the course of the night if I am to march to-morrow morning to the old ground.~[1]
Footnote:
1. The two preceding letters relate to a descent upon Staten Island, which was projected, and was to be executed by Lafayette, who was now in command of a Light Corps, consisting of battallions, stationed in advance of the main army, and was anxious to effect some important enterprise before the campaign should be brought to a close; but this expedition, as well as an attack proposed in his letter of the 30th October, ante upon the upper part of New York Island, was rendered impracticable by the want of boats and other necessary preparations. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 280, and App. No. 9.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Philadelphia, December 4, 1780.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--I will for this time write a very short letter to you and cannot be more particular either on public or private business, until some few days stay in this city have enabled me to get further information.
I have been greatly disappointed in my not meeting Mrs. Washington. I have been very angry with my bad fate which led me into another road at the only moment when I could miss her--this has been the more the case, as I knew you was uneasy about her, and I wanted both to send you an express and to advise her to the best way of meeting you as soon as possible.
The southern news are expected this evening. Leslie has re-embarked and will probably go to Charleston; the southern members are pleased to like my going towards their country. However I cannot for the present be determined, as I don't yet know if the campaign will be active, and if succours are to be expected from France.
By a vessel from there who left Lorient before the middle of October, we hear that nothing material had happened except the taking of the merchant fleet. Both naval armies were in port. There was an expedition of, I think, ten ships of the line and five thousand men ready to sail--this vessel came in company with Jones, who is daily expected; but a very little part of our clothing will be on board, some will come on board the Serapis, Jones, who mounts the _Ariel_ had dispatches from the French Court, for as he however might have been detained by a storm off the French coast which separated the little convoy. In the vessel arrived was a Mr. Ross, who, I hope will give me some account of the clothing, and Baron d'Arent, who got rid of his rupture, has a star with a cross and a ribbon, and is upon very good terms with the King of Prussia.
Congress have debated a motion about your being desired to go to the southward, but have determined that you would better know than they do if it was more useful to go or to stay. I am more than ever of this last opinion.
On my arrival I found one of the salt meat vessels sold and the other to be sold to day. I have spoken on the subject to almost every member of Congress, who promised that they would take the best measures in their power to get these provisions.
Chevalier de la Luzerne has communicated to me in _the most confidential way_ a Spanish plan against St. Augustine, upon which I am building a letter for the Generals of this nation, and using the best arguments in my power to engage them either to send twelve ships of the line to take us and conduct us to Charleston, as to render their operations as useful as possible to General Greene. To-morrow I will write you about it. If I have time before the departure of the confederacy who is going to the West Indies, I will send you the original, if not a copy of my letter. This is entirely _confidential_, as I have not the Chevelier's permission to mention it. Adieu, my dear General, your's, most respectfully.
A letter dated Cadiz, September 23d, mentions that Count d'Estaing commands the combined fleet, and is gone to sea. In this case his going with sixteen ships could not be true. I will endeavour to ascertain this matter.~[1]
Mr. Carmichael writes that Spain has sent a hundred and thirty thousand dollas. It is not a great deal, the dispositions of that court are very satisfactory. Portugal does every thing we want, letters are just arrived from St. Domingo but not desciphered.
Footnote:
1. The Light Infantry corps which Lafayette had commanded was broken up when the army went into winter quarters, and he now entertained the desire of transferring his services to the southern army under General Greene, and had applied to Washington for his advice. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 316.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
December the 5th, in the Evening, 1780.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--However acquainted I may be with your intentions, I thought, upon the whole, that I should better wait for your approbation before I present any opinion of yours to the Spanish and French Generals in the West Indies. I will, I know, lose the opportunity of the confederacy, but many vessels are going that way, and if my letters meet with your approbation I shall send them by triplicates. I Impatiently wait for your answer.
I will write to General Greene to let him know of this intended expedition, which, tho' uncertain as all human events are, may be, however, in a great measure depended upon.
I confess that I don't hope to prevail upon the Spaniards to come here; but if you will, you, Count de Rochambeau, and Chevalier de Ternay, may try. In that case I wish you would write to both of them. My letter will, at all events, give some remote chance of their doing what I wish, and insure their communicating with General Greene. For political reasons I also wish to draw them into this correspondence.
Chevalier de la Luzerne wishes his packet to Count de Rochambeau to be forward as soon as possible. Adieu, my dear General, yours most respectfully and affectionately.~[1]
Footnote:
1. For the answer to this letter, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 322.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Philadelphia, December the 16th, 1780.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your favor of the 8th instant never came to hand before last night. My former letters will have explained to you my sentiments relating to a journey southward. I must heartily thank you, my dear General, for the kind and friendly letters you have been pleased to send me. I am so happy in your friendship that every mark of your affection, for me gives me a degree of pleasure which far surpasses all expressions.
As I have written to you before, my dear General, there is an intelligence of some ships and troops having been put in readiness at Brest; there is a possibility of a Spanish officer waiting on you for the sake of a co-operation. We are also to expect news from my friend the new Minister of the French Navy, and before they arrive you would not like my departure.
Two other reasons have weight with me; the first that if the enemy make this detachment, without which nothing material will happen in the Southward, and if the intelligence is true about the fast recruiting of six month men, there is (not a probability) but a possibility of some thing to be done in this quarter. The second is, that for reasons I will explain to you when we meet, a visit from you to the French army is to be much wished, and in this case you will be glad that I may accompany you.
Under these circumstances, to which is added a natural reluctance to part from you and this army, and some idea that upon the whole my staying will be more agreeable to you, I think, my dear General, that unless new intelligence comes I will soon return.
Colonel Laurens persists in refusing to go, and hopes Hamilton may be sent, whom he thinks better calculated for the purpose; but I don't believe now that this plan may be effected, and in that case I should advise Laurens to accept of the commission, provided he is merely a _messenger_ and not an _envoy_, that would supersede the old Doctor.
The Assembly of Pennsylvania have passed a bill for their officers which seems satisfactory to them. Before I go I will still intrigue for the affair of filling up the battalions. Mifflin behaves perfectly well.
Adieu, my dear General, most affectionately and respectfully, Yours, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. For the letter referred to in the commencement of this, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 316, and see also the letter of Washington to Lafayette, ibid, p.322 & 339.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Philadelphia, March the 2nd, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your letters of the 25th and 26th~[1] both came yesterday to hand, which shows that the expresses have not made great dispatch. I would have done myself the honour of writing to your Excellency had I not every minute waited for intelligence from the Southward.
Your Excellency remembers that our shortest calculation on the arrival of the troops at the head of Elk was for the 6th of March; I am happy to inform you that they will be there this day or to-morrow early, and notwithstanding the depth of the mud, and the extreme badness of the roads, this march, which I can call rapid, (as for example, they came in two days from Morris Town to Princeton,) has been performed with such order and alacrity, that agreeable to the report two men only have been left behind; and yet these two men have embarked at Trenton with some remains of baggage. At every place where the detachment have halted, they have found covering and wood ready for them, and there has not been the least complaint made to me from any inhabitant. Every third day they have drawn their provisions; the clothing has also been distributed, and having embarked yesterday at Trenton they passed the city about two o'clock with a wind which was extremely favorable. Congress have given to their troops the advance of one month's pay which will be distributed at the head of Elk in new emission.
The Artillery, consisting of one 24, six 18, two brass 12, one 8 inch howitzer, two 8 inch mortars, in all, 12 heavy pieces; four 6 pounders, and two small howitzers, with a sufficient quantity of ammunition, will be at the head of the Elk this day and to-morrow, so that by the 4th I hope we shall be ready to sail. A quantity of medicines and instruments, and fifteen hundred pairs of shoes will be at the head of Elk before we embark. Vessels will be in readiness to receive us with thirty days provision on board. I am also assured that we will have a sufficient quantity of boats to land the detachment, and two heavy ones will be added for the Artillery, the public, and some of the private armed vessels in the Bay have been ordered to the head of Elk; two dispatch boats are there, and four more have been asked for. As a farther security to our subsistence, I have got the Minister's permission to dispose of the French flour and salt meat along the Bay in case of necessity.
On my arrival at this place I heard that M. de Tilly, the French Commander, had conferred with the Virginians, but upon seeing that nothing could be done immediately, he was undetermined whether to stay or to return to Rhode Island. Fearing that our letters might miscarry, and wishing to hurry the preparations of the Militia, I complied with the earnest solicitations of the Minister of France to send on Colonel Gouvion, and directed him to go either by land or water (as the state of the Bay would permit) on board the French squadron, and afterwards to Baron de Steuben's Camp, where he may apprise these Gentlemen of our force, our intentions, and the time of our arrival. This minuted account I give to your Excellency to show you that nothing on our part has been wanting for the success of the expedition. Our preparations have in every article fulfilled, and in the most important one, time, have exceeded what had been expected.
Your letter was sent by express to General St. Clair, who immediately came to town; but nothing having been done for the settling of the accounts, none of the promises having been complied with, and the men being much scattered, it has, (after much consideration,) been thought impossible to embark any number with us, and General St. Clair promises to make every exertion for the sending of two or three hundred in a few days whom however I am not to depend upon.
I am myself going to the head of Elk and shall arrive there this evening. It has not been possible for me to leave sooner the City, as the three days I have remained here have been fully employed in making and forwarding preparations.
Before I go I will wait on the Board of War Navy and propose the sending of the frigates; but the Trumbull having not her compliment of men, and those of the Ariel having mutinied at sea, I am afraid we will find difficulties. The preparations made at New York; the return of the Amarila; the remasting of the Bedfort; the impossibility Mr. Destouches is under to give us any further assistance; the uncertainty of what Mr. de Tilly may have determined before he had received your letter. Such are, my dear General, the many reasons which from a pretty certain expedition have lately made a precarious one. Under these circumstances, indeed, there must always be more or less danger in going down the Bay, and venturing the low country about Portsmouth. Being unacquainted with the answer you have received from Count de Rochambeau and Mr. Destouches, I am not able to judge how far I may depend upon the same ship being ordered again to Chesapeake (in case before the reception of your letter) she had thought proper to sail. Her coming was not in consequence of your proposition; her going was relative to the difficulties of an expedition very different from ours, and I wish I might know if (tho' Mr. Destouches cannot give further assistance,) this assistance at least may be depended upon, so as to hope for the return of the ship should M. de Tilly have left the bay. The bottom of the Bedfort is said to be damaged; the Amarila was said to have been dismasted. Suppose those circumstances were true, they would be in our favour. If a detachment was to go from New York to Portsmouth, Westpoint would be less in danger. If Cornwallis continues advancing on, perhaps our being in the neighbourhood of Arnold may be of service; I will, however, confine myself literally to my instructions, and if Colonel Gouvion writes me with certainty that M. de Tilly is gone; if I am not led to suppose he will return, I will march back the detachment; for the present I am going on because upon the increasing of the enemy's force at Gardner's Bay, you recommended dispatch to me; I hope, however, that I will hear from your Excellency. Now that the chain is established, Colonel Dickering says, that in six days I may receive your answer at the head of Elk. The hope of seeing the French ship again, or some other reason, may detain me; but your answer will determine my movements, and I can receive it by the 8th, which is about the time when it was thought we would arrive at the head of Elk.
My expectations are not great, and I think we have but few chances for us. I shall make all possible dispatch, and listen particularly to the voice of prudence; however, some hazard might be ran, if we undertake under these circumstances.
General Duportail having not left this place, I am led to hope that if we don't go I may return in time for the journey to Rhode Island. I most earnestly beg, my dear General, that you will favor me with an immediate answer.
With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, your's, &c.
P.S.--One of our transports from Trenton had got aground, but the troops of her will still be in time for her at the head of Elk. Some new difficulties have been made for the collecting of shoes, but I will try to get over them. From the extraordinary motions of Lord Cornwallis, whom we have not heard of these many days, and from the movements in New-York, I am led to hope that I will hear from you respecting my future conduct, and that I may be at head-quarters before you think it prudent to leave New Windsor.~[2]
Footnotes:
1. For these, See Sparks' Writ. Wash. p. 430 & 439 The date of the letter is there given as the 27th.
2. See the letters of Washington is Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 444 & 447.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Head of Elk, March the 7th, 1781.
My dear general,--Contrary winds, heavy rains, disappointments of vessels, and every inconvenience to which we had no remedy, have been, from the day of my arrival, combined against our embarkation. I hope, however, we will be on board to-morrow morning, and as nothing certain has been heard from the French ships, no time will be lost on our part for the celerity of the expedition.
The troops will embark five miles below this place, and three miles higher up than the Point where General Howe landed. There will be more room for the arrangements of our vessels, and the shallowness of the water insures us against the enterprise of any vessel of force. In this situation we may wait for intelligence from our friends. The State of Maryland have made to me every offer in their power. I will improve this opportunity of making up some deficiencies in the Quarter-Master and Engineer's Department, of insuring to us a good stock of provisions, and upon the intelligence received that Baron de Steubens was gone with a large detachment to the Southward, I had hinted the possibility of getting some Militia from the lower countries, and repairing some cannon at Baltimore; but having read the inclosed from the Baron, I will write again to Governor Lee, (as my letter has been gone but two days,) and save the State from any expence of that kind. To the obtaining of vessels has been joined the difficulty of getting them up the river, as they were taking every opportunity to slip them off. All the vessels, three excepted, are only bay craft, and our Admiral's ship mounts twelve guns. I have prepared some kind of orders for that fleet, but hope to be relieved from my Naval command by the arrival of a French frigate, and have, at all events, sent for Commodore Nicholson of Baltimore. Mr. McHenry has been very active in accelerating the measures of his State.
By a letter from Colonel Gouvion, dated Yucomico River, I find that after many adventures, he had landed there on the 4th, and was proceeding by land to his destination. The wind is fair enough to come up the Bay, and hope soon to hear from our friends.
The enclosed letter from the Baron having first come into my hand, and being on public service, as it was waited upon _to be forwarded with dispatch_, I took the liberty to open it, but was very sorry to have done it after a letter of the same date had came also to hand; both say the same thing (at least in every material point,) and I am happy to find that the Baron's preparations are going on rapidly.
Whatever may be the Baron's opinion upon the facility of taking, sword in hand, the fortifications of Portsmouth, I will not hazard any thing before I have considered the matter with my own eyes. Arnold had so much time to prepare, and plays so deep a game; nature has made the position so respectable, and some of the troops under his orders have been in so many actions that I don't flatter myself to succeed so easily as it may be thought. The prospect of preserving Naval superiority must, I think, decide if we are to save bloodshed by regular approaches, or to risk our men into the dangers of an assault; but I would like to destroy the works in some measure before we attempt to storm them. A conversation with the Baron, with Colonel Gouvion, and some other officers, joined to what I can see myself, will better fix my mind on the matter than it can be at present. When I left Philadelphia General Wayne was not far from hoping he could soon collect a thousand men; but I am not so sanguine in my expectations; I am, however, trying to prepare matters for this number of men, but I think that a sufficiency of vessels, (unless ours are sent back,) will not be obtained in a few days. Let General Wayne arrive in time or not, when he comes under my directions I wish to know if in case we succeed, he must be sent to Genl. Greene. Supposing he is to go there, would your Excellency think of selecting some riflemen for the grand army? It seems to me that I heard you once mentioning this matter. The State of Virginia, I am told, finds difficulties in the keeping of prisoners. Suppose something of the kind was stated to me, am I to alter any thing in what you said to me on the subject?
I am in a great hurry to go, my dear General; but let us succeed or fall in the object we have in view, I shan't be less hurried to return with the detachment to head-quarters, where I hope to be again as soon as you may possibly expect. I beg you will present my respects to Mrs. Washington, and Mrs. Hamilton, and compliments to the family. I have received Mr. Washington's answer, he is waiting for me at the Baron's quarters.
With the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, your's, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Washington's letter in Sparks' Writ. in Wash, vol. 8, p. 449.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Off Turkey Point, March the 9th.
My dear general,--Commodore Nicholson has joined us sooner than I expected; he answers to conduct the detachment to Annapolis without the least danger, there he will wait for intelligence from me, but says that if the French fleet are below be might go with safety (if not for the vessels at least for the troops) to the point of our destination. Nicholson will be very useful to the French fleet as he knows well the bay.
I will be at Hampton to-morrow night or the day after, and three days after my arrival, if the French (whose arrival has not been heard of) consent to send a Frigate, the detachment may come in two days from Annapolis.
Most respectfully, my dear General, your's &c.
P.S.--I have written to the State of Maryland to tell them we don't want any of their Militia. I have left to the Navy Board to judge of the propriety to send out the Ariel adding that it was no more essential.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
York, March 15th, 1781.
My Dear General,--The number of small frigates and privateers that are in the bay, made it impossible for me to carry the detachment farther down than Annapolis, and I have requested the Governor of Maryland as well as the principal officers of the detachment, to give out that we are going to join General Greene; but the object of the expedition is so perfectly well known every where, that our sole dependence to keep Arnold must be upon the apprehension he has of a French fleet being cruizing off the capes.
For my part, I came in a barge from Annapolis, and very luckily escaped the dangers that were in the way. Colonel Harrison will have given to your Excellency a minute detail of the reasons which have prompted me to this measure. I have taken his advice on the matter, and have no doubt but that your Excellency (considering the probability that no frigate would have been sent) will approve of the step I have taken to forward as much as possible both the advantage of the expedition and the honor of the American arms.
On my arrival, (yesterday afternoon) I have found that Baron de Stuben had been very active in making preparations, and agreeable to what he tells me, we shall have five thousand militia ready to operate. This, with the Continental detachment, is equal to the business, and we might very well do without any land force from Newport.
By papers found in the baggage of a British officer, (taken in a boat) it seems that General Gregory had a correspondence with the enemy. The Baron has suspended him, but he is still with the troops.
Arnold is so well acquainted with the coming of the detachment, and his object is so well known, that, as I said before, our only chance to keep him must be the idea of a French fleet being off the capes; he is fortifying at Portsmouth, and trying to get provisions. There has been some trifling skirmishes with the militia.
To my great disappointment the French fleet have not yet appeared. If the project has not been given up they must be expected every minute; they had double the time which they wanted, and such winds as ought have brought them in four days.
I wanted to hold up the idea of my going to the Southward; but the Baron says that if the detachment is not announced, the militia will desert. He wanted me to take the command immediately, but I thought it more polite not to do it until the detachment arrives or operations are begun.
In your first letter to the Baron, I wish my dear General, you will write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him, and harmony shall be my first object. As in all cases, (even this of my going to the Southward and coming here to make arrangements with the Baron) I would reconnoitre the enemies; I will take an opportunity of doing it as soon as possible. They have not as yet been reconnoitred by the Baron, and I think it therefore more necessary for me to see with my own eyes.
As I have just arrived, my dear General, I cannot give you a very exact account of matters.
This letter I send by duplicate, and have the honor to be with the highest respect and most tender affection, yours, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Elk, April the 10th, 1751.
Dear general,--By my letter of the 8th your Excellency will have known of my arrival at this place, and the preparations I was making to proceed Southward. I took at the same time the liberty to inform you that the great want of money, baggage, clothing, under which both officers and men are suffering, and the hope they had of being furnished with a part of these articles from their States, would render it very inconvenient for the troops to proceed immediately by land; they begin to be sensible of the reason which detains them here, and are uneasy about it, as they are so unprovided for the journey. I have, however, hurried on preparations, and will be able to set off to-morrow morning. The circumstances of my being ready sooner than I expected, and a letter from the Governor of Maryland telling that six ships, whom I take to be plundering vessels, were coming up the Potomac, induces me not to wait for your Excellency's answer. Not that I pretend to defend the towns of Alexandria, Baltimore and Annapolis, at a time, or to stop the depredations of the enemy's parties in a country where their naval superiority renders it impossible; but because I don't think any consideration must delay the execution of superior orders, and because, if the corps was not sent to Southward they would with alacrity march back thirty or forty miles more to rejoin the grand army.
Having received no particulars of your Excellency's journey to Rhode Island, but by the paper, a letter from you to Mr. Lund Washington, and private letters from some friends, I cannot know what change has taken place in your plans, and am not able to account for the inactivity which you foresee for the grand army. Letters from Ministers, letters from my friends, intelligences from other quarters, every thing was combined to flatter me with the hope that our grand and decisive object would be in contemplation. I then was not displeased with the dispositions of the enemy that weakened that place. It is probable that your Excellency's plans have changed, and you intend to prosecute the war to the Southward.
I had yesterday the pleasure of dining on board the Hermione, and left her under sail to go to Rhode Island, where she will probably be the day after to-morrow. Mr. Delatouche, uncle to captain Latouche, will, it is said, command the squadron of the second division. I was conversing with his nephew, on whom he has an entire confidence on the expedition against New York, and he assured me that his Uncle's plan would certainly be to take possession of the harbour, and send a force up the North River, which you know is entirely the thing that you wanted M. de Vernay to do.
Mr. Delatouche having confidentially told me that he had a great influence over Mr. Destouches, I observed to him how important it was for the common cause that the French fleet might have the greatest possible activity. We were also conversing of the difficulties we laboured under for transportation, and he told me that the next day after his arrival at Rhode Island, unless such obstacles occurred as he could not foresee; Mr. Destouches would make you an offer of the ship l'Eveillé, and the four frigates to carry twelve hundred men to any part of` continent you might think proper. Those ships are too strong to be afraid of frigates, and too fast sailers to be in the least concerned by the fear of a squadron. Thinking that (particularly as Lord Cornwallis has retreated) our march would take us forty days, where desertion and sickness, occasioned by want of shoes and every other necessary, as well as by the heat of the season, would much reduce our numbers, and that these ships, with the addition of the two frigates at Philadelphia, armed _en flute_, would in sailing on the 4th or 5th of May, carry 1500 men to Wilmington, Georgetown, or any place in the rear of Lord Cornwallis or the neighborhood of General Greene, I thought it my duty to encourage this idea, which would bring us to the point of operations sooner than we could arrive by land. It would also give you the time of forming at Morristown or Trenton, a detachment well provided, agreeably to the project you had in contemplation after the return of this corps. The appointment of officers could be made without affecting the delicacy of the regimental officers, nor the honor of those already employed. While we would be operating, Mr. Destouches might keep cruizers off Charleston. These ideas, my dear General, are only thrown out in consequence of the freedom you have often ordered me to take. What Mr. Destouches may do is uncertain, and I did not think myself authorised to express to him the least wish on that head. It was my duty to relate our difficulties to you, and the chances I foresaw to see them relieved in some measure; but unless the bad weather, of which there is now a prospect, makes it impossible, I will be to-morrow at the ferry at the Susquehannah.
You may have known from Mr. de La Luzerne, that two millions and a half had been given to Mr. Franklin, and that Marquis de Castries and Count de Vergennes, were trying to obtain a sum more adequate to our wants. This, however, the Minister of France has requested me not to mention, as it was as yet an uncertainty, and would perhaps give ill-grounded hopes, destructive of the internal efforts we ought to make. I am told that just before the departure of Mr. Dela Peyrouse, some dispatches were sent to Brest; but do not think they contain any thing relating to our operations, as Marquis de Castries writes me that the determination of the Council upon our letters will be sent by the ships who is to convoy the expected vessels.
I am very sorry I have not seen the Aid de Camp who had a verbal message from General Greene. Inclosed I send to your Excellency the letter I have received on the occasion. Perhaps, did he mean to propose an expedition towards Cape-fear or Georgetown, which might be made with the light squadron above mentioned. An additional circumstance is, that l'Eveillé will now be commanded by Mr. de Lombard, captain Latouche's uncle, who is entirely under that Gentleman's influence.
I write to the board of war to get some shoes and other parts of clothing. I will this morning speak to the commanding officers of battalions on our intended journey; but have not yet said any thing to Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan, because it is possible that new circumstances may engage you to change your dispositions. Going by water, if possible, would level most all difficulties; but if I don't hear from you, I will always proceed on. I have the honor to be, yours &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Washington's Letters of 21st of March and 5th and 6th of April. Sparks' Writ. of Wash. volume 7. pp. 449 and 468, 8469. See also--Sparks' Writ. of Wash. vol. 8. Appendix No. 1.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1751.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--I received your Excellency's letter relating to Colonel Gouvion. It would have been very agreeable to me to keep this officer, your orders have been sent to Philadelphia where he is for the present. However distant I may be from the scene, I am happy to find that your Excellency hopes to undertake the grand object we have had in contemplation.
By a letter just received from the board of War, it seems that representations of wants have been made which they have mistaken for objections from me to our journey southward. I have said to some officers that our proximity to the southern states was the reason which had induced your Excellency to send this detachment, but I hope I need not assure you that I never thought of intimating the least idea of alteration to your Excellency's projects, but such as you would think of making yourself after your own ideas and intelligences. Perhaps my letter to the board of War may appear disrespectful or impolite, but nothing could stop me in an instance where it might be suspected I objected to your plans, or even differed in opinion. You know me too perfectly not to think an explanation useless.
It is confidently reported that the second division is arrived in the capes of Delaware, consisting of nine sail of the line, this was the number mentioned to me by the Marquis de Castries to be in harbour, your Excellency would in that case have a brilliant Campaign to the northward.
With the highest and most affectionate respect Yours &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Wash. of the 11th April. Sparks' Writ. of Wash. vol. 8, p. 11.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Had your Excellency's answer to my letter of the 8th, been forwarded with an equal celerity that your favor of the 6th, I would have received it before this time, but whatever change my new situation could make in your Excellency's dispositions, I thought it my duty in the mean while to obey the positive orders I had received, the Troops are now crossing the ferry and will with all possible speed proceed to Richmond.
By a letter received from General Green I find that he is, strongly of opinion that I must go to the southward, his intention is to carry the seat of war into South Carolina, there by preventing a junction between Arnold and Cornwallis, he gives me many excellent reasons to justify the movement and requests me to make to Richmond, and they will, if possible, increase my zeal to execute your Excellency's orders.
General Green's opinion is that Lord Cornwallis will fall down towards Wilmington, his own project is to carry the war into South Carolina. Under these circumstances a corps of Light Infantry embarked at Philadelphia on board a light squadron might have been upon the seat of war in a very short passage.
I cannot help fearing, my dear General, that our campaign will take a defensive turn which is far from answering our first plans and expectations. Major McPherson is with me as a volunteer, that officer has most zealously employed himself and has been most dangerously exposed in the discovery of a plot made to furnish the enemy with provisions, he has managed this matter with infinite address, being for two days and one night with six soldiers who, as well as himself, put on the air of British, and, in company with a spy who thought them to be enemy and by a most violent gale of wind, crossed the bay in a small boat, by which means he was made sensible that a trade of flour is carried with the enemy from the western shore of Maryland, and saved a magazine of 800 barrels of continental flour which would otherwise have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In case we proceed southerly perhaps will it be possible for General Green to give Mayor McPherson a command in some detachment; I would be happy if he was recommended to him by your Excellency. My determination being to go on with rapidity, unless I am recalled, your Excellency may easily judge of my movements from the answer I will probably receive in a few hours. Was I to assure your Excellency that this journey is perfectly agreeable to the Troops, I would not use that candor which you have so much right to expect, but their zeal and discipline insure their readiness to obey. I shall do my utmost to prevent desertion, and unless I was recalled, I shall proceed with celerity. But I beg your Excellency to remember that experience has often taught us how much reduced has ever been the number of our troops from the time of their departure to that of their arrival at the Southern army.
With the highest and most affectionate respect,
Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 14th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL--Your Excellency's letter of the 11th, has overtaken me at this place, and having given to you an account of every measure I thought proper to take, I will only add that I am still at the ferry where the troops have crossed the river; but the wind blows so high that it has been impossible to take the waggons over, and I am obliged to have others impressed on the southern side of the Susquehannah. Your Excellency mentions the propriety of remaining at the head off Elk until shoes can be collected, but the prospect I have from the board of war are not flattering enough to encourage this measure. On the other side General Green is pressing in his advices, and will soon be so in his orders to me. I cannot obtain any good account of Phillip's motions, nor oppose the schemes he may have formed, until I am much farther advanced; and dissatisfaction and desertion being two greater evils than any other we have to fear; I am anxious to have rivers, other countries, and every kind of barrier to stop the inclination of the men to return home. Many men have already deserted, many more will I am afraid take the same course, whatever sense of duties, ties of affection, and severity of discipline may operate, shall be employed by me, and I wish we might come near the enemy, which is the only means to put a stop to the spirit of desertion.
Many articles, and indeed every one which compose the apparatus of a soldier, will be wanting for this detachment. But shoes, linen, overalls, hunting shirts, shirts, and ammunition will be the necessary supplies for which I request your Excellency's most pressing orders to people concerned, and most warm entreaties to the board of war. I wish it was possible to have the men equiped at once, and this would be a great saving of expense.
While I am writing to your Excellency the wind rises more and more, which will much impede our passage for such stores as were to cross over with the waggons, and the guard appointed to stay with them. At such a distance from the enemy, I cannot give your Excellency any account of their movements, but by the last intelligence General Phillips was still at Portsmouth.
Should the French get a naval superiority, an expedition against Portsmouth is very practible. These companies, filled up to their proper number, and some other troops to increase the corps to two thousand, would with a detachment of artillery from Philladelphia, be equal to the attack of that post. 3000 militia can with the greatest ease be collected. In case Duke de Lauzurn's legion arrives, that corps could come in the fleet; but should the French become superior at sea the British fleet in Chesapeak would be in danger, and in every case, if your Excellency thinks of sending any reinforcement this way, (let it be the Jersey troops or recruits) their coming by water to James or York river may save an immense trouble and expense.
My heart and every faculty of my mind, have been these last years so much concerned in the plan of an expedition against * * * that I am very desirous to hear, by the very first safe opportunity what reasons can have overthrown the project.
Some disputes that have at first happened between the Jersey and New-England troops, make me think that these last must be as much as possible separated from the Pensylvanians.
While I was writing these accounts have been brought to me, that, a great desertion had taken place last night: nine of the Rhode Island company, and the best men they had, who have made many campaigns, and never were suspected, these men say they like better a hundred lashes than a journey to the south-ward. As long as they had an expedition in view they were very well satisfied, but the idea of remaining in the southern states appear to them intolerable, and they are amazingly averse to the people and climate. I shall do my best, but if this disposition lasts I am afraid we will be reduced lower than I dare express. With the highest and most affectionate respect, yours &,c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Washington, of the 21st and 22d April--Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 8., pp. 19, 22.
TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Hanover Court House, April 28th, 1781.
Sir,--Having received intelligence that General Phillips' army were preparing at Portsmouth, for offensive operations. I left at Baltimore every thing that could impede our march, to follow us under a proper escort, and with about a thousand men, officers included; hastened towards Richmond which I apprehended would be a principal object with the enemy.
Being on our way, I have received successive accounts of their movements. On the 21st, the British troops, commanded by their Generals, Philips and Arnold, landed at City Point on the south side of James River. A thousand militia under Maj. General Caroude Stuben and General Muhlenberg, were posted at Blandford to oppose them, and on the 25th they had an engagement with the enemy; the militia behaved very gallantly, and our loss, it is said, is about twenty killed and wounded. The same day, the enemy whose force it is reported to be near 2500 regular troops, marched into Petersburg. Yesterday they moved to Osburn's, about thirteen miles from Richmond, and after a skirmish with a corps of militia, destroyed some vessels that had been collected there, but have not yet attempted to cross the river. Baron de Stuben, is at the same side, and has removed to Falling Creek Church.
The Continental detachment will in a few hours arrive at this place, 20 miles from Richmond. The enemy are more than double our force in regular troops and their command of the waters gives them great advantages.
With the highest respect, I have the honor to be yours, &c.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp on Pamunkey River, May 3d, 1781.
Sir,--I had lately the honor to inform you of the enemy's movements towards Richmond, and the forced marches I was making to its defence. The detachment arrived on the 29th; the British army was thirteen miles distant on the other side of the river. Petersburg, Chesterfield Court House, and part of our vessels had fallen into their hands. Our regular force consisted of 900 men, rank and file; that of the enemy, of 2,300, at the lowest estimate.
The command of the water, and such a superiority of regular troops, gave them possession of our shore. There was no crossing for us, but under a circuit of fifteen miles, and from the number and size of their boats, their passage over the river was six times quicker than ours.
Richmond being their main object. I determined to defend this capital, where a quantity of public stores and tobacco was contained. General Nelson was there, with a corps of militia, and Generals Stuben and Muhlenberg, higher up on the other side. The same evening, we were by summons from General Philips, made accountable for the public stores on board vessels near the town, (which he declared) should certainly fall into his hands. Next morning the enemy moved to Manchester, opposite Richmond, where they burnt the ware-houses. Six hundred men ventured on this side, but were timely recalled, and being charged by a few dragoons of Major Nelson, flew into their boats with precipitation.
Knowing General Phillip's intention against Richmond, (orders for attack had been already given) I directed Baron de Stuben to join us, and collected our force to receive the enemy, but the same night they retreated to Osburn's, from thence to the neck of land formed by James River and Appamatox, where they have re-embarked. Col. Pleasant's and Good's battallions of militia, were sent on each side of the river and gave annoyance to their troops and boats. The enemy have lost some men killed, prisoners and deserters. Since the British army landed at City Point, (some flour excepted at the Court-house) no public property has been destroyed. Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp near Bottom's Creek, May 4th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--I request you will receive my affectionate acknowledgements for your kind letters. Every mark of friendship I receive from you adds to my happiness, as I love you with all the sincerity and warmth of my heart, and the sentiment I feel for you goes to the very extent of my affections.
Inclosed I send you, my dear General, two copies of letters to General Greene, which I also sent to Congress for their information. You will also find copies of the strange letters I have received from General Phillips, and the answers which, if he does not behave better, will break off our correspondence.
The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for it Richmond was lost, and Major Galvan, who has exerted himself to the utmost, cannot be with us under two days, as he never could obtain or seize horses for the artillery and ammunition waggons. It is not without trouble I have made this rapid march. General Phillips has expressed to an officer on flag, the astonishment he felt at our celerity, and when on the 30th, as he was going to give the signal to attack, he reconnoitred our position, Mr. Osburn, who was with him, says that he flew into a violent passion and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me.
I am, however, uneasy, my dear General, and do not know what the public will think of our conduct. I cannot say in any official letter that no boats, no waggons, no intelligence, not one spy could be obtained; that if once I had been manoeuvring with Phillips he had every advantage over me; that a defeat would have scattered the militia, lost the few arms we have, and knocked down this handful of Continental troops. Great deal of mischief had been already done. I did not know but what the enemy meant to establish a post. Under these circumstances I thought it better to fight on none but my own grounds and to defeat the main and most valuable object of the enemy. Had I gone on the other side, the enemy would have given me the slip and taken Richmond, leaving nothing to me, but the reputation of a rash unexperienced young man. Our stores could not be removed.
No orders from General Greene have as yet come to me. I cannot conceive the reason of his delay in answering my letters. In the meanwhile, Phillips is my object, and if with a thousand men I can be opposed to three thousand in this State, I think I am useful to General Greene. In a former letter he tells me that his object is to divide the enemy, and having no orders I must be regulated by his opinion.
The enemy are gone down the river. I have detached some militia to Hoods where I mean to make a fort. Colonel Hennis, with another corps of militia, is gone towards Williamsburg. His orders are in case the enemy land there, to annoy them, and in case they mean to establish a post, he is to disturb them until I arrive. This position is 16 miles from Richmond, 42 from Williamsburg, 60 from Fredericksburg. I have sent an officer at Point Comfort, and established a chain of expresses to know if they appear to turn towards Potomac. Should it be the case, Fredericksburg will have my attention, having missed Mr. Hunter's works at Fredericksburg must be their next object as they are the only support to our operations in the southward. Your first letters, my dear General, will perhaps tell me something more about your coming this way. How happy I should be to see you, I hope I need not express. As you are pleased to give me the choice, I shall frankly tell my wishes. If you co-operate with the French against the place, you know I wish to be at head quarters. If something is co-operated in Virginia, I will find myself very happily situated for the present. In case my detachment remains in this State I wish not to leave it, as I have a separate and
## active command, though it does not promise great glory; but as you gave
me leave to do it, I shall in a few days write to you more particularly on my private concerns. It is not only on account of my own situation that I wish the French fleet may come into the bay. Should they come even without troops, it is ten to one that they will block up Phillips in some rivers, and then I answer he is ruined. Had I but ships, my situation would be the most agreeable in the world. Adieu my dear General, you will make me happy to write me sometimes. With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, yours, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Wash. of 31 May.--See Sparks' Writ., v. 8., p. 60.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May the 8th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--There is no fighting here unless you have a naval superiority, or an army mounted upon race-horses. Phillips' plan against Richmond has been defeated; he was going towards Portsmouth, and I thought it should be enough for me to oppose him at some principal points in this State. But now it appears I will have business to transact with two armies, and this is rather too much.
By letters from North Carolina, I find that Lord Cornwallis, who I had been assured had sailed from Charleston, is advancing towards Hallifax. In consequence of letters from the same quarter, General Phillip's has altered his plans, and returned to a place called Brandon on the south side of James river, where he landed the night before last. Our detachment is under march towards the Hallifax road, his command of the water, enabled him to land where I could not reach him. The brigade at Petersburg is destroyed, and unless he acts with an uncommon degree of folly, he will be at Hallifax before me. Each of these armies is more than the double superior to me. We have no boats, few militia, and less arms. I will try to do for the best, and hope to deserve your approbation.
Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and reinforcements destined to General Green's army. While I am going to get beaten by both armies or each of them seperately, the Baron remains at Richmond where he hurries the collection of recruits, and every other requisite. I have forbidden every department to give me any thing that maybe thought useful to General Greene, and should a battle be expected (an event which I will try to keep off,) no consideration will prevent our sending to Carolina 800 recruits who, I hope, may be equiped in a fortnight. When General Green becomes equal to offensive operations, this quarter will be relieved. I have written to Wayne, to hasten his march, but unless I am very hard pushed, shall request him to proceed south-ward. The militia have been ordered out, but are slow, unarmed, and not yet used to this business. General Green, from whom I had as yet no letters, was on the 26th, before Camden, but did not think himself equal to the storming of the works. My respects, if you please, to Mr. Washington, and compliments to the family. Most respectfully and affectionately.
Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Welton, north side of James River, May 18th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.--Having been directed by General Greene to take command of the troops in Virginia. I have also received orders from him, that every account from this quarter, be immediately transmitted to Congress, and to your Excellency; in obedience to which I shall have the honor to relate our movements, and those of the combined armies of the enemy. When General Phillips retreated from Richmond, his project was to stop at Williamsburg, there to collect contributions which he had imposed, this induced me to take a position between Pamunkey, and Chikahomany rivers, which equally covered Richmond, and some other interesting parts of the State, and from where I detached General Nelson with some militia towards Williamsburg.
Having got as low down as that place, General Phillips seemed to discover an intention to make a landing, but upon advices received by a vessel from Portsmouth, the enemy weighed anchor, and with all the sail they could crowd, hastened up the river, this intelligence made me apprehensive that the enemy intended to manoeuvre me out of Richmond where I returned immediately, and again collected our small force, intelligence was the same day received that Lord Cornwallis (who I had been assured, to have embarked at Wilmington) was marching through North Carolina, (this was confirmed by the landing of General Phillips at Brandon south side of James River.) Apprehending that both armies would move to meet at a central point, I march towards Petersburg and intended to have established a communication over Appamatox and James river, but on the 9th, General Phillips took possession of Petersburgh; a place where his right flank being covered by James River, his front by Appamatox, on which the bridges had been destroyed in the first part of the invasion, and his left not being attackable but by a long circuit through fords that at this season are very uncertain, I could not (even with an equal force) have got any chance of fighting him, unless I had given up this side of James River, and the country from which reinforcements are expected. It being at the enemy's choice to force us to an action, which their own position insured them against our enterprizes, I thought it proper to shift this situation, and marched the greater part of our troops to this place about ten miles below Richmond. Letters from General Nash, General Sumner, and General Jones are positive as to the arrival of Colonel Tarleton, and announce that of Lord Cornwallis at Halifax. Having received a request from North Carolina for ammunition, I made a detachment of 500 men under General Muhlenberg to escort 20,000 cartridges over Appamatox, and to divert the enemy's attention, Colonel Gimat, with his battalion, and 4 field pieces cannonaded their position from this side of the River. I hope our ammunition will arrive safe, as before General Muhlenberg returned he put it in a safe road with proper directions. On the 13th, General Phillips died and the command devolved on General Arnold. General Wayne's detachment has not yet been heard of, before he arrives, it becomes very dangerous to risk any engagement where (as the British armies being vastly superior to us) we shall certainly be beaten, and by the loss of arms, the dispersion of militia, and the difficulty of a junction with General Wayne, we may lose a less dangerous chance of resistance.
These considerations have induced me to think that with our so very great inferiority, and with the advantage the enemy have by their cavalry and naval superiority, there would be much rashness in fighting them on any but our grounds, and this side of the river, and that an engagement which I fear will be soon necessary; ought, if possible to be deferred till the Pensylvanians arrive, whom I have by several letters requested to hasten to our assistance.
No report has lately come from near Hallifax, though a very active officer has been sent for that purpose; but every intelligence confirms that Lord Cornwallis is hourly expected at Petersburg, it is true there never was such difficulty in getting tolerable intelligence, as there is in this country, and the immense superiority of the enemy's horses, render it very precarious to hazard our small parties.
Arnold has received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.
I am dear General, your most obedient humble servant, Yours &c.
P.S. Injustice to Major Mitchell and Captain Muir, who were taken at Petersburg, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that they had been sent to that place on public service. I have requested General Lawson to collect and take command of the militia south of Appamatox, local impediments was thrown in the road from Hallifax to Petersburg, and precautions taken to remove the horses from the enemy's reach. Should it be possible to get arms, some militia might be brought into the field, but General Greene and myself labour under the same disadvantage, the few militia we can with great pains collect arrive unarmed, and we have not a sufficiency of weapons to put into their hands.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Washington's Letter of the 31st May.--Sparks' Writ. of Wash., v. 8., p. 60.
TO COLONEL HAMILTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May 23, 1781.
MY DEAR HAMILON,--I have been long complaining that I had nothing to do, and want of employment was an objection I had to my going to the southward; but for the present, my dear friend, my complaint is quite of an opposite nature, and I have so many arrangements to make, so many difficulties to combat, so many enemies to deal with, that I am much of a General as will make me a historian of misfortunes, and nail my curse upon the ruins of what good soldiers are pleased to call the army in Virginia. There is an age past since I heard from you. I acknowledge that on my part, I have not written so often as I ought to have done, but you will excuse this silence in favor of my very embarrassing circumstances, however remote you may be from your former post of aid-de-camp, to the Commander-in-chief, I am sure you are nevertheless acquainted with every transaction at head quarters. My letters have served to report information, and I shall consequently abstain from repetitions.
Our forced march saved Richmond. Phillips was going down, and thus far I am very happy. Phillips' return, his landing at Brandon, south side of James and Appamatox rivers. Had Phillips marched to Hallifax I was determined to follow him, and should have risked every thing rather to omit making a diversion in favor of Greene; but that army took possession of Petersburg, and obliged me to stick to the side of the river whence reinforcements are expected. Both armies have formed their junction of between four and five thousand men. We have no Continentals; their infantry is near five to one; their cavalry ten to one. Our militia are not numerous, without arms, and not used to war. Government wants energy, and there is nothing to enforce the laws. General Greene has directed me to take command in this State, and I must tell you by the way, his letter is very polite and affectionate; it then became my duty to arrange the departments, which I found in the greatest confusion and relaxation; nothing can be obtained, and yet expenses are enormous. The Baron and the few new levies we could collect, are ordered to South Carolina. Is it not strange that General Wayne's detachment cannot be heard of? They are to go to Carolina; but should I have them for a few days, I am at liberty to keep them. This permission I will improve so far as to receive one blow, that being beat, I may at least be beat with some decency. There are accounts that Lord Cornwallis is very strong; others make him very weak. In this country there is no getting good intelligence. I request you will write me if you approve of my conduct. The command of the waters, the superiority in cavalry, and the great disproportion of forces, gave the enemy such advantages that I durst not venture out, and listen to my fondness for enterprise; to speak truth, I was afraid of myself as much as of the enemy. Independence has rendered me the more cautious, as I know my own warmth; but if the Pennsylvanians come, Lord Cornwallis shall pay something for his victory.
I wish a reinforcement of light infantry to recruit the battallions, or a detachment under General Huntington, was sent to me. I wish Lawson or Sheldon were immediately dispatched with some horses. Come here, my dear friend, and command our artillery in Virginia. I want your advices and your exertions. If you grant my request, you will vastly oblige your friend. Yours, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May the 24th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.--The junction of Lord Cornwallis with the other army at Petersburg was an event that, from local circumstances, and from their so great superiority, it was impossible to prevent, it took place on the 20th, and having lost every hope to operate, a timely stroke in conjunction with the Pensylvanians, my ideas were confined to defensive measures. I therefore moved up to Richmond, where precautions were taken to remove every valuable property, either public or private.
By an officer that was in Halifax after Lord Cornwallis, I hear he has not left any post at that place, it appears, his sick and wounded remained at Wilmington, and were reimplaced by that garison. Reports concerning the numbers are so different, that I cannot trust anything but my eyes, until such an opportunity offers, this is the order of march, in which it is said his Lordship crossed Roanoke. Col. Tarlton's legion, Col. Hamilton's corps, 23d, 71st, 33d, British regiments, 200 tories, an Hessian regiment, the light infantry and guards with six field pieces. I am told General Leslie and Genl. O'Hara are with him, I have received successive and repeated accounts, that a British fleet of transports was arrived at Hampton, they were said to consist of 11 large vessels, and 16 smaller ones, under convoy of three large frigates. Mr. Day D.Q.M. at Williamsburg, writes that on the 22nd, 12 sail of large ship; a sloop, and schooner got underway opposite James Town; those ships full of men, and some horses on board the sloop. We have no accounts of any fleet having sailed from New-York.
Yesterday afternoon, we had a heavy rain, which Colonel Tarlton improved in surprising some militia in Chesterfield County, thirty of whom fell into his hands.
This morning at 9 o'clock the enemy moved from Peteraburg towards City Point, and destroyed the bridge they had lately constructed over Appamatoc. I have just received accounts, that a body of them has landed at Westover. These are said to be the men who came up the river from Hampton, previous to which General Arnold had received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.
To my great mortification, I have heard this morning, that the Pensylvanians are not so near as I had been, by every account positively assured. General Wayne writes me he will hasten to my support, and I am confident he will not lose time at this critical moment, but before he arrives, it is impossible that 900 continentals and 40 horses, with a body of militia by no means so considerable as they are reported to be, and whom it is so difficult to arm, be with any advantage opposed to such a superiority of forces, such a number of cavalry, to which may be added, their very prejudicial command of the writers.
Our handful of men being the point to which militia may be collected, and the only check, however small it is, that the enemy may have in this state, it ought, I think, to be managed with a great deal of prudence as its preservation is so very important to the fate of operations in Virginia.
With the highest respect. I have the honor to be Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed you will find the copy of a letter to General Green. He at first had requested that I would directly write to you, since which his orders have been different, but he directed me to forward you copies of my official accounts. So many letters are lost in their way that I do not care to avoid repetitions.--I heartily wish, my dear general, my conduct may be approved of, particularly by you. My circumstances have been peculiar, and in this state I have sometimes experienced strange disappointments. Two of them, the stores at Charlottesville, and the delay of the Pennsylvania detachment, have given me much uneasiness and may be attended with bad consequences. Your presence, my dear general, would do a great deal, Should these detachments be increased to three or four thousand, and the French army come this way, leaving one of our generals at Rhode Island and two or three about New York and in the Jerseys, you might be very offensive in this quarter, and there could be, a southern army in Carolina. Your presence would do immense good, but I would wish you to have a large force. General Washington, before he personally appears, must be strong enough to hope success. Adieu, my dear general, with the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, Yours,~[1]
P.S. If you persist in the idea to come this way. you may depend upon about 3000 militia in the field, relieved every two months. Your presence will induce them to turn out with great spirit.
Footnote:
1. This letter, and the succeeding one to Gen. Greene, was written while Lafayette was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, and as he was about to cross the Rapidan to form a junction with Wayne. See the answers in Sparks's _Writ. of Wash_. v. 3. p. 86.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781,
SIR,--I have done myself the honor to write you many letters, but least some of them should have miscarried, which I much apprehend to have been the case, I shall repeat an account of the late transactions in this state.
The junction of the enemy being made, which for the reasons I have mentioned it was impossible to prevent, I retired towards Richmond and waited for Lord Cornwallis's movements, his regular force being so vastly superior to mine.--Reinforcements from below having still increased it, and his cavalry being ten to one, I could not think to bring into action a small body of eight or nine hundred men, that preserved the shadow of an army and an inconsiderable number of militia whose defeat was certain and would be attended with a fatal loss of arms.--
Lord Cornwallis had at first a project to cross above Richmond, but desisted from it and landed at Westover, he then proposed to turn our left flank, but before it was executed we moved by the left to the forks of Chickahomony,--the enemy advanced twelve miles and we retreated in the same proportion; they crossed Chickahomony and advanced on the road to Fredericksburg. We marched in a parallel with them, keeping the upper part of the country. Our position at Mattapony church would have much exposed the enemy's flank on their way to Fredericksburg, but they stopped at Cook's ford on the North Anna river, where they are for the present.--General Wayne having announced to me his departure on the 23d, I expected before this time to have made a junction. We have moved back some distance and are cautious not to indulge Lord Cornwallis with an
## action with our present force.--
The intentions of the enemy are not as yet well explained. Fredericksburg appears to be their object, the more so as a greater number of troops are said to be gone down than is necessary for the garrison of Portsmouth.--The public stores have been as well as possible removed, and every part of Hunter's works that could be taken out of the way.--It is possible they mean to make a stroke towards Charlotteville; this I would not be uneasy for, had my repeated directions been executed, but instead of removing stores from there to Albemarle old Court House, where Baron de Steuben has collected six hundred regulars, and where I ordered the militia south of James River to rendezvous--It appears from a letter I received this evening that state stores have been contrary to my directions collected there, least they should mix with the Continentals, but my former letters were so positive, and my late precautions are so multiplied that. I hope the precious part of the stores will have been removed to a safer place. I had also some stores removed from Orange Court House. Dispatches from the Governor to me have fallen into the enemies' hands; of which I gave him and the Baron immediate notice.
The report of an insurrection in Hampshire county, and the hurry of Lord Cornwallis to communicate the copy of a Cartel with you where it is settled the prisoners will be sent by such a time to Jamestown, are motives that gave me some suspicions of a project towards the Convention troops. The number of the rebels is said to be 700--Gen. Morgan has marched against them; I think the account is pretty well authenticated tho' it is not official.--Having luckily opened a letter from the Board of War, to the Governor whereby the Convention troops are ordered to New England, I sent a copy of it to Col. Wood and requested an immediate execution of the order. This motive and the apprehension that I might be interrupted in a junction with Gen. Wayne have induced me particularly to attend to our re-union, an event that was indispensable to give us a possibility to protect some part or other of this state. I was until lately ignorant of your orders, that the new Continentals and militia under Baron de Steuben be united with this part of your army, and the Baron intended shortly to march to the southward.--When united to Gen. Wayne 1 shall be better able to command my own movements and those of the other troops in this state.--Had this expected junction taken place sooner, matters would have been very different.
The enemy must have five hundred men mounted and their Cavalry increases daily. It is impossible in this country to take horses out of their way, and the neglect of the inhabitants, dispersion of houses, and robberies of negroes, (should even the most vigorous measures have been taken by the Civil authority) would have yet put many horses into their hands. Under this cloud of light troops it is difficult to reconnoitre as well as counteract any rapid movements they choose to make. I have the honor to be with great respect, &c.
TO GENERAL GREENE,
(ORIGINAL.)
Allen's Creek, 22 miles from Richmond, Jane 18th, 1781.
SIR,--The enemy's position at Cooke's ford enabled them either to return to James River or to gain our northern communication. The arms and other precious stores arriving from Philadelphia, the importance of a junction with Gen. Wayne, and other strong reasons mentioned in my last, made it my first object to check the further progress of Lord Cornwallis. Some stores at the forks of James River were under the care of the major general, the Baron de Steuben, who had five hundred regulars of the Virginia new levies, and some militia.
Col. Tarlton's legion having pressed for Charlottesville, where the Assembly were sitting, was disappointed in his purpose by proper information being given them. One hundred and fifty arms, however, and a small quantity of powder fell into the enemy's hands.
A detachment under Col. Simcoe said to be four hundred dragoons and mounted infantry, proceeded to the point of Fork, of which the Baron de Steuben received notice. Both his men and stores were transported to the south branch when the Baron marched to Etaunton River. Simcoe threw over a few men which destroyed what stores had been left. He hazarded a great deal, but our loss was inconsiderable.
In the meantime the British army was moving to the point of Fork, with intention to strike our magazines at Albermarle old Court House. Our force was not equal to their defence, and a delay of our junction would have answered the views of the enemy. But on the arrival of the Pennsylvanians we made forced marches towards James River, and on our gaining the South Anna we found Lord Cornwallis encamped some miles below the point of Fork. A stolen march through a difficult road gave us a position upon Michunk Creek, between the enemy and our magazines, where, agreeable to appointment, we were joined by a body of riflemen. The next day Lord Cornwallis retired towards Richmond (where he now is) and was followed by our small army.
I have directed General Steuben to return this way and a junction will be formed as soon as his distance permits.
With the highest regard, &c., &c.
P. S. The following is an extract of a letter just now received from James Barron, Commodore, dated Warwick, 9 miles from Hampton, June 17th, 1781,
"At five o'clock this afternoon anchored in the road from sea, 35 sail of the enemies' vessels; viz: 24 ships, 10 brigs and one schooner, which I take to be the fleet that sailed from hence 13 days ago. Only 4 appear to have troops on board."
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Mr. Tyter's plantation, 20 miles from Williamsburg, 27th June, 1781.
SIR,--My letter of the 18th, informed you of the enemy's retrograde movement to Richmond, where they had made a stop. Our loss at the point of Fork chiefly consisted of old arms out of repair and some cannon, most of which have been since recovered.
On the 18th the British Army moved towards us with design as I apprehend to strike at a detached corps commanded by Gen. Muhlenberg, upon this the light Infantry and Pennsylvanians marched under Gen. Wayne when the enemy retired into town. The day following I was joined by Gen. Steuben's troops, and on the night of the 20th Richmond was evacuated. Having followed the enemy our light parties fell in with them near New Kent Court House, the army was still at a distance and Lord Cornwallis continued his route towards Williamsburg; his rear and right flank were covered by a large corps commanded by Col. Simcoe. I pushed forward a detachment under Col. Butler, but notwithstanding a fatiguing march the colonel reports that he could not have overtaken them, had not Major McPherson mounted 50 light infantry behind an equal number of dragoons, which coming up with the enemy charged them within six miles of Williamsburg; such of the advance corps as could arrive to their support, composed of riflemen under Major Call and Major Willis began a smart action. Inclosed is the return of our loss. That of the enemy is about 60 killed and 100 wounded, including several officers, a disproportion which the skill of our riflemen easily explains. I am under great obligations to Col. Butler and the officers and men of the detachment for their ardor in the pursuit and their conduct in the
## action. Gen. Wayne who had marched to the support of Butler, sent down
some troops under Major Hamilton. The whole British army came out to save Simcoe, and on the arrival of our army upon this ground returned to Winsburg. The post they occupy at present is strong and under protection of their shipping, but upwards of one hundred miles from the point of Fork.
I had the honor to communicate these movements to the executive of the state that the seat of government might be again re-established in the capital. Lord Cornwallis has received a reinforcement from Portsmouth.
With the greatest respect I have the honor to be.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Ambler's Plantation, opposite Jamestown, 8 July, 1781.
SIR,--On the 4th inst. the enemy evacuated Williamsburg where some stores fell into our hands, and retired to this place under the cannon of their shipping. Next morning we advanced to Bird's tavern, and a part of the army took post at Norrel's mill about nine miles from the British camp.
The 6th I detached an advanced corps under Gen. Wayne with a view of reconnoitering the enemy's situation. Their light parties being drawn in the pickets which lay close to their encampment were gallantly attacked by some riflemen whose skill was employed to great effect.
Having ascertained that Lord Cornwallis had sent off his baggage under a proper escort and posted his army in an opened field fortified by the shipping, I returned to the detachment which I found more generally engaged. A piece of cannon had been attempted by the van guard under Major Galvan whose conduct deserves high applause.--Upon this the whole British army came out and advanced to the thin wood occupied by General Wayne.--His corps chiefly composed of Pennsylvanians and some light infantry did not exceed eight hundred men with three field pieces. But notwithstanding their numbers, at sight of the British the troops ran to the rencontre. A short skirmish ensued with a close, warm, and well directed firing, but as the enemy's right and left of course greatly outflanked ours, I sent General Wayne orders to retire half a mile to where Col. Vose's and Col. Barber's light infantry battalions had arrived by a rapid move, and where I directed them to form. In this position they remained till some hours in the night. The militia under Gen. Lawson had been advanced, and the continentals were at Norrel's mill when the enemy retreated during the night to James Island, which they also evacuated, crossing over to the south side of the river. Their ground at this place and the island were successively occupied by General Muhlenberg. Many valuable horses were left on their retreat.
From every account the enemy's loss has been very great and much pains taken to conceal it. Their light infantry, the brigade of guards and two British regiments formed the first line, the remainder of the army the second; the cavalry were drawn up but did not charge.
By the inclosed return you will see what part of Gen. Wayne's detachment suffered most. The services rendered by the officers make me happy to think that altho' many were wounded we lost none. Most of the field officers had their horses killed, and the same accident to every horse of two field pieces made it impossible to move them, unless men had been sacrificed. But it is enough for the glory of Gen. Wayne and the officers and men he commanded to have attacked the whole British army with a reconnoitering party only, close to their encampment, and by this severe skirmish hastened their retreat over the river.--
Col. Bowyer of the riflemen is a prisoner.--
I have the honor to be, &e,
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Mrs. Ruffin's, August 20th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL--Independent of the answer to your letter of the 15th, I have been very particular in a second letter intrusted to Col. Moriss. But at this moment wish to send you minuted and repeated accounts of every thing that passes in this quarter.
The enemy have evacuated their forts at Troy, Kemp's Landing, Great Bridge, and Portsmouth. Their vessels with troops and baggage went round to York. Some cannon have been left spiked up at Portsmouth; but I have not yet received proper returns.
I have got some intelligences by the way of this servant I have once mentioned. A very sensible fellow was with him, and from him as well as deserters, I hear that they begin fortifying at York. They are even working by a windmill at which place I understand they will make a fort and a battery for the defence of the river. I have no doubt but that something will be done on the land side. The works at Gloster are finished; they consist of some redoubts across Gloster creek and a battery of 18 pieces beating the river.
The enemy have 60 sails of vessels into York river, the largest a 50 gun ship and two 36 frigates.--About seven other armed vessels, the remainder are transports, some of them still loaded and a part of them very small vessels. It appears they have in that number merchantmen, some of whom are Dutch prizes. The men of war are very thinly manned. On board the other vessels there are almost no sailors.
The British army had been sickly at Portsmouth, the air of York begins to refit them. The whole cavalry have crossed on the Gloster side yesterday evening, a movement of which I gave repeated accounts to the militia there; but the light infantry and main body of the militia are at this place, Gen. Wayne on the road to Westover, and we may form our junction in one day. I keep parties upon the enemy's lines. The works at Portsmouth are levelling. The moment I can get returns and plans l will send them to your Excellency. The evacuation of a post fortified with much care and great expense will convince the people abroad that the enemy cannot hold two places at once.--The Maryland troops were to have set out on Monday last. There is in this quarter an immense want of clothing of every sort, arms, ammunition, hospital stores, and horse accoutrements. Should a maritime superiority be expected, I would propose to have all those matters carried from Philadelphia to the head of Elk.
The numbers of the British army fit for duty I _at least_ would estimate at 4500, rank and file. Their sailors I cannot judge but by intelligences of the number of vessels. In a word this part affords the greatest number of regulars and the only active army to attack, which having had no place of defence must be less calculated for it than any garrison either at New York or in Carolina.
With the highest respect and most sincere affection, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Holt's Forge, September the 1st, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.--I am happy to inform your Excellency that Count de Grasse's fleet is safely arrived in this bay; it consists of 28 ships of the line with several frigates and convoys a considerable body of troops under Marquis de St. Simon.--Previous to their arrival such positions had been taken by our army as to prevent the enemy's retreating towards Carolina.
In consequence of your Excellency's orders I had the honor to open a correspondence with the French Generals, and measures have been taken for a junction of our troops.--
Lord Cornwallis is still on York river and is fortifying himself in a strong position.--
With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~[1]
Footnote:
1. See answer of Washington, Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 156.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp Williamsburg, Sept. 8th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.--Your letter of the 2d September is just come to hand. Mine of yesterday mentioned that the ships in York river had gone down. Inclosed is the account of an engagement off the capes. What disposition has been made for the internal protection of the bay, I do not know. James river is still guarded, but we have not as yet received any letter from Count de Grasse relative to his last movements. I hasten to communicate them as your Excellency will probably think it safer to keep the troops at the Head of Elks until Count de Grasse returns. Indeed, unless the greatest part of your force is brought here, a small addition can do but little more than we do effect. Lord Cornwallis will in a little time render himself very respectable.
I ardently wish your whole army may be soon brought down to operate.
We will make it our business to reconnoitre the enemy's works and give you on your arrival the best description of it that is in our power. I expect the governor this evening and will again urge the necessity of providing what you have recommended.
By a deserter from York I hear that two British frigates followed the French fleet and returned after they had seen them out of the capes. A spy says that two schooners supposed to be French have been seen coming up York river, but we have nothing so certain as to insure your voyage, tho' it is probable Count de Grasse will soon return.
I beg leave to request, my dear General, in your answer to the Marquis de St. Simon you will express your admiration at this celerity of their landing and your sense of their cheerfulness in submitting to the difficulties of the first moments. Indeed I would be happy something might also be said to Congress on the subject.
Your approbation of my conduct emboldens me to request that Gen. Lincoln will of course take command of the American part of your army; the division I will have under him may be composed of the troops which have gone through the fatigues and dangers of the Virginia campaign; this will be the greatest reward of the services I may have rendered, as I confess I have the strongest attachment to these troops.
With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letter of Washington, Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 157. A plan of operations in Virginia at p. 158.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Williamsburg, 10 Sept. 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Gourion is just arrived, he says you may be on your way. We hasten to send to the commanding naval officer in the bay. Hitherto I had no way to write to you by water, but Count de Grasse being at sea we request the officer he has left to have every precaution taken for the safety of navigation. It is probable they are taken, but I would have been too uneasy had I not added this measure to those that have been probably adopted.
I wrote several letters to you; the surprising speedy landing of the French troops under the Marquis de St. Simon; our junction at Williamsburg; the unremitted ardor of the enemy in fortifying at York; the sailing of Count de Grasse in pursuit of 16 sail of the line, of the British fleet, were the most principal objects. I added we were short of flour, might provide cattle enough. I took the liberty to advise James River as the best to land in, the particular spot referred to a more
## particular examination, the result of which we shall send tomorrow.
Excuse the haste that I am in, but the idea of your being in a cutter leaves me only the time to add that I am, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp before York, September 30th, 1781.
My Dear General--You have been so often pleased to ask I would give my opinion on any subject that may occur, that I will this day take the liberty to mention a few articles.
I am far from laughing at the idea of the enemy's making a retreat. It is not very probable, but it is not impossible, indeed they have no other way to escape; and since we cannot get ships at York I would be still more afraid of a retreat by West Point than any thing else. The French hussars remaining here, our dragoons and some infantry might be stationed somewhere near West Point, rather on the north side. I see the service is much done by details, and to use your permission would take the liberty to observe that when the siege is once begun it might be more agreeable to the officers and men to serve as much as possible by whole battalions. Col. Scamel is taken: his absence I had accounted for by his being officer of the day. I am very sorry we lose a valuable officer, but tho' Col. Scamel's being officer of the day has been a reason for his going in front, I think it would be well to prevent the officers under the rank of generals or field officers reconnoitering for the safety of their commands from advancing so near the enemy's lines.
There is a great disproportion between Huntington's and Hamilton's battalions. Now that Scamel is taken we might have them made equal and put the eldest of the two Lieutenant Colonels upon the right of the brigade.
I have these past days wished for an opportunity to speak with your Excellency on Count de Grasse's demand relative to Mr. de Barrass's fleet. This business being soon done, we may think of Charleston, at least of the harbor or of Savannah. I have long and seriously thought of this matter but would not be in a hurry to mention it until we knew how long this will last. However it might be possible to give Count de Grasse an early hint of it in case you agree with him upon the winterly departure of the whole fleet for the West Indies. One of my reasons to wish troops (tho' not in great number) to be sent to Glocester county by way of West Point is that for the first days it will embarrass any movement of the enemy up the river or up the country on either side, and when it is in Glocester county it may be thought advantageous by a respectable regular force to prevent the enemy's increasing their works there and giving us the trouble of a second operation, and in the same time it will keep from York a part of the British forces.
With the highest respect and most sincere affection I have the honor to be, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. For a "Plan of the Siege of Yorktown," see Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.8. p. 186.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
November 29th, 1781
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed you will find some numbers, a copy of which I have kept, and which contains some names that may probably occur in our correspondence. I need not tell you, my dear General, that I will be happy in giving you every intelligence in my power and reminding you of the most affectionate friend you can ever have.
The goodness you had to take upon yourself the communicating to the Virginia army the approbation of Congress appears much better to me than my writing to the scattered part of the body I had the honor to command. Give me leave, my dear General, to recall to your memory the peculiar situation of the troops who being already in Virginia were deprived of the month's pay given to the others. Should it be possible to do something for them it would give me great satisfaction.
I will have the honor to write to you from Boston, my dear General, and would be very sorry to think this is my last letter. Accept however once more the homage of the respect and of the affection that render me for ever--
LAFAYETTE.
APPENDIX I.
A SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781,
TO SERVE AS EXPLANATION TO THE MAP.
After the combat of MM. Destouches and Arbuthnot, the project on Portsmouth was abandoned: the French sailed for Rhode Island; the militia were dismissed, the regular troops proceeded to the north. Arnold was afterwards reinforced by Major-general Phillips, and the conquest of Virginia became the true object of the English during this campaign. The allied army, under the Generals Washington and Rochambeau, proceeded towards New York; that of General Greene attacked the posts which had been left in Carolina, both about five hundred miles from Richmond: Major-general the Marquis de Lafayette was charged with defending Virginia.
_April_ and _May_.--From preparations made at Portsmouth, he conceives that the capital was the proposed aim; a forced march of his corps from Baltimore to Richmond, about two hundred miles; he arrives in the evening of the 29th of April; the enemy had reached Osborn; the small corps of militia assemble in the night at Richmond; the next morning the enemy at Manchester, seeing themselves forestalled, re-embark at Bermuda Hundred, and re-descend James River.
The Americans at Bottom's Bridge, a detached corps in Williamsburg; General Phillips receives an _aviso_, and re-ascends the river, landing at Brandon; second reinforcement from New York; Lord Cornwallis, who was reported to have embarked at Charlestown, advances through North Carolina.
The Americans at Osborn, to establish a communication on James and Appomattox, are forestalled by the march of Phillips to Petersburg, the 10th, at Wilton; the 18th, canonading and reconnoitring, on Petersburg, which, by assembling on one point, the hostile parties permit a convoy to file off for Carolina; the 20th, at Richmond; junction of Lord Cornwallis with the troops of Petersburg; the great disproportion of the American corps, the impossibility of commanding the navigable rivers, and the necessity of keeping the important side of James River, do not allow any opposition.
Having sent a portion of the troops to Portsmouth, Lieutenant-general Lord Cornwallis selected for himself an army of about five thousand men, three hundred dragoons, and three hundred light horsemen; crosses to Westover. The Americans had only about three thousand men, formed of one thousand two hundred regulars, fifty dragoons, and two thousand militia. All the important forces had evacuated Richmond; our troops at Wintson's Bridge; a rapid march of the two corps, the enemies to engage an action, the Americans to avoid it, and retain the heights of the country with the communication of Philadelphia, which is equally necessary to our army and to the existence of that of Carolina.
_June_.--The magazines of Fredericksburg are evacuated; the Americans at Mattapony Church; the enemy at Chesterfield Tavern; heavy rains, which will render the Rapid Ann impassable; Lord Cornwallis marches to engage the front; our troops hasten their march, and repair to Racoon Ford, to await General Wayne, with a regular corps of Pennsylvanians.
Despairing of being able to engage in action, or cut off the communication between Wayne and Philadelphia, Lord Cornwallis changes his own purpose,and endeavours to defeat that of the Americans; he suddenly directs his movements against the great magazines of Albemarle Court House; a detachment of dragoons strives to carry off the Assembly of State at Charlottesville, but does not accomplish this end; another detachment bore upon Point-of-Fork, where General Steuben formed six or seven hundred recruits; he evacuated that point, and thought he ought to retire in the direction of Carolina; some objects of slight importance are destroyed. The passage of the Rapid Ann was necessary, to avoid being embarrassed by Lord Cornwallis; the communication with Philadelphia was indispensable. It was impossible to hope, even by fighting, to prevent the destruction of the magazines before the junction with the Pennsylvanians. Lafayette takes, therefore, the resolution of waiting for them, and, as soon as they arrive, regains the enemy with forced marches.
The 12th, the Americans at Boswell's Tavern; Lord Cornwallis has reached Elk Island. The common road, which it is necessary for him to cross to place himself above the enemy, passes at the head of Bird's Creek; Lord Cornwallis carries thither, his advance-guard, and expects to fall upon our rear; the Americans repair, during the night, a road but little known, and, concealing their march, take a position at Mechunck Creek, where, according to the orders given, they are joined by six hundred mountaineers. The English general, seeing the magazines covered, retires to Richmond, and is followed by our army.
Various manoeuvres of the two armies; the Americans are rejoined by General Steuben, with his recruits; their force then consists of two thousand regulars, and three thousand two hundred militia. Lord Cornwallis thinks he must evacuate Richmond; the 20th, the Marquis de Lafayette follows him, and retains a posture of defence, seeking to manoeuvre, and avoiding a battle. The enemy retires on Williamsburg, six miles from that town; their rear-guard is attacked in an advantageous manner by our advanced corps under Colonel Butler. Station taken by the Americans at one march from Williamsburg.
_July_.--Various movements, which end by the evacuation of Williamsburg; the enemy at Jamestown. Our army advances upon them; the 6th, a sharp conflict between the hostile army and our advance-guard under General Wayne, in front of Green Spring: two pieces of cannon remain in their hands; but their progress is arrested by a reinforcement of light infantry; the same night they retire upon James Island, afterwards to Cobham, on the other side of James River, and from thence to their works at Portsmouth.
Colonel Tarleton is detached into Amelia County; the generals Morgan and Wayne march to cut him off; he abandons his project, burns his wagons, and retires with precipitation. The enemy remaining in Portsmouth, the American army takes a healthy station upon Malvan Hill, and reposes after all its labour.
_August_.--The Americans refusing to descend in front of Portsmouth, a portion of the English army embarks and proceeds by water to Yorktown and Gloucester. General Lafayette takes a position at the Fork of Pamunkey and Mattapony River, having a detached corps upon both sides of York River. The Pennsylvanians and some new levies receive orders to remain on James River, and think them selves intended for Carolina. An assembly of militia on Moratie or Roanoke River; the fords and roads south of James River destroyed on various pretence; movements to occupy the attention of the enemy. As in the event prepared by Lafayette, the means of escape would remain to the garrison of Portsmouth, Lafayette threatened that point. General O'Hara thinks he ought to nail up thirty pieces of cannon, and join the largest part of the army. The whole was scarcely united, when the Count de Grasse appears at the entrance of Chesapeak Bay. General Wayne crosses the river, and places himself in such a manner as to arrest the enemy's march, if he should attempt to retreat towards Carolina. The French admiral is waited for at Cape Henry by an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, to report to him the respective situations of the land troops, and ask him to make the necessary movements to cut off all retreat to the enemy. He anchors at Cape Henry, sends three vessels to York River, and fills James River with frigates; the Marquis de Saint Simon, with three thousand men, lands at James Island or Jamestown.
_September_.--The river thus defended, General Wayne receives the order to cross it; the Marquis de Lafayette marches upon Williamsburg, and assembles together, in a good position, the combined troops, to the number of seven thousand three hundred men. He had left one thousand rive hundred militia in the county of Gloucester, and sends to hasten some troops coming from the north. This station, which closes all retreat to Lord Cornwallis, (our advance posts nine miles from York,) is retained from the 4th to the 28th of September. Lord Cornwallis reconnoitres the position of Lafayette, and despairs of forcing it.
The 6th September, the Count de Grasse, quitting the defended rivers, goes out with the remainder of his fleet, pursues Admiral Hood, who had presented himself, beats him, and sinks the _Terror_; he takes the _Iris_ and _Richmond_ frigates; the 13th, he joins, in the bay, the squadron of M. de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, with eight hundred men and the French artillery: the fleet of the Count de Grasse consists, at this period, of thirty eight ships of the line.
Admiral de Grasse and General Saint Simon, commanders of the French under Lafayette, urge him to attack Lord Cornwallis and offer him a reinforcement from the ship garrisons. He prefers acting on more secure grounds, and waiting for the troops from the north. General Washington succeeded in reality, in completely deceiving General Clinton as to his intentions; he was advancing towards Virginia with an American detachment, and the army of the Count de Rochambeau embarked at the head of the Chesapeak; they proceeded upon transports, to Williamsburg. The 28th, they march upon New York, and the combined army commences investing it; the 29th, reconnoitring the place; the 30th, the enemy evacuates the advance posts, and retires into the works of York.
_October_.--The 1st, a new reconnoitre; the 3rd, a skirmish between the legion of the Duke of Lauzun and that of Tarleton, in which the former gained the advantage. That legion and eight hundred men from the ships under M. de Choisy, had joined the militia at Gloucester. The night of the 6th, the trenches were opened; that of the 11th, the second parallel. The night of the 14th, the redoubts of the enemy's left were taken, sword in hand, the one by the grenadiers and French light horsemen, the other by the light infantrymen of the Americans. The first directed by the Baron de Viomenil, a field-marshal; the 2nd by the Marquis de Lafayette. The morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis asked to capitulate; that same evening the firing ceased. The English Army, reduced to eight thousand men, comprising 900 militia gave themselves as prisoners of war.
APPENDIX II.
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Havre, 18th July, 1779.
SIR,--You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As it is not a fixed plan which you require, nor a memorial addressed in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your wishes.
The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our assistance, both by sea and land. The smallest effort made now, would have more effect on the people than a great diversion at a more distant period; but besides the gratitude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed states, a body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent. In short, sir, without entering into tedious details, you know that my opinions on this point have never varied, and my knowledge of this country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to our own country.
Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to take Halifax; but as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we should then receive assistance, and, under pretext of invading Canada, we should endeavour to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the British navy in the new world.
Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to, I will diminish, as much as possible, the necessary number of troops. I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and chasseurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally, abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who can relinquish, for one year, the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect American.
I would ask, then, for four thousand three hundred men, and, as I am not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know that I shall not court the choice of the king. Although I have commanded, with some success, a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my own claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly, and as, setting talents apart, it is on the political conduct of the leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that half the success must depend, I am obliged, reluctantly, to set forth a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some basis.
Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix; troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~[1]
Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing batteries onshore; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen, but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of January;~[2] it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are assured that four or five weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.
The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be, first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island; secure to ourselves, till spring, a fine island and harbour, and have it in our power to open the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance. Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any one of the states, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should take them by surprise.
A few days before our departure, and not sooner (to prevent the consequences of an indiscretion), three corvettes should be despatched to America, with letters to M. de Luzerne, to congress, and to General Washington. We might write that the king, desiring to serve his allies, and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some vessels to America, and, with them, a body of land forces; and that, if congress is in want of their assistance, they will willingly lend their aid to General Washington, but otherwise they will proceed to the Islands: This form will be perfectly appropriate. On any part, I would write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters to congress, and to General Washington. To the latter I would say, confidentially, that we have almost a _carte blanche_, and unfold my plans, and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be reported at our departure that we are destined as a garrison to one of the Antilles, while the troops of these islands act on the offensive, and that, in the summer, we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in Canada.
The squadron sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem to threaten New York, and we should find, on our arrival, pilots for different destinations, and the necessary signals and counter signs.~[3] If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about during the night, land at Block Island, and lay siege to Newport.
There are some continental troops, who might reach Bristol in a day. There are militia at Tivertown, who might also be mustered. Greenwich having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot. To escape the inconveniences experienced the last year, the naval commander should send, without a moment's delay, two frigates, to occupy the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and as the enemy usually leave at Conanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If the wind should be favourable, the vessels might return the same night, or the end of the squadron might join them; all these manoeuvres, however, will depend on circumstances. Thus much is certain, that the same wind which brings us to land will enable us to make ourselves masters of the eastern channel, so as to assist the Americans at Bristol and Tivertown, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel; at all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I describe.~[4]
Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the shore that is behind the town offers great facilities for landing; it is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries. There the French troops might easily disembark, and, reaching at day-break the heights which command the town and the enemy's lines, might seize their outworks and storm all before there, protected, if necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded by these false attacks on both sides of the island, would suppose that the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manoeuvre appears, the more confident we may be of its success.
You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment; the details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only say here, that my thorough knowledge of the island leads me to think that, with the above mentioned number of troops, and a very slender co-operation on the part of America, I might pledge myself to gain possession of the island in a few days.~[5]
As soon as we are in possession of the island, we must write to the state of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national troops. Unless the state should prefer waiting for the opinion of General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries upon Goat Island, Brenton's Point and Conanicut Island, would render the passage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there, and would never attempt it in an unfavourable season. We should be supported by the country, and although it is said to be difficult to procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and should obtain more resources than the American army itself.
The same letter that announces to congress our success in Rhode Island, of which, as far as calculations may be relied on, there is little doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and inquire whether, our assistance is further needed. Their reply would open to new fields of service, and, with their consent, we would leave the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The bay of Chesapeak would then be free, and that state might bend its whole force against its western frontiers.~[6]
It is impossible to estimate here the posts which the British occupy in America. Georgia and Carolina appear to need our assistance, and the precise operation against Rhode Island must be decided on the spot; but to give a general idea, it is sufficient to say that the months of December and January should be employed at the south. As the English are obliged to station some of their vessels, frigates, merchant ships, or transports, in each of their ports, they would amount in the whole to a considerable loss.
In the month of February we would return to Newport, where we might employ ourselves in interchanges with New York; and the French sailors, exchanged for soldiers, might be sent under a flag of truce to M. d'Orvillers. Political interests might be treated of with congress, and the commander of the detachment go to Philadelphia to make arrangements with the minister plenipotentiary for the next campaign, and to lay some proposals before congress and General Washington. I should propose sending for deputies from the different savage nations, making them presents, endeavouring to gain them over from the side of the English, and to revive in their hearts that ancient love of the French nation which, at some future day, it may be important for us to possess.
It is needless to say here, that if we should wait until the month of October, the season would be too far advanced to think of Rhode Island, but the southern operations would be equally practicable, and their success more certain, as we should take the enemy by surprise.
In that case, instead of proceeding to Newport, we should winter at Boston, where we should be well received, and provided with every accommodation. We could open the campaign when we pleased, and might make preparations beforehand for a great expedition against Rhode Island, procuring, at the same time, from the inhabitants of the ports of the north of Boston, and especially that of Marble Head, all the information they may have acquired about Halifax.
But let us suppose ourselves established at Newport. The campaign opens by the close of April, and the British will be in no haste to quit New York. The fear of leaving himself unprotected on our side will prevent his executing any design against the forts on the North River. It may even be in our power to assist General Washington in making an attack on New York. Count d'Estaing, before his departure, thought that he had discovered the possibility of a passage through the Sound. This question I leave to naval officers; but, without being one myself, I know that Long Island might be captured, the troops driven off, and, whilst General Washington made a diversion on his side, batteries might be erected that would greatly annoy the garrison of New York. At all events, preparations should be made to act against Halifax in the month of June. With the claims which the other expedition would give us, I will pledge myself that we should be assisted in this by the Americans. I could find at Boston, and in the northern parts, trust-worthy persons who could go to Halifax for us, and procure all the necessary information; the town of Marble Head, in particular, would furnish us with excellent pilots. The inhabitants of the north of New Hampshire and Cascobay should be assembled under the command of their general, Stark, who gained the victory at Bennington, ready to march, if circumstances require it, by the route of Annapolis. The country is said to be inhabited by subjects ill affected to British government; ~[7] some of them have entered into a correspondence with the Americans, and have given assurances that they will form a party in our favour.
With regard to ourselves, I suppose that we sail the 1st of June, and that we are accompanied by some continental frigates, and such private vessels as might be collected in Boston. Congress would undoubtedly furnish us with as many troops as we should require, and those very brigades which lately belonged to my division, and whose sole object at present is to keep the enemy at Rhode Island in check, having no longer any employment, would be able to join us without impairing the main army. They would come the more willingly, as the greater part of the regiments belonging to the northern part of New England would be averse to crossing the Hudson River, and would prefer a service more advantageous to their own country.~[8] We should find at Boston cannon and mortars. Others, if necessary, might be sent from Springfield, and the corps of American artillery is tolerably good.
The enemy would suspect our designs the less, as their ideas run wholly upon an invasion of Canada; the movements of the militia in the north would be considered as a plan for uniting with us at Sorel, near the River St. Francis, as we ascended the St. Lawrence: this opinion, which, with a little address, might be strengthened, would awaken apprehensions and excite disturbances at Quebec;~[9] and if a vessel of war should by chance be at Halifax ready for sea, they would probably despatch it to the threatened colony.
I have never seen the town of Halifax, but those persons who, before the war, were in the English service, and had spent most of the time in garrison, inform me that the great point is, to force to the right and left the passage of George's Island, and that a landing might be effected without difficulty, either on the side towards the eastern battery, in order to seize that battery and Fort Sackville, or, which appears to be a shorter way, on the side towards the town. The northern suburb, where the magazines are, is but slightly defended. The basin, where vessels are repaired, might also be secured. Several officers, worthy of confidence, have assured me, that Halifax is built in the form as of an amphitheatre; that all the houses might be cannonaded by the vessels that had forced the passage, and in that case, the town would compel the garrison to surrender. As the troops might destroy all the works on the shore, and the vessels of war easily carry the batteries on the islands, I am well persuaded, and the accounts of all who have been there convince me still more, that Halifax would be unable to withstand the united power of our forces and those of America.~[10]
The idea of a revolution in Canada is gratifying to all good Frenchmen; and if political considerations condemn it, you will perceive that this is to be done only by suppressing every impulse of feeling. The advantages and disadvantages of this scheme demand a full discussion, into which I will not at present enter. Is it better to leave in the neighbourhood of the Americans an English colony, the constant source of fear and jealousy, or to free our oppressed brethren, recover the fur trade, our intercourse with the Indians, and the profit of our ancient establishments, with out the expenses and losses formerly attending them? Shall we throw into the balance of the new world a fourteenth state, which would be always attached to us, and which, by its situation, would give us a superiority in the troubles that may, at some future day, agitate America? Opinions are very much divided on this topic. I know yours, and my own is not unknown to you; I do not, therefore, dwell on it, and consider it in no other light than as a means of deceiving and embarrassing the enemy. If, however, it should at any time be brought under consideration, it would be necessary to prepare the people beforehand; and the knowledge which I was obliged to obtain when a whole army was about to enter that country has enabled me to form some idea of the means of succeeding there But to return to Nova Scotia: part of the American troops, who will accompany us, and such of the inhabitants as take up arms in our favour, might be left there as a garrison. It would be easy to destroy or take possession of the English establishments on the banks of Newfoundland, and after this movement we should direct our course according to circumstances. Supposing that we could return to Boston or Rhode Island during the month of September, and that New York had not yet been taken, we might still be enabled to assist General Washington. Otherwise St. Augustine, the Bermudas, or some other favourable points of attack, might engage our attention; on the other hand, if we should be ordered home, we might reach France in three weeks or a month from the banks of Newfoundland, and alarm the coasts of Ireland on our way.
If the September plan, which combines all advantages, appears too near at hand, if it were decided even not to send us in October, it would be necessary to delay our departure until the end of January. In this case, as in the former, we should be preceded fifteen days only by corvettes; we should pass the month of April in the south, attack Rhode Island to May, and arrive at Halifax the last of June. But you are aware that the autumn is, on many accounts, the most favourable time for our departure; at all events, you will not accuse me of favouring this opinion from interested motives, as a winter at Boston or Newport is far from equivalent to one spent at Paris.~[11]
These views, in obedience to your request, I have the honour to submit to your judgment; I do not affect to give them the form of a regular plan, but you will weigh the different schemes according to circumstances. I trust that you will receive these remarks with the greater indulgence, as my American papers, those respecting Halifax excepted, are at Paris, and, consequently, almost all my references are made from memory; beside, I did not wish to annoy you with details too long for a letter, and if you are desirous to converse more freely on the subject, the impossibility of leaving the port of Havre, at present, will allow me time to spend three days at Versailles.
I am thoroughly convinced, and I cannot, without violating my conscience, forbear repeating, that it is highly important for us to send a body to America. If the United States should object to it, I think it is our duty to remove their objections, and even to suggest reasons for it. But on this head you will be anticipated, and Dr. Franklin is only waiting a favorable occasion to make the propositions. Even if the operations of the present campaign, with the efforts of Count d'Estaing or some other fortunate accident should have given affairs a favorable turn, there will be a sufficient field for us, and one alone of the, proposed advantages would repay the trouble of sending the detachment.
A very important point, and one on which I feel obliged to lay the greatest stress, is the necessity of perfect and inviolable secrecy. It is unnecessary to trust any person, and even the men who are most
## actively employed in fitting out the detachment and the vessel need not
be informed of the precise intentions of government. At farthest, the secret should be confided to the naval commander, and to the leader of the land forces, and not even to them before the last moment.
It will certainly be said that the French will be coldly received in that country, and regarded with a jealous eye in their army. I cannot deny that the Americans are difficult to be dealt with, especially by the Frenchmen; but if I were intrusted with the business, or if the commander chosen by the king, acts with tolerable judgment, I would pledge my life that all difficulties would be avoided, and that the French troops would be cordially received.
For my own part, you know my sentiments, and you will never doubt that my first interest is to serve my country. I hope, for the sake of the public good, that you will send troops to America. I shall be considered too young, I presume, to take the command, but I shall surely be employed. If, in the arrangement of this plan, any one, to whom my sentiments are less known than to yourself, in proposing for me either the command or some inferior commission, should assign as a reason, that I should thereby be induced to serve my country with more zeal either in council or in action, I took the liberty (putting aside the minister of the king) to request M. de Vergennes to come forward as my friend, and to refuse, in my name, favors bestowed from motives so inconsistent with my character.
I have the honor to be, &c.
LAFAYETTE.
Footnotes:
1. I hear that you have, at Lorient, three vessels of the India company, of forty guns and eight hundred tons. These caracks, if I recollect rightly, are fifty-gun ships, of nine hundred and sixty tons all number of vessels would be sufficient; they might soon be got ready, and their force would diminish the required escort. As for frigates, you will find in readiness, at Lorient, the _Alliance_, the _Pallas_, and others. However, if you are determined to employ the vessels which are fitted out, in the expedition against England, it would be necessary to take ours from St. Malo in preference. (Note from M. de Lafayette.)
2. Virginia and Carolina would be the scene of our operations during the months of December and January, and we should pass the remainder of the winter at Boston. I greatly prefer this project to waiting until the last of January.
3. To deceive the enemy, pilots might be assembled from different parts, under pretence of sending them to the Islands, at the request of the French. This business, as well as the preparations and signals, might be entrusted to a lieutenant-colonel of the royal corps of engineers, an officer of great merit at the head of the American corps of engineers, who, under cover of working to the fortifications of the Delaware, might remain near Sandy Hook.
4. The frigates or vessels necessary to protect the landing, either real or pretended, of the Americans, should anchor in those channels. The enemy would then be obliged either to disperse among the forts, and thereby to weaken their lines, or else to leave the field open to the Americans, who, by a diversion upon the lines, would force the enemy to have them fully manned, and prevent them attending to their rear.
5. It is necessary, however, to consider all the unfortunate contingencies that may occur. If the expedition to Rhode Island should be prevented, or if it should not succeed, or if nothing can be attempted at New York, we ought then to proceed on our expeditions against Virginia, or Georgia, or Carolina, and winter afterwards at Boston, leaving Rhode Island to the next season, as proposed in our plan of sailing in the month of October.
6. If the capture of the Bermudas, or some expedition of the kind, should be considered necessary, the rest of the winter might be employed in carrying it into effect.
7. The last time I was at Boston, I saw there a respectable man, a member of the council in Nova Scotia, who had secretly entered into the service of General Gates, and who assured us of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants.
8. General Gates, who is popular in New England, and perfectly acquainted with Halifax, has often proposed to make an expedition, in concert, against that town, with French and American troops combined.
9. In the present harassed state of the English, I doubt if they will have in port any vessel capable of joining the squadron.
10. I have not made any allowance for the diversion in the north, of which, however, I feel certain, and if the troops should not go to Annapolis, would, at least, compel a part of the British garrison, and such of the inhabitants as adhered to the royal party, to remain in the fort.
11. Fifteen hundred or two thousand select troops thrown into America might aid General Washington, and enable him to act on the offensive, by supplying him with good heads to his columns, and by uniting the French with an American division for combined operations. This plan would be of some use, but it appeared to me that you wished for one offering results of greater importance.