Part 10

Hannibal, however, started in autumn, and marched along the Adriatic through the Abruzzi, the country of the Marrucinians and Pelignians. Here Fabius withstood him, and tried to cut off his supplies, in which he also partly succeeded. But Hannibal, when hard pressed, eluded his vigilance, and quietly breaking up his camp, appeared all at once in Campania. It was his design to make himself master of Casinum and the Latin road, and by confining the communication between Rome and Campania to the Appian road alone, to try and see whether the Italians would declare for him. Here we may see an example of the disadvantage of the want of maps, although on the whole it is wonderful how well they managed in ancient times without them. Hannibal meant to give the order to lead the army to Casinum; but the guide, either misunderstanding him, or from downright dishonesty, led him through Upper Samnium, along the banks of the Vulturnus, down to Casilinum; and here Hannibal perceived that he was in quite a different neighbourhood from where he had wished to be. In the meanwhile, Fabius had been beforehand with him, and had left the Latin road, and strongly posted himself in Samnium. Hannibal, after having visited the country of the Falernians and Campania with devastation, and made an immense booty, owing to which the men of rank at Rome were already sufferers, now wanted to begin his retreat through Samnium to Apulia, a very mild, sunny district, where he meant to take up his winter-quarters, and to establish a communication with Tarentum and other towns of lower Italy, and also with the king of Macedon. Here Fabius cut off his retreat near Mount Callicula, blocking up with his troops the Caudine road, while another body of Romans beset the passes of Casinum, which led to Rome. Then Hannibal availed himself of his famous stratagem: he had encamped near the mountains which Fabius occupied. Livy’s account of this stratagem makes out rather a silly story for the Romans. He says that Hannibal tied faggots to the horns of oxen, and setting these on fire, had them driven up into the mountains between the Roman posts; and that on this, the Romans, believing them to be spectres, had betaken themselves to flight. But the real truth is what Polybius tells. Nothing was more common among the ancients than to march by torch light. Now, when the Romans saw lights between their stations in the space which was left unoccupied, they thought that the Carthaginians were breaking through; and they quickly made for what they supposed to be the endangered spot, that they might stop their further progress. In the meanwhile, the rest of the Carthaginians had advanced close to the defiles, and had stormed the abandoned posts; and thus the whole of the army got off without any loss: the Roman camp was burnt. Hannibal encamped on the borders between Apulia and the country of the Frentanians. Fabius followed him; and here the Master of the Horse, Minucius, in Fabius’ absence, and contrary to his orders, engaged in a successful battle with Hannibal. This raised the pride of the Romans so much, that they took it into their heads, that all their former mishaps had only befallen them by chance, and that now they were able to make up for it all; and Minucius got an equal command with Fabius. Hannibal enticed him out, and gave him such a defeat, that he would have been annihilated, had not Fabius and a faithful band of Samnites come up at the very nick of time. Fabius brought the campaign to an honourable conclusion, as he did not lose anything against Hannibal, and not to lose anything, was a great deal indeed. Minucius resigned his power. Hannibal passed the winter in a state of actual distress: he was badly off for provisions, and as yet, not a single people had declared for him.

In the year 536, L. Æmilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro were consuls. For the first, and perhaps, the only time in Roman history, symptoms now manifest themselves, like those to which we are so well accustomed in the times of Cleon and Hyperbolus, namely, that we meet with tradesmen holding the first offices of the state. C. Terentius Varro is said to have been the son of a butcher, which is so much at variance with everything before and after, that we can hardly believe it. Yet if this were so, the notion of plebeity must already have been quite changed, and such trades were carried on, not only by foreigners, Metics, and freedmen, but also by born citizens. Terentius Varro is made out to have been a demagogue who had a decided influence with the people, and used it in a spirit the very fellow to that of Cleon at Athens. But if we look to facts, we might entertain some doubts with regard to the sentence of condemnation, which our historians pronounce against him. If the overthrow at Cannæ had really been owing to his fault, and his fault alone, how would the senate--although, _ominis causa_, he was no more chosen consul--have over and over again, during a long series of years, entrusted him with an army, and after the battle have gone out to meet him, and to thank him for not having despaired? This shows that the judgment formed of Varro, as handed down to us, cannot be relied on; and that the pride of the great men was arrayed against him, as it was in former times against Cn. Flavius. That the learned M. Terentius Varro was his descendant, seems to be beyond a doubt: the latter, who lived not a hundred and fifty years later, belonged to the aristocratical party,--so much, and so quickly will the state of things change. L. Æmilius Paullus was μισόδημος, very likely from just causes; he had, after his Illyrian campaign, been wrongfully accused, and had a narrow escape from being condemned.

It was the rule that each consul had to command a consular army of two legions, each of four thousand two hundred foot and two hundred horse, with a corresponding number of allies: the latter furnished five thousand men and six hundred horse. If this force was to be strengthened, four legions and a proportionate number of allies took the field, in all, 16,800 Romans, 20,000 allies, and 3,200 horse; if one wanted to increase it still more, then, instead of four thousand two hundred Romans, there were five thousand levied for each legion, and three hundred horse instead of two hundred. The Romans now raised such an army of eight legions; and besides the consuls of the year, those of the year before were also placed at its head as proconsuls. This army collected in Apulia. Q. Fabius most earnestly recommended that his plan should be faithfully kept to, and such was likewise the conviction of the consul L. Æmilius Paullus; but the feeling at Rome was quite different.

The description of the battle of Cannæ in Appian, is taken from Fabius Pictor; the very same is likewise to be found in Zonaras. According to this version, Terentius Varro was far from being so blameable as Livy, and also Polybius make out. In fact, it is said that at the departure of the consuls from Rome, the whole people had raised an outcry against the sluggishness of Fabius, and had demanded a battle, because the long war pressed heavily upon them. This story is likely in itself, and it accounts for Paullus having yielded against his own conviction. The two consuls joined each other in Apulia, and embarrassed Hannibal by their superior numbers: he took up his position near Cannæ. This town had been destroyed by the earthquake; but the _arx_ was yet standing, and he took it by treachery. The statement in Gellius[26] that the battle was fought on the second of August, is hard to understand: if it be correct, the two armies must have faced each other for months. But it would seem from Polybius’ account, that the season was not yet so far advanced; though this is by no means clear: the harvest there is at the end of May, and it must at all events have been already over. Both armies were encamped on the banks of the Aufidus, in the midst of the plains of Apulia, where the soil throughout is calcareous, as in Champagne, and there are therefore but few springs in it; so that they were obliged to keep near the river. Hannibal is said to have been so hard put to it for provisions, that, if the battle had been at all delayed, he must needs have decamped. Yet he enticed the Romans into fighting; for in a petty skirmish, whilst foraging, they got the best of it, as he did not come to the support of his men, but feigned to be afraid. The Romans still had a camp on either side of the river; their base was Canusium, their magazines at Cannæ: Hannibal took these before their eyes, they being not yet strong enough to hinder it. Even later than this, Paullus was very loth to give battle, and it would also have perhaps been best to wait quietly: the longer Hannibal kept himself inactive, the more favourable matters became for the Romans; if once the day was lost, all would be lost. Yet, on the other hand, much might be said in behalf of the expediency of a battle. If the Romans could not gain the victory with such superior numbers, they gave the allies, who, as it was, were already troublesome, the opportunity of falling off; and if, in their rear, the Samnites, or Capua proved faithless, their situation would have been desperate. The Romans therefore passed the river.

The first who has given a satisfactory and clear description of the ground of the battle of Cannæ, was the traveller Swinburne. From his account, the battle may easily be made out. The Aufidus near Cannæ makes a bend within which the two armies took their position: the Romans stood on the chord of the arc which is formed by the river; Hannibal likewise passed over, and rested his two flanks on the curve of the river, so that the numerical superiority of the Romans was of no avail.

[Illustration:

_a._ Place where the Romans crossed. _b._ Place where the Carthaginians crossed. _c._ Line of battle of the Carthaginians. _d._ Line of battle of the Romans. ]

The Romans therefore had the land behind them. Hannibal placed himself in such a dangerous position, because anyhow he was lost, if he did not win this battle. The Romans had 80,000 foot, and from 6 to 8,000 horse; among the latter, about 2,500 were Romans. The Carthaginians had 40,000 foot, and also about 8,000 horse, most of which, however, were Numidians; these were excellent for foraging, reconnoitering, and harassing the enemy, but by no means fitted to stand the shock of a battle, and of no use at all against heavy cavalry: if they were worth anything, it was against light infantry. The Romans left ten thousand men behind in the camp, and thus advanced against the enemy with only 70,000, from whom we are besides to deduct a large number for those who at all times, and especially in a summer campaign, are either sick, or remain behind from other causes. On their right wing, they had the Roman cavalry; on the left, was that of the allies. Hannibal had no elephants in this battle: he placed his best cavalry on his left wing, over-against the right one of the Romans; on his own right, he had the Numidians. Besides these, there were on the left wing the Libyans, and on the right, the Celts and Spaniards, but part of the Libyans and Celts were also in the centre. The Romans had not room enough for the whole of their army; so that they were drawn up unusually deep, many maniples being one behind the other, which in their system of warfare was of no advantage. The battle was opened by the cavalry on the left wing of the Carthaginians making an attack upon the Roman horse, who, although they fought with great bravery, were soon routed, as the whole battle lasted only a short time: it began two hours after sunrise, and was ended two hours before sunset. In the meanwhile, the Numidians on the right wing were engaged with the cavalry of the allies. Hannibal now divided his line in the middle, and ordered one half to advance with the right, and the other with the left shoulders forward; so that they advanced in the form of a wedge against the Roman centre. This was an employment of what is called the oblique line of battle, which in the seven years’ war was so fatal at Collin, wherein one of the two extreme points stands still, while the rest of the line moves forward: he did this here with two lines. The Romans advanced to meet them, and the fight was very bloody. The Carthaginian troops could not break through, so they retreated by the wings; and these, when the Romans were pressing on, wheeled half round and attacked them in the flanks. At the same time, the cavalry of the Carthaginian left wing had gone round that of the Romans, and having been joined by the Numidians, it had routed the cavalry on the Roman left: it could now freely fall upon the Roman infantry from the rear. Æmilius Paullus was mortally wounded, and in the dreadful confusion there was no longer any command; so that two hours before sunset the whole army was annihilated. The loss is not stated with precision. Polybius, contrary to his custom, gives the largest numbers: according to him, out of 80,000 men, 50,000 were killed, and 30,000 taken prisoners: but in this instance, we must deem Livy’s statement to be the more correct one. Not to speak of those who were saved by having remained behind in the fortified camp, there also escaped at least ten thousand men from the field of battle; the Romans consequently lost about forty thousand men. In Zonaras and Appian, we meet with the following story, borrowed in all likelihood from Fabius, which is characteristic, as it shows how the Romans tried to throw a vail over their disasters. It is said that in Apulia a breeze rises every afternoon from the east, that is to say, from the sea, which lifts up clouds of dust from the chalky soil; and that Hannibal on this had not only placed himself in such a position that the Romans had the dust blown into their faces, but also on the day before had caused the ground to be ploughed, so as to increase these clouds. That he took advantage of the wind, we may believe; the rest sounds somewhat unlikely. There is another idle tale of his having allowed Spaniards, with daggers hidden about them, to go over as deserters to the enemy, and that these, being stationed by the Romans in the rear of their army, had afterwards suddenly fallen upon them. This is quite a childish and pitiful fable. The day after the battle, the Romans in the camp surrendered, on condition that if the Roman people would ransom them, they should regain their liberty. Varro escaped with seventy men to Canusium, whither all those now collected, who had got away safe; and with these he betook himself to Venusia. Here Hannibal again shows how much he disliked sieges; for he let Canusium alone with its Roman garrison, and hastened to Capua, with which he had already before entered into negotiations.

Cato has told us that Maharbal, the commander of the Carthaginian cavalry, called upon Hannibal to follow him, saying that on the fifth day he would hold a feast as conqueror on the Capitol. Hannibal smiled, and said that it was a fine idea, but that it could not be carried out. Then Maharbal had answered, “Thou art able then to gain a victory, but not to make use of it!”--There is no saying indeed what impression it would have made in Rome, if, instead of any tidings from the field of battle, the Carthaginian cavalry had been seen on the Latin road. But even cavalry could hardly have done it: the distance in a straight line is from fifty to sixty German miles; so that they must have had relays of horses: for infantry, the thing was quite impossible. Against cavalry, the gates might have been shut. Nor would the Romans have felt so utterly defenceless as they did after the battle at the Alia. There were recruits in Rome, who were drilled, and in training for the naval service; nothing would have been achieved, and the Carthaginians would in the most pestilential time of the year have been lying before the walls of Rome. To burn the country round the city, would not have been of any use to Hannibal; whilst, on the other hand, it could not but have made the worst impression upon the Italians, had he returned with the cavalry without having done anything.

How soon Hannibal arrived at Capua, is more than we can tell, as, generally speaking, in such matters we have no precise dates given us by the ancients; yet in the same year he was master of Capua, much earlier than it would seem from Livy’s account. This town enjoyed isopolity with the Romans, and was under its own government; its nobility held itself equal to that of Rome, and was connected by marriage with the very highest Roman families, even with the Claudii. During its long alliance with the Romans, it had gotten great wealth and many demesnes, and it was therefore in a very prosperous condition. But owing to their riches and their luxury, its citizens had become utterly effeminate; so that they formed the strongest contrast to the moral and political energy of Rome. If such a town had dreamed of acquiring the leading rule over Italy after the downfall of that city, it was an inconceivable delusion. Were the nations indeed to shake off the yoke of Rome, only that they might put themselves under that of Capua! But the Campanians flattered themselves with the hope of getting this hegemony with the help of Hannibal, who fostered their day-dreams, but without promising them anything for certain. They therefore separated from Rome, formed a league with Hannibal, and received him into their city, which he forthwith made his arsenal. The terms of their alliance, taken literally, were very favourable. They were granted perfect independence; and it was stipulated that no single Campanian should be charged with any burden whatever; that they should not have to furnish any soldiers; and that, in short, they should be free from everything which had been irksome to the Tarentines in their alliance with Pyrrhus. The Romans had no garrison at Capua; but three hundred horsemen from that town served in Sicily, and as hostages for these, Hannibal gave them as many Roman prisoners. They seem to have been exchanged: Rome, at that time, was by no means so haughty. The description in Livy of the way in which Hannibal established himself in the town, of the banquet and the attempt to murder Hannibal, is wonderfully beautiful, but certainly a romance. The story of Decius Magus, the only man in Capua who raised his voice for remaining true to the Romans, may alone have some foundation, however much it be embellished: there is no reason for us to doubt, that Hannibal banished him as a friend of the Romans. On the part of Capua, it was indeed a foul ingratitude to fall off from Rome, and therefore the frightful vengeance of the Romans is very much to be excused. The Campanians had derived from their alliance with Rome nothing but benefit; and now they did not only show themselves ungrateful, but they also committed an act of useless barbarity. They put the Romans who were staying with them, to death in overheated bath rooms. Nothing is more sickening than the arrogance of the unworthy, when they array themselves against worth.

Whether it be true that the winter-quarters in luxurious Capua made the troops of Hannibal effeminate and dissolute, or whether this be a mere rhetorical flourish, cannot now be decided any longer; but it is evident that the Romans made a better use of the winter. When after long and extraordinary exertions, men come into an easy life, they often fall into a state of lassitude; they are then very apt to lose the proper tone of mind, and the power of finding their way back to their former condition, and it returns no more. This is a rock on which many great characters have split. What, however, has not been taken into account, is that Hannibal was not able to recruit his army from Spaniards and Libyans. Every one of his battles cost him many men; little skirmishes, and diseases in foreign climate, swept away a great number; and he was only able to make up his losses from the Italians, which we know with certainty as for the Bruttians. This circumstance is quite enough to account for the demoralised state of his troops. The Prussian army of 1762 was much inferior to that of 1757, and likewise the French one of 1812, which fought in the Russian campaign, was not so good as that of 1807. Another difficulty for him was that the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, had not let their courage droop: they would not even receive Carthalo, the Carthaginian ambassador. He found himself in the same plight as Napoleon was in Russia, after the battle of Borodino, when the peace was not accepted. It is true that part of southern Italy declared for him, and that he might have reinforced himself from thence; but all the Latin colonies throughout its whole extent remained faithful, and were not to be conquered. He was master of the country, but with a number of hostile fortresses in it. If he wanted to advance by Campania, he was obliged to subdue the whole chain of fortified colonies, or to break through them, and reduce the Latin and Hernican towns in the neighbourhood of the city. These places were entirely in the interest of Rome, and indignant at the faithlessness of Capua. It was especially Cales, Fregellæ, Interamnium, Casinum, Beneventum, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Pæstum, Æsernia, and others, which paralysed the peoples there; these could not fairly gather their forces, because they had to fear the sallies of the Romans. They therefore in most instances blockaded those towns, and were no increase of strength to Hannibal. Thus his position was far from being an easy one. He reckoned upon support from Carthage and Spain; the former he got, as Livy states in a few lines (probably from Cœlius Antipater), although in his view of the matter, it is always as if the Carthaginians had deemed the whole undertaking of Hannibal to be madness. According to Zonaras (from Dio Cassius), the reinforcement was considerable; but it only came in the following year, or even later: from Spain he received none at all. If dearth of money had exercised as decisive an influence among the ancients, as it does with us, the Romans indeed could no more have done anything. But they made every possible sacrifice; and thus it happened that by the battle of Cannæ they only lost those districts which yielded themselves to the enemy, whilst they had no danger to fear with regard to the rest. The Marsians, Marrucinians, Sabines, Umbrians, Etruscans, Picentines, and others, remained faithful to them.