Chapter XXVI

, fourteen tanks were brought forward, and of these twelve came into action and captured Villers-Bretonneux, a point of great tactical importance; a counter-attack carried out by the Australian Corps and a few British tanks, however, restored the situation.

A month later a few tanks were used by the Germans against the French on the opening day of the great Aisne offensive, namely May 27. None of these machines, however, succeeded in passing a large trench in the second defensive system known as Dardanelles trench.

On June 1, fifteen operated with little success in the Reims sector, eight being left derelict in the French lines. Similar unsuccessful operations were carried out on June 9 and July 15.

On August 31, three German tanks approached our lines east of Bapaume; two were knocked out by our guns and eventually captured.

On October 8, some fifteen captured British machines were used against us in the Cambrai sector. Of this action the German account states that these tanks were employed defensively to fill up a gap in their line; whether this was so or not, they undoubtedly produced a demoralising effect amongst our own men, equilibrium only being re-established when two of them were put out of action. Three days later, on the 11th, a few tanks were used at St. Aubert; this was the last recorded occasion upon which the Germans made use of tanks in the Great War.

Indifferent as were the German tank tactics as compared with our own, one fact was most striking, this being that the British infantry no more than the German would or could withstand a tank attack. The reason for this is a simple one, namely, inability to do so. So pronounced was this feeling of helplessness that when, during our own retirement in March 1918, rumours were afloat that German tanks were approaching, our men in several sectors of the line broke and fell back. During the German retirement a few months later on we find exactly the same lowering of moral by self-suggested fear, fear based on the inability to overcome the danger. This moral effect produced by the tank was appreciated by the Germans, for in a note issued by the XVIIth German Army we find:

“Our own tanks strengthen the moral of the infantry to a tremendous extent, even if employed only in small numbers, and experience has shown that they have a considerable demoralising effect on the hostile infantry.”

##