Part 8
Mathematics is only possible where there are identities. These, however, are to be found only in the realm of ultimate values. Actuality has no identities. Where there are nothing but combustion processes, there each moment of existence is a thing unique that never before has been and never again will be.
Whoso has comprehended the play of world-events after the manner of the Buddha, to such an one it becomes ever more clear that science, with her pretensions to furnish us at some future date with a genuine world-conception, resembles that penniless wag who affixed a notice outside his door bearing the inscription: “To-morrow I will pay my debts.” Science, to the question as to when she finally means to pay what she owes to humanity, a genuine world-conception, has always but this _one_ answer, “To-morrow!”
Science might easily obtain a clear idea of her own nature if only she would venture to think out to a conclusion her own trains of thought.
The nature of every scientific world-conception consists in comprehending the play of world-events in its entirety, without residue, as relation values. Herewith she remains stuck fast in what may be called conclusionless comprehension. The Buddha explains this fact in the manner already shown; science confronts this fact all uncomprehending of its import, and therefore with some show of justification can argue in this strain:--
“We are undoubtedly making progress in comprehension, as is shown by our increasing capacity for determination in advance. Hence we are justified in presuming the final link in our train of thought--the entire play of world-events as a summation of pure relation values--and in building up for ourselves already the world-conception which we are sure to reach in practice some time in the future.”
This is the world-conception which modern physics calls her cosmogony of energetics--that is, that ideal world which is wholly subject to the law of the conservation of energy, and thus is conceived of as consisting entirely of reversible processes not dependent upon time.
Of course, the more discerning among modern physicists now clearly perceive that the law of the conservation of energy merely represents from the limited standpoint of physics a _reading_ of the play of world-events. If one forgets that, if one attempts to make it cover actual processes, tries to work it up into a world-theory, then not only does the real nature of the law of the conservation of energy come to light, but also the real nature of the whole of science. For--
The law of the conservation of energy has sense and meaning only in a closed system. In this fact alone its purely hypothetical nature already stands revealed; for never under any conditions whatsoever can actuality have a closed system. Thus at the very outset one has to make a compromise with actuality, a proceeding that is justified only where it is a question of achieving some practical result.
If now one makes the law of the conservation of energy into a universal law and on this erects a world-theory, one is bound to posit the universe itself as a closed system; otherwise, to speak of a universe in which the sum of all existent energies remains constant were altogether meaningless.
With this, however, science puts herself in such a position that, so soon as she ventures to think things out to a conclusion, she robs herself of the possibility of her own existence, as the following considerations will make evident.
A universe such as this, consisting entirely of relation values without residue, would be one huge process of compensation, an endlessly diversified fall from positions of higher to positions of lower tension. It is just this mode of representation which makes it possible for the physicist to calculate, to determine in advance. He cannot set about this his work at all until first after such a fashion he has given a new interpretation to the play of world-events. He must also, in similar wise, mechanise the invisible matter of the molecules, before he can master, so far as calculation goes, what takes place internally. In thought, one must loosen the existing connection between the molecules in order to be able to establish the internal falls. It is here as it is in a minuet: one takes a step backward in order to be able to take a step forward!
But this is what the physicist dares to do. All he is concerned about is to calculate, measure, determine in advance. As a general rule he not only says, “_Après nous le déluge_,” but also “_Avant nous le déluge_.” He rejoices in his power of being able to interpret and make use of the re-actual play of world-events to suit his own ends, and for the rest does not care a straw whence this power comes or whither in the future it may go. _He does not think: he only works._
Now, so long as he preserves as physicist an attitude of strict impartiality towards this universe, the attitude of simple spectator, he may reach by calculation, by technique, whatever so is reachable. He stands before his universe as before an open piece of clock-work in which with increasing accuracy he observes the style and manner of its running and formulates the laws of the same. If, however, he allows himself to be led away into working at a world-view, into putting the question “Where will this clock-work run to?” he cuts the ground from under his own feet.
For in such a universe there remains as actuating impulsion nothing but the distinctions given with the separate processes. It is just like a pendulum ever hastening on towards a condition of rest.
Now, since under the assumption in question--a universe as a closed system--an influx of force from without is excluded, what we have here is a process of mutual borrowing, so to speak, and cosmic bankruptcy is only a question of time.
This logical necessity is taken account of by science in her entropy concept--the concept of the whole universe as a process hastening towards equilibrium, though that consummation be distant by millions of years.
Therewith, however--presuming that she is honest--science stands confronted by the following question:--
Every difference of tension demands a something that has established this difference. Where there is a swinging pendulum it must originally have received a push. If, however, the entire universe is one single mass of differences in tension, the impelling force can only lie outside the universe. In other words: this force could only have been the finger of a god. He it was, the Father-god, who put all his capital of force into this universe, upon which capital everything now feeds and will continue to feed until at length all is consumed, and the great world-death comes which “He” alone again can bid depart in communicating a fresh impulsion of motion--_if He should happen to feel so disposed_.
Of course science does not say, “Energy disappears.” Instead she says, “Energy only becomes inert; _as such_, however, remains conserved.” This, however, is about as sensible as if one should say, “Heat does not disappear, it only becomes cold; _as such_, however, it remains conserved”--an absurdity rightly denounced by thinking minds among physicists, such as E. Mach, for example.
And the conclusion of the whole matter?
The colossal achievements of science upon which is erected her cosmogony of energetics, have served no other purpose but to look after those interests of faith which faith itself dare not look after if it wishes to retain its vitality. In her audacious attempt to make light of the “imperceptible in itself,” the god-idea, as a mere rudiment of atavism, science has made a pitiable shipwreck. By such an attempt she only shows that she herself is an apostate from the god-idea; and to be honourable, nothing is left her but to return as contrite vassal to the ancient and sovereign race of those that are “of Jehovah.”
Should she, however, attempt to interpret the play of world-events not as a fall, but try instead to interpolate forces, then of necessity she must resort to the hypothesis of central forces; and, as above she plays into the hands of the extra-cosmic deity of monotheism, so here she plays into the hands of the intra-cosmic deity of pantheism; for this central force, if really believed in and not a mere working hypothesis, would be nothing else but the world-spirit of pantheism translated into physical terms.
These two, faith and science, at their deepest roots, share in one common nature, since both in truth represent that grandest form of symbiosis in which is made manifest the instinct of self-preservation on the part of the universe--the universe considered as the totality of all living beings. When faith thinks things out it falls back into the lap of science. When science thinks things out it falls back into the lap of faith. And both by their simple existence demonstrate the truth of the Buddha-teaching that all mental life perforce operates under the encumbrance of ignorance. For let science, or rather the scientist in person, place himself, if only temporarily and for a specific purpose, at the artificial standpoint of the mechanistic world-view, and so soon as he really begins to think he gives the lie to his own scientific view, inasmuch as he everywhere works with the concept of identity. Nay, he is never even in a position to maintain a clear distinction between the two points of view. This is proven by the problems of science, which, without exception, are of a purely dialectical nature, inasmuch as they all presuppose the erroneous concept of things as _identities_.
Our task here is to throw the light of the Buddha-thought upon these problems, and to this task we now proceed to address ourselves.
VII
BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS
Were one to lay the Kamma teaching of the Buddha before a physicist, in all likelihood he would dismiss it with this objection:--
“Immediate passing over that cannot be put to the proof in space and time is telekinesis. Telekinesis is a fact only for faith. Accordingly, Buddhism too, like every other religion, is a religion of faith.”
The scientifically-educated man would probably concur in this train of thought. Hence, if Buddhism is to have any prospect whatever of playing a part in our intellectual life, it must offer a reply to such a line of argument.
That reply would run somewhat as follows:--
Actuality, when, where, and howsoever it makes itself manifest, really means nothing more than this--action is present. For actuality is
## action, doing, the power to do itself. It tells us, however, nothing at
all as to how this action is bound to take place. Whence comes it then that science has the presumption to dictate to actuality a definite kind of action--would have it, so to speak, run along fixed rails?
The one-sided requirement of science that all action must be mediate, demonstrable in space and time, follows perforce from the position she takes up towards nature.
Science is only possible where there is the perceptible to sense--where there is what can be compared.
Comparison is only possible where things are so arranged that the actual energies can be neglected. For every energy is something unique, strictly individual, not comparable, as my consciousness immediately proves to me.
This leaving out of account of the actual energies is only possible in the world of reactions. Here it is possible, and therefore also legitimate, to regard any kind of process as a something constant and complete, as a product, and correspondingly to treat it as such. Every physicist knows that the grocer’s pound weight, as well as the grain of his own scales, rigorously tested, to-morrow are no longer the same as they were to-day. Nevertheless we make a compromise with actuality and act as though they were the same. It suffices for all practical purposes, and so is permissible. Here one is not at all aiming at a world-theory; one only seeks to measure and weigh, and satisfy certain needs.
This compromise with actuality--the looking upon things as finished, completed--is forced upon us by the idea of identity, with which all mental life, without exception, operates. And the physicist accommodates himself to this idea with his concept of “body.”
Body, in the physical acceptation of the word, is nowhere to be found in actuality; none the less the physicist is justified in making use of this idea so long as, in the pursuit of his aims, he can do so with advantage--that is, so long as it is a question of measuring and determining in advance.
The re-actual point of view of science involves as logical correlate the merging in one, of “motion” as manifesting itself to sense, and “energy.” Aught else corresponding to energy besides motion itself is not to be found in the re-actual world of the physicist. Here motion is energy itself.
Under these two preliminary conditions--the regarding of things as “bodies,” and their motions as energies themselves--the play of world-events displays itself in its entirety to perception by the senses; and every effect is something mediate, possible of being followed up in space and time.
But the movements that are perceptible to sense are just as little the energies themselves as “bodies,” in the physical acceptation of the word, are actuality.
The sensible motion is not the energy; it is only the evidence that energies are present.
When two electro-magnets, placed in a certain position with reference to each other, go through circular movements, this does not mean that these circular movements are the energies themselves; it only means that energies are there present, and of themselves prove themselves such by producing effects.
When a geyser discharges water every hour, it does not mean that this kind of action is energy itself; it means nothing more than that energies _are there present_, and as such are at work.
The earth’s course round the sun does not represent energy itself; it means nothing more than that energies are there present, and as such are at work.
_Motion is not energy itself, but the by-product yielded by two systems of energies acting on each other._ This by-product will manifest itself, according to circumstances and antecedent conditions, at one time as circular, at another time as elliptical, at another as rhythmical motion, and so forth.
In its essential nature this by-product--the movement perceptible to sense--corresponds wholly and completely to a shadow. As a shadow means nothing save that light is present--it is nothing but the by-product of two systems of energies, one giving, the other receiving, light--so “movement” means nothing save that energy is there present. It is nothing but the by-product of two systems of energies.
It is absolutely essential that the genuine thinker should make this idea as to the intrinsic nature of all motion his own. As little as it is possible ever to draw from shadows any conclusion as to light itself--saving the one conclusion that it _must be present_--just as little is it possible ever to draw from movements any conclusion as to the energies themselves, saving only that they must be present. The energies themselves withal remain wholly inaccessible. As to whether these are transmitted mediately or immediately, the fact “movement” supplies no information whatever.
Here the physicist will say, “That the movements are transmitted mediately is proved to me by experiment, since I can intercept an energy on its way at as many intermediate stations as I choose; hence, as mediate, can track its path.”
But this is a grossly erroneous conclusion.
To be sure, if I have a magnet here and a needle there, I can intercept the magnetic energy at as many intermediate stations as I choose, and so construct for myself a “path” for the energy. But such a “path” is nothing but a dead line artificially made up of momentary reactions whose continuity is nothing actual and vital, but founded solely upon the minuteness and multiplicity of the moments of section.
Again the physicist may object:--
“We can measure exactly the speed with which the energies propagate themselves, as, for example, the time required for light to reach us from the moons of Jupiter.”
But this also is an erroneous conclusion.
Of course, the fact itself is beyond dispute. But the time here mentioned does not represent the transmission-speed of the energies themselves; it only informs us as to how much delay these have encountered on their way; whether the halting-places have been very numerous and the stay at each a long one. This time which the physicist measures does not give the speed of transmission of the energies, but only the time of their non-transmission.
In accord with this is the incorrectness of ordinary physical terminology. The physicist calls light, heat, and so forth, energies themselves. But light is not energy itself, but only a designation for energies that lie for ever beyond our reach.
But once more I would call attention to the fact that this entire manner of conceiving of things as “bodies,” and of movements as energies themselves, is quite legitimate on the part of the physicist so long as he remains a physicist. It only becomes illegitimate when, reaching out beyond the field of reactions, it seeks to get itself recognized as a world-theory--that is, when it would have actual processes “read” in accordance with the like scheme. For now there follows the claim one makes upon nature that all her action shall manifest itself mediately, as possible of being followed up in time and space.
The illegitimate feature about this conception arises from the fact that it poses itself with an insoluble problem--the problem of telekinesis.
If one regards things as “bodies” in the physical sense, and if upon this conception one insists on erecting a world-theory, then one has to solve the question: How can it ever be possible for action to take place between separate bodies?--a question which involves the idea that every effect produced by contact, even the very slightest, always presents itself to thought as a form of telekinesis. In other words: Everywhere effects are being produced, and yet one is unable to explain how they can ever be brought about.
The insolubility of this problem is attributable not to things but to thinking; that is to say, it is a problem of a purely dialectical nature.
In starting out from the conception “body” as a thing complete in itself, identical with itself, one cuts oneself off from the possibility of ever being able to explain how one thing can act upon another. In thought one has torn things out of their natural connection, and holds them fast conceptually in this artificial isolation. Once I make a thing a “body,” no power in the world can move it so as to bring it into contact with some other thing; as little so as any power in the world can impart movement to a reflected image, taken by itself. Just as such movement can only be brought about through movement of the object reflected, only from this can proceed, so contact between things can only take place, proceeding forth from the beholder, when he lets drop his false notions and comprehends actuality unmodified as that which it is--namely, _perpetual coming together into contact itself_. Actuality is verily nothing but the passing over from thing to thing--that is to say, process. Actuality is not, as science would fain have us believe, mere _possibility_--if so, it would always be necessary first to have explained how these possibilities could ever arrive at realization--but actuality is a _potency_, and so, at every moment of existence, self-realization itself.
If only actuality is rightly conceived of, the question as to how
## action betwixt thing and thing can take place simply loses all meaning.
Actuality is seen to be nothing but this action itself. Where one is, thither one cannot go; and what one is, that none can become.
When physics, and with it science as a whole, puts forward the claim that all action must be capable of being tracked mediately in space and time, it excludes itself from this requirement. For, without exception, every case of action in its own domain is to be read as a special instance of telekinesis. But be it well noted, the concepts, action by contact and telekinesis, are not something existent in themselves; they are merely intellectually-conceived functions of the purely artificial concept “body.” Where this concept is absent, there is neither action by contact nor yet telekinesis; there the whole universe, as a totality of combustion-processes, is action itself, but tells us nothing whatever as to how action can come about, or as to whether this action is mediate or immediate.
_How_ action proceeds can never be comprehended from the observation of reactions, though one should track these with never so much perseverance and accuracy; that can only be ascertained where one is acquainted with the energies themselves.
In all the world there is but _one single_ energy that is open to approach--my own _in-force_ which _becomes_ perceptible to me in consciousness. Thus the question as to how action itself proceeds can never be answered on the lines of induction: it can only be _experienced_.
When one asks the Theras of Ceylon for an illustration of how Kamma passes over from one existence to the new location, the example of teacher and pupil is that most frequently given. As instruction, stimulation, pass over from teacher to pupil, with effects that last throughout the latter’s entire lifetime, even so does Kamma pass over.
And just here we come upon something that lies too close at hand for the ordinary person to give much heed to it. Nothing is more strange to us than actuality--that is, than we ourselves!
As a matter of fact, life in its entirety, as it runs its course among human beings, is such an instance of immediate effectuation. All actuality is immediate: it is only _re-actuality_ that is mediate. Wherever I actually am alive, I stand in the midst of such immediate effectuations as mock at all scientific calculations.
When two pairs of eyes encounter one another and that springs up which we call love or hate, as the case may be, this is an instance of immediate passing over between two systems of energies. All forms of mental excitement, all our numberless sympathies and antipathies; the mutual understanding between man and man, between man and animal; the unspoken self-revelation, self-discovery between man and wife; the communion between mother and child;--all these are immediate effectuations. Each possibility of one giving an order to another, of one obeying another; all possibility of life in communities, animal or human; every possibility of education, has its roots in such immediate effectuations. But the very attempt to enumerate them tends to beget the fallacious idea that they are the exceptions. It is not so! All beings communicate with one another immediately. In immediate effectuations we live, move, and have our being. But through the re-actual apprehension of things inculcated by science our sense of actuality has become so dwarfed and stunted that we no longer dare to take actuality as itself; nay, we do not even know how to do so, but are disposed to recognize it as such only when we can have it handed us by some system of grains, feet, and seconds.