I.
The Court of Directors, before the secret dispatch became known to them, adopted courteous language in the following letter of instructions sent to Viscount Canning, referring to an earlier communication:
‘_May 5, 1858._
‘1. You will have received, by the mail of the 25th of March, a letter from the secret committee, which has since been laid before us, respecting the policy which it becomes you to pursue towards those natives of India who have recently been in arms against the authority of the British government.
‘2. That letter emphatically confirms the principles which you have already adopted, as set forth in your circular of the 31st of July 1857, by impressing upon you the propriety of pursuing, after the conquest of the revolted provinces, a course of policy distinguished by a wise and discriminating generosity. You are exhorted to temper justice with mercy, and, except in cases of extreme criminality, to grant an amnesty to the vanquished. In the sentiments expressed by the secret committee we entirely concur. While there are some crimes which humanity calls upon you to punish with the utmost severity, there are others of a less aggravated character, which it would be equally unjust and impolitic not to pardon and to forget.
‘3. The offences with which you will be called upon to deal are of three different kinds. Firstly, high crimes, instigated by malice prepense, and aggravated by treachery and cruelty. Secondly, offences the results rather of weakness than of malice, into which it is believed that many have been drawn by the contamination of example, by the fear of opposing themselves to their more powerful countrymen, or by the belief that they have been compromised by the acts of their associates, rather than by any active desire to embarrass the existing government. And, thirdly, offences of a less positive character, amounting to little more than passive connivance at evil, or at most to the act of giving such assistance to the rebels as, if not given, would have been forcibly extorted, and which in many cases it would have been death to refuse to bodies of licentious and exasperated mutineers.
‘4. It is the first only of these offences, the perpetrators of which, and their accomplices, it will be your duty to visit with the severest penalty which you can inflict; and it is, happily, in such cases of exceptional atrocity, that you will have the least difficulty in proving both the commission of the offence and the identity of the offender. In the other cases you might often be left in doubt, not only of the extent of the offence committed, but of its actual commission by the accused persons; and although we are aware that the retribution which might be righteously inflicted upon the guilty may be in some measure restricted by too much nicety of specification, and that, in dealing with so large a mass of crime, it is difficult to avoid the commission of some acts of individual injustice, we may still express our desire that the utmost exertion may be made to confine, within the smallest possible compass, these cases of uncertain proof and dubious identity, even though your retributary measures should thus fall short of what in strict justice might be inflicted.
‘5. As soon as you have suppressed the active hostility of the enemy, your first care will be the restoration of public confidence. It will be your privilege when the disorganised provinces shall no longer be convulsed by intestine disorder, to set an example of toleration and forbearance towards the subject people, and to endeavour by every means consistent with the security of the British empire in the east, to allay the irritation and suspicion, which, if suffered to retain possession of the minds of the native and European inhabitants of the country, will eventually lead to nothing less calamitous than a war of races.
‘6. In dealing with the people of Oude, you will doubtless be moved by special considerations of justice and of policy. Throughout the recent contest, we have ever regarded such of the inhabitants of that country as—not being sepoys or pensioners of our own army—have been in arms against us as an exceptional class. They cannot be considered as traitors or even rebels, for they had not pledged their fidelity to us, and they had scarcely become our subjects. Many, by the introduction of a new system of government, had necessarily been deprived of the maintenance they had latterly enjoyed; and others feared that the speedy loss of their means of subsistence must follow from the same course. It was natural that such persons should avail themselves of the opportunity presented by the distracted state of the country, to strike a blow for the restoration of the native rule, under which the permitted disorganisation of the country had so long been to them a source of unlawful profit. Neither the disbanded soldiers of the late native government, nor the great thalookdars and their retainers, were under any obligation of fidelity to our government for benefits conferred upon them. You would be justified, therefore, in dealing with them as you would with a foreign enemy, and in ceasing to consider them objects of punishment after they have once laid down their arms.
‘7. Of these arms they must for ever be deprived. You will doubtless, in prosecution of this object, address yourself in the first instance to the case of the great thalookdars, who so successfully defied the late government, and many of whom, with large bodies of armed men, appear to have aided the efforts of the mutinous soldiery of the Bengal army. The destruction of the fortified strongholds of these powerful landholders, the forfeiture of their remaining guns, the disarming and disbanding of their followers, will be amongst your first works. But, whilst you are depriving this influential and once dangerous class of people of their power of openly resisting your authority, you will, we have no doubt, exert yourself by every possible means to reconcile them to British rule, and encourage them, by liberal arrangements made in accordance with ancient usages, to become industrious agriculturists, and to employ in the cultivation of the soil the men who, as armed retainers, have so long wasted the substance of their masters and desolated the land. We believe that these landholders may be taught that their holdings will be more profitable to them under a strong government, capable of maintaining the peace of the country, and severely punishing agrarian outrages, than under one which perpetually invites, by its weakness, the ruinous arbitration of the sword.
‘8. Having thus endeavoured, on the re-establishment of the authority of the British government in Oude, to reassure the great landholders, you will proceed to consider, in the same spirit of toleration and forbearance, the condition of the great body of the people. You will bear in mind that it is necessary, in a transition state from one government to another, to deal tenderly with existing usages, and sometimes even with existing abuses. All precipitate reforms are dangerous. It is often wiser even to tolerate evil for a time, than to alarm and to irritate the minds of the people by the sudden introduction of changes which time can alone teach them to appreciate, or even, perhaps, to understand. You will be especially careful, in the readjustment of the fiscal system of the province, to avoid the imposition of unaccustomed taxes, whether of a general or of a local character, pressing heavily upon the industrial resources and affecting the daily comforts of the people. We do not estimate the successful administration of a newly acquired province according to the financial results of the first few years. At such a time we should endeavour to conciliate the people by wise concessions, and to do nothing to encourage the belief that the British government is more covetous of revenue than the native ruler whom it has supplanted.’
K.
The last document here given is a letter of instructions from the Court of Directors, kind and courteous towards the governor-general, but evidently conveying an opinion that the proposed proclamation, unless modified and acted on with caution, would be too severe for the purpose in view:
‘_Political Department, 18th of May (No. 20) 1858._
‘1. The secret committee has communicated to us the governor-general’s secret letter, dated 5th March (No. 9) 1858, with its enclosures, consisting of a letter addressed to the chief-commissioner of Oude, dated 3d of March, and of the proclamation referred to therein, which was to be issued by Sir James Outram to the chiefs and inhabitants of Oude as soon as the British troops should have possession or command of the city of Lucknow.
‘2. We have also received communication of the letter addressed to your government by the secret committee, under date the 19th of April last, on the subject of the draft of proclamation.
‘3. Our political letter of the 5th of May has apprised you of our strong sense of the distinction which ought to be maintained between the revolted sepoys and the chiefs and people of Oude, and the comparative indulgence with which, equally from justice and policy, the insurgents of that country (other than sepoys) ought to be regarded. In accordance with these views, we entirely approve the guarantee of life and honour given by the proposed proclamation to all thalookdars, chiefs, and landholders, with their followers, who should make immediate submission, surrender their arms, and obey the orders of the British government, provided they have not
## participated in the murder “of Englishmen or Englishwomen.”
‘4. We are prepared to learn that in publicly declaring that, with the exception of the lands of six persons who had been steadfast in their allegiance, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British government, the governor-general intended no more than to reserve to himself entire liberty of
## action, and to give the character of mercy to the confirmation of
all rights not prejudicial to the public welfare, the owners of which might not, by their conduct, have excluded themselves from indulgent consideration.
‘5. His lordship must have been well aware that the words of the proclamation, without the comment on it which we trust was speedily afforded by your actions, must have produced the expectation of much more general and indiscriminate dispossession than could have been consistent with justice or with policy. We shall doubtless be informed, in due course, of the reasons which induced the governor-general to employ those terms, and of the means which, we presume, have been taken of making known in Oude the merciful character which we assume must still belong to your views. In the meantime, it is due to the governor-general that we should express our entire reliance that on this, as on former occasions, it has been his firm resolution to shew to all whose crimes are not too great for any indulgence, the utmost degree of leniency consistent with the early restoration and firm maintenance of lawful authority.
‘We accordingly have to inform you, that on receiving communication of the papers now acknowledged, the Court of Directors passed the following resolution:
‘“Resolved—That in reference to the dispatch from the secret committee to the governor-general of India, dated the 19th ult., with the documents therein alluded to, and this day laid before the Court of Directors, this court desires to express its continued confidence in the governor-general, Lord Canning, and its conviction that his measure for the pacification of Oude, and the other disturbed districts in India, will be characterised by a generous policy, and by the utmost clemency that is found to be consistent with the satisfactory accomplishment of that important object.”—We are, &c.
(Signed)
‘F. CURRIE, W. J. EASTWICK, &c. &c.
‘_London, May 18, 1858._’
[Illustration:
Ganges Transport Boat. ]
-----
Footnote 157:
See Note G, at the end of the chapter.
Footnote 158:
See notes A and B, at the end of the chapter; where many of the documents here referred to are printed in full.
Footnote 159:
See Note H.
Footnote 160:
‘1. That it appears, from papers laid upon the table of this House, that a dispatch has been addressed by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to the governor-general of India, disapproving a proclamation which the governor-general had informed the court he intended to issue after the fall of Lucknow.
‘2. That it is known only from intelligence that has reached this country, by correspondence published in newspapers, that the intended proclamation has been issued, and with an important modification, no official account of this proceeding having yet been received; that this House is still without full information as to the grounds upon which Lord Canning had acted, and his answer to the objections made to his intended proclamation in the dispatch of the Secret Committee cannot be received for several weeks.
‘3. That, under these circumstances, this House is unable to form a judgment on the proclamation issued by Lord Canning, but thinks it right to express its disapprobation of the premature publication by her Majesty’s ministers of the dispatch addressed to the governor-general; since this public condemnation of his conduct is calculated to weaken the authority of the governor-general of India, and to encourage those who are now in arms against this country.’
Footnote 161:
‘That this House, whilst it abstains from expressing any opinion on the policy of any proclamation which may have been issued by the governor-general of India with relation to Oude, has seen with great and serious apprehension that her Majesty’s government have addressed to the governor-general of India, through the Secret Committee of the East India directors, and have published, a dispatch condemning in strong terms the conduct of the governor-general. And this House is of opinion that such a course upon the part of her Majesty’s government must tend, under the present circumstances of India, to produce a most prejudicial effect, by weakening the authority of the governor-general, and encouraging further resistance on the part of those who are still in arms against us.’
Footnote 162:
See Note C.
Footnote 163:
See Note D.
Footnote 164:
See Note E.
[Illustration:
JUNG BAHADOOR, of Nepaul. ]
## CHAPTER XXVIII.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN APRIL.
The British officers and soldiers in India looked forward, not without anxiety, to a hot-weather campaign in the summer of 1858. Much disappointment was felt, too, in England, when necessity for such a campaign became manifest. Persons in all ranks had fondly hoped that, when Sir Colin Campbell had spent two or three months in preparing for the siege of Lucknow, he would be enabled so to invest that city as to render the escape of the mutineers impossible; and that in conquering it, the heart of the rebellion would be crushed out. The result did not answer to this expectation. Lucknow was conquered; but the prisoners taken could be reckoned simply by dozens; nearly all the rebels who were not killed escaped into the provinces. It is true that they were now a dispersed body instead of a concentrated army; but it is also true that, in abandoning Lucknow, they would retire to many towns and forts where guns could be found, and where a formidable stand might be made against British troops. Let the summer approach, and the ratio of advantages on the two sides would be changed in character. Hot weather may affect the sepoy, but it affects him relatively less than the Englishman. It is heart-breaking work to a gallant soldier to feel his bodily strength failing through heat, at a time when his spirit is as heroic as ever. The rebels were astute enough to know this. The lithe Hindoo, with supple limbs and no superfluous flesh, can make great marches—especially when he retreats. His goods and chattels are few in number; his household arrangements simple; and it costs him little time or thought to shift his quarters at a short notice, in a period of peace. During war or rebellion, when he becomes a soldier, his worldly position is even more simple than before. A man who can live upon rice, parched corn, and water, and to whom it is a matter of much indifference whether he is clothed or not, has a remarkable freedom of movement, requiring little intricacy of commissariat arrangements. The English, during the war of the mutiny, had ample means of observing this mobility of the native rebel troops, and ample reasons for lamenting its consequences. If this were so during the winter, it would be still more decidedly the case during a hot-weather campaign, when exhaustion and _coups de soleil_ work so terribly on the European constitution. It was this consideration, as we have said, that gave rise to much disappointment, both in India and in England, when the real sequel of the siege of Lucknow became apparent. The disappointment resolved itself in some quarters into adverse criticism on Sir Colin Campbell’s tactics; but even those who deemed it wise and just to postpone such criticism, could not postpone their anxiety when they found that the rebels, fleeing from Lucknow, assumed such an attitude elsewhere as would render a summer campaign necessary.
The long sojourn of the commander-in-chief in and near the Oudian capital, and the frequent communications between him and the governor-general, told of serious and weighty discussions concerning the policy to be pursued. Rumours circulated of an antagonism of plans; of one project for leaving the rebels unmolested until after the hot season should have passed, and of another for crushing them in detail before they could succeed in recombining. But whatever might have been the rumours, the policy adopted followed the latter of these two courses. The army of Lucknow, broken up into divisions or columns, was set again to work, to pursue and defeat those insurgents who kept the field with a pertinacity little expected when the mutiny began. So much of those operations as took place during the month of April, it is the purpose of this chapter to narrate; but a few words may previously be said concerning the state of affairs in Bengal, more dependent on Calcutta than on the army of Oude or the commander-in-chief.
The fact has already been adverted to that the supreme government, amid all the anxiety of the rebellion in the northwest, began in the spring of the year to take measures for the better protection of Lower Bengal. That province, the most important in the whole of India, had been very little affected by the mutiny, chiefly because there were few Mohammedan leaders inclined to become rebels; but the authorities could not close their eyes to the facts that the province was very insufficiently defended, and that any successful revolt there would be more disastrous than in other regions. So long as the delta of the Ganges remained in British hands, there would always be a base of operations for reconquering Upper India, if necessary; but that delta once lost, the services of a Clive, backed by a large army from England, would be again needed to recover it. A plan was therefore formed for locating five or six thousand European troops in Bengal, quartered at Calcutta, Dumdum, Chinsura, Barrackpore, Dinapoor, Benares, and one or two other places. It became very seriously contested whether any native army whatever would be needed in the province. The Bengalees are peaceful, and have few ambitious chieftains among them; hence, it was argued, a few thousand British troops, and a few hundred seamen of the Naval Brigade, would suffice to protect the province. There were ‘divisional battalions’ of native troops still at certain stations, as a sort of military police; but the regular Bengal native army had been extinguished, or had extinguished itself. So useful had a few hundred seamen become, that their employment led to many such suggestions as the following—‘Wherever these seamen are, there is a feeling of absolute security at once from external attack and internal treachery. Bengal has now been nearly twelve months without a native army, and within that twelve months they have never once been missed. Why not retain this security? Why not strike off Bengal from the provinces to be occupied by a native force, and render our improvised force a permanent institution? A company of European sailors would be a nucleus for the armed police in each division. Why not keep them up as such, give them permanent allowances, recruit them primarily from the same useful class? There can be no want of men when once such a permanent opening is known. They would not only protect the great cities, and double the physical force on which all authority must ultimately rest, but act as a permanent check on the divisional battalions. We want such a check. These men may be as faithful as the sepoys have been false, as attached to Europeans as the sepoys have proved themselves hostile; but there can never be any proof of the fact. Let us not again trust armed natives without the precautions we take in our ships against our own sailors—a check by a different body.’ All such considerations necessarily resolved themselves into a much larger inquiry, to be conducted deliberately and cautiously—how ought the army of India to be re-constituted?
Semi-barbarous tribes in many instances took advantage of the disturbed state of British influence in India, to make inroads into districts not properly belonging to them; and it sometimes happened that the correction of these evildoers was a very difficult matter. Such an instance occurred in the month now under notice. On the borders of Assam, at the extreme northeast corner of India, were a wild mountain tribe called Abors, who had for some time been engaged in a system of marauding on the Assam side of the frontier. Captain Bivar, at Debrooghur, set forth to punish them, taking with him a mixed force of sailors and Goorkhas. The Abors retreated to their fastnesses, and Bivar attempted to follow them; but this was an unsuccessful manœuvre. The Abors brought down many of his men by poisoned arrows, and maimed others by rolling down stones upon them from the rocks; a portion of their numbers, meanwhile, making a circuit, fell upon the baggage-boats, and captured the whole of the baggage. Captain Bivar and his companions suffered many privations before they safely got back to Debrooghur. These, however, were minor difficulties, involving no very serious consequences. Throughout the northeast region of India there were few ‘Pandies,’ few sepoys of Hindustani race; and thus the materials for rebellion were deprived of one very mischievous ingredient.
The Calcutta authorities found it necessary to make stringent rules concerning ladies and children; and hence some of the magistrates and collectors, the representatives of the Company in a civil capacity in the country districts, were occasionally placed in troublesome circumstances by family considerations during times of tumult. From the first, the Calcutta government had endeavoured, by every available means, to prevent women and children from going to the scenes of danger: knowing how seriously the movements of the officers, military and civil, would be interfered with by the presence of helpless relatives during scenes of fighting and tumult. One of the magistrates, in Western Bengal, was brought into difficulty by disobedience to this order. His wife entreated that she might come to him at his station. She did so. Shortly afterwards a rumour spread that a large force of the enemy was approaching. The lady grew frightened, and the husband anxious. He took her to another place, and was thereby absent from his post at a critical time. The government suspended him from office for disobeying orders in having his wife at the station, and for quitting his district without leave at a time when his presence was imperatively needed.
One other matter may be mentioned here, in connection with the local government, before proceeding to the affairs of Oude and the northwest. The Calcutta authorities shared with the Court of Directors, the English government, and the House of Commons, the power of rewarding or honouring their troops for good services; the modes adopted were many; but amid the controversies which occasionally arose concerning military honours, medals, promotions, and encomiums, it was made very manifest during the wars of the mutiny that the Victoria Cross, the recognition of individual valour, was one of the most highly valued by the soldiery, both officers and privates. The paltriness of the bits of metal and ribbon, or the tastelessness of the design, might be abundantly criticised; but when it became publicly known that the Cross would be given _only_ to those who had shewn themselves to be brave among the brave, the value of the symbol was great, such as a soldier or sailor could alone appreciate. From time to time notices appeared in the _London Gazette_, emanating from the War-office, giving the utmost publicity to the instances in which the Victoria Cross was bestowed. The name of the officer or soldier, the regiment or corps to which he belonged, the commanding officer who had made the recommendation, the dispatch in which the deed of bravery was recorded, the date and place of that deed, the nature of the deed itself—all were briefly set forth; and there can be little doubt that the recipients of the Cross would cherish that memorial, and the _Gazette_ notice, to the end of their lives. Incidental notices of this honorary testimonial have been frequently made in former chapters; and it is mentioned again here because of its importance in including officers and privates in the same category. Thus, on the 27th of April, to give one instance, the _London Gazette_ announced the bestowal of the Victoria Cross on Lieutenant-colonel Henry Tombs, of the Bengal artillery; Lieutenant James Hills, of the same corps; Lieutenant William Alexander Kerr, of the 24th Bombay native infantry; Sergeant John Smith, of the Bengal Sappers and Miners; Bugler Robert Hawthorne, of the 52d foot; Lance-corporal Henry Smith, of the same regiment; Sergeant Bernard Diamond, of the Bengal horse-artillery; and Gunner Richard Fitzgerald, of the same corps. Sergeant Smith and Bugler Hawthorne, it will be remembered, assisted poor Home, Salkeld, and Burgess in blowing up the Cashmere Gate at Delhi; unlike their heroic but less fortunate companions, they lived to receive the Victoria Cross.[165]
Let us now pass to the stormy northwest regions. Beginning with Lucknow as a centre, it will be convenient to treat of Sir Colin’s arrangements at that place, and then to notice in succession the operations of his brigadiers in their movements radially from that centre, so far as they were connected with the month of April.
That portion of the army which remained in Lucknow found the month of April to open with a degree of heat very distressing to bear. A temperature of 100° F., under the shade of a tent, was not at all unusual. When the wind was calm, the pressure of temperature was not much felt; but the blowing of a hot wind was truly terrible—not only from the heat itself, but from the clouds of dust laden with particles of matter of the most offensive kind. Every organ of sense, every nerve, every pore, was distressed. And it was at such a time that a commander was called upon to plan, and officers and soldiers to execute, military operations with as much care and exactitude as if under a cool and temperate sky. There were putrefying bodies yet unburied in the vicinity, pools of recently dried blood in the streets and gardens, and abominations of every kind in this city of palaces: how these affected the air, in a temperature higher than is ever known in England, may be imperfectly, and only imperfectly, conceived.[166]
The last chapter told in what way the treatment of the Oude rebels engaged the attention of the imperial legislature, and what were the violent discussions to which that subject gave rise. In this place it will only be necessary to state that, long before Viscount Canning came to hear the views of the two Houses of Parliament, he found it necessary to determine, if not the policy itself, at least the names of those who would have the onerous task of re-establishing civil government in the distracted province. Mr Montgomery, who, as judicial commissioner of the Punjaub, had rendered admirable service to Sir John Lawrence, was selected by the governor-general to fill the office of chief-commissioner of Oude—aided by a staff of judicial and financial commissioners, civil and military secretaries, deputy-commissioners, commissioners of divisions, deputy-commissioners of districts, and other officers. It was believed that he combined the valuable qualities of sagacity, experience, firmness, and conciliation. Oude was to be parcelled out into four divisions, and each division into three districts. The intention was, that as soon as any part of the province was brought into some degree of order by Sir Colin and his brigadiers, Montgomery should take it in hand, and bring it to order in relation to judicial and revenue affairs. Large powers were given to him, in relation to ‘proclamations’ and everything else; and it remained for time to shew the result.
While on this subject, it may be well to advert to the conduct and position of one particular native of Oude. During many months the line of policy pursued by the influential Oudian landowner, Rajah Maun Singh, was a subject of much anxiety among the British authorities. His power in Oude was very considerable, and it was fondly hoped or wished that he might prove faithful in mutinous times. This hope was founded on two kinds of evidence, positive and negative—proofs that he had often befriended the poor European fugitives in the hour of greatest need, and that on many occasions he had _not_ injured the British when he might easily have done so. Nevertheless it was impossible to get rid of the impression that he was ‘playing fast and loose;’ reserving himself for whichever party should gain the ascendency in the Indian struggle. So much importance was attached in England to this rajah’s conduct, that the House of Commons ordered the production of any documents that might throw light upon it. The papers produced ranged over a period of six months. So early as June 1857, when the mutiny was only six or seven weeks old, Mr Tucker, commissioner of Benares, wrote to Maun Singh concerning the relations between him and the British government—acknowledging the steadiness of the rajah in maintaining the district of Fyzabad in a peaceful condition, so far as he could, and assuring him that it would be good policy for him to continue in the same path. He told him that although England was engaged in a war with China, and had only just concluded one with Persia, and that moreover her Hindustani troops had proved faithless, she would undoubtedly triumph over all opposition from within and without, and would equally remember those who had been true and those who had been false to her—to reward the one and punish the other. It was a letter of thanks for the past, and of warning for the future. During the same month, Maun Singh was in correspondence with Mr Paterson, magistrate of Goruckpore, giving and receiving friendly assurances, and impressing the magistrate with a belief in his sincere desire to remain faithful to the British government during a time of trouble. In the middle of July he was in correspondence with Mr Wingfield, British political agent with the Goorkha force at that time in the Goruckpore district. Maun Singh, it may here be remarked, had suffered severely in his estate, by the land-settlement made when the Company took possession of Oude; he had suffered, whether rightly or wrongly; and the Calcutta authorities were naturally anxious to know whether his losses had converted him into a rebel. He wrote to Mr Wingfield, promising to adhere faithfully to a course of friendliness towards the English. Mr Wingfield recommended the government to trust Maun Singh, to supply him with a certain amount of funds, and to believe that he was able and willing to keep the districts of Fyzabad and Sultanpore tolerably free from anarchy. He added: ‘All I see and hear of Maun Singh makes me think him stanch up to this moment. He has exerted himself in every way to protect the women and children that were left at Fyzabad, and to place them in safety. He sent four sergeants’ wives and seven children to this place; but we cannot expect him to sacrifice himself for us. He has doubtless already made himself obnoxious to the rebels by his open adhesion to our cause; and if fortune goes against us at Lucknow, instead of being able to render us any assistance, he will himself have to take shelter here.’ The Calcutta government authorised Mr Wingfield to thank Maun Singh for his actions and his promises, and to assist him with money to a certain prescribed amount. In August a letter was sent to the rajah himself by the government, thanking him for what he had done, and urging him to a continuance in the same course. Many months afterwards, the Calcutta authorities had again to discuss this subject. During the autumn, Maun Singh’s former promises had been a good deal belied. He had been in and near Lucknow during the period when Havelock, Outram, and Campbell were engaged in warfare at that city; and it was more than suspected that he had aided the insurgents. True, he was a man who, having something of the feelings of a gentleman, rather succoured than persecuted hapless fugitives who were powerless for aught save suffering; but his proceedings in other ways were not satisfactory. When Outram commanded in the Residency, shut up with Havelock and Inglis, he exchanged many communications with the rajah, but to no satisfactory end. During the winter, rumours reached Maun Singh that the governor-general, regarding him as a traitor in spite of his many promises, intended to deprive him of his estates, as a punishment. He wrote a reproachful letter to Mr Brereton, the magistrate at Goruckpore—complaining that this was a poor reward for his services; that he went with his family to Lucknow because he was threatened by insurgents at Fyzabad; but that throughout the various sieges at Lucknow he never joined the rebels in attacking the British. Among various letters from the officials, were two which shewed that Mr Wingfield had greatly modified his former favourable opinion of the Fyzabad rajah. On the 2d of February he wrote: ‘Maun Singh is not the man to be selected as an object of clemency. He has not the excuse of having been hurried into insurrection by the force of example, the impetuosity of his feelings, or even regard for his personal safety. He withstood all these trials; for it was on mature reflection, and after weighing all the chances on either side, that he chose that of rebellion. As long as he thought the success of the insurrection was but transient, and that our government would speedily recover its position, he professed loyalty, and even supported us; but when he heard that the Goorkhas were not to march through Fyzabad, and that Havelock had been obliged to abandon his design of relieving the Residency and to retire on Cawnpore, he thought our case hopeless, and joined what appeared the triumphant side. He has now found out his mistake, and wishes to turn again.’ Again, on the 12th of February Mr Wingfield wrote: ‘On Maun Singh’s conduct I look with some distrust, which his letter does not tend to remove. Our Fyzabad news-writer, whose information has invariably proved correct, reports that the rajah has had an interview with some of the sepoy officers, and agreed to their proposal to invade this (Goruckpore) district, and moved three of his guns down to the Ghat. It would be quite consistent with his known character for duplicity to infer that, while aiding the insurgents, he is trying to keep well with us.’ The double-dealer had, indeed, his hands full of employment; for he had been sounding Sir James Outram at the Alum Bagh, before he applied to the Goruckpore authorities, at the very time that he had on hand some sort of negotiation with the rebels. He succeeded so far as this—that no party liked absolutely to throw him off. Mr Wingfield, in writing to the government, candidly admitted that, inscrutable and unreliable as Maun Singh was, matters would have gone worse for the British in Oude if he had not been there. ‘It must be admitted that his neutrality up to the present time has paralysed the plans of the insurgents, and has made him the object of their indignation. Had he declared himself openly against us, the district of Goruckpore would long ago have been invaded.’ On the 16th of February the governor-general sent orders from Allahabad, as to the mode in which any overtures from Maun Singh should be received. He directed that the rajah should be thanked for the humanity he had shewn towards individuals; reminded that strong suspicions were entertained of his complicity with the rebels; threatened with a full and searching inquiry into his past conduct; and recommended to submit himself—without any other conditions than a promise of his life and honour—to the British authorities. But Maun Singh did not follow this advice—he remained throughout the spring months balancing and trimming between loyalty and disloyalty.
Reverting to the state of affairs at Lucknow, it may here be observed that the commander-in-chief remained in that city until the middle of April. There was nothing Napoleonic, nothing rapid, in his movements after the conquest; but those who knew him best knew that he was organising plans of operation for all his brigadiers, and on all sides of the Oudian capital. So thoroughly was he master of his own secrets, and of his correspondence with the governor-general, that very little concerning his plans were known until the very day of operation. Even the higher officers had little but conjecture to rest upon; while the mere retailers of gossip were sorely puzzled for materials. It may be that the excessive publicity of the details of the Crimean war had rendered military authorities uneasy, and tended to render them chary of giving information of their plans in any subsequent wars. During the second week in the month, Sir Colin Campbell took a rapid gallop to Allahabad—a long distance and a somewhat perilous ride in such a disturbed state of the country; but he was not a man to care for distance or for danger, as personally affecting himself. He had many weighty questions to settle with Viscount Canning; and as the governor-general could not or would not go to the commander, the commander went to the governor-general. The result of the interview was the departure of Sir Colin Campbell himself, as well as his generals, for active service in districts distant from Lucknow.
It will be desirable to trace the movements of the generals and brigadiers singly before noticing those of the commander-in-chief and his head-quarters.
And first, for Sir James Outram. This eminent man, the second in influence among the military commanders in India, quitted Lucknow nearly at the same time as many other officers; but on a different mission. When that city was conquered, Outram at once became supreme authority there, as chief-commissioner of Oude. He collected round him a civil staff, and proceeded to enrol a police, establish police-stations, and restore order in the city. From these duties, however, he was summoned away. His services were needed at Calcutta. The supreme council in that city generally contained one military officer among its members, to advise on matters pertaining to war. General Low, who had for some time filled that position, retired to England; and Outram was chosen to supply his place. Personally, it was well that Sir James should quit the camp for a while, after half a year’s incessant military employment in Oude; and professionally, it was desirable that the council at Calcutta should have the benefit of his assistance, in any plans for the reorganisation of the Indian army—a most important matter, towards which the attention of the authorities was necessarily much directed. Sir James did not forget his old companions-in-arms. As soon as he reached Calcutta, he gave orders that copies of one of the newspapers should be regularly sent to the hospitals of six of the British regiments at Cawnpore, Meerut, Lucknow, and Benares; he knew how irksome are the hours in a sick-room, and how joyfully a few books or journals are hailed in such a place.
The lines of operation marked out for the other generals naturally bore relation to the real or supposed position of the insurgent forces. The rumours which reached head-quarters concerning the concentration of rebel leaders in Rohilcund, even making allowance for exaggerations, told of a somewhat formidable organisation. Among the best-known names included in the list were Khan Bahadoor Khan, Nena Sahib, Fuzul Huq, Waladid Khan, and the Nawab of Furruckabad. Khan Bahadoor Khan was chief ruler; and he appears to have organised something like a regular government, with dewans, moonshees, naibs, darogahs, kotwals, nazims, and military commanders. Nena Sahib was there as a sort of distinguished refugee; as were also two shahzadas or princes of the royal family of Delhi. Nena Sahib is supposed to have arrived at Bareilly in Rohilcund, after Sir Colin’s great victory at Lucknow, with four hundred troopers, and to have taken up his abode in the fine large native school-room built by the British in that city. One among many bazaar reports was, that Khan Bahadoor Khan began to entertain misgivings concerning the ultimate success of his rebel policy; but that Nena Sahib, acting on his fears, insisted that a drawing back would be ruinous. Another rumour, having much probability to recommend it, was to the effect that Nena Sahib looked to Central India, the region of Gwalior, Kotah, and Indore, as the field in which his own personal success might ultimately be best insured, on account of his great influence among the Mahrattas of that region; and it was supposed that, failing of success in Oude and Rohilcund, he would endeavour to cross the Ganges and the Jumna into Bundelcund and Central India. Hence one of the points of policy on the side of the commander-in-chief, was to guard those great rivers at as many ghats or passing-places as possible—in the hope that, confined to Oude and Rohilcund, the rebels might be crushed; and in the fear that, scattered over Central India, they might again become powerful. Whether his forces were sufficiently numerous for this duty, was one of the many questions that pressed upon Sir Colin Campbell. The trite saying of an enemy ‘not knowing when they were beaten,’ was many times revived by the British officers in those days; the mutineers seldom gained a victory; but on the other hand, they were not much disheartened by defeat; they retreated, only to collect and fight again; and thus the British troops seldom felt that a victory would give an unquestionably permanent advantage.
Of the leaders who had taken part in the conquest of Lucknow, Jung Bahadoor, the Nepaulese chieftain—as has been shown in a former chapter—went to Allahabad with a body-guard, to hold an interview with the governor-general. The rest of the Goorkha contingent retraced their steps by slow degrees towards their Nepaulese home. So late as the 22d of April, the main body of Goorkhas were no further from Lucknow than Nawabgunge, a town on the banks of the Gogra, northeast of the capital of Oude. On that day, they marched to Sutturgunje, and on the 23d to Durriabad. This town had a fort which might have made a stout resistance, but there were no rebel troops at hand to put the matter to proof. After remaining at Durriabad two days, the Goorkhas marched on the 25th to Shugahgunje, on the 26th to Mobarrukgunje, and on the 27th to Durabgunje—all of them places on or near the banks of the Gogra, on the route towards Fyzabad. Resting two days at Durabgunje, they marched on the 29th to Ayodha or Oude, the ancient Hindoo capital, afterwards supplanted by the Mohammedan Fyzabad, just at hand—which Fyzabad was in its turn supplanted by Lucknow. On the last day of the month, the Goorkhas were on one side of the river Gogra at Fyzabad, and a body of rebels on the other—each intently watching the other, but without fighting. Maun Singh was at that time at Fyzabad, friendly to the British. Little satisfaction appears to have been derived by any party from this co-operation of the Goorkhas with the British. In the preceding July and August, when Havelock was straining every nerve to bring a small force up to Lucknow, and when Inglis was contending against stupendous difficulties in that city—in those months, there was an army of three or four thousand Goorkhas near the eastern frontier of Oude, badly commanded and insufficiently employed. Why they were not pushed on to Lucknow, as an auxiliary force, was known only to the authorities; but, in its effect, this inactivity of the Goorkhas called forth much adverse criticism. Again, during the six months from the beginning of September to the beginning of March, the assistance from Nepaul was not of such a character as had been hoped by those who knew that the Goorkhas enlisted in the Sirmoor and Kumaon battalions were really brave and efficient troops, and who expected that Jung Bahadoor’s Goorkhas would prove to be men of the same stamp. Why the aid rendered was so small, was a politico-military question, on which very little information was afforded. When, at last, a really large Nepaulese army entered Oude, its movements were so slow that Sir Colin began the siege of Lucknow without its aid; and when the siege was over, the army began to march back again, without participating further in the war. This was a very impotent result; and the Nepaulese episode was by no means a brilliant one in the history of the wars of the mutiny. So far as concerns the march during the month of April, from Lucknow towards the Nepaul frontier, it may be remarked that the Goorkhas dreaded the approaching hot weather, that their number of sick was very large, and that the carts for their baggage were so enormous in number as greatly to impede their movements.
[Illustration:
Goorkha Havildar or Sergeant. ]
Another of the generals concerned in the siege of Lucknow, Sir Edward Lugard, was intrusted by the commander-in-chief with service in a region infested by Koer Singh—the chieftain whose name had been so closely associated with the Dinapoor mutiny and the ‘disaster at Arrah,’ in the preceding summer. This rebel had worked round nearly in a circle—not metaphorically, but topographically. He had marched at the head of insurgents south and southwest from Arrah, then west into Bundelcund, then north into the Doab and Oude; and now it was his fortune to be driven east and southeast back to his old quarters in the neighbourhood of Arrah.
Before Lugard could cross the frontier into the provinces eastward of Oude, it was found necessary to bring smaller forces to bear upon bodies of rebels infesting those provinces, and threatening to command the region between the rivers Goomtee and Gogra. The city of Azimghur was in this way greatly indebted to the gallant exertions of Lord Mark Kerr. This officer, immediately on the arrival of news that Azimghur was beset by the enemy, started off from Benares on the 2d of April, with 450 men of H.M. 13th regiment and Queen’s Bays, and two 6-pounder guns. Though impeded by a train of three hundred bullock-carts laden with ammunition, Kerr pushed forward with such rapidity that he arrived in the neighbourhood of Azimghur on the third day after quitting Benares. Here he was opposed by three or four thousand rebels, comprising a large proportion of sepoys of the too celebrated Dinapoor brigade. The rebels were commanded with some skill by a subadar of one of the mutinied regiments. They occupied a position of considerable strength, on the right and left sides of the main road; their right resting on a strong village, and their left protected by a ditch and embankment. Lord Mark succeeded in dislodging those of the enemy who were immediately in his front; but while thus engaged, his convoy in the rear was attacked by eight hundred rebels, who were with great difficulty beaten off, at the expense of the life of Captain Jones, who was guarding the convoy. Overcoming all resistance, Lord Mark succeeded in reaching a point near Azimghur, and remained there until the arrival of Lugard’s column from Lucknow. This portion of the rebels did not return to the city after the
## action, but retired in good order, taking their guns and baggage with
them.
Azimghur, however, needed the assistance of a larger force than Kerr could bring against it; for Koer Singh, with a formidable band of rebels, had to be contended against, in a region containing many large towns. Sir Edward Lugard, placed by Sir Colin Campbell in command of a column destined for service in this region, started from Lucknow during the last week in March; but the destruction of a bridge over the Goomtee at Sultanpore greatly delayed his progress, and compelled him to take a circuitous route by Jounpoor, which city he did not reach till the 9th of April. His column was a strong one; comprising three regiments of infantry, three of Sikh horse, a military train, three batteries of horse-artillery, and seven hundred carts full of warlike stores. On the evening of the 10th, he marched out from Jounpoor, to encounter Gholab Hossein, one of the rebel chuckladars or leaders. The enemy did not stay to fight, but retreated precipitately. They required close watching, however; for while Sir Edward was on the march from Jounpoor to Azimghur, a large rebel force got into his rear, and attempted to re-enter Jounpoor. This caused him to modify his plan, and to disperse the rebels before proceeding to Azimghur. In this he succeeded, but lost the services of Lieutenant Charles Havelock, nephew of the distinguished general. The gallant young officer, at the commencement of the mutiny, had been adjutant of the 12th Bengal native irregular cavalry, and was thrown out of employment by the revolt of that regiment. He then went as a volunteer with his uncle, and was for nine months more or less engaged in the operations in and around Lucknow. When Lugard left the army of Oude, and took command of the column whose operations are here being recorded, young Havelock accompanied him, holding a command in a Goorkha battalion. It was while Lugard was dispersing the rebels near Jounpoor, that the lieutenant was killed by a shot from a hut in an obscure village.
Sir Edward, resuming his march towards Azimghur, reached that city at length on the 15th, somewhat vexed at the numerous delays that had occurred on his journey. On his arrival at the bridge of boats which crossed the small river Tons at that city, he encountered a portion of Koer Singh’s main army. They fought well, and with some determination; and it was not without a struggle that he defeated and dispersed them. Mr Venables, the civilian who had gained so high a reputation for courage during the earlier mutinous proceedings in the district, was wounded on this occasion. The East India Company had reason to be proud of its civilians, for the most part, during the troubles; Mr Venables was only one among many who nobly distinguished themselves. After this battle at the bridge, it soon became evident, as in many other instances, that the rebels had been too quick for their pursuers. Koer Singh and the main body of his force were quitting Azimghur on the one side just when Lugard entered it on the other; the fighting was merely with the rear guard, and all the rest of the insurgents marched off safely. As it was by no means desirable that they should escape to work mischief elsewhere, Sir Edward, on the 16th, sent off Brigadier Douglas in pursuit of them, with the 37th and 84th regiments, some cavalry and artillery. Lugard himself proposed to encamp for a while at Azimghur.
We have now for a time to leave Sir Edward Lugard, and to notice the unsatisfactory result of the operations which he initiated. The town of Arrah was destined to be the scene of another discomfiture of British troops, as mortifying if not as disastrous as that which occurred early in the mutiny, and inflicted by the same hand—Koer Singh. When this indefatigable rebel was driven out of Azimghur, he separated from some of the other chieftains, at a point which he believed would enable him to cross the Ganges into the district of Shahabad, where Arrah would be near at hand. He marched with two thousand sepoys and a host of rabble. Brigadier Douglas pursued him with great rapidity, marching a hundred miles in five days of great heat; he came up with the rebels at Bansdeh, defeated them, and drove them to Beyriah, Koer Singh himself being wounded. On the 21st, a portion of Douglas’s force again came up with the enemy while in the act of crossing the Ganges at Seoporeghat in the Ghazeepore district. It appeared that Koer Singh had cleverly outwitted Colonel Cumberlege, who, with two regiments of Madras cavalry, was endeavouring to aid Douglas in crushing him at a particular spot. Koer Singh did not wait to be crushed, but swiftly and silently marched to the Ganges at a spot not guarded by Cumberlege. When Douglas’s troops came up, they killed a few of the rebels, and captured two guns, six elephants, and much ammunition and treasure—but the interception had not been prompt enough; for Koer Singh and the greater part of his force had safely crossed to the right bank of the river. The remainder of Douglas’s column came up on the evening of this day, quite worn out with their long march, and needing some days’ rest. Koer Singh, although beaten first by Lugard and then by Douglas, had baffled them both in reference to a successful flight; and now it was his fortune (though wounded) to baffle a third British officer. The rebels reached Koer Singh’s hereditary domain of Jugdispore. The town of Arrah was at that time occupied by 150 men of H.M. 35th foot, 150 of Rattray’s Sikhs, and 50 seamen of the Naval Brigade—the whole under Captain Le Grand. This officer, hearing of the approach of the rebels, and knowing that small bodies had often defeated large armies during the course of the war, sallied forth to prevent the march of Koer Singh to Jugdispore, or else to disturb him at that place. He found them posted in a jungle. They were nearly two thousand in number, but dispirited, and without guns. Le Grand’s small force, with the two 12-pounder howitzers, encountered the enemy about two miles from Jugdispore, at daylight on the 23d. After an ineffectual firing of the howitzers, a bugle-call threw everything into confusion. Whether Le Grand, fearing to be surrounded, sounded a retreat, or whether some other signal was misinterpreted, it appears certain that his force fell into inextricable confusion; they abandoned guns and elephants, and fled towards Arrah, followed by numbers of the enemy, who shot and cut down many of them. The 35th suffered terribly; two-thirds of their number were either killed or wounded, including Captain Le Grand himself, Lieutenant Massey, and Dr Clarke. This mortifying calamity, in which the unfortunate Le Grand is said to have disobeyed instructions given by the superior officer of the district, gave rise to much bitter controversy. The 35th was one of those regiments of which the colonel was an old man, shattered in health, and not well fitted to head his troops in active service. It was also, in the heat of controversy, brought as a charge against him that he was a martinet in matters of discipline, and kept his soldiers in red cloth and pipe-clayed belts under the tremendous heat of an Indian sun. The charges, in this as in many similar cases, may have been overwrought; but all felt that the 35th had not behaved in such a way as English troops are wont to behave when well commanded—and hence the inference that they were _not_ well commanded.
A new series of operations became necessary as a consequence of this disaster near Jugdispore. The news hastened the movements of Brigadier Douglas, who on the 25th crossed the Ganges at Seenaghat, and pushed on the 84th foot and two guns towards Jugdispore. It was, however, not till the month of May that that jungle-haunt of rebels was effectually cleared out. Meanwhile a little had been doing at another spot in the same region. When, after the action at the bridge of Azimghur, Koer Singh’s force divided into three, one of these divisions, with several horse-artillery guns, marched towards Ghazeepore. Brigadier Gordon, at Benares, at once ordered two companies of H.M. 54th to proceed to Ghazeepore by hasty marches, half the number being carried on elephants or in ekahs. It was hoped that these troops, coming in aid of small numbers of royal troops, European cavalry, Madras cavalry, and two 6-pounder guns, already at Ghazeepore, would suffice to protect that important city from the rebels; and this hope was realised. Considerably to the northwest, between Goruckpore and the Oude frontier, Colonel Rowcroft maintained a small force, with which from time to time he repelled attacks made by the enemy. On the 17th of April, when at Amorah, his camp was attacked by three thousand rebels; the attack was not effectually resisted without eight hours’ hard fighting. The sepoys, almost for the first time in the war, endeavoured to resist a cavalry charge in British fashion, by kneeling in a line with upturned bayonets; but a corps of Bengal yeomanry cavalry made the charge with such impetuosity that the enemy were overthrown and a victory gained.
Such, in brief, was the general character of the operations eastward of Oude. We have next to touch upon those of Sir Hope Grant, in Oude itself.
This gallant general, as colonel of a cavalry regiment, had commenced his share in the war as a subordinate to one or more brigadiers; but he had since proved himself well worthy of the command of a column under his own responsibility. When Sir Colin Campbell parcelled out among his chief officers various duties consequent on the flight of the insurgents from Lucknow, a column or division was made up, to be commanded by Sir Hope Grant, to look after such of the rebels as had taken a northerly direction. His column consisted of H.M. 38th foot, one battalion of the Rifle Brigade, a regiment of Sikhs, H.M. 9th Lancers (Hope Grant’s own regiment), a small body of reliable native cavalry, two troops of horse-artillery, and a small siege and mortar train. It was known or believed that the Moulvie of Fyzabad had collected a force near Baree, about thirty miles north of Lucknow; and that the Begum of Oude, with several cart-loads of treasure, had fled for concealment to Bitowlie, the domain of a rebel named Gorhuccus Singh. To what extent Sir Hope Grant would be able to capture, intercept, or defeat the rebels in the service of these leaders, was a problem yet to be solved. He set out from Lucknow on the 11th of April, with Brigadier Horsford as his second in command. In the first three days the troops marched to Baree, on the Khyrabad road; and then was experienced one of the perplexities of the campaign. Every brigadier or divisional general was painfully impressed with the danger of moving in a country where the mass of the population was unfriendly. In many provinces the towns-people and villagers were for the most part disposed, if not to aid the British, at least to hold aloof; but the fact could not be concealed that the Oudians generally were in a rebellious state of feeling, and would gladly have aided to cut off the resources of Sir Colin’s lieutenants. It was merely one among many examples, when Sir Hope Grant set out towards the Gogra, in hopes to overtake the Begum and her fleeing forces; his column or field-force was accompanied by no less than 6000 hackeries or vehicles of various kinds, forming a line of nearly twenty miles; and it was essentially necessary, while assuming the offensive in front, that the flanks and rear of this immense train should be protected—a difficult duty in a hostile country. Scarcely had Grant approached near Baree, when the cavalry of the Moulvie’s rebel force got into his rear, and attempted to cut off the enormous baggage-train. Sir Hope was too good a general to be taken by surprise; but his rear-guard found enough to do to repel the attack made upon them, and to protect the enormous baggage-train. This done, and some horse-artillery guns captured, Sir Hope Grant resumed his march. Turning eastward from Baree, he marched towards the Gogra, in the hope of intercepting the flight of the Begum of Oude, her paramour Mummoo Khan, and a large force of rebels. On the 15th he reached Mohamedabad, on this route; and on the 17th he halted at Ramnuggur for a few days, while a strong reconnoitring party set forth to ascertain if possible the exact position and strength of the rebels. The news obtained was very indefinite, and amounted to little more than this—that the Begum and Mummoo Khan were retreating northward with one large force, and the Moulvie westward with another; but that it would not be very easy to catch either, as the sepoys were celebrated for celerity of movement during a retreat. Sir Hope Grant dispersed various bodies of rebels, and disturbed the plans of the Begum and the Moulvie; but he returned to Lucknow towards the close of the month without having caught either of those wily personages, and with many of his troops laid prostrate by the heat of the sun.
[Illustration:
GHAZEEPORE. ]
We turn now towards the west or northwest, on the Rohilcund side of Oude. It has already been mentioned, that after the fall of Lucknow, many of the rebel leaders fled to Rohilcund, with the hope of making a bold stand at Bareilly, Shahjehanpoor, Moradabad, and other towns in that province. Khan Bahadoor Khan, the self-appointed chief of Bareilly, was nominally the head of the whole confederacy in this region; but it depended on the chapter of accidents how long this leadership would continue. At any rate, Sir Colin Campbell saw that he could not allow this nest of rebels to remain untouched; Bareilly must be conquered, as Delhi and Lucknow had been. The veteran commander probably mourned in secret the necessity for sending his gallant troops on a long march, into a new field of action, with a sun blazing on them like a ball of fire; but seeing the necessity, he commanded, and they obeyed. His plan of strategy comprised a twofold line of action—an advance of one column northwestward from Lucknow; and an advance of another southeastward from Roorkee; the two columns to assist in clearing the border districts of Rohilcund, and then to meet at Bareilly, the chief city of the province. We will notice first the operations of the force on the northeast border.
Brigadier Jones, with the Roorkee field-force, commenced operations in the eastern part of Rohilcund, about the middle of April. His force consisted of H.M. 60th Rifles, the 1st Sikh infantry, Coke’s Rifles, the 17th Punjaub infantry, the Moultan Horse, with detachments of artillery and engineers. The force numbered three thousand good troops in all, and was strengthened by eight heavy and six light guns. Major (now Brigadier) Coke, whose Punjaub riflemen had gained for themselves so high a reputation, commanded the infantry portion of Jones’s column. The column marched from Roorkee on the 15th, and made arrangements for crossing to the left bank of the Ganges as soon as possible. A large number of the enemy having intrenched themselves at Nagul, about sixteen miles below Hurdwar on the left bank, Jones made his dispositions accordingly. He determined to send his heavy guns and baggage to the ghat opposite Nagul; while his main body should cross at Hurdwar, march down the river on the other side, and take the intrenchment in flank. This plan was completely carried out by the evening of the 17th—Nagul being taken, the enemy driven away with great loss, and the whole column safely encamped on that side of the Ganges which would afford easier access to the hot-bed of the rebels at Bareilly. Four days afterwards, Brigadier Jones encountered the Daranuggur insurgent force near Nageena or Nuggeena, on the banks of a canal. The insurgents maintained a fire for a time from nine guns; but Jones speedily attacked them with his cavalry, outflanked them, charged, captured the guns and six elephants, and put the enemy speedily to flight, after very considerable loss. Jones’s killed and wounded were few in number; but he had to regret the loss of Lieutenant Gostling, who was shot through the heart while heading some of the troops. The brigadier resumed his march. Luckily for British interests, Mooradabad was not so deeply steeped in rebellion as Bareilly; and the Rajah of Rampore, not far distant, was faithful so far as his small power would extend. The benefit of this state of affairs was felt at the time now under notice. Feroze Shah, one of the Shahzadas or princes of Delhi in league with the Bareilly mutineers, marched on the 21st of April towards Mooradabad, to demand money and supplies. He was refused; and much fighting and pillage resulted as consequences. Brigadier Jones’s column came up opportunely; he entered Mooradabad on the 26th, checked the plundering, drove out the rebels, captured many insurgent chieftains, and re-established the confidence of the towns-people. At the end of the month, Jones was still in Mooradabad or its neighbourhood, ready for co-operation in May with another column which we must now notice.
While Jones had been thus occupied, Bareilly and the rebels were threatened on the other side by the Rohilcund field-force. During the first two or three weeks after the conquest of Lucknow, Sir Colin Campbell was engaged in various plans which did not permit of the immediate dispatch of troops to Rohilcund; but on the 7th of April several regiments began to assemble at the Moosa Bagh, to form a small special army for service in that province. Why they were not despatched earlier, was one of the many problems which the commander-in-chief kept to himself. On the 9th this minor army, the Rohilcund field-force, set out, with General Walpole as its commander, and Brigadier Adrian Hope at the head of the infantry. The distance from Lucknow to Bareilly, about fifteen marches, was through a region so ill provided with roads that few or no night-marches could be made; it was necessary to have the aid of daylight to avoid plunging into unforeseen difficulties and dangers. As a consequence, the troops would be exposed to the heat of an Indian sun during their journey, and had to look forward to many trials on that account. Not the least among the numerous perplexities that arose out of the defective state of the roads, was the difficulty of dragging the guns which necessarily accompanied such a force; cavalry and infantry were, in all such cases, inevitably delayed by the necessity of waiting until the ponderous pieces of ordnance could arrive.[167]
Walpole’s field-force, resting at night under shady groves, it was hoped might reach Bareilly about the 24th of the month; and this was the more to be desired, seeing that Rohilcund, from its position in relation to numerous rivers, becomes almost impassable as soon as the rains set in—about the end of May or the beginning of June. Marching onward in accordance with the plan laid down, Walpole came on the 14th of April to one of the many forts which have so often been mentioned in connection with the affairs of Oude. The name of the place, situated about fifty miles from Lucknow, and ten from the Ganges, was variously spelled Rhodamow, Roodhamow, Roer, and Roowah; but whatever the spelling, the fort became associated in the minds of the British troops with more angry complainings than any other connected with the war; since it was the scene of a mortifying repulse which better generalship might have avoided, and which was accompanied by the death of a very favourite officer. Rhodamow was a small fort or group of houses enclosed by a high mud-wall, loopholed for musketry, provided with irregular bastions at the angles, and having two gates. It was a petty place, in relation to the largeness of the force about to attack it—nearly six thousand men. While marching through the jungle towards Rohilcund, Walpole heard that fifteen hundred insurgents had thrown themselves into this fort of Rhodamow; but the number proved to be much smaller. He attacked it with infantry without previously using his artillery, and without (as it would appear) a sufficient reconnaissance. He sent on the 42d Highlanders and the 4th Punjaub infantry to take the fort; but no sooner did the troops approach it than they were received by so fierce and unexpected a fire of musketry, from a concealed enemy, that not only was the advance checked, but the gallant Brigadier Adrian Hope was killed at the head of his Highlanders. The troops could not immediately and effectually reply to this fire, for their opponents were hidden behind the loopholed wall. Everything seems to have been thrown into confusion by this first fatal mistake; the supports were sent up too late, or to the wrong place; and the exasperated troops were forced to retire, amid yells of triumph from the enemy. The heavy guns were then brought to do that which they ought to have done at first; they began to breach the wall, but the enemy quietly evacuated the fort during the night, with scarcely any loss. Besides Adrian Hope, several other officers were either killed or wounded, and nearly a hundred rank and file. During this mortifying disaster, in which the Highlanders were particularly unfortunate in the loss of officers, Quartermaster Sergeant Simpson, of the 42d, displayed that daring spirit of gallantry which so endears a soldier to his companions. When the infantry had been recalled from the attack, Simpson heard that two officers of his regiment had been left behind, dead or wounded in the ditch outside the wall. He rushed out, seized the body of Captain Bromley, and brought it back amid a torrent of musketry; setting forth again, he brought in the body of Captain Douglas in a similar way, and he did not cease until seven had been thus brought away—to be recovered if only wounded, to be decently interred if dead. It was a day, however, the memory of which could not be sweetened by any such displays of gallantry, or by many subsequent victories; the men of the two Highland regiments felt as if a deep personal injury had been inflicted on them by the commander of the column. Sir Colin Campbell, when the news of this untoward event reached him, paid a marked compliment to Adrian Hope in his dispatch. ‘The death of this most distinguished and gallant officer causes the deepest grief to the commander-in-chief. Still young in years, he had risen to high command; and by his undaunted courage, combined as it was with extreme kindness and charm of manner, had secured the confidence of his brigade in no ordinary degree.’ Viscount Canning, in a like spirit, officially notified that ‘no more mournful duty has fallen upon the governor-general in the course of the present contest than that of recording the premature death of this distinguished young commander.’
General Walpole pursued his march, and had a successful encounter on the 22d with a large body of the enemy at Sirsa. His cavalry and artillery attacked them so vigorously as to capture their guns and camp, and to drive them over the Ramgunga in such haste as to leave them no time for destroying the bridge of boats at that place. This achievement was fortunate, for it enabled Walpole on the 23d to transport his heavy guns quickly and safely over the Ramgunga at Allygunje. A few days after this, he was joined by the commander-in-chief, whose movements we must next notice.
It was immediately after Sir Colin Campbell’s return from his interview with the governor-general at Allahabad, that he withdrew from Lucknow all the remaining troops, except those destined for the defence of that important city, and for the re-establishment of British influence in Oude. He formed an expeditionary army, which he headed himself—or rather, the army set forth from Lucknow to Cawnpore, and the commander-in-chief joined it at the last-named place on the 17th of April. The result of the conference at Allahabad had been, a determination to march up the Doab to Furruckabad, and to attack the Rohilcund rebels on a side where neither Jones nor Walpole could well reach them. The heat was great, the rivers were rising, and the rains were coming in a few weeks; and it became now a question whether the movements from Lucknow as a centre had or had not been too long delayed. Sir Colin with his column—for, being a mere remnant, it was too small a force to designate an army—took their departure from Cawnpore on the 18th, leaving that city in the hands of a small but (at present) sufficient body of troops. On the 19th he advanced to Kilianpore, on the 20th to Poorah, and on the 21st to Urrowl—marching during early morn, and encamping in the hotter hours of the day. The day’s work commenced, indeed, so early as one o’clock in the morning; when the elephants and camels began to be loaded with their burdens, the equipage and tents packed up, and the marching arrangements completed. Between two or three o’clock, all being in readiness, away went infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, commissariat, and a countless host of natives, horses, camels, elephants, bullocks, and vehicles—covering an area of which the real soldiers occupied but a very small part. They marched or rode till about six o’clock; when all prepared for breakfast, and for a hot day during which little active exertion was possible without imminent danger of _coup de soleil_. Sir Colin’s train of munition and supplies was enormous; for, in addition to the usual baggage of an army, he had to take large commissariat supplies with him. The villagers held aloof in a manner not usual in the earlier stages of the mutiny, and in other parts of India; they did not come forward to engage in a traffic which would certainly have been profitable to them, in selling provisions to the army. Whether this arose from inability or disinclination, was a matter for controversy; but the fact itself occasioned embarrassment and uneasiness to a commander who had to drag with his army a huge train of animals and vehicles filled with food. The enormous number of natives, too, that accompanied the force, with their wives and families, exerted its usual cumbrous effect on the movements of the troops; so that the fighting-men themselves bore but a minute fractional ratio to the living and dead accompaniments of the column. It is useless to complain of this. An army of five thousand, or any other number, of British troops _must_ have a large train of native attendants, to contend against the peculiarities of Indian climate and Indian customs. Mr Russell, marching with this portion of the late ‘Army of Oude,’ said: ‘If the people we see around us, who are ten or twelve to one as compared with us in this camp, were—not to arm and cut our throats, or poison us, or anything of that kind—but simply bid us a silent good-bye this night, and leave us, India would be lost to us in a day. It requires only that, and all the power of England could not hold the eastern empire. We could not even strike our tents without these men to-morrow. We are dependent on them—even the common soldier is—for the water we drink and the meals we eat, for our transport, for all but the air we breathe; and the latter, it must be admitted, is not improved by them sometimes. The moment that such a thing becomes possible as a popular desertion, through patriotic or any other motives, from the service of the state, it becomes impossible to hold India except upon sufferance. It is the rupee, self-interest, and the necessities of a population trained to follow camps, which afford guarantees against such a secession—unlikely enough indeed in any nation, and scarcely possible in any war.... We are, in fact, waging war against Hindoos and Mussulmans by the aid and with the consent of other Hindoos and Mussulmans, just as Alexander was able to beat Porus by the aid of his Indian allies; and no European or other state can ever rule in India without the co-operation and assistance of a large proportion of the races which inhabit the vast peninsula.’
Sir Colin marched on the 22d to Meerun-ke-serai, near the ruins of the ancient city of Canouje; on the 23d to Gosaigunje; and on the 24th to Kamalgunje—approaching each day nearer to Furruckabad. Every day’s camping-ground was selected near the Ganges, both for the sake of salubrity, and to check if possible the passage of rebel bands over the river from Oude into the Doab. On the 25th the column reached Furruckabad, or rather the adjacent English station of Futteghur. General Penny came from a neighbouring district to confer with the commander-in-chief on matters connected with the Rohilcund campaign, and then returned to the column or brigade which he commanded. Futteghur had regained a part of its former importance, as the place where most of the artillery-carriages and sepoy-clothing were made, and where vast quantities of timber and cloth had fallen as spoil to the enemy.
The sojourn at Futteghur was very brief. The electric telegraph had been busy transmitting information to and from Allahabad; and as Sir Colin’s plans were already made, he lost no time in putting them in execution. The main plan comprised four movements—Campbell from Futteghur, Walpole from Lucknow, Jones from Roorkee, and Penny from Puttealee; all intended to hem the rebels into the middle of Rohilcund, and there crush them. The marches of Walpole and Jones have already been noticed; Penny was to march his column towards Meerunpore Muttra, between Shahjehanpoor and Bareilly, after crossing the Ganges near Nudowlee; while the commander-in-chief was to enter Rohilcund directly from Futteghur. In the middle of the night between the 26th and 27th his column, elephants and guns and all, crossed the Ganges by the bridge of boats, and entered the province which was to be a scene of hostilities. After a few hours the column reached the river Ramgunga, which it crossed by the bridge of boats fortunately secured by Walpole as the fruit of his victory at Allygunje; and soon afterwards the commander-in-chief effected a junction with Walpole, at Tingree near the Ramgunga. No very long time for repose was allowed; stern work was to be done, and the sooner commenced, the less would it be checked by heat and prohibited by rains. A march of a few hours brought the now united columns to Jelalabad—one of many places of that name in India. It was a fort which had lately been occupied by a small body of matchlockmen, who had precipitately abandoned it when news of Sir Colin’s approach reached them. A small village lay near, and was governed by the fort. The Moulvie of Fyzabad was believed to have intended to make a stand at this place, but to have abandoned it for a larger stronghold at Shahjehanpoor. On the 29th, a further approach was made to Kanth. Each day was pretty well like that which preceded it—the same early marching, camping, and resting, and the same struggle with the camp-followers, who, however closely watched, pertinaciously plundered the villages through or near which they passed—thereby terrifying and exasperating all villagers alike, whether friendly or unfriendly to the British. This system of plunder by the camp-followers was one of the greatest troubles to which the generals of the several columns were exposed; severe punishments were threatened, but all in vain.
It was on the last day of the month that Sir Colin Campbell and General Walpole arrived at Shahjehanpoor; and then it was to learn that the wily and active Moulvie had again outmanœuvred them. The plan had been to draw a cordon more and more closely round the rebels at Shahjehanpoor and Bareilly, and thus to catch them as in a trap. But the Moulvie would not enter the trap. He held Shahjehanpoor, with a considerable force of men and guns, as long as he deemed it safe, and then escaped just at the right moment. It was well to regain Shahjehanpoor, after that place had been eleven months in the hands of rebels; but it was vexing to learn that the Moulvie had retreated towards Oude—the very province where his presence was least desired by the British. Nena Sahib, it was also ascertained, had quitted Shahjehanpoor a few days earlier, and just before leaving, had ordered the government buildings to be destroyed, in order that the British troops might find no shelter when they arrived. This cowardly, ruthless, but active and inventive chieftain succeeded in his aim in this matter; there were few roofed buildings left, and the encampment had to be effected under a tope of trees, with earthen intrenchments thrown up around.
It is evident, from this summary of Rohilcund affairs, that the operations against the rebels in that province did not advance far during the month of April, as concerns any effective crushing of the rebellion. The insurgents were beaten wherever met with; but their ubiquity and vitality greatly puzzled Sir Colin and his brigadier; and it remained to be seen how far the month of May would witness the re-establishment of British authority in Rohilcund and Oude. Some of the columns and field-forces had penetrated from the east and south as far as Shahjehanpoor, others from the west and northwest as far as Mooradabad; but Bareilly, the chief city in Rohilcund, had not been reached by any of them at the end of April.
Few events caused more regret in the army at this period than the death of Captain Sir William Peel, the gallant seaman who had earned so high a reputation as commander of the Naval Brigade. After his wound, received at Lucknow, he was carried in a doolie or litter to Cawnpore; and when at that station he gradually became able to walk about slowly by the aid of a stick. He soon, however, exhibited symptoms of small-pox, which,
## acting on a system at once ardent and debilitated, proved fatal. He died
at Cawnpore after Sir Colin Campbell’s force had departed from that place towards Futteghur; and thus the Queen and the country lost the services of an eminent son of an eminent statesman. Every one felt the justice of the special compliment paid to this gallant naval officer by the governor-general, in the official order issued immediately on the receipt of the news of Peel’s death.[168] Throughout the Crimean, Persian, and Indian wars, the British navy had been engaged in less fighting than many of its ardent members wished; and it was therefore all the more incumbent on the authorities to notice the exertions of naval brigades when on shore.
Throughout the extent of the Upper Doab, the British officers found much difficulty in maintaining a fair stand against the rebels. Not that there were large bodies of trained sepoys in the field, as in the regions just described, and in Central India; but there were numerous chieftains, each at the head of a small band of followers, ready to harass any spot not protected by English troops. Brigadier Penny, in command of a field-force organised at Delhi, was watching the district between that city and the Ganges—ready to put down insurgents wherever he could encounter them, and hoping to assist the commander-in-chief in Rohilcund. Another column, under Brigadier Seaton, controlled the region around Futteghur before Sir Colin reached that place; and he, like Penny, Jones, Walpole, Hope Grant, Lugard, and all the other commanders of sections of the army, found an active watchfulness of the enemy necessary. One among Seaton’s engagements in the month of April may be briefly noticed. On the 6th, when evening had darkened into night, he marched from Futteghur to attack a body of rebels concerning whom he had received information. He took with him about 1400 men—comprising 600 of H.M. 82d under Colonel Hall, 400 Sikhs under Captain Stafford, 150 cavalry under Lieutenant St John, and 200 of the Futteghur mounted-police battalion under Lieutenant de Kantzow—together with five guns under Major Smith. After marching all night, Seaton came up with the enemy at seven in the morning, at a place called Kankur. The enemy’s force was very large, though not well organised, and included nearly a thousand troopers well mounted and armed. After an artillery-fire on both sides, and a sharp fire from Enfield rifles, the 82d rushed forward, entered the village, and worked terrible execution. The rebels fled, abandoning their camp, ammunition, and stores; together with papers and correspondence which threw light on some of the hitherto obscure proceedings of the mutineers. The rebel Rajah of Minpooree was the chief leader of the insurgents, and with him were Ismael Khan and Mohson Ali Khan.
The Minpooree district was much troubled by this rebellious rajah; but as Futteghur on the one side, and Agra on the other, were now in English hands, the rebels were more readily kept in subjection. Agra itself was safe, and so was the main line of road thence through Muttra to Delhi.
One of the few pleasant scenes of the month, at Delhi, was the awarding of honour and profit to a native who had befriended Europeans in the hour of greatest need. Ten months before, when mutiny was still new and terrible, the native troops at Bhurtpore rose in revolt, and compelled the Europeans in the neighbourhood to flee for their lives. The poor fugitives, thirty-two in number—chiefly women and children—roamed from place to place, uncertain where they might sleep in peace. On one day they arrived at the village of Mahonah. Here they met with one Hidayut Ali, a ressaldar (troop-captain), of a regiment of irregular cavalry which had mutinied at Mozuffernugger; he was on furlough or leave of absence at his native village, and did not join his mutinous companions. He received the fugitives with kindness and courtesy, fed them liberally, gave them a comfortable house, renewed their toil-worn garments, posted village sentries to give notice of the approach of any mutineers, disregarded a rebuke sent to him by the insurgents at Delhi, formed the villagers into an escort, and finally placed the thirty-two fugitives in a position which enabled them safely to reach Agra. This noble conduct was not forgotten. In April the commissioner held a grand durbar at Delhi, made a complimentary speech to Hidayut Ali, presented him with a sword valued at a thousand rupees, and announced that the government intended to bestow upon him the jaghire or revenues of his native village.
Good-fortune continued to mark the wide and important region of the Punjaub, in the absence of any of those great assemblages of rebels which so distracted the provinces further to the southeast. Nevertheless Sir John Lawrence found a demand on him for unceasing watchfulness. The longer the struggle continued in Hindostan and Central India, the more danger was there that the Punjaubees, imbibing an idea that the British were weak, would encourage a hope of regaining national independence. There was also a grave question involved in the constitution of the native army. When the troubles began in the month of May, and when Canning was beset with so many difficulties in his attempt to send up troops from Calcutta, John Lawrence came to the rescue in a manner deserving the lasting gratitude of all concerned in the maintenance of British rule in India. He felt a trusty reliance that the inhabitants of the Punjaub, governed as he (aided by Montgomery, Cotton, Edwardes, and other energetic men) had governed them, would remain faithful, and would be willing to accept active service as soldiers in British pay. His trust was well founded. He sent to Delhi those troops, without which the conquest of the city could not have been effected; and he continued to raise regiment after regiment of Sikhs and Punjaubees—equipping, drilling, and paying a number so large as to constitute in itself a powerful army. But there would necessarily be a limit to this process. The Sikhs were faithful so far; but what if they should begin to feel their power, and turn to a national object the arms which had been given to them to fight in the British cause? Not many years had elapsed since they had fought fiercely at Moultan and Lahore, Sobraon and Chillianwalla, Moodkee and Ferozshah, against those very English whom they were now defending; and it was at least possible, if not probable, that dreams of reconquest might occupy their thoughts. Sir John Lawrence brought to an end his further raising of regiments; and there can be little doubt that the governor-general and the commander-in-chief appreciated the motives by which he had been influenced. In political affairs the Punjaub was very active; for not only did Lawrence become chief authority over a larger region than before, but many of his assistants were taken away from him. When Sir James Outram went to Calcutta as a member of the supreme council, Mr Montgomery was appointed chief-commissioner of Oude, and took with him many of the most experienced civilians from Lahore to Lucknow. This necessitated great changes in the _personnel_ of the Punjaub civil service, the commissionerships and sub-commissionerships of districts, &c.
Peshawur, the most remote portion of Northwest India, was throughout the period of the Revolt more troubled by marauding mountaineers than by revolted sepoys. Very few Hindoos inhabited that region; the population was mostly Mussulman, especially among the hills; and these followers of Islam had but little sympathy with those in Hindostan Proper. The disturbances, such as they were, were of local character. In April, it became necessary to visit with some severity certain tribes which throughout the winter had been engaged in rebellion and rapine. General Cotton and Colonel Edwardes, two of the most trusted officers in the Indian army, collected a column at Nowsherah for service against the hill-men; and at the close of the month there were nearly four thousand men in rendezvous, ready for service. It comprised detachments of H.M. 81st and 98th foot; of the 8th, 9th, and 18th Punjaub infantry; of other native infantry; of the 7th and 18th irregular cavalry; of the Guide cavalry; and of various artillery and engineer corps. On the 28th of the month, Cotton was at a place among the hills called Mungultana, a stronghold of some of the frontier fanatics. The place was easily taken, and the insurgents dispersed; as they were at Jelemkhana, Sitana, and other places, soon afterwards; but it was hard work for the troops, over very bad roadless tracks in hot weather.
[Illustration:
Fort of Peshawur. ]
It was a strange but hopeful sign that, amid all the sanguinary proceedings in India—the ruthless barbarities of some among the sepoys and rebels, and the military retributions wrought by the British—amid all this, the peaceful, civilising agency of railways was steadily though slowly advancing. A recent chapter shewed that the grand trunk-railway was extended into the Doab, the very hot-bed of insurrection, during the month of March: the engineers, mechanics, and labourers having been accustomed to resume their operations as soon as the insurgents were driven away from any spot where the works were in progress. In the Madras and Bombay presidencies, little affected by rebellion, various railways were gradually advancing; and now, in the month of April, the province of Sinde was to have its heyday of railway rejoicing. In an earlier portion of the volume,[169] a brief account was given of the schemes, present and prospective, for supplying India with railways. Among those was one for a line, 120 miles in length, from Kurachee to Hydrabad in Sinde: expected, if no difficulties intervened, to be finished towards the close of 1859. This was to be one link in a vast and extensive chain, if the hopes of its projectors were ever realised. Kurachee is not at the mouth of the Indus; but it has an excellent harbour, in which large merchantmen can cast anchor; and engineers were enabled to shew that a little over one hundred miles of railway would connect this port with the Indus at a point above the delta of that river, and just where Hydrabad, the chief city of Sinde, is situated. Such a railway would, in fact, bear a remarkably close analogy to that in Egypt, from Alexandria to Cairo—each connecting a seaport with a capital, and avoiding delta navigation much impeded by shallows and shifting sands. From Hydrabad there are 570 miles of Indus available for river-steaming up to Moultan, in the Punjaub. From that city a railway would be planned through Lahore to Umritsir, where a junction would be formed with the grand trunk-line, and thus Kurachee connected with Calcutta by rapid means of travel—a great scheme, worthy of the age and the country. It could, however, only have small beginnings. On the 29th of April, the first sod of the ‘Sinde Railway’ was turned at Kurachee. It would be well if all rejoicings were based on such rational grounds as those which marked that day in the young Alexandria of Western India. Mr Frere, commissioner of Sinde, presided over the ceremonies. All was gaiety. The 51st regiment lent its aid in military pomp; and all the notabilities of the place—political, military, naval, clerical, commercial, and engineering—were gathered together. And not only so; but the lookers-on comprised many of those who well marvelled what a railway could be, and how a carriage could move without visible means of draught or propulsion—Parsees, Hindoos, Beloochees, Sindians, Afghans, Punjaubees—all were there, with their picturesque garments, and their little less picturesque native vehicles. How the officiating dignitary turned the sod and wheeled the barrow; how the band played and the people cheered; how the chief personages celebrated the event by a dinner; how, at that dinner, a triumphant specimen of confectionary was displayed, comprising sweetmeat Kurachees, Calcuttas, rivers, mosques, ghats, temples, wheelbarrows, pick-axes, rails, locomotives, bridges, tunnels—need not be told: they belong to one remarkable aspect of modern European and American society, which becomes doubly interesting when exhibited among the less active, more sensuous orientals.
We now turn to that stormy, unsettled region southwest of the Jumna, comprising Bundelcund, Central India, and Rajpootana.
Probably no commander had a series of more uninterrupted successes during the wars of the mutiny than Sir Hugh Rose. Looking neither to Calcutta nor to the Punjaub, for aid, but relying on the resources of the Bombay presidency, he gradually accumulated a force for service in Central India which defeated the rebels wherever they were met with. We have seen that, in January, Sir Hugh was busily engaged in defeating and dispersing rebels at Ratgurh, and in various parts of the district between Bhopal and Saugor. We find him in February relieving the British garrison which had for so many months been shut up within the fort of the last-named city, and then clearing a vast range of country in the direction of Jhansi. Lastly, we have seen how, after subduing a district in which rebellious Mahrattas were very numerous, he approached nearer and nearer to Jhansi during the early weeks of March; that he arrived within a short distance of that city on the 21st of that month, with the second brigade of the Central India field-force; that the rebels fortified the walls of the town, and shut themselves up within the town and fort; that the mutinied sepoys and rebel Bundelas in the place were computed at eleven or twelve thousand; that the Ranee of Jhansi had left her palace to seek greater safety in the fort; that Rose’s first brigade joined him on the 25th; and that he then commenced the siege in a determined manner. From this point, the narrative of Sir Hugh’s operations may be carried into the following month.
Before the first week in April had terminated, this distinguished general had gained very considerable advantages over the enemy. At daybreak on the first of the month, his force encountered an army of the enemy outside the walls of Jhansi, and completely defeated them. The rebels were commanded by a Mahratta chieftain, Tanteea Topee, a relative of Nena Sahib, who had marched thither in the hope of being able to relieve his brother rebels shut up within the beleaguered city. Sir Hugh divided his force into two parts—one to continue the siege, and the other to meet Tanteea Topee in the field. The rebels, including among their number two regiments of the traitorous Gwalior Contingent, fought desperately; but Rose succeeded in turning their left flank with artillery and cavalry, breaking up their array, and putting them to flight. It was a severe contest, for the rebels defended themselves individually to the last, even when their order of battle was broken. Rose pursued them to the river Betwah, and captured all their guns and ammunition. During the pursuit, they endeavoured to check him by setting the jungle on fire; but his cavalry and horse-artillery, nothing daunted, galloped through the flames, and kept close at the heels of the fugitives. The whole line of retreat became strewed with dead bodies; and it was estimated that the day’s sanguinary work had cost the enemy not less than fifteen hundred men.
This battle was followed by a result more favourable than Sir Hugh had ventured to hope. The ranee, shut up within Jhansi, well knew that Tanteea Topee was hastening to her assistance; for there was everywhere an intercommunication between the insurgents too close for the British to baffle. She knew of his approach, and hoped that he would be able to defeat and drive away the besiegers; but the battle of the Betwah dismayed her, and the result was very favourable to the British. In arranging for the siege, Sir Hugh divided his infantry into four detachments, two on the right and two on the left. H.M. 86th, and the 25th Bombay infantry, soon gained the walls, some by breach and others by escalade. Lieutenant Dartnell of the 86th, who was foremost in the assault, narrowly escaped being cut to pieces directly he entered the place. These two regiments were on the left attack. The attack on the right was less successful, owing to the use of defective ladders; the troops were for some time exposed to a murderous fire; but at length they entered the place, and joined their companions near the ranee’s palace. A discovery was now made. The ranee had evacuated the place during the night, with such of her troops as could break through the cordon which Rose endeavoured to draw round Jhansi. In the endeavour of the garrison to escape, the slaughter was terrible; insomuch that, during the storming of the fort and the pursuit of the garrison, more than three thousand of the rebels were laid low, besides the fifteen hundred during the battle. Much of this slaughter was within the city itself; for the towns-people were believed to have favoured the rebels, and the soldiers took severe vengeance before their officers could check the bloodshed. All this stern fighting could not be carried on without loss on the part of the British. Sir Hugh had to lament the fall of Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull, Captain Sinclair, Lieutenants Meicklejohn and Park, and Dr Stack, besides a number of non-commissioned officers and privates. The evacuation of the place in so sudden a way greatly lessened his chance of loss, for its defence might have been long continued. ‘Jhansi,’ he said in his telegraphic dispatch, ‘is not a fort, but its strength makes it a fortress; it could not have been breached; it could only have been taken by mining and blowing up one bastion after another.’
After this signal defeat of the rebels at Jhansi, the victorious army of Sir Hugh gradually prepared to move towards Calpee, a town on the Jumna, on the line of road from Jhansi to Cawnpore. Symptoms appeared to shew that a struggle would take place at this spot. Two rebel leaders made renewed exertions to regain lost ground in that region. The chief of these was Tanteea Topee, lately defeated at Jhansi; he had with him two mutinied infantry regiments, seven hundred cavalry, a large following of Ghazees or fanatics, and twelve guns. The other was Ram Rao Gobind, who had the command of three thousand rabble and four guns. These two leaders resolved to act on some common plan; and Sir Hugh Rose equally resolved to defeat them. Nevertheless this gallant officer had much need for careful planning long after he was master of Jhansi. He had a large number of sick and wounded, whose safety it would be necessary to provide for; and the roads around that city were still infested with remnants of the Kotah rebels and the Chanderee garrison. He himself remained at Jhansi until such time as he could resume his march without danger to those left behind; but he gave active employment to portions of his force. About the middle of the month he sent Major Orr with a column from Jhansi across the Betwah to Mhow, to clear that part of the country of rebels, and afterwards to join Rose and the main body of the force on the road to Calpee; the major had many small encounters with the rajahs of Bampore and Shagurh, and with detached parties of rebels. Some days afterwards, on the 21st, Sir Hugh despatched Major Gall, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, to a point on the Calpee road, to watch the enemy and aid Major Orr if necessary. Gall, besides other minor engagements, captured a fort belonging to the Rajah of Sumpter; the rebels in it proved to be disguised mutineers of the 12th Bengal native infantry, who fought desperately until all were killed. Sir Hugh, with his first brigade and head-quarters, did not take his departure from Jhansi until the 25th. He marched ten miles that day to Boregaum, on the Calpee road, and resumed his progress on subsequent days. His second brigade was soon to follow him—with the exception of detachments of the 3d Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, and artillery, left under the charge of Colonel Liddell to protect Jhansi and the sick and wounded. Rumours reached Sir Hugh that four of the rebel leaders—the Ranee of Jhansi, Tanteea Topee, the Rajah of Shagurh, and the Rajah of Bampore—with seven thousand men and four guns, intended if possible to intercept him, and prevent his march to Calpee. To what result all these manœuvres on both sides led, was left to the month of May to determine.
While these operations were going on in and near the Jhansi district, General Whitlock, with a column of Madras troops, was engaged a little further eastward, in a district of Bundelcund having Banda for its chief town. He was frequently in contact with large or small bodies of rebels. One of these struggles took place on the 19th of April, when he encountered a force of seven thousand insurgents headed by the Nawab of Banda. Whitlock defeated the Nawab, captured Banda, killed five hundred of the enemy, and took several guns. After this victory, he gradually worked his way towards Calpee, to aid in Rose’s operations.
The city of Saugor remained in a somewhat peculiar condition during the spring months—secure itself, but surrounded by a disturbed district. The European residents were living in cantonments, sufficiently protected by troops left there by General Whitlock after he relieved the place early in February. These troops were neither stationary nor idle; the vicinity was swarming with rebels and malcontents, whom it was necessary to check by frequent pursuit and defeat. Those two exceptions to the generally mutinous condition of the Bengal native army, the 31st and 42d regiments, still remained in and near Saugor—or such portions of them as had not become tainted by insubordination. Divided into small detachments, they assisted the European and Madras troops in keeping open the line of communication between Saugor and the district marked by the victorious operations of Sir Hugh Rose.
Turning to the Mahratta and Rajpootana states, we find that, on the 2d of April, a large body of rebels, many thousands in number, with ten guns, crossed the Parbuttee river at Copoind into Scindia’s Gwalior territory. They were fleeing from Kotah, where a British force had severely handled them. Scindia still remained true to his alliance. Many of his officers, each with a small force, opposed the rebels at different points, drove them back across the river, and overturned many of their guns and wagons in the stream. The rebels, accompanied by large numbers of women and children, made their way by other routes towards Bundelcund.
Kotah, just mentioned, was closely connected with the insurgent and military operations in Rajpootana. It will be remembered[170] that in the month of March General Roberts, commanding the Rajpootana field-force, marched from Nuseerabad towards Kotah, accompanied by Richard Lawrence as political representative; that many difficulties had to be surmounted on the march; that Kotah was reached on the 22d; and that Roberts captured that place just before the end of the month, defeating a large body of rebels, and obtaining possession of an extensive store of ordnance and ammunition. After this victory, Roberts remained a long time at Kotah. Many other places would have welcomed his appearance; but there were doubts how far Kotah could safely be left, seeing that the neighbourhood was in a very disaffected state. The Kotah rebels, on the other hand, were greatly disconcerted at the news of the fall of Jhansi, which interfered with their plans and hopes. They had been camping for a while at Kularus, on the road from Gwalior to Bombay, but began now to move off towards the south. Captain Mayne, with some of Scindia’s troops, was at that place on the 11th of April, and found that the Kotah rebels, about four thousand strong, with six guns, had joined the rebel Rajah of Nirwur, six miles distant. Captain Mayne was preparing to watch and follow them, but the troops at his command consisted of only a few hundred men, and he could do little more than reconnoitre. Later in the month, General Roberts organised a column to look after the rebels at Goonah, Chupra, and other places. The column consisted of H.M. 95th foot, the 10th Bombay native infantry, a wing of the 8th hussars, a wing of the 1st lancers, and a troop of horse-artillery; and it started from Kotah for active service on the 24th. Thus the month of April passed away; Roberts himself remaining at Kotah; while some of his officers, each with a detachment of the Rajpootana field-force, were engaged in chastising bodies of rebels in the turbulent region on the border of the Rajpoot and Mahratta territories. Like Sir Hugh Rose at Jhansi, he had to consider how his conquered city would fare if he quitted it.
The province of Gujerat, lying as it does between Rajpootana and Bombay, was narrowly watched by the government of that presidency; and as one precaution, all the inhabitants were disarmed. On the 8th of April, a field-force, comprising about a thousand men of all arms, left Ahmedabad to conduct the disarming. Another column of about the same strength was preparing to march from the same station about a week later. It was expected that the difficulties of the troops would arise, not so much from the opposition of the natives, as from the gradually increasing heat of the weather.
Southward of Bombay there was still, as in the earlier months of the year, just so much of insubordination as to need careful watching on the part of the government, but without presenting any very alarming symptoms. The small Mahratta state of Satara was a little troubled. Two officers of the recently deposed rajah, his commander-in-chief and his commandant of artillery, were detected in treasonable correspondence with Nena Sahib. One of them, having been found guilty, was sentenced to be hanged; the indignity struck with horror one imbued with high-caste notions, and he asked to be blown away from a gun as a more noble death; this was refused; and under the influence of dismay and grief, he made a confession which afforded a clue to a further conspiracy. There was much in these southern Mahrattas which puzzled the authorities. To what extent the natives were bound into a brotherhood by secret compact, the English never could and never did know. Much comment was excited by an occurrence at Kolapore, where two native officers were blown away from guns, on conviction of being concerned in the mutiny and rebellion. It was remembered that those very men had sat on courts-martial which condemned numbers of their fellow-mutineers to the same punishment which was their own ultimate doom. One of the principal witnesses against them was a colleague whom they had sentenced to death, but who escaped by making a confession which implicated them. Many others, however, condemned by the court of which these two men were members, died without making a similar confession, although it was believed that they also might have implicated their judges.
Note.
_Native Police of India._—So peculiar was the position of the native police of India—as a medium between the military and the civilians, and between the government and the people—that it may be desirable to say a few words on the organisation of that body. All parties agreed that this organisation was defective in many points, and numerous reforms were suggested; but the Revolt found the police system still in force unreformed. The information here given is obtained chiefly from a dispatch sent from the India House about six months before the Revolt began, at a time when few or none saw the dark shadow that was hovering over our eastern empire.
In Bengal, each district was subdivided into smaller jurisdictions, each having its local police. The police were charged with duties both preventive and detective. They were prohibited from inquiring into cases of a petty nature; but complaints in cases of a more serious character were usually laid before the police _darogah_—whose duties were something more than those of an English police superintendent, something less than those of an English magistrate. The darogah was authorised to examine the complaints brought before him, to issue process of arrest, to summon witnesses, to examine the accused, and to forward the case to the magistrate or collector-magistrate, or submit a report of his proceedings, according as the evidence seemed to warrant the one or the other course.
In the Northwest Provinces the native revenue-officers called _tehsildars_ were, at the discretion of the government, invested with the powers of police darogahs; whereas in Bengal the revenue service was kept wholly distinct from the police or magisterial.
In the Madras presidency, the duties ordinarily performed in Bengal by the police darogahs were, even more generally than in the Northwest Provinces, performed by the tehsildar; indeed it was a recognised part of the system that the tehsildar and the darogah were the same person. This double function carried with it an increase of power. The Madras tehsildar-darogah was authorised, not only to inquire into petty cases (which the Bengal darogah was prohibited from doing), but also to proceed in certain specified instances to judgment, sentence, and the infliction of punishment.
In the Bombay presidency, the revenue and police functions were, until a recent period, combined in the same way as in Madras. The tehsildars, besides their revenue duties, were authorised in their police capacity to investigate all complaints of a criminal nature, and to exercise a penal jurisdiction in respect of certain petty offences. Within a few months before the Revolt, however, a change was made in the organisation. A new officer, a superintendent of police, was placed under the magistrate. The magistrate, confining himself for the most part to judicial and administrative matters, left to his superintendent of police the control of the executive police and the command of the entire stipendiary body, with the initiative in the prevention and detection of crime. To aid this superintendent in the supervision of the district police, there was placed in each police division an officer called joint-police _amildar_; whose duties, in regard to the preservation of the public peace and the investigation of serious crimes, were nearly similar to those of the Bengal darogah, but without including any power of punishing even for the most trivial offences.
It thus appears that, apart from the penal powers exercised by the Madras district police, the Bengal _darogah_, the Madras _tehsildar_, and the Bombay _amildar_, all acted to a certain extent judicially when engaged in investigating crimes of a serious nature. They examined the parties and the evidence, and they formed a judgment on the case to the extent of deciding whether it was one for the immediate arrest of the accused and transmission to the magistrate, or otherwise.
No doubt the founders of this police system anticipated beneficial results from it; but those results were not obtained. It was very inefficient for the detection of crime, and almost useless for prevention. There were defects both in organisation and in procedure. The police force attached to each division was too much localised and isolated; and the notion of combination between any separate parts of it, with a view of accomplishing extensive police objects, was seldom entertained. Although unable to check crime to the extent intended and hoped for, the police were very unscrupulous in their mode of wielding their authority, and bore a very general character for oppression and corruption. The great source of mischief was found to be, the want of efficient control and overlooking. The native police had a proneness to oriental modes of administering justice, in which bribery and barbarity perform a great part: this tendency required to be constantly checked by Europeans; and if the magistrate or collector-magistrate found his time too fully occupied to exercise this supervision, the police wrought much mischief, and brought the English ‘raj’ into disfavour. Where the district was smaller than usual, or where the magistrate was more than commonly zealous and active, the police were found to be more efficient through more supervision. Whenever it was found necessary to grapple effectually with any particular crimes, such as _thuggee_ or _dacoitee_, the ordinary police proved to be wholly useless; an entirely separate instrumentality was needed. Besides the want of effective supervision, the native police were underpaid, and had therefore an excuse for listening to the temptations of bribery.
In the dispatch already adverted to, written by the Court of Directors, a course of improvement was pointed out, without which the native police, it was affirmed, could not rise to the proper degree of efficiency. The suggestions were briefly as follows: To separate the police from the administration of the land-revenue, in those provinces where those duties had been customarily united; in order that the native officer should not be intrusted with double functions, each of which would interfere with the other. To subject all the police to frequent visit and inspection, that they might feel the influence of a vigilant eye over them. To relieve the collector-magistrate from this addition to his many duties, by appointing in each district a European officer with no other duty than that of managing the police of the district, subject to a general superintendent of police for each presidency. To increase the salaries of the police, in order that the office might have a higher dignity in the estimation of the natives, and in order that the official might be less tempted to extortion or bribery. To empower the authorities to punish and degrade, more readily than was before possible, those police who oppressed the people or otherwise displayed injustice; and to reward those who displayed more than ordinary intelligence and honesty, a further suggestion was made, arising out of the organisation of the Punjaub under the Lawrences and their coadjutors; in which there was a preventive police with a military organisation, and a wholly distinct detective police with a civil organisation. This system was found to work so well, that the Court of Directors submitted to the Calcutta government an inquiry whether the police generally might not with advantage be thus separated into two parts, preventive and detective, each exercised by a different set of men.
The Revolt broke out before the reform of the police system could commence; and then, like other reforms, it was left to be settled in more peaceful days.
[Illustration]
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Footnote 165:
The following will give an idea of the mode in which the _Gazette_ announcements were made: ‘24th Bombay N. I.—Lieutenant William Alexander Kerr; date of act of bravery, July 10, 1857.—On the breaking out of a mutiny in the 27th Bombay N. I. in July 1857, a party of the mutineers took up a position in the stronghold or _paga_ near the town of Kolapore, and defended themselves to extremity. “Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, took a prominent share in the attack on the position; and at the moment when its capture was of great public importance, he made a dash at one of the gateways, with some dismounted horsemen, and forced an entrance by breaking down the gate. The attack was completely successful, and the defenders were either killed, wounded, or captured—a result that may with perfect justice be attributed to Lieutenant Kerr’s dashing and devoted bravery.” (Letter from the Political Superintendent at Kolapore to the Adjutant-general of the Army, dated September 10, 1857.)’
Footnote 166:
‘Of the dust it is quite beyond the powers of writing to give a description. It is so fine and subtle, that long after the causes which raised it have ceased to exert their influence, you may see it like a veil of gauze between your eyes and every object. The sun, while yet six or seven degrees above the horizon, is hid from sight by it as though the luminary were enveloped in a thick fog; and at early morning and evening, this vapour of dust suspended high in air seems like a rain-cloud clinging to a hillside. When this dust is set rapidly in motion by a hot wind, and when the grosser sand, composed of minute fragments of talc, scales of mica, and earth, is impelled in quick successive waves through the heated atmosphere, the effect is quite sufficient to make one detest India for ever. Every article in your tent, your hair, eyes, and nose, are filled and covered with this dust, which deposits a coating half an inch thick all over the tent.’—W. H. RUSSELL.
Footnote 167:
It may here be remarked that the difficulty of moving heavy ordnance over the bad roads and roadless tracts of India, painfully felt by the artillery officers engaged in the war, suggested to the East India Company an inquiry into the possibility of employing locomotives for such a purpose. A machine, called ‘Boydell’s Traction Engine,’ patented some time before in England, was tested with a view to ascertain the degree of its availability for this purpose. The peculiarity of this engine was, that it was a locomotive _carrying its own railway_. Six flat boards were ranged round each of the great wheels in such a way that each board came in succession _under_ the wheel, and formed, for a few feet, a flat plankroad or tramway for the wheel to roll upon. It was supposed that the vehicle would move much more easily by this contrivance, than if the narrow periphery of the wheel ran upon soft mud or irregular pebbles and gravel. The motion of the wheel placed each plank down at its proper time and place, and lifted it up again, in such a way that there was always one of the boards flat on the ground, beneath the wheel. Colonel Sir Frederick Abbott and Colonel Sir Proby Cautley, on the part of the directors, tested this machine at Woolwich—where it drew forty tons of ordnance along a common road, uphill as well as upon the level. Another road-locomotive, by Messrs Napier, was tested for a similar purpose. The results were of good augury for the future; but the machines were not perfected early enough to be made applicable for the wars of the mutiny.
Footnote 168:
‘_Allahabad, April 30._—It is the melancholy duty of the Right Honourable the Governor-general to announce the death of that most distinguished officer, Captain Sir William Peel, K.C.B., late in command of her Majesty’s ship _Shannon_, and of the Naval Brigade in the Northwest Provinces.
‘Sir William Peel died at Cawnpore, on the 27th instant, of small-pox. He had been wounded at the commencement of the last advance upon Lucknow, but had nearly recovered from the wound, and was on his way to Calcutta, when struck by the disease which has brought his honourable career to an early close.
‘Sir William Peel’s services in the field during the last seven months are well known in India and in England. But it is not so well known how great the value of his presence and example has been wherever during this eventful period his duty has led him.
‘The loss of his daring but thoughtful courage, joined with eminent abilities, is a very heavy one to his country; but it is not more to be deplored than the loss of that influence which his earnest character, admirable temper, and gentle kindly bearing exercised over all within his reach—an influence which was exerted unceasingly for the public good, and of which the governor-general believes that it may with truth be said that there is not a man of any rank or profession who, having been associated with Sir William Peel in these times of anxiety and danger, has not felt and acknowledged it.’
Footnote 169:
Chap. vii., NOTES, p. 119.
Footnote 170:
Chap. xxvi., p. 441.
[Illustration:
Summer Costumes, Indian Army. ]
## CHAPTER XXIX.
PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN MAY.
When, on the 10th of May 1858, the course of twelve months had been completed since the commencement of the mutiny, the nation looked back at the events of that period as a terrible episode in the history of British dominion. Into how many thousands of families mourning had been introduced by it, no one correctly knew; the problem was a dismal one, which few had the heart to investigate. Those who, not affected by private grief, or hiding their grief in a sense of public duty, viewed the twelvemonth’s conflict in a national sense, saw in it a mingled cause for humiliation and pride—humiliation that British rule should be so trampled on by those who had been long and peacefully under it; pride that so many public servants, so many private persons, should have proved worthy of their country in a time of severe and bitter trial. In military matters, the once great Bengal native army had almost ceased to exist. Twenty thousand disarmed sepoys were in and near the Punjaub, carefully watched lest they should join the ranks of the insurgents; disarmed regiments were similarly detained elsewhere; others had been almost annihilated by twelve months of fierce warfare; others were still engaged as the nuclei of rebel armies; while the number of Bengal sepoys was very small indeed, reckoned by hundreds rather than thousands, who still fought faithfully on the side of the British. The Madras and Bombay troops had, happily for India and England’s interest therein, remained almost wholly ‘true to their salt;’ enabling the governors of those two presidencies to send gallant field-forces into the disturbed northern and central provinces. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Moultanese, Scindians, Beloochees, and hill-men on the Afghan frontier, had rendered services of such lasting importance in Hindostan, that they may almost be regarded as the preservers of the English ‘raj;’ this they had been enabled to do from two causes—the want of sympathy between the mutineers and those northwestern tribes; and the admirable system of Punjaub government organised by the Lawrences. In civil matters, India had witnessed the almost total breaking up of the ordinary revenue and magisterial arrangements, in provinces containing at least fifty millions of souls; Europeans driven into hiding-places, even if not murdered; and treasuries plundered by bands of ruffians, who gladly hailed the state of anarchy brought on by the mutiny of the sepoy regiments. Among the superior members of the government, Viscount Canning still maintained his position, battling against unnumbered difficulties; Sir Colin Campbell still remained at the head of the army, well aware that his utmost skill as a military commander would long be needed; and Sir John Lawrence still held the Punjaub in his wonderful grasp, displaying governing powers of the very highest order at an eminently critical time. On the other hand, the Anglo-Indians had to mourn over a sad death-list. Henry Lawrence, Havelock, Colvin, Neill, Venables, Nicholson, William Peel, Adrian Hope, Wheeler, Barnard, Banks, Battye—all, and a vast many more gallant spirits, had sunk under the terrible pressure of the past twelve months.
Appropriating the present chapter to a rapid glance at the progress of events in the month of May, and beginning (as usual) with the Bengal regions, we may conveniently notice two or three arrangements made by the Calcutta government, bearing relation either to the state of the army, or to the condition of civilians affected by the mutiny.
Among the earliest measures taken to reconstruct the Bengal army, so shattered by the mutiny, was one announced in a government notification on the 7th of May. It was to the effect that four regiments of Bengal _European_ cavalry should be formed, in lieu of eight regiments of Bengal _native_ cavalry, erased from the list of the establishment for mutinous conduct. Each regiment was to consist of 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 14 captains, 18 lieutenants, 8 cornets, 1 adjutant, 1 interpreter and quartermaster, 4 surgeons and assistants, 119 non-commissioned and subordinate officers of various kinds, and 700 privates; making a total of 870—an unusually large number for a cavalry regiment. In addition to these, there were to be native syces, grass-cutters, and quarter-masters, attached to each regiment; and various persons employed at the depôt. The pay was to be the same as in the royal dragoon regiments. Each regiment was to be divided into ten troops. As the officers were to be about doubly as numerous as the English officers in the disbanded native regiments, it was calculated that the four new would absorb the officers of eight old regiments. The regiments thus extinguished by this first process, were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Bengal native cavalry; the 5th and the 8th were left to be dealt with at some subsequent period. As for any larger measures connected with the reconstruction of a _native_ Bengal army, these were left for determination at a later period, after collating the opinions of the most experienced authorities in India.
The distress experienced by the British troops from the intense heat of the Indian sun, and the severe strictures passed by the press and by members of the legislature on those regimental officers who permitted or compelled their soldiers to swelter in red cloth, led to the issuing of orders concerning light summer clothing. It was found that a kind of gray or dust-coloured linen called _khakee_ or _carkey_ was better suited than anything else—even white—as a material for clothing in the hot season; and hence the issuing of an order by the adjutant-general, on the 21st of May, to the effect noted below.[171] This question concerning appropriate clothing had long been discussed by military men in India: the officers of greatest experience being those who most disapproved the wearing of closely fitting garments in such a climate. General Jacob had resolutely contended against the adoption of English uniforms by the sepoys of the Company’s army. He said: ‘A sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat; trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all; bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack, so that he can scarcely breathe; strapped, belted, and pipe-clayed within an inch of his life; with a rigid basket-shako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour; and with a leather-stock round his neck, to complete his absurd costume—when compared with the same sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency—forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the “regular” system with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common sense now recommended for adoption.’ The graphic description by Mr Russell, of the officers and men in Sir Colin Campbell’s army of Oude, shews how eager soldiers are to get rid of their irksome uniforms when permitted, under the influence of a heat denoted by the cabalistic mark 100° F. or 110° F.: ‘Except the Highlanders—and when they left Lucknow they were panting for their summer clothes, and had sent officers to Cawnpore to hurry them—not a corps that I have seen sport a morsel of pink or shew a fragment of English scarlet. The Highlanders wear eccentric shades of gray linen over their bonnets—the kilt is discarded, or worn out in some regiments; and flies, mosquitoes, and the sun are fast rendering it impossible in the others. Already many officers who can get trews have discarded the ponderous folds of woollen stuff tucked into massive wads over the hips, and have provided some defence against the baking of their calves by day, and have sought to protect their persons against the assaults of innumerable entomological enemies by night. The artillery had been furnished with excellent head-covers and good frocks of light stuff.... The 7th Hussars, the Military Train, have vestiary idiosyncrasies of their own; but there is some sort of uniformity among the men. Among the officers, individual taste and fantasy have full play. The infantry regiments, for the most part, are dressed in linen frocks, dyed carkey or gray slate-colour—slate-blue trousers, and shakos protected by puggerees, or linen covers, from the sun. The peculiarity of carkey is that the dyer seems to be unable to match it in any two pieces, and that it exhibits endless varieties of shade, varying with every washing, so that the effect is rather various than pleasing on the march or on the parade-ground. But the officers, as I have said, do not confine themselves to carkey or anything else. It is really wonderful what fecundity of invention in dress there is, after all, in the British mind when its talents can be properly developed. To begin with the head-dress. The favourite wear is a helmet of varying shape, but of uniform ugliness.... Whatever it might be in polished steel or burnished metal, the helmet is a decided failure in felt, or wicker-work, or pith, so far as external effect is concerned. It is variously fabricated, with many varieties of interior ducts and passages leading to escape-holes for imaginary hot air in the front or top, and around it are twisted infinite colours and forms of turbans with fringed ends and laced fringes. When a peacock’s feather, with the iris end displayed, is inserted in the hole in the top of the helmet, or is stuck in the puggeree around it, the effect of the covering is much enhanced; and this style is rather patronised by some of the staff. The coat may be of any cut or material, but shooting-jackets hold their own in the highest posts; and a carkey-coloured jerkin, with a few inches of iron curb-chain sewed on the shoulders to resist sabre-cuts, is a general favourite.... As to the clothing of the nether man, nothing but a series of photographs could give the least notion of the numerous combinations which can be made out of a leg, leather, pantaloons, and small-clothes. Long stage-boots of buff-coloured leather—for the manufacture of which Cawnpore is famous—pulled up over knee-breeches of leather or regimental trousers, are common. There are officers who prefer wearing their Wellingtons outside their pantaloons, thus exhibiting tops of very bright colours; and the boot and baggy trousers of the Zouave officer are not unknown.’
The next point to be adverted to affected civilians and private traders more extensively than the military. The compensation to sufferers by the mutiny, a much-disputed question for nearly twelve months, was put into a train for settlement by a government order issued at Calcutta in May. This order applied to Bengal only, as being a region quite large enough to be brought within one set of official rules. The compensation was to be for loss of property and effects, leaving losses affecting life or health to be settled by a distinct machinery. A Mr E. Jackson was appointed at Calcutta as commissioner to inquire into claims for compensation. A limit was named, the 26th of August, after which no claims would be received from persons resident in India: an extension of time being allowed for those who were not in that country. In cases where the amount claimed did not exceed fifty thousand rupees, the application to the commissioner was to be accompanied by a detailed statement of the particulars of the claim, and of the evidence adducible in support of it; but where the property was of higher amount, the regulation required only a general estimate to accompany the application, a further period of three months being allowed for the preparation and submission of the detailed statement of losses. It was at the same time very pointedly mentioned that these preliminary operations did not constitute an actual _claim_ on the Company for any compensation whatever. ‘It is to be understood that the registry of applications above provided for does not imply any recognition of claims to compensation; the Honourable Court of Directors having expressly reserved their final decision upon the question, whether or not compensation for losses sustained by the mutiny shall be awarded.’ The Company probably deemed it wise, in the uncertainty how large might be the total aggregate sum claimed, to avoid any formal pledge that these compensations could be rightfully demanded and would be really paid. The above, we have said, applied to Bengal; but about the same time a similar notification appeared at Allahabad, applicable to the Northwest Provinces. Mr C. Grant and Mr E. H. Longden were named commissioners to record and register claims. The conditions were generally the same as those in Bengal; and to them was added an announcement that ‘Applications will be received, subject to the same rules, from natives of the country for compensation, on account of loss of property caused by their known loyalty and attachment to the British government.’ A similar announcement was afterwards made, extending the boon to the province of Oude.
Superadded to the arrangements made for the succour of those who had borne pecuniary loss by the mutiny, was one dated May 25th. This was to the effect that some provision would be made for the relief of the destitute families of persons who had died after the loss of their property, even though the death were not occasioned by the mutiny. It was thereupon determined that grants of money should be given to families rendered impoverished by this double calamity; the grants to be regulated on the same principle as those allowed to European and native officers of the government.
[Illustration:
DACCA. ]
One of the resolutions arrived at by the authorities at Calcutta gave very general satisfaction—except to a few officers jealous of any encroachments on the privileges of the army. Whether suggested at home, or in India, the movement was in the right direction. The regulation was to the effect that civilians who had distinguished themselves in the field since the commencement of the mutiny, or who should so distinguish themselves before the mutiny ended, should be allowed to participate in the honours which had hitherto been considered peculiar to the military service. The civil servants of the Company, as a body, greatly raised themselves in the estimation of the nation by the gallantry which many of them displayed under circumstances of great peril—not only in defending their posts against large bodies of insurgents, but in sharing those field and siege operations which are more immediately sources of honour to military men. What those honours were to be, depended partly on the crown, partly on the Company; but the object of the order was to shew that the civil position of a gallant man should not necessarily be a bar to his occupancy of an honoured place among military men.
In entering now upon the military operations of the month, it is satisfactory to know that nothing important presents itself for record in connection with the eastern regions of Bengal. There were few or no actual mutinies, for reasons more than once assigned in former chapters. Notwithstanding this safety, however—partly through the superstitious character of the natives of India, and partly through the uneasy feeling prevailing in the minds of Europeans during the mutiny—the newspapers were frequently engaged in discussing mysteries, rumours, and prophecies of a strange character. One, connected more with Bengal than with the other provinces, related to ‘something white,’ which was to be ominous of British rule in India. Where it arose, or how, remained as undiscoverable as the chupatty mystery; but the rumour put on various forms at different times and places. At Tipperah, the native story told of a ‘white thing’ which would be unprocurable after some time. At Chittagong, a particular day was named, when, ‘out of four things, three would be given and one withheld;’ and at Jessore, the bazaar-people became so excited concerning a prophetic rumour of an equally enigmatical kind, that the magistrate endeavoured to elicit something from his police-darogah that might explain it; but the man either could not or would not tell how the story arose. In Dacca and other places the prediction assumed this form—that after a certain period, a certain ‘white thing’ would cease to exist in India; and in some instances the exact interval was named, ‘three months and thirteen days.’
Occasionally, the authorities found it necessary to watch very closely the proceedings of Mohammedan fanatics; who, at Burdwan, Jessore, Rungpoor, and other places, were detected in attempts to rouse up the people to a religious war. Fortunately, the townsmen and villagers did not respond to these appeals. Southwest of Calcutta, the Sumbhulpore district, disturbed occasionally by rebel bands intent on plunder, was kept for the most part tranquil by the firm management of Colonel Forster. In the month of May he hit upon the plan of inviting the still faithful chieftains of the districts to furnish each a certain number of soldiers to defend British interests, on promise of a due recognition of their services afterwards. The chieftains raised two thousand matchlockmen among them, and took up such positions as Colonel Forster indicated—a measure which completely frustrated and cowed the rebels.
We may pass at once to a consideration of the state of affairs in Behar or Western Bengal, comprising the districts around what may be called the Middle Ganges. This region, as former chapters have sufficiently told, and as a glance at a map will at once shew, contains many important cities and towns, which were thrown into great commotion by the mutiny—such as Patna, Dinapoor, Arrah, Buxar, Azimghur, Goruckpore, Ghazeepore, Jounpoor, Sasseram, Benares, Chunargur, and Mirzapore. It is true that many of these were formerly included within the government of the ‘Northwest Provinces,’ and then in that of the ‘Central Provinces;’ but this is a matter of little consequence to our present purpose; if we consider them all to belong to the Mid-Ganges region, it will suffice for the present purpose.
The condition of the region just defined, during May, depended mainly on the relation between Sir Edward Lugard on the one hand, and the Jugdispore rebels on the other. How it fared with this active general and the troops under his command, when April closed, we have already seen. It will be remembered that about the middle of that month, Koer Singh took up a strong position at Azimutgurh, from which Lugard deemed it necessary to dislodge him; that Lugard himself remained encamped at Azimghur with the bulk of his Azimghur field-force, in order that he might watch the proceedings of numerous bands of rebels under the Rajahs of Nuhurpoor and Naweejer and Gholam Hossein, hovering about the districts of Sandah, Mundoree, and Koelser; but that he made up a strong column to pursue Koer Singh. This column, placed under the command of Brigadier Douglas, consisted of the following troops: H.M. 4th foot; a wing of the 37th foot; a detachment of Punjaub Sappers; two squadrons of Sikh cavalry; a squadron of the Military Train; and nine guns and mortars. Then followed the series of cross-purposes, in which Koer Singh was permitted or enabled to work much more mischief than Sir Edward had anticipated. The events may briefly be recapitulated thus: On the 17th and 18th, Douglas, after starting with his column from Azimghur, came up with the rebels, defeated them at Azimutgurh, and chased them to Ghosee, Nugra, and Secunderpore. On the 19th he found that they intended to cross the Gogra before he could come up to them in pursuit—an intention which he strove to render nugatory. On the 20th he encountered them again, at Muneer Khas, defeated them with great slaughter, captured most of their munitions of war, and dispersed the rebels, the main body of whom fled towards Bullah and Beyriah. On the 21st, Douglas had the mortification, on reaching Sheopore, of finding that Koer Singh had outwitted the officer who had been ordered to guard the passage of the Ganges in the vicinity of Ghazeepore with about nine hundred men; the wily chief of Jugdispore had got in the rear of the detachment by a flank-movement, and had crossed the Ganges at an undefended spot. Then followed Captain Le Grand’s disastrous expedition to Jugdispore on the 23d; the crossing of the Ganges on the 25th by Douglas, with his column; and the advance towards Arrah and Jugdispore to retrieve the disaster. To what results these operations led in the month of May, we have now to see.
Brigadier Douglas arrived at Arrah with a part of his force on the 1st of May, the rest having arrived two days earlier; but Douglas not being in sufficient force to effectually encompass the enemy, and the importance of thoroughly routing Koer Singh being evident, Sir Edward Lugard, leaving a few troops to guard Azimghur, set out for the Ganges with his main column, crossed over into the Shahabad district on the 3d and following days, and prepared for operations in the direction of Arrah and Jugdispore. The rebels, estimated at seven or eight thousand, were supposed to be intrenching themselves, and getting in supplies. On the 8th, Sir Edward arrived in the vicinity of Jugdispore, and came in sight of some of the rebels. Two companies of the 84th foot, with detachments of Madras Rifles, and Sikh horse, aided by two horse-artillery guns, were sent back to Arrah, to protect that place while operations were being directed against Jugdispore. The commissioner of Patna at the same time sent the steamer _Patna_ up the Ganges, to watch the ghâts or ferries. On the 9th, Sir Edward marched his force from Beheea to an open plain a little to the west of Jugdispore. Here he intended to encamp for a while, to allow Colonel Corfield to come up with some additional troops from Sasseram. Circumstances occurred, however, to change his plan. In the afternoon of this day a large body of rebels formed outside the jungle, and moved in the direction of Arrah; but these were quickly followed by cavalry and horse-artillery, and driven back into the jungle. Another body, much more numerous, began to fire into Sir Edward’s camp before he could get his baggage well up and tents fixed. This determined him to attack them at once. Dividing his force into three columns, he planned an assault on Jugdispore on three points at once. The place was carried after a little skirmishing, the rebels making only a slight resistance; they retired to Lutwarpore, in the jungle district, taking with them two guns which they had captured from the British in the preceding month. The loss on both sides was trifling. Leaving a strong party to retain Jugdispore, Lugard returned to his camp in the evening. According to the rumours prevalent, Koer Singh, who had so long been a source of annoyance to the British, had died of his wounds; and the rebels, under his brother Ummer Singh, were ill supplied and in much confusion. A nephew of Koer Singh, named Ritbhunghur Singh, gave himself up to the British a short time afterwards—hopeful of insuring forgiveness by being able to shew that, in earlier months, he had befriended certain Europeans in a time of great peril. On the 10th, after ordering all the fortifications at Jugdispore, and all the buildings which had belonged to Koer Singh, to be destroyed, Lugard prepared to follow the rebels into the jungle. He arranged that Colonel Corfield, with the Sasseram force, should approach Lutwarpore in one direction, while he himself intended to advance upon it from Jugdispore. On the 11th and 12th much fighting took place. Sir Edward took the rebels by surprise; they expected to be attacked from Arrah or Beheea, but he marched westward through a belt of jungle to Hettumpore, and attacked them on a side which they believed to be quite safe. Lugard and Corfield were everywhere successful. It was, however, a harassing kind of warfare, bringing more fatigue than glory; the rebels, though chastised everywhere, avoided a regular engagement, and retreated into the jungle after every partial skirmish. At Arrah, Jugdispore, Lutwarpore, Hettumpore, Beheea, Peroo, and Chitowra, Lugard defeated and cut them up at various times in the course of the month; yet he could not prevent them from recombining, and collecting around them a rabble of budmashes and jail-felons. Sir Edward hoped, at any rate, to be able so to employ a strong detachment of cavalry as to prevent the rebels from crossing the river Sone, and carrying anarchy into other districts. They nevertheless continued to harass the neighbourhood by freebooting expeditions, if not by formidable military projects. After Lugard’s defeat of the main force, some of the insurgents broke up into bands of a few hundreds each, and were joined by budmashes from the towns and revolted villages. One party attacked an indigo factory near Dumoran, and burned it to the ground; another effected a murderous outbreak at the village of Rajpore, near Buxar; another threatened the railway-bridge works at Karminassa. These mischievous proceedings naturally threw the whole district into agitation. The threat against the railway-works was fully carried out about the end of the month; for the devastators destroyed the engineers’ bungalows and the workmen’s sheds, set fire to all the wood and coal collected for brick-burning, destroyed everything they could easily lay their hands on, and effectually stopped the works for a time. Nothing could be done to quell these disturbances, until a British force appeared.
Practically, therefore, the ‘Azimghur field-force,’ under Sir Edward Lugard, succeeded in breaking down the military organisation of the rebels in that part of India, without being able to prevent the formation of roaming bands bent on slaughter and devastation. And even the limited amount of advantage gained was purchased at a high price; for the tremendous heat of the sun struck down the poor soldiers with fatal certainty; numbers of them were carried from Jugdispore to Arrah, towards the close of the month—prostrated by sickness, wounds, fatigue from jungle fighting, and sun-stroke.
Somewhat further to the north, in the Goruckpore district, another group of rebels continued to harass the country, disturbing the operations of peaceful planters and traders. About the end of May, the rebel leader Mahomed Hussein, with four thousand men, suddenly made an attack upon the Rajah of Bansee, one of those who had remained faithful to the British government. The rajah was obliged to flee to a stronghold in a neighbouring jungle; and then his palace, with the town of Bansee, were plundered by the rebels. Mr Wingfield, the commissioner of Goruckpore, immediately started forth with two hundred and fifty Europeans and some guns to the relief of the rajah, whom he found besieged in his stronghold. The enemy fled precipitately on hearing of Wingfield’s approach, notwithstanding the immense disparity of force. The energetic commissioner then proceeded with the rajah to attack some rebel villages; while a simultaneous advance was made on Amood by Colonel Rowcroft. The object of these demonstrations was to keep the rebels in check until the rains set in, and the waters of the Gogra rose. Towards the end of the month, four Europeans came into Goruckpore from a neighbouring station, where they had been suddenly attacked by a body of rabble under one Baboo Surdoun Singh, and other leaders. This was one among many evidences of a still disturbed condition of the Goruckpore district. The district was in a slight degree protected by the passage of a body of troops who, though retiring rather than fighting, exerted some kind of influence on the evildoer of the country. We speak of the Goorkhas of Jung Bahadoor’s Nepaulese contingent. These troops retreated slowly from Oude towards their own country, neither receiving nor giving satisfaction from their late share in the warlike operations. After a sojourn of some time at Goruckpore, they resumed their march on the 17th of May, proceeding by brigades, and consuming much time in arranging and dragging their enormous supply of vehicles. They crossed the river Gunduck at Bagaha, with much difficulty. A distance of about thirty miles then brought them to Bettiah, and fourteen more to Segowlie—very near the frontier of the British dominions. It was early in the following month when the Goorkhas finally reached their native country, Nepaul—their leader Jung Bahadoor being, though still faithful as an ally, somewhat dissatisfied by his failure in obtaining notable advantage from the governor-general in return for services rendered. Viscount Canning had, many months earlier, received fierce newspaper abuse for not having availed himself more promptly of aid offered by Jung Bahadoor; but there now appeared much probability that caution had been all along necessary in dealing with this ambitious chieftain.
Directing attention next to the region of the Jumna and the Upper Ganges, we have to notice the continuance of insubordination around the Allahabad region, almost in the very presence of the governor-general himself, who still remained, with his staff, in that station. One of the most vexing symptoms of mischief at this place was the occurrence of incendiarism—the burning of buildings by miscreants who could not be discovered. On the 24th of May a new range of barracks was found to be on fire, and six bungalows were completely destroyed. The prevalence of a fierce wind, and the scarcity of water, frustrated for some time all attempts to extinguish the flames. One poor invalid soldier was burned to death, and many others injured. Beyond the limits of the city itself, it was a state of things very unexpected by the supreme authorities, that the road from Allahabad through Futtehpoor to Cawnpore—a road more traversed than any other by British troops throughout twelve months of anarchy—should in the middle of May be scarcely passable without a strong escort. Yet such was the case. The opposition to the British raj, though it had assumed a guerrilla character, was very harassing to deal with. The British were strong in a few places; but the rebels were in numerous small bodies, scattered all over the surrounding country; and these bodies occasioned temporary panics at spots where there was no force to meet them. The thorough knowledge of the country, possessed by some of the leaders, enabled them to baffle the pursuers; and thus it arose that these petty bands occasioned alarms disproportionate to the number of men comprising them. Sometimes they would occupy the great trunk-road, between Allahabad and Cawnpore, and close up all means of transit unless attacked and driven away by force. On the other hand, this district exhibited a remarkable union of the new with the old, the European with the oriental, the practical with the primitive—arising out of the opening of a railway through a part of the route. After reading, as we so often have in this volume, of toilsome marches by sunburnt and exhausted troops over rough roads and through jungle-thickets, it is with a peculiar feeling of interest that we find an announcement to the effect, that ‘on the 26th of May a special train left Allahabad with a party of Sikhs to reinforce Futtehpoor, which was said to be threatened by a large force of the enemy.’ Had this railway been opened when or soon after the Revolt began, there is at least a fair probability that the Cawnpore massacre might have been prevented—provided always that the railway itself, with its locomotives and carriages, were _not in rebels’ hands_.
Allahabad, about the period now under notice, was made the subject of a very important project, one of many arising out of the mutiny. The Indian government had long and fully considered the various advantages likely to be derived from the founding of a great Anglo-Indian capital at some spot far removed from the three older presidential cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The spot selected was Allahabad. The peculiarities of this very important station, before and during the mutiny, have been frequently noticed in past chapters. Occupying the point of the peninsula formed by the junction of the two grand rivers Ganges and Jumna, Allahabad is scarcely paralleled for situation by any other city in India. The one river brings down to it a stream of traffic from Kumaon, Rohilcund, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, Futtehpoor, and the southwestern districts of Oude; while the other brings down that from Kurnaul, Roorkee, Meerut, Delhi, Muttra, Agra, Calpee, and a wide range of country in Rajpootana, Bundelcund, and the Doab. On the other sides, too, it has an extraordinary number of large military and commercial towns within easy reach (in peaceful times), such as Lucknow, Fyzabad, Sultanpore, Goruckpore, Azimghur, Jounpoor, Benares, Ghazeepore, Mirzapore, Dinapoor, and Patna. Agra was at one time intended to have been converted into a presidential city, the capital of an Agra presidency; but the intention was not fully carried out; the Northwest Provinces were formed into a lieutenant-governorship, with Agra as the seat of government; but the events of the mutiny shewed the necessity of holding with a strong hand the position of Allahabad, as a centre of great influence; and Agra began to fall in relative importance.
[Illustration:
FYZABAD. ]
It has been remarked that England has seldom built cities as a nation, as a government; cities have _grown_, like the constitution, without those preconceived theories of centralised organisation which are so prevalent on the continent of Europe. It has been much the same in India as in England. The three presidential capitals—Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay—became what they are, not from the development of a plan, but from a series of incidents having little relative connection. ‘Our three capitals are congeries of houses, without order, or beauty, or healthiness other than nature may have supplied. Our cantonments, which sometimes grow into cities, are generally stuck down in a plain as a kind of petrified encampment. Even when founding, as in Rangoon, it is with the utmost difficulty we can compel successive governors to care whether the original plan be not set aside.’ A problem arose whether Allahabad might not be an exception to this rule. Standing at the extreme end of the Doab, and bounded by two fine rivers on the north, south, and east, it is susceptible of any degree of enlargement by including additional ground on the west; it might be made one of the strongest forts in India; and its rivers, aided by the railway when finished, might make it a great centre of trade. Most of the conditions, therefore, were favourable to the building of a fine Anglo-Indian city on that spot. The river frontages, it is easily seen, might easily be defended against any attacks which orientals could bring against them. On the west or land side, it was proposed to construct a line of intrenchment, or a sort of intrenched camp, four miles in length, from river to river. This fortification would consist mainly of two great redoubts on the river-banks, each capable of holding an entire regiment, but each defensible by a small force if necessary. With these two redoubts, and one midway between them, and earthern embankments to connect the three, it would be possible to render Allahabad impregnable to any hostile force likely to be brought against it. Within the space thus marked out by the embankment and the rivers would be included a cantonment, a European town, and a native town. The cantonment, a complete military establishment for four or five regiments, would be near the western boundary, on the Jumna side. Eastward of this would be the new English town, built in plots of ground let on lease to builders (native or European), who would be required, in building houses, shops, and hotels, to conform to some general plan, having reference to the railway station as a centre of trade. Nearer the Ganges would be the native town; while at the point of junction of the two rivers would be the existing fort, extended and enlarged so as to form if needed a last stronghold for all the Europeans in Allahabad. Many of the details in the plan were suggested during a period of panic fear, when the natives were looked upon as if they were permanently bitter enemies; and, during the long course of years necessary for working out the idea, great modification in these details might be expected; but the general character of the scheme, as developed about the period to which this chapter relates, may be understood from the above brief sketch.
It was on the 5th of May that a notification appeared at Allahabad, signed by Mr Thornhill, officiating commissioner under the governor-general, concerning the leasing of land in that city for building purposes. The terms were evidently framed with the intention of attracting the notice of commercial firms, at Calcutta and elsewhere, to Allahabad as a future emporium of commerce. The regulations may be summarily noticed as follow: A new civil European town to be formed near the railway station at Allahabad, distinct from the cantonment, the native town, and the fort. Land, in plots of three acres each, to be let on lease by the government, for the erection of shops, hotels, warehouses, and other buildings requisite for a European population. Each plot to have a frontage of three hundred feet on a public road, with a smaller road in the rear. Some of the plots to be let for dwelling-houses; and these, as well as the hotels and shops, to receive a certain systematic arrangement, laid down by the authorities for the general convenience of the whole community. Priority of choice to be given to those who intend to construct hotels, on account of the great necessity for that species of accommodation in a newly collected community. Plots, competed for by two or more persons, to be sold by auction to the highest bidder. The lease to be for fifty years, unless a shorter time be specified by agreement; and the lessee to have the privilege of renewal, under approval as to conditions, but not with any rise of rental. The rent to be thirty rupees (about £3) per acre per annum. Leases to be transferable, and sub-letting to be permitted, on payment of a registration fee; provided the transferree or sublessee enter into an engagement to fulfil the necessary conditions to the government. Every lessee to specify the kind of structures he intends to build on his plot; to commence building within one year after obtaining the lease; and to finish in three years—on forfeiture both of the lease and of a money penalty, if the building fail in kind, value, or time. Lessees to be subject to such rates and taxes as may be imposed for municipal purposes, and to all regulations of police and conservancy. Lessees to be placed under stringent rules, concerning the employment of thatch or other inflammable materials for the roofs of buildings. As a general rule, one plot to one lessee; but if a special application be made, and supported on sufficient grounds, two or more plots to be leased together.—Such were the general regulations. At the time of issuing the order, there were about forty plots set out as a commencement to the system.
The turbulent province of Oude next calls for attention; and as Sir Colin Campbell’s operations bore almost equal reference to Oude and Rohilcund, we will treat both provinces together.
It will be remembered, from the details given in the last chapter, that after the great conquest of Lucknow in March, a considerable time elapsed before any effective attempts were made to overtake and defeat the rebels who had escaped from that city. A few troopers and a few guns were, it is true, sent in pursuit, but with no resources for a long series of marchings and encampings. We have seen that Brigadier John Jones, with the Roorkee field-force, about three thousand strong—H.M. 60th Rifles, 1st Sikh infantry, Coke’s Rifles, 17th Punjaub infantry, the Moultan Horse, and detachments of artillery and engineers—advanced into the heart of Rohilcund from the northwest, while Sir Colin Campbell and General Walpole operated from the Oude or southeastern side: the object being to hem in such of the rebels as had assembled in any force in Rohilcund. Recapitulating the narrative in a few words, we may remind the reader that Jones started from Roorkee on the 15th of the month; crossed the Ganges on the 17th; defeated a body of rebels at Nagul on the same day; and advanced during the next four days steadily on the road to Mooradabad. On the 22d, he fought and won the battle of Nageena; on the 23d, at Noorpoor, he struck into the high road from Mozuffernugger to Mooradabad, with a view of protecting one of the ghâts or ferries of the Ganges; on the 24th, he reached Chujlite, where he learned that Feroze Shah, one of the numerous princes of the House of Delhi, had taken and entered Mooradabad two days before; and on the 25th he reached that town, which had been hastily evacuated by Feroze Shah on the news of Jones’s approach. Encamping outside the town, Jones ordered Lieutenant-colonel (formerly Major) Coke, who commanded the infantry portion of his force, to march into Mooradabad, and make a diligent search for a number of rebel chieftains believed to be hidden there. This search was attended with unexpected success. Coke placed parties of the Moultan cavalry at all the outlets of the city, to prevent escapes, and then he attacked and searched all the houses in which rebel chieftains were believed to be concealed. The capture of one of them was marked by a daring act of intrepidity on the part of an English officer. Nawab Mujjoo Khan, the chief of the rebels hereabouts, had caused himself to be proclaimed Nawab of Mooradabad, and had instigated the people to murder and plunder the Europeans in the place, many months earlier. To capture this villain was a point of some importance. Coke proceeded to the Nawab’s house with two guns, a party of Sappers, and the 1st Punjaub infantry. The soldiers of the Nawab’s guard making a stout resistance, many of them were shot down, including the son and nephew of the Nawab. Lieutenant Angelo then burst open the door of the room in which the Nawab and another of his sons were concealed, and captured them. While so occupied, he was fired upon by some of the Nawab’s guard, from an upper room; whereupon he rushed up stairs, burst open the door, entered the room single-handed, and shot three men in succession with his revolver; some of his troops then coming up, he captured the rest of the guard. In short, the search was thoroughly successful. The names and titles of twenty-one rebel chieftains captured, containing many repetitions of Khan, Sheik, Ali, Hossein, Beg, and Shah, shewed that these evildoers were mostly Mohammedans—the Hindoos of Rohilcund having been much less extensively involved in rebellion. While Jones was thus operating in the northwest, Walpole was engaged, though less successfully, in the southeast. He started on the 9th from Lucknow, with the ‘Rohilcund Field-force,’ five thousand strong; received a mortifying discomfiture on the 14th at Fort Rhodamow, rendered more distressing by the death of Brigadier Adrian Hope; defeated the rebels at Sirsa on the 22d; and crossed the Ramgunga at Allygunje on the 23d. The commander-in-chief himself left Lucknow about the middle of the month; started from Cawnpore at the head of a small column on the 18th; advanced to Kilianpore, Poorah, Urrowl, Meerun-ke-serai, Gosaigunje, and Kamalgunje between that date and the 24th; entered Furruckabad and Futteghur on the 25th; crossed the Ganges on the 26th and 27th; joined Walpole’s field-force on the banks of the Ramgunga on the 28th; marched to Kanth on the 29th; and reached Shahjehanpoor on the 30th, in force sufficient to retake that city, but not in time to capture the rebel Moulvie of Fyzabad, who escaped to work mischief elsewhere.—We thus call to mind that, at the end of April, Campbell and Walpole had advanced from the southeast as far as Shahjehanpoor; while Jones had advanced from the northwest to Mooradabad—the two forces being separated by the city of Bareilly, and a wide expanse of intervening country. About the same time General Penny was planning a march with a third column towards a point between Bareilly and Shahjehanpoor, after crossing the Ganges at Nudowlee; he was to march through the Budayoon district, and to unite his column with Sir Colin’s main force at Meeranpore Kutra, six marches distant from Futteghur. Bareilly, the chief city of Rohilcund Proper, became the point to which the attention of the commanders of all three forces were directed. We have now to see to what result these combinations led in the following month.
On the 2d of May the Rohilcund field-force, of which Sir Colin Campbell now assumed the command in person, started from Shahjehanpoor, to commence operations against Bareilly. A small force was left behind for the defence of Shahjehanpoor, comprising one wing of the 82d foot, De Kantzow’s Irregular Horse, four guns, and a few artillerymen and sappers, under Colonel Hall. What befel this small force will presently appear. Sir Colin marched on the 2d to Tilmul, over a fertile flat country, diversified with topes of trees, but nearly overwhelmed with dust, and inhabited by villagers who were thrown into great doubt by the approach of what they feared might be a hostile force. On the 3d he advanced from Tilmul to Futtehgunje; where he was joined by the force which General Penny had undertaken to bring into Rohilcund from the west.
At this point it is desirable, before tracing the further operations of the commander-in-chief, to notice the course of events which led to the death of General Penny. Being at Nerowlee, on the 29th of April, and believing that the rebels were in some force at the town of Oosait, Penny set out with a column for service in that direction. This column consisted of something under 1500 men: namely, 200 Carabiniers, 350 H.M. 64th, 250 Moultan Horse, 360 Belooch 1st battalion, 300 Punjaub 2d infantry, a heavy field-battery, and a light field-battery with four guns. The column left Nerowlee about nine in the evening; but various delays prevented Penny from reaching Oosait, seven miles distant, until midnight. It then appeared that the enemy had retired from Oosait, and, as native rumour said, had retreated to Datagunje. The column advanced deliberately, under the impression that no enemy was near; but when arrived at Kukerowlee, it suddenly fell into an ambuscade. From the language used by Colonel Jones of the Carabiniers, whose lot it was to write the official account of this affair, it is evident that General Penny had been remiss in precautionary measures; he shared the belief of Mr Wilson, a political resident who accompanied him, that no enemy was near, and under the influence of this belief he relaxed the systematic order of march which had been maintained until Oosait was reached. ‘From this point,’ we are told, ‘military precautions were somewhat neglected, the mounted portion of the column being allowed very considerably to outmarch the infantry; and eventually, though an advanced-guard was kept up, it was held back immediately in front of the artillery.’ Penny with his staff, and Mr Wilson, were riding at the head of the advanced-guard; when at four o’clock, near Kukerowlee, they came into the midst of a wholly unexpected body of the enemy; who poured out grape and round shot at not more than forty yards’ distance, charged down from the left with horsemen, and opened fire with musketry in front. One of the first who fell was General Penny, brought low by grape-shot. Colonel H. R. Jones, who now took the command, made the best arrangements he could to meet the emergency. The four guns of the light field-battery were quickly ordered up to the front, and the cavalry were brought forward ready for a charge. There were, however, many difficulties to contend against. The enemy’s right occupied a mass of sand-hills; their left was protected by thick groves of trees; the town of Kukerowlee was in their rear to fall back upon; and the dimness of the light rendered it impossible rightly to judge the number and position of the rebels. Under these circumstances, Colonel Jones deemed it best merely to hold his ground until daylight should suggest the most fitting course of procedure, and until the infantry should have arrived. When the 64th came up with the cavalry and artillery which Penny had imprudently allowed to go so far ahead, Colonel Bingham at once charged the enemy in front, and drove them into the town. This done, Jones ordered the artillery to shell the town; this completely paralysed the rebels, who soon began to escape from the opposite side. Hereupon Jones sent his cavalry in pursuit; many of the enemy were cut up, and one gun taken; but it was not deemed prudent to continue this pursuit to any great distance, in a district imperfectly known. This battle of Kukerowlee was thus, like nearly all the battles, won by the British; and had it not been for the unfortunate want of foresight on the part of General Penny, he might have been spared to write the dispatch which described it. He was the only officer killed. Those wounded were Captains Forster and Betty, Lieutenants Eckford, Davies, and Graham. Eckford’s escape from death was very extraordinary. The first fire opened by the rebels shot his horse from under him; he then mounted an artillery-horse; a party of Ghazees—fanatics who have sworn to die for their ‘deen’ or faith—attacked him, wounded him, and stabbed his horse; Eckford fell off; and a Ghazee gave him a tremendous cut over the back of the right shoulder, and left him for dead; Surgeon Jones came up, and helped the wounded lieutenant along; but the enemy pursuing, Eckford was made to lie down flat on his face as if dead; the enemy passed on without noticing him, and he was afterwards rescued by some of his companions. Three days after this encounter with the rebels, Colonel Jones succeeded in bringing poor Penny’s column into safe junction with Sir Colin’s force at Futtehgunje—the mutineers and ruffians from the district of Budayoon retiring before him, and swelling the mass of insurgents at Bareilly.
While this was doing, another Jones was marching through Rohilcund in a different direction. It is necessary to avoid confusion in this matter, by bearing in mind that Brigadier John Jones commanded the ‘Roorkee field-force;’ while Colonel H. R. Jones held the temporary command of the column lately headed by General Penny. The brigadier, in pursuance of a plan laid down by Sir Colin, directed his march so that both might reach Bareilly on the same day, the one from Mooradabad and the other from Shahjehanpoor. While on his march, Jones expected to come up with the rebels at Meergunje, a place within a few miles of Bareilly. He found, however, that after constructing two batteries at the first-named place, they had apparently misdoubted their safety, and retreated to Bareilly. Cavalry, sent on in pursuit, overtook the rear of the rebels, cut down great numbers of them, and captured two guns. At an early hour on the 6th, the brigadier with his force arrived within a mile and a half of a bridge contiguous to Bareilly, known as Bahadoor Singh’s bridge. His reconnoitring party was fired upon. A skirmish at once ensued, which lasted three hours, and ended in the capture of the bridge; the rebels were driven back with great slaughter into Bareilly. Just as Jones reached the margin of the city, he heard a cannonading which denoted the arrival of the commander-in-chief from the opposite direction.
Having thus noticed the coalescence of the forces under the two Joneses, we shall be prepared to trace the march of Sir Colin Campbell towards the common centre to which the attention of all was now directed.
After being reinforced at Futtehgunje by the column recently under the command of Penny, Sir Colin resumed his march on the 3d of May. As he advanced, he received news that the rebels were in much disorder. Several of the chiefs had left them; and Nena Sahib, a coward throughout, had sought safety by fleeing towards the border-region between Oude and Nepaul. The main body had been some time at Fureedpore; but when they heard of Sir Colin being at Futtehgunje they retreated to Bareilly—thereby running into the power of another column. The villagers, mostly Hindoos, told distressing tales of the extortions and wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the Mohammedan chieftains, during the twelve months that Rohilcund had been in the power of the rebels; they made great profession of their joy at seeing the arrival of an English army; but past experience had shewn that such profession should be received with much qualification. Certain it was, that Sir Colin Campbell, during his marches through Oude, the Doab, and Rohilcund, received very little aid, and very little correct information, from the villagers of the districts through which he passed; they were either timid, or double-dealing, or both. In one of his dispatches he said: ‘In spite of the assumed friendship of the Hindoo portion of the population, I have not found it easier to obtain information in Rohilcund, on which trust could be put, than has been the case in dealing with the insurrection in other parts of the empire.’ On the 4th, the commander-in-chief advanced from Futtehgunje to Fureedpore, only one march from Bareilly. Rumours now arrived that not only Nena Sahib, but the Delhi prince Feroze Shah, had sought safety by flight from Bareilly; but that Khan Mahomed Khan still remained at the head of the rebels. On this point, however, and on the number of the enemy’s forces, no information was obtained that could be relied upon. As for Bareilly itself, supposing no fortifications to have been thrown up by the rebels, it could not long maintain a siege; seeing that, with the exception of a stream with rather steep banks, there was no obstacle to the entrance of a force from without. The city itself consisted mainly of a street two miles long, with numerous narrow streets and lanes branching off to the right and left; outside these streets and lanes were large suburbs of detached houses, walled gardens, plantations, and enclosures; and outside the suburbs were wide plains intersected by nullahs. It was at present uncertain whether the two forces, from Shahjehanpoor and Mooradabad, could prevent the escape of the enemy over these lateral suburbs and plains; but such was certainly the hope and wish of the commander-in-chief.
[Illustration:
Hindoo Fruit-girl. ]
Early in the morning of the 5th, Sir Colin left his camping-ground at Fureedpore, and advanced towards Bareilly. After a brief halt, the videttes detected a body of rebel cavalry in the distance; and Sir Colin at once marshalled his forces for an attack. The whole force was brigaded into two brigades of cavalry, under Jones and Hagart; one of artillery, under Brind; and two of infantry, under Hay and Stisted.[172] Without reference to the brigades, however, the order of advance was thus arranged: the 2d Punjaub cavalry formed a line of skirmishers on the left of the main-road; the Lahore light horse formed a similar line on the right; while across the road, and in support of these skirmishers, was a line formed by troops of the 9th Lancers and the 1st Punjaub cavalry, a troop of horse-artillery, and several field-guns. Then came the 78th Highlanders, and a body of Sappers and Engineers, along the road; the 93d foot on the right of the road; and the 42d Highlanders on the left. Next, supporting and flanking these, were the 79th foot, the Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, the remainder of the 9th Lancers and of the Punjaub cavalry, and a wing of the Belooch battalion. Then came the siege-train and the enormous array of baggage; flanked by the 64th foot, a wing of the 82d, the 2d Punjaub infantry, and the 4th Punjaub rifles. Lastly came the rear-guard, comprising the 22d Punjaub infantry, the 17th irregular cavalry, a squadron of the 5th Punjaub cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery. As this strong force advanced, the rebels fired a few shot from a battery set up at the entrance to Bareilly; but they made scarcely any attempt to fortify or defend either the stream that crossed the high road, or the bridge over the stream. The enemy’s infantry appeared to be mostly congregated in the old cantonment or sepoy-lines, while the cavalry were hovering about in topes of trees. The infantry scarcely shewed; but the cavalry, aided by horse-artillery, made demonstrations as if about to attack, in numbers estimated at two or three thousand. This did not stay the progress of Sir Colin, who was too strong to be affected by such an attempt. Advancing through a suburb on one side of the city, he ordered the 42d, the 79th, and a Sikh or Punjaub regiment, to explore a ruined mass of one-storied houses. What followed may best be told in the language of Mr Russell, who was with the army at the time: ‘As soon as the Sikhs got into the houses, they were exposed to a heavy fire from a large body of matchlockmen concealed around them. They either retired of their own accord, or were ordered to do so; at all events, they fell back with rapidity and disorder upon the advancing Highlanders. And now occurred a most extraordinary scene. Among the matchlockmen, who, to the number of seven or eight hundred, were lying behind the walls of the houses, was a body of Ghazees or Mussulman fanatics, who, like the Roman Decii, devote their lives with solemn oaths to their country or their faith. Uttering loud cries, “Bismillah, Allah, deen, deen!” one hundred and thirty of these fanatics, sword in hand, with small circular bucklers on the left arm, and green cummerbungs, rushed out after the Sikhs, and dashed at the left of the right wing of the Highlanders. With bodies bent and heads low, waving their tulwars with a circular motion in the air, they came on with astonishing rapidity. At first they were mistaken for Sikhs, whose passage had already somewhat disordered our ranks. Fortunately, Sir Colin Campbell was close up with the 42d; his keen, quick eye detected the case at once. “Steady, men, steady; close up the ranks. Bayonet them as they come on.” It was just in time; for these madmen, furious with bang, were already among us, and a body of them sweeping around the left of the right wing got into the rear of the regiment. The struggle was sanguinary but short. Three of them dashed so suddenly at Colonel Cameron that they pulled him off his horse ere he could defend himself. His sword fell out of its sheath, and he would have been hacked to pieces in another moment but for the gallant promptitude of Colour-sergeant Gardiner, who, stepping out of the ranks, drove his bayonet through two of them in the twinkling of an eye. The third was shot by one of the 42d. Brigadier Walpole had a similar escape; he was seized by two or three of the Ghazees, who sought to put him off his horse, while others cut at him with their tulwars. He received two cuts on the hand, but he was delivered from the enemy by the quick bayonets of the 42d. In a few minutes the dead bodies of one hundred and thirty-three of these Ghazees, and some eighteen or twenty wounded men of ours, were all the tokens left of the struggle.’
Sir Colin had not yet reached Bareilly. The little skirmishing that had occurred was in one of the suburbs. The enemy’s cavalry, though powerless for any serious attack, succeeded in creating, by a dash across the plain towards the baggage, an indescribable amount of alarm among the camp-followers, bazaar-traders, horses, camels, bullocks, and elephants. There was not much real fighting throughout the day; but the heat was so intense, the poor soldiers suffered so much from thirst, so many were brought low by sun-stroke, and all were so fatigued, that Sir Colin resolved to bivouac on the plain for the night, postponing till the next day an advance into, and the capture of, the city of Bareilly.
Whether this delay on the road to victory was sound or not in a military sense, it afforded the enemy an opportunity to escape, which they did not fail to take advantage of. On the morning of the 6th, it was ascertained that many of the leaders, and a large body of rebel troops, had quietly left the place. Guns were brought to bear upon certain buildings in the city, known or suspected to be full of insurgents; and it was while this cannonade was in progress that Sir Colin became aware of the arrival of Brigadier Jones, already adverted to. On the 7th the two forces advanced into the city, and took complete possession of it, but without capturing any of the leaders, or preventing the escape of the main body of rebels. A large quantity of artillery, mostly of recent native manufacture, fell into the hands of the victors, together with a great store of shell, shot, and powder, for the manufacture of which, materials and machinery had been provided by the rebels.
Before proceeding with the narrative of Bareilly affairs, it will be necessary to notice a very remarkable episode at Shahjehanpoor. It will be remembered that when Sir Colin Campbell started from that place on the 2d of May, to advance on Bareilly, he left behind him a small defensive force. In his dispatch he said: ‘When I passed through Shahjehanpoor, I was informed that the Fyzabad Moulvie, and the Nawab of the former place, were at Mohumdee, with a considerable body of men who had retired from Shahjehanpoor; and I thought it would be impolitic to leave the district without evidence of our presence.’ He therefore told off a small defensive force; comprising a wing of the 82d foot, Lieutenant De Kantzow’s irregular horse, a few artillerymen, and four guns. In obedience to orders left by Sir Colin, Colonel Hall, of the 82d, marched this small force from the camp at Azeezgunje, to occupy the jail in the cantonment of Shahjehanpoor as a military post. There being no shade within the cantonment, he pitched his camp for a time in a tope of trees near the jail. He next formed the jail into a small intrenched position, with four guns, and as large a supply of provisions as he could procure. All this was done in one day, the 2d of May; and, indeed, not an hour was to be lost; for a spy appeared on the following morning to announce that a large body of rebels had arrived within four miles of the place. This announcement proved to be correct. A strong band of insurgents from Mohumdee in Oude, taking advantage of Sir Colin’s departure from Shahjehanpoor, were advancing to regain possession of that station. Colonel Hall immediately sent his baggage and provisions into the jail, and ordered four companies of the 82d to guard the camp during this transfer. Going out to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy’s cavalry approaching. Lieutenant De Kantzow would willingly have charged the enemy with his small body of horse; but the colonel, knowing the overwhelming force of the rebels, and noting his instructions to act on the defensive, forbade this charge. Both went into the jail, with their handful of troops, and prepared for a resolute defence. The rebels arrived, seized the old fort, plundered the town, put many of the principal inhabitants to death, and established patrols on the river’s bank. It was computed that they were little less than eight thousand strong, with twelve guns. Against this strong force, Hall held his position for eight days and nights, sustaining a continuous bombardment, without thinking for an instant of yielding. Not until the 7th of the month did the commander-in-chief hear of this disaster at Shahjehanpoor. He at once made up a brigade; consisting of the 60th Rifles, the 79th Highlanders, a wing of the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, two squadrons of Carabiniers, Cureton’s Horse, with some artillery and guns. Brigadier Jones, who commanded this brigade, received at the same time from Sir Colin discretionary power to attack the enemy at Mohumdee after the relief of Hall at Shahjehanpoor, if he should so deem it expedient. Jones, at the head of his brigade, started from Bareilly on the 8th, and reached Shahjehanpoor on the 11th. At daybreak, a body of the enemy having been seen, Jones sent out the Mooltan Horse to pursue them; but a heavy mass of troops being now visible, it became necessary to draw up in order of battle. The enemy’s cavalry began the battle; these were driven off by Jones’s howitzers. Then the Highlanders and Rifles were pushed on as skirmishers, supported by horse-artillery; and in a short time the rebels were put to flight—allowing the brigadier to select his own point of entrance into Shahjehanpoor. Fortunately he made himself acquainted with the fact that many buildings in the suburbs had been loopholed for musketry, and with the probability that many others in the heart of the town had been similarly treated; he thereupon avoided the main street, and made a detour through the eastern suburbs. No enemy was visible within the town, until a strong party of troopers were found drawn up near the school-house; these were quickly dispersed by a few shrapnell shells, and a pursuit by the Carabiniers, leaving a gun and some ammunition-wagons behind them. Jones continued his march by the church, and across the parade-ground to the jail, where the gallant little garrison under Colonel Hall had so long defended themselves against an overwhelming force. The bold stand made by this officer was an enterprise that excited little attention amid the various excitements of the period; but Sir Colin Campbell did not fail to see that the defence had been prompt, energetic, and skilful. The adjutant-general, writing to the governor-general, said: ‘I am directed by the commander-in-chief to inform his lordship that the lieutenant-colonel hardly does justice to himself in his report of this defence, which was conducted by him with prudence and skill, and consequently with trifling loss. I am to add that Lieutenant-colonel Hall, although he makes no mention of the fact, was himself wounded by a musket-bullet in the leg, from the effect of which he has not yet (May 29th) recovered.’
To return to Bareilly. After the operations which have now been briefly described, the insurgents were so completely driven out of Mooradabad, Bareilly, and Shahjehanpoor, the principal towns in this province, that it was no longer deemed necessary to keep up the ‘Rohilcund field-force’ in its collected form; the various brigades, cavalry and infantry, were broken up, and Sir Colin gave separate duties to his various officers, according to the tenor of the information received from various parts of the country. Some corps and detachments remained at Bareilly; some went to Lucknow; one or two Punjaub regiments set off towards Meerut; and General Walpole was placed in command in Kumaon and Rohilcund. It was just at this time, the 11th of May, that Sir Colin Campbell received an official notification from the Queen to thank his troops in her name for their gallant services in earlier months. The address was, of course, merely of a customary kind under such circumstances; but it constituted one among the list of honours to which soldiers look as some reward for their hard life.[173] The ‘last stronghold’ adverted to by him was Bareilly; he could not then know that another stronghold, Gwalior, was destined to be the scene of a much more sanguinary struggle.
Among the arrangements more immediately affecting Rohilcund, was the formation of a column for special service in the country districts. This column, placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel (now Brigadier) Coke, comprised a wing of the 42d Highlanders, the 1st Punjaub rifles, the 1st Sikh infantry, a detachment of the 24th Punjaub infantry, a squadron of Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, a detachment of the 17th irregular cavalry, and a considerable force of artillery. With three weeks’ supplies for the European troops, and four weeks’ for the native, this column set forth from Bareilly on the 12th of May.
The commander-in-chief, leaving instructions for the formation of efficient defences at Bareilly, started off to some more central station, where he could be in easy communication with the various columns engaged in different parts of Northern India. General Walpole took command of the whole of the Rohilcund troops; having under him Coke’s brigade just adverted to, and Major Lennox to superintend the engineering works at Bareilly. Mr Alexander established himself as civil commissioner, to reorganise a government for that long-distracted province. Being thus satisfied that affairs were in a good train, Sir Colin started on the 15th, taking with him his head-quarters staff, the 64th foot, a wing of the 9th Lancers, and detachments of other troops. The veteran commander bore heat and fatigue in a manner that astonished his subordinates; he got through an amount of work which knocked up his aids-de-camp; and was always ready to advise or command, as if rest and food were contingencies that he cared not about. The natives, when any of them sought for and obtained an interview with him, were often a good deal surprised to see the commander of the mighty British army in shirt-sleeves and a pith-hat; but the keen eye and the cool manner of the old soldier told that he had all his wits about him, and was none the worse from the absence of glitter and personal adornment. His advance in the first instance was to Fureedpore, as a first stage towards Futteghur; his second to Futtehgunje; but here he heard news that changed his plans. To understand what occurred, we must revert to the affairs at Shahjehanpoor.
When Brigadier Jones had relieved Colonel Hall from his difficulties on the 11th, he found that he had been engaged with a fragment only of the enemy’s force; and he prepared for the contingency of a hostile encounter. On the 15th he was attacked with great fury and in great force by the rebels, who were headed by the Moulvie of Fyzabad, the Begum of Oude, the Shahzada of Delhi, and (as some thought) by Nena Sahib. The struggle continued throughout the day, and needed all the
## activity and resources of the brigadier. So large was the body of
rebels, indeed, that he could do nothing more than act on the defensive until reinforcements could reach him. This was the information received by Sir Colin when at Futtehgunje. He immediately re-arranged his forces. Leaving the 47th and 93d foot, the 17th Punjaub infantry, the 2d Sikh cavalry, and some horse and foot artillery, to guard Bareilly; he hastened towards Shahjehanpoor with the 64th foot, the Belooch battalion, the 9th Lancers, and some horse and foot artillery. On the 17th he marched to Tilhur; moving cautiously, for the rebels were known to be in great force not far distant. He rested during the mid-day heat, in a tope of mango-trees beyond the village of Tilhur. In the evening, information arrived that the Moulvie, with a large force, was strongly posted on the Mohumdee road, a few miles northeast of Shahjehanpoor. Mohumdee, which had been made a stronghold by the rebels, comprised a brick-fort, mounted with twelve or fifteen guns, strengthened in various ways, and protected within and without by troops. The Moulvie, as the most skilful of the insurgent leaders, held the chief command in these parts; but the Begum of Oude, and the Shahzada of Delhi, were believed to be near at hand. Mohumdee itself was about twenty miles from Shahjehanpoor; but the whole road was more or less commanded by the rebels. In the early morn of the 18th Sir Colin started again. Arriving at Shahjehanpoor, he passed the old camping-ground, made a partial circuit of the city to the bridge of boats, crossed the bridge, and traversed the city to the other side. It was found that the city had suffered considerably by the cannonading which Brigadier Jones had been compelled to inflict upon it, in his operations for the relief of the little garrison under Colonel Hall; and that many of the respectable inhabitants had deserted the place until more peaceful times, more facilities for quiet trade, should arrive.
When Sir Colin’s force joined that under Brigadier Jones, and the two commanders compared notes, it was found that the brigadier’s troops had suffered intensely from the heat. Mr Russell, who at that time—sick and hurt by a kick from a horse—was carried in a doolie or litter among the ‘baggage’ of Sir Colin’s army, was not sufficiently in front to witness much of the fighting; but his diary is full of vivid pictures of camp-life under a burning sun: ‘In Rose’s attack on the enemy at Koonch, eight men fell dead in the ranks, and upwards of twenty officers and men had to be carried from the field through the heat of the sun. Nineteen of our casualties at Bareilly, ten of which were fatal, were caused in the same way. In fact, every march henceforth after ten o’clock in the morning must be attended with loss of life.’—‘A peep into most of the tents would discover many of the head-quarters’ staff panting on their charpoys, in the nearest possible approach to Adamite costume, and gasping for breath like carp on the banks of a moat. It may readily be imagined—if officers, each of whom has a tent to himself, with kuskus tatties, punkahs, and similar appliances to reduce the temperature, suffer so much from heat—what the men endure, packed ten or twelve in a tent, and in some regiments eighteen or twenty, without such resources, and without change of light clothing; and how heavily picket-duty, outlying and inlying, presses upon them.’ In encamping after a twilight morning march, ‘it may be easily imagined how anxiously each man surveys the trees about his tent as the site is marked out, and calculates what shelter it will give him, and at what time the sun will find out his weak points during the day; for indeed the rays do strike through every interstice like red-hot shot. There is no indecision of shadow, no infirmity of outline; for wherever the sun falls on the side of a tent, it seems to punch out a fervid blazing pattern on the gray ground of the canvas.’—‘The motion of a doolie is by no means unpleasant; but I confess my experience of its comforts has now lasted quite long enough. It is a long cot slung from a bamboo-pole, borne on the shoulders of four men, two in front and two behind, who at a shuffling pace carry you along the road at the rate of four miles an hour; and two spare men follow as a relief. As the bottom of the litter hangs close to the ground, the occupant has more than his share of all the dust that is going; but if the curtains or tilts are let down, the heat becomes insupportable.’—‘The march of Jones’s column to the relief of Shahjehanpoor had told heavily upon the men. Upwards of thirty rank and file of the 79th fell out in marching to and through the city; and the 60th Rifles, accustomed though they be to Indian warfare, were deprived of the services of upwards of forty men from sun-stroke. It was pitiable, I was told, to see the poor fellows lying in their doolies, gasping their last. The veins of the arm were opened, and leeches applied to the temples; but notwithstanding every care, the greater number of the cases were fatal almost immediately; and even among the cases of those who recovered, there are few who are fit for active service again, except after a long interval of rest.’—‘I own I am distressed when I see the 60th Rifles dressed in dark-green tunics, which absorb the heat almost as much as if they were made of black cloth, and their cloth forage-caps poorly covered with a few folds of dark cotton. What shall we say of the 79th Highlanders, who still wear that picturesque and extraordinary head-dress, with the addition of a flap of gray cloth over the ears? If it were white, perhaps it would afford some protection against the sun; but, as it is, this mass of black feathers is surely not the head-dress that would be chosen by any one, except a foolish fantastic savage, for the plains of India.’
Having arrived at Shahjehanpoor on the 18th, the commander-in-chief wished to give his troops a little needful rest during the heat of the day. A cavalry detachment, however, having gone out to reconnoitre, came in sight of a small mud-fort containing four guns; the guns fired upon the cavalry; the report of this firing brought forward a body of the enemy’s troopers; and the appearance of these drew out Sir Colin and nearly the whole of his force. Thus a battle-array was very unexpectedly formed. Among the rebels was a large body of Rohilla troopers—active, determined, well mounted, and well armed; and as these men fought better than was wont among the enemy, and were supported by many guns, there followed a good deal of cavalry and artillery skirmishing. During the firing, a round-shot passed so close to Sir Colin Campbell and General Mansfield as greatly to endanger both, and to increase the desire among the soldiers generally that the commander-in-chief, who was very careful of his men’s lives, would attach a little more value to his own. Although the result of the encounter was to drive off the enemy to a greater distance, it was not wholly satisfactory or decisive; Sir Colin had not intended to resume active service until his troops had been refreshed by a few hours’ rest; but the reconnaissance had been so managed as to precipitate an engagement with the enemy. It was only a small part of the rebel force that was thus encountered on the 18th; the main body, eight or ten thousand strong, was at Mohumdee.
The commander-in-chief, finding himself too weak in cavalry to pursue the enemy with any effect, suspended operations for a few days; remaining at Shahjehanpoor until Brigadier Coke’s column could join him from the district of Pileebheet. Coke, in accordance with a plan already noticed, was preparing to sweep round the country by way of Boodayoun to Mooradabad; but he now joined Sir Colin, on the 22d; and preparations were made for an immediate advance upon the rebel position at Mohumdee. Again were the enemy beaten, and again did the Moulvie and the other leaders escape. When the British marched to that place on the 24th they found that the rebels had evacuated their strong fort, after destroying the defence-works. They had also destroyed Kujoorea, a very strong doubly intrenched position, surrounded by thick bamboo-hedges, and having a citadel. Several guns were dug up at the last-named place; and much property was discovered which had once belonged to the unfortunate Europeans murdered by the rebels nearly twelve months earlier.
Throughout the operations in Oude and Rohilcund, from May 1857 till May 1858, one of the master-spirits among the rebels was the Moulvie of Fyzabad—a man whose name has been so often mentioned: ‘A tall, lean, and muscular man, with lantern jaws, long thin lips, high aquiline nose, deep-set large dark eyes, beetle brows, long beard, and coarse black hair falling in masses over his shoulders.’ During the investigations which were subsequently made into the plans and intrigues of the rebels in Oude, the fact was ascertained that this Moulvie had been known many years before as Ahmed Shah, a sort of inspired fanatic or fakeer. He travelled through the Northwest Provinces on some sort of miraculous mission which was a mystery to the Europeans; his stay at Agra was of considerable duration, and was marked by the exercise of much influence over the Mohammedan natives. Mr Drummond, magistrate of that city, kept an eye on him as a suspicious character; and it was afterwards regarded as a probability that the Moulvie had been engaged in some plotting inimical to the English ‘raj.’ The commencement of the mutiny in May 1857 may have been determined by unforeseen circumstances; but abundant proofs were gradually obtained that some sort of conspiracy had been long before formed, and hence a reasonable inference that the Moulvie may have been one of the conspirators. When the troops mutinied at Fyzabad in June, they placed the Moulvie at their head. He had been in that city in April, attended by several fanatic followers; and here he circulated seditious papers, openly proclaiming a religious war. Although the police on this occasion were ordered to arrest him, he and his followers made an armed resistance which could not be suppressed without military aid. The Moulvie was captured, tried, and condemned for execution; but the Revolt broke out before he could thus be got rid of, and then he suddenly changed character from a felon to a leader of a formidable body of armed men. Though sometimes eclipsed in power by other leaders, he maintained great influence over the rebels throughout the turbulent proceedings of the period. There can be little doubt that he had much of the sincerity of a true religious fanatic; and as he was an able man, and free from the dastardly cruelty that so stained the names of Nena Sahib and other leaders of unenviable notoriety, a certain kind of respect was felt for him by the British whom he opposed.
When the month of May ended, and Sir Colin Campbell had proceeded to Futteghur as a central station whence he could conveniently watch the progress of events, the Rohilcund and Roorkee field-forces were broken up; and the regiments which had composed them were set apart for various detached duties. Brigadier Seaton remained at Shahjehanpoor, with the 60th Rifles, the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, Cureton’s cavalry, two squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Guards, and some artillery. The 79th Highlanders, and various detachments of artillery, took their departure for Futteghur. The 64th went to Meerut; the 9th Lancers to Umballa; and Coke’s Sikh brigade to Boodayoun or Pileebheet. At the end of the month all was quiet at and near Shahjehanpoor, and the peaceful portion of the inhabitants were returning; but it was doubtful how soon a new irruption of rebels from Oude would throw everything again into confusion. Indeed there were at that time many rebel leaders at the head of small bodies of insurgents, ready for mischief; among whom were Baboo Ramnarain of Islamnuggur, and Nizam Ali of Shahee—but these men could safely be regarded rather as guerrilla chieftains than as military leaders.
It was on this fitting occasion, when there seemed to be a lull in the din of war, that Sir Colin Campbell issued a congratulatory address to the troops of the Anglo-Indian armies. Although the address was not made publicly known to the troops by the adjutant-general until the following month, it was dated the 28th of May, and ran as follows:
‘In the month of October 1857 the garrison of Lucknow was still shut up, the road from Calcutta to Cawnpore was unsafe, the communications with the northwest were entirely closed, and the civil and military functionaries had disappeared altogether from wide and numerous provinces. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-general, a large plan was designed, by which the resources of the three presidencies, after the arrival of reinforcements from England, should be made available for combined action. Thus, while the army of Bengal, gathering strength from day to day, has recovered the Gangetic Doab, restored the communications with the northwest of the empire, relieved the old garrison of Lucknow, afterwards taking that city, reoccupying Rohilcund, and finally insuring in a great measure the tranquillity of the old provinces—the three columns put in movement from Bombay and Madras have rendered like great and efficient services in their long and difficult marches on the Jumna, through Central India, and in Rajpootana. These columns, under Major-generals Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., Whitlock, and Roberts, have admirably performed their share in the general combination arranged under the orders of his lordship the governor-general. This combination was spread over a surface ranging from the boundaries of Bombay and Madras to the extreme northwest of India. By their patient endurance of fatigue, their unfailing obedience, and their steadfast gallantry, the troops have enabled the generals to fulfil their instructions. In no war has it ever happened that troops have been more often engaged than during the campaigns which have now terminated. In no war has it ever happened that troops should always contend against immense numerical odds, as has been invariably the case in every encounter during the struggle of the last year; and in no war has constant success without a check been more conspicuously achieved. It has not occurred that one column here, another there, has won more honour than the other portions of the army; the various corps have done like hard work, have struggled through the difficulties of a hot-weather campaign, and have compensated for paucity of numbers in the vast area of operations by continuous and unexampled marching, notwithstanding the season. It is probable that much yet remains for the army to perform; but now that the commander-in-chief is able to give the greater part of it rest for a time, he chooses this moment to congratulate the generals and troops on the great results which have attended their labours. He can fairly say that they have accomplished in a few months what was believed by the ill-wishers of England to be either beyond her strength, or to be the work of many years.’
This address is not fully intelligible without taking into account certain brilliant proceedings in Central India, hereafter to be noticed; but it is transcribed here as a suitable termination to the Rohilcund operations in the month of May. The other important affairs bearing relation to it will find their due place of record.
Oude itself has been very little mentioned in this chapter. The reason is, that the most important section of the rebels escaped from that province into Rohilcund, after the great siege of Lucknow, thereby determining the main scene of struggle during May. There was not, however, a total cessation of fighting in Oude. Sir Hope Grant, who had been left at Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell, had more than one encounter with the rebels in the course of the month. Some of these operations brought him, on the 10th, to a place called Doundea Khera, a fort belonging to the rebel Ram Buksh. This fort, though of mud, was of considerable strength; it was square, with earthen walls and bastions of considerable thickness; it had four guns, and was rendered difficult of approach by a ditch and belt of prickly jungle. The fort was, however, found deserted when Sir Hope arrived. His work then consisted in destroying the fort, and such of the buildings as could be shewn to have belonged to Ram Buksh. This done, he advanced on the 12th to Nuggur. Hearing that two thalookdars or chieftains, Beni Madhoo and Shewrutten Singh, had assembled an army of fifteen thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eleven guns, at Sirsee, a village and fort about five miles off, Grant determined to attack them at once. He left all his baggage, supplies, &c., with tents struck, in a safe position, with a force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery for their protection. From the extreme difficulty of obtaining correct information in that country, Sir Hope was in much doubt concerning the ground occupied by the enemy; and eventually he found it stronger than he had expected. The rebels were drawn up on the banks of a nullah, with an extensive thick jungle in their rear, rendered still stronger by the fortified village of Towrie. At five in the afternoon the enemy’s first gun opened fire; but as soon as Grant had formed his column, with cavalry and horse-artillery covering his right flank, the rebels were attacked with such boldness and vigour that they gave way, and were driven into the jungle, leaving two iron guns behind them. Grant’s column was at one time almost surrounded by the rebels; but a prompt movement of some of the regiments speedily removed this difficulty. The rebels suffered severe loss, including that of one of their leaders, Shewrutten. Sir Hope Grant, deeming it imprudent to allow his troops to enter the jungle, bivouacked for the night on the ground where the battle had been fought, and returned on the morning of the 13th to his camp at Nuggur. During these operations, he found himself within a short distance of the small Hindoo temple in which Lieutenants Delafosse and Thomson, and several other Europeans, sought refuge after their escape from the boat-massacre at Cawnpore, eleven months earlier.[174] Much blood having been spilled on that occasion, one of the objects of the present expedition was to bring certain of the native miscreants to justice. Mr Elliott, assistant-commissioner, who accompanied the column, went on to the temple with a squadron of cavalry, took a few prisoners, and then destroyed the temple—which still exhibited the shot-holes resulting from the dastardly attack of a large body of natives on a few unarmed Europeans.
Towards the close of the month, Hope Grant found that a body of the enemy was threatening Bunnee, and endeavouring to obtain command of the high road between Lucknow and Cawnpore; this necessitated an expedition on his part to frustrate the design. As a means of better controlling approach to the capital, he blew up the stone-bridge over the Goomtee, thus leaving the iron suspension-bridge as the only mode of crossing.
Of Lucknow, little need be said in this chapter. The engineers were employed in constructing such batteries and strongholds, and clearing away such native buildings, as might enable a small British force to defend the place; while Mr Montgomery, the newly appointed chief-commissioner, was cautiously feeling his way towards a re-establishment of civil government. Viscount Canning had given him plenary powers, in reference to the issue of any proclamation to the natives—powers which required much tact in their exercise; for there was still a large amount of fierce opposition and vindictive feeling to contend against.
In the Doab, and the district adjacent to it, several minor affairs took place during the month, sufficient to indicate a very turbulent condition of portions of the population, even if not of great military importance. At one period of the month five thousand rebels, in two bodies, crossed the Kallee Nuddee, and marched along the western boundary of the Futteghur district, burning and destroying villages. They then crossed the Ganges into Oude by the Shorapore Ghât, taking with them several guns. Here, however, they were watched and checked by a small force under Brigadier Carthew, and by Cureton’s Horse. About the same time, a party of a thousand rebels, with four guns, marched from Humeerpore to Asung, on the great trunk-road between Lullutpore and Cawnpore; they commanded that road for several days, until a force could be sent out to dislodge them. Higher up the Doab, the fort and village of Ayana, in the Etawah district, were taken by a party of Alexander’s Horse, and a rebel chief, named Roop Singh, expelled. Colonel Riddell, who commanded a column from Etawah, encountered and defeated small bodies of rebels near Ooriya and Sheregurh, and then descended the Ganges in boats to Calpee, to take part in an important series of operations in which the Central India field-force was mainly concerned. Brigadier Showers, during the greater part of this month, was employed in various ways around Agra as a centre. Among other measures, he organised a corps of Jât cavalry, to defend the ghâts of the Ganges, and prevent rebels from crossing the river. Agra itself, with the brigadier at hand to check rising disturbances, remained free from serious troubles; though from time to time rumours were circulated which threw the Europeans into some uneasiness. As the native inhabitants still possessed a number of old firelocks, swords, and other weapons; it was deemed prudent to issue an order for disarming. An immense collection of queer native weapons was the result—not very formidable to English troops, but mischievous as a possible element of strength to the disaffected. Many of the guns in the fort were kept pointed towards the city, as a menace to evildoers.
In reference to many parts of the Doab, there was ample reason for British officers feeling great uneasiness at the danger which still surrounded them in the Northwest Provinces, wherever they were undefended by troops. The murder of Major Waterfield was a case in point. About the middle of May the major and Captain Fanshawe were travelling towards Allygurh _viâ_ Agra. In the middle of the night, near Ferozabad, a band of a hundred and fifty rebels surrounded the vehicle, shot the driver, and attacked the travellers. The two officers used their revolvers as quickly as they could; but the unfortunate Waterfield received two shots, one in the head and one through the chest, besides a sword-cut across the body; he fell dead on the spot. Fanshawe’s escape was most extraordinary. The rebels got him out of the carriage, and surrounded him; but they pressed together so closely that each prevented his neighbour from striking. Fanshawe quickly drew his sword, and swung it right and left so vigorously that he forced a passage for himself through the cowardly crew; some pursued him, but a severe sword-cut to one of them deterred the rest. The captain ran on at great speed, climbed up a tree, and there remained till the danger was over. His courage and promptness saved him from any further injury than a slight wound in the hand. Poor Waterfield’s remains, when sought for some time afterwards, were found lying among the embers of the burned vehicle; they were carried into Agra, and interred with military honours. The native driver was found dead, with the head nearly severed from the body.
Nynee Tal, Mussouree, and the other hill-stations towards which the sick and the weak looked with so much yearning, were almost wholly free from disturbance during May. One of the few events calling for notice was an expedition from Huldwanee by Captain Crossman. Receiving news that two rebel leaders, Nizam Ali Khan and Kali Khan, were preparing for mischief at a place called Bahonee, he started off on the 8th of May, with two or three companies of his own regiment, and a hundred Goorkhas mounted on elephants. He missed the two leaders, but captured many other rebels, included Kali Khan’s brother—all in the service of the notorious Khan Bahadoor Khan, self-appointed chief of Bareilly. After burning five rebel villages, in which great atrocities had been perpetrated against Christians many months before, Crossman returned to Huldwanee—having been in incessant movement for twenty-six hours.
Fortunately, the other regions of India presented so few instances—with a notable exception, presently to be mentioned—of rebellious proceedings, that a few paragraphs will suffice for their treatment.
During the earlier half of the month of May, minor engagements took place in the Nagpoor territory, for the dispersion of bands of marauders and insurgents. The rebels were so little influential, the troops sent against them so few in number, and the towns and villages so little known, that it is unnecessary to trace these operations in detail. The localities concerned were Arpeillee, Ghote, Ashtee, Koonserra, Chamoorshee, and others equally obscure. The insurgents were a contemptible rabble, headed by refractory zemindars; but as their country was almost a complete jungle, it was very difficult work for Lieutenant Nuttall and Captain Crichton to put them down. The first of these two officers had under him five companies of the Nagpoor irregular infantry, with one gun; the other was deputy-commissioner of the district. A party of two thousand rebels, under the zemindar of Arpeillee—about a hundred miles south of Nagpoor—ravaged many villages; and at one spot they brutally murdered Mr Gartlan and Mr Hall, electric-telegraph inspectors, taking away all the public and private property from the station. The marauders and murderers were gradually put down; and this necessary work, though difficult from the cause above mentioned, was facilitated by the peaceful tendencies of the villagers generally, who rather dreaded than favoured Yenkut Rao, Bapoo Rao, and the other rebel zemindars. It also tended to lessen the duration of the contest, and insure its success, that Milloo Potail, and some other chieftains, sided with the British. Bapoo Rao, the head rebel of the district, was believed to be bending his steps towards the Nizam’s country; but as he would there fall into the hands of an ally of the British, little doubt was entertained that his career would soon be cut short.
The Nizam and his prime-minister kept the large territory of Hyderabad free from any extensive military disturbances; but the country districts were so harassed by bands of marauding Rohilla freebooters, that the Nizam requested the Bombay government to furnish a small force for putting down this evil. Accordingly a corps of a few hundred men were sent to the region between Aurungabad and Jaulnah—with very evident and speedy effect.
It will be remembered that, in connection with the events of the month of April, the intended disarming of the province of Gujerat was adverted to. This critical and important operation was carried out during May. Sir Richmond Shakespear, who held a military as well as a political position in that province, managed the enterprise so firmly and skilfully that village after village was disarmed, and rendered so far powerless for mischief. Many unruly chieftains regarded this affair as very unpalatable. It was a work of great peril, for the turbulent natives were out of all proportion more numerous than any troops Sir Richmond could command; but he brought to bear that wonderful influence which many Englishmen possessed over the natives—influence shewing the predominance of moral over physical power. The native sovereign of Gujerat, the Guicowar, had all along been faithful and friendly to the British; he trusted Sir Richmond Shakespear as fully as Scindia trusted Sir Robert Hamilton, and gave an eager assent to the disarming of his somewhat turbulent subjects. The Nizam, the Guicowar, Scindia, and Holkar—all remained true to the British alliance during the hour of trouble; if they had failed us, the difficulties of reconquest would have been immensely increased, if not insuperable.
Of the Bombay presidency mention may be postponed to the chapter relating to the month of June, so far as concerns the appearance and suppression of slight rebellious symptoms. One of the minor events in Bombay city at this period was the conferring of a baronetcy on a native gentleman, the high-minded liberal Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy. He had long before been knighted; but his continued and valuable assistance to the government through all trials and difficulties now won for him further honour. The Parsee merchant became Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Bart.—perhaps the most remarkable among baronets, race and creed considered. Whatever he did, was done in princely style. In order that his new hereditary dignity might not be shamed by any paucity of wealth on the part of his descendants, he at once invested twenty-five lacs of rupees in the Bombay four per cents., to entail an income of ten thousand pounds a year on the holder of the baronetcy. A large mansion at Mazagon was for a like purpose entailed; and the old merchant-prince felt a commendable pride in thinking that Bombay might possibly, for centuries to come, count among its inhabitants a Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy.
The reader will have observed that this chapter is silent concerning the brilliant campaign of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India, and of the subsidiary operations under Generals Roberts and Whitlock. It has been considered advantageous, on account of the great importance of Sir Hugh’s exploits, and of the intimate manner in which his proceedings in June were determined by those of May, to treat those transactions in a separate chapter, apart from those connected with the names of Campbell, Lugard, Douglas, Grant, Walpole, Jones, and Penny. The narrative will next, therefore, take up the affairs of Central India during the months of May and June.
Note.
_Transport of Troops to India._—Early in the session of 1858, many members of the legislature, anxious to witness the adoption of the speediest mode of transporting troops to India, insisted not only that the overland route viâ Suez ought to have been adopted from the first, but also that the government and the East India Company ought to receive national censure for their real or supposed remissness on this point. In former chapters the fact has been rendered evident that, among the many important questions pressed upon the attention of the government, none was more imminent than that which related to the mode of strengthening the British army in India. England, not a military country in the continental estimate of that phrase, could ill spare troops to wage a great war in her Eastern possessions; and yet such a course was absolutely necessary. With ninety-nine regiments of line-infantry, and a proportionate number of troops of other kinds, she had to defend nearly thirty colonies besides the home country. Nay, at the very time when the mutiny began, she had barely finished a war with Persia, and had just commenced another with China—superadded to the defensive requirements just adverted to. Had the Persian expedition not been brought to a successful termination in the spring of 1857, and had the regiments destined for China become practically engaged in hostilities in that country at that time, it is difficult to imagine how the governor-general could have sent up any reinforcements from Calcutta, or Lord Elphinstone from Bombay, until summer had far advanced. Under the particular circumstances of time and place, however, Generals Outram and Havelock were released from their duties in Persia time enough to conduct the important operations at Lucknow and elsewhere—bringing with them the Queen’s troops and Company’s troops which had been engaged in the war in that country; while, on the other side, troops intended for service in China were rendered available for the needs of India. Still, this did not affect the strictures passed in the home country. Members of the legislature inquired, and journalists inquired: ‘Why was not the overland route adopted for or by troops sent from England?’ Hence the appointment of a committee of the House of Commons—‘To inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the lines of communication adopted for reinforcing our army during the pending Revolt in India, and report thereon to the House: with a view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of our Eastern dominions.’
As the report given in by the committee was comprised within a few paragraphs, we will present it unaltered here, and then touch upon a few matters of detail connected with the subject.
The committee agreed to report:
‘1. That the inquiry which this committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of steamers, as compared with sailing-vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the colonies.
‘2. That the Court of Directors appear, from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut, to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred her Majesty’s ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.
‘3. That the committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the cabinet.
‘4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route at the earliest possible period; and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route.
‘5. That although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.
‘6. That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing-vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the committee to shew that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam-transport was attainable; whilst it has been shewn that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam-vessels than were actually employed.
‘7. That steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.
‘8. That the governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the home government to transmit to India; that the committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.
‘9. That the committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother-country, and that the committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.
‘10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year.’
From the tenor of this report, it is evident that the East India directors were ready to adopt the overland route before the government gave in their adhesion. The ‘political reasons’ for avoiding that route were connected with the relations between Egypt and various European countries: relations often involving jealousy and diplomatic intrigue, and likely to be thrown into some perplexity by the passage of troops belonging to another nation. The ministers were unwilling to speak out plainly on this point, possibly for fear of giving offence to France; and the committee, though sorely against the wish of some of its members, refrained from pressing them on this point; hence the cautious phraseology of the report, throwing a sort of shield over the government.
In reference to the proceedings connected with the transport of troops to India, it may be well to advert to a few dates. The home government received, on the 9th of April, the first intimation that a disaffected spirit had made its appearance among the native troops at Barrackpore. On the 19th of May, Lord Ellenborough inquired in the House of Lords whether reinforcements were being sent to India; a reply in the affirmative was given, accompanied by an expression of opinion that the disaffection was of very minor character. Shortly afterwards, in the House of Commons, a similar belief was expressed by members of the government that the occurrences at Barrackpore were trifling, not likely to lead to serious results. At that period, as we have already seen,[175] the Bengal presidency, including the vast range of territory from Pegu to Peshawur, contained about 23,000 European troops and 119,000 native; the Madras presidency, 10,000 European and 50,000 native; the Bombay presidency, 5000 European and 31,000 native—making a total of about 38,000 Company’s and Queen’s European troops, and 200,000 native. These, the actual numbers, were exclusive of the large brigades of the Bombay army at that time engaged in, or not yet returned from, the Persian expedition. During May, the government and the East India directors decided that more European troops ought to be in India, in consideration both of the condition of India itself, and of the incidence of war in Persia and China; and the early dispatch of four regiments was decided on. At length, on the 27th of June, arrived a telegram announcing the revolt at Meerut and the seizure of Delhi by the mutineers. While Lord Elgin on the way to China, Lord Harris at Madras, Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, Sir Henry Ward at Ceylon, Sir James Higginson at Mauritius, and Sir George Grey at the Cape of Good Hope, were using their best exertions to send troops to aid Viscount Canning, the home authorities considered what best could be done in furnishing reinforcements from England. There were no less than 13,000 troops at the Cape of Good Hope at that time, including ten regiments of Queen’s infantry; it was fully believed in England that the governor might well have spared the greater portion of these troops; and the smallness of the number really contributed by him led to much disappointment in India, and much adverse criticism in England.
When the authorities at the War-office commenced their arrangements for despatching troops to India, they had to provide for a sea-voyage of about fourteen thousand miles. A question arose whether, without changing the route or shortening the distance, the duration of the voyage might not be lessened by the employment of steam-vessels instead of sailing-ships. The Admiralty, and most members of the government, opposed this change on various grounds, principally in relation to difficulties in the supply of fuel, but
## partly in relation to monsoons and other winds. By the 10th of July,
out of 31 vessels chartered by the government and the Company for conveying troops to India, nearly all were sailing-ships. A change of feeling took place about that date; the nation estimated time to be so valuable, that the authorities were almost coerced into the chartering of some of the noble merchant-steamers, the rapid voyages of which were already known. Between the 10th of July and the 1st of December, 59 ships were chartered, of which 29 were screw-steamers. The autumnal averages of passages to India were greatly in favour of steamers. Within a certain number of weeks there were 62 troop-laden ships despatched from England to one or other of the ports, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Kurachee; the average duration of all the voyages was 120 days by sailing-vessels, and only 83 days by steamers—a diminution of nearly one-third. Extending the list of ships to a later date, so as to include a greater number, it was found that 82 ships carried 30,378 troops from the United Kingdom to India—thus divided: 66 sailing-ships carried 16,234 men, averaging 299 each; 27 steamers carried 14,144, averaging 522 each. It was calculated that 14,000 of these British soldiers arrived in India _five weeks earlier_, by the adoption of steam instead of sailing-vessels. It is impossible to estimate what amount of change might have been produced in the aspect of Indian affairs, had these steam-voyages been made in the summer rather than in the autumn; it might not have been permitted to the mutineers to rule triumphant at Lucknow till the spring of the following year, or the fidelity of wavering chieftains to give way under the long continuance of the struggle.
Besides the two inquiries concerning the promptness with which troops were sent, and the kind of vessels employed to convey them, there was a third relating to the route adopted. From the earliest news of the revolt at Meerut, many persons in and out of parliament strenuously recommended the use of the overland route, as being much shorter than any possible ocean-route. The Court of Directors viewed this proposal more favourably than the government. Until the month of September, ‘political difficulties’ were dimly hinted at by ministers, but without any candid explanations; and as the objections gave way in the month just named, the nation arrived at a pretty general conclusion that these difficulties had never been of a very insurmountable character. It is only fair to state, however, that many experienced men viewed the overland route with distrust, independently of any political considerations. They adverted to the incompleteness of the railway arrangements between Alexandria and Cairo; to the difficulty of troops marching or riding over the sandy desert from Cairo to Suez; to the wretchedness of Suez as a place of re-embarkation; and to the unhealthiness of a voyage down the Red Sea in hot summer weather. Nevertheless, it was an important fact that the East India directors, most of whom possessed personal knowledge concerning the routes to India, urged the government from the first to send at least a portion of the troops by the Suez route. It was not until the 19th of September that assent was given; and the 13th of October witnessed the arrival of the first detachment of English troops into the Indian Ocean _viâ_ Suez. These started from Malta on the 1st of the month. On the 2d of October, the first regiment started from England direct, to take the overland route to India. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company, having practically almost a monopoly of the Suez route, conveyed the greater portion of the troops sent in this way; and it may be useful to note the length of journey in the principal instances. The following are tabulated examples giving certain items—such as, the name of the steamer, the date of leaving England, the number of troops conveyed, and the time of reaching Alexandria, to commence the overland portion of the journey:
Steamer. Left England. No. of Days to Troops. Alexandria. _Sultan_, 1857. Oct. 2 248 13 days. _Dutchman_, Oct. 14 256 17 days. _Sultan_, Nov. 17 264 14 days. _Euxine_, Dec. 2 236 15 days. _Indus_, Dec. 4 83 14 days. _Abeona_, Dec. 8 861 15 days. _Pera_, 1858. Feb. 4 231 15 days. _Ripon_, Feb. 11 242 15 days. _Sultan_, Feb. 24 244 13 days. _Malabar_, Mar. 11 264 14 days. _Ripon_, Mar. 27 420 14 days. _Benares_, Apr. 8 607 17 days.
Thus the voyage was made on an average in about 14½ days, from the shores of England to those of Egypt. The landing at Alexandria, the railway journey to Cairo, the journey by vans and donkeys across the desert, the short detention at Suez, and the embarkation in another steamer at that port, occupied a number of days varying from 2 to 17—depending chiefly on the circumstance whether or not a steamer was ready at Suez to receive the troops when they arrived from Alexandria; the average was about 5½ days. From Suez the voyages were made to Kurachee, Bombay, Ceylon, Madras, or Calcutta. The steamers took forward all the troops mentioned in the above list, as well as others which reached Alexandria by other means. Most of these troops were landed at Bombay or Kurachee, as being nearer than Calcutta; and the average length of voyage was just 16 days. The result, then, presented was this:
England to Alexandria, 14½ days’ average. Alexandria to Suez, 5½ days’ average. Suez to India, 16 days’ average. ——— 36 days’ average.
Those which went to Calcutta instead of Bombay or Kurachee, were about 3 days longer. Comparing these figures with those before given, we arrive at the following remarkable conclusion:
Sailing-ships round Cape, 120 days’ average. Steamers round Cape, 83 days’ average. Suez route, 36 days’ average.
This, as a question of time, triumphantly justified all that had been said by the advocates of the shortest route; nor did it appear that there were any counterbalancing disadvantages experienced. Between the 6th of November 1857, and the 18th of May 1858, more than 5000 officers and soldiers landed in India, who had travelled by the Suez overland route from England.
[Illustration]
-----
Footnote 171:
‘With the concurrence of the government, the commander-in-chief is pleased to direct that white clothing shall be discontinued in the European regiments of the Honourable Company’s army; and that for the future the summer-clothing of the European soldiers shall consist of two suits of “khakee,” corresponding in pattern and material with the clothing recently sanctioned for the royal army of England. Corps are to be permitted to wear out serviceable summer-clothing of the old pattern now in use; but in regiments in which this clothing requires to be renewed, the new pattern now established is to be introduced without delay. Commanding officers will take steps to obtain patterns from regiments of her Majesty’s service. A complete suit, including cap-cover, should not exceed in cost 4-12 rupees. The summer-clothing now authorised will be supplied from the clothing agency of the presidency to all recruits of the Company’s service arriving at Calcutta between 1st February and 1st October, to be issued with the least possible delay after arrival of the recruits.’
Footnote 172:
_Cavalry._—_1st Brigade_, under Brigadier Jones (6th Dragoon Guards). Head-quarters and two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards, under Captain Bickerstaff; Captain Lind’s Moultanee horse. _2d Brigade_, under Brigadier Hagart (7th Hussars). Her Majesty’s 9th Lancers, under Major Coles; 2d Punjaub cavalry, under Major S. Browne; detachments of Lahore light horse, 1st Punjaub cavalry, 5th Punjaub cavalry, and 17th irregular cavalry.
_Artillery._—Under Lieutenant-colonel Brind, C.B., B.A.; Lieutenant-colonel Tombs’s troop, B.H.A.; Lieutenant-colonel Remington’s troop, B.H.A.; Major Hammond’s light field-battery, B.A., four guns; two heavy field-batteries. Captain Francis, B.A.; siege-train with Major Le Mesurier’s company, B.A., under Captain Cookworthy’s detachment, B.A.; detachment R.E. Bengal and Punjaub; Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant-colonel Harness, R.E., chief-engineer to the force.
_Infantry._—_Highland Brigade_, under Lieutenant-colonel Leith Hay, C.B. (her Majesty’s 92d Highlanders). Her Majesty’s 42d Highlanders, under Lieutenant-colonel Cameron; her Majesty’s 79th Highlanders, under Lieutenant-colonel Taylor, C.B.; her Majesty’s 93d Highlanders, under Lieutenant-colonel Ross; 4th Punjaub Rifles, Lieutenant M’Queen; Belooch Battalion, Captain Beville. _Brigadier Stisted’s_ (70th) _Brigade_. Seven companies her Majesty’s 64th foot, Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, C.B.; her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders, Colonel Hamilton; 4 companies her Majesty’s 82 foot, Colonel the Hon. P. Herbert, C.B.; 2d Punjaub infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Greene; 22d Punjaub infantry, Captain Stafford.
Footnote 173:
‘The commander-in-chief has received the most gracious commands of her Majesty the Queen to communicate to the army an expression of the deep interest felt by the Queen in the exertions of the troops, and the successful progress of the campaign.
‘Sir Colin Campbell has delayed giving execution to the royal command, until he was able to announce to the army that the last stronghold of rebellion had fallen before the persevering attempts of the troops of her Majesty and the Hon. East India Company.
‘It is impossible for the commander-in-chief to express adequately his sense of the high honour done to him in having been chosen by the Queen to convey her Majesty’s most gracious acknowledgments to the army, in the ranks of which he has passed his life.
‘The commander-in-chief ventures to quote the very words of the Queen:
‘“That so many gallant, brave, and distinguished men, beginning with one whose name will ever be remembered with pride, Brigadier-general Havelock, should have died and fallen, is a great grief to the Queen. To all Europeans and native troops who have fought so nobly and so gallantly—and amongst whom the Queen is rejoiced to see the 93d—the Queen wishes Sir Colin to convey the expression of her great admiration and gratitude.”’
Footnote 174:
See Chap. viii., p. 138.
Footnote 175:
## Chapter xii., p. 208.
[Illustration:
SIR HUGH ROSE. ]
## CHAPTER XXX.
ROSE’S VICTORIES AT CALPEE AND GWALIOR.
The fame of Sir Hugh Rose came somewhat unexpectedly upon the British people. Although well known to persons connected with India as a gallant officer belonging to the Bombay army, Rose’s military services were not ‘household words’ in the mother-country. Henry Havelock had made himself the hero of the wars of the mutiny by victories won in a time when the prospects were stern and gloomy; and it was not easy for others to become heroes of like kind, when compared in the popular mind with such a noble soldier. Hence it may possibly be that the relative merits of Campbell, Havelock, Neill, Wilson, Nicholson, Outram, Hope Grant, Inglis, Rose, Roberts, Napier, Eyre, Greathed, Jones, Smith, Lugard, and other officers, as military leaders, will remain undecided for a long period—until dispatches, memoirs, and journals have thrown light on the minuter details of the operations. Be this as it may, Sir Hugh Rose won for himself a high name by a series of military exploits skilfully conceived and brilliantly executed.
To understand the true scope of Rose’s proceedings in the months of May and June, it may be well to recapitulate briefly the state of matters at the close of the preceding month.
After Sir Hugh—with the 1st brigade of his Central India Field-force under Brigadier Stuart, and the 2d brigade under Brigadier Steuart—had captured the important city of Jhansi, in the early part of April, his subsequent proceedings were determined according to the manœuvres of the rebels elsewhere. Jhansi, as the strongest and most important place in Bundelcund, was a valuable conquest; but as the Ranee and Tanteea Topee—the one chieftainess of Jhansi, and the other a representative of the Mahratta influence of Nena Sahib in these parts—had escaped, with the greater part of their rebel troops, it became necessary to continue the attack against them wherever they might be. The safety of Jhansi, the succour of the sick and wounded, and the reconstruction of his field-force, detained Rose in that city until the 25th of the month; but Majors Orr and Gall were in the interim actively employed in chasing and defeating various bodies of rebels in the surrounding country. Orr was sent from Jhansi across the river Betwah to Mhow, to clear that region from insurgents, and then to join Rose on the way to Calpee; he captured a small fort at Goorwai, near the Betwah, and kept a sharp watch on the proceedings of the rebel Rajahs of Banpore and Shagurh. Gall, with two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons and three 9-pounders, was commissioned to reconnoitre the position and proceedings of the rebels on the Calpee road; he captured the fort of Lohare, belonging to the insurgent Rajah of Sumpter. Hearing that Tanteea Topee, Ram Rao Gobind, and other leaders, had made Calpee a stronghold, and intended to dispute the passage of the road from Jhansi to that place, Rose laid his plans accordingly. Calpee, though not a large place, was important as being on the right bank of the Jumna, and on the main road from Jhansi to Cawnpore. During the later days of April, Sir Hugh was on the road to Calpee with the greater part of his two brigades; the rest of his troops, under Orr, Gall, and one or two other officers, being engaged in detached services. At that same time, General Whitlock, after defeating many bodies of rebels in and near the Banda district, was gradually tending towards a junction with Rose at Calpee; while General Roberts was at Kotah, keeping a vigilant eye on numerous turbulent bands in Rajpootana.
When May arrived, Sir Hugh, needing the services of Majors Orr and Gall with his main force, requested General Whitlock to watch the districts in which those two officers had been engaged. Being joined on the 8th by his second brigade (except the regiments and detachments left to guard Jhansi), he resumed his march on the 9th. News reached him that Tanteea Topee and the Ranee intended to dispute his passage towards Calpee at a place called Koonch, with a considerable force of cavalry and infantry. As soon as he arrived at Koonch, he engaged the enemy, drove them from their intrenchment, entered the town, cut them up severely, pursued them to a considerable distance, and captured several guns. The heat on this occasion was fearful. Rose himself was three times during the day disabled by the sun, but on each occasion rallied, and was able to remount; he caused buckets of cold water to be dashed on him, and then resumed the saddle, all wet as he was. Thirteen of his gallant but overwrought soldiers were killed by sun-stroke. Nothing daunted by this severe ordeal, he marched on to Hurdwee, Corai, Ottah, and other villages obscure to English readers, capturing a few more guns as he went. Guided by the information which reached him concerning the proceedings of the rebels, Sir Hugh, when about ten miles from Calpee, bent his line of march slightly to the west, in order to strike the Jumna near Jaloun, a little to the northwest of Calpee. He had also arranged that Colonel Riddell, with a column from Etawah, should move down upon Calpee from the north; that Colonel Maxwell, with a column from Cawnpore, should advance from the east; and that General Whitlock should watch the country at the south. The purpose of this combination evidently was, not only that Calpee should be taken, but that all outlets for the escape of the rebels should as far as possible be closed.
On the 15th, the two brigades of Rose’s force joined at a point about six miles from Calpee. A large mass of the enemy here made a dash at the baggage and rear-guard, but were driven off without effecting much mischief. When he reached the Jumna, Rose determined to encamp for a while in a well-watered spot; and was enabled, by a personal visit from Colonel Maxwell, to concert further plans with him, to be put in force on the arrival of Maxwell’s column. On the 16th, a strong reconnoitring column under Major Gall proceeded along the Calpee road; it consisted of various detachments of infantry, cavalry, and horse-artillery. On the same day, the second brigade was attacked by the enemy in great force, and was not relieved without a sharp skirmish. On the 17th, the enemy made another attack, which was, however, repulsed with less difficulty. Nena Sahib’s nephew was believed to be the leader of the rebels on these two occasions. It was not until the 18th that Rose could begin shelling the earthworks which they had thrown up in front of the town. Greatly to their astonishment, the enemy found that Maxwell arrived at the opposite bank of the Jumna on the 19th, to assist in bombarding the place; they apparently had not expected this, and were not prepared with defences on that side. On the 20th, they came out in great force on the hills and nullahs around the town, attempted to turn the flank of Sir Hugh’s position, and displayed a determination and perseverance which they had not hitherto exhibited; but they were, as usual, driven in again. On the 21st, a portion of Maxwell’s column crossed the Jumna and joined Rose; while his heavy artillery and mortars were got into position. On the 22d, Maxwell’s batteries opened fire across the river, and continued it throughout the night, while Sir Hugh was making arrangements for the assault. The rebels, uneasy at the prospect before them, and needing nothing but artillery to reply to Maxwell’s fire, resolved to employ the rest of their force in a vigorous attack on Rose’s camp at Gulowlie. Accordingly, on that same day, the 22d, they issued forth from Calpee in great force, and attacked him with determination. Rose’s right being hard pressed by them, he brought up his reserve corps, charged with the bayonet, and repulsed the assailants at that point. Then moving his whole line forward, he put the enemy completely to rout. In these assaults, the rebels had the advantage of position; the country all round Calpee was very rugged and uneven, with steep ravines and numerous nullahs; insomuch that Rose had much difficulty in bringing his artillery into position. The assaults were made by numbers estimated at not far less than fifteen thousand men. The 71st and 86th foot wrought terrible destruction amongst the dense masses of the enemy. About noon on the 23d, the victorious Sir Hugh marched on from Gulowlie to Calpee. The enemy, who were reported to have chosen Calpee as a last stand-point, and to have sworn either to destroy Sir Hugh’s army or to die in the attempt, now forgot their oath; they fled panic-stricken after firing a few shot, and left him master of the town and fort of Calpee. This evacuation was hastened by the effect of Maxwell’s bombardment from the other side of the river.
Throughout the whole of the wars of the mutiny, the mutineers succeeded in escaping after defeat; they neither surrendered as prisoners of war, nor remained in the captured towns to be slaughtered. They were nimble and on the watch, knew the roads and jungles well, and had generally good intelligence of what was going on; while the British were seldom or never in such force as to be enabled completely to surround the places besieged: as a consequence, each siege ended in a flight. Thus it had been in Behar, Oude, the Doab, and Rohilcund; and thus Rose and his coadjutors found it in Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Central India. Sir Hugh had given his troops a few hours’ repose after the hot work of the 22d; and this respite seems to have encouraged the rebels to flee from the beleaguered town; but they would probably have succeeded in doing the same thing, though with greater loss, if he had advanced at once. The British had lost about forty commissariat carts, laden with tea, sugar, arrack, and medical comforts; but their loss in killed and wounded throughout these operations was very inconsiderable.
Sir Hugh Rose inferred, from the evidences presented to his notice, that the rebels had considered Calpee an arsenal and a point of great importance. Fifteen guns were kept in the fort, of which one was an 18-pounder of the Gwalior Contingent, and two others 9-pounder mortars made by the rebels. Twenty-four standards were found, one of which had belonged to the Kotah Contingent, while most of the rest were the colours of the several regiments of the Gwalior Contingent. A subterranean magazine was found to contain ten thousand pounds of English powder in barrels, nine thousand pounds of shot and empty shells, a quantity of eight-inch filled shrapnell-shells, siege and ball ammunition, intrenching tools of all kinds, tents new and old, boxes of new flint and percussion muskets, and ordnance stores of all kinds—worth several lacs of rupees. There were also three or four cannon foundries in the town, with all the requisites for a wheel and gun-carriage manufactory. In short, it was an arsenal, which the rebels hoped and intended to hold to the last; but Sir Hugh’s victory at Gulowlie, and his appearance at Calpee, gave them a complete panic: they thought more of flight than of fighting.
The question speedily arose, however—Whither had the rebels gone? Their losses were very large, but the bulk of the force had unquestionably escaped. Some, it was found, had crossed the Jumna into the Doab, by a bridge of boats which had eluded the search of the British; but the rest, enough to form an army of no mean strength, finding that Rose had not fully guarded the side of Calpee leading to Gwalior, retreated by that road with amazing celerity. Sir Hugh thereupon organised a flying column to pursue them, under the command of Colonel Robertson. This column did not effect much, owing in part to the proverbial celerity of the rebels, and in part also to difficulties of other kinds. Heavy rains on the first two days rendered the roads almost impassable, greatly retarding the progress of the column. The enemy attempted to make a stand at Mahona and Indoorkee, two places on the road; but when they heard of the approach of Robertson, they continued their retreat in the direction of Gwalior. The column reached Irawan on the 29th; and there a brief halt was made until commissariat supplies could be sent up from Calpee. An officer belonging to the column adverted, in a private letter, to certain symptoms that the villagers were becoming tired of the anarchy into which their country had been thrown. ‘The feeling of the country is strong against the rebels now, whatever it may have been; and the rural population has welcomed our advent in the most unmistakable manner. At the different villages as we go along, many of them come out and meet us with earthen vessels full of water, knowing it to be our greatest want in such weather; and at our camping-ground they furnish us voluntarily with supplies of grain, grass, &c., in the most liberal manner. They declare the rebels plundered them right and left, and that they are delighted to have the English raj once more. It is not only the inhabitants of the towns and villages where we encamp who are so anxious to evince their good feeling; but the people, for miles round, have been coming to make their salaam, bringing forage for our camp with them, and thanking us for having delivered them from their oppressors. They say that for a year they have had no peace; but they have now a hope that order will be once more restored.’ Concerning this statement it may suffice to remark, that though the villagers were unquestionably in worse plight under the rebels than under the British, their obsequious protestations to that effect were not always to be depended on; their fears gave them duplicity, inducing them to curry favour with whichever side happened at the moment to be greatest in power.
Colonel Robertson, though he inflicted some loss on the fugitives, did not materially check them. His column—comprising the 25th Bombay native infantry, the 3d Bombay native cavalry, and 150 Hyderabad horse—pursued the rebels on the Gwalior road, but did not come up with the main body. On the 2d of June he was joined by two squadrons of the 14th dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. On the next day, when at Moharar, about midway between Calpee and Gwalior (fifty-five miles from each) he heard news of startling import from the last-named city—presently to be noticed. About the same time Brigadier Steuart marched to Attakona on the Gwalior road, with H.M. 71st, a wing of the 86th, a squadron of the 14th Dragoons, and some guns, to aid in the pursuit of the rebels.
While these events were in progress on the south of the Jumna, Colonel Riddell was advancing from the northwest on the north side of the same river. On the 16th of May, Riddell was at Graya, with the 3d Bengal Europeans, Alexander’s Horse, and two guns; he had a smart skirmish with a party of rebels, who received a very severe defeat. Some of the Etawah troops floated down the Jumna in boats, under the charge of Mr Hume, a magistrate, and safely joined Sir Hugh at Calpee. On their way they were attacked by a body of insurgents much more numerous than themselves; whereupon Lieutenant Sheriff landed with a hundred and fifty men at Bhijulpore, brought the rebels to an engagement, defeated them, drove them off, and captured four guns with a large store of ammunition. On the 25th, when on the banks of the Jumna some distance above Calpee, Colonel Riddell saw a camp of rebels on the other side, evidently resting a while after their escape on the 23d; he sent the 2d Bengal Europeans across, and captured much of the camp-equipage—the enemy not waiting to contest the matter with him.
When Calpee had been securely taken, and flying columns had gone off in pursuit of the enemy, to disperse if not to capture, Sir Hugh Rose conceived that the arduous labours of his Central India Field-force were for a time ended, and that his exhausted troops might take rest. He issued to them a glowing address, adverting with commendable pride to the unswerving gallantry which they had so long exhibited: ‘Soldiers! you have marched more than a thousand miles, and taken more than a hundred guns. You have forced your way through mountain-passes and intricate jungles, and over rivers. You have captured the strongest forts, and beaten the enemy, no matter what the odds, whenever you met him. You have restored extensive districts to the government, and peace and order now where before for a twelvemonth were tyranny and rebellion. You have done all this, and you never had a check. I thank you with all sincerity for your bravery, your devotion, and your discipline. When you first marched, I told you that you, as British soldiers, had more than enough of courage for the work which was before you, but that courage without discipline was of no avail; and I exhorted you to let discipline be your watchword. You have attended to my orders. In hardships, in temptations and danger, you have obeyed your general, and you have never left your ranks; you have fought against the strong, and you have protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of foes as well as of friends. I have seen you in the ardour of the combat preserve and place children out of harm’s way. This is the discipline of Christian soldiers, and it is what has brought you triumphant from the shores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna, and establishes without doubt that you will find no place to equal the glory of your arms.’
Little did the gallant Sir Hugh suspect that the very day on which he issued this hearty and well-merited address (the 1st of June) would be marked by the capture of Gwalior by the defeated Calpee rebels, the flight of Scindia to Agra, and the necessity for an immediate resumption of active operations by his unrested Central India Field-force.
The rebels, it afterwards appeared, having out-marched Colonel Robertson, arrived on the 30th of May at the Moorar cantonment, in the neighbourhood of Gwalior, the old quarters of the Gwalior Contingent. Tanteea Topee, a leader whose activity was worthy of a better cause, had preceded them, to tamper with Scindia’s troops. The Maharajah, when he heard news of the rebels’ approach, sent an urgent message to Agra for aid; but before aid could reach him, matters had arrived at a crisis.
The position of the Maharajah of Gwalior had all along been a remarkable and perilous one, calling for the exercise of an amount of sagacity and prudence rarely exhibited by so youthful a prince. Although only twenty-three years of age, he had been for five years Maharajah in his own right, after shaking off a regency that had inflicted much misery on his country; and during these five years his conduct had won the respect of the British authorities. The mutiny placed him in an embarrassing position. The Gwalior Contingent, kept up by him in accordance with a treaty with the Company, consisted mainly of Hindustanis and Oudians, strongly in sympathy with their compatriots in the Jumna and Ganges regions. His own independent army, it is true, consisted chiefly of Mahrattas, a Hindoo race having little in common with the Hindustanis; but he could not feel certain how long either of the two armies would remain faithful. After many doubtful symptoms, in July 1857, as we have seen in former chapters, the Gwalior Contingent went over in a body to the enemy—thus adding ten or twelve thousand disciplined and well-armed troops to the rebel cause. Scindia contrived for two or three months to remain on neutral terms with the Contingent—on the one hand, not sanctioning their proceedings: on the other, not bringing down their enmity upon himself. During the winter they were engaged in encounters at various places, which have been duly noticed in the proper chapters. When Sir Hugh Rose’s name had become as much known and feared in Central India as Havelock’s had been in the Northwest Provinces many months before, the rebels began to look to Gwalior, the strongest city in that part of India, as a possible place of permanent refuge; and many of the Mahratta and Rajpoot chieftains appear to have come to an agreement, that if Scindia would not join them against the British, they would attack him, dethrone him, and set up another Maharajah in his stead. Meanwhile the Gwalior prince, a brave and shrewd man, as well as a faithful ally, looked narrowly at the circumstances that surrounded him. He had some cause to suspect his own national or regular army, but deemed it best to conceal his suspicions. There was every cause for apprehension, therefore, on his part, when he found a large body of insurgent troops approaching his capital—especially as some of the regiments of the old Gwalior Contingent were among the number.
Although aid from Agra or Calpee had not arrived, Scindia had courage and skill enough to make a bold stand against them, if his own troops had proved faithful; but treachery effected that which fair fighting might not easily have done. Scindia’s body-guard remained faithful. Such was not, however, the case with the bulk of his infantry, who had been tampered with by Tanteea Topee, and had agreed to desert their sovereign in his hour of greatest need. This was doubtless the motive of the rebel leader in preceding the march of the Calpee fugitives. When the struggle began, Scindia’s force comprised two or three thousand cavalry, six thousand infantry, and eight guns; that of the enemy consisted of four thousand cavalry, seven thousand infantry, and twelve guns—no overwhelming disparity, if Scindia’s own troops had been true. The rebels did not want for leaders; seeing that they had the Ranee of Jhansi, the Nawab of Banda, Tanteea Topee, Rao Sahib, Ram Rao Gobind, and Luchmun Nena. Rao Sahib, nephew of the Nena, was the nominal leader of the Mahrattas in this motley force; but Tanteea Topee was really the man of action and power. Certainly the most remarkable among the number was the Ranee of Jhansi, a woman who—but for her cruelty to the English at that station—would command something like respect. Whether she had been unjustly treated by the Company, in relation to the ‘annexations’ in former years, was one among many questions of a similar kind on which opinions were divided; but supposing her to be sincere in a belief that territory had been wrongly taken from her, then did her conduct (barring her cruelty and her unbounded licentiousness) bear something like the stamp of heroism. At anyrate, she proved herself a very Amazon in these warlike contests—riding like a man, bearing arms like a man, leading and fighting like a man, and exhorting her troops to contend to the last against the hated Feringhees.
The battle between the Maharajah and the insurgents was of brief duration. The enemy, at about seven o’clock on the morning of the 1st of June, made their appearance in battle-array. Scindia took up a position about two miles eastward of the Moorar cantonment; placing his troops in three divisions, of which the centre was commanded by him in person. The rebels pushed on a cloud of mounted skirmishers, with zumborucks or camel-guns; these were steadily confronted by Scindia’s centre division. But now did the treachery appear. It is not quite clear whether the right and left divisions of his force remained idle during the fighting of the centre division, waited for the capture of guns as a signal for revolt, marched over to the opposite side, and began to fire on such of their astonished companions as still remained true to Scindia; or whether the left division went over at the commencement of the fighting, and was followed soon after by the right; but at anyrate the centre, comprising the body-guard with some other troops, could not long contend against such immense odds. The body-guard fought manfully until half their number had fallen, and the rest fled. Scindia himself, too, powerless against such numerous opponents, sought safety in flight, and fortunately found it. Attended by a few faithful troops, the Maharajah galloped off by way of the Saugor Tal, the Residency, and the Phool Bagh, avoiding the Lashkar or permanent camp of his (late) army; he then took to the open country, by the Dholpore road, and reached Agra two days afterwards. The rebels sent a troop of cavalry sixteen or eighteen miles in pursuit, but he happily kept ahead of them. Most of the members of his family fled to Seepree, while his courtiers were scattered in all directions.
Directly the Maharajah had thus been driven out of his capital, the rebels entered Gwalior, and endeavoured to form a regular government. They chose Nena Sahib as ‘Peishwa,’ or head of all the Mahratta princes. They next set up Rao Sahib, the Nena’s nephew, as chief of Gwalior. These selections appear to have been assented to by Scindia’s traitorous troops as well as by the other rebels. All the troops were to have a certain number of months’ pay for their services in this achievement. The army was nevertheless the great difficulty to be contended against by the rebel leaders. The insurgents from Calpee, and the newly revolted troops of Scindia, had worked together for a common object in this instance; but there was jealousy between them; and nothing could make them continue together without the liberal distribution of money—partly as arrears of pay, partly as an advance. Ram Rao Gobind, who had long before been discharged from Scindia’s service for dishonesty, became prime-minister. The main bulk of the army, under the masculine Ranee of Jhansi, remained encamped in a garden called the Phool Bagh, outside the city; while pickets and guns were sent to guard all the roads of approach. The property of the principal inhabitants was sequestered, in real or pretended punishment for friendliness towards the Maharajah and the British. Scindia possessed an immense treasure in his palace, which he could not take away in his flight; this the rebels seized, by the connivance of the truculent treasurer, Ameerchand Batya; and it was out of this treasure they were enabled to reward the troops. They also declared a formal confiscation of all the royal property. Four petty Mahratta chieftains in the district of Shakerwarree—named Kunughat, Gholab Singh, Dooghur Shah, and Bukhtawar Singh—had some time previously declared themselves independent, and had been captured and imprisoned by Scindia for so doing; these men were now set at liberty by the newly constituted authorities, and received insignia and dresses of honour, on condition of raising forces in their several localities to oppose any British troops who might attempt to cross the Chumbul and approach Gwalior. The leaders mustered and reviewed their troops, plundered and burnt the civil station, and liberated such prisoners as they thought might be useful to them. They also sent letters of invitation to the Rajahs of Banpore, Shagurh, &c., to join them.
Thus did a body of rebels, collected from different quarters, and actuated by different motives, expel the Maharajah Scindia from the throne of Gwalior, and install a government avowedly and bitterly hostile to him and to the British with whom he was in alliance. Throughout twelve months’ events at Gwalior, the more experienced of the Company’s officers frequently directed their attention to a certain member of Scindia’s family, in doubt whether treachery might have been exhibited in that quarter. This was a princess, advanced in life, whose influence at Gwalior was known to be considerable, and whose experience of the checkered politics of Indian princedoms had extended over a very lengthened period. She was known as the Baeza Baee of Gwalior. Sixty years before the mutiny began, she was the beauty of the Deccan, the young bride of the victorious Dowlut Rao Scindia of 1797; and she lived through all the vicissitudes of those sixty years. During thirty years of married life she exercised great influence over her husband and the court of Gwalior, exhibiting more energy of purpose than is wont among eastern women. In 1827 Scindia died without a legitimate son; and the widow, in accordance with Indian custom, adopted a kinsman of the late Maharajah to be the new Scindia. The Baeza Baee as regent, and Moodkee Rao as expectant rajah, had many quarrels during the next seven years: these ended, in 1834, in the installation of the young man as rajah, and in the retirement of the widowed princess to Dholpore. Tumults continued; for the princess was considered the more skilful ruler of the two, and many of the Mahrattas of Gwalior wished her to continue as regent. Whether from justice, or from motives of cold policy, the British government sided with Scindia against the Baeza Baee; and she was ordered to take up her abode in some district beyond the limits of the Gwalior territory. In 1843, when Moodkee Rao Scindia died, this territory came more closely than before under British influence; a new Scindia was chosen, with the consent of the governor-general, from among the relations of the deceased Maharajah; and with this new Scindia the aged Baeza Baee appears to have resided until the time of the mutiny. Nothing unfavourable was known against this venerable lady; but when it was considered that she was a woman of great energy, and that many other native princesses of great energy—such as the Ranee of Jhansi and the Begum of Oude—had thrown their influence in the scale against the English, it was deemed proper to watch her movements. And this the more especially, as she had some cause to complain of the English policy in the Mahratta dominions in past years. Although watched, however, nothing appeared to justify suspicion of her complicity with the rebels.
Great was the anxiety at all the British stations when the news arrived that Gwalior, the strongest and most important city in Central India, and the capital of a native sovereign uniformly true to the British alliance, had fallen into the hands of the rebels. In many minds a desponding feeling was at once manifest; while those who did not despond freely acknowledged that the situation was a critical one, calling for the exercise of promptness, skill, and courage. All felt that the conqueror of Jhansi and Calpee was the fit man to undertake the reconquest of Gwalior, both from his military fame and from the circumstances of his position—having around him many columns and corps which he could bring to one centre. It was in the true spirit of heroism that Sir Hugh Rose laid aside all thoughts of self when the exigencies of the service called for his attention. He had won a complete victory at Calpee, and believed that in so doing he had crushed the rebels in Bundelcund and Scindia’s territory. Then, and then only, did he think of himself—of his exhausted frame, his mind worn by six months of unremitting duty, his brain fevered by repeated attacks of sun-stroke in the fearful heat of that climate. He knew that he had honestly done his part, and that he might with the consent of every one claim an exemption for a time from active service. He intended to go down to Bombay on sick-certificate—after having sent off a column in pursuit of the fleeing rebels, and made arrangements for his successor. Such were Sir Hugh’s thoughts when June opened. The startling news from Gwalior, however, overturned all his plans. When he found that Scindia’s capital was in the hands of the insurgents whom he had so recently beaten at Calpee, all thoughts concerning fatigue and heat, anxiety and sickness, were promptly dismissed from his mind. He determined to finish the work he had begun, by reconquering the great Mahratta city. No time was to be lost. Every day that Gwalior remained in the hands of the rebels would weaken the British prestige, and add strength to the audacity of the rebels.
Sir Hugh’s first measure was to request the presence of General Whitlock at Calpee, to hold that place safely during the operations further westward. Whitlock was at Moudha, between Banda and Humeerpoor, when he heard the news; he at once advanced towards Calpee by the ford of the Betwah at Humeerpoor. Rose’s next step was to organise two brigades for rapid march to Gwalior. Of those brigades the infantry consisted of H.M. 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, a wing of the 3d Bombay Europeans, the 24th and 25th Bombay native infantry, and the 5th Hyderabad infantry; the cavalry comprised wings of the 4th and 14th Dragoons, the 3d Hyderabad cavalry, and a portion of the 3d Bombay native cavalry; the artillery and engineers consisted of a company of the Royal Engineers, Bombay Sappers and Miners, Madras Sappers and Miners, two light field-batteries, Leslie’s troop of Bombay horse-artillery, and a siege-train consisting of two 16-pounders, three 18-pounders, eight 8-inch mortars, two 10-inch mortars, and one 8-inch howitzer. The first of these two brigades was placed under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay army; the second under Brigadier R. Napier, of the Bengal Engineers. Arrangements were made for the co-operation of a third brigade from Seepree, under Brigadier Smith. Orders were at the same time given for bringing up Major Orr’s column from the south, and for joining it with Smith’s brigade somewhere on the road to Gwalior; Colonel Maxwell, with the 5th Fusiliers and the 88th foot, was invited to advance from Cawnpore to Calpee; while Colonel Riddell was instructed to cross the Chumbul with his Etawah column. Rose did not know what might be the number of insurgents against whom he would have to contend when he reached Gwalior, and on that account he called in reinforcements from various quarters.
Pushing on his two main brigades as rapidly as possible, Sir Hugh appeared in the vicinity of Gwalior on the ninth day after leaving Calpee—allowing his troops no more rest by the way than was absolutely needed. On the evening of the 15th of June he was at Sepowlie, about ten miles from the Moorar cantonment; and by six o’clock on the following morning he reached the cantonment itself. Sir Hugh galloped forward with his staff to a point about midway between the cantonment and the city; and there began to reconnoitre the position taken up by the enemy. Gwalior is very remarkable as a military position, owing to the relation which the city bears to a strong and lofty hill-fort. ‘The rock on which the hill-fort is situated,’ says Mr Thornton, ‘is completely isolated; though seven hundred yards to the north is a conical hill surmounted by a very remarkable building of stone; and on the southeast, south, and southwest, are similar hills, which form a sort of amphitheatre at the distance of from one to four miles. The sandstone of the hill-fort is arranged in horizontal strata, and its face presents so steep a fracture as to form a perpendicular precipice. Where the rock was naturally less precipitous, it has been so scarped as to be rendered perpendicular; and in some places the upper part considerably overhangs the lower. The greatest length of the rock, which is from northeast to southwest, is a mile and a half; the greatest breadth three hundred yards. The height at the south end, where it is greatest, is 342 feet. On the eastern face of the rock, several colossal figures are sculptured in bold relief. A rampart runs round the edge of the rock, conforming to the outline of its summit; and as its height is uniform above the verge, its top has an irregular appearance. The entrance within the enclosure of the rampart is towards the north end of the east side; first, by means of a steep road, and higher up by steps cut in the face of the rock, of such a size and of so moderate a degree of acclivity that elephants easily make their way up. This huge staircase is protected on the outer side by a high and massive stone-wall, and is swept by several traversing guns pointing down it: the passage up to the interior being through a succession of seven gates. The citadel is at the northeastern extremity of the enclosure, and has a very striking appearance. Adjoining is a series of six lofty round towers or bastions, connected by curtains of great height and thickness. There are within the enclosure of the rampart several spacious tanks, capable of supplying an adequate garrison; though fifteen thousand men would be required fully to man the defences.’ The town of Gwalior, it may suffice to state, was situated along the eastern base of the rock. The Lashkar, or permanent camp of the Maharajah, stretch out from the southwest end of the rock; whereas the Moorar, or cantonment of the old Gwalior Contingent, was on the opposite side of the town.
Such was the place which Sir Hugh Rose found it necessary to reconnoitre, preparatory to a siege. The hill-fort, the Lashkar, the Moorar, the city, and the semicircular belt of hills, all needed examination, sufficient at least to determine at what points the rebel army was distributed, and what defences had been thrown up. He found that only a few troops were in the city itself, the main body being placed in groups on and near the surrounding hills and cantonments. Rumour assigned to the rebels a force of seventeen thousand men in arms; but the means for testing the truth of this rumour were wanting.
The examination made by Rose led him to a determination to attack the Moorar cantonment suddenly, before the other portions of the rebels could arrive from the more distant stations—to adopt, in fact, the Napoleon tactics, possible only when rapid movements are made. Brigadier Smith was operating on the hills south of the town, as we shall presently see; but Rose carried out his own portion of the attack independently. Orders were at once given. The cavalry and guns were placed on each flank; while the infantry, in two divisions, prepared to advance. The 86th headed the attack, as part of the second brigade. No sooner did the enemy find themselves attacked, than they poured out a well-directed fire of musketry and field-guns; but this was speedily silenced, and the rebels forced to make a precipitate retreat. Many of them escaped into the city over a stone-bridge, the existence of which was not correctly known to Sir Hugh. Four pieces of ordnance were at the same time dragged over the bridge to the Lashkar camp—somewhat to the vexation of the British, who wished to seize them: the capture, however, was not long delayed. The main body of rebels, after being driven through the whole length of the cantonment, were chased over a wide expanse of country. Some terrible fighting occurred during this chase. At one spot a number of the enemy had been driven into a fortified trench around a village, and here they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, until the trench was nearly choked with dead and wounded bodies. It was while rushing on at the head of a company of the 71st Highlanders in this contest that Lieutenant Neave fell, mortally wounded. The rebels engaged in this struggle included several men of the Maharajah’s 1st regiment. A strong body of the enemy’s cavalry were drawn up about half a mile from the bridge; but they did not venture forth; and Sir Hugh encamped for the night in the Moorar cantonment.
This, then, was the first scene in the conquest. Sir Hugh had obtained safe possession of the cantonment of Moorar, and had conquered and expelled such of the insurgents as had taken up a position there. Nevertheless this was only a preliminary measure; for the city and the rock-fort were still in the hands of the enemy. Either through want of means or want of foresight, the rebels had done little to strengthen this fort; or, perchance, reposing on the Indian idea that that famous fortress was impregnable, they deemed such a precaution unnecessary. Instead of attending to that duty, they disposed their forces so as to guard the roads of approach from Indoorkee, Seepree, and other places; and it was in this field-service that the mail-clad Amazon, the Ranee of Jhansi, engaged.
We must now trace the progress of Brigadier Smith, who had taken charge of the operations from the south, and who would need to obtain command of the hills southward of the city before he could reach Gwalior itself. This active officer had to make a long march before he could reach the scene of conflict. His column—comprising a wing of the 8th Hussars, a wing of the Bombay Lancers, H.M. 95th foot, the 10th Native Bombay infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse-artillery—started from Seepree, and was joined, on the 15th of June, at Antree, by Major Orr with his men of the Hyderabad Contingent. Setting out from that place, the brigadier, thus reinforced, arrived on the 17th at Kotah-ke-serai, a place about eight miles from Gwalior, on the little river Oomrah. Here was a small square fort, and also a native travellers’ bungalow (implied by the words _ke-serai_). As he approached this place, the brigadier could see masses of the enemy’s cavalry and infantry in motion at the base of some neighbouring hills—some of those already adverted to as forming a semicircular belt around the southern half of Gwalior. These hills it was necessary for him to cross to get to the Lashkar camping-ground. Two companies of infantry, belonging to the 10th and 95th regiments, were thrown across the river as skirmishers, with a squadron of Hussars as videttes; while the rest of his column remained south of the river, to guard the ford and the fort. After a little skirmishing, some of his cavalry crossed the river, and came under the fire of a battery until then unperceived. Much sharp fighting ensued: the enemy having been permitted to retain their hold of the hills on one side of the river, in consequence of a movement made by Smith under false information. The road from Jhansi to Gwalior crosses the hills that lie southward of the Lashkar; and, before debouching from these hills, it runs for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated; the eastern embankment of this canal, twenty or twenty-five feet in height, supplied an excellent cover for Smith’s troops during their advance. It was while his column was thus marching through the defile, defended by three or four guns on a neighbouring hill, that the principal part of the day’s fighting took place. When night came, Smith had secured the defile, the road, and the adjoining hills; while the enemy occupied the hills on the other side of the canal. The most distinguished person who fell in this day’s fighting was the Ranee of Jhansi—an Amazon to the last. The account given of her death is simply as follows: ‘The Ranee, in trying to escape over the canal which separated the camp from the Phool Bagh parade, fell with her horse, and was cut down by a Hussar; she still endeavoured to get over, when a bullet struck her in the breast, and she fell to rise no more.’ The natives are said to have hastily burned her dead body, to save it from apprehended desecration by the Feringhees. During the night between the 17th and 18th, the enemy constructed a battery on one of their hills, from which they poured forth a well-directed fire, lessened in serious results by the greatness of the distance. It was not without much difficulty and constant firing that the brigadier, during the 18th, became master of the hills, and drove away the enemy, who were led with much energy by Tanteea Topee.
[Illustration:
GWALIOR. ]
While Brigadier Smith was thus closely engaged on the southern hills, Sir Hugh Rose contented himself with maintaining his won position at the Moorar cantonment; he could not safely advance into the city until Smith had achieved his portion of the work. On the 18th, when the brigadier had surmounted some of the southern hills, Sir Hugh, seeing that the enemy’s strong positions were on that side of the city, joined him by a flank-movement of twelve miles—leaving only a sufficient number of troops to guard his camp at the Moorar. Rose bivouacked for the night in rear of Smith’s position, thus enabling both to act together on the morrow. The enemy still occupied some of the heights nearest to the city; and from these heights, as well as from the rock-fort, on the 19th, they poured out a fire of shot, shell, and shrapnell. Rose, after narrowly examining the chief of the heights occupied by the enemy, resolve to capture it by storm. Two of the choice infantry regiments sent on in advance, ascended this height—the 71st on the right, the 86th on the left; other regiments supported them; while the artillery was plied wherever the most effective result could be produced. The scheme required that some of the guns should be taken across the canal, in order to form a battery on one of the hills; and the sappers executed this difficult work under a hot fire. The struggle was not a long one; the infantry ran intrepidly up to the enemy’s guns, and captured them. The height was now gained; and large masses of the enemy came full in view in the plain below. The rebels, losing heart at their failures, became panic-stricken when the height was taken; they began to flee in all directions. Then was the time for Rose’s cavalry to render useful service; the troopers scoured the plain in all directions, cutting off the wretched fugitives in large numbers. By four o’clock in the day, Rose was master of Gwalior, to the inexpressible astonishment of the enemy. There was scarcely any fighting in the city itself, or in the Lashkar camp; nor was there much firing from the rock-fort; when the heights were gained, the rebels gave way on all sides. While Brigadier Smith advanced with cavalry and artillery to occupy the plain of the Phool Bagh, Sir Hugh pushed on to the palace. Very little opposition was encountered; few of the enemy being met with either there or at the Lashkar. After providing for the safety of the palace, by posting Europeans and Bombay infantry at the entrances, Sir Hugh made arrangements for the security of the city. This he found comparatively easy; for the regular inhabitants of the place had good reason to wish for the suppression of the rebels, and gladly aided the conquerors in restoring order.
[Illustration:
THE RANEE OF JHANSI. ]
Thus, on the night of the 19th, Sir Hugh Rose was virtually conqueror, though not thoroughly. The seizure of palace, city, and cantonments did not necessarily imply the seizure of the rock-fort, the bold fortress which for ages has rendered Gwalior so famous in India. In point of fact, the conquest of this fort was deferred until the 20th; Sir Hugh looked upon it as an easy achievement, because it became known that only a few natives remained within the place. The conquest was not effected without causing the death of a gallant officer—Lieutenant Arthur Rose, of the 25th Bombay native infantry. As soon as the city had fallen into the hands of the besiegers, the lieutenant was sent by the commanding-officer of his regiment to guard the Kotwallee or police-station. A shot or two being unexpectedly fired from the fort, Rose proposed to a brother-officer, Lieutenant Waller, the daring project of capturing it with the handful of men at their joint disposal—urging that, though the risk would be great, the honour would be proportionally great if the attempt succeeded. Off they started, taking with them a blacksmith. This man, with his lusty arm and his heavy hammer, broke in the outermost or lowermost of the many gates that guarded the ascent of the rock on which the fort was situated; then another, and another, until all the six gates were broken into, and entered by the little band of assailants. It is hardly to be expected, that if the gates were really strong and securely fastened, they could have been burst open in this way; but the confusion resulting from the fighting had probably caused some of the defensive arrangements to be neglected. At various points on the ascent the assailants were fired at by the few rebels in the place; and near the top a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place, during which the numbers were thinned on both sides. While Rose was encouraging his men in their hot work, a musket was fired at him from behind a wall; and the bullet, striking him on the right of the spine, passed through his body. The man who had fired the fatal shot, a Bareilly mutineer, then rushed out, and cut him across the knee and the wrist with a sword. Waller came up, and despatched this fellow, but too late to save the life of his poor friend Rose.[176]
Several days before the conquest of Gwalior was finally completed, arrangements were made for reinstating Scindia upon the throne from which he had been so suddenly and unexpectedly hurled. Irrespective of the justice of Scindia’s cause, Sir Robert Hamilton and Sir Hugh Rose wished him to return at once from Agra to Gwalior for another reason—to enable the British to judge who among the townsmen deserved punishment, and who were worthy of forgiveness. It was also very important to shew that the government meant promptly and firmly to support so faithful a man, as an encouragement to other native princes to maintain faith with the British. Even before Rose had reached Gwalior, and when the result of the approaching battle could not in any degree be foreseen, Hamilton, as political resident at the court of Gwalior, sent a dispatch to Scindia at Agra, requesting him to move down at once to the Chumbul, that he might be in readiness to present himself at Gwalior whenever the proper time should arrive. Accordingly the temporarily dethroned Maharajah set out from Agra on the 13th of June with all his retinue, escorted by a party of Meade’s Horse, and by some of his own troopers who still remained faithful. He reached Dholpore on the 15th, where he joined Colonel Riddell’s column. On the next he faintly heard the roar of cannon at his capital, thirty-seven miles distant; and in the evening an express arrived from Sir Robert Hamilton, announcing the capture of the cantonment—the first stage towards the capture of Gwalior itself. Crossing the Chumbul, and mounting his horse, Scindia galloped off, and rode all night, reaching Gwalior on the 17th. During the next three days, the presence and advice of the Maharajah were very valuable to the British authorities, contributing much towards the final conquest. On the 20th, when all the fighting was well-nigh over, Scindia was restored to his throne with as much oriental pomp as could be commanded in the limited time: Rose, Hamilton, and all the chief military and civil officers, accompanying him in procession from the camp to the palace. It was a good augury that the townsmen, who lined all the streets, seemed right glad to have him back again amongst them.
When Gwalior was fairly cleared of rebels, and Scindia reinstated as Maharajah, two official congratulatory documents were issued, one by Sir Colin Campbell, and the other by Viscount Canning—somewhat differing in character, but tending to the same end. Sir Colin congratulated Sir Hugh Rose on the successful result of his rapid advance upon Gwalior, and the restoration of Scindia. He adverted to these as a happy termination of Rose’s brilliant campaign in Central India—a campaign illustrated by many engagements in the open field; by the relief of Saugor; by the capture of Ratgurh, Shagurh, and Chendaree; by the memorable siege of Jhansi; by the fall of Calpee; and lastly, by the re-occupation of Gwalior. While thanking Rose and his troops heartily for their glorious deeds, Sir Colin did not fail to notice two other generals who had shared in the hot work of those regions. ‘It must not be forgotten that the advance of the Central India Field-force formed part of a large combination, and was rendered possible by the movement of Major-general Roberts, of the Bombay army, into Rajpootana, on the one side; and of Major-general Whitlock, of the Madras army, on the other; and by the support they respectively gave to Major-general Sir Hugh Rose as he moved onwards in obedience to his instructions.’ Viscount Canning’s proclamation was more formal, and was intended to meet the eye of Scindia quite as much as those of the gallant troops who had just reinstated him; it had a political object, to encourage native princes in a course of fidelity, by shewing that the British government would aid in maintaining them on their thrones, just in proportion to their good faith.[177]
The British had reconquered every part of the city and neighbourhood of Gwalior, reinstated Scindia on his throne, wrought terrible execution on the insurgents, and compelled the main body to seek safety in flight. But the questions then arose, in this as in all previous instances—to what quarter had the fugitives retreated, and what amount of mischief might they produce during and in consequence of their retreat? It was soon ascertained that, while others had chosen a different route, the main body had taken the road to Kurowlee. Hence it became an object with Sir Hugh to send off a force in pursuit, in the hope of so completely cutting up the fugitives as to prevent them from reassembling as an organised army at any other spot. He invited the co-operation of Brigadier Showers from another quarter, but depended chiefly on the exertions of a flying column hastily made up, and placed under the command of Brigadier Napier. On the 20th, within a few hours after the capture of Gwalior, Napier set forth; and the next few days were marked by deeds of gallantry worthy of the name he bore. The column consisted of a troop of horse-artillery, a troop of the 14th Dragoons, a wing of the Hyderabad Contingent cavalry, and three troops of Meade’s Horse—altogether about six hundred men, with six guns. Starting from the Moorar cantonment, and passing from the Residency into the open country, Napier reached Sunnowlie, twenty-four miles from Gwalior, by three o’clock the next morning. On approaching Jowra Alipore, a few hours afterwards, he descried the enemy in great force, with nearly thirty guns. Not waiting to consider how small his numbers were compared with those opposed to him, Napier resolved to grapple with the enemy. He moved his column to the cover of a rising-ground which afforded partial concealment; and finding the rebels disposed to move off, he at once attacked them, with a chivalrous daring worthy of all praise. The column galloped off to the right, towards the enemy’s guns, of which nine were grouped in and around a small tope of trees. Captain Lightfoot’s horse-artillery galloped up to the front, poured in two rounds of shot at a distance of five hundred yards, limbered up, and dashed off to the enemy’s guns, even outstripping the supporting cavalry; these guns, being found deserted by the enemy, were at once captured. Of fighting, there was really little in amount. The enemy, supposed to be at least ten times as numerous as Napier’s troops, and supplied with formidable artillery, scarcely made a stand at any point; the necessity for flight from Gwalior had produced a sort of panic, and they made but little resistance to Napier. They ran off in various directions, but chiefly towards the south. Their haste was too great, and the pursuit too prompt, to enable them to save any of their guns; Napier seized them all, twenty-five in number, together with numerous stands of arms. Great as was this achievement, however, considering the relative forces of the belligerents, the result was hardly satisfactory in a political point of view. The hope was not merely to recover Gwalior, but to crush the rebel forces. Gwalior, it is true, was taken, and artillery in much strength was captured; still the main body of the rebels escaped from Rose at Gwalior on the 19th, and the same main body escaped from Napier at Jowra Alipore on the 21st. Although they had few or no guns, they fled as an army and not as a rabble; they retained that sort of military organisation which might enable them to work mischief elsewhere. Napier, wishing to prevent this as far as possible, pursued them some distance; but as the rebels were wonderfully quick in their movements, they gradually increased the distance between them and their pursuer, until at length Napier was thirty miles behind. He then gave up a pursuit which was likely to be fruitless, and returned to Gwalior with the guns he had captured. It was afterwards made a subject for question whether Rose should not have placed a greater force of light cavalry at Napier’s disposal; but there appears much probability that, when once in flight, the rebels would have succeeded in escaping, in this as in all similar instances. They had attained great mastery in the art of fleeing.
Who was the leader of the body of rebels adverted to in the preceding paragraph was not clearly known; perhaps there was no recognised leader in the hasty flight. Another body, however, estimated at five or six thousand in number, followed the orders of the indefatigable Tanteea Topee; he led them across the Chumbul, past Shree Muttra and Hindoun, and made towards Jeypoor—the chief city of the principal among the Rajpoot states. So far as could be ascertained, he hoped to obtain the assistance of insurgent chieftains in that region. He carried with him the crown-jewels, and an immense amount of treasure, that had belonged to Scindia. There was a possibility that Tanteea Topee, by bending a little to the north, would advance to Bhurtpore instead of Jeypoor. The population of Bhurtpore was warlike, and Tanteea Topee could not enter within the earthen walls if opposed; but it was impossible at that time to rely on any body of Rajpoot troops; and hence the British authorities watched with some anxiety the progress of the rebel leader.
When, a few weeks earlier, Sir Hugh Rose had thanked his gallant troops after the capture of Calpee, he hoped to be able to retire to Bombay, to recruit his shattered health after so much active service in hot weather. This hope was founded on what appeared to be rational grounds. The last stronghold of the enemy had fallen into his hands, with its guns, ammunition, and stores. Detached posts, it is true, might require to be carefully guarded; isolated bodies of rebels might need pursuit and punishment; but there did not appear to be any enterprise of such magnitude and importance as to demand the combined services of the different regiments in the Central India Field-force. Therefore it was that, almost immediately after the fall of Calpee, Sir Hugh issued the glowing address to his troops, already adverted to. His hope of retirement, however, was for a time frustrated by the defeat of Scindia by the rebels; but when he had retaken Gwalior, and reinstated the Maharajah upon the throne, Sir Hugh found himself enabled to fulfil his wish. Towards the close of June he issued another address to his troops, in which he said: ‘The major-general commanding being on the point of resigning the command of the Poonah division of the Bombay army,[178] on account of ill health, bids farewell to the Central India Field-force; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwalior. The major-general witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajpootana brigade, under General Smith—stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwalior. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural strength or health; and an Indian sun, and months of marching and broken rest, had told on the strongest; but the moment they were told to take Gwalior for their Queen and country, they thought of nothing but victory. They gained it, restoring England’s true and brave ally to his throne; putting to complete rout the rebel army; killing numbers of them; and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwalior, reckoned the strongest in India. The major-general thanks sincerely Brigadier-general Napier, C.B., Brigadier Stuart, C.B.,[179] and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better aspects than those of the victory of Gwalior.’
Every one admitted that Sir Hugh Rose had well earned a season of repose, after his five months of marching, fighting, besieging, and conquering. It was on the 12th of January 1858 that he took command of his Central India Field-force at Sehore. On the 23d he captured the town of Ratgurh; on the 28th, defeated the enemy in the field; and on the 30th, captured the fort of Ratgurh. February came, and with it, the relief of Saugor and the capture of the fort of Garra Kotah. In March he forced the pass of Mudenpore; captured a series of strongholds which gave him command of Bundelcund; took and burned Churkaree; and occupied Tal Behut. In April he defeated the rebel army of Tanteea Topee, near Jhansi; captured that city; and afterwards stormed and captured the fort belonging to it. In May he took the fort of Koonch; then fought a severe battle near Calpee; and eventually captured the fort at that place. Lastly, in June, as we have just seen, he thoroughly defeated the Gwalior mutineers, captured that important Mahratta city and fort, and replaced Scindia on the throne of his ancestors. Second to Havelock—and it may be doubted whether even this exception should be made—there was no general engaged in the wars arising out of the mutiny, whose operations were so numerous and so uniformly successful as those of Sir Hugh Rose. It must at the same time be admitted that Havelock, from first to last, had far smaller forces at his command.
The Central India Field-force underwent a total break up after the capture of Gwalior. The 95th regiment remained for a time within the rock-fort. Two of the Queen’s regiments of infantry, and one of the Bombay regiments, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, occupied the Moorar cantonment, until further directions could be received. At Jhansi were stationed the 3d Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, with cavalry and artillery. Brigadier Smith’s Rajpootana brigade, which had rendered such good service at the siege of Gwalior, was distributed into three portions—one remaining at Gwalior, and the others going to Seepree and Goonah. All these troops absolutely needed rest. Whatever exertions were necessary to check the career of the fugitive rebels, were intrusted to troops from other quarters, especially to General Roberts, who held command of all the available troops in Rajpootana. Nothing but dire necessity kept British soldiers in the field under a midsummer sun in the plains of India. As to Sir Hugh Rose, a triumphant reception awaited him at Bombay; all ranks strove to render him honour, as one who had brought great renown to the Bombay army.
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Footnote 176:
Brigadier Stuart, when he heard of the fatal termination of this bold and daring achievement, issued the following general order: ‘Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret a report of the death of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay N. I., who was mortally wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwalior, on duty with his men. The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who knew him could fail to appreciate.’
Footnote 177:
‘_Allahabad, June 24, 1858._—The Right Honourable the Governor-general has the highest gratification in announcing that the town and fort of Gwalior were conquered by Major-general Sir Hugh Rose on the 19th instant, after a general action in which the rebels, who had usurped the authority of Maharajah Scindia, were totally defeated. On the 20th of June, the Maharajah Scindia, attended by the governor-general’s agent for Central India, and Sir Hugh Rose, and escorted by British troops, was restored to the palace of his ancestors, and was welcomed by his subjects with every mark of loyalty and attachment. It was on the 1st of June that the rebels, aided by the treachery of some of Maharajah Scindia’s troops, seized the capital of his highness’s kingdom, and hoped to establish a new government under a pretender in his highness’s territory. Eighteen days had not elapsed before they were compelled to evacuate the town and fort of Gwalior, and to relinquish the authority which they had endeavoured to usurp. The promptitude and success with which the strength of the British government has been put forth to the restoration of its faithful ally to the capital of his territory, and the continued presence of British troops at Gwalior to support his highness in the re-establishment of his administration, offer to all a convincing proof that the British government has the will and the power to befriend those who, like Maharajah Scindia, do not shrink from their obligation or hesitate to avow their loyalty. The Right Honourable the Governor-general, in order to mark his appreciation of the Maharajah Scindia’s friendship, and his gratification at the re-establishment of his highness’s authority in his ancestral dominions, is pleased to direct that a royal salute shall be fired at every principal station in India.’
Footnote 178:
The Central India Field-force was a kind of offshoot from the Poonah division of the Bombay army.
Footnote 179:
Brigadier Steuart, who had been with Sir Hugh Rose in the earlier scenes of the campaign, retired through ill health before the operations at Gwalior began. His brigade passed to the command of Napier.
[Illustration:
DARJEELING—Hill Sanatorium in Sikkim. ]
## CHAPTER XXXI.
STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE END OF JUNE.
Although the military operations conducted by Sir Hugh Rose and his heroic companions, bearing relation to the reconquest of Gwalior, and the re-establishment of Scindia on his Mahratta throne, were the most interesting events in India during the month of June, the other provinces also witnessed struggles and contests which equally need to be chronicled; seeing that they all contributed towards the one great and earnestly desired result—the pacification of the Anglo-Indian empire. Terrible, it is true, were the labours of the gallant men who fought and marched against the rebels under the scorching heat of an Indian sun—heat which was that year excessive, even for India itself; but such labours were necessary, and were borne with a degree of cheerfulness which commands our admiration for the sterling qualities of British troops. Sir Colin Campbell yearned to place his brave men under shade and at rest, until such time as the rains should have cooled down the summer’s fiery temperature; he did so to such an extent as was practicable; but this extent was not great. June, as we shall see, was a month of much fighting in the regions adjacent to the Ganges, the Jumna, the Chumbul, and the Sone.
Calcutta saw nothing of the governor-general during many months. He took up his abode at Allahabad; filling the offices not only of governor-general of the whole of India, but special governor of some of those disturbed regions which had at one time been called the Northwest Provinces, and at another the Central Provinces. This he had done in order that he might be in more easy communication with the commander-in-chief, and in more prompt receipt of intelligence from the various stations and camps in Oude, Behar, Rohilcund, the Doab, Bundelcund, Central India, and Rajpootana. How the weight of responsibility pressed on one who had to govern at such a time and in such a climate, few were aware; he worked on, early and late, thinking only how best he could act as the Queen’s viceroy for India. Calcutta had not much more to do with Lord Canning’s proceedings at that period, than the other presidential cities; for he had his staff of government employés with him at Allahabad.
Bengal was nearly at peace in June; few troubles disturbed the equable flow of commerce and industry. One slight transaction of an opposite kind may, however, be briefly noticed. A body of sailors sent from Calcutta had an opportunity of bringing some rebels to an account, and defeating them in the wonted style. A naval brigade, under Captain Moore, was stationed in the district of Singbhoom, southwest of Calcutta, near the frontier between the Bengal and Madras presidencies. The district comprised the four petty states of Singbhoom, Colehan, Surakella, and Khursawa, each of which had its rajah or chieftain. The only town of any note in the district was Chyebassa; and here was the Company’s civil station. The Rajah of Singbhoom, at the period now under notice, was endeavouring, like many other rajahs, to strengthen himself by throwing off British supremacy. It happened, on the 9th of the month, when the brigade was encamped at Chuckerderpore, but when some of the officers had gone to Chyebassa, that the camp was suddenly attacked by the rajah’s motley retinue of Koles, a half-savage tribe armed with battle-axes, bows and arrows, spears, and matchlocks. They invested the camp on all sides, and made a very fierce attack. The seamen poured in a few shells among them, which threw them into much disorder. After this a party of thirty went out, and committed much havoc among them in a hand-to-hand contest. Captain Moncrieff then rode in from Chyebassa, with a cavalry escort, and at once engaged with the rebels. After five hours’ skirmishing, the mid-day sun exhausted alike Europeans and Koles; and nothing further occurred till the morning of the 10th. The rebels were so numerous that the brigade could only attack them on one side at once; and thus it was not until the arrival of a hundred Ramgurh troops and fifty Sikhs, at noon on the 11th, that the rajah and his Koles gave way—retreating to the jungles of Porahaut.
In other parts of Bengal there were petty chieftains of like character, who were quite willing to set up as kings on their own account—regardless of treaties existing between them and the Company, and actuated solely by the temptations afforded during a period of disorder. But the conditions were not favourable to them. The meek and cowardly Bengalees did not imitate the Hindustanis of the Doab and Oude; the hill-tribes were too few in number to be formidable; and the steady arrival of British troops at Calcutta strengthened the hands of the authorities in all the surrounding regions. Arrangements were gradually made for increasing the number of European troops at Calcutta, Dacca, Barrackpore, Berhampore, Hazarebagh, Jessore, and one or two other stations—so as to place the whole of Bengal more immediately under the eye of the military authorities.
These defensive measures extended as far north as Darjeeling—one of those healthy and temperate Hill-stations which have so often been adverted to in former chapters as important _sanitaria_ for the English in India. Simla, Landour, Kussowlie, Subathoo, Mussouree, Dugshai, Almora, and Nynee Tal, are all of this character; and to these may be added Darjeeling. A patch of hill-country, containing about three hundred square miles, and formerly belonging to the Rajah of Sikim, was obtained by the Company a few years ago, and Darjeeling established near its centre. The Himalayas bound it on the north, Nepaul on the west, Bhotan on the east, and two of the Bengal districts on the south. The hills and valleys are beautiful, and the climate healthy. Darjeeling is more particularly mentioned in this place, because, about the date to which this chapter refers, public attention was called to a project for establishing a settlement called Hope Town, on the slopes of a hill near Darjeeling. This settlement was to be for independent emigrants, colonists, or settlers, from the plains, or even from Europe; who, it was hoped, might be tempted to that region by a fertile soil and a magnificent climate, and thus gradually introduce English farming at the base of the Himalayas. A company or society purchased or leased about fourteen thousand acres of hill-land, in Darjeeling district, but not in immediate contiguity to Darjeeling town. It was announced that the locality contained clay for bricks, rubble for masonry, lime for mortar, timber for carpentry and for fuel, and all the essential requisites for building; water was abundant, from the mountain streams and springs; while peaceful natives in the neighbouring plains would be eager to obtain employment as artisans and labourers. The elevation of the land, varying from three to six thousand feet, offered much facility of choice. As the government had commenced a road from Darjeeling and Hope Town to Caragola Ghât on the Ganges, there would be good markets for hill produce in many parts of Bengal—perhaps in Calcutta itself. When the project of this Hope Town settlement was first formed in 1856, it was intended that the projectors should grant leases of small plots for farms or dwellings, for a fixed number of years, and at a rental so small as to attract settlers; while at the same time this rental should so far exceed what the speculators paid to the government as to enable them to construct a road, and build a school-room, church, library, and other component elements for a town. This, it may be observed, was only one among several colonising projects brought before public notice in India. The land containing many magnificent tracts, and the climate presenting many varieties of temperature, it has often been urged that that noble country presents advantages for settlement which ought no longer to be overlooked. So long as the East India Company’s power existed, any colonising schemes would necessarily prove almost abortive; but now that British India owns no other ruler than the sovereign of England, there may in future years be an opening offered for the thorough examination and testing of this important question, that its merits and demerits may be fairly compared. Some of the advocates of colonisation have painted imaginary pictures so glowing as to represent India as the true Dorado or Golden Land of the widely spreading British empire; some of the opponents of colonisation, on the other hand, have asserted that British farmers could not live in India if they would, and would not if they could:—the future will strike out a practicable mean between these two extremes.
The controversy concerning Indian heat, in reference to the wants and constitutions of English settlers, bore very closely on the subject of colonisation, and on the difference between the hilly districts and the plains. In military matters, however, and in reference to the struggle actually going on, all admitted that the summer of 1858 had been more than usually fierce in its heat. A correspondent of one of the journals said: ‘As if to try the endurance of Englishmen to the utmost, the season has been such as has not been known since 1833. Those who know Bengal will understand it when I say that on the 15th inst. one clergyman in Calcutta buried forty-eight Englishmen, chiefly sailors. In one ship the captain, chief-mate, and twenty-six men, had all apoplexy at once. Nine men from Fort-William were buried one morning from the same cause. Her Majesty’s 19th, at Barrackpore, who are nearly all under cover, and who are most carefully looked after, have 200 men unfit for duty from immense boils. All over the country paragraph after paragraph announces the deaths of so many men at such a place from apoplexy.’ The same writer mentions the case of a colonel who, just arrived with his regiment at Calcutta, and, unfamiliar with an Indian climate, marched off his men _with their stocks on_: in an hour afterwards he and his instructor in rifle-practice were both dead from apoplexy.
Before quitting Calcutta, it may be well to mention that the month of June was marked by an honourable and energetic movement for recording the services and cherishing the memory of Mr Venables, one of those civil servants of the Company who displayed an undaunted spirit, and considerable military talent, in times of great trial. It will be remembered that, after many months of active service, both civil and military, Mr Venables was wounded at Azimghur on the 15th of April;[180] from the effects of this wound he soon afterwards sank—dying as he had lived, a frank and gallant man. A committee was formed in Calcutta to found, by individual subscriptions, some sort of memorial worthy of the man. Viscount Canning took an early opportunity of joining in this manifestation; and in a letter to the committee he spoke of Mr Venables in the following terms: ‘It will be a satisfaction to me to join in this good work, not only on account of the admiration which I feel for the high qualities which Mr Venables devoted to the public service, his intrepidity in the field, his energy and calm temper in upholding the civil authority, and his thoroughly just appreciation of the people and circumstances with which he had to deal; but also, and especially, on account of circumstances attending the last service which Mr Venables rendered to his country. After the capture of Lucknow, where he was attached to Brigadier General Franks’ column, Mr Venables came to Allahabad. He was broken in health and spirits, anxious for rest, and looking forward eagerly to his return to England, for which his preparations were made. At that time the appearance of affairs near Azimghur was threatening; and I asked Mr Venables to forego his departure from India, and return to that district, with which he was intimately acquainted—there to assist in preserving order until danger should have passed away. He at once consented cheerfully; and that consent cost him his life. I am certain that the Court of Directors, who are fully informed of all particulars of Mr Venables’s great services and untimely death, will be eager to mark, in such manner as shall seem best to them, their appreciation of the character of this brave, self-denying English gentleman; and I am truly glad to have an opportunity of joining with his fellow-countrymen in India in testifying the sincere respect which I feel for his memory.’
Beyond the limits of Bengal, one of the many interesting questions that pressed upon public attention bore relation to Nepaul and Jung Bahadoor. That gay, gorgeous, shrewd, and unscrupulous chieftain had gone back to his own country somewhat dissatisfied with his share in the Oude campaign, or with the advantages accruing from it. Queen Victoria had made him a Grand Cross of the Bath—a gentle knight ‘sans peur et sans reproche,’ according to the original meaning of that honourable distinction; but there were those who believed he would have better welcomed some more substantial recognition of his services, such as a fair slice out of the territory of Oude. Some doubted his fidelity to the British cause, and among these were several of the leaders among the rebels. There came to light a most remarkable correspondence, shewing in what way Jung Bahadoor was tempted to swerve from his allegiance, and in what way he resisted the temptation. Several letters were made public—by what agency does not clearly appear—addressed by the Begum of Oude and her adherents to the Nepaulese chieftain. About the period to which this chapter relates, the rebel party at Lucknow disseminated rumours to the effect that Jung Bahadoor, after his return to Nepaul, had been written to by the Begum, and that he had undertaken to throw in his lot with the ‘patriots’ of Oude. That the attempt was made is clear enough; but the nature of the response, so far as the published correspondence revealed it, certainly does not seem to implicate him. One letter, apparently written about the end of May, was signed by Mahomed Surfraz Ali, who designated himself ambassador of the King of Oude. It began by expressing astonishment that Nepaul should have aided the infidel British, after having in former days been in friendly alliance with Oude. ‘The chiefs of every tribe,’ it said, ‘should fight for their religion as long as they live.’ Considering that the Oude royal family were Mohammedans, and the Nepaulese Hindoos, the ambassador had some difficulty in so framing his letter as to prove that Jung Bahadoor ought to aid them rather than the English; and indeed his logic was somewhat lame. The ambassador stated that he was then writing at Toolseepore, whither he had been sent by the powerful Moulvie Ahmedoolah Shah, on the part of the King of Oude, to act as accredited agent or ambassador with the Nepaul authorities. He proceeded to state that seven letters, in the Persian language, had been written by Mahomed Khan Bahadoor, viceroy of Oude, to as many of the chief personages in Oude—among others, to Jung Bahadoor himself; and that two letters, in the Hindee language, had been written under the seal of the King of Oude, one addressed to the King of Nepaul, and one to Jung Bahadoor. Mahomed Surfraz Ali added: ‘Neither I nor the servants of our government are acquainted with your titles, or those of your authorities, so we cannot address you properly. I am in hopes that you will send me word how we should address you; and pray forgive any mistakes or omissions in this letter.’ He begged the favour of a letter, with the chieftain’s seal attached, for presentation to the court of Oude. The letters purporting to be written by or for ‘Ramzan Ali Khan Mirza Birjiz Kudr Bahadoor,’ King of Oude, assumed quite a regal style, and almost claimed the alliance of the Nepaul Maharajah as a right. The royal letter-writer made short work of the causes of the mutiny: ‘The British some time ago attempted to interfere with the faith of both the Hindoos and the Mohammedans, by preparing cartridges with cows’ grease for the Hindoos, and that of pigs’ for the Mohammedans, and ordering them to bite them with their teeth. The sepoys refused, and were ordered by the British to be blown away from guns on the parade-ground. This is the cause of the war breaking out, and probably you are acquainted with it. But I am ignorant as to how they managed to get your troops, which they brought down here, and began to commit every sort of violence, and to pull down temples, mosques, imaumbarahs, and sacred places. You are well aware of the treachery of the British; and it is proper you should preserve the standard of religion, and make the tree of friendship between you and me fresh.’ The real correspondents, in this exchange of letters, were the Begum of Oude and Jung Bahadoor. The astute chieftain wrote a reply, couched in such terms as to suggest a probability that the British resident at Khatmandoo was at his elbow. One of his high-flown paragraphs ran thus: ‘Since the star of faith and integrity, sincerity in words as well as in acts, and wisdom and comprehension, of the British, are shining as bright as the sun in every quarter of the globe, be assured that my government will never disunite itself from the friendship of the exalted British government, or be instigated to join with any monarch against it, be he as high as heaven. What grounds can we have for connecting ourselves with the Hindoos and Mohammedans of Hindostan?’ And he ended with this bit of advice: ‘As you have sent me a friendly letter, let me persuade you, that if any person, Hindoo or Mohammedan, who has not murdered a British lady or child, goes immediately to Mr Montgomery, the chief-commissioner of Lucknow, and surrenders his arms, and makes submission, he will be permitted to retain his honour, and his crime will be pardoned. If you still be inclined to make war on the British, no rajah or king in the world will give you an asylum; and death will be the end of it.’ This reply, supposing it to be a spontaneous expression of the real sentiments of Jung Bahadoor, would have possessed very high value; but a large deduction must probably be made both from the spontaneity and the sincerity.
It may perhaps be well to notice that the royal house of Oude was at discord with itself in those days, and that the king’s name was used ‘as a tower of strength’ by intriguers who cared little for rightful ownership. The real king—that is, the ex-king—was at Calcutta, a prisoner and a half-idiot, with depravity enough to enjoy plots, but not brains to execute them. The legitimate son and heir, so to speak, was in Europe, where he had lately buried his grandmother the dowager-queen of Oude, and was spending his father’s money at a very rapid rate. The regal personages at Lucknow were the Begum and her son. The Begum was one of the king’s many ladies; and her son was a weak-headed youth of thirteen years old—‘illegitimate,’ according to the assertions of the ‘legitimate’ son at that time in Europe. The exiled king and his two sons were, in reference to these machinations at Lucknow, mere tools or pretences; the real mover was the clever and ambitious Begum. In Nepaul, likewise, the real power was possessed, not by the maharajah, or sovereign, but by his all-controlling, king-making subject, Jung Bahadoor.
The proceedings of the Oudian intriguers during the month of June will presently be noticed in other ways; but it will be convenient first to attend to the affairs of Behar.
In former chapters it has been narrated, in sufficient fulness for the purpose in view, how the western provinces of Behar were troubled by the Jugdispore and Dinapoor rebels, and with how many difficulties Sir Edward Lugard had to contend in bringing his ‘Azimghur Field-force’ to bear against them. The month of June offered no exception to this state of things. Most harassing indeed were the labours which they brought upon him, testing his patience and perseverance more, perhaps, than his military skill. Notwithstanding the numerous defeats which they had suffered, these mutinied sepoys and armed budmashes were continually moving from place to place—giving evidence of their presence by murder, plunder, and burning. The jungles around Jugdispore afforded many facilities for hiding and secret flight. One of the many defeats inflicted by Sir Edward occurred on the 27th of May. Immediately afterwards a body of several hundreds of those insurgents issued from the eastern portion of the jungle, and shewed themselves in their true character as marauders bent on mischief, rather than as soldiers fighting for a definite cause. On the 30th they burned an indigo factory at Twining Gunge, a place near Dumoran; whilst on the same day another body advanced to the village of Rajpore, within eight miles of Buxar, and murdered two natives in government service. From thence they wandered, during the next four or five days, among the neighbouring villages, working mischief at every step. In anything like a military sense, these bands of marauders were contemptible; but so numerous were the unemployed and half-fed ruffians in the disturbed districts, that there were always materials at hand for swelling the numbers of these freebooting insurgents. Lugard was compelled to keep his troops moving about, between Arrah and Buxar; while the authorities at Ghazeepore and Benares were on the alert to check any advance of the rebels towards those cities. On the 2d of June he divided his force into two wings, and established camps at Keshwa and Dulleepore, with a line of posts across the jungle. On the next day he cut a broad road through the jungle to connect the two camps. Having thus completely hemmed a considerable body of the rebels within the southern end of the jungle, he attacked them with his whole force on the 4th, with a very successful result—so far as regarded the maintenance of military superiority. The rebels attempted for a time to make a stand; but the 10th and 84th foot, charging with the bayonet, defeated them with great slaughter. Here again, however, was the old story repeated; his hope of capturing the main body of rebels was frustrated; they broke up into small bands, and fled in various directions.
Instead of describing numerous petty contests that occurred during the month, it may be well to illustrate the peculiar characteristics of the struggle by one particular instance, to shew that the British troops in Behar had more certainty of hard work than chance of glory. During the first week in June, Sir Edward intrusted to Brigadier Douglas the duty of intercepting a body of rebels from the Jugdispore district towards Buxar—a difficult duty, on account of the ingenuity of the rebels in eluding pursuit. Douglas started on the 7th, taking with him H.M. 84th foot, a troop of the 4th Madras cavalry, three troops of the military train, and three guns of the royal horse-artillery. On that and the two following days he marched to Buxar, by way of Shahpoor and Saumgunje. Between the 10th and the 13th he was busily engaged in the almost hopeless task of catching the rebels who were known to be marching and marauding not far distant. Now he would descry a few hundred of them in a tope of trees, and send his horse-artillery to disperse them with grape-shot; now he would cross the little river Surronuddee, or the Kurrumnassa, or hasten to the Sheapoor Ghât, in the hope of cutting off fugitives; now he would march through or near the villages of Ghamur, Chawsa, or Barra, in search either of rebels or of intelligence. His success by no means repaid him for his harassing exertions; he could seldom rely on information obtained concerning the movements of the rebels, and still more seldom could he catch the rebels themselves. In his dispatch relating to these operations, the brigadier said: ‘Three men of the royal horse-artillery died during the night from the effects of the sun, and one man of the 84th.... The heat during the operations was intense, and the troops suffered much, particularly the 84th regiment, who have now been thirteen months in the field. I consider this regiment at present to be quite unfit for active service; the men have no positive disease, but they are so exhausted that they can neither eat nor sleep.’ If they could have encountered the enemy, and thoroughly vanquished them in a regular battle, the overworked and heat-worn soldiers would have borne this and more than this cheerfully; but they had to deal with rebels who eluded their search in an extraordinary way. Sir Edward Lugard, in a dispatch written on the 14th, dated from his camp at Narainpoor, near Jugdispore, adverted to this subject in the following terms: ‘To shew the rapidity and secrecy with which the rebels conduct their movements, I beg to state, that in order to guard against the return of any party from the west towards the jungles, without my getting timely intelligence, so that I might intercept them, I posted at Roop-Saugor—a village thirteen miles to my southwest, on the track taken by the rebels in their flight—Captain Rattray, with his Sikh battalion. He again threw forward scouts some miles in the same direction, and constantly had parties patrolling in the different villages. But in spite of every precaution, the rebel force were at Medneepore, within four miles of him, before he could communicate with me, and passed on towards the jungle the same night. Every endeavour to obtain information from the people of the district has proved vain; scarcely ever has any intelligence been given to us, until the time has passed when advantage could be taken of it.’
In reference to these Jugdispore rebels, it has been remarked that they were neither Sikhs from the west, nor Poorbeahs from the east; but chiefly Bhojpoories of the Shahabad district, most of them born on Koer Singh’s own estates. Moreover, causes have been assigned for thinking that these, as well as other rebels, adhered most to those leaders who could treat them best, whether in pay or plunder, without much reference to their military abilities. ‘The extraordinary variations in the numbers of the insurgents may be partly accounted for by variations in the readiness of pay. Koer Singh, when he left Oude, had barely five hundred men in his train. As he marched, every straggling sepoy, every embarrassed scoundrel with a sword, enlisted in his service. By the time he reached Azimghur he had two thousand five hundred followers; most, but not all, well armed. The flight across the river dispersed them once more; and it was not till the check sustained by H.M. 35th that they thronged to him again. Apparently the leaders are well aware of the advantage this peculiarity affords. Thus, after their defeat by Sir E. Lugard, the great bulk of the Behar insurgents vanished; the work was apparently complete, and the military ends of the campaign to all appearance accomplished. The leaders, however, remained in the jungle, and in five days their followers were round them again; they had glided back in twos and threes, by paths on which no European would be met.’
After many weeks of fatiguing duty in this region, Sir Edward Lugard, worn with heat and sickness, resigned the command about the end of June; handing over to Colonel Douglas the office of chasing the Jugdispore rebels from place to place. Nor was it in that particular locality alone that this duty had to be fulfilled. Ummer Singh, equalling his deceased brother in activity, was no sooner defeated in one place than he made his appearance in another, carrying discord into villages where his presence was as little desired by natives as by Europeans. While Colonel Douglas was on his way towards the scene of his new command, news reached him that the English at Gayah had been driven into intrenchments by a party of a hundred and fifty rebel prisoners, who had been set at liberty by the native police employed to watch them, and were speedily joined by the jail convicts; all—prisoners, police, and convicts—became suddenly ‘patriots,’ and shewed their patriotism by threatening all the officials at the station. This is believed to have been done by some connivance with Ummer Singh. The Europeans at Gayah were thrown into a great ferment by this visitation; the few troops present were withdrawn into the intrenchment, as were likewise the civilians, ladies, and children. No immediate attack followed; but the incident furnished one among many proofs that the native police were, in most of the Bengal and Hindostan provinces, a source of more danger than protection to the British—except the Sikh police, who almost uniformly behaved well.
The transactions in Oude, during the month of June, told of rebels defeated but not disbanded, weakened but not captured. There were many leaders, and these required to be narrowly watched.
One of the first cares of the authorities was to place the important city of Lucknow in such a state of defence as to render it safe from attacks within and without. Various military works were planned by Colonel Napier, and were executed by Major Crommelin after Napier’s departure. From the vast extent of Lucknow, and the absence of any very prominent features of the ground, it was a difficult city to defend except by a large body of troops. The point which gave the nearest approach to a command over the city was the old fort or Muchee Bhowan, near which was the great Emanbarra, capable of sheltering a large number of troops. It was decided to select several spots as military posts, to clear the ground round those spots, and to open streets or roads of communication from post to post. The Muchee Bhowan was selected as the chief of these posts; a second was near the iron bridge leading over the Goomtee to the Fyzabad road; a third was on the site of the Residency, now a heap of ruins; a fourth was at the Moosa Bagh. All suburbs and buildings lying on the banks of the river, likely to intercept the free march of troops from the Muchee Bhowan to the Moosa Bagh, were ordered to be swept away. Large masses of houses were also removed, to form good military roads from the Muchee Bhowan to the Char Bagh, the Moosa Bagh, the stone bridge, the iron bridge, and the old cantonment. The vast range of palaces, such as the Fureed Buksh, the Chuttur Munzil, the Kaiser Bagh, &c., were converted temporarily into barracks, and all the streets and buildings near them either pulled down or thrown open. The Martinière, the Dil Koosha, and Banks’s house, were formed into military posts on the eastern side of the city. The two extremes of these posts, from northwest to southeast, were not far short of seven miles asunder; they would require a considerable number of troops for their occupancy and defence; but under any circumstances such would be required in the great capital of Oude for a long period to come.
The Alum Bagh continued to be maintained, as an important and useful station on the road from Lucknow to Cawnpore. It was destined to live in history as a place which Sir James Outram had defended for nearly four months against armed forces estimated at little short of a hundred thousand men. It was not originally a fort, only a palace in the midst of a walled garden; but it presented facilities for being made into useful shelter for troops. Another place, the bridge of Bunnee, over the river Sye, was also carefully maintained as an important military post between Lucknow and Cawnpore. During the latter part of May, the English troops employed with Sir Hope Grant in various expeditions against the enemy suffered severely from the heat; and it was found necessary to give the 38th regiment a temporary sojourn in the Emanbarra at Lucknow, supplying their place by the 53d. On the 3d of June the Bunnee force moved out, to disperse a body of rebels who had posted themselves near Pooroa. There was another duty of a singular kind intrusted to these troops. The Rajah of Kupoorthully, a Sikh chieftain, who had rendered valuable services to the government in time of need, received as a reward an extensive jaghire or domain in Oude. In order that he might defend both himself and British interests in that domain, he was assisted in intrenching himself, and was supplied with guns, mortars, and ammunition; this was irrespective of his own force of four thousand Sikh troops.
Shortly after the opening of the month, rumours reached the authorities at Lucknow that a body of rebels, estimated at seventeen or eighteen thousand, had crossed the Gogra, and taken up a position at Ramnuggur Dhumaree, under the orders of Gorhuccus Singh. The correctness of this report was not certain—nor of others that Madhoo Singh was at the head of five thousand rebels at Goosaengunje, Benee Madhoo with a small number in the Poorwah district, and Dunkha Shah with a larger force near Chinhut. Still, though these numbers were probably exaggerated by alarmists, it was not considered prudent to leave the northeast region of Oude unprotected. Accordingly, a movable column was organised, to proceed towards Fyzabad.
Sir Hope Grant, intrusted at that time with the conduct of military affairs in Oude, himself conducted an expedition towards the districts just adverted to. A little before midnight on the 12th of June, acting on information which had reached him, he marched from Lucknow to Chinhut, and thence towards Nawabgunge, on the Fyzabad road. His force consisted of the 2d and 3d battalions of the Rifle Brigade, the 5th Punjaub Rifles, a detachment of Engineers and Sappers, the 7th Hussars, two squadrons of the 2d Dragoon Guards, Hodson’s Horse, a squadron of the first Sikh cavalry, a troop of mounted police, a troop of horse-artillery, and two light field-batteries. Leaving a garrison column at Chinhut, under Colonel Purnell, and intrusting the same officer with the temporary charge of the baggage and supplies belonging to the column, Sir Hope resumed his march during the night towards Nawabgunge, where sixteen thousand rebels had assembled, with several guns. By daylight on the following morning he crossed the Beti Nuddee at Quadrigunje, by means of a ford. He had purposely adopted this route instead of advancing to the bridge on the Fyzabad road; in order that, after crossing the nullah, he might get between the enemy and a large jungle. As a strong force of rebels defended the ford, a sharp artillery-fire, kept up by Mackinnon’s horse-artillery and Johnson’s battery, was necessary to effect this passage. Having surmounted this obstacle, Sir Hope, approaching nearer to Nawabgunge, got into the jungle district. Here the rebels made an attempt to surround him on all sides, and pick off his men by repeated volleys of musketry. The general speedily changed the aspect of affairs. He sent a troop of horse-artillery to the front; Johnson’s battery and two squadrons of horse were sent to defend the left; while a larger body confronted the rebels on the right—where the enemy apparently expected to find and to capture Sir Hope’s baggage. The struggle was very fierce, and the slaughter of the rebels considerable; the enemy, fanatical as well as numerous, gave exercise for all Grant’s boldness and sagacity in contending with them. The victory was complete—and yet it was indefinite; for the rebels, as usual, escaped, to renew their mischief at some other time and place. Nearly six hundred of their number were slain; the wounded were much more numerous. Hope Grant’s list of killed and wounded numbered about a hundred. Many of the rebels were Ghazees or Mohammedan fanatics, far more difficult to deal with than the mutinied sepoys. Adverting to some of the operations on the right flank, Grant said in his dispatch: ‘On arriving at this point, I found that a large number of Ghazees, with two guns, had come out on the open plain, and attacked Hodson’s Horse. I immediately ordered up the other four guns under the command of Lieutenant Percival, and two squadrons of the 7th Hussars under Major Sir W. Russell, and opened grape upon them within three or four hundred yards with terrible effect. But the fanatics made the most determined resistance; and two men in the midst of a shower of grape brought forward two green standards, which they planted in the ground beside their guns, and rallied their men. Captain Atherley’s two companies of the 3d battalion Rifle Brigade at this moment advanced to the attack, which obliged the rebels to move off. The cavalry then got between them and the guns; and the 7th Hussars, led gallantly by Sir W. Russell, supported by Hodson’s Horse under Major Daly, swept through them—killing every man.’ Whatever may have been the causes, proximate or remote, of the mutiny, it is quite evident that such Mussulman fanatics as these, with their green flag of rebellion and their cries of ‘Deen! deen!’ had been worked up, or had worked themselves up, to something like a sincere belief that they were fighting for their religion.
The chief body of rebels, as has just been stated, succeeded in escaping from Nawabgunge after the battle. They fled chiefly to Ramnuggur and Mahadeo on the banks of the Gogra, and to Bhitowlie at the junction of that river with the Chowka—with the apparent and probable intention of throwing up earthworks for the defence of those positions.
Just about the time when Sir Hope Grant defeated these Nawabgunge rebels—supposed to have been headed by the Begum of Oude and her paramour Mummoo Khan—the career of the energetic Moulvie was suddenly cut short at another. This remarkable man, Moulvie Ahmedullah Shah, died as he had long lived, struggling against the Feringhees and all who supported them. On the 15th of June, after having been driven from place to place by the various British columns and detachments, he arrived from Mohumdee at Powayne, a town about sixteen miles northeast of Shahjehanpoor. He had with him a considerable body of horse, and some guns. The Rajah of Powayne, named Juggernath Singh, having incurred the displeasure of the Moulvie by sheltering two native servants of the Company, was attacked by him. Juggernath Singh, and his two brothers Buldeo Singh and Komul Singh, went out to confront the Moulvie as best they could. A skirmish ensued, which lasted three hours. The most notable result was the death of the Moulvie; he received a shot, and fell; his head was at once severed; and the Rajah sent the head and trunk to Shahjehanpoor, to be delivered to Mr Gilbert Money, the commissioner. Glad as the British may have been to get rid of a formidable enemy, it is doubtful whether Mr Money received the bleeding gift with much gratification. The Rajah of Powayne, however, had long been an object of suspicion, on account of his unfeeling conduct towards some of the poor fugitives in the early days of the Revolt; and as the British cause was now obviously the winning cause, he was anxious, by his alacrity in dealing with the dead body of the Moulvie, to win favour with the authorities. A very large reward had been offered by the government to whoever could capture the Moulvie; and although some doubt was expressed whether this was intended to apply as well to the bleeding corpse as to the living man, the reward was paid to the Powayne chieftain.
[Illustration:
Principal Street in Lucknow. ]
It was unquestionably a great gain to the British to know that the Moulvie was really removed from the field of strife. As to the Begum, she still remained unsubdued, moving from place to place according as she could gather a large body of adherents around her. It was about the second week in June, so far as is rendered apparent by the correspondence, that she received Jung Bahadoor’s very decisive rejection of the appeal made by her for his alliance, lately adverted to; and as she lost nearly at the same time her able coadjutor the Moulvie, her prospects became more gloomy. Of Nena Sahib, little more could be said than that he was true to his character—a coward in all things. Where he was at any particular time, the British seldom certainly knew: he had not the courage of the Moulvie, or the Begum, or the Ranee.
In connection rather with the province of Goruckpore than with that of Oude, though nearly on the boundary-line between the two, must be mentioned two encounters in which the naval brigade honourably distinguished itself. The _Shannon’s_ seamen, it will be remembered, supplied a naval brigade under the lamented Captain Sir William Peel, for service in Oude; but there was also another brigade furnished by the _Pearl_, of which Captain Sotheby was commander. During May and June, this brigade was associated with certain troops and marines in the maintenance of order on the Goruckpore frontier of Oude. While on detached service, Major Cox and Lieutenant Turnour came in contact with the enemy on the 9th of June. The lieutenant had under him two 12-pounder howitzers, a 24-pounder rocket-tube, and about fifty seamen of the _Pearl’s_ crew; Lieutenant Pym had the control of about twenty marines from the same ship; while Major Cox, who commanded the whole detachment, had under him a small military force comprising two hundred men of the 13th light infantry, two troops of Madras cavalry, two troops of Bengal cavalry, and twenty Sikhs. It was altogether a singular medley of combatants. Having heard that Mahomed Hussein was occupying the neighbouring village of Amorha or Amorah in great force, Major Cox resolved to attack him. He divided his detachment into two parts, one headed by himself, and the other by Major Richardson. The seamen and marines were attached to Richardson’s party. Starting at two o’clock in the morning, they marched along the road leading through the village. When within a mile of Amorah, they received a heavy fire from the rebel skirmishers; these were immediately attacked and driven in by Pym and the marines; while the guns threw shot and shell on the main body. Attempting to retreat on the other flank, Cox met and frustrated them; and the result of the skirmish was a decisive abandonment of the village by the rebels. Nine days afterwards another force, similar in constitution but larger in numbers, comprising in its naval element about a hundred and ten seamen, set out from Captangunje to make another attack on Mahomed Hussein, who was posted with four thousand rebels at Hurreah, about eight miles off. On approaching near Hurreah, the enemy’s skirmishers were descried thrown across the river Gogra, screened in thick bamboo jungles, villages, topes of trees, and a dry nullah. British skirmishers were quickly sent on ahead, drove in the enemy, and waded the river after them up to their waists; the guns followed, and the enemy were driven from tope to tope, and from every place of concealment, and chased for four miles. The heat was tremendous; insomuch that seven hours’ marching, fighting, and pursuing nearly knocked up officers and men. Mahomed Hussein, however, was severely defeated, and this was deemed a sufficient reward for all the fatigues and privations. The _Pearl’s_ naval brigade counted this as the tenth time in which it had been in action in nine months.
It may be here mentioned that an endeavour was made, towards the end of June, to estimate the number of thalookdars and other petty chieftains who were in arms against the British in the province of Oude; together with the amount of force at their disposal. The estimate was not wholly reliable, for the means of obtaining correct information were very deficient. The list published in some of the Bombay newspapers, professing to be the nearest attainable approach to the truth, included the names of about thirty-five ‘thalookdars,’ ‘rajahs,’ and ‘chuckladars,’ holding among them about twenty-five mud-forts, with nearly a hundred guns, and forty thousand armed retainers. The chief items in this curious list were—‘The three chuckladars Mahomed Hussein, Mehndee Hussein, and Shaik Padil Imam, have twenty-three guns and ten thousand men massed about Sultanpore; some occupying Saloun, ten kos from Roy Bareilly’—‘At Nain, within nine kos of Roy Bareilly, four thalookdars, named Juggernath Buksh, Bugwan Buksh, Bussunth Singh, and Juggernath (?), have collected eight guns and six thousand men’—‘Banie Madhao, thalookdar; at Sukerpore, a strong fort surrounded by jungle, a few kos from Roy Bareilly; nineteen guns and eight thousand men’—‘Rajah Ali Buksh Khan, at Moham, a small fort twenty-five kos east of Lucknow; five guns and fifteen hundred men.’ Most of the rebel gatherings here adverted to were in the region around Roy Bareilly, southeast of Lucknow.
But notwithstanding these high-sounding names and formidable numbers, the cause of regular government in Oude was gradually advancing. The rebels could no longer endanger; they could only annoy. Mr Montgomery, at Lucknow, intrusted with large powers by the governor-general, was gradually feeling his way. While Crommelin took charge of the immediate defence of that city, and Hope Grant was grappling with the rebels in the open field, Montgomery was employed in re-establishing the network of judicial and revenue organisation, as favourable opportunities arose. The Rajah of Kapoorthully, lately adverted to, undertook the defence of the region between the Bunnee and Cawnpore; while Hope Grant kept a vigilant eye on the centre of Oude. The astute and double-dealing Maun Singh was placed in a singular position. He was distrusted by both
## parties, because he would not openly side with one against the other. As
the chieftain of Shahgunje, on the river Gogra, very near the eastern frontier of Oude, he would be formidable either as a friend or a foe. He had a fort, guns, and men at his command. There could be no question that for thirteen months he had been watching the progress of events, to determine in which balance to throw his sword; and it was equally evident that he was gradually recognising more and more the value of English friendship—as a consequence, he was bitterly disliked by the rebel leaders. Taking a view of the state of Oude generally during June, it is necessary to make a distinction between the earlier and the later days of the month. The former was much less favourable than the latter. It could not truthfully be said that the pacification proceeded rapidly. Injury was wrought by the party-tactics concerning the famous proclamation penned by Viscount Canning and condemned by the Earl of Ellenborough. The violent discussions arising out of that collision of opinion could not be wholly concealed from the natives of India. It cannot be doubted that many of the reckless and unscrupulous speeches made in the British parliament became known to, and cherished by, the insurgent chieftains. When a halo of suffering virtue was thrown around the Oudian royal family, and when the Queen of England’s viceroy in India was spoken of almost as a murderer and robber, the power of the government became necessarily shaken, and the difficulties of pacification increased. The proclamation was modified; nay, Mr Montgomery received discretionary powers to determine whether, and when, and where there should be a proclamation at all—the governor-general wisely leaving it to his sagacity to be guided by the circumstance of time and place. At the beginning of June little had been effected towards winning the submission of the malcontent thalookdars and chuckladars; the hopes of successful rebellion had not been sufficiently damped. Nevertheless, as the month advanced, and when the Moulvie was dead and the Gwalior rebels beaten, the Oudian landowners, by ones and twos, began to look out for a compromise, which might enable them safely to abandon a losing cause. One of the most embarrassing difficulties perhaps was this—that the rebel leaders made instant war against any thalookdars or chuckladars who gave in their submission to the British government under the modified proclamation—thereby deterring the more timid landowners from the adoption of this course. Maun Singh himself was besieged by an insurgent force; but his means of resistance were considerable.
One of the evidences afforded that the pacification of Oude was considered to be gradually approaching, was the disbandment of the corps of Volunteer Cavalry, which was composed almost wholly of officers and gentlemen, and which had rendered such eminent services at a time when European troops were doubly precious from their extreme rarity. In a notification issued at Calcutta, Viscount Canning, after mentioning some of the arrangements connected with the disbanding, thus spoke of the services of the corps: ‘The Volunteer Cavalry took a prominent part in all the successes which marked the advance of the late Major-general Sir Henry Havelock from Allahabad to Lucknow; and on every occasion of its employment against the rebels—whether on the advance to Lucknow, or as part of the force with which Major-general Sir James Outram held Alum Bagh—this corps has greatly distinguished itself by its gallantry in
## action, and by its fortitude and endurance under great exposure and
fatigue. The governor-general offers to Major Barrow, who ably commanded the Volunteer Cavalry, and boldly led them in all the operations in which they were engaged, his most cordial acknowledgments for his very valuable services: and to Captain Lynch, and all the officers and men who composed this corps, his lordship tenders his best thanks for the eminent good conduct and exemplary courage which they displayed during the whole time that the corps was embodied.’ The farewell of Sir James Outram was more hearty, because less official.[181]
Directing our attention next to the Doab and Rohilcund, it becomes at once apparent that organisation and systematic government made great advances during the month of June. The Doab no longer contained any large body of armed rebels. There were numerous smaller bands, but these bands chiefly made use of the Doab as a route of passage. The hopes of the rebel leaders were directed mainly towards two regions—Oude, on the north of the Ganges; and Central India, on the south of the Jumna. According as the fortunes of war (or rather depredation) tended in the one direction or the other, so did groups of armed insurgents cross, or attempt to cross, those rivers by means of the ghâts or ferries. If the chances for rebel success appeared stronger at Lucknow or Fyzabad, Bareilly or Shahjehanpoor, this current tended northward, or rather northeastward: if Calpee or Jhansi, Gwalior or Jeypoor, excited the hopes of the insurgents, the current took an opposite direction. The Doab, in either case, was regarded rather as a line of transit than as a field of contest. Sir Colin Campbell, well acquainted with this fact, devoted a portion of his attention to the ghâts on the two great rivers. It became very important to check if possible the marching and countermarching of the rebels across the Doab; and several columns and detachments of troops were engaged in this duty during the month now under notice. The success of the few actual encounters depended very much on the course of events in Scindia’s dominions, narrated in the last chapter. When Gwalior fell into the hands of Tanteea Topee and his associates, all the turbulent chieftains in the surrounding districts displayed an audacity and hopefulness which they had not exhibited during the preceding month; but when Sir Hugh Rose reconquered that city, and replaced Scindia on his throne, timidity succeeded to audacity, misgiving to hopefulness.
The commander-in-chief, after his participation in the reconquest and pacification of Rohilcund, returned to his former quarters at Futteghur, where he remained until the second week in June. Throughout the month he was personally engaged in no hostilities; he was occupied either in studying how to give his heat-worn soldiers repose, or how best to employ those whose services in the field were still indispensable. The governor-general much desired his presence at Allahabad, to confer with him personally on the military arrangements necessary during the summer and autumn. It afforded a significant proof of the scattered position of the British forces, that during the first week in June there were no soldiers that could be spared to escort Sir Colin from Futteghur to Allahabad. Quiet as the Doab was, compared with its condition earlier in the year, there were still rebel bands occasionally crossing and recrossing it, and these bands would have hazarded much to capture a prize so important as the commander-in-chief of the Anglo-Indian army. He could not safely move without an escort, and he had to delay his journey until a few troops came in from Shahjehanpoor and other stations. While at Futteghur he caused a search to be made in the bazaars of that place and Furruckabad for sulphur, in order that any stores of that substance might be seized by and for the government. The rebels of the various provinces still possessed many guns; the chieftains and landowners still owned more weapons of various kinds than they chose to acknowledge to the government; there was iron for the making of cannon-balls; there were charcoal and saltpetre towards the making of gunpowder; but there was one ingredient, sulphur, without which all the firearms of the insurgents would be useless; and as sulphur was an imported article in India, the government made attempts to obtain possession of any stores of that substance that might be in doubtful hands. Percussion-caps, too, were becoming scarce among the rebels; and, the materials and machinery for making more being wanting, they were perforce superseded by the less effective matchlock.
The state of the Doab at that time is well told in connection with a journey made by Mr Russell. After the Rohilcund campaign was over, this
## active journalist looked about him to determine what was best worth
seeing and describing, in reference to his special duties. If he went with or after Sir Colin to Allahabad, he would get to the head-quarters of politics, where very few stirring military operations were to be witnessed; if he went northeast into Oude, or southwest into Central India, he might, after much danger and difficulty, become involved in the movements of some flying column, ill assorting with the necessities of a lame man—for he still suffered from an injury by a kick from a horse. Mr Russell therefore resolved upon a journey through the Upper Doab from Futteghur to Delhi, and thence by Umballa to the healthy hill-station of Simla. He travelled by Bhowgong, Eytah, Gosaigunje, and Allygurh, meeting with ample evidence on the way of the ruin resulting from thirteen months of anarchy. Of the dâk bungalows or stations he says: ‘Let no one understand by this a pleasant roadside hostelry with large out-offices, spacious court-yard, teams of horses, and hissing ostlers; rather let him see a mud-hovel by the way, standing out, the only elevation in the dead level of baked earth, a few trees under which are tethered some wretched horses, and a group of men’—whose dress consisted of little beyond a turban. From Bhowgong to Eytah the country looked like a desert; and by the roadside, at intervals of ten miles or less, were thannahs or police-stations—small one-storied houses, bearing traces of the destructiveness of the rebel leader which had so often swept the district. He crossed the Kallee Nuddee at a point where the Company had never yet introduced the civilised agency of a regular bridge. The gharry was pushed and dragged down a shelving bank of loose sand, and then over a rickety creaky bridge of boats—the native attendants making much use of the primitive distended bladders and earthen jars as floating supporters. Arrived at Eytah, he found the place little other than a heap of blackened ruins, with enclosures broken down and trees lopped off at the stem. Yet here were three Englishmen, civil servants of the Company, engaged in re-establishing the machinery of regular government. Mr Russell, like every one else, tried all the varieties of language to express adequately the tremendous heat of an Indian June. He left Eytah at two in the afternoon. ‘The gharry was like an oven; the metal-work burning so that it could not be borne in contact with the hand for an instant. The wind reminded me of the deadly blast which swept over us on the march to Futteghur that dreadful morning when we left Rohilcund. Not a tree to shade the road; on each side a parched, dull, dun-coloured plain, with the waving heat-lines dancing up and down over its blighted surface; and whirling dust-storms or “devils,” as they are called, careering to and fro as if in demoniac glee in their own infernal region. On such a day as this Lake’s men (half a century earlier) fell file after file on their dreadful journey. Could I have found shelter, I would gladly have stopped, for even the natives suffered, and the horses were quite done up; but in India, in peace and war, one’s motto must be “No backward step!”—so on we went.’ After passing through many small towns and poor villages, in which half the houses were either ruined or shut up, he reached Allygurh, where, ‘being late, there was nothing ready at the bungalow but mosquitoes.’ Pursuing his journey, he at length reached Delhi.
The imperial city was now wholly and safely under British control. Sentries guarded the bridge of boats over the Jumna, allowing no native to pass without scrutiny; the fort of the Selimgurh was garrisoned by a small but trusty detachment. The plan, once contemplated, of destroying the defences, had not been adopted; the majestic wall, though shattered and ball-pierced in parts, remained in other respects entire. The defences were, altogether, calculated to strike a stranger with surprise, at the height and solidity of the wall, the formidable nature of the bastions, the depth and width of the dry ditch, the completeness of the glacis, and the security of such of the gates as had not been battered down or blown in. Some of the streets of the city had escaped the havoc of war; but others exhibited the effects of bombardment and assault in a terrible degree, although nine months of peaceful occupation had intervened; houses pitted with marks of shot and bullet, public buildings shattered and half in ruins, trees by the wayside split and rent, doors and windows splintered, gables torn out of houses, jagged holes completely through the walls. Half the houses in the city were shut; and the other half had not yet regained their regular steady inhabitants. The mighty palace of the Moguls was nearly as grand as ever on the outside; but all within displayed a wreck of oriental splendour. The exquisite Dewani Khas, when Mr Russell was there, instead of being filled with turbaned and bejewelled rajahs, Mogul guards, and oriental magnificence, as in the olden days, was occupied by British infantry—infantry, too, engaged in the humblest of barrack domestic duties. ‘From pillar to pillar and column to column extended the graceful arches of the clothes-line, with shirts and socks and drawers flaunting in the air in lieu of silken banners. Long lines of charpoys or bedsteads stretched from one end of the hall to the other—arms were piled against the columns—pouches, belts, and bayonets depended from the walls; and in the place where once blazed the fabulous glories of the peacock’s throne, reclined a private of her Majesty’s 61st, of a very Milesian type of countenance.’
[Illustration:
SURAT.—From a View in the Library of the East India Company. ]
The old king still remained a prisoner at Delhi. The drivelling, sensual descendant of Tamerlane, shorn of everything that could impart dignity, occupied some of the smaller apartments of the palace, with a few of his wives, children, and grandchildren, near him. All were fretful and discontented, as they well might be: for they had nothing to see, nowhere to go, no honours to receive, no magnificence to luxuriate in. When interrogated by visitors concerning the early days of the Revolt, he was peevish, and wished to change the subject; and when his youngest begum, and his son Jumma Bukht, were induced to converse, the absence of family unity—if such a thing is possible in an oriental palace—was apparent enough.
Considered politically, Delhi had the great advantage, during the spring months, of being placed under Sir John Lawrence. The province which contained the once imperial city was detached from the ‘northwestern’ group, and made—with Sirhind, the Punjaub, and the Peshawur Valley—one compact and extensive government, under the control of one who, morally speaking, was perhaps the greatest man in India. It was necessary to reconstruct a government; but much careful consideration was needed before the principle of construction could be settled. If the peaceful industrious population would return to their homes and occupations, their presence would doubtless be welcome; but the neighbouring villages still swarmed with desperate characters, whose residence in Delhi would be productive of evil. Many of the better class of natives feared that the imperial city would never recover; that the injury which its buildings had received during the siege, the disturbance of trade by the hurried exit of the regular inhabitants, the enormous losses by plunder and forfeiture, and the break-up of the imperial establishment in the palace, had combined to inflict a blow which would be fatal to the once great Mogul capital. Delhi, nevertheless, had outlived many terrible storms; and these prognostications might be destined to fail.
[Illustration:
LAHORE. ]
One consequence of the steady occupation of Delhi during the winter and spring was the gradual departure of troops to other districts where they were more needed. Among these was one of the native regiments. The ‘gallant little Goorkhas,’ as the British troops were accustomed to designate the soldiers of the Sirmoor and Kumaon battalions, held their high reputation to the very last. The Sirmoor battalion had marched down to Delhi at the very beginning of the disturbances, and during more than twelve months had been on continuous duty in and near that region. The time had now come when a respite could be given to their labours. They took their departure to the healthy hill-station of Deyrah Dhoon. As they marched out of Delhi, headed by their commandant, Colonel Reid, they were escorted over the bridge by the 2d Bengal Europeans, who cheered them lustily, and inspirited them with a melody, the meaning of which they had perchance by this time learned—‘_Should auld acquaintance be forgot_.’ An officer, well familiar with these ‘jolly little Goorkhas,’ remarked on this occasion: ‘There is not in military history a brighter or purer page than the record of the services and faithful conduct of the Sirmoor Goorkha battalion during the past year. First in the field, always in front, prominent, and incessantly fighting throughout the entire campaign and siege-operations before Delhi, the regiment has covered itself with honour and glory. In our darkest days, there was never a whisper, a suspicion, the shadow of a doubt of the honest loyalty and fidelity of these brave, simple-minded, and devoted soldiers. When others turned traitors, robbers, assassins, these rushed without a moment’s hesitation to our side, fought the good fight, bled, and died, faithful to their salt, honourable and true to the last.’
The Punjaub—at Lahore and all the other cities and stations—was so steadily and watchfully governed, that no disturbances took place except of a very slight character—personally distressing, it is true, but not nationally or politically of any moment. One such was the following: On a certain day a number of disbanded sepoys, who had long before taken refuge in Cashmere, recrossed the frontiers, and attacked the Christians stationed at a place called Madhopore; they murdered a few, including children, under circumstances of great barbarity. No other reason could be assigned for this brutality than a vengeful thirst for European blood. Hastily they crossed again into Cashmere, taking with them a quantity of plunder. A demand was at once made upon the chief of Cashmere, Rumbeer Singh, to capture and give them up; which demand was shortly afterwards attended to, although he had exhibited a little remissness in this matter in one or two former instances. The Rajah of Cashmere was not wholly unsuspected, indeed, of unfavourable views towards the British; and, with a less firm man than John Lawrence at his elbow, he might possibly have made his mountain territory a retreat for rebels.
Sinde, the land of the Indus, remained firmly in the hands of Mr Frere and General Jacob, the one as civil commissioner and the other as military commandant. At one period during the month, however, Frere was called upon to settle a question of religious zealotry, which might have kindled into a flame if not promptly dealt with. A Mohammedan of respectable character came to him, while at Hydrabad, and complained of an inscription on the inner wall of an open-fronted shop belonging to the Christian Mission. The inscription comprised one or two quotations from the Koran, and an argument to disprove the divine authority of the Prophet of Islam, from the evidence of the Koran itself. It was prepared and written, in the Sindhi and Arabic languages, by the Rev. Mr Matchett; and the Rev. Mr Gell caused it to be conspicuously exhibited in the open shop where Bibles were sold or distributed. The complainant was one Gholam Ali, a Mohammedan lately returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. He stated to Mr Frere that the inscription, visible to all the passers-by in the main bazaar of the city, was irritating and offensive to the Mohammedans. Mr Frere read the inscription; and in afterwards explaining to Lord Elphinstone the reasons which determined his decision on the subject, he said: ‘I am willing to be judged by any one who has any acquaintance with the ordinary feelings of a bigoted Mohammedan population as to the probable effects of such a placard on them. I feel confident that any such unprejudiced person would agree with me, that there was much danger of its causing an outbreak of fanatical violence; and holding that opinion, I cannot think that I should have been justified in allowing it to remain. It is quite possible it might never have caused any breach of the peace; but I did not think the present a time to try unnecessary experiments as to how much a fanatical native population will or will not bear in the way of provocation.’ Mr Frere wrote to the Rev. Mr Gell, the mission-superintendent, requesting him to remove the inscription; on the ground that, however well meant, it might produce more harm than good. This proceeding led to a violent outcry on the part of the missionaries and their supporters, and to an erroneous narrative forwarded to the government of Bombay—accusing Mr Frere of encouraging Mohammedanism and insulting Christianity. It was one of those numerous occasions, presented during the course of the Revolt and its suppression, in which the governing authorities had much difficulty in steering clearly through the opposite dangers of two religious extremes.
Sir Hugh Rose’s operations in Central India during the month of June were treated so fully in the last chapter, that little need be added here on the subject. The recapture of Gwalior was the great event; all the operations in Rajpootana, Bundelcund, Goojerat, and Holkar’s territory, were subordinate to it. When the month closed, General Roberts, with the ‘Rajpootana Field-force,’ was on the march from Nuseerabad to Jeypoor, to check the progress of the Gwalior fugitives in that direction. Brigadier Showers was at or near Futtehpore Sikri, guarding the Agra route. Major Ramsey was advancing from Rohilcund with the Kumaon battalion. The English residents at Jeypoor and Bhurtpore were actively engaged in supporting, so far as was practicable, the loyal tendencies of the rajahs of those two states, so as to enable them to resist the rebels if the latter were to enter either of those cities. The doubt was, not so much of the rajahs, as of the soldiery in their pay, whose fidelity could not wholly be relied on. The main body of Gwalior fugitives were at that time somewhere near Hindoun, a town about equidistant from Gwalior, Agra, and Jeypoor; whether they were about to advance to Ummerpore on the Jeypoor road, to Mhow on the Ulwar road, or to any other point, was not well known. Indeed, the rebels themselves seemed to be divided in opinion as to their future movements; they were looking around, to find some rajah, nawab, or nazim who would join them in rebellion; but those chieftains were becoming more and more cautious how they committed themselves in this way. The spectacle of rajahs blown away from guns, and nawabs hung from gallows, was by no means encouraging.
General Whitlock’s field-force, at the end of June, was distributed in various parts of Bundelcund, keeping in subjection the petty chieftains here and there in arms; for there was no longer anything like a formidable army of rebels opposed to him. Brigadier Carpenter, with three or four hundred men, and two guns, was at Kirkee. Major Dallas, with the 1st Madras N.I., was assisting the civil authorities in re-establishing the revenue and judicial departments. Colonel Reede, with two hundred men and two guns, was sent to look after the safety of Humeerpoor and its neighbourhood. Brigadier Macduff, with a portion of H.M. 43d foot, went to Calpee. Brigadier Munsey, with a small column of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was sent to Nowgong, to protect a convoy of stores on their way from Saugor. The remainder of the force encamped for a while at Banda as head-quarters, having with them Narain Rao and Madhoo Rao as prisoners, a large number of guns, and a considerable amount of treasure and jewels captured from the rebels. Whitlock’s long-continued exertions, although not attended by any great battles, had gradually restored something like tranquillity to this distracted region. Bundelcund and the Saugor territory, from the Jumna to the Nerbudda, had for nearly twelve months been in a miserable condition. The various bands of mutineers passing from Dinapoor and elsewhere wrought great mischief; powerful villages preyed upon their weaker neighbours; and the self-installed nawabs and rajahs extorted every farthing they could get from the peasantry and towns-people. Many villages were completely deserted; many more had been burned to the ground, and the people plundered of all the grain and other property which they possessed. The lesson which the peaceful natives had received from the rebels was a severe one, calculated to teach them the advantages of regular government under British influence.
Among the many ‘field-forces’ which about this time were broken up, to relieve the troops from some of their exhausting labours in fiercely hot weather, was a small one called the ‘Satpoora Field-force.’ Satpoora is a town in Holkar’s Mahratta dominions, about seventy-five miles southeast of Indore, and very near the boundary of the Nagpoor territory. Satpoora also gives name to a range of mountains which, running east and west, separates the valley of the Taptee from that of the Nerbudda; and it was in this sense that the designation ‘Satpoora Field-force’ was given to a small body of troops collected for the defence of the region in question. Major Evans, commanding this force, took farewell of his men on the 22d of June. In an order or address, dated from his camp at Jalwana, he thanked Captain Sealey and the artillery, Captain Langston and the Rifles, Captain Baugh and the 9th Bombay N.I., Captain Briggs and the 19th, Lieutenant Latouche and the Poonah horse—being the components of his force. He made special mention of a certain encounter on the 11th of April; ‘when the insurgents, posted in positions from which they supposed they could not be driven, were at once attacked at three different points; and despite a most obstinate and deadly resistance, were signally defeated and dispersed.’ He proceeded in commendatory terms to state that ‘the effect on the enemy has been so dispiriting that they have never again dared to collect in force; the disaffected chiefs themselves wandering about in concealment. The force has therefore been disappointed in not being able again to shew their prowess, which all were so eager to do, and would have done so well, had opportunity offered.’
Gujerat, the Guicowar’s territory—situated south of Rajpootana, and west of Holkar’s territory—had, it will be remembered, been most happily and effectively disarmed by Sir Richmond Shakespear, political resident at the court of the Guicowar; thereby lessening the probability of any hostile outbreak. Gujerat became subject, however, during this month, to one of those strange mysteries in which orientals so much delight. The lotus, and the chupatties, and the ‘something white,’ had had their day; and now arose the mystery of _twigs_. It was ascertained that twigs or small branches had been circulated from village to village in the province of Gujerat, as signals or watchwords; but nothing could be learned concerning their meaning. An ancient custom existed in many parts of India, of measuring the footprints with straws or twigs whenever a robbery had been committed, then forwarding them from village to village, until the measurement was found to implicate some one villager; after which the village was made responsible. This and many other ancient customs were referred to; but nothing appeared to throw light on the meaning of the twigs thus transmitted through Gujerat.
To assist in the maintenance of tranquillity in the Deccan, a small field-force, composed of troops selected from the Poonah division of the Bombay army, was made up, and placed under the command of Colonel Gall. Starting from Poonah, the colonel arrived at Aurungabad on the 8th of June, and resumed his march on the following day to Jaulnah, a military station in the northwest corner of the Nizam’s dominions. Large bands of Rohilla marauders, expelled from the city of Hyderabad by the Nizam’s troops, were known to be in various villages in the Jaulnah district; and it was deemed expedient to hold Colonel Gall’s force in readiness to watch and disperse these men, lest their machinations should assume a military form. A new cavalry corps named Beatson’s Horse assisted in this object. This corps, organised by and under the active officer of that name, consisted of recruits from various parts of the Deccan, for
## active service in any regions where their presence might be deemed most
useful. At present, their quarters were at Jaulnah, where they were regularly picketed around the encampment at night. Arrangements were also made for strengthening the Jaulnah district with a wing of the 92d Highlanders, and with several guns.
Of the presidency of Bombay it may happily be said that—partly owing to the scarcity of the Poorbeah element in the native army, partly to the sagacious and energetic government of Lord Elphinstone—the curse of rebellion was rendered very little apparent. Sinde, placed temporarily under that presidency, was well looked after by Mr Frere; Gujerat was safe under Sir Richmond Shakespear; Rajpootana was watched by the vigilant eye of General Roberts; while the northern Mahratta states, so far as they were subject to Bombay influence, were under the care of Sir Robert Hamilton.
Certain occurrences in the South Mahratta country, however, deserve to be noticed both in their political and their military phases.
Nothing is more certain than that many of the insurgent bodies in India rose in arms on account of personal or local matters, bearing little relation to the great military revolt, or to the so-called national rebellion. The derangement of regular government furnished opportunity for those who had real or assumed grievances. An example of this kind was furnished in the South Mahratta country. The natives of one of the least known districts south of Bombay had been in the habit of cutting down trees wherever they pleased, for the purpose of planting the cleared ground with various kinds of grain. The Bombay government at length put a stop to this wholesale destruction of timber. This stoppage was looked upon by the natives as an infringement of their ‘vested rights.’ A mischief-maker—one of the many usually at hand when the populace are excited—appeared in the person of the Rajah of Jumbote, a place southwest of Belgaum. He believed, or persuaded the people to believe, that Nena Sahib held Poonah with a large force; that the British troops were kept in check almost everywhere; and that it was a favourable time for a rise against the constituted authorities who held sway there. Another cause for disaffection arose out of the Hindoo custom of adoption; and this was felt in the South Mahratta country as in other parts of India. Many circumstances arose during the Revolt, shewing that the natives are familiar with and attached to this custom. When a prince, a chief, or a landowner, had no legitimate heir, it was customary for him to name a successor or heir, generally from among his kinsmen. So long as the East India Company had no territorial rights in a particular province or region, there was no motive for interfering with this custom; but self-interest afterwards stepped in, in a way that may be very easily explained. The Company, we will suppose, made a treaty with a native prince, to the effect that a certain state or a certain revenue should belong to him ‘and his heirs for ever.’ If he had no legitimate heir, the Company was tempted to seize the golden prize after his death, under the plea that the _adopted_ son was not a true representative. A Hindoo custom was interpreted in an English sense, and, being found wanting, was disallowed; thereby enriching the Company. English lawyers found no difficulty in supporting this course of proceeding, because it was consistent with English law. It was not, however, until the governor-generalship of the Marquis of Dalhousie, that this kind of confiscation was extensively acted on; and hence the interval between 1848 and 1858 was marked by much more irritation among native princely families, than had been before exhibited in connection with this particular subject. Be it right or wrong, thus to interpret a Hindoo usage by an English test, the history of the Revolt plainly shewed that many of the bitterest enemies of the government were persons whose domains or revenues had been disturbed by a refusal of the Company to acknowledge the principle of adoption in heirship. The miscreant Nena Sahib, the spirited but unscrupulous Ranee of Jhansi, many of the princes of the house of Delhi, and others whose names and deeds have often been recorded in these pages, had—for some years preceding the outbreak—brooded over their real or fancied wrongs in some such matters as these. Is it matter for surprise that they welcomed a day of revenge—a day that might possibly restore to them that of which they deemed themselves unjustly deprived?
The Rajah of Nargoond was one of those to whom, in a minor degree, this principle applied. He was a South Mahratta prince, holding a small territory eastward of Dharwar—separated from Bombay by the once disturbed Kolapore district. Being one of the tributaries to the Bombay government, he petitioned for leave to adopt an heir to his raj or rajahship; and the result of this petition was such as to render him a bitter enemy. His enmity made itself apparent about the date to which this chapter relates, in intrigues with the malcontents around him. A ruthless murder brought matters to an issue. Mr Manson, political agent for the South Mahratta country, having cause to suspect the rajah, set out from Belgaum to seek a personal interview with him, in the hope of dissuading him from rebel movements. They had been on terms of intimacy, which seemed to justify this hope. On the evening of the 29th of May, Mr Manson reached Ramdroog—the chieftain of which advised him to be on his guard, as the Rajah of Nargoond could not be relied on. The unhappy gentleman, believing otherwise, pushed on towards Nargoond. That same night his palanquin was surrounded by a body of the rajah’s troops at Soorbund, fifteen miles from Nargoond, and the political agent was foully murdered, together with most of his escort.
The Bombay government at once issued orders to attack the insurgents, and deal severely with the disaffected chieftains. It had been already ascertained that in the Dharwar collectorate, besides the Rajah of Nargoond, there were Bheem Rao of Moondurg, and the Desaee of Hembegee, to be confronted. The South Mahratta country, being near the boundary-line between the Bombay and Madras presidencies, had facilities for receiving small bodies of troops from two directions, to quell any disturbances that might arise. A Madras column, setting out from Bellary under Major Hughes, proceeded northward, and invested the stronghold of Bheem Rao at Kopal or Copal. A message was sent to this chief, giving him three hours to remove the women and children from the place. He returned no answer; whereupon a cannonade was opened. A breach was made practicable; a storming-party entered; the rebels gave way at every point; and very speedily the town and fort were in Major Hughes’s possession. Bheem Rao himself, as well as Kenchengowda, the Desaee of Hembegee, were among the slain on this occasion. While Hughes was thus occupied at Kopal, a small column of Bombay troops was engaged in another part of the South Mahratta country. Three or four hundred men, with two guns, started from Belgaum under Captain Paget, and joined a party of Mahratta horse under Colonel Malcolm at Noolgoond. They advanced on the 1st of June to Nargoond, the stronghold of the rebel rajah. This stronghold consisted of a fortress on the summit of a rock eight hundred feet high, with the town at its base. A reconnaissance being made, it was found that nearly two thousand rebels were encamped about a mile out of the town; and the rajah could be seen, on an elephant, brandishing his sword. Malcolm sent on the Mahratta horse to commence the attack; with the two guns, two companies of the 74th Highlanders, and one of the 28th Bombay infantry, to support. Of fighting there was scarcely any; the rebels very soon fled from the plain and the town, and left them in the hands of Malcolm. The rock-fortress, however, still remained unconquered. Early in the morning of the 2d, a storming-party was sent to ascend the steep and rugged pathway which led up to the gate of the fortress, prepared to blow it open with powder. Only one rebel was visible; and after a couple of rifles had been fired at him, the gate was forced open and an entrance obtained. Four men, the only occupants of the fortress, threw themselves over a precipitous wall in a panic terror, and were dashed to pieces—either not understanding or not believing the promise of quarter offered to them.
[Illustration:
KOLAPORE. ]
Thus fell the fortress of Nargoond, which had been regarded as a formidable stronghold ever since the days of Tippoo Saib. The rajah fled early in the fight, with seven of his principal followers. Mr Souter, police-superintendent at Belgaum, knowing the rajah’s complicity in the murder of Mr Manson,[182] set out in pursuit of him. At sunset on the 2d, the rajah and his followers were discovered skulking in a belt of jungle on the banks of the Malpurba, near Ramdroog; all but one were captured, just as they were about to start for Punderpore. They were sent to Belgaum, to be tried by a special commission. As to the rajah, the last hour of this wretched man was marked by very unseemly circumstances. On the 11th of June he was brought to trial, before Captain Schneider, political agent at Belgaum. He was found guilty of the crimes imputed to him, and was sentenced to be hanged on the next day. Early in the morning of the 12th, two companies of H.M. 56th, and two of the 20th Bombay native infantry, marched into Belgaum from Dharwar to afford a guard during the execution. When the last hour was approaching, the rajah begged hard to be blown from a gun, as a less degrading death than hanging; but the authorities on the spot were not empowered to accede to this application. The gallows was erected, and the hanging effected; but the rope broke, and the wretched man fell to the ground, where an undignified struggle took place between him and his executioners. The extreme sentence of the law was at length carried out, but not without evidences of mismanagement that added to the painfulness of the whole scene.
In connection with the affairs of the Bombay presidency generally, a few observations may be made on the state of the native army. One of the questions that pressed upon the authorities during many months bore relation to the treatment of the disarmed sepoy regiments—regiments which, though disarmed for suspicious conduct, had not so far committed themselves as to receive any more severe punishment. In the Punjaub Sir John Lawrence was troubled with the safe keeping of many thousands of these men; he dared not re-arm them, for their fidelity was more than doubtful; and he would not disband and dismiss them, lest they should swell the ranks of the rebels. Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, was affected by this difficulty only in a small degree, because the mutineers in the Bombay army were few in number. A proceeding took place, however, in the month now under notice, which will illustrate one of the modes adopted of dealing with these dangerous incumbrances. It will be remembered[183] that in the early part of August 1857 many parts of the South Mahratta country were thrown into agitation by the appearance of mutiny among certain of the Bombay native troops. Kolapore, Poonah, Satara, Belgaum, Dharwar, Rutnagherry, and Sawunt Waree were the chief places affected; a plot was discovered, in which some of the troops were leagued with certain Mohammedan fanatics—discovered in time to prevent the massacre of numerous Europeans. The 21st and 27th regiments were two of those implicated; or rather some of the companies in those regiments; while other companies, not actually detected in the conspiracy, were simply disarmed. In this disarmed state the men remained more than ten months, watched, but not treated otherwise as culprits. At length a settlement of their treatment was effected. Lord Elphinstone and his council decided as follows: That the native commissioned officers, present when the disarming took place, should be dismissed from the army, unless they could bring forward special proofs of fidelity—that of the native non-commissioned officers, the elder should be expelled, and the younger reduced to the ranks—that the sepoys or privates should not be expelled unless special grounds were assignable in their disfavor—that the 21st and 27th regiments should be formally erased from the Bombay army list, to mark with some stigma the conduct of those regiments—that two new regiments, to be called the 30th and 31st infantry, should be formed, with a rank lower in dignity than that of the other native infantry regiments of the Bombay army—that all the privates of the (late) 21st and 27th, with excepted instances, and such native officers as could clear themselves from ill charges, should form the bulk of the two new regiments—finally, that the vacancies in the list of officers (subadars, jemadars, havildars, naiks) should be filled by chosen sepoys who had worthily distinguished themselves in the campaigns of Rajpootana and Central India. Lord Elphinstone, in his order in council relating to this matter, dwelt upon the disgrace which had been brought upon the Bombay army by the misdeeds of some of the men of the late 21st and 27th regiments; adverted to the terrible deaths which most of them had met with in the Kolapore region; exhorted the rest to beware how they listened to the solicitations and machinations of traitors; and added: ‘The Governor in Council trusts that the 30th and 31st regiments will, by their future conduct, shew their determination to render themselves worthy of the leniency with which they have been treated, and to wipe out the stain which the crimes of the 21st and 27th have left upon the character of the Bombay army; so that the recollection of their past misdeeds may be as effectually effaced from the minds of men, as their former numbers will be erased from the roll of the army.’
Another instance, somewhat analogous to this, was presented in the Punjaub. During the early days of the Revolt, the 36th and 61st Bengal regiments at Jullundur, and the 3d at Phillour, were among those which mutinied. Some of the sepoys in each, however, remained free from the taint; they stood faithful under great temptation. At a later date even these men were disarmed, from motives of policy; and they had none but nominal duties intrusted to them. At length Sir John Lawrence, finding that these men had passed through the ordeal honourably, proposed that they should be re-armed, and noticed in a way consistent with their merits. This was agreed to. About three hundred and fifty officers and men, the faithful exceptions of three unfaithful regiments, were formed into a special corps to be called the Wufadar Pultun or ‘faithful regiment.’ This new corps was to be in four companies, organised on the same footing as the Punjaub irregular infantry; and was to be stationed at some place where the men would not have their feelings wounded and irritated by the taunts of the Punjaubee soldiery—between whom and the Hindustani sepoys the relations were anything but amicable. Any of the selected number who preferred it, might receive an honourable discharge from the army instead of entering any new corps. The experiment was regarded as an important one; seeing that it might afford a clue to the best mode of dealing with the numerous disarmed sepoys in the Punjaub.
The Bombay presidency was not so closely engaged in political and military matters as to neglect the machinery of peaceful industry, the stay and support of a nation. Another of those paths to commerce and civilisation, railways, was opened for traffic in India in June. It was a portion of a great trunk-line which, when completed, would connect Bombay with Madras. The length opened was from Khandalla to Poonah; and this, with another portion opened in 1853, completed a route from Bombay to Poonah, excepting a long tunnel under the range of hills called the Bhore Ghauts, which was not expected to be completed until 1860. On the day of ceremonial opening, a journey was made from Bombay to Poonah and back in eighteen hours, including four hours of portage or porterage at the Bhore Ghauts. There were intermediate stations at Kirkee and Tulligaum. The Company organised a scheme including conveyance across the ghauts, by palkees and gharries, as part of their passenger contract. An instructive index to the advancing state of society in India was afforded by the fact, that one of the great Parsee merchants of Bombay, Cursetjee Jamsetjee, was the leading personage in the hospitalities connected with this railway-opening ceremonial.
A few remarks on the sister presidency, and this chapter may close.
If Madras, now as in former months, was wholly spared from fighting and treason, it at least furnished an instance of the difficulty attending any collision on religious matters with the natives. The Wesleyan missionaries had a chapel and school in the district of Madras city called Royapettah. Many native children attended the school, for the sake of the secular instruction there given, without becoming formal converts. One of them, a youth of fifteen or sixteen, mentioned to the Rev. Mr Jenkins, the Wesleyan minister, his wish to become a Christian; it was found on inquiry, however, that the parents were averse to this; and Mr Jenkins left it to the youth whether he would join the mission or return to his parents. He chose the former course. Hereupon a disturbance commenced among the friends of the family; this was put down by the police; but as the youth remained at the mission-house, the religious prejudices of the natives became excited, and the disturbance swelled into a riot. A mob collected in front of the mission-house, entered the compound, threw stones and bricks at the house, forced open the door, and broke all the furniture. Mr Jenkins and another missionary named Stephenson, retreated from room to room, until they got into the bathroom, and then managed to climb over a wall into another compound, where they found protection. It was a mere local and temporary riot, followed by the capture of some of the offenders and the escape of others; but it was just such a spark as, in other regions of India, might have set a whole province into a flame. The missionaries, estimating the youth’s age at seventeen or eighteen years, claimed for him a right of determining whether he would return to his parents (who belonged to the Moodelly caste), or enter the mission; whereas some of the zealots on the other side, declaring that his age was only twelve or thirteen, advocated the rightful exercise of parental authority. The magistrates, without entering into this question of disputed figures, recommended to the missionaries the exercise of great caution, in any matters likely to arouse the religious animosity of the natives; and there can be little doubt that, in the prevailing state of native feeling, such caution was eminently necessary.
Note.
_Queen’s Regiments in India in June_.—Sufficient has been said in former chapters to convey some notion of the European element in the Indian army in past years; the necessity for increasing the strength of that element; the relation between the Queen’s troops and the Company’s troops; the difficulty of sparing additional troops from England; the mode in which that difficulty was overcome; and the controversy concerning the best route for troop-ships. It seems desirable to add here a few particulars concerning the actual number of European troops in India at or about the time to which this chapter relates, and the localities in which they were stationed.
The following list, correct as to the regiments, is liable to modification in respect of localities. Many of the regiments were at the time in detachments, serving in different places; in such cases, the station of the main body only is named. Other regiments were at the time on the march; these are referred to the station towards which they were marching.
QUEEN’S TROOPS IN THE BENGAL ARMY.
It may here be remarked, that the distinctions between ‘fusiliers,’ ‘foot,’ ‘light infantry,’ ‘Highlanders,’ and ‘rifles,’ are more nominal than real; these are all infantry regiments of the line, with a special number attached to each—except the particular corps called the ‘Rifle Brigade.’
_Cavalry._ 2d Dra. Gds., Lucknow. 6th Dra. Gds., Meerut. 7th Dra. Gds., Sealkote. 7th Lt. Dra., Lucknow. 9th Lancers, Umballa. Mil. Trn., 2d bat., Benares.
_Horse-artillery._ E Troop, Allahabad. F Troop, Lucknow.
_Foot-artillery._ 2d Bat. 8th Com. Benares. 3d Bat. 5th Com. Calcutta. 5th Bat. 4th Com. Lucknow. 6th Bat. 1st Com. Moultan. 7th Bat. 6th Com. Rawul Pindee. 8th Bat. 3d Com. Lucknow. 9th Bat. 3d Com. Dumdum. 11th Bat. 6th Com. Lucknow. 12th Bat. 5th Com. Lucknow. 13th Bat. 5th Com. Bunnee. 13th Bat. 6th Com. Lucknow. 14th Bat. 3d Com. Agra. 14th Bat. 4th Com. Allahabad. 14th Bat. 7th Com. Futteghur.
_Engineers._ 4th Company, Lucknow. 23d Company, Lucknow.
_Infantry._ 5th Fusiliers, Calpee. 7th Fusiliers, Meean Meer. 8th foot, Agra. 10th foot, Dinapoor. 13th Lt. Infantry, Goruckpore. 19th foot, Barrackpore. 20th foot, Lucknow. 23d Fusiliers, Lucknow. 24th foot, Ferozpore. 27th foot, Umballa. 29th foot, Rangoon. 32d Lt. Infantry, Allahabad. 34th foot, Azimghur. 35th foot, Dinapoor. 37th foot, Ghazeepore. 38th foot, Lucknow. 42d Highlanders, Bareilly. 52d foot, Sealkote. 53d foot, Lucknow. 54th foot, Allahabad. 60th Rif., 1st bat. Shahjehanpoor. 60th Rif., 2d bat. Dinapoor. 61st Delhi. 70th Peshawur. 73d Sheergotty. 75th Meerut. 77th Calcutta. 79th Futteghur. 80th Cawnpore. 81st Nowsherah. 82d Shahjehanpoor. 84th Buxar. 87th Jullundur. 88th Cawnpore. 90th Lucknow. 93d Bareilly. 97th Lucknow. 98th Campbellpoor. Rif. Brig., 2d bat. Lucknow. Rif. Brig., 3d bat. Lucknow.
QUEEN’S TROOPS IN THE BOMBAY ARMY.
The preceding list, relating to the Bengal army, gives the names and localities of regiments for the later weeks of June; the following, having reference to the Bombay army, applies to the earlier part of the same month; but the difference in this respect cannot be considerable.
_Cavalry._ 3d Drag. Guards, Kirkee. 8th Hussars, Nuseerabad. 14th Light Drag., Calpee. 17th Lancers, Kirkee.
_Horse-artillery._ D Troop, Poonah.
_Foot-artillery._ 1st Bat. 8th Com., Baroda. 4th Bat. 3d Com. Rajpootana. 6th Bat. 1st Com. Sinde. 11th Bat. 2d Com., Rajpootana. 11th Bat. 7th Com. Bombay. 14th Bat. 5th Com. Cen. India. 14th Bat. 8th Com. Dharwar.
_Engineers._ 11th Company, Rajpootana. 21st Company, Cen. India.
_Infantry._ 4th foot, Gujerat. 18th Royal Irish, Poonah. 33d foot, Poonah. 51st foot, Kurachee. 56th foot, Belgaum. 57th foot, Aden. 64th foot, Allygurh. 71st Highlanders, Calpee. 72d Highlanders, Neemuch. 78th Highlanders, Alum Bagh. 83d foot, Rajpootana. 86th foot, Calpee. 89th foot, Ahmedabad. 92d Highlanders, Bombay. 95th foot, Rajpootana.
QUEEN’S TROOPS IN THE MADRAS ARMY.
The following list applies to the state of affairs about the third week in June:
_Cavalry._ 1st Drag. Guards, Bangalore. 12th Lancers, Kurnool.
_Horse-artillery._ II Troop, Mount.
_Foot-artillery._ 3d Bat. 3d Com., Bangalore. 14th Bat. 6th Com., Bundelcund.
_Infantry._ 1st foot, 1st Battalion, Secunderabad. 43d foot, Bundelcund. 44th foot, Madras. 60th Rifles, 3d Battalion, Bangalore. 66th foot, Cananore. 68th foot, Rangoon. 69th foot, Vizagapatam. 74th foot, Bellary.
Summing up these entries, it will be seen that out of the 99 regiments of the line in the British army (the 100th, a new Canadian regiment, had not at that time completed its organisation), no less than 59 were in India in June 1858; with a proportion of the other branches of the military service. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate the importance attached to the state of our Indian possessions.
On the 1st of January 1857, there were about 26,000 royal troops and 12,000 Company’s European troops in India. During the ensuing fifteen months, to April 1858, there were sent over 42,000 royal troops and 5000 Company’s Europeans. These would have given a total of 85,000 British troops in India; but it was estimated that war, sickness, and heat had lessened this number to 50,000 available effective men. At that time the arrangements of the English authorities were such as to insure the speedy increase of this European element to not less than 70,000 men; and during the summer, still further advances were made in the same direction.
[Illustration]
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Footnote 180:
## Chapter xxviii., p. 469.
Footnote 181:
‘MY DEAR BARROW—We are about to separate, perhaps for ever; but, believe me, I shall ever retain you in affectionate remembrance, and ever speak with that intense admiration which I feel for the glorious volunteers whom you have commanded with such distinction. It would afford me much pleasure to shake every one of them by the hand, and tell them how warmly I feel towards them. But this is impossible; my pressing duties will not allow me even to write a few farewell lines to each of your officers: but I trust to your communicating to them individually my affectionate adieu and sincerest wishes for their prosperity. May God bless you and them.’ From one like Sir James, who had had such special means of observing and appreciating the exertions of the volunteer cavalry, this warm and genial letter must have been doubly gratifying.
Footnote 182:
The governor of Bombay, in a public notification, used many expressions of respect towards the memory of the political agent. Adverting to the advice given to Mr Manson not to trust himself to the mercies of the Rajah of Nargoond, Lord Elphinstone said: ‘But with that noble devotion to duty, of which the recent history of India has presented so many instances, Mr Manson determined to make a final effort to save the chief, by his personal influence, from the ruin impending over him.’ He added that the facts shewed ‘that a gallant and accomplished gentleman, who had proved himself a most valuable servant of the state, has been basely murdered.’ And he concluded by announcing that ‘the body of Mr Manson has been recovered, and has been buried at Kulladgee. The Right Hon. the Governor in Council will regard it as a sacred duty to make a provision for the families of the brave men who lost their lives in defending one whose untimely fate is now so deeply deplored.’
Footnote 183:
See Chap. xvii., pp. 289, 290.
[Illustration:
Almorah, Hill-station in Kumaon. ]
## CHAPTER XXXII.
GRADUAL PACIFICATION IN THE AUTUMN.
If the events of the three months—July, August, and September, 1858—be estimated without due consideration, it might appear that the progress made in India was hardly such as could fairly be called ‘pacification.’ When it is found how frequently the Jugdispore rebels are mentioned in connection with the affairs of Behar; how numerous were the thalookdars of Oude still in arms; how large an insurgent force the Begum held under her command; how fruitless were all the attempts to capture the miscreant Nena Sahib; how severely the friendly thalookdars and zemindars of Oude were treated by those in the rebel ranks, as a means of deterring others from joining the English; how active was Tanteea Topee in escaping from Roberts and Napier, Smith and Michel, with his treasure plundered from the Maharajah Scindia; how many petty chieftains in the Bundelcund and Mahratta territories were endeavouring to raise themselves in power, during a period of disorder, by violence and plunder—there may be some justification for regarding the state of India as far from peaceful during those three months. But notwithstanding these appearances, the pacification of the empire was unquestionably in progress. The Bengal sepoys, the real mutineers, were becoming lessened in number every week, by the sword, the bullet, the gallows, and privation. The insurgent bands, though many and apparently strong, consisted more and more exclusively of rabble ruffians, whose chief motive for action was plunder, and who seldom ventured to stand a contest even with one-twentieth part their number of English troops. The regiments and drafts sent out from England, both to the Queen’s and the Company’s armies, were regularly continued, so as to render it possible to supply a few British troops to all the points attacked or troubled. There was a steady increase in the number of Jâts, Goorkhas, Bheels, Scindians, Beloochees, &c., enlisted in British service, having little or no sympathy with the high-caste Hindustani Oudians who had been the authors of so much mischief. There was a re-establishment of civil government in all the provinces, and (excepting Oude) in nearly all the districts of each province; attended by a renewal of the revenue arrangements, and by the maintenance of police bodies who aided in putting down rebels and marauders. There was an almost total absence of anything like nationality in the motions of the insurgents, or unity of purpose in their proceedings; the decrepit Emperor of Delhi, and the half-witted King of Oude, both of them prisoners, had almost gone out of the thoughts of the natives—who, so far as they rebelled at all, looked out for new leaders, new paymasters, new plunder. In short, the British government had gained the upper hand in every province throughout India; and preparations were everywhere made to maintain this hold so firmly, that the discomfiture of the rebels became a matter almost of moral certainty. Much remained to be done, and much time would be needed for doing it; but the ‘beginning of the end’ was come, and men could speak without impropriety of the gradual pacification of India.
The events of these three months will not require any lengthened treatment; of new mutinies there was only one; and the military and other operations will admit of rapid recital.
Calcutta saw nothing of Viscount Canning during the spring, summer, and autumn. His lordship, as governor-general, appreciated the importance of being near Sir Colin Campbell, to consult with him daily on various matters affecting the military operations in the disturbed districts. Both were at Allahabad throughout the period to which this chapter relates. The supreme council, however, remained at the presidential capital, giving effect to numerous legislative measures, and carrying on the regular government of the presidency. Calcutta was now almost entirely free from those panics which so frequently disturbed it during the early months of the mutiny; rapine and bloodshed did not approach the city, and the English residents gradually sobered down. Although the violent and often absurd opposition to the governor-general had not quite ceased, it had greatly lessened; the dignified firmness of Lord Canning made a gradual conquest. Some of the newspapers, here as at Bombay, invented proclamations and narratives, crimes and accusations, with a disregard of truth which would hardly have been shewn by any journals in the mother-country; and those effusions which were not actually invented, too often received a colour ill calculated to convey a correct idea of their nature. Many of the journalists never forgot or forgave the restrictions which the governor-general deemed it prudent to place on the press in the summer of 1857; the amount of anonymous slander heaped on him was immense. One circumstance which enabled his lordship to live down the calumnies, was the discovery, made by the journalists in the following summer, that Lord Derby’s government was not more disposed than that of Lord Palmerston to expel Viscount Canning from office—a matter which will have to be noticed more fully in another chapter. The more moderate journalists of the Anglo-Indian press, it must in fairness be stated, did their part towards bringing about a more healthy state of feeling.
That the authorities at Calcutta were not insensible to the value of newspapers and journals, in a region so far away from England, was shewn by an arrangement made in the month of August—which afforded at the same time a quiet but significant proof of an improved attention towards the well-being of soldiers. An order was issued that a supply of newspapers and periodicals should be forwarded to the different military hospitals in Calcutta at the public expense. Those for the officers’ hospital[184] comprised some magazines of a higher class than were included in the list for the men’s hospitals; but such were to be sent afterwards to the men’s hospitals, when the officers had perused them.
In connection with military matters, in and near the presidential city, it may be mentioned that the neighbourhood of Calcutta was the scene of a settlement or colonisation very novel, and as unsatisfactory as it was novel. It has been the custom to send over a small number of soldiers’ wives with every British regiment sent to our colonies or foreign territories. During the course of twelve months so many regiments arrived at Calcutta, that these soldiers’ wives accumulated to eighteen hundred in number. They were consigned to the station at Dumdum, a few miles north of Calcutta; and were attended by three or four surgeons and one Protestant chaplain. The accommodation provided for them was sufficient for the women themselves, but not for the children, who added greatly to their number. Many of these women, being of that ignorant and ill-regulated class from which soldiers too frequently choose their wives, brought with them dirty habits and drinking tendencies; and these, when the fierce heat of an Indian summer came, engendered dysentery and diarrhœa, from which diseases a large number of women and children died. Other irregularities of conduct appeared, among a mass of women so strangely separated from all home-ties; and arrangements were gradually made for breaking up this singular colony.
The details given in former chapters, especially in the ‘notes,’ will have shewn how large was the number of regiments conveyed from the United Kingdom and the colonies to India; and when it is remembered that far more of these landed at Calcutta than at Madras, Bombay, or Kurachee, it will easily be understood how military an aspect they gave to the first-named city. Still, numerous as they were, they were never equal to the demand. Without making any long stay at Calcutta, they marched to the scenes of action in the northwest. In the scarcity of regular troops, the Bengal government derived much valuable services from naval and marine brigades—men occupying a middle position between soldiers and sailors. Captain Sir William Peel’s naval brigade has been often mentioned, in connection with gallant achievements in Oude; and Captain Sotheby’s naval brigade also won a good name, in the provinces eastward of Oude. But besides these, there were about a dozen different bodies in Bengal, each consisting of a commandant, two under-officers, a hundred men, and two light field-guns. Being well drilled, and accustomed to active movements, these parties were held in readiness to march off at short notice to any districts where a few resolute disciplined men could overawe turbulent towns-people; and thus they held the eastern districts in quietness without drawing on the regular military strength of the presidency. The _Shannon_ naval brigade acquired great fame; the heroic Peel had made himself a universal favourite, and the brigade became a noted body, not only for their own services, but for their connection with their late gallant commander. When the brigade returned down the Ganges, the residents of Calcutta gave them a public reception and a grand dinner. Sir James Outram was present at the dinner, and, in a graceful and appropriate way, told of his own experience of the services of the brigade at Lucknow in the memorable days of the previous winter. ‘Almost the first white faces I saw, when the lamented Havelock and I rushed out of our prison to greet Sir Colin at the head of our deliverers, were the hearty, jolly, smiling faces of some of you _Shannon_ men, who were pounding away with two big guns at the palace; and I then, for the first time in my life, had the opportunity of seeing and admiring the coolness of British sailors under fire. There you were, working in the open plains, without cover, or screen, or rampart of any kind, your guns within musket-range of the enemy, as coolly as if you were practising at the Woolwich target. And that it was a hot fire you were exposed to, was proved by three of the small staff that accompanied us (Napier, young Havelock, and Sitwell) being knocked over by musket-balls in passing to the rear of those guns, consequently further from the enemy than yourselves.’ Such a speech from such a man was about the most acceptable compliment that the brigade could receive, and was well calculated to produce a healthy emulation in other quarters.
The authorities at all the stations were on the watch for any symptoms which, though trivial in themselves, might indicate the state of feeling among the soldiery or the natives generally. Thus, on the 10th of July, at Barrackpore, a chuprassee happening to go down to a tank near the lines, saw a bayonet half in and half out of the water. A search was thereupon ordered; when about a hundred weapons—muskets, sabres, and bayonets—with balls and other ammunition—were discovered at the bottom of the tank. These warlike materials were rendered almost valueless by the action of the water; but their presence in the tank was not the less a mystery needing to be investigated. The authorities, in this as in many similar cases, thought it prudent not to divulge the results of their investigation.
The great jails of India were a source of much trouble and anxiety during the mutiny. All the large towns contained such places of incarceration, which were usually full of very desperate characters; and these men were rejoiced at any opportunity of revenging themselves on the authorities. Such opportunities were often afforded; for, as we have many times had occasion to narrate, the mutineers frequently broke open the jails as a means of strengthening their power by the aid of hundreds or thousands of budmashes ready for any atrocities. So late as the 31st of July, at Mymensing, in the eastern part of Bengal, the prisoners in the jail, six hundred in number, having overpowered the guard, escaped, seized many tulwars and muskets, and marched off towards Jumalpore. The Europeans at this place made hurried preparations for defence, and sent out such town-guards and police as they could muster, to attack the escaped prisoners outside the station. About half of the number were killed or recaptured, and the rest escaped to work mischief elsewhere. It is believed, however, that in this particular case, the prisoners had no immediate connection with rebels or mutinous sepoys; certain prison arrangements concerning food excited their anger, and under the influence of this anger they broke forth.
So far as concerns actual mutiny, the whole province of Bengal was nearly exempt from that infliction during the period now under consideration; regular government was maintained, and very few rebels troubled the course of peaceful industry.
Behar, however, was not so fortunate. Situated between Bengal and Oude, it was nearer to the scenes of anarchy, and shared in them more fully. Sir Edward Lugard, as we have seen, was employed there during the spring months; but having brought the Jugdispore rebels, as he believed, to the condition of mere bandits and marauders, he did not think it well to keep his force in active service during the rainy season, when they would probably suffer more from inclement weather than from the enemy. He resigned command, on account of his shattered health, and his Azimghur field-force was broken up. The 10th foot, and the Madras artillery, went to Dinapoor; the 84th foot and the military train, under Brigadier Douglas, departed for Benares; the royal artillery were summoned to Allahabad; the Sikh cavalry and the Madras rifles went to Sasseram; and the Madras cavalry to Ghazeepore. Captain Rattray, with his Sikhs, was left at Jugdispore, whence he made frequent excursions to dislodge small parties of rebels.
A series of minor occurrences took place in this part of Behar, during July, sufficient to require the notice of a few active officers at the head of small bodies of reliable troops, but tending on the other hand to shew that the military power of the rebels was nearly broken down—to be followed by the predatory excursions of ruffian bands whose chief or only motive was plunder. On the 8th a body of rebels entered Arrah, fired some shot, and burnt Mr Victor’s bungalow; the troops at that station being too few to effectually dislodge them, a reinforcement was sent from Patna, which drove them away. Brigadier Douglas was placed in command of the whole of this disturbed portion of Behar, from Dinapoor to Ghazeepore, including the Arrah and Jugdispore districts; and he so marshalled and organised the troops placed at his disposal as to enable him to bring small bodies to act promptly upon any disturbed spots. He established strong posts at moderate distances in all directions. The rebels in this quarter having few or no guns left, Douglas felt that their virtual extinction, though slow, would be certain. He was constantly on the alert; insomuch that the miscreants could never remain long to work mischief in one place. Meghur Singh, Joodhur Singh, and many other ‘Singhs,’ headed small bands at this time. On the 17th, Captain Rattray had a smart encounter with some of these people at Dehree, or rather, it was a capture, with scarcely any encounter at all. His telegram to Allahabad described it very pithily: ‘Sangram Singh having committed some murders in the neighbourhood of Rotas, and the road being completely closed by him, I sent out a party of eight picked men from my regiment, with orders to kill or bring in Sangram Singh. This party succeeded most signally. They disguised themselves as mutinous sepoys, brought in Sangram Singh last night, and killed his brother (the man who committed the late murders by Sangram Singh’s orders), his sons, nephew, and grandsons, amounting in all to nine persons—bringing in their heads. At this capture, all the people of the south [of the district?] are much rejoiced. The hills for the present are clear from rebels. I shall try Sangram Singh to-morrow.’ The trunk-road from Calcutta to the upper provinces, about Sasseram, Jehanabad, Karumnassa, and other places, was frequently blocked by small
## parties of rebels or marauders; and then it became necessary to send out
detachments to disperse them. As it was of immense importance to maintain this road open for traffic, military and commercial, the authorities, at Patna, Benares, and elsewhere, were on the alert to hunt down any predatory bands that might make their appearance.
Although Douglas commanded the district in which Jugdispore is situated, he did not hold Jugdispore itself. That place had changed hands more than once, since the day when Koer Singh headed the Dinapoor mutineers; and it was at the beginning of August held by Ummer Singh, with the chief body of the Behar rebels. Brigadier Douglas gradually organised arrangements for another attack on this place. His object was, if possible, so to surround Ummer Singh that he should only have one outlet of escape, towards Benares and Mirzapore, where there were sufficient English troops to bring him to bay. The rebels, however, made so many separate attacks at various places in the Shahabad district, and moved about with such surprising celerity, that Douglas was forced to postpone his main attack for a time, seeing that Jugdispore could not be invested unless he had most of his troops near that spot. All through the month of August we hear of partial engagements between small parties of rebels and much smaller parties of the English—ending, in almost every case, in the flight of the former, but not the less harassing to the latter. At one time we read of an appearance of these ubiquitous insurgents at Rasserah; at another at Arrah; at others at Belowtee, Nowadda, Jugragunje, Masseegunje, Roopsauguty, Doomraon, Burrarpore, Chowpore, Pah, Nurreehurgunje, Kuseea, Nissreegunje, and other towns and villages—mostly south of the Ganges and west of the Sone.
It is unnecessary to trace the operations in this province during September. There was no rebel army, properly so called; but there were small bands in various directions—plundering villages, burning indigo-works, molesting opium-grounds, murdering unprotected persons known or supposed to be friendly to the British, and committing atrocities from motives either of personal vengeance or of plunder. Of patriotism there was nothing; for the peaceful villages suffered as much from these ruffians as the servants of the state. The state of matters was well described by an eye-witness, who said that Shahabad (the district which contains Arrah and Jugdispore) ‘is one of the richest districts in Behar, and is pillaged from end to end; it is what an Irish county would be with the Rockites masters of the opportunity.’ It was a riot rather than a rebellion; a series of disorders produced by ruffians, rather than a manifestation of patriotism or national independence. To restore tranquillity, required more troops than Brigadier Douglas could command at that time; but everything foretold a gradual suppression of this state of disorder, when October brought him more troops and cooler weather.
We now pass on to the turbulent province of Oude—that region which, from the very beginning of the mutiny, was the most difficult to deal with. It will be remembered, from the details given in the former chapters, that Lucknow was entirely reconquered by the British; that the line of communication between that city and Cawnpore was safely in their hands; that after Sir Colin Campbell, Sir James Outram, and other generals had taken their departure to other provinces, Sir Hope Grant remained in military command of Oude; and that Mr Montgomery, who had been Lawrence’s coadjutor in the Punjaub, undertook, as chief-commissioner of Oude, the difficult task of re-establishing civil government in that distracted country.
It may be well here to take some notice of an important state document relating to Oude and its government, its thalookdars and its zemindars.
During the spring and summer,[185] the two Houses of Parliament were hotly engaged in a contest concerning Viscount Canning and the Earl of Ellenborough, which branched off into a contest between Whigs and Conservatives, marked by great bitterness on both sides. The immediate cause was a proclamation intended to have been issued (but never actually issued) by Viscount Canning in Oude, announcing the forfeiture of all estates belonging to thalookdars and zemindars who had been guilty of complicity with the rebels. The Earl of Ellenborough, during his brief tenure of office as president of the Board of Control, wrote the celebrated ‘secret dispatch’ (dated April 19th),[186] in which he condemned the proposed proclamation, and haughtily reproved the governor-general himself. It was a dispatch, of which the following words were disapproved even by the earl’s own party: ‘We must admit that, under these circumstances, the hostilities which have been carried on in Oude have rather the character of legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration, than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation. Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted upon a different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made.’
It was not until the month of October that the English public were made acquainted with Viscount Canning’s reply to this dispatch. During the interval of five or six months, speculation was active as to the mode in which he would view it, and the course he would adopt in relation to it. His reply was dated ‘Allahabad, June 17th,’ and, when at length publicly known, attracted general attention for its dignified tone. Even those who continued to believe that the much-canvassed proclamation would not have been a just one to issue, admitted (in most instances) the cogency of the governor-general’s arguments against the Ellenborough dispatch—especially in relation to the unfairness of making public a professedly ‘secret’ dispatch. The reply was not addressed to the earl, whose name was not mentioned in it throughout; its address was to ‘the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,’ in accordance with official rule; but the earl was responsible, and alone responsible, for the dispatch and the severe language it contained. The personal part of Viscount Canning’s reply, the calm but indignant allusion to the ungenerous treatment he had received, was comprised in the first six clauses, which we give in a foot-note.[187] He proceeded to notice the strange way in which the Ellenborough dispatch almost justified the Oudians, as if they were fighting for a righteous cause—quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, proposing a reconsideration of the annexation of Oude; but quite unjustifiable in a minister serving Queen Victoria, who was at that moment, rightly or wrongly, the real Queen of Oude. Viscount Canning declined to discuss the policy which, two years earlier, had dictated the annexation; it was not his performance, nor was he empowered to undo it when once done. But he felt it incumbent on him to point out the disastrous effects which might follow, if the Oudians were encouraged by such reasonings as those contained in the Ellenborough dispatch. Speaking of the Begum, the Moulvie, the Nazim, and other rebel leaders in Oude, he stated that there was scarcely any unity of plan or sympathy of purpose among them; ‘but,’ he added, ‘I cannot think this want of unity will long continue. If it shall once become manifest that the British government hesitates to declare its right to possess Oude, and that it regards itself as a wrongful intruder into the place of the dynasty which the Begum claims to represent, I believe that this would draw to the side of the Begum many who have hitherto shewn no sympathy with the late ruling family, and that it is just what is wanting to give a national character to her cause. An uncompromising assertion of our authority in Oude is perfectly compatible with a merciful exercise of it; and I respectfully submit that if the government of India is not supported in making this assertion, and in declaring that the recent acts of the people of Oude are acts of rebellion, and that they may in strict right be treated as such, a powerful temptation will be offered to them to maintain their present struggle or to renew it.’
The governor-general’s defence of the proclamation itself we need not notice at any length; the proclamation was never issued in its original form—the subject being left generally to the discretion of Mr Montgomery. The tenor of his reply may be thus briefly indicated—That he went to Allahabad to reside, chiefly that he might be able personally to investigate the state of Oude; that he soon decided to make a difference between mutinied sepoys and Oudian rebels; that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for Oudian rebellion should be confiscation of estates, a punishment frequently enforced against rebels in past years, both by the British and by the native governments; that it is a punishment which in no way affects the honour of the most sensitive Rajpoot or Brahmin; that it admits of every gradation, according to the severity or lightness of the offence; that it would enable the government to reward friendly thalookdars and zemindars with estates taken from those who had rebelled; that most of the thalookdars had acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities, at a time when they (the thalookdars) were acting under the native government as ‘nazims’ (governors) or ‘chuckladars’ (collectors of government rents); that, as a matter of abstract right, it would be just to give these estates back again to the village communities; but that, as there would be insuperable difficulties to this course, it would be better to take the forfeited estates of rebellious thalookdars as government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.
Another reply, written by Viscount Canning on the 7th of July, was to the dispatch of the Court of Directors dated the 18th of May. In that dispatch the directors, while expressing full confidence in the governor-general, courteously requested him to furnish an explanation of the circumstances and motives which led him to frame the proclamation. This explanation he most readily gave, in terms equivalent to those above indicated. He expressed, too, his thankfulness for the tone in which the directors had written to him. ‘Such an expression of the sentiments of your honourable court would be to me a source of gratification and just pride under any circumstances; but the generous and timely promptitude with which you have been pleased to issue it, and the fact that it contains approval of the past, as well as trust for the future, has greatly enhanced its value. Your honourable court have rightly judged, that in the midst of difficulties no support is so cheering to a public servant, or so strengthening, as that which is derived from a declared approval of the spirit by which his past acts have been guided.’
It may be here remarked that some of the European inhabitants of Calcutta, who had from the first placed themselves in antagonism with Viscount Canning, prepared an address to the Earl of Ellenborough, thanking him for the ‘secret’ dispatch, denouncing the principles and the policy acted on by the governor-general, lamenting the earl’s retirement after so brief a tenure of office, denouncing the Whigs, and expressing a hope that the earl, whether in or out of office, would long live to ‘uphold the honour and interests of British India.’
We now proceed to a brief narrative of the course of events in Oude during July, August, and September.
The province, in the first of these three months, was in a remarkable condition. Mr Montgomery, as chief-commissioner, intrusted with large powers, gradually felt his way towards a re-establishment of British influence. Most of the dependants and adherents of the deposed royal family belonged to Lucknow; and it was hence in that city that they required most carefully to be watched. In the provinces, the late king’s power and the present British power were regarded with about equal indifference or dislike. A sort of feudalism prevailed, inimical to the recognition of any central authority, except in merely nominal matters. There were rebel forces under different leaders at different spots; but it is doubtful whether any of them were fighting for the deposed king; each leader had an eye to the assumption of power by or for himself. Even the Begum, one of the king’s wives, was influenced by motives very far removed from affection to her lord. Great as Montgomery’s difficulties were, therefore, they were less than would have been occasioned by a concentration of action, a unity of purpose, among the malcontents. He reorganised civil tribunals and offices in such districts as were within his power, and waited for favourable opportunities to do the like in other districts.
General Sir Hope Grant was Mr Montgomery’s coadjutor in these labours, bringing military power to bear where civil power was insufficient. In the early part of the month he remained at Lucknow, keeping together a small but efficient army, and watching the course of events around him. Later in the month, however, he deemed it necessary to take the field, and endeavour to chastise a large body of rebels who were setting up the Begum in authority at Fyzabad. On the 21st he started off in that direction, taking with him a force comprising the 1st Madras Europeans, the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade, the 1st Punjaub infantry, the 7th Hussars, Hodson’s Horse, twelve light guns, and a heavy train. It was considered probable that, on his way, Grant would relieve Maun Singh, the powerful thalookdar so often mentioned, who was besieged in his fort at Shahgunje by many thousand rebels. This cunning time-server had drawn suspicion upon his acts and motives on many former occasions; but as it was more desirable to have him as a friend than an enemy, and as he had unquestionably earned the enmity of the rebels by his refusal to act openly against the British, it was considered prudent to pay some attention to his present applications for aid. Grant and Montgomery, the one as general and the other as commissioner, held possession of the road from Cawnpore to Lucknow, and the road from Lucknow to Nawabgunge; it was hoped that Grant’s expedition would obtain command likewise of the road from Nawabgunge to Fyzabad. These are the three components of one main road which nearly intersects Oude from west to east; the possession of it would render practicable the gradual crushing of the rebel bands in different forts north and south of the road. The rebel leaders, about the middle of the month, were believed to comprise the Begum of Oude, her paramour Mummoo Khan, Beni Madhoo, Baboo Rambuksh, Bihonath Singh, Chandabuksh, Gholab Singh, Nurput Singh, the Shahzada Feroze Shah, Bhopal Singh, and others of less note; they had under their command sixty or seventy thousand armed men of various grades, and forty or fifty guns. More than half of the whole number were supposed to be with the Begum and Mummoo Khan, at Chowka-Ghât, beyond the river Gogra; and to these Sir Hope Grant directed his chief attention. Where Nena Sahib was hiding, the British authorities could never definitely learn; although it was known that he was near the northern or Nepaul frontier of Oude. It was believed that he, as well as the Begum, was becoming straitened for want of funds—appliances without which they could never hope to keep their rebel forces together.
The general, with his force from Lucknow, experienced no obstruction in his march towards Fyzabad. He arrived at a point within fourteen miles of that city by the 28th of July, having passed on his way through Nawabgunge—leaving the Rajah of Kupoorthulla to keep open his communications. His advance alarmed the rebel army which was at that time engaged in besieging Maun Singh in Shahgunje (twelve miles south of Fyzabad); it broke up into three divisions—one of which fled towards Gonda; a second marched for Sultanpore on the Goomtee; while a third made for Tanda on the Gogra. This precipitate flight shewed in a striking way the dread felt by the insurgents of an encounter with Sir Hope Grant; for their numbers are supposed to have been at least ten times as great as his. On the 29th, Grant entered Fyzabad, and there heard that a large body of rebels were escaping across the Gogra a mile or two ahead; he pushed on with cavalry and horse-artillery, but was only in time to send a few round-shot into their rear. On the following day, Maun Singh, now delivered from beleaguerment, had an interview with him. On the 2d of August, two of the three divisions of the rebel army contrived to join in the vicinity of Sultanpore, where they again formed a compact army of eighteen thousand men, with eleven guns. Notwithstanding the escape of the rebels, Grant’s undisputed occupation of Fyzabad made a great impression in the whole province. This place was a centre of Mohammedan influence; while near it was the very ancient though decayed city of Ayodha or Oude, one of the most sacred of Hindoo cities. Religious quarrels had often broken out between the two communities; and now the British shewed themselves masters alike over the Mohammedan and the Hindoo cities.
It was a great advantage at this time that Hurdeo Buksh, a powerful zemindar of Oude, was enabled to give practical efficiency to the friendly feeling with which he had regarded the English throughout the mutiny. At his estate of Dhurrenpore, not far from Nawabgunge, he organised a small force of retainers, which, with two guns, he employed in fighting against some of the neighbouring thalookdars and zemindars who were hostile to British interests. Such instances were few in number, but they were gradually increasing; and to such agency the ultimate pacification of Oude would necessarily be in considerable part due.
While Grant was encamped at Fyzabad, he made arrangements for routing some of the rebel bodies stationed in places to the east and southeast, whither they had fled on his approach. He made up a column—comprising the 1st Madras Europeans, the 5th Punjaub Rifles, a detachment of Madras Sappers, a detachment of the 7th Hussars, 300 of Hodson’s Horse, and a troop of horse-artillery. With this force, Brigadier Horsford was directed to proceed to Sultanpore, whither an important section of the rebels had retreated. Heavy rains prevented the departure of the brigadier so soon as had been intended; but he set forth on the 9th of August, and was joined on the way by a small force from Lucknow, comprising Brasyer’s Sikhs and two horse-artillery guns. On the 13th, Horsford took possession of Sultanpore, after a tough opposition from sixteen or eighteen thousand rebels; he not only drove the enemy across the river Goomtee, but shelled them out of the cantonments on the opposite banks. The most determined of the combatants among the rebels were believed to be those regiments of mutinied sepoys which had been known as the Nuseerabad brigade; they had established three posts to guard the ghâts or ferries across the river, and held these ghâts for a time with such obstinacy as to occasion them a severe loss.
Sultanpore occupied an important position in relation to the rest of Oude; being on the same river (the Goomtee) as Lucknow, and on the high road from Allahabad to Fyzabad. It was evident that this place, from the relative positions of the opposing forces, could not long remain at peace. The rebels endeavoured to regain possession of it after their defeat; while Sir Hope Grant resolved to prevent them. They returned to the Goomtee, and occupied many villages nearly opposite the city. On the 24th of August, Grant made preparations for crossing the river and attacking them. This plan he put in execution on the following day; when twelve hundred foot and two guns effected the passage, and seized three villages immediately in front. The rebels, however, maintained a position from which they could send over shot into the British camp; this lasted until the 29th, when they were driven from their position, and compelled to retire towards Sassenpore, where they reassembled about seven thousand of their number, with eight guns.
The first days of September found this body of rebels separating and recombining, lessening and augmenting, in a manner that renders it difficult to trace the actual movements. The real mutinous sepoys, the ‘Pandies’ of the once mighty Bengal army, were now few among them; and the fluctuating numbers were made up chiefly of the adherents of the rebellious thalookdars and zemindars of Oude—the vassals of those feudal barons—together with felons and scoundrels of various kinds. On one day they appeared likely to retire to Amethee, the stronghold of a rebel named Lall Madhoo Singh; on another, they shewed symptoms of marching to Mozuffernugger, a place about ten miles from Sultanpore; while on a third, some of them made their appearance at a town about twenty miles from Sultanpore on the Lucknow road.
At this time (September) the position of the British in Oude, so far as concerned the possession of actual governing power, was very singular. They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province from east to west; while the districts north and south of that belt were either in the possession of rebels, or were greatly troubled by them. The position was thus clearly described by the Lucknow correspondent of the _Bombay Gazette_: ‘The districts in our possession lie in a large ellipse, of which Lucknow and Durriabad are foci, the ends of one diameter being Cawnpore and Fyzabad. These cities are situated almost due east and west. Our civil jurisdiction extends, on the average, twenty-five miles all round Lucknow, and not much less round Durriabad. Our line of communication is uninterrupted from Cawnpore to Fyzabad, which latter borders on the Goruckpore district.’ North of this belt or ellipse were various bodies of rebels under the Begum, Mummoo Khan, Feroze Shah, Hurdut Singh, and other leaders; while south of the belt were other bodies under Beni Madhoo, Hunmunt Singh, the Rajah of Gonda, &c. Irrespective of these, were Nena Sahib and some of his relations who, though not to be encountered, were known to be still in the northeast of Oude, near the Nepaul frontier. Sir Hope Grant had immediate control over both banks of the Goomtee, near Sultanpore, and was preparing for a decisive advance against the rebels as soon as he was joined by Brigadier Berkeley, who was sent from Allahabad on an expedition presently to be noticed.
The portion of Oude nearest to Rohilcund, where the energetic Moulvie had lately lost his life, was kept for a long time in a state of anarchy by a combination of rebel chieftains, who declared hostility against the Rajah of Powayne for having betrayed and killed the Moulvie. They at first quarrelled a good deal concerning the possession of the effects of the deceased leader; but the Begum put in a claim, which seems to have been acceded to. Although the authorities at Lucknow could not at this time spare a force to rout out the insurgents on this side of Oude, the service was rendered from Rohilcund, as will be shewn shortly.
In a district of Oude between Lucknow and the Rohilcund frontier, a gallant affair was achieved by Mr Cavanagh, who had gained so much renown by carrying the message from Sir James Outram at Lucknow to Sir Colin Campbell’s camp. Being appointed chief civil officer of the Muhiabad district, he arranged with Captain Dawson and Lieutenant French to defend the district from rebels as well as they could, by the aid of a few native police and sowars. On the 30th of July a body of 1500 insurgents, with one gun, made a sudden attack on a small out-station defended only by about 70 men. The place was gallantly held until Cavanagh and French reached it. One bold charge sent the rebels fleeing in all directions; and the district was soon pacified. Mr Cavanagh had the tact to win over several small zemindars to the British cause, by threatening to punish them if insubordinate, and by undertaking to aid them if they were attacked by rebel bands; they combined to maintain four hundred matchlockmen at their own expense in the British cause. Many of the petty rajahs and zemindars had themselves been more than suspected; but the civil authorities were empowered to win them over, by an indulgent forgetfulness of their past conduct.
[Illustration:
Interior of Hindoo Rajah’s House. ]
On another side of Oude, near Allahabad and the apex of the Doab, there were many bold and reckless thalookdars, who held out threats to all of their class who dared to profess friendship to the English. A loyal thalookdar, Baboo Rampursand Singh, was attacked by a number of these confederated chieftains with their retainers at Soraon; they took him and his family prisoners, destroyed his house, and sacked the village. As this course of proceeding would have deterred friendly thalookdars from a persistence in their loyalty, and still more certainly deterred waverers from making a choice adverse to the rebel cause, means were taken to check it. Brigadier Berkeley was placed in command of a ‘Soraon Field-force,’ hastily collected, comprising 200 of H.M. 32d foot, the 7th Punjaub infantry, about 150 other infantry, two troops of Lahore light horse, a detachment of Madras cavalry, detachments of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars. The brigadier set out for Allahabad, where the force had been collected, crossed the Ganges, marched to the Oude frontier, and came in sight of a body of rebels on the 14th of July, at the fort and village of Dehaign—one of the small forts in which Oude abounded. The rebels retired into the fort on his approach, allowing his skirmishers to take easy possession of the village. He encircled the fort with cavalry, and placed horse-artillery to watch any outlets of escape. A firing by heavy guns was not satisfactory to him, owing to the fort being completely hidden by trees and thick scrubby jungle; and he therefore resolved on storming the place by his infantry. The assault was speedily and thoroughly successful. About 250 of the rebels were killed in the fort and ditch; and about as many more were chased through the jungle and cut down by the cavalry and horse-artillery. The place was not properly a fort; it was a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis, having a brick house in the centre. The rebels being driven out, Brigadier Berkeley caused the jungle to be cut, the walls to be levelled, and the house destroyed. After resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the fort of Tiroul, seven miles north of Soraon. He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions known only to the natives; it was surrounded by a very thick thorny abattis; and it had walls, bastions, ditches, escarps, like a miniature fortress, with a stronghold in the centre to which the garrison could retire when closely pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, but the walls were loopholed for musketry. So thick was the belt of trees and jungle around, that the brigadier could scarcely obtain a sight of the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24-pounder howitzer before sending in his infantry to assault. This succeeded; the enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and gun-ammunition. The infantry were on the alert to assist, but the enemy left them nothing to do. Fort Tiroul was then destroyed, as fort Soraon had been. The former was rather a superior example of an Oudian fort; although the walls and bastions were only of earth, they were of such considerable thickness, and were aided so greatly by loopholed parapets, ditches, breastworks, rifle-pits, thorny abattis, zigzag intrenchments, and thick jungle—that the enemy might have made a tough resistance to an infantry attack, if they had not been frightened out by shells and balls. By a somewhat similar train of operations, Brigadier Berkeley captured and destroyed a fort at Bhyspoor; and having thus finished the work intrusted to him, he returned with his temporary ‘Soraon Field-force’ to Allahabad. After a brief interval, he was again sent forth, to demolish other Oudian forts at places accessible from Allahabad, of which one was at Pertabghur; and then to advance to Sultanpore, to aid Sir Hope Grant. The two generals would then command a semicircle of country, within which most of the rebels in the eastern half of Oude would be enclosed; and an advance of other columns from Lucknow would completely hem them in. There were many symptoms, at the end of the month, that numerous zemindars and thalookdars were only waiting for a decent pretext, a decisive success of the British, to give in their adhesion.
The banks of the Ganges nearest to the province of Oude, even so low down as Allahabad, where the governor-general and the commander-in-chief were residing, required close watching; they were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom devastated the villages, while others sought to cross the Ganges into the Doab; and carry mischief into new districts. Towards the close of July—to cite one among many instances—it became known that the rebels had collected many boats on the Oude side of the river, ready to cross over into the Doab if the fortune of war should render this desirable. The authorities at once sent up the _Jumna_ steamer, with a party of 130 Sikhs and two guns. At Manickpore and Kunkur, some distance up the river, they found more than twenty boats, which they succeeded in destroying; but the two forts were well armed with guns and rebels, and could not be safely attacked at that time—another and stronger expeditionary force was required to effect this. In August, and again in September, small forces were sent up from Allahabad by river, which had the desired effect of checking these insurgents.
Viscount Canning and Sir Colin Campbell both remained at Allahabad throughout the period to which this chapter relates—where, indeed, they had long been located. It was convenient for each in his special capacity, owing to its central situation. Sir Colin needed to be informed daily of the proceedings of all the brigades, columns, forces, and detachments which were out on active service. Gladly would he have kept them all under cover until the rainy season had passed; but the exigencies of the service prevented this: some troops were necessarily in the field—in Behar, in Oude, in Rohilcund, in Bundelcund, in the Mahratta states, in Rajpootana; and these, whether their number were few or many, were all working to one common end. At no other city could Sir Colin receive news from all those regions more promptly than at Allahabad. Again, Viscount Canning found it necessary to be in intimate communication with the commander-in-chief, in relation to all projects and arrangements involving military operations, on which the ultimate pacification of India so much depended. It was desirable, also, that he should be near Oude, the affairs of which were far more delicate than those of any other Indian province. Many events were likely to arise, concerning which the electric telegraph, though instantaneous, might be too curt and enigmatical, and which would be much better settled by a personal conference with the chief to whom the government of the Anglo-Indian empire was consigned.
Orders and dispatches, military and political, were issued in great number from Allahabad, which was the substitute for Calcutta at that time. Much progress had been made towards the construction of a new English town, with houses, hotels, offices, and shops; and much also in the building of new barracks, for the English troops which must necessarily continue to be stationed at this important place. The governor-general and the commander-in-chief were each surrounded with his staff of officials, for the transaction of business; and both worked untiringly for the public benefit.
From time to time Viscount Canning gave effect to several recommendations made by the generals and brigadiers for an acknowledgment of the fidelity and bravery of native soldiers. At a period when the treachery of the ‘Pandies’ of the Bengal army had been productive of such bitter fruit, it was doubly desirable to praise and reward such native troops as bore up well against the temptations to which they were exposed. On one day he issued orders for the promotion of certain officers and men of the Hyderabad Contingent, for conspicuous gallantry in the action at Banda; and in orders of subsequent dates, other well-deserving native troops were singled out for reward. Ressaldars were promoted to be ressaldar-majors, duffadars to be ressaldars or jemadars, bargheers and silladars to be duffadars, naiks to be havildars, and so on—these being some of the many designations of native military officers in India. One of the higher grade of native officers in the Hyderabad Contingent, Ressaldar-major Meer Dilawar Hossein, was made a member of the First Class of ‘the Order of British India,’ with the title of ‘Sirdar Bahadoor.’ Sometimes towns themselves were complimented, as a mode of gratifying the inhabitants, when good service had been rendered. Thus Sasseram became the subject of the following order: ‘As a special mark of the consideration of government for the loyal services rendered by Shah Koobeeroodeen Ahmed of Sasseram, and his fellow towns-people, in repelling the mutineers, the Right Hon. the Governor-general is pleased to confer upon Sasseram the name of Nasirool Hook-Kusbah, “Sasseram the aider or supporter of the rulers.”’
Sir Colin Campbell’s[188] daily duties of course bore relation chiefly to military matters. On one occasion, while at Allahabad, he reviewed the camel-corps as one of the reinforcements which from time to time arrived at that place. This was towards the close of July. It was a curious sight to see four hundred camels going through their military evolutions on the _maîdan_ or plain outside the city. These ungainly beasts performed almost all the usual cavalry movements. Besides an armed native driver, each camel carried an English soldier, who occupied the back seat, and was in a position to use his rifle. The camels had been trained to the word of command. On a recognised touch of the guiding-string, they dropped on their knees, the riflemen descended quickly, went on for a distance in skirmishing order, remounted on the recall being signalled, and the camels then rose in their wonted clumsy manner. This corps was likely to render very valuable service, by rapidly conveying a few skilled riflemen to distances and over tracts which would be beyond the reach of infantry.
The commander-in-chief, a man indefatigable in the performance of his duties, acquired for himself the reputation of being a general who insisted on all the duties of regimental service being properly attended to by the officers; to the effect that all alike should _work_ for the common cause, in camps and barracks, as well as in the field. The following order, issued about the close of August, will shew how numerous were the duties thus marked out: ‘The commander-in-chief begs that general officers commanding divisions and brigades will urge commanding-officers of her Majesty’s regiments, troops, and batteries, to give their most particular attention to all points of interior economy; to examine and correct regimental books; to re-enlist soldiers of limited service willing to renew their engagements; to complete soldiers’ clothing and necessaries, examine soldiers’ accounts, soldiers’ claims, and small account-books; to close, and render to the proper departments, the accounts of deceased officers and soldiers; to examine arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, and repair deficiencies; to continue judging-distance drills and musketry-instruction, as far as the climate will permit; to provide occupation for soldiers without harassing them by mere routine drills; to consider their comforts, diet, and amusements; to re-establish the regimental school, and encourage by every means the study of the Hindustani language, both by officers and soldiers disposed to study it; to ascertain by inquiry what means exist in the neighbourhood of their quarters, both in materials and workmen, to furnish their regiments with boots and clothing, in the event of failure of the usual supply; finally, to maintain the most exact discipline, the strict performance of all duties, and proper marks of respect to officers; which will be much assisted by a proper example on the part of officers, in dress and deportment, regularity in their duties, and treatment of native servants and followers.’
This last clause, ‘treatment of native servants and followers,’ related to a serious matter. Many of the younger officers, chiefly those whose knowledge of India had extended only over a few months, had acquired the habit of speaking and writing of the natives as if they were all fiends alike, to sabre and hang whom was a pleasurable duty. The atrocities of some were visited on all. The ‘Pandies’ who had begun the mutiny were now mixed up with others in the common designations of ‘niggers’ and ‘devils;’ and the officers above alluded to were far too prone to use the stick or the whip on the shoulders of natives, simply because they were natives, even when inoffensively employed. The observant correspondents of some of the London journals were too much struck with this dangerous tendency to allow it to pass unnoticed; they commented on it with severity. The letters from officers, made public in the journals published in India, furnished abundant proof of the feelings and language adverted to, conveyed in their own terms. Unless the mutiny were to end with general enmity on both sides, it was essential that an improved tone should prevail in this matter; and to this end, many hints were given by the authorities, in England as well as in India.
A few words will suffice to say all that need be said concerning the Doab and Rohilcund, the regions in which the mutiny really commenced.
Rohilcund was troubled with nothing beyond trifling disturbances during the month of July; and these came chiefly from Oude. Rebel leaders, with small bands of depredators, crossed the frontier, and harried some of the neighbouring villages. So little, however, was there of an organised rebel army in the province, that the predatory irruptions were easily quelled by means of small detachments of troops. At one period in the month a body of Oudians crossed into the northern part of Rohilcund, and combined with a rabble under one Nizam Ali in the wild Roodurpore tract of country. As it was considered possible that an attack on Pileebheet might be contemplated, the authorities at Bareilly sent a small force—comprising the Rohilcund Horse, a troop or two of Punjaub cavalry, and three companies of the Kumaon levies—to Pileebheet; this movement caused the insurgents to retire quickly. In the neighbourhood of Mohumdee, where much fighting had taken place during Sir Colin Campbell’s campaign in the spring, bands of rebels still hovered about, looking for any chances of success, and requiring to be carefully watched. One, of about four thousand men, was under Khan Bahadoor Khan of Bareilly; a second, under Khan Ali Nazim of Oude, numbered five thousand; and a third, under Wilayut Shah, mustered three thousand. These, with twenty or thirty guns, might have wrought much mischief if combined with the Oude rebels; but they were so placed on the frontier of the two provinces as to be nearly isolated, and afraid of any bold movements. The authorities, however, were on their guard. A force, including De Kantzow’s Horse, was sent for the protection of Powayne; and Rajah Juggernath Singh, of that place, had about two thousand men who could be depended upon to oppose the rebels. In August, the town and station of Pileebheet were frequently threatened by one Kala Khan, who had three thousand budmashes at his beck, with four guns. As it was deemed necessary to defend Noria, a station about ten miles distant, a small force was sent out from Pileebheet to effect this. Kala Khan attacked the force at Sersown, and brought on an engagement in which his three thousand were opposed to about five hundred. He received a severe defeat, and lost his guns, three elephants, and a number of bullocks. This occurred during the last week in August. In September, matters remained nearly in the same state; the authorities in Rohilcund could not at once spare troops in sufficient number to put down the insurgents thoroughly; but the successes of Sir Hope Grant, in the central parts of Oude, would gradually but necessarily weaken the isolated bands of rebels on the frontier of the two provinces.
Meerut and Delhi had long been at peace. No symptoms of rebel armies appeared near those cities. Sir John Lawrence, having had the province of Delhi attached to his government of the Punjaub, was ruling it with the same vigour as his other provinces. All the natives, Hindoo and Mohammedan, saw that he was a man not to be trifled with. Many of the antiquated usages of the East India Company, in force in other provinces, he abrogated, and introduced a system more suitable to the actual condition of the country and its inhabitants. The ‘regulations,’ as they are called, he abolished altogether; and established in their place a system of government in which summary trial by _vivâ voce_ examination was adopted. A military police was organised; and every village compelled to pay compensation for any damage done within its boundaries.
The district around Etawah was occasionally disturbed by a dacoit leader named Roop Singh, who collected a band of adherents, comprising a few of the Gwalior Contingent, a few of the mutinied troops from Scindia’s own army, and numerous matchlockmen from the ravines of the Jumna. With this motley force he levied contributions from such of the villages as were not strong enough to resist him. He made his appearance at Ajeetmul and other places early in July; but was speedily routed out by a small detachment sent in pursuit. During August, this part of India was infested by men of the same class as those who troubled so many other provinces—reckless adventurers and escaped felons, who took advantage of the state of public affairs to plunder villages, and make exactions on every side. Some of them were headed by chieftains who could boast of a few hundred retainers, and who, with retainers and rabble together, gave more organisation to the plunderers. The principal among them was Roop Singh, mentioned above, who kept armed possession of a fort at Burhee, Bhurree, or Burhay, at the junction of the Chumbul with the Jumna, and occasioned great annoyance by attacking boats and levying toll as they passed. To keep these several mischief-makers in subjection required much activity on the part of the troops belonging to the district. Towards the close of the month, a force was sent out from Etawah purposely to take this fort and disperse the rebels. This was effectually accomplished on the 28th. Suspecting what was intended, the rebels attempted to check the progress of the boats carrying the detachment, at a place called Gurha Koodor, a fortified village three miles higher up. So long as the troops were in the boats, the rebels made a show of determination on shore; but a landing soon scattered them in all directions. The troops then re-embarked, floated down to Burhee, landed, took possession of the fort, and compelled Roop Singh to make a hasty retreat. This done, they collected and secured all the boats in the neighbouring parts of the rivers Jumna, Chumbul, and Kooraree, as a measure of precaution, clearing all the rebels from the vicinity of Dholpore. They then proceeded against the chief of Chuckernuggur, another leader of rebel bands whom it was necessary to put down. In September, Etawah, like the other districts around it, was very little troubled by warlike or mutinous proceedings.
Agra found no difficulty in maintaining order in and near the city. When, in June, the temporary success of Tanteea Topee and the Gwalior mutineers gave some cause for alarm, the authorities of Agra sent out troops to escort Scindia back to the capital of his dominions; and when, at a later date, those mutineers were fleeing from Gwalior, and were believed to be on the way to Bhurtpore or Odeypore, a detachment was sent out to check their approach. This detachment consisted of the 3d Bengal Europeans and a battery of guns, and was placed in aid of Brigadier Showers’s force. The demonstration took effect; for (as we shall see more in detail presently), Tanteea Topee bent his steps southward, away from the threatened assault; and Showers was enabled to send back the detachment through Futtehpore Sikri to Agra. From that time, during the summer and autumn months, Agra and its neighbourhood were at peace.
Directing attention next to the Punjaub, we may remark that those who had the keenest sense of the value of loyal integrity in times of trouble, were anxious to see the day when some recognition should be shewn of the services of three native rajahs, without whose co-operation it would scarcely have been possible for Sir John Lawrence to have sent those troops from the Punjaub which enabled Sir Archdale Wilson to recapture Delhi. These were the Rajahs of Putialah, Jheend, and Nabah—three small states which were at one time included within Sirhind, then among the ‘Sikh protected states,’ and then among the ‘Cis-Sutlej states.’ The rajahs were semi-independent, having most of the privileges of independent rulers, but being at the same time under certain engagements to the British government. If they had swelled the ranks of the insurgents, it is difficult to see how Hindostan could have been recovered; for these states intervene between Lahore and Umritsir on the one side, and Delhi on the other. From first to last the rajahs not only fulfilled their engagements, but more; and the government had abundant reason to be glad that these three territories had not been ‘annexed;’ for annexation, if not the cause, was unquestionably one of the aggravations to mutiny. Viscount Canning, in July, rewarded these three Sikh chiefs (for they were Sikhs, though not exactly Punjaubees) with estates and honours. The Rajah—or rather Maharajah, for he was of higher grade than the other two—of Putialah received certain territories in Jhujjur and Bhudour, on a certain military tenure in return for the revenues. He also received the gift of a house at Delhi which, once belonging to one of the begums of the imperial family, had been confiscated on account of her complicity in the mutiny. Lastly, his honorary titles were increased by the following: ‘Furzund Khan, Munsoor Zuman, Ameer-ool-Omrah, Maharajah Dhurraj Rajahshur Sree Maharajah Rajgan, Nirundur Singh Mahundur Bahadoor’—an accumulation, the weight of which would be oppressive to any but an oriental prince. The translation is said to be: ‘Special Son, Conqueror of the World, Chief of the Chiefs, Maharajah of Rajahs’—and so on. The Rajah of Jheend received the Dadree territory, thirteen villages in the Koolran Pergunnah, and a confiscated royal house at Delhi. The additions were: That he be allowed a salute of eleven guns; that his presents be increased from eleven to fifteen trays; that his state visits to the governor-general be returned by the secretary; and that his honorary titles be thus increased: ‘Most cherished Son of true Faith, Rajah Surroop Singh Walee Jheend.’ The Rajah of Nabah received similar presents, and the honorary appellations of—‘Noble Son of good Faith, Berar Bunsee Sirmoor Rajah Bhurpoor Singh Malindur Bahadoor.’ The revenues made over to these rajahs amounted—to the first, about £20,000 per annum; to the second, £12,000; to the third, £11,000.
[Illustration:
UMRITSIR. ]
We may smile at these extravagances of compliment, but the services rendered deserved a solid reward as well as an addition to honorary titles. For, it must be remembered, the Rajah of Putialah maintained a contingent of 5000 troops—protected the stations of Umballa and Kurnaul at the outbreak of the mutiny—guarded the grand trunk-road from Kurnaul to Phillour, keeping it open for the passage of British and Punjaub troops—co-operated with General Van Cortlandt in Hissar—lent money when Sir John Lawrence’s coffers were running low—and encouraged others by his own unswerving loyalty. Again: the Rajah of Jheend, whose contingent was very small, did not hesitate to leave his own territory undefended, and march towards Delhi—assisting to defend most of the stations between that city and Kurnaul, and to keep open the communication across the Jumna. Again: the Rajah of Nabah, at the very outset of the disturbances, proceeded to aid Mr Commissioner Barnes in maintaining Loodianah—supplied an escort for the siege-train—gallantly opposed the Jullundur mutineers—provided carriage for stores—and made loans to the Punjaub government in a time of monetary need. The districts given to these rajahs, at the suggestion of Sir John Lawrence, were so chosen as to furnish a prudent barrier of Sikhs between turbulent Mohammedans on the one side and equally turbulent Rajpoots on the other.
Nor did the authorities neglect to recognise the services of humbler persons, although, principally from the proverbial slowness of official movements, the recognition was often delayed to an unreasonable extent. Occasion has more than once presented itself, in former chapters, for noticing the bestowal of the much-prized Victoria Cross on officers and soldiers who had distinguished themselves by acts of personal valour. Owing to the dilatory official routine just adverted to, it was not until the 27th of July that Sergeant Smith and Bugler Hawthorne received the Victoria Cross for their intrepid services at the siege of Delhi ten months before. Their regiment, the 52d foot, was at Sealkote in the Punjaub on that date; and Brigadier Stisted had the pleasure of giving the honouring insignia to them. He told them that the Victoria Cross is in reality more honourable than the Order of the Bath, seeing that no one can obtain it except by virtue of well-authenticated acts of heroism. He gracefully admitted that his own Order of the Bath was due more to the pluck and bravery of his men than to his own individual services; and in reference to the Victoria Cross he added: ‘I only wish I had it myself.’ Another bestowal of this honour we will briefly mention, to shew what kind of spirit is to be found within the breasts of British troops. The award of the Cross, in this instance, was delayed no less than fourteen months after the achievement for which it was given; and the soldier may well have doubted whether he would ever receive it. The instance was that of Gunner William Connolly, of the Bengal horse-artillery; and the conduct for which his officer, Lieutenant Cookes, recommended him for this distinction, was recorded in a dispatch from which an extract is here given in a foot-note.[189]
A very unexpected event, in July, was the revolt of a regiment, or a portion of a regiment, in that region of India which was believed to be more vigorously governed and in better hands than any other—the Punjaub. The facts, as they afterwards came out (mostly, however, on hearsay evidence), appear to have been nearly as follow: The 18th Punjaub infantry, stationed at Dera Ismael Khan, on the western side of the Indus, contained among its numbers about a hundred Malwaie Sikhs, a peculiar tribe different from the other Sikhs of the Punjaub. These Malwaies planned a mutiny. On a particular night, some of them were to murder the officers of the station; the fort was to be seized; and the 39th Bengal native infantry, which had been disarmed some time previously, was to be re-armed from the magazines and stores of the fort. The two regiments of mutineers, perhaps joined by the Sikhs of Renny’s regiment at Bunnoo, were then to embark in boats on the Indus, taking with them the guns, ammunition, and treasure, and were to float down to Dera Ghazee Khan; here they expected to be joined by the native garrison, with whom they would cross the Indus to Moultan; and lastly, with two regiments from the last-named place, they hoped to march upon Lahore. Such was the account, probably magnified in some of its
## particulars, obtained of the plans of the mutineers. So far as concerned
the actual facts, the plot was discovered in time to prevent its execution. On the evening of the 20th, Major Gardiner of the 10th Punjaub infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, having received from some quarter a hint of what was intended, went down to the lines at ten o’clock at night, and summoned two of the men to appear. One, a sepoy, came first; he was ordered at once to be confined; but no sooner did he hear the order, than he ran off. Just as the guard were about re-capturing this man, a jemadar rushed out, cut down one of them, and wounded another. The sepoy and the jemadar, who were the ringleaders in the plot, escaped for a time, but were captured a few days afterwards. As soon as Sir John Lawrence heard of this occurrence, he ordered the disarmed 39th to be sent to Sealkote, where their movements could be more carefully watched.
Still more serious, in its nature if not in its intention, was the outbreak of the 62d and 69th Bengal native infantry, with a native troop of horse-artillery, at Moultan. These disarmed regiments, like many others in similar plight, were a source of embarrassment to the authorities. They could not safely be re-armed, for their Hindustani sympathies caused them to be suspected; while it was a waste of power to employ English soldiers to watch these unarmed men in their lines. At length it was determined to disband the two regiments, and let the men depart, a few at a time, and under necessary precautions, to their own homes. When this order was read out to them, they appeared satisfied; but a rumour or suspicion spread that there was an intention of destroying them piecemeal on the way. Whether this or any other motive actuated them, is not fully known; but they broke out into rebellion on the 31st of August. There were at Moultan at the time about 170 of the royal artillery, a wing of the 1st Bengal Europeans, the 11th Punjaub infantry, and the 1st Bengal irregular cavalry. Just as the mid-day gun fired, the two disarmed mutinous regiments rose in mutiny, seized anything they could find as weapons, and made a desperate assault on the troops at the station not in their plot. The 62d made their attack on the artillery stables and the European barracks; the 69th went at the guns and the artillery barracks. As these mutineers had few weapons but sticks, their attack appeared so strange, and was so wholly unexpected, that the loyal troops at the station were at first hardly prepared to resist them, and a few Europeans lost their lives; but when once the real nature of the mad attempt was clearly seen, the result was fearful. The misguided men were shot or cut down by all parties and in all quarters. Of thirteen hundred mutineers, few lived to return to their own Hindostan; three or four hundred were laid low in and near Moultan, others were shot by villagers, others were captured and brought in for military execution. It was the nearest approach to the utter annihilation of two regiments, perhaps, that occurred throughout the wars of the mutiny. The sepoys sometimes behaved more like madmen, at others more like children, than rational beings. In the present case they had scarcely a chance of success; for the Sikhs and Punjaubees around them displayed no affection for Hindustanis; the soldiery shot and cut them down, while the peasantry captured them for the sake of the reward offered. They possibly reckoned on the support of the 1st Bengal irregular cavalry; but this regiment remained loyal, and assisted in cutting down the sepoys instead of befriending them.
This occurrence strongly attracted the attention of the government. The disarmed sepoys, as has been more than once mentioned, were a source of much perplexity; it was not decided in what way best to set them free; and on the other hand, such an outbreak as this shewed that it would not be safe to re-arm them. There was at the same time a necessity for watching the Sikh and Punjaubee troops—now nearly 70,000 in number. Hitherto they had behaved admirably, fighting manfully for the government at times and places where the Hindustanis had been treacherous. That they had done so, afforded a justification for the confidence which Sir John Lawrence had placed in them; but that sagacious man saw that recruiting had gone quite far enough in this direction. It was just possible that the Punjaub army might become too strong, and rejoice in its strength by means of insubordination.
One of the incidents in the Punjaub during the month of August related to a physical rather than a moral outbreak—the overwhelming of a military station by a river torrent. The Indus, when about to enter the Punjaub from the Himalaya, passes through a narrow ravine in the Irhagan Hills. The rocks on either side here, undermined by the action of the water through unknown centuries, broke away and fell into the river. Half the water of the stream still continued to find its way onward; but the other half became dammed up, and accumulated into a vast lake. When the pressure of this body of water had augmented to an irresistible degree (which it did in fifteen days), it burst its barrier and rushed down with indescribable force, sweeping away villages on its banks. At Attock the level of the river rose fifty feet in one hour, carrying away the bridge of boats which constituted the only roadway over the Indus, and destroying workshops and timber-stores on the banks. The Cabool river, coming from Afghanistan, and joining the Indus at Attock, had its stream driven backwards or upwards with fearful rapidity; it speedily overflowed its banks, and destroyed nearly all the houses at the military station of Nowsherah. ‘The officers,’ said an eye-witness, ‘not knowing when it would stop, but hoping the flood would soon subside, put all their things on the tops of their houses; but the water still continued rising, and house after house went down before it.... The barracks were flooded and vacated by the troops; and all, gentle and simple, had to pass the night on some sand-hills.’ The barracks, being ‘pucka-built’ (burnt bricks and mortar), were not destroyed, although flooded; the other buildings, being ‘rutcha-built’ (unburnt bricks and mud), were destroyed. The troops were at once removed to Peshawur; but the destruction of the boat-bridge at Attock threatened a serious interruption to military movements.
Nothing occurred in the Punjaub during September to need record here; nor did Sinde depart from its usual peaceful condition. Both of these large provinces, filling up the western belt of India from the Himalaya to the ocean, were held well in hand by the civil and military authorities.
Attention must now be transferred to those regions which, during many months, had been disturbed by anarchy and rebellion—Bundelcund, the Mahratta States, and Rajpootana. These large territories contained many petty chieftains, among whom a considerable number were prone to seize this opportunity to strengthen themselves by plundering their neighbours. Of patriotism, there was little enough; men appeared in arms for their own interests, or what they deemed their own interests, rather than for any common cause involving nationality or affection to native princes.
Bundelcund and the Saugor provinces were chiefly under the military control of General Whitlock, who had advanced from Madras with a force consisting chiefly of Madras troops, and had gradually established regular government in districts long troubled by violence and confusion. At the end of June, as the last chapter shewed, Whitlock’s force was divided into a great many detachments, which overawed the turbulent at as many different stations; and the same state of matters continued, with slight variations, during the next three months. It must, however, be mentioned here, in relation to military commands, that—as one mode of facilitating the thorough discomfiture of the rebels—Viscount Canning made a new arrangement affecting the Saugor and Gwalior territories. That portion of India having been much disturbed during a period of more than twelve months, it was determined to establish there two military divisions instead of one, and to place in command of those divisions two of the generals who by hard fighting had become accustomed to the district and the class of inhabitants. General Whitlock was appointed to the Saugor division, which was made to extend to the Jumna, and to include the districts of Saugor, Jubbulpoor, Banda, Humeerpoor, and Calpee, with Saugor as the military head-quarters. General Napier was appointed to the Gwalior division, which was made to include Gwalior, Sepree, Goonah, and Jhansi. This arrangement, organised about the end of July, was to hold good whether any rebels should make a sudden outbreak, or whether the troops were fortunate enough to have a period of repose during the rainy season. Whitlock’s force, consisting of H.M. 43d foot, the 1st and 19th Madras native infantry, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery—was mainly in two brigades, under Brigadiers Macduff and Rice.
Brief mention was made in the last chapter of a large capture of treasure by General Whitlock. This matter must here be noticed a little more fully, on account of its connection with the intricacies of Mahratta dynastic changes. During the general’s operations in Bundelcund, he marched from Banda towards Kirwee in two brigades, intending to attack Narain Rao at the last-named place. This chieftain, a descendant of the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, possessed a rabble army, with which for a time he attempted to block up the roads of approach to Kirwee. The resistance made, however, was very slight; and shortly before Whitlock entered the place, Radha Govind, an adherent of Narain Rao, escaped from the town in the opposite direction, taking with him most of the armed men, and a large quantity of money and jewels, but no guns. Narain Rao, and another Mahratta leader named Madhoo Rao, remained at Kirwee. Their fears having been roused, they now resolved to surrender as a means of obtaining forgiveness for their rebellious proceedings. They came out to meet Whitlock, at a camping-ground a few miles from Kirwee. Delivering up their swords, they were kept securely for a time. Whitlock took possession of the town and palace, and found that the rebels had been busily engaged in casting cannon, making gunpowder, and enlisting men. In the palace and its precincts were discovered forty pieces of cannon, an immense supply of shot and powder, two thousand stands of arms, numerous swords and matchlocks, accoutrements of many of the rebel sepoy regiments, elephants and horses, and a vast store of wealth in cash and jewels. It was conjectured that the jewels might possibly be those which, half a century earlier, had mysteriously disappeared from Poonah, and were supposed to be in possession either of Scindia or Holkar, the most powerful of the Mahratta chiefs in those days; but the discovery now led to an opinion that the jewels had been stolen or appropriated by Bajee Rao, father of Narain Rao, and hidden by that family for half a century. As to the quantity and value of cash and jewels captured, it will be prudent to venture on no estimate. Some of the Anglo-Indian journals spoke of ‘a hundred and forty cart-loads of gold ingots and nuggets, and forty lacs of rupees,’ besides the jewels; but to whatever degree this estimate may have been exaggerated, the largeness of the sum gave rise to many inquiries concerning the history of the family to which it had belonged, and of which Nena Sahib was an ‘adopted’ member. It then transpired, that the first Peishwa of the Mahrattas, who died in 1720, was succeeded by Balajee Rao Sahib; one of Balajee’s sons, Ragoba Dada, died in 1784; and from him were descended Narain Rao and Madhoo Rao, by one branch, and Nena Sahib by another—or rather, all these three individuals were adopted sons of Ragoba’s descendants. According to the loose principles of oriental heirship, therefore, it was not difficult for any one among several Mahratta princes to set up a claim to the enormous wealth which, at a time of discord at the Peishwa’s court, somehow disappeared from the treasury at Poonah.
Throughout India, there was no province which more strikingly illustrated than Bundelcund the misery which some of the villages must have suffered during many months of anarchy, when predatory bands were passing to and fro, and rebel leaders were forcing contributions from all who had anything to lose. Writing early in July concerning the Banda district, a British officer said: ‘This district has suffered very extensively in the long interval of disorder to which it was abandoned; the various bands of mutineers passing up from Dinapoor did great mischief; various powerful villages preyed considerably upon their weaker neighbours; and, lastly, the Nawab and Narain Rao’s officials extracted by torture every farthing they could get. Many villages are completely deserted, and many more have been burned to the ground, and the people plundered of all the grain and cattle and other property which they possessed. They have gained a very fair idea of what they are to expect under a native government; and I firmly believe they generally hail our return with delight.’
The difficulty of supplying English troops, or reliable native troops, to the numerous points where insurgents were known to be lurking, led occasionally to rebel successes little looked for by the authorities. Thus, on the first of August, a party of mutinous sepoys, headed by a subadar, took possession of the town of Jaloun, near the frontier of Scindia’s territory; this they were enabled to do by the connivance of some of the inhabitants, who opened the gates for them. They were, however, speedily driven out by a small force from Calpee, under Brigadier Macduff. A slight but brilliant cavalry affair occurred about the middle of August, in a district of the Saugor territory placed under General Whitlock’s care. A body of a thousand rebels, under Indur Goshun and other chiefs, had for some time been committing great havoc in the district, plundering the villages, and ill-using all the inhabitants who would not yield to their demands. After having thus treated Shahpoor, they advanced to Garrakotah with similar intent. To prevent this, a small force was sent from Saugor under Captain Finch. He made a forced march; and when within a few miles of them, seeing his infantry were tired out, he rushed forward with only sixty-seven troopers. So impetuous was the charge made by these horsemen on the rebels, that they killed a hundred and fifty, took many wounded prisoners, and brought away three hundred matchlocks and swords. The leader of the rebels, Indur Goshun, was among the slain. In another part of Bundelcund, between Banda and Rewah, about the middle of August, were three groups of rebels—one under Baboo Radha Govind and Gulabraee, a second under Runmunt Singh, and a third under Punjah Singh and Dere Singh. They were supposed to amount, in all, to six thousand men; but only three hundred of these were regular sepoys, and two hundred horsemen, the rest being adventurers and rabble. After ravaging many villages, they approached the station of Kirwee on the 13th. Brigadier Carpenter at once went out to meet them with a small force from Kirwee; he found Runmunt Singh’s band drawn up as if for battle, but a few shots sent them fleeing. About the same time Punjab Singh and Dere Singh were defeated by a small force under Captain Griffin. Early in August, Captain Ashburner set out from Jhansi with five hundred men, on the duty of dispersing a few Bundela chiefs who had been engaged in rebellious machinations. The weather being very heavy, and the rebels swift of foot, a long period elapsed before anything decisive could be effected; but on the 1st of September, he came up with a body of rebels, occupying Mahoni and Mow Mahoni, two villages on the opposite banks of the small river Pooj, both surrounded by deep and difficult ravines, which rendered them strong places. After a little skirmishing, the rebels were driven by shot and shell out of Mahoni, and Ashburner crossed to attack a fort at Mow Mahoni. Symptoms soon appeared that the rebels were making off. Ashburner despatched fifty cavalry, all he had to spare at the moment, under Lieutenant Moore, to gallop after and cut them up in retreat. Moore effected this in dashing style.
We now turn to a region further west, in which the operations were more important than those of Bundelcund.
Referring to former chapters for the details of Sir Hugh Rose’s victory over the Gwalior mutineers, and of his retirement to Bombay after a long season of incessant activity; we proceed to notice the operations of the troops after he parted company from them. His small but famous army, the ‘Central India Field-force,’ was broken up into detachments about the middle of July. The hope entertained was, that the fatigued soldiers might be able to go into quarters during the rainy season, as a means of recruiting their strength for any operations that might be necessary when the cooler and more tranquil weather of the autumn arrived. To understand this, it may be well to bear in mind that the rains of Britain furnish no adequate test of those of India, which fall in enormous abundance at certain seasons, rendering field-operations, whether for industry or war, very difficult. The detachments above adverted to could only in part obtain cessation of duties during the rainy season of 1858. At Jhansi were General Napier and Colonel Liddell; with a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3d Bombay cavalry, the 3d Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay Sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopal Contingent. At Gwalior, under Brigadier Stuart, were three squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, Meade’s Horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th foot, the 95th foot, the 25th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay artillery, a company of royal engineers, and a light field-battery. At Seepree, under Brigadier Smith, were two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 10th Bombay native infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse-artillery. Lastly, at Goonah, were Mayne’s irregular horse. Sir Hugh Rose himself was at that time at Bombay receiving the well-won congratulations of all classes, and resting for a while from his exhausting labours.
At Gwalior, where the rainy season soon began to shew symptoms, General Napier made preparations for the comfortable housing of his troops. The Maharajah, now more firmly knit than ever in bonds of amity with the British, lent his aid in this matter. Sir Robert Hamilton again took up his permanent residence in the city, gradually re-establishing political relations with the various petty states around. During July there was scarcely any fighting in Scindia’s territory; and the component elements of the now-dissolved Central India Field-force were allowed to remain pretty well at peace.
Before tracing the Central India operations of August, it may be well to see what was doing in Rajpootana during July.
After the siege and capture of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose, as we have already narrated, the rebels made a hasty flight northwestward, across the river Chumbul, into Rajpootana; where a victory was gained over them by General Napier, who had been despatched after them for that purpose by Sir Hugh Rose. They appear to have separated, after that, into three bodies. The most important section, under Tanteea Topee and Rao Sahib, received the especial watchfulness of General Roberts, as comprising some of the best of the mutinied troops, and possessing a large amount of Scindia’s property. Roberts took up the work which Rose had laid down. His ‘Rajpootana Field-force,’ now that detachments had been separated from it for service in various quarters, was by no means a large one. It comprised H.M. 83d foot, a wing of the 72d Highlanders, wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay native infantry, a few squadrons of the 8th Hussars and 1st Bombay Lancers, 400 Belooch horse, a light field-battery, and a siege-train of six pieces. The chief body of rebels, under Tanteea Topee and Rao Sahib, made their appearance, a few days after their defeat at Gwalior, at a point more than a hundred miles to the northwest, threatening Jeypoor. Roberts at once marched from Nuseerabad, to check these fugitives. He reached Jeypoor without opposition on the 2d of July; and there he learned news of Tanteea’s miscellaneous force of about ten thousand men. The rebel leader was reported to have with him Scindia’s crown-jewels and treasure, the former estimated at one million sterling value, and the latter at two millions. The treasure, being mostly in silver, was of enormous weight; and Tanteea had been endeavouring to exchange it for gold, on terms that would have tempted any money-changer in more peaceful times: seeing that fifty shillings’ worth of silver was offered for gold mohurs worth only thirty shillings each. On the 5th Tanteea and his troops were at Dowlutpore, thirty-four miles south of Jeypoor; and it thereupon became a problem whether Roberts could overtake them before they reached the more southern states of Rajpootana; for he was on that day at Sanganeer, near Jeypoor. During the next few days, large bodies of rebels were seen, or reported to have been seen, at places whose names are not familiar to English readers—such as Chatsoo, Lalsoont, Tongha, Gureasa, Karier, Madhopore, Jullanee, Tonk, Bursoonie, Bhoomgurh, &c.—all situated in the northeast part of Rajpootana, and separated from the Gwalior region by the river Chumbul. We also find that General Roberts marched through or halted at many places whose names are equally unfamiliar—Sherdoss, Gurbroassa, Glooloussee, Donghur, Kukkor, Rumpore, and Bhugree. In fact, the rebels marched wherever they thought they could capture a stronghold which might serve them as a citadel; while Roberts tried every means to intercept them in their progress. On the 9th, the rebels took possession of the town of Tonk—situated on the river Bunnas, nearly due east of Nuseerabad, and about one-third of the distance from that station to Gwalior; they plundered it, captured three brass guns and a little ammunition, and besieged the Nawab in the neighbouring fort of Bhoomgurh. Roberts immediately sent on a detachment under Major Holmes, in advance of his main force; and the enemy hastily departed as soon as they heard of this. To enable him to keep up the pursuit more effectually, the general sent to Seepree for Colonel Smith’s brigade. There was strong reason to suspect that the rebels wished to penetrate into Mewar and Malwah, provinces far to the south of Gwalior and Jeypoor, and in which the Mahrattas and Rajpoots counted many leaders who were ripe for mischief. To prevent this southward progress was one of the objects which General Roberts held well in view; this was the more necessary, because the country here indicated affords many mountain fastnesses from which it would be difficult to expel insurgent bands. Roberts was disappointed in not being able to come up with the Gwalior rebels at Tonk; but a few days’ sojourn at that town greatly relieved his troops, who had suffered severely during a fortnight’s marching in sultry weather, losing many of their number by sun-stroke.
By the 23d of the month, when Major Holmes was still in pursuit of the enemy, who were reported to be approaching the fortress of Mandulghur in Mewar, Roberts broke up his temporary camp at Tonk, and recrossed the river Bunnas—his movements being greatly retarded by the swollen state of the stream and the swampy condition of the fields and roads. After wading for a whole week through an almost continuous slimy swamp, he came within twenty-four miles of Nuseerabad on the 1st of August. Sending all his sick to that station, he prepared to continue a pursuit of Tanteea Topee towards the south, with as great a rapidity as the state of the country would permit.
We now turn again to the Gwalior territory, to trace such operations as took place in the month of August.
About the middle of the month, there were no fewer than five detachments of the late Central India Field-force marching about the country on and near the confines of Scindia’s Gwalior territory. Sir Hugh Rose’s wish and expectation, that his exhausted troops would be able to remain quietly at quarters during the rainy season, were not realised; the state of affairs rendered active service still necessary. One detachment, under General Napier, had set out from Gwalior, and was on the way to Paoree, on an expedition presently to be mentioned; a second was at Burwa Saugor, on the river Betwah; a third at Nota, sixty miles from Jhansi, on the Calpee road; a fourth at Fyzabad (one of many places of that name), fifty miles from Jhansi on the Saugor road; and a fifth, consisting of Sappers and Miners, were preparing a bridge over the Betwah, ten miles from Jhansi. Colonel Liddell, at that period commandant of the Jhansi district, was on the alert to supply small detachments of troops to such places in the vicinity as appeared to need protection; and he himself started off to Burwa Saugor, near which place a rebel chieftain was marching about with three thousand men and two or three guns.
A circumstance occurred, early in August, which led to an expedition in a new direction, and to an eventual co-operation of General Napier with General Roberts in a pursuit of the rebels. This occurrence was an outbreak which required immediate attention. A petty Mahratta chieftain, Man Singh (not Maun Singh of Oude), who had conceived himself aggrieved by Scindia, put himself at the head of 2000 men, and on the 3d of the month, attacked and captured the strong fort of Paoree, southwest of Gwalior, and about eighteen miles from Seepree. Brigadier Smith, on hearing of this, started off on the 5th from the last-named station, with a force consisting of four squadrons of the 8th Hussars, the 1st Bombay Lancers, a wing of H.M. 95th foot, and three field-guns. On nearing Paoree, Man Singh sent a messenger to inquire what was the purpose of the brigadier, seeing that the quarrel was with Scindia and not with the English; he obtained an interview, and stated that his grievance arose from the refusal of Scindia to recognise his (Man Singh’s) right to succeed his father in the principality of Nerwar and the country adjacent; and he further declared that he had no connection with the mutineers and rebels who were fighting against the English. Brigadier Smith, responsible for a time for the peace of that district, could not admit such a plea in justification of the maintenance of an armed force against the sovereign of the country; it would have been dangerous. Man Singh, thereupon, increasing the number of his retainers within the fort of Paoree to three or four thousand, prepared to defend himself. Scindia had some time before stored the fort with six months’ provisions, in case he should deem it at any time necessary to defend the place from the rebels; but this proved to be an unlucky precaution, for Man Singh captured the place in a single night, and then had the six months’ supplies to count upon. Brigadier Smith, finding his eleven hundred men too few to capture the fort, sent to Gwalior for a reinforcement and for a few siege-guns. In accordance with this requisition, a force of about 600 horse and foot, with five guns and four mortars, set out from Gwalior on the 11th. General Napier, feeling the importance of settling this matter quickly, resolved to attend to it in person; he started from Gwalior, reached Mahona on the 14th, and Seepree on the 17th, and joined Smith on the 19th. On the 23d, this demonstration had its effect on Man Singh, who, with another chieftain, Ajheet Singh, had been holding Paoree. Napier poured a vertical fire into the fort for twenty-four hours, and then commenced using his breaching-batteries. But the enemy did not await the result; they evacuated the place, and fled through a jungle country towards the south. Napier entered Paoree, garrisoned it, and hastily made up a column, with which Colonel Robertson started off in pursuit of the rebels. Robertson, after many days’ rapid march, came up nearly to the rear of Man Singh’s fleeing force; but that active leader, scenting the danger, made his rebels separate into three parties, with instructions to recombine at an appointed place; and for the present pursuit was unavailable. When August closed, Man Singh was at Sirsee, north of Goonah, with (it was supposed) about sixteen hundred men, but no guns. General Napier, having destroyed the fortifications at Paoree, and burst the guns, retired to Seepree, where he was encamped at the end of the month, making arrangements for a further pursuit of Man Singh in September.
While the forces in the Gwalior territory were thus employed, General Roberts was engaged in a more important series of operations in Rajpootana. On the 1st of August, as we have seen, Roberts was sufficiently near Nuseerabad to send his sick to that station, where they could be better attended to than on the march; while he himself would be more free to make a rapid advance southward. Major Holmes, many days before, had been sent from Tonk by Roberts, with a force consisting of 120 Bombay Lancers, 220 of H.M. 72d foot, four companies of the 12th Bombay N.I., and four guns—to pursue the retreating rebels in a certain (or rather an uncertain) direction. The duty was a most harassing one. It was difficult to obtain reliable information of the route taken by the rebels; and even when the route was known, they never once allowed him to overtake them—so rapid were their movements. So important was it considered to catch these Gwalior mutineers, that the Bombay government (with whom the operations in Rajpootana rested) sent out small expeditionary forces from various places, according as probabilities offered for intercepting the mutineers. Thus, on the 1st of August, Major Taylor started from Neemuch with a force, consisting of 300 of H.M. 72d Highlanders, 400 of the 13th Bombay N.I., 180 of the 2d Light Cavalry, a few engineers, four guns, and a military train. It was believed that, on that day, about seven thousand of the Gwalior mutineers were somewhere between Chittore and Rampoora, a few miles distant from Neemuch; and Major Taylor entertained a hope that he might intercept and defeat them. We have already seen that General Roberts had had a most harassing duty, attended with very little success, seeing that he could seldom manage to reach a town or village in which the rebels had halted, until after they had taken their departure; and it was now Major Taylor’s turn to share the same ill-luck. He returned to Neemuch on the 7th, disappointed. His advance-guard had seen the rebels near Rampoora in great force; yet the latter, though many times stronger than himself in troops, would not stand the chance of an engagement. The rebels escaped, and Taylor returned with his mission unfulfilled.
[Illustration:
JEYPOOR. ]
One advantage, at any rate, the British could count upon at this period—the fidelity of many native rajahs, who would have terribly complicated the state of affairs if they had joined the rebels. Tanteea Topee sounded the Rajah of Jeypoor, then the Rajah of Kotah, next the Rajah of Ulwar, all of them native princes of Rajpootana; and it was on account of the refusal of those rajahs to receive or countenance him, that the rebel made such strangely circuitous marches from one state to another. Whither he went, however, thither did Roberts follow him. The general, after sending his sick to Nuseerabad, marched to Champaneer on the 4th, and to Deolia on the 5th. At that time, it was believed that the rebels, checked in some of their plans by the floods, had turned aside from Mandulghur to Deekodee, in the direction of Odeypore. On the 8th—after a forced march with 500 of H.M. 83d, 200 Bombay infantry, 60 Gujerat horse, and three guns—General Roberts came up with a body of rebels near Sunganeer (not Sauganeer near Jeypoor), where they occupied a line on the opposite side of the river Rotasery. He speedily routed them; but as usual, they fled too rapidly for him to overtake them; they made towards the Odeypore road. Roberts, again disappointed of his prey, was forced to rest his exhausted troops for a while.
The general, when Major Holmes had rejoined him after a fruitless pursuit of the mutineers, again considered anxiously the conditions and possibilities of this extraordinary chase. He had, each day, to endeavour to discover the locality of the rebels, then to guess at their probable future movements, and, lastly, to lay plans for overtaking or intercepting them. On the 11th, they were supposed to be at Lawah; and on the 12th, they marched to the crest of the Chutterbhoog Ghaut, with a view of passing from Mewar into Marwar. Captain Hall, commanding at Erinpoora, held a post at the foot of this ghaut, with a small force sufficient to deter the rebels. They thereupon changed their plan, retraced their steps to some distance, and marched over a rocky country to Kattara or Katario, a village near the Nathdwara Hills; here they encamped on the 13th. Meanwhile General Roberts, with his force strengthened by that of Major Holmes, started from the vicinity of Sunganeer on the 11th, and by the evening of the 13th had marched sixty-seven miles. On that night he was at Kunkrowlee, within eight miles of the rebels; but his troops were too much exhausted to proceed further without a little rest. On the forenoon of the 14th he descried the enemy defiling through a very hilly country covered with rocks and loose stones; he had, in fact, reached Kattara, the village mentioned above. They took up an excellent position on a line of rocky hills, on the crest of which they planted four guns, which they began to work
## actively. Roberts thereupon sent Major Holmes by a detour into that
region; for, even if the rebels were not overtaken, it would be desirable to give them no rest to consolidate their plans. At length the general had the gratification of overtaking and defeating these insurgents, in search of whom he had been so long engaged. He advanced his troops through the defile, his horse-artillery beating off the enemy until the infantry could form into line. After a brief period, the rebels shewed symptoms of retiring. On mounting the crest, the infantry saw them endeavouring to carry away two of their guns with a small escort; a volley soon set them to flight, and rendered the guns an easy capture. The flight soon became a rout; the rebels escaped in various directions, and the victors came upon a camp covered with arms and accoutrements. The cavalry and horse-artillery followed the fugitives for ten miles, cutting down great numbers. Roberts captured all the guns which the enemy had brought from Tonk, four elephants, a number of camels, and much ammunition—with surprisingly little loss to himself.
It was at this time regarded, by some of the authorities, as a hopeful symptom that the rebels were now descending to a part of India inhabited by Bheels and other half-civilised tribes, who would think much more of the wealth than of the so-called patriotism of the mutineers. Most of Tanteea Topee’s men were laden with silver coin, their share of the booty from Gwalior; this cash they carried with them, although in food and clothing they were ill provided; and there was a probability that, if once they ceased to be a compact army, they would individually be robbed by the Bheel villagers. Nevertheless, whatever may have been the hope or expectation in this respect, Roberts and his officers could never intercept the treasure which Tanteea Topee was known to have with him. This treasure, consisting of jewels and money (except the share of plunder distributed among the men) was carried on elephants; and so well were those elephants guarded, whether during fighting or fleeing, that the British could never capture them.
Few of the troops in British service had had harder work with little brilliant result than those in General Roberts’s Rajpootana Field-force. The country is wild and rugged, the weather was rainy and hot at the same time, and the duty intrusted to the troops was to chase an enemy who would not fight, and who were celebrated for their fleetness in escaping. Hence it was with more than usual pleasure that the hard-worked men regarded their victory at Kattara; they felt they had a fair claim to the compliment which their commander paid them, in a general order issued the day after the battle.[190]
After the victory at Kattara, Roberts left the further pursuit of the rebels for a time to Brigadier Parkes. This officer had started from Neemuch on the 11th with a miscellaneous force of about 1300 men, comprising 72d Highlanders, native infantry, Bombay cavalry, royal engineers, royal artillery, Bheels, and Mewar troopers. By a series of forced marches, Parkes headed the rebels in such a way as greatly to aid General Roberts at Kattara. A few days’ sojourn having refreshed them, the troops were again brought into action. Tanteea Topee, by amazing quickness of movement, traversed a wide belt of country eastward to the river Chumbul, which he crossed near Sagoodar on the 20th. Continuing his route, he arrived at Julra Patteen, a town on the main road from Agra to Indore; it was on the confines of the Rajpoot and Mahratta territories, and was held by a petty chieftainess or Rana. After a brief conflict, in which he was assisted by a few of the troops of the Rana, who broke their allegiance, he captured the place, levied contributions on the inhabitants, and took possession of all the guns, treasure, and ammunition he could find. Here, then, this extraordinary conflict took a new turn; a new region had to be attended to, although against the same offender as before; and new columns had to be despatched in pursuit. The flooding of the river Chumbul cut off Roberts and Parkes for a time from a further pursuit of Tanteea Topee; and therefore two new columns were sent, one from Indore under Colonel Hope, and one from Mhow under Colonel Lockhart. The great point now was to prevent Tanteea from getting into Malwah, and thence crossing the Nerbudda into the Deccan.
Before treating of the operations against this leader in September, it may be well to see what progress was made in checking the rebel leader who had appeared in Scindia’s territory—Man Singh. General Napier made up a new force, comprising certain regiments from his own and Brigadier Smith’s brigades, and placed it under the command of Colonel Robertson, with baggage and vehicles so arranged as to facilitate rapid movement. Setting out from Paoree on the 27th of August, the colonel marched eighteen miles to Bhanore; on the 28th, nineteen miles to Gunneish; and so on for several days, until he reached Burrumpore, near the river Parbuttee. Here, on the 2d of September, he learned that a body of rebels, under Man Singh, were a few miles ahead, endeavouring to reach a fort which they might seize as a stronghold. Pushing on rapidly, Robertson came up with them on the 5th, near the village of Bujeepore. They had not kept a good look-out; they had no suspicion that an active British officer was at their heels; consequently, when Robertson came suddenly upon them with horse and foot, while they were preparing their morning meal, their panic was extreme. They fled through the village, over a hill, across a river, and into a jungle; but the pursuers were so close behind them that the slaughter was very considerable. These rebels were nearly all good troops, from Scindia’s body-guard and from the Gwalior Contingent; they were supposed to have been among the fugitives from Gwalior with Tanteea Topee, but at what time or in what locality they had separated from that leader, and joined Man Singh, was not clearly known. About the middle of the month, Colonel Robertson was at Goonah; Brigadier Smith was searching for Man Singh; while General Napier was watching for any symptoms of the approach of the last-named leader towards Gwalior or its vicinity.
While affairs were thus progressing in the Mahratta country during September, new efforts were made to meet the existing state of things a little further to the west. When Tanteea Topee crossed the Chumbul towards Julra Patteen, and when that river began to swell, General Roberts’s Rajpootana Field-force was unable conveniently to continue the pursuit of the rebel; and, therefore, arrangements were made from the south. As a means of hemming in the rebels as much as possible, and preventing them from carrying their mischief into other regions, a ‘Malwah Field-force’ was sent up from Mhow, under General Michel. Tanteea Topee does not appear to have regarded Julra Patteen as a stronghold in which it was worth his while to remain; he plundered the place of some treasure and many guns, and then took his departure. He must, however, have wavered considerably in his plans; for he took a fortnight in reaching Rajghurh—a place only sixty miles distant. He was probably seeking for any rajah or chieftain who would join his standard. At Rajghurh, Tanteea Topee was joined by some of the beaten followers of Man Singh, probably by Man Singh himself, and seemed to be meditating an attack upon Bhopal. Tanteea and Michel were now both contending which should reach a particular station first, on the Bhopal and Seronj road, as the possession of that station (Beora) would give the holder a powerful command over the district—especially as it was one of the telegraph stations, by which Calcutta and Bombay held communication with each other. Michel came up with Tanteea Topee on the 15th of September, before he reached Beora. The rebels would not meet him openly in the field, but kept up a running-fight. When they saw defeat awaited them, they thought more of their elephant-loads of treasure than of their guns; they escaped with the former, and abandoned the latter, which they had brought from Julra Patteen. At the expense, of one killed and three wounded, General Michel gained a victory which cost the enemy three hundred men, twenty-seven guns, a train of draught bullocks, and much ammunition.
Towards the close of September, Tanteea Topee was in this remarkable position. He was near Seronj, on the high road from Gwalior to Bhopal, looking for any outlet that might offer, or for any chieftain who would join his standard. Roberts was on the west of him; Napier, Smith, and Robertson were on his north; Michel, Hope, and Lockhart, on the south; and Whitlock on the east. Active he assuredly had been; for since the fall of Gwalior he and his mutineers and budmashes had traversed a vast area of the Rajpoot and Mahratta territories; but he was now within the limits of a cordon, from which there was little chance of his ultimate escape.
Of the other parts of India, it is scarcely necessary here to say anything. The course of peaceful industry had been little disturbed, and the civil government had been steadily in the ascendant. All round the west and south of Rajpootana did this state of things continue, and so downward into the long-established districts of Surat, Poonah, Bombay, &c. It is well to observe, however, that even in the Bombay presidency, slight occurrences shewed from time to time that the leaven of Hindustani ‘pandyism’ was working mischief. The safety of that army depended on an admixture of different creeds and castes in its ranks; there were in it Rajpoots and Brahmins, as in the (late) Bengal native army, and these elements were sometimes worked upon by fermenters of mischief. Generally speaking, however, these, as well as the other components of the Bombay army, behaved well. Their faithfulness was shewn in the month of August, in connection with a circumstance which might else have been productive of disaster. Among the troops quartered at Gwalior after its reconquest by Sir Hugh Rose was the 25th Bombay N. I., containing, like other regiments of the same army, a small proportion of Hindustani Oudians. A non-commissioned officer of this regiment, a havildar-major, went to the adjutant, and told him that a Brahmin pundit, one Wamun Bhut, was endeavouring to tamper with the Hindustanis of the regiment, and, through them, with the regiment generally; he also expressed an opinion that there were persons in the city of Gwalior concerned in this conspiracy. Captain Little, when informed by the adjutant of this communication, laid a plan for detecting the plotters. He found Havildar-major Koonjul Singh, Naik Doorga Tewarree, and private Sunnoo Ladh ready to aid him. These three native soldiers, pretending to bend to the Brahmin’s solicitations, gradually learned many particulars of the conspiracy, which they faithfully revealed to the captain. A purwannah or written order was produced, from no less a personage than Nena Sahib, making magnificent promises if the regiment, or any portion of it, would join his standard; they were to kill all their officers, and as many Europeans as possible, and then depart to a place appointed. At length, on the 29th, the naik made an appointment to meet the two chief conspirators, a Brahmin and a Mahratta chief, under a large tree near the camp; where the havildar-major would expect to have an opportunity of reading the purwannah. Captain Little, with the adjutant and the quartermaster, arranged to move suddenly to the spot at the appointed time: they did so; the conspirators were seized, and the document taken from them. Two other leaders in the plot were afterwards seized: all four were blown from guns on the 7th of September; and many others were placed in confinement on evidence furnished by the purwannah itself. It became evident that Nena Sahib, a Mahratta, had many emissaries at work in this Mahratta territory, although he himself was hiding in inglorious security far away.
[Illustration:
POONAH. ]
Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, with his commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Somerset, established several new corps, as means of gradually increasing the strength of the Bombay army. Two Belooch regiments, a 2d regiment of South Mahratta Horse, and a Bombay Naval Artillery Brigade, were among the new components of the army.
The South Mahratta country, lower down the peninsula than Bombay, had quite recovered from the disturbances which marked it in earlier months. Satara, Kolapore, Sawuntwaree, Belgaum—all were peaceful. On the eastern or Madras side of the peninsula, too, troubles were few. It is true, there was a repetition in September of a dispute which had occurred three months before, between natives who wished to bring up their children in their own faith, and missionaries who wished to convert those children to Christianity; but this was a source of discord which the governor, if firm, could readily allay. Lord Harris had not an Indian reputation like that of Lawrence or Elphinstone; but he had tact and decision enough for the duties of his office—the maintenance of peace in a presidency where there were few or no Hindustani sepoys.
Of the large country of the Deccan, Hyderabad, or the Nizam’s dominions, nothing disastrous has to be told. A pleasant proof was afforded of the continuance of friendly relations between the British and the Nizam, by a grand banquet given at Hyderabad on the 2d of July by Salar Jung to Colonel Davidson. These two officers—the one prime-minister to the Nizam, the other British resident at the Nizam’s court—had throughout the mutinies acted in perfect harmony and good faith. All the British officers and their families at Secunderabad, the cantonment of the Hyderabad Contingent, were invited. The guests came from Secunderabad to the Residency at Hyderabad, and thence on elephants and in palanquins to the minister’s palace. The entertainment was in celebration of the birth of the Nizam’s son, Meer Akbar Ally, heir to the throne of the Deccan; and everything was done, by an admixture of oriental magnificence with European courtesies, to render it worthy of the occasion. It was, however, not so much the grandeur of the banquet, as the sentiment it conveyed towards the British at a critical time, that rendered this proceeding on the part of the Nizam’s prime-minister important. The Nizam’s dominions were at that time the scene of party struggles between two sets of politicians—the adherents of Salar Jung, and those of Shumsul Oomrah; but both of the leaders were fortunately advocates of an English alliance.
[Illustration:
HYDERABAD. ]
The northwest portion of the Nizam’s dominions, around Aurungabad and Jaulnah, in near neighbourhood to some of the Mahratta states, was troubled occasionally by bands of marauders, who hoped to establish a link of connection between the anarchists of Hindostan and those of the Deccan. They were, however, kept in check by Colonel Beatson, who brought his corps of irregulars, ‘Beatson’s Horse,’ to Jaulnah, there to remain during the rainy season—maintaining order in the surrounding districts, and holding himself ready to march with his troopers to any disturbed region where their services might be needed.
-----
Footnote 184:
To the officers’ hospital—_Calcutta Englishman_, _Bengal Hurkaru_, _Phœnix_, _Illustrated London News_, _Punch_, _Blackwood’s Magazine_, _Fraser’s Magazine_, _New Monthly Magazine_, _Monthly Army List_, four copies _Chambers’s Journal_, four copies _Family Herald_. To the men’s hospitals—two copies _Calcutta Englishman_, two copies _Bengal Hurkaru_, two copies _Phœnix_, two copies _Illustrated London News_, two copies _Punch_, two copies _Household Words_, twelve copies _Chambers’s Journal_, twelve copies _Family Herald_.
Footnote 185:
See Chap. xxvii., pp. 450-461.
Footnote 186:
Ibid, p. 459.
Footnote 187:
‘1. The dispatch condemns in the strongest terms the proclamation which, on the 3d of March, I directed the chief-commissioner of Oude to issue from Lucknow.
‘2. Although written in the Secret Committee, the dispatch was made public in England three weeks before it reached my hands. It will in a few days be read in every station in Hindostan.
‘3. Before the dispatch was published in England, it had been announced to parliament by a minister of the Crown as conveying disapproval in every sense of the policy indicated by the governor-general’s proclamation. Whether this description was an accurate one or not I do not inquire. The telegraph has already carried it over the length and breadth of India.
‘4. I need scarcely tell your honourable committee that the existence of such a dispatch, even had it never passed out of the records of the Secret Department, would be deeply mortifying to me, however confident I might feel that your honourable committee would, upon reconsideration, relieve me of the censure which it casts upon me. Still less necessary is it for me to point out that the publication of the document, preceded as it has been by an authoritative declaration of its meaning and spirit, is calculated greatly to increase the difficulties in which the government of India is placed, not only by weakening the authority of the governor-general, but by encouraging resistance and delusive hopes in many classes of the population of Oude.
‘5. So far as the dispatch and the mode in which it has been dealt with affect myself personally, I will trouble your honourable committee with very few words. No taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they may, will turn me from the path which I believe to be that of my public duty. I believe that a change in the head of the government of India at this time, if it took place under the circumstances which indicated a repudiation on the part of the government in England of the policy which has hitherto been pursued towards the rebels of Oude, would seriously retard the pacification of the country. I believe that that policy has been from the beginning merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the government. I believe that wherever the authority of the government has been established, it has become manifest to the people in Oude, as elsewhere, that the indulgence to those who make submission, and who are free from atrocious crime, will be large. I believe that the issue of the proclamation which has been so severely condemned was thoroughly consistent with that policy, and that it is so viewed by those to whom it is addressed. I believe that that policy, if steadily pursued, offers the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to Oude upon a stable footing.
‘6. Firm in these convictions, I will not, in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, lay down of my own act the high trust which I have the honour to hold; but I will, with the permission of your honourable committee, state the grounds upon which those convictions rest, and describe the course of policy which I have pursued in dealing with the rebellion in Oude. If, when I have done so, it shall be deemed that that policy has been erroneous, or that, not being erroneous, it has been feebly and ineffectually carried out, or that for any reason the confidence of those who are responsible for the administration of Indian affairs in England should be withheld from me, I make it my respectful but urgent request, through your honourable committee, that I may be relieved of the office of governor-general of India with the least possible delay.’
Footnote 188:
It may here be mentioned that, about the date to which these events refer, the commander-in-chief began to be frequently designated by his peerage-title. He had been created Baron Clyde of Clydesdale, in recognition of his valuable military services. To prevent confusion, however, it may be well, in the remaining pages of this work, to retain the more familiar appellation, Sir Colin Campbell.
Footnote 189:
‘I advanced my half-troop at a gallop, and engaged the enemy within easy musket-range. The sponge-man of one of my guns having been shot during the advance, Gunner Connolly assumed the duties of second sponge-man; and he had barely assisted in two discharges of his gun, when a musket-ball through the left thigh felled him to the ground. Nothing daunted by pain and loss of blood, he was endeavouring to resume his post, when I ordered a movement in retirement. Though severely wounded, he was mounted on his horse in the gun-team, rode to the next position which the guns took up, and manfully declined going to the rear when the necessity of his so doing was represented to him. About 11 o’clock A.M., when the guns were still in action, the same gunner, while sponging, was again knocked down by a musket-ball striking him on the hip, thereby causing great faintness and partial unconsciousness; for the pain appeared excessive, and the blood flowed fast. On seeing this, I gave directions for his removal out of action; but this brave man, hearing me, staggered to his feet and said: “No, sir; I’ll not go there while I can work here;” and shortly afterwards he again resumed his post as sponge-man. Late in the afternoon of the same day, my three guns were engaged at a hundred yards from the walls of a village with the defenders—namely, the 14th native infantry, mutineers—amid a storm of bullets, which did great execution. Gunner Connolly, though suffering severely from his two previous wounds, was wielding his sponge with an energy and courage which attracted the admiration of his comrades; and while cheerfully encouraging a wounded man to hasten in bringing up ammunition, a musket-ball tore through the muscles of his right leg. With the most undaunted bravery, he struggled on; and not till he had loaded six times, did this man give way, when, through loss of blood, he fell into my arms; I placed him upon a wagon, which shortly afterwards bore him in a state of unconsciousness from the fight.’
Footnote 190:
The major-general commanding has sincere pleasure in congratulating the troops under his command on the great success achieved by them yesterday. All have shewn most conspicuous gallantry in action; and the patient unmurmuring endurance of fatigue during the recent forced marches has enabled them to close with an enemy proverbially active in movements. The horse-artillery and cavalry (the latter nineteen hours in the saddle) have by their spirit and alacrity completed the success, and inflicted a most signal punishment on the rebels. The major-general tenders his hearty thanks to all, and doubts not but their brave and earnest devotion will meet with the approval of his excellency the commander-in-chief.
[Illustration:
Government Buildings, Madras.—From a Drawing by Thomas Daniell. ]
## CHAPTER XXXIII.
LAST DAYS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY’S RULE.
The demise of the great East India Company has now to be recorded—the cessation of functions in the mightiest and most extraordinary commercial body the world ever saw. The natives of India never did and never could rightly understand the relations borne by the Company to the crown and nation of England. They were familiar with some such name as ‘Koompanee;’ but whether this Koompanee was a king, a queen, a viceroy, a minister, a council, a parliament, was a question left in a state of ludicrous doubt. And no wonder. It has at all times been difficult even for Englishmen, accustomed to the daily perusal of newspapers, to understand the relations between the Crown and the Company. Men asked whether the Punjaub was taken possession of by the Queen or by the Company; and if by the Queen, why the Company was made to bear the expense of the Punjaub war? So of the war in Persia, the annexation of Oude, the disastrous campaign in Afghanistan, the Burmese war—were these operations conducted by and for the Queen, or by and for the Company?—who was to blame if wrong?—who to bear the cost whether right or wrong?—who to reap the advantage? Even members of parliament gave contradictory answers to these and similar questions; nay, the cabinet ministers and the Court of Directors disputed on these very points. The Company was gradually shorn of its trading privileges by statutes passed in the years 1813, 1833, and 1853; and as its governing privileges had, in great part, gone over to the Board of Control, it seemed by no means clear for what purpose the Company continued to exist. There was a guarantee of 10½ per cent. on £6,000,000 of India stock, secured out of the revenues of India—the stock to be redeemable by parliament at cent. per cent. premium after the year 1874; and it appeared as if the whole machinery of the Indian government was maintained merely to insure this dividend, and to obtain offices and emoluments for persons connected with the Company. The directors always disowned this narrow view of the Company’s position; and there can be no doubt that many of them and of their servants had the welfare of the magnificent Indian empire deeply at heart. Still, the anomaly remained, of a governing body whose governing powers no one rightly understood.
When the Revolt began in 1857, the nation’s cry was at once against the East India Company. The Company must have governed wrongly, it was argued, or this calamity would never have occurred. Throughout a period of six months did a storm of indignation continue, in speeches, addresses, lectures, sermons, pamphlets, books, reviews, magazines, and leading articles in newspapers. By degrees the inquiry arose, whether the directors were free agents in the mode of governing India; whether the Board of Control did not overrule them; and whether the disasters were not traceable fully as much to the Board as to the directors? Hence arose another question, whether the double government—by a Court sitting in Leadenhall Street, and a Board sitting in Cannon Row—was not an evil that ought to be abolished, even without reference to actual blame as concerning the Revolt? The virulent abuse of the Company was gradually felt to be unjust; but the unsatisfactory nature of the double government became more and more evident as the year advanced.
There was a preliminary or short session of parliament held in that year, during a few days before Christmas, for the consideration of special business arising out of the commercial disasters of the autumn; but as every one knew that India and its affairs must necessarily receive some notice, the speech from the throne was looked for with much eagerness. On the 3d of December, when parliament met, the ministers put into the Queen’s mouth only this very brief allusion to projected changes in the Indian government: ‘The affairs of my East Indian dominions will require your serious consideration, and I recommend them to your earnest attention.’ These vague words were useless without a glossary; but the glossary was not forthcoming. Ministers, when questioned and sounded as to their plans, postponed all explanations to a later date.
The first public announcement of the intentions of the government was made shortly before Christmas. A General Court of Proprietors of the East India Company was held on the 23d of December, for the discussion of various matters relating to India; and, in the course of the proceedings, the chairman of the Company announced that, on the 19th, an official interview had been held, by appointment, with Lord Palmerston. On this occasion, the prime minister informed the Court of Directors that it was the intention of the ministry, early in the approaching year, to bring a bill into parliament for the purpose of placing the government of British India under the direct authority of the crown. In this interview, as in the royal speech, no matters of detail were entered upon. The members of parliament in the one assembly, the proprietors of East India stock in the other, were equally unable to obtain information concerning the provisions of the intended measure. All that could be elicited was, that the ‘double government’ of India would cease; and a written notice or letter to this effect was transmitted from the First Lord of the Treasury to the Court of Directors on the 23d.
During the period of six or seven weeks between the preliminary and the regular sessions, the journalists had full scope for their speculations. Those who, from the first, had attributed the Revolt in India to the Company’s misgovernment, rejoiced in the hoped-for extinction of that body, and sketched delightful pictures of happy India under imperial sway. Those who supported the Company and vested interests, predicted the utter ruin of British influence in India if ‘parliamentary government’ were introduced—a mode of government, as they alleged, neither cared for nor understood by the natives of that region, and utterly unsuited to oriental ideas. Those, the moderate thinkers, who believed that on this as on other subjects the truth lies between two extremes, looked forward hopefully to such a change as might throw new vigour, and more advanced ideas, into the somewhat antiquated policy of the East India Company, without destroying those parts of the system which had been the useful growth of long experience. Many things had transpired during the year, tending to shew that the Court of Directors had been more prompt than the Board of Control, in matters requiring urgent attention; and that, therefore, whatever might be the evils of the double government, it would not be just to throw all the onus on the Company.
Early in January 1858, on a requisition to that effect, a special Court of Proprietors was summoned, to meet on the 15th, for considering ‘the communication addressed to the Court of Directors from the government respecting the continuance of the powers of this Company.’ At this meeting, it transpired that the directors had written to Lord Palmerston, just before the Christmas vacation; but as no cabinet council had been held in the interim, and as no reply to that letter had been received, it had been deemed most courteous towards the government to withhold the publication of the letter for a time. A long debate ensued. One of the proprietors brought forward a resolution to the effect, ‘That the proposed transfer of the governing power of the East India Company to the crown is opposed to the rights and privileges of the East India Company, fraught with danger to the constitutional interests of England, perilous to the safety of the Indian empire, and calls for the resistance of this corporation by all constitutional means.’ Many of the supporters of this resolution carried their arguments to the verge of extravagance—asserting that ‘our Indian empire, already tottering and shaking, will fall to the ground without hope of recovery, if the East India Company should be abolished’—and that ‘by means of the enormous patronage that would be placed in the hands of the government, ministers would possess the power of corrupting the people of this country beyond the hope of their ever recovering their virtue or their patriotism.’ Most of the defenders of the Company, however, adopted a more moderate tone. Colonel Sykes, speaking for himself and some of his brother-directors, declared: ‘If we believed for one moment that any change in the present administration of the government of India would be advantageous to the people of India, would advance their material interests, and promote their comforts, we should gladly submit to any personal suffering or loss contingent upon that change.’ He added, however, ‘By the indefeasible principles of justice, and the ordinary usages of our courts of law, it is always necessary that a bill of indictment with certain counts should be preferred before a man is condemned; and I am curious to know what will be the counts of the indictment in the case of this Company; for at present we have nothing but a vague outline before us.’ Finally it was agreed to adjourn the discussion, on the ground that, until the views of the government had been further explained, it would be impossible to know whether the words of the resolution were true, that the proposed change would be ‘fraught with danger to the constitutional interests of England, and perilous to the safety of the Indian empire.’
On the renewal of the debate at the India House, on January 20th, the directors presented a copy of a letter which they had addressed to the government on the last day of the old year. In this letter they said: ‘The court were prepared to expect that a searching inquiry would be instituted into the causes, remote as well as immediate, of the mutiny in the Bengal native army. They have themselves issued instructions to the government of India to appoint a commission in view to such an inquiry; and it would have been satisfactory to them, if it had been proposed to parliament, not only to do the same, but to extend the scope of the inquiry to the conduct of the home government, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the mutiny could, wholly or partially, be ascribed to mismanagement on the part of the court acting under the control of the Board of Commissioners. But it has surprised the court to hear that her Majesty’s government—not imputing, so far as the court are informed, any blame to the home authorities in connection with the mutiny, and without intending any inquiry by parliament, or awaiting the result of inquiry by the local government—should, even before the mutiny was quelled, and whilst considerable excitement prevailed throughout India, determine to propose the immediate supersession of the authority of the East India Company; who are entitled, at least, to the credit of having so administered the government of India, that the heads of all the native states, and the mass of the population, amid the excitements of a mutinous soldiery inflamed by unfounded apprehension of danger to their religion, have remained true to the Company’s rule. The court would fail in their duty to your lordship and to the country if they did not express their serious apprehension that so important a change will be misunderstood by the people of India.’ This letter failed to elicit any explanatory response from the government. Lord Palmerston, in a reply dated January 18th, after assuring the directors that their observations would be duly considered by the government, simply added: ‘I forbear from entering at present into any examination of those observations and opinions; first, because any correspondence with you on such matters would be most conveniently carried on through the usual official channel of the president of the Board of Control; and, secondly, because the grounds on which the intentions of her Majesty’s government have been formed, and the detailed arrangements of the measure which they mean to propose, will best be explained when that measure shall be submitted to the consideration of parliament.’ The directors about the same time prepared a petition to both Houses of Parliament, explanatory of the reasons which induced them to deprecate any sudden transference of governing power from the Company to the Crown. As this petition was very carefully prepared, by two of the most eminent men in the Company’s service; as it contains a considerable amount of useful information; and as it presents in its best aspects all that could be said in favour of the Company—it may fittingly be transcribed in the present work. To prevent interruption to the thread of the narrative, however, it will be given in the Appendix (A), as the first of a series of documents.[191]
When these various letters and petitions came under the notice of the Court of Proprietors, they gave rise to an animated discussion. Most of the proprietors admired the petition, as a masterly document; and many of the speakers dwelt at great length on the benefits which the Company had conferred upon India. One of the directors, Sir Lawrence Peel, feeling the awkwardness of dealing with a government measure not yet before them, said: ‘I have not signed the petition which you have just heard read; and I will shortly state the reason why. I entirely concur in the praises which have been bestowed upon that document. It is a most ably reasoned and worded production; it does infinite credit to those whose work it is; and it is much to the honour of this establishment that it has talent capable of producing such a document. But I have not signed the petition, because I have not thought it a prudent course to petition against a measure, the particulars of which I am not acquainted with.’ The debate was further adjourned from the 20th to the 27th, and then to the 28th, when the speeches ran to great length. On one or other of the four days of meeting, most of the directors of the Company expressed their opinions—on the 13th, Mr Ross D. Mangles (chairman), and Colonel Sykes; on the 20th, Sir Lawrence Peel and Captain Eastwick; on the 27th, Mr Charles Mills, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Captain Shepherd, Mr Macnaghten, and Sir F. Currie (deputy-chairman); on the 28th, Mr Prinsep and Mr Willoughby. As might have been expected, a general agreement marked the directors’ speeches; they were the arguments of men who defended rights which they believed to be rudely assailed. Some of the directors complained that the government notice was not explicit enough. Some thought that, at any rate, it clearly foreshadowed the destruction of the Company’s power. Some contended that, if the Company did not speak out at once, it would in a few weeks be too late. Some insisted that the government brought forward the proposed measure in order to shift the responsibility for the mutiny to other shoulders. Some accused the ministers of being influenced by a grasping for patronage, a desire to appropriate the nominations to appointments. One of the few who departed from the general tone of argument was Sir Henry Rawlinson, who assented neither to the resolution nor to the petition. He dwelt at some length on the two propositions mainly concerned—namely, ‘that the transfer of the government of India to the Crown would be unjust to the East India Company;’ and that such transfer ‘would be fatal to British rule in India.’ Most of the other speakers had contended or implied that the first clause of this statement involved the second; that the transfer would be equally unjust to the Company, and injurious to India. Sir Henry combated this. He contended that the connection was not a necessary one. After a very protracted debate, the original resolution was passed almost unanimously; and then the petition to both Houses of Parliament was sanctioned as that of the Company generally.
Just at this period, the directors caused to be prepared, and published at a cheap price, an elaborate ‘_Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India during the last Thirty Years_.’ It was evidently intended to fall into the hands of such members of parliament as might be disposed to take up the cause of the Company in the forthcoming debates, and to supply them with arguments in favour of the Company, derived from a recital of the marked improvements introduced in Indian government. To this extent, it was simply a brief placed in the hands of counsel; but the _Memorandum_ deserves to be regarded also in a historical light; for nothing but a very narrow prejudice could blind an observer to the fact that vast changes had been introduced into the legislative and administrative rule of India, during the period indicated, and that these changes had for the most part been conceived in an enlightened spirit—corresponding in direction, if not in intensity, with the improved state of public opinion at home on political subjects.
Parliament reassembled for the regular session on the 4th of February, fully alive to the importance of attending to all matters bearing on the welfare of India. Earl Grey, on the 11th, presented to the House of Lords the elaborate petition from the East India Company, lately adverted to. Characterising this as a ‘state paper deserving the highest commendation,’ the earl earnestly deprecated the abolition of the Court of Directors, and the transfer of their authority to the ministry of the day; grounding his argument on the assumption that the interposition of an independent body, well informed on Indian affairs, between the government and the natives of that country, was essential to the general welfare. He admitted the need for reform, but not abolition. The Duke of Argyll, on the part of the government, admitted that the Company’s petition was temperate and dignified, but denied that its reasoning was conclusive. The Earl of Ellenborough, agreeing that the Queen’s name would be powerfully influential as the direct ruler of India, at the same time doubted whether any grand or sweeping reform ought to be attempted while India was still in revolt. The Earl of Derby joined in this opinion, and furthermore complained of discourtesy shewn by the ministers toward the directors, in so long withholding from them a candid exposition of the provisions of the intended measure.
On the following day, the 12th of the month, the long-expected bill was introduced to the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston—or rather, leave to bring in the bill was moved. The first minister of the Crown, in his speech on the occasion, disowned any hostility to the Company, in reference either to the Revolt or to matters of general government. He based the necessity for the measure on the anomaly of the Company’s position. When the commercial privileges were withdrawn, chiefly in 1833, the Company (he urged) became a mere phantom of what it had been, and subsided into a sort of agency of the imperial government, without, however, responsibility to parliament. Admitting the advantages of checks as securities for honesty and efficiency in administrative affairs, he contended that check and counter-check had been so multiplied in the ‘double government’ of India, as to paralyse action. He considered that complete authority should vest where complete responsibility was expected, and not in an irresponsible body of merchants. His lordship concluded by giving an outline of the bill by which the proposed changes were to be effected.
As the Palmerston Bill, or ‘India Bill, No. 1,’ as it was afterwards called, was not passed into a law, it will not be necessary to reprint it in this work; nevertheless, to illustrate its bearing on the subsequent debates, the pith of its principal clauses may usefully be given here: The government of the territories under the control of the East India Company, and all powers in relation to government vested in or exercised by the Company, to become vested in and exercised by the sovereign—India to be henceforth governed in the Queen’s name—The real and personal property of the Company to be vested in Her Majesty for the purposes of the government of India—The appointments of governor-general of India, with ordinary members of the Council of India, and governors of the three presidencies, now made by the directors of the Company with the approbation of her Majesty, and other appointments, to be made by the Queen under her royal sign-manual—A council to be established, under the title of ‘The President and Council for the Affairs of India,’ to be appointed by her Majesty—This council to consist of eight persons, exclusive of its president—In the first nomination of this council, two members to be named for four years, two for six, two for eight, and two for ten years—The members of council to be chosen from among persons who had been directors of the East India Company, or ten years at least in the service of the Crown or Company in India, or fifteen years simply resident in India—Members of council, like the judges, only to be removable by the Queen, on an address from both Houses of Parliament—The president of the council eligible to sit in the Commons House of Parliament—Four members of council to form a quorum—Each ordinary member to receive a yearly salary of £1000; and the president to receive the salary of a secretary of state—The council to exercise the power now vested in the Company and the Board of Control; but a specified number of cadetships to be given to sons of civil and military servants in India—Appointments hitherto made in India to continue to be made in that country—Military forces, paid out of the revenues of India, not to be employed beyond the limits of Asia—Servants of the Company to become servants of the crown—The Board of Control to be abolished.
Such was the spirit of the bill which Lord Palmerston asked leave to introduce. Mr T. Baring moved as an amendment, ‘That it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India.’ Thereupon a debate arose, which extended through three evenings. The government measure was supported by speeches from Lord Palmerston, Sir Erskine Perry, Mr Ayrton, Sir Cornwall Lewis, Mr Roebuck, Mr Lowe, Mr Slaney, Sir W. Rawlinson, Mr A. Mills, Sir Charles Wood, and Lord John Russell; while it was opposed on various grounds by Mr T. Baring, Mr Monckton Milnes, Sir J. Elphinstone, Mr Ross D. Mangles, Mr Whiteside, Mr Liddell, Mr Crawford, Colonel Sykes, Mr Willoughby, Sir E. B. Lytton, and Mr Disraeli. The reasonings in favour of the government measure were such as the following: That the proper time for legislation had come, when the attention of the country was strongly directed to Indian affairs; that all accounts from India shewed that some great measure was eagerly expected; that it was dangerous any longer to maintain an effete, useless, and cumbrous machine, which the Court of Directors had virtually become; that the Company’s ‘traditionary policy’ unfitted it to march with the age in useful reforms; that as the Board of Control really possessed the ruling power, the double government was a sham as well as an obstruction; that the princes of India felt themselves degraded in being the vassals and tributaries of a mere mercantile body; that, such was the anomaly of the double government, it was possible that the Company might be at war with a power with which her Majesty was at peace, thus involving the nation in inextricable embarrassment; that, with the exception of a very small section of the covenanted civil servants, the European community and the officers of the Indian army would prefer the government of the crown to that of the Company; that the natives of India having been thrown into doubt concerning the intentions of the Company to interfere with their religion, some authoritative announcement of the Queen’s respect for their views on that subject would be very satisfactory; and that as the native Bengal army had disappeared, as India must in future be garrisoned by a large force of royal troops, and as the military power would then belong to the crown, it was desirable that the political power should go with it. Among the pleas urged on the opposite side were such as follow: That the natives of India would anticipate an increased stringency of British power, under the proposed _régime_; that the ministerial influence and patronage, in Indian matters, would be dangerous to England herself; that as the Whig and Conservative parties had both supported the system of double government in the India Bill of 1853, there was no reason for making this sudden change in 1858; that before any change of government was effected, it was imperatively necessary that an inquiry should be made into the causes and circumstances of the Revolt; that the direct exercise of governing power by a queen, formally designated ‘Defender of the Faith,’ could not be agreeable either to the Hindoos or the Mohammedans of India, whose ideas of ‘faith’ were so widely different from those of Christians; that, as all previous organic changes in the administration of the government of India had been preceded by an inquiry into the character of that government, so ought it in fairness to be in the present case; that if the proposed change were effected, European theories and novelties, owing to the pressure of public opinion on the ministry, would be attempted to be grafted on Asiatic prejudices and immobility, without due regard to the inherent antagonism of the two systems; and that the enormous extent, population, revenue, and commerce of India ought not to be imperiled by a measure, the consequences of which could not at present be foreseen.
This debate ended on the 18th; the House of Commons, by a majority of 318 to 173, granting leave for the introduction of the bill—it being understood that a considerable time would elapse before the second reading, in order that the details of the measure might be duly considered by all who took an interest in the matter.
Before, however, any very great attention could be given to the subject, either in or out of parliament, a most unexpected change took place in the political relations of the government. The same minister who, on the 18th of February, obtained leave to bring in the India Bill, was placed on the 19th in a minority which led to the resignation of himself and his colleagues. Circumstances connected with an attempted assassination of the Emperor of the French induced the Palmerston government to bring in a measure which proved obnoxious to the House of Commons; the measure was rejected by 234 against 219, and the government accordingly resigned. So far as concerned the immediate effect, the most important fact connected with India was the offer by the Earl of Derby, the new premier, of the presidency of the India Board to the Earl of Ellenborough. This nobleman had long been in collision with the East India Company and its civil servants. Twice already had he been president of the Board of Control, and in 1842-3-4 he had filled the responsible office of governor-general of India. In both offices, and at all times, he had cherished as much as possible the royal influence in India against the Company’s, the military against the civil. As a consequence, his enemies were bitter, his friends enthusiastic. The author of an anonymous ‘red pamphlet,’ which attracted much notice during the Revolt, spoke of the Earl of Ellenborough as the one great man who could alone be the saviour of India—as the chivalrous knight who would shiver to atoms the ‘vested rights’ and ‘traditionary policy’ of the Court of Directors. It was natural, therefore, that the accession of the earl to the new government should be regarded as an important matter, either for good or evil.
It speedily became apparent that the new president of the Board of Control would find difficulty in framing a line of proceeding on Indian affairs. His own predilections were quite as much against the Company, as those of his predecessor; but many of his colleagues in the Derby government had committed themselves, when out of office, to a defence of the Company, and to a condemnation of any immediate alteration in the Indian government. Either he must change his opinions, or they belie their own words. The Court of Directors would fain have expected indulgent treatment from the Derby administration, judging from the speeches of the two preceding months; but their past experience of the Earl of Ellenborough threw a damp over their hope.
Three weeks after the vote which occasioned the change of government, Lord Palmerston proposed the postponement of the second reading of his India Bill until the 22d of April—a further lapse of six weeks; and this was agreed to. He would not withdraw the bill, because he still adhered to its provisions; he would not at once proceed with it, because his opponents were now in office, and he preferred to see what course they would adopt. The fate of India was thus placed in suspense for several weeks, simply through a party struggle arising out of French affairs; the great question—’Who shall govern India?’—was made subservient to party politics.
Although Lord Palmerston had named the 22d of April as the day for reconsidering his India Bill, this did not tie down the Derby ministry to the adoption of any particular line of policy. After many discussions in the cabinet, it was resolved that the ministers should ‘eat their words’ by legislating for India, although it had before been declared a wrong time for so doing; and that, throwing Lord Palmerston’s bill aside, a new India Bill should be introduced.
Accordingly, on the 26th of March, Mr Disraeli, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved for leave to bring in that which was afterwards called the ‘India Bill No. 2.’ As in a former instance, this bill may be most usefully rendered intelligible by a condensed summary: A secretary of state for India, to be appointed by the Queen—This secretary to be president of a Council of India—The council to consist of eighteen persons, nine nominated and nine elected—The nominated councillors to be appointed under the royal sign-manual by the crown, and to represent nine distinct interests—Those nine interests to be represented as follow: the first councillor to have belonged for at least ten years to the Bengal civil service; the second to the Madras service; the third to the Bombay service; and the fourth to the Upper or Punjaub provinces, under similar conditions; the fifth to have been British resident at the court of some native prince; the sixth to have served at least five years with the Queen’s troops in India; the seventh, to have served the Company ten years in the Bengal army; and the eighth and ninth, similarly in the Madras and Bombay armies—The nine nominated members to be named in the bill itself, so as to give them parliamentary as well as royal sanction—The remaining eight members of the council to be chosen by popular election—Four of such elected members to be chosen from among persons who had served the Crown or the Company at least ten years in any branch of the Indian service, or had resided fifteen years in India; and to be chosen by persons who had been ten years in the service of the Crown or the Company, or possessed £1000 of India stock, or possessed £2000 of capital in any Indian railway or joint-stock public works—The other five of such elected members to be chosen from among persons who, for at least ten years, had been engaged in the commerce of India, or in the export of manufactured articles thither; and to be chosen by the parliamentary constituencies of five large centres of commerce and manufactures in the United Kingdom, namely, London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and Belfast—the Secretary of State for India to have the power of dividing the council, thus constituted, into committees, and to exercise a general supervision over these committees—The secretary alone, or six councillors in union, to have power to summon a meeting of the council—The councillors not to be eligible to sit in parliament, but to have each £1000 per annum for their services—The patronage heretofore exercised by the East India Company to be now exercised by the Council—The army of India not to be directly affected by the bill—The revenues of India to bear the expenses of the government of India—A royal commission to be sent to India, to investigate all the facts and conditions of Indian finance.
It will be seen that this remarkable scheme was based on the idea of conciliating as many different interests as possible, in England and in India. Mr Disraeli, in the course of his speech, mentioned the names of the nine gentlemen whom it was proposed to nominate to the council on the part of the crown; and in relation to the vast powers of the secretary and council, he said: ‘To establish a British minister with unrestricted authority, subject to the moral control of a body of men who by their special knowledge, their independence, their experience, their distinction, and their public merit, are, nevertheless, invested with an authority which can control even a despotic minister, and which no mere act of parliament can confer upon them, is, I admit, no ordinary difficulty to encounter; and to devise the means by which it may be accomplished is a task which only with the indulgence of this House and with the assistance of parliament we can hope to perform.’
Criticisms were much more numerous and contradictory on this than on Lord Palmerston’s bill. It was no longer a contest of Conservatives against Whigs. The new bill was examined on its merits. The friends of the East India Company, expecting something favourable from the change of government, were much disappointed; they analysed the clauses of the bill, but found not what they sought. True, the old Indian interests were to be represented in the new council; but just one-half of the members were to be nominees of the crown, and five others were to be elected by popular constituencies over which the Company possessed no control. Even those who cared little whether the Company lived or died, provided India were well governed, differed among themselves in opinion whether the popular element would be usefully introduced in the manner proposed. The objections were more extensively urged out of parliament than within; for after the first reading of the bill, on the 26th of March, the further consideration of it was postponed to the 19th of April.
The Conservatives had reproved the Whigs for discourtesy to the East India Company, in not giving due notice of the provisions of ‘Bill No. 1;’ but now equal discourtesy (if discourtesy it were) was shewn by the first-named party in reference to ‘Bill No. 2.’ On the 24th of March, at a quarterly meeting of the Company, and only two days before Mr Disraeli introduced his measure—or rather the Ellenborough measure—into the House of Commons, the chairman of the Court of Directors was asked whether he knew aught concerning the provisions of a bill so nearly touching the interests of the Company; to which he replied: ‘I know no more about the forthcoming bill than I knew of the last before its introduction into parliament.’ On the 7th of April, however, at a special Court of Proprietors, the directors presented copies of the bills, ‘No. 1’ and ‘No. 2;’ and at the same time presented a Report against both. In the debate, on the 7th and 13th, arising out of the presentation of the Report, there was a pretty general opinion among the proprietors, that if Lord Palmerston’s India Bill was bad, Mr Disraeli’s was not one whit better, in reference to the interests of the Company; and there was a final vote for the following resolution: ‘That this court concur in the opinion of the Court of Directors, that neither of the bills now before parliament is calculated to secure good government to India; and they accordingly authorise and request the Court of Directors to take such measures as may appear to them desirable for resisting the passing of either bill through parliament, and for introducing into any bill for altering the constitution of the government of India such conditions as may promise a system of administration calculated to promote the interests of the people of India, and to prove conducive to the general welfare.’ One of the proprietors having expressed an opinion that the directors ought to prepare a third bill, more just than either of the other two, the chairman very fairly pointed out that it was not the Company’s duty so to do.
Under somewhat unfavourable circumstances did the Derby ministry renew the consideration of Indian affairs after the Easter recess. Parliament, it is true, had not yet had time or opportunity to criticise ‘Bill No. 2;’ but that measure had been very unfavourably received both by the East India Company and by the newspaper press; and it became generally known that the ministers would gladly accept any decent excuse for abandoning or at least modifying the bill. This excuse was furnished to them by Lord John Russell. On the 12th of April, when the Commons resumed their sittings after the Easter vacation, his lordship expressed an opinion that the bill was ill calculated to insure the desired end; that its discussion was likely to be disfigured by a party contest; and that it would be better to agree to a set of resolutions in committee, on which a new bill might be founded. Mr Disraeli accepted this suggestion with an eagerness which led many members to surmise that a private compact had been made in the matter. He suggested that Lord John Russell should draw up the resolutions; but as his lordship declined this task, Mr Disraeli undertook it on the part of the government. Hereupon a new phase was presented by the debate. One member expressed his astonishment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be so ready to hand over the functions of government to the care of a private member. Another declared he could not see what advantage was to be gained by a resolution in committee in lieu of a bill in the whole House. The members of the late Whig government all condemned the plan suggested by Lord John and accepted by Mr Disraeli; but, pending the introduction of the proposed resolutions, they would not frustrate the plan. Mr Mangles, on the part of the East India Company, expressed an earnest hope that all party feeling would be excluded from the debates on India. The East India Company, he remarked, could hardly be expected to acquiesce in a measure for their own extinction; nevertheless, if such should be proved to be inevitable, the directors would give their best assistance to the perfecting of any measure which the House might think proper to adopt. Mr Disraeli finally promised to prepare a set of resolutions, and to bring them in for discussion on the 26th.
The state, then, to which this intricate discussion had been brought was this—the ‘Bill No. 1,’ proposed by Lord Palmerston, stood over for a second reading on the 22d of April; the ‘Bill No. 2,’ proposed by Mr Disraeli, was placed in abeyance for a time; while the ‘resolutions,’ to be prepared by Mr Disraeli on the suggestion of Lord John Russell, and intended as a means of improving ‘Bill No. 2,’ or perhaps of leading to a ‘Bill No. 3,’ were to be introduced on the 26th of April. It was pretty generally felt, both within and without the walls of parliament, that the whole subject was in great confusion, and that the ministers themselves had no definite notion of the best course to pursue. At the meeting of the East India Company on the 13th, Mr Mangles, who was a member of parliament as well as chairman of the Company, said: ‘After the extraordinary occurrences we have witnessed within the last six weeks, in which we have seen a minister ousted who was supposed to have the support of a most commanding majority, and another minister placed in power without having a majority, or even a considerable minority, he would be a very bold man who would prophesy what the fate of any new measure in the House of Commons would be.’
On the 23d of April, Mr Disraeli announced his intention of abandoning ‘Bill No. 2’ altogether, and of postponing the preparation of ‘Bill No. 3’ until the House should have agreed to any ‘resolutions’ bearing on the subject. Lord Palmerston would not withdraw his ‘Bill No. 1;’ he simply held it in abeyance for a time, to watch the course of pending events. On the 26th, Mr Disraeli craved four days more for the preparation of his resolutions. He made a speech, in which he praised his own ‘Bill No. 2’ at the expense of his antagonist’s ‘Bill No. 1;’ but, as he had ‘voluntarily stifled his own baby’—to use the illustration of another speaker—his arguments fell with little force. The illustration, in truth, was so tempting, that it was long made use of both in and out of parliament. Lord Palmerston said: ‘The measure, upon which the right honourable gentleman has pronounced so unbounded a funeral panegyric, has been murdered by himself. If he thought so well of the merits of the bill, why did he kill it?’ Mr Gregory, wishing, by getting rid of the proposed ‘resolutions,’ to postpone all legislation on the subject until another year, moved as an amendment—‘That at this moment it is not expedient to pass any resolutions for the future government of India.’ A general desire prevailed in the House, however, that some measure or other should be passed into a law, to strengthen and render more definite the governing authority in India; and the amendment was withdrawn.
At length, on the 30th of April, the resolutions were proposed. They departed very widely from ‘Bill No. 2.’ The members of the council, instead of being definitely eighteen in number, were to be ‘not less than twelve and not more than eighteen.’ The scheme for representing classes, services, presidencies, and commercial communities in the council was given up; as was likewise the election of a portion of the members by parliamentary constituencies. As the whole of the fourteen resolutions, if agreed to, would require a separate agreement for each, and as every member would be allowed to speak on every resolution if he so chose, there were the materials presented for a very lengthened debate. There was a preliminary discussion, moreover, on a motion intended to extinguish the resolutions altogether. Lord Harry Vane moved—‘That the change of circumstances since the first proposal by her Majesty’s late advisers, to transfer the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, renders it inexpedient to proceed further with legislation on the subject during the present session.’ This proposal, however, was negatived by 447 to 57.
It would scarcely be possible, and scarcely worth while if possible, to follow all the intricacies of the debate on the ‘resolutions.’ Every part of the India question was opened again and again; every speaker considered himself at liberty to wander from principles to details, and back again; and hence the amount of speaking was enormous. Should there be a secretary of state for India, or only a president of a council? Should there be a council at all, or only a secretary with his subordinates, as in the home, foreign, colonial, and war departments? If a council, should it be wholly nominated, wholly elective, or part of each? Who should nominate, and who elect, and under what conditions? Should the secretary or president possess any power without his council, and how much? Should the East India Company, or not, be represented in the new council? By whom should the enormous patronage of the Court of Directors be hereafter exercised? What would become of the ‘vested rights’ of the Company, such as the receipt of dividends on the East India stock? In what relation would the governor-general of India stand to the new council? Would the local governments of the three presidencies be interfered with? Who would organise and support the Indian army? What would be done in relation to missionaries, idolatrous practices, caste, education, public works, manufactures, commerce, &c., in India?—These were some of the questions which were discussed, not once merely, but over and over again. Owing to the strange ministerial changes, the independent members in the House had had but few opportunities of fully expressing their sentiments; they did so now, at ample length. Many long nights of debate were spent over the resolutions; many amendments proposed; many alterations assented to by the ministers. It occupied three evenings—April 30, May 3, and May 7—to settle the first three resolutions; or rather, to agree to the first, to modify the second, and to withdraw the third. At this period occurred the exciting episode concerning the Oude proclamation, the censure of Viscount Canning, and the resignation of the Earl of Ellenborough.[192] As there was now no president of the Board of Control, the India resolutions could not conveniently be proceeded with; and therefore everything remained for a time at a dead-lock. Soon afterwards Lord Stanley, son of the Earl of Derby, accepted the seals of the office vacated by the Earl of Ellenborough. He had every claim to the indulgence of the House, in the difficulty of his new position; and this indulgence was willingly shewn to him; he was permitted to choose his own time, after the ceremony of his re-election, to bring the great question of India once again before the Commons House, in the hope of arriving at some practicable solution. For a period of one full month did the further consideration of the resolutions remain in abeyance, while these party tactics and ministerial changes were engaging public attention.
At length, on the 7th of June, when the subject was resumed, and when Lord Stanley took the lead on Indian affairs in the House of Commons, it began to be apparent that the resolutions were less valued by the government than they had before been. The debate concerning them, however, continued. When the time came for deciding how many members should compose the new Council of India, Mr Gladstone reopened the whole question by moving as an amendment, ‘That, regard being had to the position of affairs in India, it is expedient to constitute the Court of Directors of the East India Company, by an act of the present session, to be a council for administering the government of India in the name of her Majesty, under the superintendence of such responsible minister, until the end of the next session of parliament.’ Mr Gladstone proposed this amendment under a belief that it was not practicable, during the existing session of parliament, to perfect a scheme of government for India that would be worthy of the nation. The problem to be solved was one of the most formidable ever presented to any nation or any legislature in the history of the world, and the evils of delay would be insignificant in comparison with those of crude and hasty legislation. His suggestion, he contended, would not be inconsistent with the appointment of a new council in the following year, if it should be deemed desirable to make such appointment. Lord Stanley opposed this amendment—on the grounds that it had all the evils of a temporary and provisional measure; that the directors, as a council merely for one year, would be placed in an inconvenient position; that having been told that they were doomed, and that nothing could save them as a permanent body, they would slacken their zeal and energy, and impair the confidence of the public; that the much-condemned delays would still continue; and that the public service would derive no advantage. The friends of the East India Company supported this amendment; but it was rejected by 265 against 116. Mr Roebuck then made an attempt to extinguish the council both in theory and in fact. He contended that a Secretary of State, alone responsible for all his acts, relying upon his own mind for guidance and counsel, and having a more direct interest in doing right, was morally and mentally the best governor for India; he feared that a council would render the governing body practically irresponsible to the nation. Lord Stanley, on the other hand, insisted that it was quite impossible for any minister to act efficiently in such a difficult office without the aid of advisers possessing special information on Indian affairs; and as the House generally concurred in this view, Mr Roebuck’s amendment was negatived without a division. Two evenings, June 7th and 11th, were spent in discussing two resolutions. On the 14th the House was engaged many hours in considering whether the council should be elective, or nominated, or both; great diversity of opinion prevailed; and the speakers, tempted by the peculiarity of the subject, wandered very widely beyond the limits of the immediate question. Lord John Russell thought that the members of the council ought to be wholly appointed by the Crown, on the responsibility of the minister; Sir James Graham thought that the Court of Directors ought to be _ex officio_ members of the council, to insure practical knowledge on Indian affairs; but Lord Stanley contended that the advantages of two systems would be combined if one half of the council were nominated by the Crown, and the other half elected by a constituency of seven or eight thousand persons interested in or connected with Indian affairs; and the House, agreeing with this view, voted a resolution accordingly.
Midsummer was approaching. The House of Lords had not yet had an opportunity of discussing the Indian question either in principle or in detail; and it began now to be strongly felt that, as the resolutions really did not bind the Commons to any particular clauses in the forthcoming bill, their value was doubtful. Accordingly, on the 17th of June, after a long discussion on desultory topics, Lord Stanley proposed, amid some laughter in the House, to withdraw all the remaining resolutions—a proposition that was assented to with great alacrity, shewing that the legislators were by no means satisfied with the wisdom of their past proceedings.
Thus was completed the third stage in this curious legislative achievement. Lord Palmerston’s ‘India Bill No. 1’ was laid aside, because he was expelled from office; Mr Disraeli’s ‘India Bill No. 2’ was abandoned, because it was ridiculed on all sides; and now the ‘resolutions’ were given up when half-finished, because they were found to be inoperative and non-binding. Some of the supporters of the East India Company claimed, and not illogically, a little more respect for the Company than had lately been given; the difficulty of framing a new government for India shewed, by implication, that the old _régime_ was not so bad as had been customarily asserted.
The ‘India Bill No. 3’ was brought in by Lord Stanley on the evening (June 17th) which witnessed the withdrawal of the resolutions. The bill comprised sixty-six clauses—of the more important of which a brief outline may be given here, to furnish means of comparison with bills ‘No. 1’ and ‘No. 2:’ The government of India to revert from the Company to the Crown—A Secretary of State to exercise all the powers over Indian affairs hitherto exercised by the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee, and the Board of Control—The Crown to determine whether to give these powers to one of the four existing secretaries of state, or to appoint a fifth—The Secretary to be assisted by a ‘Council of India,’ to consist of fifteen persons—The Court of Directors to elect seven of those members from among its own body, or from among persons who had at any time been directors; the remaining eight to be nominated by the Queen—Vacancies in the council to be filled up alternately by the Crown and by the council assembled for that purpose—A majority of all the members to be chosen from among persons who had served or resided at least ten years in India—Every councillor to be irremovable during good behaviour, to be prohibited from sitting in the House of Commons, to receive twelve hundred pounds a year as salary, to be allowed to resign when he pleases, and to be entitled to a retiring pension varying in amount according to the length of service—Compensation to be given to such secretaries or clerks of the Company as do not become officers of the new department—The Secretary of State to be president of the ‘Council of India,’ to divide the council into committees for the dispatch of business, and to appoint any member as vice-president—Council meetings to be called by the Secretary, or by any five members; and five to be a quorum—Questions to be decided in the council by a majority, but the Secretary to have a _veto_ even over the majority—The Secretary may send and receive ‘secret’ dispatches, without consulting his council at all—Most of the appointments in India to be made as heretofore—Patronage of cadetships to be exercised partly by the council, but principally by the Secretary of State, and to be given in a certain ratio to sons of persons who have filled military or civil offices in India—The property, credits, debits, and liabilities of the Company, except India stock and its dividends, to be transferred from the Company to the Crown; and the council to act as trustees in these matters—The council to present annual accounts to parliament of Indian finance and all matters relating thereto—The council to guarantee the legalised dividend on India stock, out of the revenues of India.
The ‘Bill No. 3,’ of which the above is a slight programme, came on for second reading on the 24th of June. Lord Stanley—who, as admitted by opponents as well as supporters, entered with great earnestness upon the duties of his office—stated that he had endeavoured to avail himself of all the opinions expressed during the various debates, to prepare a measure that should meet the views of a majority of the House. In the discussion that ensued, Mr Bright wandered into subjects that could not possibly be treated in the bill; he reopened the whole topic of Indian misgovernment—disapproved of governor-generals—condemned annexations—suggested new presidencies and new tribunals—and told the Commons how he would govern India if he were minister. The speech was vigorous, but inapplicable to the subject-matter in hand. The bill was read a second time without a division.
The East India Company were not silent at this critical period in their history. A meeting of proprietors on the 23d was made special for the consideration of ‘Bill No. 3,’ which was to be read a second time in the Commons on the following day; and at this meeting there was a general expression of disappointment that the Company had been treated as such a nullity. The only source of consolation was in the fact that seven members of the new council were to be chosen by the Court of Directors, from persons who then belonged or had formerly belonged to that court. The opinions of the Company were embodied in a letter addressed to Lord Stanley by the chairman and deputy-chairman, and presented to the House of Commons.
On the 25th, the House went into committee on the bill. Lord Palmerston proposed two amendments—that the members should be twelve in number instead of fifteen, and that all should be appointed by the Crown; but both amendments were rejected by large majorities as being inconsistent with the recent expression of opinion. At a further sitting on the 1st of July, the ministers shewed they had obtained a considerable hold on the House; for they succeeded in obtaining the rejection of amendments proposed by Lord Palmerston, Mr Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Mr Vernon Smith. Lord Stanley, however, proposed many amendments himself on the part of the government; and these amendments were accepted in so friendly a spirit, that a large number of clauses were got through by the end of a long sitting on the 2d of July. One of the most interesting of the questions discussed bore relation to the Secret Committee of the past, and the proposed exercise of similar powers by the Secretary of State. Lord John Russell and Mr Mangles advocated the abolition of those powers altogether; while Sir G. C. Lewis recommended great caution in their exercise, if used. Mr Mangles, the late chairman of the Court of Directors, stated that the powers of the Secret Committee had been much more extensive than was generally supposed. ‘During many years after the conquest of Sinde, the whole government of that province was conducted by the Secret Committee, and the Court of Directors knew nothing about it. He believed that much mischief had arisen from the Secret Committee undertaking to transact business with which it had no right to interfere. The real fact was, that nine-tenths of that which came before the Secret Committee might with safety be communicated to the whole world. He wished, therefore, that there should be no Secret Committee in future. It was a mere delusion and snare. The Court of Directors had shewn themselves to be as competent to keep a secret, when there was one, as the cabinet of her Majesty; and he had no reason to think otherwise of the proposed Indian Council.’ The ministers, however, received the support of Lord Palmerston in this matter; and the continuance of the secret powers was sanctioned, although by a small majority only. On the 5th and 6th, the remaining clauses and amendments were gone through. Mr Gladstone proposed a clause enacting, ‘That, except for repelling actual invasion, or under sudden or urgent necessity, her Majesty’s forces in India shall not be employed in any military operation beyond the external frontier of her Indian possessions, without the consent of parliament.’ Lord Palmerston opposed this clause; but Lord Stanley assented to it as a wholesome declaration of parliamentary power; and it was agreed to.
At length, on the 8th of July—five months after ‘Bill No. 1’ had been introduced by Lord Palmerston, and three or four months after the introduction of ‘Bill No. 2’ by Mr Disraeli—‘Bill No. 3’ was passed by the House of Commons, after a vehement denunciation by Mr Roebuck, who predicted great disaster from the organisation of the ‘Council of India.’ Lord Palmerston’s bill was withdrawn on the next day: it never came on for a second reading.
The House of Lords justly complained of the small amount of time left to them for the discussion of the bill; but there was now no help for it, short of abandoning the measure for the session; and therefore they entered at once on the discussion. On the 9th, the bill was brought in and read a first time. Between that time and the second reading, the East India Company made one more attempt to oppose the measure. They agreed to a petition for presentation to the House of Lords. It was in part a petition, in part a protest. The propriety of adopting the petition was urged by such considerations as these: ‘If we do not protest, every wrong that may be done for years to come will be laid at our doors; but with this protest upon record, history will do us the justice of stating that we have been deprived of our power without inquiry.’ The Court of Proprietors also discussed whether counsel should be employed to represent the Company before the House of Lords. Many of the directors assented to this—but only so far as concerned technical and legal points; for, they urged, it would be very undignified to employ any hired counsel to argue the moral and political question, or to defend the conduct of the Company and the rights of India. It remained yet, however, an unsettled point whether counsel would be permitted to appear at all.
On the 13th of July, after a feeble attempt to attach importance to the Company’s petition and protest, the bill was read a second time in the Lords. The most remarkable speech made on this occasion was that of the Earl of Ellenborough, Lord Stanley’s predecessor at the Board of Control. He declared that, whether in or out of office, he could not approve of the measure, the parentage of which he gave to the House of Commons rather than to the government. He disapproved of the abandonment of popular election in the proposed council; disapproved of the strong leaven of ‘Leadenhall Street’ in its composition; disapproved of competitive examinations for the Indian artillery and engineers; and expressed a general belief that the scheme would not work well. When the bill went into committee on the 16th, the earl proposed that the members of the council should be appointed for five years only, instead of for life; but this amendment was negatived without a division. Lord Broughton, who, as Sir John Cam Hobhouse, had once been president of the India Board, opposed the whole theory of a council in the strongest terms. He described in anticipation the inconveniences he believed would flow from it. ‘The council would only embarrass the minister with useless suggestions and minutes on the most trifling questions; and, if they were rejected, the minority would always be able to furnish weapons of attack against the Secretary in the House of Commons. The minister would gain no advice or knowledge from the council he could not obtain from others without the embarrassment of having official councillors.’ The Earl of Derby contested these assertions simply by denying their truth; and they had no effect on the decision of the House. All the clauses were examined during three sittings, on the 16th, 19th, and 20th of the month, and were adopted with a few amendments. During the discussions, the Earl of Derby appeared as the friend of the ‘middle classes.’ The Earl of Ellenborough having repeated his objection to competitive examination for the engineers and artillery of the Indian army, on the ground that it would lower the ‘gentlemanly’ standard of those services, the premier replied that, ‘He was not insensible to the advantages of birth and station: but he could not join with his noble friend in saying that because a person happened to be the son of a tailor, a grocer, or a cheesemonger, provided his mental qualifications were equal to those of his competitors, he was to be excluded from honourable competition for an appointment in the public service.’
On the 23d of July the India Bill was read a third time and passed by the House of Lords, with only a few observations bearing collaterally on Indian affairs. The Archbishop of Canterbury and some of the bishops made an appeal for the more direct encouragement of Christianity in India; but the Earl of Derby made a very cautious response. ‘Due protection ought to be given to the professors of all religions in India, and nothing should be done to discourage the efforts of Christian missionaries. On the other hand, he deemed it essential to the interests, the peace, the well-being of England, if not also to the very existence of her power in India, that the government should carefully abstain from doing anything except to give indiscriminate and impartial protection to all sects and all creeds; and that nothing could be more inconvenient or more dangerous on the part of the state than any open or
## active assistance to any attempt to convert the native population from
their own religions, however false or superstitious.’ The Earls of Shaftesbury and Ellenborough joined in deploring the vindictive feeling which had sprung up between the Europeans and natives in India, and which, if continued, would neutralise all attempts at improvement. The Anglo-Indian press was severely reproved for the share it had taken in originating or fostering this feeling.
The Lords having introduced a few amendments in the India Bill, these amendments required the sanction of the Commons before they could be adopted. One of these affected the secret service of the new council; another, the mode of appointing the higher officials in India; a third, the principle of competitive examinations; a fourth, the application of Indian revenues; and so on. The Commons rejected some of these amendments, and accepted the rest, on the 27th. On the 29th the Lords met to consider whether they would abandon the amendments objected to by the Commons. This they agreed to do except in one instance—relating to competitive examinations for the Indian artillery and engineers; they still thought that commissions in these two services should be given only to ‘gentlemen,’ in the conventional sense of the term. The government, rather than run into collision with the Lords, recommended the Commons to assent to the slight amendment which had been made; and this was agreed to—but not without many pungent remarks on the course which the Upper House had thought proper to pursue. Sir James Graham adverted to a supercilious allusion by the Earl of Ellenborough to the ‘John Gilpin class,’ and added—‘Where is hereditary wisdom found? In what consists the justice of the tenet that India must henceforward be governed by gentlemen, to the exclusion of the middle classes—a gentleman being defined to be something between a peer and those who buy and sell. Is this, I would ask, the only argument that can be advanced against the system of competitive examinations? Who, let me ask, founded, who won our Indian empire?—Those who bought and sold. Who extended it?—Those who bought and sold. Who now transfer that empire to the Crown?—Those who bought and sold; a company of merchants—merchants, forsooth, whose sons are now not thought worthy to have even inferior offices in India committed to their hands. But are not the sons of those who buy and sell entitled to the appellation of gentlemen? Definitions are dangerous; but I should, nevertheless, like to know what it is that constitutes a gentleman. Why, sir, it appears to me that if a man be imbued with strong Christian principles, if he have received an enlightened and liberal education, if he be virtuous and honourable—it appears to me that such a man as that is entitled to the appellation. And who will tell me that among the sons of those who buy and sell may not be found men possessing literary attainments and a refinement of mind which place them in a position to bear comparison with the highest born gentlemen in India? Who, let me ask, were the conquerors of the country? From what class have they sprung? Who was Clive?—The son of a yeoman. Who was Munro?—The son of a Glasgow merchant. Who was Malcolm?—The son of a sheep-farmer upon the Scotch border. These, sir, are the men who have won for us our Indian empire; and I entertain no fear that the sons of those who buy and sell, and who enter the Indian service by means of this principle of open competition, will fail to maintain a high position in our army, or that they will do anything to dishonour the English name.’
When the India Bill finally passed the Lords, the Earl of Albemarle recorded a protest against it—on the grounds that the home government established by it would be inefficient and unconstitutional; that the council would be too numerous; that it would be nearly half composed of the very directors who were supposed to be under condemnation; that those directors, by self-election to the council, would establish a vicious principle; that the members of the council would be irresponsible for the use of the great amount of patronage held by them; that the change in the mode of government was too slight to insure those reforms which India so much needed; that it was pernicious, and contrary to parliamentary precedent, to allow the members of the council to hold other offices, or to engage in commercial pursuits; that the practical effect of the council would be merely to thwart the Secretary of State for India, or else to screen him from censure; and that efficient and experienced under-secretaries would be far better than any council.
The bill received the royal assent, and became an act of parliament, on the 2d of August, under the title of ‘An Act for the Better Government of India;’ 21st and 22d of Victoria, cap. 106. A brief and intelligible abstract of all the provisions of this important statute will be found in the Appendix.
One clause in the new act provided that the Court of Directors should elect seven members to the new council of India, either out of the existing court, or from persons who had formerly been directors of the Company. On the 7th of August they met, and chose the following seven of their own number—Sir James Weir Hogg, Mr Charles Mills, Captain John Shepherd, Mr Elliot Macnaghten, Mr Ross Donelly Mangles, Captain William Joseph Eastwick, and Mr Henry Thoby Prinsep. Many of the public journals severely condemned this selection, as having been dictated by the merest selfish retention of power in the directors’ own hands; but on the other side, it was urged that these seven gentlemen possessed a large amount of practical knowledge on Indian affairs; and, moreover, that the Company, owing the legislature no thanks for recent proceedings, were not bound to be disinterested in the matter.
A remarkable meeting was held by the East India Company on the 11th of August, to consider the state of affairs produced by the new act. The directors and proprietors met as if no one clearly knew what to think on the matter. They asked—What _is_ the East India Company now? What does it possess? What can it do, or what has it got to do? Has it any further interest in the affairs of India? Is there now any use in a Court of Directors, or a Court of Proprietors, further than to distribute the dividends on India stock handed over by the new Council of India out of Indian revenues? Is the regular payment of that dividend well secured? Are the _trading_ powers of the Company abolished; and if not, is there any profitable trade that can be entered upon? Are they to lose their house in Leadenhall Street, their museum, their library, their archives; and if so, why? If the Company at any time become involved in law-proceedings, will the costs come out of the dividends, or out of what other fund? The answers to these various questions were so very conflicting, and the state of doubt among all the proprietors so evident, that it was agreed—‘That a committee of proprietors be appointed to act in concert with the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Court of Directors, for the purpose of obtaining counsel’s opinion as to the present legal position of the Company under previous acts of parliament, as well as the present act—more especially as to the parliamentary guarantee of the Company’s stock, and the position of the Company’s creditors, Indian as well as European.’
The 1st of September 1858 was a day to be recorded in English annals—it witnessed the death of the once mighty East India Company as a governing body. ‘On this day,’ said one of the able London journals, ‘the Court of Directors of the East India Company holds its last solemn assembly. To-morrow, before the shops and the counting-houses of our great metropolis shall have received their accustomed inmates, the greatest corporate body the world has ever seen will have shrivelled into an association of receivers of dividends. The great house in Leadenhall Street will stand as it has stood for long years, and well-nigh the same business will be done by well-nigh the same persons; but the government of the East India Company will have passed into a tradition. Thousands and tens of thousands, including many of the greatest and wisest in the land, intent upon pleasure at this pleasure-seeking period of the year, will, in all human probability, not give the great change a thought. But the first and second days of September 1858, which witness the extinction of the old and the inauguration of the new systems of Indian government, constitute an epoch in our national history—nay, in the world’s history, second in importance to few in the universal annals of mankind. On this day the East India Company, which hitherto, through varied changes and gradations, has directed the relations of Great Britain with the vast continent of India, issues its last instructions to its servants in the east. On this day the last dispatches written by the authoritative “we” to our governor-general, or governors in council, will be signed by their “affectionate friends.” To-morrow the _egomet_ of her Majesty’s Secretary of State will be supreme in the official correspondence of the Indian bureau. It may or may not be for the good of India, it may or may not be for the good of England, that the government of the East India Company should on this day cease to exist; but we confess we do not envy the feelings of the man who can contemplate without emotion this great and pregnant political change.’ There was a disposition, on this last day of the Company’s power, to look at the bright rather than the dark side of its character. ‘It has the great privilege of transferring to the service of her Majesty such a body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before. A government cannot be base, cannot be feeble, cannot be wanting in wisdom, that has reared two such services as the civil and military services of the East India Company. To those services the Company has always been just, has always been generous. In those services lowly merit has never been neglected. The best men have risen to the highest place. They may have come from obscure farmhouses or dingy places of business; they may have been roughly nurtured and rudely schooled; they may have landed in the country without sixpence or a single letter of recommendation in their trunks; but if they have had the right stuff in them, they have made their way to eminence, and have distanced men of the highest connections and most flattering antecedents.... Let her Majesty appreciate the gift—let her take the vast country and the teeming millions of India under her direct control; but let her not forget the great corporation from which she has received them, nor the lessons to be learned from its success.’
[Illustration:
Old East India House, Leadenhall Street. ]
The last special General Court of the Company was held, as we have said, on the 1st of September. The immediate purpose was a generous one: the granting of a pension to the distinguished ruler of the Punjaub, Sir John Lawrence; and this was followed by an act at once dignified and graceful. It was an earnest tender of thanks, on the part of the East India Company generally, to its servants of every rank and capacity, at home and in India, for their zealous and faithful performance of duties; an assurance to the natives of India that they would find in Queen Victoria ‘a most gracious mistress;’ an expression of hearty belief that the home-establishment, if employed by the Crown, would serve the Crown well as it had served the Company; a declaration of just pride in the sterling civilians and noble soldiers at that moment serving unweariedly in India; and an earnest hope and prayer ‘That it may please Almighty God to bless the Queen’s Indian reign by the speedy restoration of peace, security, and order; and so to prosper her Majesty’s efforts for the welfare of her East Indian subjects that the millions who will henceforth be placed under her Majesty’s direct as well as sovereign dominion, constantly advancing in all that makes men and nations great, flourishing, and happy, may reward her Majesty’s cares in their behalf by their faithful and firm attachment to her Majesty’s person and government.’
The East India House in Leadenhall Street was chosen by Lord Stanley as the office of the new Council for India, on account of its internal resources for the management of public business. During more than two centuries and a half, the city of London had contained the head-quarters of those who managed Anglo-Indian affairs. The first meeting of London merchants in 1599, on the subject of East India trade, was held at Founders’ Hall. The early business of the Company, when formed, was transacted partly at the residences of the directors, partly in the halls of various incorporated companies. In 1621 the Company occupied Crosby Hall for this purpose. In 1638 a removal was made to Leadenhall Street, to the house of Sir Christopher Clitheroe, at that time governor of the Company. In 1648 the Company took the house of Lord Craven, adjoining Clitheroe’s, and on the site of the present India House. In 1726 the picturesque old front of this mansion was taken down, and replaced by the one represented in the above cut. Finally, in 1796, the present India House was built,[193] and remained the head-quarters of the Company. Acquiring skill by gradual experience, the Company had rendered this one of the most perfectly organised establishments that ever existed. Ranged in racks and shelves, in chambers, corridors, and cellars, were the records of the Company’s administration; prepared by governor-generals, judges, magistrates, collectors, paymasters, directors, secretaries, and other officials abroad and at home. These documents, tabulated and indexed with the greatest nicety, related to the whole affairs of the Company, small as well as great, and extended back to the earliest period of the Company’s history. Declarations of war, treaties of peace, depositions of native princes, dispatches of governor-generals, proceedings of trials, appeals of natives, revenue assessments, army disbursements—all were fully recorded in some mode or other. The written documents relating to a hundred and fifty-five years of the Company’s history, from 1704 to 1858, filled no less than a hundred and sixty thousand huge folio volumes. These documents were so thoroughly indexed and registered that any one could be found by a very brief search. It was mentioned with pride by the staff of the India House, that when Lord Stanley, in his capacity as Secretary of State for India, made his first official visit to Leadenhall Street, he was invited to test the efficiency of this registration department, by calling for any particular dispatch, or for any document bearing upon any act or policy of the Court of Directors, throughout a period of a century and a half; a promise was given that any one of these documents should be forthcoming in five minutes. His lordship thereupon asked for a report on the subject of some occurrence which took place under his own observation while on a tour in India. The document was speedily produced, and was found to contain all the details of the transaction minutely described.
After the Court of Directors had elected seven members to the new council, the government nominated the other eight. The greatest name on the list was Sir John Laird Muir Lawrence, who was expected to return to England, and for whom a place at the council-board was kept vacant. The other seven nominated members were Sir Henry Conyngham Montgomery, Sir Frederick Currie, Major-general Sir Robert John Hussey Vivian, Colonel Sir Proby Thomas Cautley, Lieutenant-colonel Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson, Mr John Pollard Willoughby, and Mr William Arbuthnot. It was considered that the fifteen members, in reference to their past experience of Indian affairs, might fairly represent the following interests:
Bengal Civil Service, Prinsep, Mangles. Madras Civil Service, Montgomery. Bombay Civil Service, Willoughby. Bengal Army, Cautley. Madras Army, Vivian. Bombay Army, Eastwick. The Punjaub, Lawrence. Afghan Frontier, Rawlinson. Native States, Currie. Indian Law, Hogg, Macnaghten. Shipping Interests, Shepherd. Finance, Mills. Indian Commerce, Arbuthnot.
This classification, however, was not official; it was only useful in denoting the kind of knowledge likely to be brought to the council by each member. When, in the early days of September, Lord Stanley presided at the first meetings of the new council, he grouped the members into certain committees, for the more convenient dispatch of business. This grouping was based in part on the previous practice of the East India Company, and in part on suggested improvements. The committees were three in number, of five members each—partly nominated, and partly elected. The functions and composition of the committees were as follow:
FINANCE, HOME, AND PUBLIC WORKS. Sir Proby Cautley, } Mr Arbuthnot, } Nominated.
Mr Mills, } Mr Macnaghten, } Elected. Captain Shepherd, }
POLITICAL AND MILITARY. Sir John Lawrence, } Sir R. Vivian, } Sir H. Rawlinson, } Nominated. Mr Willoughby, }
Captain Eastwick, Elected.
REVENUE, JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE. Sir H. Montgomery, } Sir F. Currie, } Nominated.
Sir J. W. Hogg, } Mr Mangles, } Elected. Mr Prinsep, }
Lord Stanley appointed Sir G. R. Clerk and Mr Henry Baillie to be under-secretaries of state for India; and Mr James Cosmo Melvill, late deputy-secretary to the East India Company, to be assistant under-secretary. Mr John Stuart Mill, one of the most distinguished of the Company’s servants in England, was earnestly solicited by Lord Stanley to assist the new government with his services; but he declined on account of impaired health. With a few exceptions, the valued and experienced servants of the Company became servants of the new council, as secretaries, clerks, examiners, auditors, record-keepers, &c.; for the rest, arrangements were to be gradually made in the form of compensations, pensions, or retiring allowances.
One of the first proceedings under the new _régime_ was the appointment of a commission to investigate the complicated relations of the Indian army. The heads of inquiry on which the commission was to enter included almost everything that could bear upon the organisation and efficiency of the military force in the east, under a system where the anomalous distinction between ‘Company’s’ troops and ‘Queen’s’ troops would no longer be in force. Such an inquiry would necessarily extend over a period of many months, and would need to be conducted partly in India and partly in England.
In closing this narrative of the demise of the powerful East India Company as a political or governing body, it may be remarked that all the well-wishers of India felt the change to be a great and signal one, whether for good or harm. There were not wanting prophets of disaster. The influence of parliament being so much more readily brought to bear upon a government department than upon the East India Company, many persons entertained misgivings concerning the effect of the change upon the well-being of India. Before any long period could elapse, submarine cables would probably have been sunk in so many seas, and land-cables stretched across so many countries, that a message would be flashed from London to Calcutta in a few hours. Lord Palmerston once jocularly made a prediction, ten years before the Indian mutiny broke out, to the effect that the day would come when, if a minister were asked in parliament whether war had broken out in India, he would reply: ‘Wait a minute; I’ll just telegraph to the governor-general, and let you know.’ A war in India did indeed come, before the period for the fulfilment of this prediction; but the time was assuredly approaching when the ‘lightning-post,’ as the natives of India felicitously call it, would be in operation. What would be the results? Some of the foreboders of disaster said: ‘In any great crisis, it is true, which demands prompt
## action on the part of the governing country, this rapid
intercommunication will be a source of strength; the resources of England will be brought to bear upon any part of India four or five weeks sooner than under existing circumstances. But, on the other hand, the ordinary work of government, at either end of the wire, will be greatly complicated and embarrassed by this frequent intercommunication of ideas. The Council of India will probably not be overanxious to fetter the movements of the governor-general; nor will the Secretary of State for India be necessarily prone to send curt sentences of advice or remonstrance to the distant viceroy; but it is doubtful whether parliament would suffer the council or the Secretary to exercise this wise forbearance. There would be a tendency to govern India by the House of Commons through the medium of the electric telegraph. A sensitive governor-general would be worried to death in a few months by the interference of the telegraph with his free action; and an irritable one might be stung into indignant resignation in a much shorter time.’ All such fears are groundless. If a message from England were perilous in its tendency through its ease and quickness of transmission, a message from India pointing out this perilous tendency would be equally easy and quick. The electric messenger does its work as rapidly in one direction as the other. A governor-general, worthy of the name, would take care not instantly to obey an order which he believed to be dangerous to the welfare of the country under his charge; the wire would enable him to converse with the authorities at home in a few hours, or, at any rate, a few days, and to explain circumstances which would probably lead to a modification of the order issued. The electric telegraph being one of the greatest boons ever given by science to mankind, it will be strange indeed if England does not derive from it—in her government of India, as in other matters—an amount of benefit that will immeasurably outweigh any temporary inconveniences.
[Illustration:
Calcutta.—Company’s Troops early in the Nineteenth Century. ]
-----
Footnote 191:
Some of the documents here adverted to will be given _verbatim_; others in a condensed form.
Footnote 192:
See Chap, xxvii., p. 451.
Footnote 193:
See Engraving, p. 452.
[Illustration:
W. & R. CHAMBERS LONDON & EDINBURGH ]
[Illustration:
ORMUZ—Entrance to the Persian Gulf. ]
SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.
§ 1. THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION, 1856-7.
§ 2. THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPEDITIONS, 1856-7-8.
§ 3. ENGLISH PROSPECTS IN THE EAST.
Not the least among the many extraordinary circumstances connected with the Revolt in India was this—that England, at the very time when the Revolt began, had two Asiatic wars on her hands, one eastward and the other westward of her Indian empire. True, the Shah of Persia had consented to a treaty of peace before that date; true, the Emperor of China had not yet actually received a declaration of war; but it is equally true that British generals and soldiers were still holding conquered positions in the one country, and that hostilities had commenced in the other. We have seen in former chapters, and shall have occasion to refer to the fact again, that Viscount Canning was most earnestly desirous, when the troubles in India began, to obtain the aid of two bodies of British troops—those going to China, and those returning from Persia. It must ever remain an insoluble problem how the Revolt would have fared if there had been no Persian and Chinese expeditions. On the one hand, several additional regiments of the Company’s army, native as well as European, would have been in India, instead of in or near Persia. On the other hand, there would not have been so many disciplined British troops at that time on the way from England to the east. Whether these two opposing circumstances would have neutralised each other, can only be vaguely guessed at.
There are other considerations, however, than that which concerns the presence or absence of British troops, tending to give these two expeditions a claim to some brief notice in the present work. The Persian war, if the short series of hostilities deserve that name, arose, mainly and in the first instance, out of apprehensions for the future safety of British India on the northwest. The Chinese war arose, mainly and in the first instance, out of that opium-traffic which had put so many millions sterling into the coffers of the East India Company. Other events, it is true, had tended to give a different colour and an intricate complication to the respective quarrels; but it can hardly be doubted that the India frontier-question in the one case, and the India opium-question in the other, were the most powerful predisposing causes in bringing about the two wars. Two sections of the present chapter are appropriated to such an outline of these two warlike expeditions as will shew how far they were induced by India, and how far they affected India, before and during the Revolt. Any detailed treatment of the operations would be beyond the scope of the present volume. The expedition to Japan will claim a little notice as a peaceful episode in the Chinese narrative.
§ 1. THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION, 1856-7.
Examining a map of Asia, we shall see that the country, called in its widest extent Afghanistan, is bounded on the east by India, on the west by Persia, and on the north by the territories of various Turcoman tribes. Whatever may be the fruitfulness or value of Afghanistan in other respects, it includes and possesses the only practicable route from Central Asia to the rich plains of India. So far as Persia, Bokhara, and Khiva are concerned, England would never for a moment think of doubting the safety of India; but when, in bygone years, it was known that Russia was increasing her power in Central Asia, acquiring a great influence over the Shah of Persia, and sending secret agents to Afghanistan, a suspicion arose that the eye of the Czar was directed towards the Indus as well as towards the Bosphorus, to India as well as to Turkey. Alarmists may have coloured this probability too highly, but the symptoms were not on that account to be wholly neglected. About midway between the Punjaub and the Caspian Sea is the city of Herat, near the meeting-point of Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkistan or Independent Tatary. It was this city, rather than any other, which caused the war with Persia. To what state does Herat belong, Persia or Afghanistan? The answer to this question is of great political importance; for as Russia has more influence in the first-named state than in the second, any aggressive schemes of the court of St Petersburg against India would be favoured by a declaration or admission that Herat belonged to Persia. In the course of twenty centuries Afghanistan has been in succession under Persian, Bactrian, Scythian, Hindoo, Persian, Saracenic, Turcoman, Khorasan, Mongol, Mogul, Persian, and Afghan rule; until at length, in 1824, three Afghan princes divided the country between them—one taking the Cabool province, another that of Candahar, and another that of Herat. There are therefore abundant excuses for Persians and Turcomans, Afghans and Hindoos, laying claim to this region, if they think themselves strong enough to enforce their claims. It is just such a complication as Russia would like to encourage, supposing her to have any designs against India—just such a complication, we must in justice add, as would lead England to seize Afghanistan, if she thought it necessary for the safety of her Indian empire. When Lord Auckland was governor-general of India, in 1837, he interfered in Afghan politics, in order to insure the throne of Cabool to a prince friendly to England and hostile to Russia and Persia; this interference led to the first Afghan war in 1838, the disastrous termination of which brought on the second Afghan war of 1842. Since the year last named, the Cabool and Candahar territories have remained in the hands of princes who were bound, by treaties of alliance, to friendly relations with England. Herat, however, further west and more inaccessible, became a prey to contentions which brought on the Persian war in 1856.
About the year 1833, disputes arose between Herat and Persia which have never since been wholly healed. The Shah claimed, if not the ownership of Herat, at least a tribute that would imply a sort of protective superiority. This tribute was suddenly withdrawn by Kamran Mirza, Khan of Herat, in or about the year just named; and certain clauses of a treaty were at the same time disregarded by him. Thence arose a warlike tendency in the court of Teheran—encouraged by Count Simonich, Russian ambassador; and discouraged by Mr Ellis, British ambassador. Negotiations failing, a Persian army began to march, and the Shah formally declared Herat to be a province of the Persian empire. The fortress of Ghorian fell, and after that the city of Herat was invested and besieged. Russia proposed a treaty in 1838, whereby Herat was to be given to the Khan of Candahar, on the condition that both of these Afghan states should acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia: the fulfilment of the conditions being guaranteed by Russia. This alarmed Sir John M’Neill, at that time British representative at Teheran; he suggested to Lord Palmerston that the British should send an army to support Herat, as a means of preventing the falling of the whole of Afghanistan into the clutches of Russia. Herat was defending itself bravely, and there might yet be time to save it. The Shah refusing to listen to M’Neill’s representations, and various petty matters having given England an excuse to ‘demand satisfaction,’ an expedition was sent from India to the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1838. Nominally a dispute about Herat, it was really a struggle whether England or Russia should acquire most ascendency over the Shah of Persia. Three years of negotiation, on various minor grievances and differences, led to a treaty between England and Persia in 1841. There then followed many years of peace—not, however, unalloyed by troubles. Persia, urged on secretly by Russia, continually endeavoured to obtain power in the Herat territory; while the oriental vanity of the officials led them into many breaches of courtesy towards English envoys, consuls, and merchants. In 1851, it came to the knowledge of Colonel Sheil, at that time British minister at the court of Teheran, that Persia was quietly preparing for another attack on Herat. In spite of Sheil’s remonstrances, the Shah sent an army against that city in 1852, captured the place, set up a dependent as subsidiary chief or khan, coined money with his own effigy, imprisoned and tortured many Afghan chiefs, and formally annexed the Herat territory as part of the great Persian empire. Colonel Sheil, failing in all his endeavours to counteract the policy of the Persian court, sent home to recommend that the British should despatch an expedition to the Persian Gulf. Under the influence of English pressure, the Shah signed another treaty in 1853—engaging to give up Herat; not to attack it again unless an attack came previously from the side of Cabool or Candahar; and to be content with the merely nominal suzerainty which existed in the time of the late Khan. The Persians, nevertheless, threw numberless obstacles in the way of carrying out this treaty; insomuch that Colonel Sheil was engaged in a perpetual angry correspondence with them. Faith in treaties is very little understood in Asia; and the court of Persia is thoroughly Asiatic in this matter. While this wrangle was going on, another embarrassment arose, out of the employment by the Hon. A. C. Murray, British representative, of a Persian named Mirza Hashem Khan, against the Shah’s orders. A seizure of Hashem’s wife by the authorities was converted by Mr Murray into a national insult, on the ground that Hashem was now in the service, and under the protection, of the British crown. Murray struck his flag from the embassy house, until the matter should be settled. A most undignified quarrel took place during the winter of 1855, and far into 1856—Mr Murray insisting on the supreme rights of the British protectorate; and the Persian authorities disseminating scandalous stories as to the motives which induced him to protect the lady in question.
The scene was next transferred to Constantinople; where, early in 1856, the Persian minister discussed the matter with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, deploring the rupture, and laying all the blame on Mr Murray and the other British officials. In a memorandum drawn up at Teheran, for circulation in the different European courts, M’Neill, Sheil, Murray—all were stigmatised as mischief-makers, bent on humiliating Persia, and on disturbing the friendly relations between the Shah and Queen Victoria. In an autograph document from the Shah himself, Mr Murray was designated ‘stupid, ignorant, and insane; one who has the audacity and impudence to insult even kings.’
Before this Murray quarrel was ended, hostilities broke out again at Herat. There were rival parties in that city; there was an attack threatened by Dost Mohammed of Cabool; an appeal was made to Persia for aid, by the Khan who at this time ruled Herat; and Persia marched an army of 9000 men in that direction. The British government, regarding this march as an infringement of the treaty of Herat, demanded the withdrawal of the troops, and threatened warlike proceedings if the demand were not attended to. The Persians, whether emboldened by secret encouragement from Russia, or actuated by any other motive, made a pretence of negotiating, but nevertheless proceeded with their expedition, captured Ghorian, and laid siege to Herat. Hereupon instructions were sent out to the governor-general of India, to prepare a warlike force for service in the Persian Gulf. Before those instructions could reach Bombay, Ferukh Khan arrived at Constantinople with full powers from the Shah to settle all points of difference between Persia and England. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was empowered to treat with this plenipotentiary; they made great advances towards the settlement of the terms of a treaty; but while they were discussing (in November), news arrived that the Persians had captured the city of Herat after a long siege. This strange confusion between diplomacy at Constantinople and war at Herat, stringent orders from London and warlike alacrity at Bombay, totally disarranged the negotiations of Ferukh Khan and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; those ministers could do nothing further. The governor-general declared war against Persia on the 1st of November, and the Persian plenipotentiary left Constantinople for Teheran in December.
Thus arose the Persian expedition—out of circumstances so complicated, that it is difficult to bear in mind the relations of one to another. The existence of intrigues among contending parties in the state of Herat; the frequent strife between the Afghans of Cabool and Candahar and those of Herat; the well-remembered and never-abandoned claims of Persia upon the last-named state; the open desire of Russia to obtain a hold over the Persian court; the concealed desire of the same astute power to approach nearer and nearer to the gates of India; the anxiety of England to see Afghanistan remain as a barrier between India and the centre of Asia; the tendency of Persia to disregard those courtesies to western nations which oriental potentates have never willingly conceded—all were concurrent causes in bringing about the British expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1856. The most powerful incentive, probably, although never acknowledged in diplomatic correspondence, was the wish to keep Russia as far as possible away from India.
But, it may be asked, what had the East India Company to do with this war? Why was India put to the expense of providing an armament for invading Persia? This, in truth, was one of the anomalies connected with the ‘double government’ of India. It was a war declared by Lord Palmerston’s cabinet; but as it was founded on considerations relating to the safety of India, it was treated as an India war, to be conducted by the authorities in British India.
The providing of the army for the Persian Gulf devolved chiefly upon Lord Elphinstone, as governor of Bombay. The army was in two divisions, one of which left Bombay several weeks before the other. Numerous transport-vessels were chartered, besides many of the large mail-steamers, to carry troops, guns, and stores to the Persian Gulf. The commissariat and quarter-masters’ departments had to make great preparations—a thousand baggage-cattle; fodder for these, for draught-bullocks, and for cavalry and artillery horses; framework for fifteen hospitals; hutting for many thousand soldiers, &c. Means of transport had to be provided for most of these, as it would not be safe to rely on supplies obtained in an enemy’s country.
Gradually, as the troops, guns, and stores reached the shores of Persia, the organisation of the force proceeded. It was thus constituted:
FIRST DIVISION.
{ H.M. 64th foot. 1st Infantry Brigade, { 20th Bombay N.I.
{ 2d Bombay Europeans. 2d Infantry Brigade, { 4th Bombay Rifles.
{ 3d Bombay native cavalry. Cavalry Brigade, { Poonah Horse.
Artillery Brigade, Various detachments.
SECOND DIVISION.
{ H.M. 78th Highlanders. 1st Infantry Brigade, { 26th Bombay N.I.
{ 23d Bombay N.I. 2d Infantry Brigade, { Light Batt. B.N.I.
{ H.M. 14th Dragoons. Cavalry Brigade, { Jacob’s Sinde Horse.
{ Troop horse-artillery. Artillery Brigade, { Two field-batteries.
The several divisions and brigades were thus commanded: The first division was placed under Major-general Stalker; and the four brigades of which it consisted were commanded by Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, Tapp, and Trevelyan. The second division was under Brigadier-general Havelock—who lived to become so famous in connection with the wars of the Indian mutiny; and the four brigades which it comprised were commanded by Brigadiers Hamilton, Hale, Steuart, and Hutt. Brigadier-general Jacob commanded in chief the cavalry of both divisions; while Major-general Sir James Outram held supreme command of the whole force.
The first division, as we have said, preceded the second by several weeks. General Stalker took his departure from Bombay on the 26th of November, with a fleet of nearly forty vessels under Admiral Sir Henry Leeke—a few of them war-steamers, but chiefly steam and sailing transports, carrying 10,000 soldiers, sailors, and men of all grades and employments. Stalker and Leeke, having brought all the troops and stores past Ormuz and up the Persian Gulf, captured the island of Karrack as a military depôt, and then effected a landing at Hallila Bay, about twelve miles south of Bushire. Although the opposition, from a few hundred Persian troops, was very insignificant, the landing was nevertheless a slow process, occupying three days and two nights—owing chiefly to the absence of any other boats than those belonging to the ships. There being no draught-cattle landed at that time, the troops were without tents or baggage of any kind; they therefore carried three days’ rations in their haversacks. After being thus engaged on the 7th of December and two following days, Stalker and Leeke advanced towards Bushire—the one with the troops along the shore, the other with the fleet at easy distance. Bushire is an important commercial town on the northeast side of the gulf; whoever commands it, commands much of the trade of Persia. Stalker found the defences to be far stronger than he had anticipated. On the 9th he dislodged a body of Persian troops from a strong position they occupied in the old Dutch fort of Reshire. On the 10th, after a short bombardment, Bushire itself surrendered—with a promptness which shewed how few soldierly qualities were possessed by the garrison; for the place contained sixty-five guns, with a large store of warlike supplies. The governor of the city, and the commander of the troops, came out and delivered up their swords. The troops of the garrison, about two thousand in number, having marched out and delivered up their arms, were escorted by cavalry to a distance, and then set free. By the evening of the 11th the tents and cooking-utensils were landed; and an intrenched camp was formed outside Bushire as a temporary resting-place for the force—sufficient detachments being told off to hold the city and fort safely. So entirely had the expedition been kept secret from the Persians, that when, on the 29th of November, the first vessels of the fleet hove in sight, the governor of Bushire sent to Mr Consul Jones to ask what it meant; and he only then learned that our army and navy had come to capture the city. This plan was adopted, to obtain a ‘material guarantee’ sufficiently serious to influence the double-dealing Persian government.
Here the troops remained for several weeks. The second division, and the real head of the force, had not arrived; and General Stalker was not expected or authorised to undertake anything further at present. His camp, about a mile from Bushire, assumed every day a more orderly appearance; and steady trading transactions were carried on with the towns-people. The transport ships went to and fro between Bushire and Bombay, bringing guns and supplies of various kinds.
The political relations between the two countries, meanwhile, remained as indefinite as before. Mr Murray came from Bagdad to Bushire, to confer with the military and naval leaders on all necessary matters, and to negotiate with the Shah’s government if favourable opportunity for so doing should offer. Herat remained in the hands of its conquerors, the Persians. Sir John Lawrence, in his capacity as chief authority in the Punjaub, held more than one interview with Dost Mohammed, Khan of Cabool, in order to keep that wily leader true to his alliance with England; and it was considered a fair probability that if Persia did not yield to England’s demands, a second expedition would be sent from the Punjaub and Sinde through Afghanistan to Herat.
It was not until the last week in January, 1857, that Sir James Outram and his staff reached the Persian Gulf; nearly all the infantry had preceded him, but much of the artillery and cavalry had yet to come. Sir James sighted Bushire on the 30th; and General Stalker, long encamped outside the town, made prompt preparations for his reception. Outram was desirous of instant action. Stalker had been stationary, not because there was nothing to do, but because his resources were inadequate to any extensive operations. Shiraz, the most important city in that part of Persia, lying nearly due east of Bushire, is connected with it by two roads, one through Ferozabad, and the other through Kisht and Kazeroon; the Persians were rumoured to have 20,000 men guarding the first of these two roads, and a smaller number guarding the second. These reports were afterwards proved to be greatly exaggerated; but Sir James determined that, at any rate, there should be no longer sojourn at Bushire than was absolutely needed.
Information having arrived that a large body of Persians was at the foot of the nearest hills, Outram resolved to dislodge them. The troops were under Soojah-ool-Moolk, governor of Shiraz, and formed the nucleus of a larger force intended for the recapture of Bushire. Leaving the town to be guarded by seamen from the ships, and the camp by about 1500 soldiers under Colonel Shephard, with the _Euphrates_ so moored that her guns could command the approaches—Outram started on the 3d of February, with about 4600 men and 18 guns. He took no tents or extra clothing; but gave to each soldier a greatcoat, a blanket, and two days’ rations; while the commissariat provided three more days’ rations. He marched round the head of Bushire creek to Char-kota, and on the 5th came suddenly upon the enemy’s camp, which they had precipitately abandoned when they heard of his approach. This was near the town of Borasjoon, on the road to Shiraz. On the next two days he secured large stores of ammunition, carriages, camp-equipage, stores, grain, rice, horses, and cattle—everything but guns; these had been safely carried off by the enemy to the difficult pass of Mhak, in the mountains lying between Bushire and Shiraz; and as Sir James had not made any extensive commissariat arrangements, he did not deem it prudent to follow them at that time.
On the evening of the 7th, Outram began his march back to Bushire—after destroying nearly twenty tons of powder, and vast quantities of shot and shell; and after securing as booty such flour, grain, rice, and stores as belonged to the government rather than to the villagers. But now occurred a most unexpected event. The Persian cavalry, which retreated while Outram had been advancing, resolved to attack while he was retreating. They approached soon after midnight; and the British were soon enveloped in a skirmishing fire with an enemy whom they could not see. Outram fell from his horse, and Stalker had to take the command for a time. The enemy having brought four guns within accurate range, the position was for a time very serious. Stalker was enabled by degrees to get the regiments into array, so as to grapple with the enemy as soon as daylight should point out their position. When at length, on the morning of the 8th, the British saw the Persians, seven or eight thousand strong, drawn up in order near the walled village of Khoosh-aub, they dashed at them at once with cavalry and horse-artillery, so irresistibly that the plain was soon strewed with dead bodies; the enemy fled panic-stricken in all directions; and if Outram’s cavalry had been more numerous (he had barely 500 sabres), he could almost have annihilated the Persian infantry. By ten o’clock all was over, the Persians leaving two guns and all their ammunition in the hands of the British. In the evening Outram resumed his march, and re-entered Bushire during the night of the 9th. His troops had marched ninety miles over ground converted into a swamp by heavy rains, and had seized a camp and won a battle, in a little more than six days. In a ‘Field-force Order,’ issued on February 10th, and signed by Colonel (afterwards Sir Edward) Lugard as chief of the staff, Outram warmly complimented his troops on this achievement.
After this dashing affair at Khoosh-aub, the patience of Sir James was sorely tried by a long period of comparative inactivity—occasioned in part by the rainy state of the weather, and in part by the non-arrival of some of the artillery and cavalry, without which his further operations would necessarily be much impeded. Brigadier-general Havelock arrived about this time, and took command of the second division, which had hitherto been under a substitute. The feeding of the army had become a difficult matter; for the Persian traders came in less readily after the battle of Khoosh-aub. Rumours gradually spread in the camp that an expedition was shortly to be sent out to Mohamrah, a town near the confluence of the Euphrates and the Karoon, about three days’ sail up from Bushire; these rumours gave pleasurable excitement to the troops, who were becoming somewhat wearied of their Bushire encampment. Much had yet to be done, however, before the expedition could start; the northwest winds in the gulf delayed the arrival of the ships containing the cavalry and artillery. On the 4th of March, Sir James made public his plan. General Stalker was to remain at Bushire, with Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Tapp, in command of about 3000 men of all arms; while Outram and Havelock, with several of the brigadiers, at the head of 4000 troops, were to make an expedition to Mohamrah, where many fortifications were reported to have been recently thrown up, and where 10,000 or 12,000 Persian troops were assembled. During many days troop-ships were going up the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates—some conveying the troops already at Bushire; and others conveying cavalry and artillery as fast as they arrived from Bombay. The enemy eagerly watched these movements from the shore, but ventured on no molestation.
During the three weeks occupied by these movements, events of an almost unprecedented character occurred at Bushire—the suicide of two British officers who dreaded the responsibility of the duties devolving upon them. These officers were—Major-general Stalker, commanding the first division of the army; and Commodore Ethersey, who had been placed in command of the Indian navy in the Persian Gulf when Sir Henry Leeke returned to Bombay. Stalker shot himself on the 14th of March. On that morning, Sir James Outram and Commander Jones had breakfasted with him in his tent. He displayed no especial despondency; but it had been before remarked how distressed he appeared on the subject of the want of barrack-accommodation for his troops—fearing lest he should be held responsible if the soldiers, during the heat of the approaching summer, suffered through want of shelter. On one or two other subjects he appeared unable to bear the burden of command; he dreaded lest Outram, by exposing himself to danger in any approaching conflict, might lose his life, and thereby leave the whole weight of the duty and responsibility on him (Stalker). Shortly after breakfast, a shot was heard in the tent, and the unfortunate general was found weltering in his blood. Commodore Ethersey followed this sad example three days afterwards. For three months he had been labouring under anxiety and despondency, haunted by a perpetual apprehension that neither his mental nor physical powers would bear up under the weight of responsibility incurred by the charge of the Indian navy during the forthcoming operations. Memoranda in his diary afforded full proof of this. An entry on the day after Stalker’s suicide ran thus: ‘Heard of poor Stalker’s melancholy death. His case is similar to my own. He felt he was unequal to the responsibility imposed on him.... I have had a wretched night.’ So deep had been his despondency for some time, and so frequently expressed to those around him, that the news of his suicide on the 17th excited less surprise than pain.
It had been Outram’s intention to proceed against Mohamrah directly after his return from Borasjoon and Khoosh-aub; but the unexpected and vexing delays above adverted to prevented him from setting forth until the 18th of March. He was aware that the Persians had for three months been strengthening the fortifications of that place; he knew that the opposite bank of the river was on Turkish ground (Mesopotamia), on which he would not be permitted to erect batteries; and he therefore anticipated a tough struggle before he could master Mohamrah. His plan was, to attack the enemy’s batteries with armed steamers and sloops-of-war; and then, when the fire had slackened, to tow up the troops in boats by small steamers, land them at a selected point, and at once proceed to attack the enemy’s camp. The Persian army, 13,000 strong, was commanded by the Shahzada, Prince Mirza. Outram’s force was rather under 5000, including only 400 cavalry: the rest having been left to guard Bushire and the encampment. Outram and Havelock arrived near Mohamrah on the 24th, and immediately began to place the war-ships in array, and to plant mortars on rafts in the river. On the 26th, the ships and mortars opened a furious fire; under cover of which the troops were towed up the river, and landed at a spot northward of the town and its batteries. The Persians, who had felt the utmost confidence that the landing of a British force, in the face of thirteen thousand men and a formidable array of batteries, would be an impossibility, were panic-stricken at this audacity. When, at about two o’clock, Outram advanced from the landing-place through date-groves and across a plain to the enemy’s camp, the Persians fled precipitately, after exploding their largest magazine—leaving behind them all their tents, several magazines of ammunition, seventeen guns, baggage, and a vast amount of public and private stores. As Outram had, at that hour, been able to land not even one hundred cavalry, he could effect little in the way of pursuit; the Persians made off, strewing the ground with arms and accoutrements which they abandoned in their hurry. Commodore Young commanded the naval portion of this expedition, having succeeded the unfortunate Ethersey.
This action of Mohamrah scarcely deserved the name of a battle; for as soon as the ships and mortars had, by their firing, enabled the troops to land, the enemy ran away. Outram had scarcely any cavalry, and his infantry had no fighting—rather to their disappointment. The Persians having retreated up the river Karoon towards Ahwaz, Outram resolved to send three small armed steamers after them, each carrying a hundred infantry. Captain Rennie started on the 29th, in command of this flotilla: his instructions being, ‘to steam up to Ahwaz, and act with discretion according to circumstances.’ He proceeded thirty miles that day, anchored at night, landed, and found the remains of a bivouac. On the 30th he reached Ismailiyeh, and on the 31st Oomarra. Arriving near Ahwaz on the 1st of April, Rennie came up with the Persian army which had retreated from Mohamrah. Nothing daunted, he landed his little force of 300 men, advanced to the town, entered it, and allayed the fears of the inhabitants; while the Persians, thirty or forty times his number, retreated further northward towards Shuster, with scarcely any attempt to disturb him—such was the panic into which the affair at Mohamrah had thrown them. Captain Rennie, having had the satisfaction of putting to flight a large Persian army with a handful of 300 British, and having given to the inhabitants of Ahwaz such stores of government grain and flour as he could seize, embarked a quantity of arms, sheep, and mules, which he had captured, and steamed back to Mohamrah—earning and receiving the thanks of the general for his management of the expedition.
Just at this period a most sudden and unexpected event put an end to the operations. Captain Rennie’s expedition returned to Mohamrah on the 4th of April; and on the 5th arrived news that peace had been signed between England and Persia. Outram’s army, European and native, was rapidly approaching 14,000 men; such a force, under such a leader, might have marched from one end of Persia to the other; and both officers and soldiers had begun to have bright anticipations of honour, and perhaps of prize-money. It was with something like disappointment, therefore, that the news of the treaty was listened to; there had not been fighting enough to whet the appetites of the heroic; while soldiers generally would fain make a treaty at the sword’s point, rather than see it done in the bureaux of diplomatists. Captain Hunt of the 78th Highlanders, who was concerned in the operations at Mohamrah and Ahwaz, and who wrote a volume descriptive of the whole campaign, told very frankly of the dissatisfaction in the camp: ‘The news of peace with Persia having been signed at Paris on the 4th of March damped the elation of all, and considerable disgust was felt at this abrupt termination to what had promised to prove a brilliant campaign.’
How and where the treaty of peace was concluded, we must now shew, in connection with the proceedings of ministers, legislators, and ambassadors.
When the Persian expedition was determined on, parliament was not sitting, and no legislative sanction for the war could be obtained; but when the session opened in February 1857, the policy of the government was severely canvassed. Ministers were charged with involving the country in a war, without the nation itself being acquainted with the causes, or even consulted at all in the matter. The Earl of Clarendon explained the course of events at considerable length. He went into the case of Mr Murray, and the quarrel with the Persian government on matters of diplomatic etiquette—justifying that envoy in all that he had done. But the earl was particular in his assertions that the Murray dispute was not the cause of the war. The siege and capture of Herat furnished the _casus belli_. He dwelt on the immense value of that city as a military station. ‘Herat is altogether a most important place for military operations; and an enemy once in possession of it is completely master of the position. Every government of this country has desired that Afghanistan should be protected; and it clearly cannot be protected if Herat remains in the power of Persia.’ He expressed a conviction that ‘the Russian government and the whole of the Russian people are under a belief that their destiny is to go forward, to conquer, and to hold new territory;’ and that this disposition would be greatly tempted if Persia, backed up by Russia, were permitted to seize Herat. He stated finally that the Persian ambassador at Paris had recently expressed a wish to renew negotiations for peace, and that the British government would willingly listen to any overtures for that purpose. Lord Palmerston gave similar explanations in the House of Commons. The Earls of Derby and Malmesbury, Earl Grey, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli, all spoke disparagingly of the Persian expedition—either because it was not necessary; or because, if necessary, parliamentary permission for it ought to have been obtained. The latter was the strong point of opposition; many members asserted, not only that the nation was involved in a new war without its own consent, but that no one could understand whether war had been declared by the Crown or by the East India Company. Earl Grey moved an amendment condemnatory of the ministerial policy; but this was negatived. The ministers declined to produce the diplomatic correspondence at that time, because there was a hope of renewed negotiations with Furukh Khan at Paris.
At the close of February it became known to the public that the East India Company had, not unnaturally, demurred to the incidence of the expenses of the Persian war on their revenues. It appeared that, so early as the 22d of October the Court of Directors had written to the president of the Board of Control—adverting to ‘the expedition for foreign service preparing at Bombay, under the orders (it is presumed) of her Majesty’s government, communicated through the Secret Committee;’ and suggesting for his consideration ‘how far it may be just and proper to subject India to the whole of the charges consequent on those orders.’ The directors, as a governing body, had no voice whatever in determining on the Persian war; and yet their soldiers and sailors were to take part in it, and the Indian revenues to bear all or part of the burden. It was ultimately decided that England should pay one-half of the expenses, the other half being borne by the Company out of the revenues of India.
Before the British public could learn one single fact connected with the landing of Sir James Outram or of the second division in Persia, they were surprised by the announcement that Lord Cowley and Furukh Khan had succeeded in coming to terms of pacification at Paris—the Persian ambassador having received from his sovereign large powers for this purpose. A provisional treaty was signed on the 4th of March, of which the following is a condensed summary: Peace to be restored between England and Persia—British troops to evacuate Persia as soon as certain conditions should be complied with—All prisoners of war to be released on both sides—The Shah to give an amnesty to any of his subjects who might have been compromised by and during the war—The Shah to withdraw all his troops from Herat and Afghanistan within three months after the ratification of the treaty—The Shah to renounce all claim upon Herat or any other Afghan state, whether for sovereignty or for tribute—In any future quarrel between Persia and the Afghan khans, England to be appealed to as a friendly mediator—England to display equal justice to Persia and Afghanistan, in the event of any such appeal—Persia to have the power of declaring and maintaining war against any Afghan state in the event of positive insult or injury; but not to make such war a pretext for annexation or permanent occupation—Persia to liberate all Afghan prisoners, on condition of Persian prisoners being released by Afghans—All trading arrangements between England and Persia, in relation to consuls, ports, customs, &c., to be on an equal and friendly footing—The British mission, on its return to Teheran, to be received with due honours and ceremonials—Two commissioners to be named by the two courts, to adjudicate on British pecuniary claims against Persia—The British government to renounce all claim to any ‘protection’ over the Shah’s subjects against the Shah’s consent, provided no such power be given to [Russia or] any other court—England and Persia to aid each other in suppressing the slave-trade in the Persian Gulf—A portion of the English troops to remain on Persian soil until Herat should be evacuated by the Persians, but without any expense, and with as little annoyance as possible, to the Persian government—Ratifications to be exchanged at Bagdad within three months.
This treaty—which, if faithfully carried out, would certainly debar Persia from any undue interference with Afghan affairs—was signed at Paris on the very day (March 4th) when Sir James Outram announced to his troops at Bushire the intended attack on Mohamrah. Such was one of the anomalies springing from diplomacy at one place and war at another many thousand miles distant. Furukh Khan proceeded, on the 19th from Paris to London, where he was received by Queen Victoria as plenipotentiary extraordinary from the Shah of Persia, and where the arrangements for the fulfilment of the treaty were further carried out. The treaty having been forwarded to Teheran, was ratified by the Shah of Persia on the 14th of April, and the ratification arrived at Bagdad on the 17th. The English nation was still, as it had been from the beginning, without the means of judging whether the Persian war had been necessary or not; the government still withheld the state papers, on the ground that, as the ratification of the treaty would speedily be effected, it would be better to wait until then. When, later in the year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked the House of Commons for a vote of half a million sterling, ‘on account of the expenses of the Persian war,’ many members protested against the vote, on the ground that parliament had not been consulted in any way concerning the war. On the 16th of July Mr Roebuck moved a resolution—‘That the war with Persia was declared, prosecuted, and concluded without information of such transactions being communicated to parliament; while expensive armaments were equipped without the sanction of a vote of this House; and that such conduct tends to weaken its just authority, and to dispense with its constitutional control over the finances of the country, and renders it requisite for this House to express its strong reprobation of such a course of proceeding.’ The government policy was censured on many grounds by Mr Roebuck, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli; the first of these speakers even went so far as to attribute the mutiny in India to the withdrawal of troops for the Persian war. The House of Commons agreed, however, pretty generally in the opinion, that although the ministers might reasonably have been more communicative before they commenced hostilities with Persia, there was ground sufficient for the hostilities themselves; and the resolution was negatived by 352 to 38. The question was reopened on the 17th, when the House granted the half-million asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer towards defraying the expenses of this war; renewed attacks were made on the Asiatic policy of the Palmerston government, but the vote was agreed to; and nothing further occurred, during the remainder of the session, to disturb the terms of the pacification.
It is unnecessary to trace the course of events in Persia after the ratification of the treaty. The British officers, and the troops under their charge, had no further glory or honour to acquire; they would be called upon simply, either to remain quietly in Persia until Herat was evacuated, or to go through the troublesome ordeal of re-shipment back to Bombay. The troops all assembled in and near Bushire, where they resumed their former camp-life. The officers, having little to do, took occasional trips to Bassorah, Bagdad, and other places on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris; while the soldiers were employed in destroying the fortifications of the encampment, now no longer needed. On the 9th of May Sir James Outram issued a ‘Field-force Order’—thanking the troops for their services during this brief and rather uneventful war, and announcing the break-up of the force. Some of the regiments and corps were to return to India, as rapidly as means of transport could be obtained for them; while the rest, under Brigadier-general Jacob, were to form a small compact army, to remain at Bushire until all the terms of the treaty were fulfilled. Outram, Havelock, and a large number of officers, embarked within a few days for India; and by the time they reached Bombay and Madras, according to the place to which they were bound, the startling news reached their ears that a military mutiny had broken out at Meerut and Delhi. What followed, the pages of this volume have shewn. As to Persia, much delay occurred in carrying out the terms of the treaty, much travelling to and fro of envoys, and many months’ detention of British troops at Bushire; but at length the Persians evacuated Herat, the British quitted the Gulf, and the singular ‘Persian war,’ marked by so few battles, came to an end.
[Illustration:
BUSHIRE. ]
§ 2. THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPEDITIONS, 1856-7-8.
The occurrences westward of India having thus been briefly narrated, attention may now be directed to those on the east.
Viewed in relation to the circumstances which immediately preceded hostilities, it might almost be said that England declared war against China because a few persons went on board a small vessel to search for certain offenders, and because a Chinese official would not civilly receive visits from a British official. These trifling incidents, however, were regarded as symptoms of something greater: symptoms which required close diplomatic watching. To understand this matter, a brief summary of earlier events is needed.
During the first thirty years of the present century, in like manner as in earlier centuries, Europeans had no recognised right of residing in China, or even of visiting its ports. Merchants were allowed to reside at Canton, by official connivance rather than sanction; and even this was possible only at certain times of the year—they being required in other months to retire to Macao. They were liable to be expelled from Canton at any time, with or without assigned cause; their trade was liable to be stopped with equal suddenness; and, under the designation of ‘barbarians,’ all negotiation was denied to them except through the medium of a mercantile community called the Hong merchants. During many years, Indian opium was the chief commodity sold by the English to the Chinese, in exchange for tea and other produce. This opium-trade was always declared illegal by the Chinese government, though always covertly favoured by the Chinese officials. Quarrels frequently arose concerning this trade, and the quarrels sometimes ended in violence. The import of opium became so large that the exports were insufficient to pay for it; and when silver was thus found necessary to make up the balance, the imperial anger waxed stronger and stronger. The ‘barbarians’ were commanded not to bring any more opium; but, finding the trade too profitable to be abandoned, they continued their dealings in spite of the mandates of the celestial potentate.
The year 1831 may be said to have commenced the political or international stage of this difficulty. The governor-general of India wrote a letter to the governor of Canton, complaining of the conduct of the Chinese authorities, and demanding explanations, &c. Why his lordship, rather than any functionary in England, did this, was because the East India Company in those days sold opium on its own account, and made use of its political power to render that trade as profitable as possible—one of the pernicious anomalies arising out of the Company’s double functions. In 1832, the governor of Canton vouchsafed a partial explanation, but only to the Hong merchants—refusing with superb scorn, to communicate either with the Company’s merchants, or with the governor-general. In 1833 an imperial edict forbade the introduction of opium; but this, like many that preceded it, remained inoperative. In 1834 the Company’s trading monopoly ceasing, private merchants thereupon engaged in the tea-trade with China. The English government sent three commissioners—Lord Napier, Mr (afterwards Sir) J. F. Davis, and Sir G. B. Robinson—as ‘superintendents of British commerce in China.’ The Chinese authorities refused to acknowledge these commissioners in any way, in spite of numerous invitations; while on the other hand the commissioners refused to retire from Canton to Macao. These disputes led to violence, and the violence brought a British ship-of-war up the Canton river. A compromise was the result—the commissioners retiring to Macao, and the Chinese authorities allowing the resumption of the opium-traffic. Lord Napier died towards the close of the year, and was succeeded as chief-superintendent by Mr Davis—Captain Elliot being appointed secretary, and afterwards third superintendent. During the next three years trade continued; but the Chinese officials were uniformly rude and insulting. The British government would not permit Captain Elliot to submit to these indignities; missives and counter-missives passed to and fro; and the year 1837 ended with threatening symptoms. In 1838 Admiral Maitland arrived in Canton river with a ship of war, to protect British interests—by cannon-balls, if not by friendly compact. The nearest approach to equality between the two nations was in an interview between Admiral Maitland and the Chinese Admiral Kwan; in which Maitland assured his brother-admiral that he would remain peaceful—until provoked. In 1839, as in previous years, the opium-trade was often violently interrupted by the Chinese authorities. The officers of the English government, political and naval, were placed in an embarrassing position in this matter; their duty was to protect Englishmen; but they could not compel the Chinese to trade in opium—for the Chinese government held the same power as all other despotic governments, of prohibiting or encouraging trade with other countries. In this year, when Maitland was absent, Elliot became powerless at Canton; he and all the English were made prisoners, and could not obtain release until they had destroyed all the opium in the English stores—more than twenty thousand chests. This was done: Elliot guaranteeing that the English government would repay the merchants. Commissioner Lin saw that the opium was wholly destroyed; and by the end of May almost every European had quitted Canton.
It was thus that commenced the first Chinese war—a war which had a bad moral basis on the English side; since it arose more out of the forced sale of an intoxicating drug, than out of any other circumstance. The British government, finding themselves bound by Captain Elliot’s promise to pay an enormous sum for the opium destroyed, and feeling the importance of maintaining British supremacy in the east, resolved to settle the quarrel by warlike means. Fighting and negotiating alternated during 1840 and the two following years. At one time, Sir Gordon Bremer, at another, Sir Hugh Gough, commanded troops on the Chinese coast,
## acting in conjunction with ships-of-war; and according to the amount of
naval or military success, so did the Chinese authorities manifest or not a disposition to treat. Commissioner Lin, then Commissioner Keshen, and afterwards Commissioner Key-ing, conducted negotiations—a perilous duty; for their imperial master did not scruple to punish, or even to put to death, those diplomatists who made a treaty distasteful to him; and nothing but the noise of cannon induced him to respect treaties when made. The chief military and naval events of the three years, in connection with this struggle, were the following: The British ship _Hellas_ attacked by junks, and many of the crew killed; an attempt to burn the British fleet by fire-rafts; Chusan taken by the English; naval
## action near Macao; attack and capture of Chuen-pe and Tae-cok-tow;
Hong-kong taken by the English; the Bogue forts, with 460 guns, taken by Sir Gordon Bremer; Canton attacked by the British, under Sir Hugh Gough, and only spared on the prompt payment of five million dollars; Amoy, with 300 guns, taken by the British; the cities of Ting-hae, Ching-hae, Ning-po, and several others on the coast, captured; several military engagements in the vicinity of the captured cities; an advance of a powerful squadron up the Yang-tsze-kiang; and a threatening of the great city of Nankin, which brought the emperor effectually to terms—all the previous offers of negotiation on the part of the Chinese having been mere expedients to save time.
The war ended thuswise. Sir Henry Pottinger arrived in the Chinese waters in April 1842, with full power as representative of the British Crown; and it was he who procured the important ‘Treaty of Nankin,’ signed by the respective plenipotentiaries in 1842, and the ratifications exchanged by the respective sovereigns in 1843. This treaty having had an important bearing on the later or second war with China, we will epitomise a few of its chief conditions: Lasting peace and friendship established between England and China—China to pay 21,000,000 dollars for the opium destroyed, and for the expenses of the war; the payments to be spread over four years—The ports of Canton, Amoy, Fuh-choo-foo, Ning-po, and Shang-hae, to be thrown open to British merchants, with consular facilities, and just and regular tariffs—The island of Hong-kong to become a permanent British possession—All British subjects, at that time confined in China, to be at once and unconditionally released—The Chinese emperor to give an amnesty to all his own subjects, in respect of any proceedings on their part friendly to the British—Correspondence in future to be conducted on terms of perfect equality between the officers of the two governments—The islands of Chusan and Kulangsoo to be held by the British until the fulfilment of all the conditions of the treaty, and then given up.
Under the influence of this Treaty of Nankin, trade rapidly extended between England and China. Instead of being confined to Canton, and conducted in a stealthy and undignified manner, it was openly carried on at five ports. The British government did not undertake to protect the opium-trade more than that in any other commodity; on the contrary, the representatives of the English government would gladly have seen that trade diminish; but in truth, the East India Company realised several millions sterling a year profit by it, and English merchants reaped many additional millions: insomuch that a very powerful influence was brought to back up this trade.
A ‘Supplementary Treaty’ was signed in October 1843, for regulating the terms of commercial intercourse at the five ports, and providing for the courteous reception of British representatives by the Chinese officials, in matters relating to mutual trade. During the thirteen years following the signature of the Treaty of Nankin, the trade between England and China gradually increased, though not at so rapid a rate as had been hoped by British manufacturers and merchants. The English had trading establishments, with consuls and other officials, at the five ports, and a colony or military settlement at Hong-kong; while there were always a few ships-of-war in the Chinese waters. The relations, however, were not wholly peaceful. The inhabitants of Canton had a general ill-will towards the English; so had the imperial viceroy; and violence arising out of this ill-will led to a brief period of hostilities. In April 1847, the English seized the Bogue Forts, in the Canton river, in order to obtain redress for various insults; this seizure was followed by a new convention.
Thus matters continued until October 1856. On the 8th of that month, an incident occurred, trivial in itself, which gave rise to the ‘Second War with China.’ Sir John Bowring was at that time chief representative of British interests in China, with Hong-kong as his head-quarters; Admiral Sir Michael Seymour commanded the royal ships in those seas; Commodore Elliot was under Seymour in the Canton and Hong-kong district; and Mr Parkes was consul at Canton. These were the English officials more immediately concerned in the matter. On the day here named, a Chinese officer and a party of soldiers boarded a _lorcha_ or small vessel called the _Arrow_, anchored off Canton; and then seized twelve out of fourteen of the crew, bound them, and carried them away. The _Arrow_ had a colonial register from the governor of Hong-kong, which placed it under British protection; the master, an Englishman, protested against the seizure, but was not listened to. The British flag, too, was hauled down from the lorcha. This was the statement on the part of the British. Most of the accusations, however, were stoutly denied by the officials of Canton, who asserted that the lorcha was Chinese, that the owner was Chinese, that the crew were Chinese, and that the boarding was effected simply to take into custody men who had committed some offence against Chinese laws.
When the seizure of the men from the _Arrow_ became known, Mr Parkes remonstrated with the Chinese officer, on the ground that the crew were under British protection. No notice being taken of this remonstrance, Mr Parkes communicated with the highest dignitary in that part of China, whose name was Yeh Mingchin, and whose office was variously designated imperial commissioner, governor, and viceroy. The letter sent by Parkes to this functionary demanded that the twelve men should be brought back to the lorcha by the same officer who had taken them away, that an apology should be made, and an assurance given that the British flag should in future be respected. The men were sent back, after much negotiation; but Mr Parkes complained that the return ‘was not made in the public manner which had marked the seizure, and that all appearance of an apology was pointedly avoided.’ The facts were communicated to Sir John Bowring, and by him to Admiral Seymour. No real injury had been done, for the men had been reinstated; but there was an insult, which the English representatives conceived themselves bound to resent. They had often been piqued at the absence of respect shewn by the officers of the Celestial Empire, and were willing to avail themselves of any reasonable opportunity for bringing about a more diplomatic state of affairs.
The first act of war occurred on the part of the British. Sir John Bowring recommended to the admiral the seizure of a Chinese junk or war-boat, as a probable mode of bringing an apology. Sir Michael accordingly directed Commodore Elliot, of the _Sybille_, to carry out Bowring’s instructions; and placed at his disposal the _Burracouta_ steam-sloop and the _Coromandel_ tender. A junk was seized; but this was a profitless adventure; for, being found to be private property, the junk was given up again. The admiral next sent the steam-frigates _Encounter_ and _Sampson_ up the Canton river; ‘in the hope that the presence of such an imposing force would shew the high-commissioner the prudence of complying with our demands.’ The Chinese viceroy remained, nevertheless, immovable; he made no apology. Mr Parkes thereupon went from Canton to Hong-kong, to consult with Bowring and Seymour as to the best course to be adopted. They all agreed that the seizure of the defences of the city of Canton would be the most judicious, both as a display of power without the sacrifice of life, and of the determination of the English to enforce redress—‘experience of the Chinese character having proved that moderation is considered by the officials only as an evidence of weakness.’
Then commenced the second stage in the proceedings. On the 23d of October, Sir Michael Seymour went in person up to Canton, with the _Coromandel_, _Sampson_, and _Barracouta_, and accompanied by the marines and boat-crews of the _Calcutta_, _Winchester_, _Bittern_, and _Sybille_. He captured four forts a few miles below Canton, spiked the guns, destroyed the ammunition, and burned the buildings. Another, the Macao fort, in the middle of the river, mounting 86 guns, he retained and garrisoned for a time. Mr Parkes was then sent to announce to Yeh that the British admiral had come to enforce redress for insults received, and would remain in the river until redress was obtained. The high-commissioner sent a reply which was not deemed satisfactory. On the morning of the 24th, marines and sailors were sent to capture the ‘Bird’s Nest Fort,’ the Shamin Fort, and others near Canton; this they did, spiking the guns and destroying the ammunition. On the afternoon of the same day, strong reinforcements were sent to the British factory, or trading-station of the merchants, to protect it from any sudden attack, and to guard against the floating of fire-rafts by the Chinese on the river.
‘Apology’ was the demand made by the British representatives; but no apology came; and thereupon the siege of Canton was proceeded with. On the 25th, a fort called the Dutch Folly, immediately opposite the city, was captured. The 26th being Sunday, nothing was done on that day. On the 27th, the admiral heightened his demands. He caused Consul Parkes to write to the Chinese commissioner, to the effect that as the required apology and reparation had not been given, the terms should be made more stringent. Henceforward, the field of contest was widened; it was no longer the lorcha and the flag alone that constituted the grievance. Sir John Bowring probably thought that the same amount of threat and of fighting, if fighting there must be, might be made to settle other annoyances, as well as those more immediately under notice. No reply being sent to Parkes’s letter, the guns of the _Encounter_ and _Barracouta_ were brought to bear upon the Chinese commissioner’s residence, and upon some troops posted on the hills behind a fort named by the English Gough’s Fort. This enraged Yeh Mingchin, who issued a proclamation, offering a reward of thirty dollars for every Englishman’s head.
Sir Michael, resolved to punish this obstinate viceroy, made preparations for a much more serious attack. He sent Captain Hall on shore, to warn the inhabitants of Canton to remove their persons and property from the vicinity of a certain portion of the city; this they did during the night of the 27th. On the 28th, a bombardment was kept up from the Dutch Folly, with a view of opening a clear passage to the wall of the city; and when this passage was opened by noon on the 29th, a storming-party was sent in under Commodore Elliot. Marines and sailors, with two field-pieces, advanced to the wall, and speedily obtained possession of the defences between two of the city-gates. One of the gates was then blown to pieces by gunpowder, and another body of seamen advanced to that spot under Captain Hall. Soon afterwards, Seymour, Parkes, and Elliot entered the city through this shattered gate, went to the high-commissioner’s house, inspected it, remained there some time, and then returned to the ships. The motive for this visit was a singular one, unusual in European warlike politics, but having a significance in dealing with so peculiar a people as the Chinese; it was simply (in the words of the admiral’s dispatch) ‘to shew his excellency that I had the power to enter the city.’
The month of November opened ominously. The British were determined to humble the pride of the Chinese officials; whereas, these officials shewed no signs of yielding. Admiral Seymour now addressed a letter in his own name to the high-commissioner, adverting to the case of the _Arrow_; pointing threateningly to the fact that Canton was at the mercy of cannon-balls, and inviting him to terminate the unsatisfactory state of affairs by a personal interview. He claimed credit, rather than the reverse, for his conduct towards the city. ‘It has been wholly with a view to the preservation of life, that my operations have hitherto been so deliberately conducted. Even when entering the city, no blood was shed, save where my men were assailed; and the property of the people was in every way respected.’ Commissioner Yeh’s reply to this letter was not deficient in courtesy or dignity; whether or not he believed his own assertions, he at least put them forth in temperate language. He maintained, as he had before asserted to Consul Parkes, that the seizure of the twelve men on board the _Arrow_ was perfectly legal; that some of them had been released on their innocence of an imputed crime being proved; that the other three were given up when Parkes demanded them; that the _Arrow_ was a Chinese vessel; that the authorities had no means of knowing that she had passed into the hands of an Englishman; that no flag was flying when the vessel was boarded, and, therefore, no flag could have been insultingly hauled down. The non-admission of English representatives into Canton was defended on the plea that, the less the two nations came in contact, the less were they likely to quarrel. Again was a letter written, and in more threatening terms than before. Sir Michael refused to discuss in writing the case of the _Arrow_, and insisted that nothing short of a personal interview between himself and Yeh, either on shipboard, or in Canton city, could settle the quarrel. Nothing daunted, Commissioner Yeh replied on the 3d, reiterating his assertions of the justice of his cause, and acceding to no propositions for a personal interview.
On the 6th a naval engagement took place on the river. The Chinese collected twenty-three war-junks in one spot, under the protection of the French Folly fort, mounted with twenty-six heavy guns. This fort was a little lower down the river than the Dutch Folly. Seymour resolved to disperse this junk-fleet at once. Commodore Elliot headed an attack by the guns, the crews, and the boats of the _Barracouta_ and _Coromandel_. A fierce exchange of firing took place: the Chinese having no less than a hundred and fifty guns in the junks and the fort. The fort was taken, the guns spiked, and the ammunition destroyed; the Chinese were driven out of the junks, and twenty-two of those vessels were burned. No fighting took place on the 7th. On the 8th the Chinese made a bold attempt to burn the British ships by fire-rafts; but the intended mischief was frustrated. The commissioner still being immovable, Bowring now suggested to Seymour that the next step ought to be the capture and destruction of the Bogue Forts—four powerfully armed defences on which the Chinese much relied. This was done after more fruitless negotiation.
[Illustration:
Chinese War-junks. ]
Admiral Seymour had thus, by the middle of November, obtained full command of the Canton river; and he then stayed his operations for a while. The original cause of dispute, comparatively trifling, had now given place to a very grave state of affairs; and it remained to be seen whether the Palmerston ministry would lay all the blame on the obstinacy of Commissioner Yeh, or whether Bowring and Seymour would be considered to have exceeded their powers and their duties. So far as concerns the attitude of the Cantonese themselves, three deputations from the principal merchants and gentry waited on Mr Parkes between the 8th and 12th of November, to express their wishes that an amicable termination of the quarrel could be brought about; but at the same time to assert their conviction that, such was the inflexibility of the high-commissioner’s character, he would never alter his expressed determination to refuse the English representatives admission into the city.
It may be well to remark in this place that the opium difficulty, which was unquestionably paramount above all others in the first war with China, had now lost much of its importance. The imperial government had in later years issued very few edicts against the traffic in this drug. Perhaps the quietness in this matter was mainly due to the fact that the export of silver to pay for the Indian opium was no longer needed—the increased sale of tea and silk being sufficient to make up an equivalent.
On the 26th of the month, other armed forts in the Canton river were taken by the English. The Chinese, in revenge for these proceedings, burned and destroyed almost all the European factories, mercantile buildings, and banks at Canton—leaving so little but ruins that Admiral Seymour could hardly find a roof to cover the seamen and marines when they afterwards landed. The commercial losses might be repaired; but an irreparable consequence of the incendiarism was the destruction of Dr Williams’s printing establishment; including the large founts of Chinese type with which Morrison’s Dictionary was printed; and comprising also more than 10,000 unsold volumes of books.
In this sort of piecemeal war, each successive attack irritated in its turn the opposite party; but the burning of the factories determined Bowring and Seymour to the adoption of a sterner policy than had hitherto been displayed. They resolved to bombard Canton itself, and to send an application to the governor-general of India for military aid—trusting that the home-government would hold them justified in adopting this course under difficulties and responsibilities of no light kind.
The year 1856 came to a close. The new year was ushered in with an attack by the Chinese on Dutch Folly on the 1st of January. Six guns mounted on the Canton shore, and four on the opposite shore, fired into the Folly; but the small English force there stationed soon quelled this attack. On the 4th, a fleet of war-junks opened fire on the _Comus_ and _Hornet_ at the barrier in Macao Passage. No sooner did news of this attack reach Admiral Seymour, than he hastened forward in the _Coromandel_, towing all the available boats of the other ships. On nearing the junks, some of them undauntedly attacked the _Coromandel_, the boats, and a fort called the Teetotum Fort, which the English had before captured. The junks were heavily armed, and some of them had long snake-boats lashed to each side to row them along. A third fleet came down Sulphur Creek, and attacked the _Niger_ and the _Encounter_. This was altogether a new aspect of the quarrel; the Chinese, not in the least humbled by the demands of Bowring and Seymour, became the assailants in the Canton river, and fought with a resolution hardly expected by their opponents. The attacks were not attended with very definite results. Not one junk was taken; they retired and collected into a somewhat formidable fleet of nearly four hundred.
The state of affairs was in every sense unsatisfactory to the English authorities. Commissioner Yeh was as firm as ever, and severely reproved the Canton gentry and merchants who had sent deputations to Sir Michael. He issued proclamations, denouncing the ‘barbarians’ in fiercer terms than before. Cruel massacres took place, whenever an isolated Englishman chanced to fall into the hands of the Chinese. Proclamations in the native language found their way to Hong-kong, inviting the seventy thousand Chinese residing in that island to rise against their English employers. Some of these Chinese were detected in attempts to introduce poison into the bread made for and sold to the English residents by the Chinese bakers. Against all this Bowring and Seymour could do little; and yet something, it was felt, must be attempted; for British trade at Canton was for a time ruined; and if matters were allowed to remain in their present state, the triumph of the Chinese would be most humiliating and pernicious to the English.
During the month of January (1857), while no progress was made in settling the differences at Canton, the spirit of the Chinese at Hong-kong became more and more hostile to the British; nor were those at Singapore unaffected by the taint. The warlike movements of the month—so far as that can be called war where no war had yet been declared—exasperated the Chinese, without making any impression on the obstinacy of Yeh. They consisted in the destruction of a portion of the city of Canton. Early on the morning of the 12th, bodies of marines and sailors set forth, armed with fireballs, torches, steeped oakum, &c.; they were conveyed in ships’ boats, and landed on different parts of the suburbs of the city. The boats then retired a little way from the shore, while the _Barracouta_, _Encounter_, and _Niger_, kept watch in the middle of the river. The men advanced into the outer streets of the city, and commenced the work of destruction. The houses being mostly built of wood, they were easily ignited, and the breeze within an hour united all the fires into one vast sheet of flame. To increase the destruction, shot and shell were poured into the city from the ships and the fort. Throughout the whole of the day, did this miserable work continue—miserable in so far as it inflicted much suffering on the inhabitants, without hastening the capture of the city. On the 13th the attack ceased; Sir Michael Seymour made what arrangements he could to retain command of the passage of the Canton river; while the Cantonese provided for their houseless towns-people in hastily built structures. The British naval force under Sir Michael Seymour, comprising all the ships in the India and China seas, was by this time very formidable. It comprised the _Calcutta_ (84), _Raleigh_ (50), _Nanking_ (50), _Sybille_ (40), _Pique_ (40), eight other sailing-vessels varying from 12 to 26 guns, twelve war-steamers, and seven steam gun-boats. These could have wrought great achievements in action at sea, with their 5000 seamen and marines; but there were scarcely any regular troops to conduct operations on land.
During February, the English consuls and traders could not but observe the increasing hostility of the Chinese. Dastardly assassinations occasionally took place; piracy was more rampant than ever; war-junks made their appearance wherever an English boat appeared to be insufficiently guarded; and proclamations were issued in the name of the emperor, applauding the firmness of Yeh. The merchants wished either that the affair of the _Arrow_ had never been taken notice of by the British authorities, or else that the warlike operations had been carried on with more resolute effect. All the commercial relations had become disturbed, without any perceptible prospect of a return to peaceful trade. One of the worst features in the state of affairs was this—that as the English throughout the whole of the China seas were at all times few in number, they were obliged to employ Chinese servants and helpers; and these Chinamen were found now to be very little trustworthy. On the 23d of the month, the passenger-steamer _Queen_ was on its way from Hong-kong to Macao; when suddenly the Chinese passengers joined with the Chinese crew in a murderous attack on the English passengers and officers, by which several lives were lost.
March arrived, but with it no solution of the Chinese difficulty. Even supposing Sir John Bowring, by this time, to have received instructions from home, warlike or otherwise, there had been no time to send him reinforcements of troops; and until such arrived, any extensive operations on land would be impracticable. Sir John and his colleagues waited until their hands were strengthened.
In April, Seymour as well as Bowring remained quietly at Hong-kong, effecting nothing except the destruction of some junks. On the 6th, Commodore Elliot, with a fleet of armed boats from the _Sampson_, _Hornet_, _Sybille_, and _Nanking_, captured and destroyed eleven war-junks and two well-armed lorchas, after a chase and an engagement which lasted all day. Documents fell into the hands of the authorities at Hong-kong, tending to prove the complicity of the mandarins and many inhabitants of Canton in the various plots of incendiarism, kidnapping, and assassination, which had imperiled the persons and property of the English at that island. There were no present means of punishing these conspirators; but the discovery led to increased watchfulness.
The month of May witnessed no advance towards a settlement of Chinese difficulties. A great rebellion was distracting many inland provinces of the gigantic empire; but it did not appear that this could in any way help the English. Commissioner Yeh remained in his official residence at Canton, promising nothing, yielding nothing, and endeavouring to strengthen the city against the English. The Chinese, on the 3d, made an attempt to blow up the _Acorn_ sloop-of-war in the Canton River, by means of a large iron tank filled with gunpowder, which was exploded close to the sloop; and a similar tank was afterwards found close to the _Hornet_—the first was exploded with little damage; the second was discovered before explosion.
Now occurred the sudden and startling outbreak in India, which wrought a most signal influence on the progress of affairs in China. Before this influence can usefully be traced, it will be necessary to glance briefly at the proceedings in England having reference to the Chinese quarrel.
It will be remembered that Sir John Bowring had incurred the heavy responsibility of commencing hostilities in October 1856, without special Foreign-office instructions; and that Sir Michael Seymour was equally without Admiralty instructions. These officers could not possibly receive an expression either of approval or condemnation, of advice or command, from England, until four or five months after the commencement of the troubles. It was near the close of the year when the British government received particulars of the first operations against Canton; and it was about the beginning of 1857 when the British newspapers and the nation took up the subject in earnest.
Immediately on the opening of the session of parliament in February 1857, ministers were eagerly pressed for information concerning the hostilities in China; because there was a general impression that an unduly severe punishment had been inflicted by Bowring and Seymour on the Chinese for a very small offence. On the 5th of February, the Earl of Ellenborough asked for the production of papers which might throw light on the affair of the lorcha _Arrow_, and prove whether it was an English or a Chinese vessel. The Earl of Clarendon, after promising the production of all the needful documents, stated that Sir John Bowring had not received any special instructions to demand admission into China; but that his general instructions authorised him ‘to bear in mind the desirableness of obtaining that free access to Chinese ports which was mentioned in the treaty, and more particularly as regarded Canton.’ Whether the means adopted by Bowring to obtain this free access were commendable, was a question on which the Houses of Parliament soon became fiercely engaged. Sir George Bonham, Bowring’s predecessor, had not thought the admission into Canton a matter of great moment; and as Bowring was appointed by the Whigs, the Conservatives soon contrived to make a party question of it. Among the papers made public by the government about this time, was a dispatch written by the Earl of Clarendon to Sir John Bowring on the 10th of December 1856. The earl had just learned all that occurred at Canton between the 8th and the 15th of October; and he expressed an approval of the course pursued by Bowring and Parkes. Referring to voluminous documents which had been transmitted to him, he declared his opinions that the lorcha _Arrow_ had a British master, British flag, and British papers, and was therefore a British vessel under the terms of the existing treaty; that if the Chinese authorities suspected there were pirates among the crew, they should have applied to the English consul, and not have taken the law into their own hands by boarding and violence—in short, he approved of what the British officials had done, so far as concerned the single week’s proceedings which had alone come to his knowledge. Another mail brought over news of the seizure of the junks, and of the forcible entry of Sir Michael Seymour into Commissioner Yeh’s house. This conduct met with the marked and clearly expressed commendation of the Earl of Clarendon, who, in a dispatch written on the 10th of January, complimented Seymour, Bowring, and Parkes on the moderation they had displayed under difficult circumstances.
On the 24th of February, the Earl of Derby moved a series of resolutions in the House of Lords: ‘That this House has heard with deep regret of the interruption of amicable relations between her Majesty’s subjects and the Chinese authorities at Canton; arising out of the measures adopted by her Majesty’s chief-superintendent of trade to obtain reparation for alleged infractions of the Supplementary Treaty of the 8th of October 1843. That, in the opinion of this House, the occurrence of differences on this subject rendered the time peculiarly unfavourable for pressing on the Chinese authorities a claim for the admittance of British subjects into Canton, which had been left in abeyance since 1849; and for supporting the same by force of arms. That, in the opinion of this House, operations of actual hostilities ought not to have been undertaken without the express instructions, previously received, of her Majesty’s government; and that neither of the subjects adverted to in the foregoing resolutions afforded sufficient justification for such operations.’ These resolutions at once threw the whole blame on Sir John Bowring; his ‘measures adopted’ caused the ‘interruption of amicable relations,’ and the House ‘heard with deep regret’ this news. Of course, the ministers could not sanction the resolutions; they had already sent over approval of Bowring’s conduct, and now they must manfully defend him. Hence arose a most exciting debate. The Treaty of 1842, the Supplementary Treaty of 1843, the Convention of 1847—all came into discussion, as well as the documents which had passed between the British and Chinese authorities. It became a party battle. All or nearly all the Whigs defended Sir John; all or nearly all the Conservatives attacked him. The judicial peers on the one side declared that the papers proved the _Arrow_ to be a British vessel; those on the other asserted that the registry of that vessel at Hong-kong had not been so conducted as to render this fact certain. The statesmen on the one side argued that Bowring was right to insist on being admitted into Canton by virtue of the treaty; those on the other contended that the right was not such as to justify him in bombarding the city. The general adherents of the one party believed the statement that the flag of the _Arrow_ had been insultingly hauled down by the Chinese; those of the other credited the Chinese statement that the flag had not been hauled down. And so throughout the debate. It was quite as much a contest of Conservative against Whig, as of Bowring against Yeh. The Earl of Derby made a vehement appeal to the peers, for their condemnation of Sir John’s conduct in going to war without express orders from home; and an earnest exhortation to the bishops ‘to come forward on this occasion and vindicate the cause of religion, humanity, and civilisation from the outrage which had been inflicted upon it by the British representatives in Canton.’ He declared that ‘he should be disappointed indeed if the right reverend bench did not respond to this appeal.’ The legal argument was very strongly contested against the government; Lords Lyndhurst, St Leonards, and Wensleydale all contending that, owing to some irregularities in the registry, the _Arrow_ was virtually a Chinese vessel in October 1856, and that the Chinese authorities had a right to board it in search of pirates. On a division, the resolutions were negatived by 146 against 110—the bishops, notwithstanding the Earl of Derby’s appeal, being as much divided as the other peers.
[Illustration:
CANTON. ]
On the 26th the Commons took up the subject, in connection with a resolution proposed by Mr Cobden—‘That this House has heard with concern of the conflicts which have occurred between the British and Chinese authorities in the Canton river; and, without expressing an opinion as to the extent to which the government of China may have afforded this country cause of complaint respecting the non-fulfilment of the treaty of 1842, this House considers that the papers which have been laid upon the table fail to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measures resorted to at Canton in the late affair of the _Arrow_; and that a select committee be appointed to inquire into the state of our commercial relations with China.’ This motion was more important than the one in the Lords, since it led to a dissolution of parliament. The debates extended through four evenings. Sir John Bowring was attacked by Mr Cobden, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, Lord John Russell, Mr Warren, Mr Whiteside, Lord Goderich, Sir John Pakington, Sir F. Thesiger, Mr Sidney Herbert, Mr Roundell Palmer, Mr Milner Gibson, Mr Henley, Mr Roebuck, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli; while he was defended by Mr Labouchere, Mr Lowe, the Lord Advocate, Admiral Sir Charles Napier, Admiral Sir Maurice Berkeley, the Attorney-general, Sir George Grey, Sir Fenwick Williams ‘of Kars,’ Mr Serjeant Shee, Mr Bernal Osborne, and Lord Palmerston. It was not merely a contest between Liberals and Conservatives; for the Derby party were joined here by the small but influential Peel party; while the names of Russell, Cobden, Goderich, Milner Gibson, and Roebuck will shew to how large an extent the Liberals were dissatisfied with the proceedings in China. The arguments employed were such as have been more than once adverted to—that the _Arrow_ was rather a Chinese than an English vessel; that the Chinese authorities had a right to board it, to search for pirates; that no British flag was hauled down, because none was flying on the lorcha at the time; that the return of the crew by the authorities ought to have satisfied Mr Parkes; that as Commissioner Yeh gave explanations, a demand ought not to have been made upon him for an apology also; that Sir John Bowring ought not to have extended the quarrel so as to include the question of his admission into Canton; that the seizure of the junks was illegal; and that the bombardment of Canton was not only illegal, but ferocious and unbefitting Christian men. Every one of these positions was disputed by the government; nevertheless the House of Commons sanctioned them, or the resolutions which implied them, by a majority of 263 over 247. This vote, arrived at on the 3d of March, determined Lord Palmerston to appeal to the country by dissolving the existing parliament and assembling a new one.
During the interregnum between the two parliaments, public opinion was much divided concerning Chinese affairs. Lord Palmerston was at that time in much favour, and his courage was admired in defending an absent subordinate when fiercely attacked; still it was not without a painful feeling that the nation heard of a great city being bombarded for trivial reasons. Those who most warmly defended Sir John Bowring were those who best knew the faithlessness of the Chinese authorities. By a combination of various causes, direct and indirect, a new House of Commons was elected more devoted to Lord Palmerston than the one which preceded it; and the Chinese war then became a settled question, so far as that branch of the legislature was concerned. During the interval of more than two months, between the adverse vote on the 3d of March and the assembling of the new parliament on the 7th of May, the government were making arrangements for bringing the Chinese difficulty to a satisfactory termination. They told off certain regiments to be sent to China; they appointed General Ashburnham to command them; they sent over the Earl of Elgin with large powers to control the whole of the proceedings; and they arranged with the French government a joint plan of action for obtaining, if possible, free commerce at all the Chinese ports. This scheme of policy was formed and partially put in execution; but the various portions of it were only by degrees made publicly known.
When parliament reassembled in May, numerous questions were put to the ministers in both Houses—concerning the appointment of General Ashburnham; the poisonings at Hong-kong; the treatment of Chinese prisoners; the relations between the East India Company and China in reference to the opium trade; the condition of Hong-kong as a British colony; the emigration of Chinese coolies—and other matters bearing upon the state of affairs in the Chinese seas. It speedily transpired that the French government had appointed Baron Gros, to act with the Earl of Elgin in the political negotiations with the Chinese; that the United States government would also send out a plenipotentiary; and that the Russian governor of the sterile provinces on the banks of the Amoor would be intrusted with similar powers by the court of St Petersburg. If peaceful efforts should fail to bring the Chinese government to amicable relations, war was to be carried on more energetically than before. In addition to the regiments of troops, the British government sent out the _Furious_ steam-frigate, the _Surprise_ and _Mohawk_ dispatch-boats, thirteen steam gun-boats, and a steam transport. The Earl of Elgin left England on the 21st of April; General Ashburnham had started two or three weeks earlier; and the troops had gradually been shipped off as transport for them could be obtained. Certain regiments had been assigned to India, to relieve other regiments which had been long stationed there; but it was now proposed to send them first to China, whence, after settling the troubles, they might be transferred to India.
Little did the English government foresee how strangely their plans would be overturned by the formidable Revolt in India. In the earlier half of the month of June, the English nation directed no particular attention to the affairs of the east. The Persian war had come to a close; the Chinese difficulty was languidly waiting for a solution; and news of the Indian Revolt had not yet arrived. But the close of the month witnessed a different state of things. The terrible tragedies at Meerut and Delhi were now known; and legislators and the press alike demanded that the comparatively unimportant Chinese expedition should not be allowed to absorb the services of Queen’s troops so much needed in India. On the 29th, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Ellenborough said: ‘We have sent to China that naval force which should, in my opinion, be left upon the shores of England, to give security to this country even under the auspices of the most profound peace. That naval force has been despatched to the Chinese waters—for what?—to carry on a contest between Sir John Bowring and Commissioner Yeh! Six battalions of troops have been sent out there for the same purpose; but I cannot help thinking that those six battalions will be found insufficient to bring under our control the numerous population of Canton. The consequence will be, that we shall find ourselves under the necessity of sending out further reinforcements. But are we, with India in danger, to fight the battle of the government? Are we, my lords, determined, happen what may, to persevere in that fatal policy which her Majesty’s ministers have adopted?’ Similar animadversions were made in the House of Commons by Mr Disraeli. The ministers, while announcing the immediate dispatch of more troops to India, did not promise that the Chinese expedition should be diverted from its purpose; for they underrated at that time the serious import of the sepoy revolt. Soon afterwards, however, when the news from India became more and more gloomy, orders were issued that some of the troops not yet embarked should be sent to India instead of China. As no such catastrophe as a mutiny in India could reasonably be anticipated when the Earl of Elgin was sent out, the ministers could not tell how far that plenipotentiary might accede to any application made to him by the governor-general of India for the use of the troops already approaching or in the Indian seas.
Such being the progress of opinion and of preparation in England in reference to the Chinese quarrel, we may resume the rapid sketch of operations in China itself.
When, at about the middle of May 1857, Viscount Canning received news at Calcutta of the disasters at Meerut and Delhi, he instantly, as we have seen in a former chapter,[194] transmitted telegraphic messages to Bombay, Ceylon, and Madras. He inquired whether the Earl of Elgin and General Ashburnham had arrived at either of those stations, on their way to China; and made earnest applications that the troops sent from England to China might be diverted from that route, and despatched to Calcutta instead. Canning and Elgin had both been intrusted by their sovereign with extensive powers; both, when they came to communicate, saw that the events in India were more critical than those in China; and both were of opinion that the Queen’s troops were more wanted on the Jumna and Ganges than on the Canton or Pekin rivers. Hence arose an almost entire stoppage of the operations in the China seas till towards the close of the year. The slight events that marked the summer and autumn may be noticed in a few brief paragraphs.
Towards the close of May, before any considerable reinforcements could reach China, an attack was made by the British on a fleet of Chinese war-junks with very considerable effect. One of the many channels which the Canton river presents, called by the English Escape Creek, being known to contain a large fleet of junks, Commodore Elliot was ordered to make a vigorous demonstration in that quarter. On the 25th he entered the creek, with the _Hong-kong_, _Bustard_, _Staunch_, _Starling_, and _Forbes_, towing boats filled with men from the _Inflexible_, _Hornet_, and _Tribune_. He found forty-one mandarin junks, all heavily armed, moored across the creek; a brisk engagement ensued; and it was not until after the loss of many men, on the 25th and two following days, that the junks were destroyed.
The month of June opened with an engagement of more importance—the battle of Fatshan. This city is about seven miles distant in a straight line from Canton, but lying upon a different affluent of the Canton river. The expedition was not so much against Fatshan itself, as against a fleet of junks lying in the Fatshan branch or channel. Sir Michael Seymour himself accompanied this expedition. The channel was too narrow to admit any except small-craft; and therefore the work was to be done by gun-boats and row-boats. At three in the morning of the 1st of June the expedition started forth, the _Coromandel_ towing three hundred marines in open boats. Many heavily armed forts line the Fatshan creek near the city, and these speedily opened fire as the boats advanced. When the _Coromandel_ had nearly reached the town, the _Hong-kong_, _Haughty_, _Bustard_, _Forester_, _Plover_, _Opossum_, and other gun-boats, steamed up, each having its few but formidable guns, and each towing ships’ boats full of ‘blue-jackets.’ The men landed at the foot of a hill which was crowned with a fort mounting twenty large guns, and which from that day was called Fort Seymour. The rush up the hill was exciting; commodores, captains, lieutenants, seamen, marines, all ran up, equally regardless of danger; and after a few rounds from the fort’s guns, the Chinese, dismayed at the boldness of the English, took flight, and ran away from their guns. The assailants then hastened to attack the junks, which, mounting twelve guns each, were able to pour forth a tremendous fire of shot and shell. How the British escaped with so little loss in this encounter is a marvel. The seamen were in ecstasies at the boldness of the duty assigned to them. The boats’ crews baffled the shots from so many hundred guns by rowing right up to the junks, _beneath_ the line of fire of the guns; and when there, they did not cease till they had set fire to the junks, from which the crews escaped precipitately over the opposite sides. Out of the seventy-two junks, sixty-seven were destroyed.
Anxious were the speculations whether these renewed successes would or would not lead to any decisive termination of the struggle. Bowring and Parkes among the civilians, Seymour and Elliot among the naval commanders, knew well enough that without a military force this could not be done. They knew, moreover, that until the Earl of Elgin should arrive, they could not be placed fully in possession of the views of the home-government. They anxiously counted the days before the new arrivals would be announced. The Earl of Elgin and General Ashburnham were at Bombay on the day when the disastrous news from Meerut and Delhi reached that city. The general went on to Hong-kong, where he arrived on the 10th of June; but the earl, after reaching Singapore, gave orders that two of the approaching regiments should be diverted from the Chinese expedition to the service of Viscount Canning. This was ominous of the cessation of any effective operations on the China coast. Elgin, moreover, issued orders that, if Canning should make pressing application for more aid, other regiments should be similarly diverted to Calcutta. Meanwhile, at Canton, Yeh remained as impassable as ever; he did not yield an inch. The rich were flying from the city, the poor were half starved by the stoppage of all trade; nevertheless these miseries, bad enough to the Chinese themselves, did not improve the position of the English.
Early in July the Earl of Elgin arrived in the _Shannon_ war-steamer. A large staff of military officers had now assembled at Hong-kong; but there was nothing for them to do, seeing that the regiments had not arrived, nor did it appear probable how soon Canning could spare them. A fleet and a staff of military officers were now in the Canton river almost in a state of idleness. The active correspondent of the _Times_, having no fighting to witness, made those rambling visits to Shang-hae and elsewhere which enabled him to give so graphic an account of the Chinese in their homes and shops and places of amusement. On the 13th the French admiral arrived at Hong-kong, to confer with Elgin on the policy to be pursued. At first there was an intention of steaming up to the Pei-ho river, on which the imperial city of Pekin stands, to bring the emperor to a conference. Within a few days, however, an urgent dispatch arrived from Viscount Canning, announcing that the revolt was spreading widely in India, and asking for further aid. The Earl of Elgin at once changed his plan. He set off to Calcutta, taking with him a force of fifteen hundred seamen and marines, mostly belonging to the _Shannon_ and _Pearl_ war-steamers. It was these hardy men who constituted the ‘Naval Brigades’ so often mentioned in past chapters of this work, and in service with which the gallant Captain Sir William Peel met his death. Elgin’s determination was arrived at in part from this circumstance—that Baron Gros, the French high-commissioner or plenipotentiary, was not expected at Hong-kong until September; and that any negotiations at Pekin would be weakened in force unless the two countries acted in conjunction through their respective representatives.
August found the English officers and seamen very little satisfied with their position and duties in the Chinese waters. An occasional junk-hunt was all that occurred to break the monotony. Of fighting, such as men-of-war’s men would dignify by the name, there was little or none. Yeh continued to govern Canton; the Cantonese continued to suffer by the suspension of their trade with the British. The four northern ports managed to retain a trade which was very lucrative to them—selling tea and silk to the English, and buying opium, which the Chinese dealers sold again at an enormous profit in the upper or inner provinces. As for the emperor at Pekin, the English authorities at Hong-kong had no means of determining to what extent he was cognizant of affairs in the south, nor how far he sanctioned the immovable line of policy followed by his viceroy at Canton.
In the early part of September, Yeh took advantage of the lull in warlike operations; he built more junks, cast more cannon, raised up several guns which had been sunk by the English, and collected a fleet of two hundred war-junks in the Canton and Fatshan waters, ready to encounter the ‘barbarians’ again in time of need. As a means of ascertaining what was in progress in this quarter, Commodore Elliot set forth from Hong-kong to make a reconnaissance. He started up the Canton river on the 9th, taking with him the gun-boats _Starling_, _Haughty_, and _Forester_, and the heavy boats of the _Sybille_ and _Highflyer_. He steamed through some of the channels, which are so numerous as to convert the banks of the river into a veritable archipelago, difficult to explore on account of the shallowness of the water in the channels. He met with a vast array of trading-junks, which he did not molest because they were engaged in peaceful commerce; and a few war-junks, which he destroyed; but he did not reach any spot where war-junks in large numbers were congregated. One event of this month was the appearance of Russia on the scene. Admiral Count Putiatine, who had been appointed governor of the Russian province of Amoor, and who had made a rapid overland journey from St Petersburg to the mouth of the Amoor in seventy days, steamed from that river to the Pei-ho on a diplomatic mission. The purport of this mission was not revealed to the English; but there were many at Hong-kong who surmised that Russia, like the United States, was secretly planning that a goodly share of any contingent advantages arising from the struggle should fall to her—leaving all the odium of hostilities on the shoulders of England and France.
When October arrived, the stormy state of the China seas rendered it doubtful how soon the Earl of Elgin’s diplomatic expedition to Pekin would take place. The British community at Hong-kong rather rejoiced at this; for they had all along advocated the simple formula—take Canton first, and negotiate with the emperor afterwards. The earl’s intention to postpone his visit becoming clearly known, many of the staff-officers who had been in enforced idleness at Hong-kong took their departure—some to Calcutta, some to other places. When Baron Gros arrived in the _Audacieuse_, which was not until the middle of October, the talk of the fleet was that Canton would be really and effectually besieged, as a preliminary to any proceedings further north. The _Imperador_ arrived towards the close of the month, bringing five hundred marines direct from England; and large accessions of warlike stores denoted a resolution on the part of the government to bring about some definite termination of this Chinese quarrel.
In November, General Ashburnham, apparently tired of doing nothing in China, gave up the military command and went to India, where a proffer of his services was courteously declined by Lord Canning and Sir Colin Campbell. His sudden return to England, without leave, gave rise to much comment in and out of parliament. General Straubenzee now became military commander in China, that is, commander of the British troops whenever they should arrive. Captain Sherard Osborne was collecting gun-boats from various quarters. Baron Gros undertook that France would operate in the capture of Canton, with three frigates, two corvettes, and four gun-boats, containing altogether about a thousand men. Mr Reed arrived in the _Minnesota_, as American commissioner to represent the interests of his country, but without any intention of taking part in the hostile demonstration. Throughout the whole affair, indeed, the United States ‘fraternised’ much more freely with Russia than with England and France.
At length the month arrived (December 1857) which was to witness the conquest of Canton. At the beginning of this month the European war-vessels in Chinese waters were really formidable in number. Besides the _Calcutta_ (80), there were, including everything from steam-frigates down to gun-boats, a total of 70 European and American war-vessels, of which no less than 49 were British. On the 12th of the month, the Earl of Elgin sent a formal letter to Commissioner Yeh—announcing his arrival as ambassador extraordinary from Queen Victoria to the Emperor of China, and as plenipotentiary to settle all existing differences; expressing the pleasure which England would feel in being on friendly terms with China; enumerating the causes of complaint against the Chinese authorities; demanding ‘the complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements, including the free admission of British subjects into the city,’ and ‘compensation to British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses incurred in consequence of the late disturbances;’ threatening a seizure of Canton if these terms were not acceded to; and hinting that the terms would in that case be rendered much more severe. On the 14th Yeh sent a reply, very tortuous and cunning, justifying the conduct of himself and his countrymen, but evading any direct notice of Elgin’s demand and threat. On the 24th the British plenipotentiary wrote to announce that, as his desire for a peaceful termination of the dispute had not been properly met, he should at once prepare for war. The next day (Christmas-day) brought a second letter from Yeh, repeating his former arguments in a very discursive fashion, but evading everything in the way of concession.
When December had brought what few troops the home-government and Lord Canning thought they could spare for China, the available numbers appeared as follow—800 men of various services, principally of the 59th foot, from the garrison of Hong-kong; 2500 marines belonging to the various ships; 1500 naval brigade formed from the ships’ crews for service on shore; and 900 French troops and seamen—making a total of 5700 men. These were aided by about 1000 Chinese and Malay coolies, as carriers and labourers—men who readily sold their patriotism for silver and copper. On the 16th, while the attempt at negotiation with Yeh was still going on, the English and French took possession of Honan, as a measure of precaution. This is an island just opposite Canton; its shore forms the Southwark of the great city. The merchants and traders were allowed all possible facilities for removing their families and goods from such buildings as the captors chose to appropriate—the wish being to inflict as small an amount of suffering as possible on the Chinese people, whom the Earl of Elgin carefully distinguished from the Chinese government. From the 16th to the 23d, steamers and gun-boats were daily arriving, and taking up positions mostly between Canton and the island. On the 22d a council was held, at which the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, having virtually declared war against China, gave up the command of the operations to the general and the two admirals—namely, General Straubenzee, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, and Admiral R. de Genouilly. On the 23d, several military and naval officers steamed in gun-boats past the whole length of the city, landed at a point beyond its northwestern extremity, walked a mile and a half under the escort of a party of marines and sailors, mounted a hill, made accurate observations on a series of forts north of the city, and returned without the loss of a man. On the 24th there was a similar reconnaissance east and northeast of the city. These examinations satisfied the officers that the capture of the northern forts must be made from the east rather than the west. Christmas-day and the two following days were spent in making preparations for the bombardment; and in distributing papers along the shore, announcing to the Cantonese what calamity was in store for their city if Yeh did not yield before midnight on the 27th. The viceroy remained as immovable as ever, and so the terrible work began.
At daylight on the morning of the 28th of December the guns opened fire. Their number was enormous—some in war-steamers, some in gun-boats, some on Honan Island, some in the captured forts. The general orders were to fire at various parts of the city-wall, and over the city to the northern forts, but to work as little mischief as possible to the inhabited streets. Meanwhile the troops, marines, and naval brigade gradually effected a landing at about a mile from the eastern extremity of the city; they landed guns and vast quantities of stores and ammunition, and then proceeded by regular siege-operations to capture all the forts on the northern side of the city—the bombardment of the southern and western wall still continuing. These fearful operations continued throughout the last four days of the year, during which an immense number of fragile wooden buildings were burned—not purposely, but of necessity. The Chinese soldiers did not shew in any vast numbers, nor did they display much heroism; the assailants conquered one fort after another, until they held the whole of the eastern and northern margin of the city—having free communication with their ships by a line of route to their unmolested landing-place. Great as was the amount of burning of wooden tenements, the loss of life was very small; the allied killed and wounded were less than 150, and the Chinese loss was believed to be not more than double that number—so careful had the soldiers and sailors been to avoid bringing slaughter into a place containing a million of human beings.
Rarely has a city been held under a more singular tenure than Canton was held by the English and French on New-year’s Day 1858. They were masters of all the defences, and naturally inferred that the city would formally yield. Nothing of the kind, however, took place. The Cantonese resumed trade in their streets and shops, but Yeh and his officers kept wholly out of sight. The ordinary usages of war were ignored by this singular people. Elgin, Gros, Straubenzee, Seymour, Genouilly—all came to the captured forts on the northern heights, and all were perplexed how to deal with these impassible Cantonese. On the 2d of January and two following days the captors lived in much discomfort on the heights; but on the 5th a very decided advance was made. Mr Parkes, and a few other Englishmen who were familiar with the Chinese language, had been busily engaged collecting information concerning the hiding-places of the dignitaries within the city; and, acting on the information thus obtained, Straubenzee sent several strongly armed parties into different districts of the city. The results were very important. The explorers captured Commissioner Yeh, the lieutenant-governor Peh-kwei, the Tatar general of the Chinese forces in and near Canton, fifty-two boxes of dollars in the treasury, and sixty-eight packages of silver ingots.
From the 5th of January to the 10th of February the city was placed under very anomalous government. In the first place, Yeh was sent as a sort of prisoner to Calcutta. In the next place, Yeh’s palace became the head-quarters of the allied authorities; while other large buildings were appropriated as barracks. The Earl of Elgin decided that the Tatar general and the lieutenant-governor of Canton should be liberated. The general, Tseang-keun, was obliged to disarm and disband his troops, as a condition of his liberation. Elgin thought it prudent that Peh-kwei should be formally made governor of the city, to save it from pillage. On the 9th the installation of this functionary took place, in the presence of Elgin, Gros, Bowring, Parkes, Straubenzee, Seymour, Genouilly, and other officials. Colonel Holloway, Captain Martineau, and Mr Parkes were appointed commissioners, or a council of three, to assist Peh-kwei in his municipal duties. The city now became safely traversable by the English and French without much danger; the Chinese soldiers were disbanded; and the citizens were willing enough to go on with such trade as was left to them. The council of three insisted on organising an efficient street-police; on expediting the administration of justice; on visiting all the prisons; and on liberating such wretched captives as appeared to have been unjustly incarcerated. Although Peh-kwei protested loudly against this interference with his supreme authority, he was obliged to submit. This period was a saturnalia for pirates; the regular government being subverted, thousands of lawless men on the river carried on with impunity that system of piracy and plunder which the numerous creeks around Canton rendered so practicable. When this became fully known to the authorities now in the ascendant, Sir Michael Seymour put in force a severe measure of attack and reprisal against them.
How far the objects of the war had been attained, remained still a problem. Canton, it is true, was seized; but the imperial court at Pekin was invisible and inaccessible, and much evidently remained yet to be done. On the 10th of February the blockade was raised. The Canton river was speedily swarming with trading junks; the Honan warehouses were reopened and refilled; British merchants resumed their dealings with Chinese merchants; and within a few days many million pounds of tea were on their way to England. Shortly after the removal of the blockade, the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros opened communications with Count Putiatine and Mr Reed; they proposed, in the names of England and France, that Russia and the United States should take part in the demands still necessary to be made upon the Emperor of China. These overtures were promptly met; but it must in justice be stated that, in the subsequent operations and negotiations for obtaining treaties, the Russian and American plenipotentiaries adopted a more secret and selfish policy than comported with the liberal offer made on the part of England and France. Elgin and Gros determined that Canton should remain in their power until full and satisfactory treaties had been obtained from the emperor. It affords a curious illustration of the indomitable perseverance of the English newspaper press, that the _Times_ correspondent, Mr Wingrove Cooke, after seeing all the fighting in the Canton waters, and incurring as much hazard as his colleague Mr Russell had incurred in similar duties in the Crimea, contrived to obtain a passage in the ship (the _Inflexible_) which conveyed Yeh to Calcutta, and to draw forth many peculiarities in the character of that redoubtable Chinaman—a personage who, through the columns of that newspaper, soon became familiarly known in nearly every part of the globe; a man whose shipboard life was thus summed up, ‘he eats a great deal, sleeps a great deal, and washes very little.’
Early in March, after the forwarding to Pekin of official dispatches under such circumstances as to render probable their receipt by the emperor, Elgin and Gros moved towards the north. This conveyance of letters was, as is usual in the Celestial Empire, a most complicated affair. Mr Lawrence Oliphant, the Earl of Elgin’s private secretary, and Viscount de Contades, secretary of legation to Baron Gros, went from Canton to Shang-hae, bearing letters from the English and French plenipotentiaries, and also from those of America and Russia. After reaching Shang-hae, and being joined by the British, French, and American consuls, they pushed on in boats up the river, on whose banks stands the city of Soo-choo, the capital of that part of China. The governor endeavoured by every means to avoid an interview; but as the messengers would not be refused, he received them with an unwilling courtesy, and undertook to forward their letters to Pekin. The envoys then returned to Shang-hae. Certain arrangements were now made for the safety of Canton and Hong-kong, and vast stores were sent up to Shang-hae, in preparation for any contingencies. The Earl of Elgin and his suite, on their way to Shang-hae, sojourned for a while at Fuh-choo-foo. All the plenipotentiaries arrived at Shang-hae during the latter half of the month. They received answers from the court of Pekin to their several letters. The Chinese authorities endeavoured so to treat the subject as to keep the plenipotentiaries as far away from Pekin as possible. They alleged that, whether Yeh had or had not misused his authority at Canton, he was now dismissed, and was replaced by a viceroy who would be ready to listen to any reasonable representations; they recommended that the English and French plenipotentiaries had better return to the south, there to resume their superintendence of peaceful commerce; that the Russians should return to the north, and the Americans remain quietly at the trading ports. These replies did not purport to come from the emperor, who was too lofty a personage to recognise the plenipotentiaries; they came through the governor of the Shang-hae province, and were worded in the customary style of Chinese magniloquence.
The month of April found the Chinese quarrel apparently as far from solution as ever. The advice of the imperial authorities, that they should keep away from Pekin, and attend to their trading affairs, was not likely to be followed by the plenipotentiaries—one of whom, at any rate, had come from Europe for a far different purpose. Affairs did not progress very favourably at Canton. Pirates continued to infest the river; while an army of rebels—equally hostile to the imperialists and to the ‘barbarians’—was marching towards the city from the interior. Many of the inhabitants, rendered uneasy by the strange confusion in the government and ownership of their city, fled from Canton. The English merchants found their trading arrangements sadly checked by these sources of disquietude; and they sighed for the return of those times when opium, and tea, and silk brought them large profits. Finding, as they had all along surmised, that nothing effectual could be done except in the immediate vicinity of Pekin, the plenipotentiaries took their departure from Shang-hae, and steamed northward. Count Putiatine, in the _America_ steamer, anchored off the Pei-ho river on the 14th; a few hours afterwards arrived the _Furious_ and the _Leven_, in the former of which was the Earl of Elgin; Mr Reed, in the _Mississippi_, made his appearance on the 16th; Baron Gros, in the _Audaiceuse_, joined his brother-plenipotentiaries on the 23d; and Admirals Seymour and Genouilly arrived on the 24th. Letters were now sent off to Pekin, demanding the appointment of an official of high rank to meet the representatives of the four courts, to confer on the matters in dispute; and allowing six days for the return of an answer. This decisive step produced a more immediate effect than any course yet adopted; the emperor, unless wholly deceived by those around him, had now ample means of knowing that a formidable armament was at the mouth of the river on whose banks the imperial city is situated, and that Russia and America had joined England and France in this demonstration. Before the six days had expired, a messenger arrived to announce that Tao, or Tān, governor-general of the province, had been appointed as envoy to meet the plenipotentiaries. Meanwhile, the month of May was a troubled one in Canton. The new governor Hwang, and the lieutenant-governor Peh-kwei, were frequently detected in manœuvres not quite satisfactory to the English and French officers left in charge of the city. Many of the Cantonese themselves believed that Hwang had received secret orders from Pekin to retake Canton while the allies were engaged in the northern waters. There were machinations at Pekin, rebel armies in the inner provinces, restless Tatars in the Canton province, pirates in the river, and unreliable Chinese authorities everywhere; insomuch that the continuance of quietude in the city was very problematical. During the month, about 1200 sepoys arrived from Calcutta; they had belonged to the 47th and 65th Bengal native infantry, disarmed in India as a matter of precaution, but not implicated in actual mutiny; the 70th had preceded them, and had behaved steadily in China.
The Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros experienced the customary difficulty in bringing the Chinese to anything like a candid agreement or understanding. The new envoy, Tao, was long in making his appearance; and when he did appear, his powers of treating were found to be so limited, and his attempts at evasion so many, that the aid of cannon-balls was again found to be necessary. Steamers were quickly sent down to Shang-hae, Hong-kong, and Canton, for reinforcements; and on the 20th of May hostile operations began. The banks of the Pei-ho being defended by forts, these forts were attacked one by one, and captured. The plenipotentiaries were by this means enabled to advance higher up the river, increasing their chance of a direct communication with the authorities at Pekin. The Chinese had not been idle; for throughout the month they had been seen drilling their troops in the forts, and sinking junks to bar the navigation of the river; but the gun-boats which the English and French had now brought up, and the boats of the war-ships, made light of these obstructions. The Russian and American ambassadors were pretty well satisfied with the trading concessions offered to them by the Chinese authorities; but the English and French were determined to be satisfied with nothing less than a definite settlement of all the points in dispute; and hence the attack on the forts, which evidently produced an immense excitement higher up the river.
June began with a battle, or at least, a skirmish, outside Canton—shewing that a peaceful occupation of that city was not readily to be looked for. A military force of ‘braves’ or Chinese soldiers having gradually been approaching from the north, General Straubenzee deemed it necessary to encounter and crush or disperse them at once. On the 2d, accompanied by Mr Parkes, he started off to the hills on the north of the city, having with him about a thousand men supplied with three days’ rations. The braves, who were soon met with, kept up a skirmishing fight all day on the 3d, and then retired without much loss. Straubenzee returned to Canton on the 4th, also without much loss in actual fighting; but his soldiers had been stricken down in considerable number by the terrible heat of the sun. The expedition was scarcely to be considered satisfactory; for the braves were still hovering among the hills, very little disheartened by their defeat. As the month advanced, the state of affairs at Canton became worse and worse. Rockets were frequently fired at night into the posts held by the allies; the suburbs were full of armed ruffians ready for any mischief; the streets became unsafe to Europeans unless armed or guarded; occasional attacks were made on the police, and even on the sentries; headless bodies of Europeans were sometimes found in the river; two or three sailors were waylaid, cut down, and carried off; and placards were posted up about the city, couched in the most ferocious language against the ‘foreign devils.’ One of these placards designated the British consul as ‘the red-haired barbarian Parkes.’
The state of affairs further north, during this month of June, was more favourable. The destruction of the forts on the banks of the Pei-ho had the effect of bringing the Chinese authorities again into a disposition for negotiation. The river was carefully examined from Ta-koo up to Tien-sing—a city of 300,000 inhabitants, situated on the high road to Pekin, at a point where the Great Canal of China enters the Pei-ho. The four plenipotentiaries steamed up to Tien-sing, where they were allowed to remain: seeing that the Chinese government, paralysed by the capture of the forts, no longer made an attempt to obstruct them. Governor Tao was dismissed, for having managed matters badly; and two mandarins of high rank, Kwei-liang and Hwa-sha-na, were appointed to negotiate with the barbarians. The plenipotentiaries took up their abode on shore, in a house provided by the mandarins; and a renewed series of negotiations commenced. Meanwhile, all hostilities were suspended; the war-junks and the gun-boats remained peacefully at anchor, and the trading-junks were allowed to pass up and down the river. About the middle of the month, some of the inhabitants of Tien-sing manifested a disposition to molest the plenipotentiaries and their suites; whereupon Sir Michael Seymour ordered up a few seamen and marines—who, perambulating the walls and streets of the city for a few hours, gave such a check to the citizens as to induce a more peaceful demeanour. One of the first definite results of the conferences which now ensued, was a treaty between China and the United States, signed on the 18th of June by Mr Reed and the two Chinese mandarins. America had from the first sought to obtain the best terms for herself, without much consideration for the other powers; and as her demeanour was more courteous than threatening, more submissive than dignified; as, moreover, her demands were not so extensive as those of England—she found less difficulty in settling the terms of a commercial treaty, which would open up a door for increased American trading with China; and with this Mr Reed was well satisfied. Count Putiatine about the same date signed a treaty as the representative of Russia. The policy of his court was to keep the other great powers as far from Pekin as possible, in order that nothing might check the gradual growth of Russian influence on the northern frontier of the Chinese empire. The terms of the Russian treaty were far more important than those of the American; they included the cession to Russia of a large area of country near the mouth of the great river Amoor, and of an amount of trading privileges such as had never before been conceded by China to any other country whatever.
[Illustration:
HONG-KONG. ]
The English and French treaties, especially the former, being more comprehensive in their character, could not be settled so readily as the American. Commissioner Key-ing, who had concluded the treaty of Nankin with Sir Henry Pottinger in 1842, was sent from Pekin to Tien-sing to assist Kwei-hang and Hwa-sha-na in the present instance; but the Earl of Elgin, seeing that Key-ing was disposed for a course of cunning and trickery, refused to treat with him; and the negotiations were left to the other two commissioners. All difficulties being gradually removed by three weeks of negotiation, treaties were at length signed on the 26th and 27th of June respectively by the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, with the two Chinese commissioners. The provisions were nearly the same for England and for France, except an indemnity to be given to the former nation for the expenses of the war and for certain losses incurred by the merchants. The more important clauses of the English treaty may be thus thrown into a summary: Confirmation of the former Treaty of Nankin—Agreement to appoint British ambassador at Pekin, and Chinese ambassador at London—Family and suite of British ambassador to have residence and security at Pekin, and facilities for travelling, transaction of business, and transmission of letters—British ambassador to correspond on terms of equality with the Chinese minister for foreign affairs—Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic, to be tolerated, and Christian missionaries protected throughout the Chinese Empire—British subjects permitted to trade and to travel in the interior—Chin-kiang, on the great river Yang-tsze-kiang; Niuchwang, in Manchooria; Tang-choo, in the Gulf of Pe-che-lee; Tae-wan, in the island of Formosa; Swatow and Kiung-choo, in the island of Hainan, to be declared free ports; in addition to Canton, Amoy, Fuh-choo-foo, Ning-po, and Shang-hae, the five already opened; and in addition, also, to three other ports on the Yang-tsze-kiang, as soon as they should be freed from rebels—An Anglo-Chinese commission to prepare a commercial tariff, which is to be revised every ten years—Inland transit dues to be commuted for an _ad valorem_ rate—Official correspondence to be conducted in English as the text or original, with a Chinese translation as an accompaniment—The Chinese character or symbol denoting ‘barbarian’ to be in future omitted in Chinese official documents relating to foreigners—British ships-of-war permitted to visit any ports in the empire, and their commanders to be treated on terms of equality by the Chinese officials—Both nations to assist in suppressing piracy in Chinese waters—Amount of indemnity to be settled by a separate article.
The Earl of Elgin would not quit Tien-sing until he had clearly ascertained that the emperor understood and accepted the terms of the treaty: this done, he returned on the 6th of July to Shang-hae.
It is impossible to avoid seeing that such a treaty, if faithfully carried out, would greatly revolutionise the commercial and social institutions of China. If British ships-of-war be permitted to visit any of the ports, and trading-ships have free entry to nearly a dozen of the number; if the great Yang-tsze-kiang be made a channel up which British manufactures may penetrate; if Christian missionaries may teach and preach, print and distribute, without opposition from the government; if a British official may reside at the imperial city, and the Chinese emperor condescend to appoint an ambassador to London; finally, if the vain assumption of superiority be discontinued in Chinese official documents relating to the English—an immense advance will have been made towards bringing China into the fraternity of nations. The great doubt was, whether so vast a change would not be too extensive to be made at once—too humiliating, in the Chinese view, for the imperial government to adopt in its integrity: especially as the British did not offer to assist the emperor against the rebels who ravaged his dominions. It was not expected that the formalities of ratification could all be completed before the summer of 1859. The Hon. Mr Bruce, brother to the Earl of Elgin, conveyed the treaty to England. No sooner was the tenor of the treaty known, than English merchants began to make inquiries and calculations concerning increased exports, of salt and other commodities, to the China seas. The indemnity question was felt to be one which could not be settled without long delay, in treating with so peculiar a people as the Chinese. Commissioners on both sides were to decide how much should be paid by China, for injury inflicted on British property at Canton, and for the expenses of the British expedition; they were also to decide on the revised tariff for imports and exports.
While the terms of this treaty were being settled at Tien-sing, the state of Canton became more and more disturbed. Street-murders were very frequent; bags of gunpowder were exploded in the streets, at moments when patrols were expected to pass; and missiles were hurled, from unseen quarters, into all parts of the city where Europeans resided. Many of the more peaceful citizens left Canton, and their houses were at once seized by ruffians, who posted up proclamations of most ultra-Chinese character. One of these proclamations was to the effect that, ‘We have ascertained that there are only two or three thousand English and French dogs in the city; but our numbers are thousands on thousands; and if every one of us carry but a sword to kill every foreigner that we meet, we shall soon kill them all. If any one trade or supply provisions to the foreign dogs, we shall arrest and punish him according to the village regulations. All those who are in the employ of the foreign dogs must leave their employment in one month’—and terrible denunciations were hurled against all those who should disobey these behests. General Straubenzee and the other officials were much perplexed how to deal with this state of things; they began to fear that nothing less than a bombardment of the city would drive out the ‘braves,’ and restore peaceful trade; and yet it would be an anomaly to use cannon and muskets, beheading and imprisonment, against the subjects of an emperor with whom we had just made a treaty of peace. In this exigency, Sir John Bowring caused large posting-bills to be printed in Chinese—announcing that a treaty of peace had been signed between the two countries; that all animosity ought now to cease; that many Chinese, hitherto residing at Hong-kong as servants and traders, had been frightened away by threatening proclamations from some of the authorities on the mainland; that surreptitious attempts had been made to check the supply of provisions to Hong-kong; and that many inconveniences had thence arisen. The placard proceeded to warn all persons and communities against any interference with the peaceful resumption of commerce between the two nations. An attempt to distribute this placard or proclamation was clumsily made, and led to disaster. Two British officers, knowing the Chinese language, went with a few seamen in the gun-boat _Starling_, to the coast of the mainland nearly opposite the island of Hong-kong. Some difficulty being experienced in obtaining an interview with the official authorities, the sailors landed under a flag of truce, and attempted to post up the placards in the water-side suburbs of the town of Namtow; they were, however, attacked by Chinese soldiery, and driven back to the gun-boat, with the loss of one of their number and the wounding of another.
This untoward failure of course led to further fighting. As the attack made by the Chinese on the sailors was in defiance of a flag of truce, Sir John Bowring deemed himself justified in inflicting a punishment on the town. He made a requisition to General Straubenzee, who thereupon organised a small expeditionary force. He selected 700 men—59th foot, artillery, engineers, marines, and naval brigade—who were commanded by himself and Commodore Keith Stewart. They landed near Namtow on the 11th of August, and gave notice to the inhabitants that no injury would be done to them if they remained neutral; the attack being intended against the ‘braves’ or Chinese soldiers, who had originated the contest. Within a few hours a fort was attacked, the Chinese troops driven out, the fort destroyed, and two large brass guns brought away as trophies. The object in view was, not to injure the town or the inhabitants, but to prove to the authorities that any disregard of a flag of truce would subject them to a hostile demonstration.
Throughout these strange operations, in which war and peace were so oddly mingled—the one prevailing at Namtow, the other at Tien-sing—the city of Canton continued in a disturbed state. On the 21st of July, the ‘braves’ outside the city went so far as to plan an attack for the expulsion of the English and French altogether from the place. They were speedily beaten off. As before, however, it was a discomfiture, not a suppression; for the braves settled down in an encampment about four miles from Canton, ready for any exigencies. During a considerable time after the signing of the treaty at Tien-sing, Governor Whang either did not know of it, or else disregarded it; but in the course of the month of August, evidence gradually appeared that he had been officially informed of the treaty. He forbade the braves to make any further attacks. Many Chinese traders, who had been driven in disquietude from Canton, now returned; and Hong-kong began again to look out for Chinese servants and work-people. Governor Whang’s proclamation, dated August 17th, contained a statement which bore an aspect of considerable probability: ‘There are, both within and without the city, many villains and thieves who, pretending they are braves, take advantage of the state of affairs to create disturbances in order to plunder and rob, and from whose hands the citizens have suffered much. If such rascality be not speedily suppressed, how can the minds of the people be set at ease, or tranquillity restored? And unless the villains be apprehended, how can the districts be purged?’ Wherefore he gave orders for the suppression of violence and hostile manifestations.
During the months of September and October—with the exception of a stroke of diplomacy at Japan, presently to be adverted to—Lord Elgin remained in the China seas, chiefly at Shang-hae, waiting for the Chinese commissioners who were to settle with him the minor details supplementary to the treaty. Former experience having shewn that the Chinese authorities viewed the obligations of a treaty somewhat lightly, it was not deemed prudent either to give up Canton, or to withdraw the powerful naval force from the China coast, until all the conditions of the treaty had been put in a fair train for fulfilment. Canton gradually recovered its trade and quietude; Hong-kong gradually got back its Chinese servants and artisans; and the English fleet vigorously put in operation that clause of the treaty which related to the suppression of piracy. Expeditions were fitted out from Hong-kong, which captured and destroyed hundreds of piratical junks.
One of the most remarkable episodes in this remarkable Chinese war bore relation to Japan—an empire consisting of many islands, lying northeastward of China. Until a few years ago, the Japanese traded only with the Chinese and the Dutch. The Dutch were allowed to establish a trading station on the small island of Desima, which was connected with the larger island of Kiusiu or Kioosioo by a bridge. At the Kiusiu end of the bridge was the city of Nagasaki or Nangasaki, with the inhabitants of which only the Dutch were allowed to trade. One ship annually, and one only, was permitted to come to Desima from Java, bringing sugar, ivory, tin, lead, bar-iron, fine chintzes, and a few other commodities, and conveying away in exchange copper, camphor, lackered-wood ware, porcelain, rice, soy, &c. The Chinese, like the Dutch, were confined to the little island opposite Nagasaki, but their trading privileges were greater; at three different periods of the year they were wont to send laden junks from Amoy, Ning-po, and Shang-hae, and exchange Chinese commodities for Japanese. Such was the state of matters until a short time previous to the Russo-Turkish war; when the United States, taking advantage of an insult offered to American ships, induced or compelled the Japanese government to permit intercourse between the two countries, to be conducted at certain ports under certain regulations. Some time afterwards, similar privileges were accorded to Russia and England. The convention with England, signed at Nagasaki on the 9th of October 1855, provided for very little more than this—that British ships might resort to the three ports of Nagasaki, Simoda, and Hakodadi, for the purpose of effecting repairs, and obtaining fresh water, provisions, and such supplies as they might absolutely need. It was a denial of such aid to distressed ships that had led the United States to threaten the Japanese. France, not to be left behind by other nations, sent an expedition to obtain shipping privileges similar to those conceded to America, England, and Russia. On the 25th of May 1856, M. de Montravel presented himself before the governor of Nagasaki, accompanied by rather an imposing array of officers; he had no difficulty in procuring the desired concession. On the 11th of December in the same year, two British merchant-ships, about to enter the harbour at Nagasaki, to purchase certain supplies, were refused admission; whereupon the two captains sailed up close to the town, landed, and marched with a strong escort to the residence of the governor. He declined to receive them, but undertook that any letter from them should be conveyed to the emperor at Jedo or Yedo, the capital of Japan. This letter obtained the desired result; an imperial edict being issued on January 26, 1857, that ships from any of the four nations might enter Nagasaki as well as the other two ports—provided that none of the crews attempted to penetrate into the interior. This letter was, in fact, nothing more than the carrying out of an agreement, which the governor of Nagasaki had on a former occasion evaded. On the 17th of June 1857, Mr Townshend Harris, acting under the United States consul at Hong-kong, signed a treaty at Simoda with two Japanese commissioners. This treaty was a great advance, in commercial liberality, on anything previously known in that region.
Thus matters remained until the autumn of 1858; when, expeditions to China having been sent from England, France, Russia, and America, advantage was taken of the proximity of Japan to obtain by and for the first three countries the same trading privileges as had been granted to America. It was, throughout, a very singular race between four great nations, in which America obtained the first start. The Japanese had, during three or four years, seen much more of Europeans and Americans than at any former period, and had begun to acquire enlarged notions of international commerce; moreover, they had lately heard of the powerful armaments on the Canton and Pei-ho rivers, and of the treaties which those armaments had enforced; from whence the Earl of Elgin inferred that he might probably meet with success in an attempt to obtain an improved treaty of commerce. On the 3d of August he entered the port of Nagasaki, with the _Furious_, _Retribution_, and _Lee_—taking with him a steam-yacht as a present from Queen Victoria to the Emperor of Japan. On the following day he was joined by Sir Michael Seymour, with the _Calcutta_ and _Inflexible_. It being deemed best that the yacht should be presented at Jedo if possible, the expedition set forth again, and proceeded to Simoda. Here it was ascertained that Mr Townshend Harris, United States consul, had just returned from Jedo with a new and very advantageous treaty of commerce between America and Japan; that Count Putiatine was at that very moment negotiating for a similar treaty between Russia and Japan; and that Mr Donker Curtius, Dutch consul, had been trying in a similar direction for Holland. The Earl at once saw that no time was to be lost, or he would be distanced by the other diplomatists. Procuring the aid of a Dutch interpreter, through the courtesy of Mr Harris, his lordship proceeded from Simoda towards Jedo on the 12th. Disregarding the rules laid down by the Japanese government concerning the anchoring-places of ships, the squadron, led by Captain Sherard Osborne, boldly pushed on to the vicinity of the city—to the utter astonishment of the natives, official and nonofficial. Boats approached, containing Japanese officers, who earnestly begged the British representative not to approach the great city, which had never yet been visited by a foreign ship; but as he was deaf to their entreaties, they prepared to give him a courteous reception on shore. Although the city was strongly protected by forts, there was no indication of a hostile repulsion of the strangers. During eight days did Elgin reside within the great city of Jedo, treated with every attention—possibly because there were British ships-of-war and a gun-boat just at hand. All the naval officers had opportunity of traversing the city during this interval, and met with signs of civilisation such as induced them to write home very glowing descriptions. The earl at first met with difficulties, arising from the circumstance that a conservative had just supplanted a liberal ministry (to use English terms) at Jedo, strengthening the prejudice against foreigners. Indeed, this change of ministry had arisen two or three days before, in consequence of the signing of the liberal treaty with America. Elgin, however, triumphed over this and all other difficulties; he arrived at Shang-hae again on the 3d of September, bringing with him a treaty of commerce between England and Japan, signed at Jedo on the 26th of August.
The treaty thus obtained was written in Dutch as the original, with English and Japanese translations. The chief clauses comprised the following provisions: England may appoint an ambassador to Jedo, and Japan an ambassador to London—The ambassadors to be free to travel in the respective empires—Each power may appoint consuls at the ports of the other—The ports of Hakodadi, Nanagawa, Nagasaki, Nee-e-gata, Hiogo, Jedo, and Osaca, to be opened to British traders at various times by the year 1863—British traders may lease ground and build dwellings and warehouses at those ports—The British may travel to distances within a certain radius of each port—In any dispute between British and Japanese, the British consuls to act as friendly arbitrators—If arbitration fail, British offenders to be tried by British laws, and Japanese by those of Japan—British residents may employ Japanese as servants or workmen—British may freely exercise their religion—Foreign and Japanese coin may be used indifferently for commercial purposes—Supplies for British vessels may be stored at certain ports free of duty—Japanese authorities to render aid to stranded British vessels—British captains may employ Japanese pilots—Goods may be imported at an _ad valorem_ duty, without any transit or other dues, and may be re-exported duty free—British and Japanese to aid each other in preventing smuggling—Money, apparel, and household furniture of British subjects residing in Japan to be imported duty free—Munitions of war to be prohibited—All other articles to pay an _ad valorem_ import-duty, varying from 5 to 35 per cent., according to a tariff to be specially prepared—Any trading privileges, granted hereafter to any other nation, to be granted equally to England.
This very important treaty—even more liberal in its provisions than that concluded with China—was to be ratified by the two courts, and the ratifications exchanged, within one year from the signature.
[Illustration:
SIR EDWARD LUGARD. ]
§ 3. ENGLISH PROSPECTS IN THE EAST.
When, by the month of October 1858, it was known that the object of the Persian expedition had been fulfilled by the complete withdrawal of the Persians from Herat; that the purpose of the Chinese expedition had been even more than fulfilled, supposing the advantageous treaty made by the Earl of Elgin to be faithfully observed; and that a remarkable commercial treaty had been signed with Japan—the English nation felt, not unjustly, that their prospects of advancement in the east were greatly heightened. All depended, however, or would depend, on the result of the struggle in India; if that ended satisfactorily, the power of England in Asia would be greater than ever. That the Indian struggle _would_ have a favourable termination, few doubted. There was much to be done; but as the whole empire cheerfully supported the government in the preparations for doing it, and as those preparations had been widely spread and deeply considered, success was very confidently looked forward to.
The arrangements for the final discomfiture (if not extinction) of the mutineers, and for bringing back a misguided peasantry to habits of order and of industry, will be noticed presently; but it may be desirable first to glance at two important subjects which much occupied the attention of thoughtful men—namely, the probable causes of the Revolt; and, consequent on those causes, the general character of the reforms proper to be introduced into the government of India, as an accompaniment to the change from the Company’s _régime_ to that of the Queen.
The complexity of Indian affairs was very remarkable; and in no instance more so than with reference to the first of the above two subjects of speculation. Down to the closing scene, men could not agree in their answers to the question—‘What was the cause of the mutiny?’ Military officers, cabinet ministers, commissioners, magistrates, missionaries, members of parliament, pamphleteers, writers in newspapers, as they had differed at first, so did they differ to the end. This discrepancy offers strong proof that the causes were many in number and varied in kind—that the Revolt was a resultant of several independent forces, all tending towards a common end. It may not be without value to shew in what directions public men sought for these causes. The following summaries present the views of a few among many who wrote on the subject:
Mr Gubbins,[195] who was financial commissioner of Oude (or Oudh) when the mutiny began, was requested by Mr Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces, to express his opinions concerning the causes of that catastrophe. He wrote out his opinions; and stated that Sir Henry Lawrence, shortly before his death, concurred mainly with them. In the first place, he did not attribute the mutiny to Russian intrigue—an explanation that had occurred to the minds of some persons. In the second place, he disbelieved that the mutiny was due to a Mohammedan conspiracy; the movement began among soldiers, of whom four-fifths or more were Hindoos; and certain Mohammedan sovereigns and leaders only joined it when they saw a probable chance of recovering dominion for their race and their religion. In the third place, Mr Gubbins equally denied that it was a national rebellion, a rising of a nation against its rulers; for, he urged, the villagers were throughout more disposed to remain neutral than to aid either side; we had no right to expect any great loyalty from them; and we received all that could fairly be looked for—the sympathy of some, the hostility of others, but the neutrality of the greater number. In the fourth place, he denied that the annexation of Oude caused the mutiny; there were certain persons—courtiers of the deposed king, shopkeepers at Lucknow, soldiers of the late king’s army, and budmashes—who had suffered by the change; but the mass of the population, he contended, had been benefited by us, and had neither ground nor wish for insurrection. Having thus expressed his dissent from many modes of explanation, Mr Gubbins proceeded to give his own views, which traced the mutiny to three concurrent causes: ‘I conceive that the native mind had been gradually alarmed on the vital subjects of caste and religion, when the spark was applied by the threatened introduction of the greased cartridge; that this spark fell upon a native army most dangerously organised, subject to no sufficient bonds of discipline, and discontented; and, above all, that this occurred at a time when Bengal and the Northwestern Provinces were so denuded of European troops as to leave the real power in the hands of the natives.’
Mr Rees,[196] confining his observations to the province with which he was best acquainted, attributed the mutiny to the mode of governing Oude by the English, superadded to the fierce hostility of the Mussulmans to Christians in general. Thousands of natives had been thrown out of employ by the change of government, and with them their retainers and servants; all alike were rendered impoverished and discontented. The shopkeepers of Lucknow, who had made large profits by supplying the palaces and harem of the king before his deposition, lost that advantage when an English commissioner took the king’s place. New taxes and duties were imposed, as a means of substituting a regular for an irregular revenue; and these taxes irritated the payers. The Mohammedan teachers and fanatics, he urged, enraged at the substitution of a Christian for a Moslem government, were ready for any reactionary measures. Lastly, there were innumerable vagabonds, bravos, and beggars in the city, who had found bread in it under native rule, but who nearly starved under the more systematic English government. Hence, Mr Rees contended, the great city of Lucknow had for a year or more been ripe for rebellion, come from what quarter and in what way it might.
Colonel Bourchier,[197] like many military officers, sought for no other origin of the mutiny than that which was due to the state of the native army. The enormous increase in that army—by the contingents raised to guard the newly acquired territories in Central India, the Punjaub, and Oude—with no corresponding increase in the European force, encouraged a belief on the part of many of the natives that they had a fair chance of being able to drive the English altogether from the country. The colonel quoted an opinion expressed by the gallant and lamented Brigadier Nicholson, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the native character—‘Neither greased cartridges, the annexation of Oude, nor the paucity of European officers, was the cause of the mutiny. For years I have watched the army, and felt sure they only wanted an opportunity to try their strength with us.’
Mr Ludlow[198] ridiculed the idea of the mutiny being sudden and unexpected. He pointed to the fact that Munro, Metcalfe, Napier, and other experienced men, had long ago predicted an eventual outbreak, arising mainly from the defective organisation of the military force. Mr Ludlow himself attributed the mutiny to many concurrent causes. The Brahmins were against us, because we were gradually sapping the foundations of their religion and power; the Mussulman leaders were against us, because we had reduced the Mogul rule to a shadow, and most of the nawabships likewise; the Mahrattas were against us, because we had gradually lessened the power of Scindia, Holkar, the Guicowar, the Peishwa, the Nena, and other leading men of their nation; the Oudians were against us, because, in addition to having deposed their king, we had greatly lessened the privileges and emoluments of the soldiery who had heretofore served him; and lastly, the Hindoo sepoys were turned against us, because they believed the rumour that the British government intended to degrade their caste and religion by the medium of greased cartridges. Mr Ludlow treated the cartridge grievance as the spark that had directly kindled the flame; but he believed there were sufficient inflammable materials for the outbreak even if this particular panic had not arisen.
Mr Mead,[199] who, in connection with the press of India, had been one of the fiercest assailants of the Company in general, and of Viscount Canning in particular, insisted that the mutiny was a natural result of a system of government wrong in almost every particular—cruel to the natives, insulting to Europeans not connected with the Company, and blind even in its selfishness. More especially, however, he referred it to ‘the want of discipline in the Bengal army; the general contempt entertained by the sepoys for authority; the absence of all power on the part of commanding officers to reward or punish; the greased cartridges; and the annexation of Oude.’ The ‘marvellous imbecility’ of the Calcutta government—a sort of language very customary with this writer—he referred to, not as a cause of the mutiny, but as a circumstance or condition which permitted the easy spread of disaffection.
Mr Raikes,[200] who, as judge of the Sudder Court at Agra, had an intimate knowledge of the Northwest Provinces, contended that, so far as concerned those provinces, there was one cause of the troubles, and one only—the mutiny of the sepoys. It was a revolt growing out of a military mutiny, not a mutiny growing out of a national discontent. Ever since the disasters at Cabool taught the natives that an English army _might_ be annihilated, Mr Raikes had noticed a change in the demeanour of the Bengal sepoys. He believed that they indulged in dreams of ambition; and that they made use of the cartridge grievance merely as a pretext, in the beginning of 1857. The outbreak having once commenced, Mr Raikes traced all the rest as consequences, not as causes.—The villagers in many districts wavered, because they thought the power of England was really declining; the Goojurs, Mewatties, and other predatory tribes rose into activity, because the bonds of regular government were loosened; the Mussulman fanatics rose, because they deemed a revival of Moslem power just possible; but Mr Raikes denied that there was anything like general disaffection or national insurrection in the provinces with which he was best acquainted.
‘Indophilus’[201]—the _nom de plume_ of a distinguished civilian, who had first served the Company in India, and then the imperial government in England—discountenanced the idea of any general conspiracy. He believed that the immediate exciting cause of the mutiny was the greased cartridges; but that the predisposing causes were two—the dangerous constitution of the Bengal sepoy army, and the Brahmin dread of reforms. On the latter point he said: ‘In the progress of reform, we are all accomplices. From the abolition of suttee, to the exemption of native Christian converts from the forfeiture of their rights of inheritance; from the formation of the first metalled road, to covering India with a network of railways and electric telegraphs—there is not a single good measure which has not contributed something to impress the military priests with the conviction that, if they were to make a stand, they must do so soon, else the opportunity would pass away for ever.’
The Rev. Dr Duff,[202] director of the Free Church Scotch Missions in India, differed, on the one hand, from those who treated the outbreak merely as a military revolt, and, on the other, from those who regarded it as a great national rebellion. It was, he thought, something between the two—a political conspiracy. He traced it much more directly to the Mohammedan leaders than to the Hindoos. He believed in a long-existing conspiracy among those leaders, to renew, if possible, the splendour of the ancient Mogul times by the utter expulsion of the Christian English; the Brahmins and Rajpoots of the Bengal army were gradually drawn into the plot, by wily appeals to their discontent on various subjects connected with caste and religion; while the cartridge grievance was used simply as a pretext when the conspiracy was nearly ripe. The millions of India, he contended, had no strong bias one way or the other; there was no such nationality or patriotic feeling among them as to lead them to make common cause with the conspirators; but on the other hand they displayed very little general sympathy or loyalty towards their English masters. Viewing the subject as a missionary, Dr Duff strongly expressed his belief that we neither did obtain, nor had a right to obtain, the aid of the natives, seeing that we had done so little as a nation to Christianise them.
Without extending the list of authorities referred to, it will be seen that nearly all these writers regarded the ‘cartridge grievance’ as merely the spark which kindled inflammable materials, and the state of the Bengal army as one of the predisposing causes of the mutiny; but they differed greatly on the questions whether the revolt was rather Mohammedan or Hindoo, and whether it was a national rebellion or only a military mutiny. It is probable that the affirmative opinions were sounder than the negative—in other words, that every one of the causes assigned had really something to do with this momentous outbreak.
We now pass to the second of the two subjects indicated above—the views of distinguished men, founded in part on past calamities, on the reforms necessary in Indian government. And here it will suffice to indicate the chief items of proposed reforms, leaving the reader to form his own opinions thereon. During the progress of the Revolt, and in reference to the future of British India, a most valuable and interesting correspondence came to light—valuable on account of the eminence of the persons engaged in it. These persons were Sir John Lawrence and Colonel Herbert Edwardes—the one chief-commissioner of the Punjaub, the other commissioner of the Peshawur division of that province. Both had the welfare of India deeply at heart; and yet they differed widely in opinion concerning the means whereby that welfare could be best secured—especially in relation to religious matters. Early in the year 1858, Colonel Edwardes published a _Memorandum on the Elimination of all unchristian Principles from the Government of British India_. About the same time Mr MacLeod, financial commissioner, published a letter on the same subject; as did also, some time afterwards, Mr Arnold, director-general of public instruction in the Punjaub. Sir John Lawrence, on the 21st of April, addressed a dispatch to Viscount Canning, explanatory of his views on the matters treated by these three gentlemen, especially by Colonel Edwardes. The colonel had placed under ten distinct headings the ‘unchristian elements’ (as he termed them) in the Indian government; and it will suffice for the present purpose to give here brief abstracts of the statements and the rejoinders—by which, at any rate, the subject is rendered intelligible to those who choose to study it:
1. _Exclusion of the Bible and of Christian Teaching from the Government Schools and Colleges._—Edwardes insisted that the Bible ought to be introduced in all government schools, and its study made a part of the regular instruction. Lawrence was favourable to Bible diffusion, but pointed out certain necessary limits. He would not teach native religions in government schools; he would teach Christianity only (in addition to secular instruction), but would not make it compulsory on native children to attend that portion of the daily routine. He would wish to see the Bible in every village-school throughout the empire—with these two provisoes: that there were persons able to teach it, and pupils willing to hear it. Who the teachers should be—whether clergymen, missionaries, lay Bible-readers, or Christianised natives—is a problem that can only very gradually receive its solution. Lawrence insisted that there must be no compulsion in the matter of studying Christianity; it must be an invitation to the natives, not a command. The four authorities named in the last paragraph all differed in opinion on this Bible question. Colonel Edwardes advocated a determined and compulsory teaching of the Bible. Mr MacLeod joined him to a considerable extent, but not wholly. Mr Arnold strongly resisted the project of teaching the Bible at all—on the grounds that it would infringe the principle of religious neutrality; that it would not be fair to the natives unless native religions were taught also; that it would seem to them a proselyting and even a persecuting measure; that it might be politically dangerous; and that we should involve ourselves in the sea of theological controversy, owing to the diversities of religious sects among Christians. Sir John Lawrence, as we have seen, adopted a medium between these extremes.
2. _Endowment of Idolatry and Mohammedanism by the Government._—In British India, many small items of revenue are paid by the government for the support of temples, priests, idols, and ceremonies pertaining to the Hindoo and Mohammedan religions. Edwardes urged that these payments should cease, as a disgrace to a Christian government. Lawrence pointed out that this withdrawal could not be effected without a gross breach of faith. The revenues in question belonged to those religious bodies before England ‘annexed’ the states, and were recognised as such at the time of the annexation. They are a property, a claim on the land, like tithes in England, or like conventual lands in Roman Catholic countries. They are not, and never have been, regarded as religious offerings or gifts. We seized the lands; but if we were to withhold the revenues derived from those lands, on the ground that the religious services are heathen, it would be a virtual persecution of heathenism, and, as such, repugnant to the mild principles of Christianity. Lawrence believed that the payments might so be made as not to appear to encourage idolatry; but he would not listen to any such breach of faith as withholding them altogether.
3. _Recognition of Caste._—Colonel Edwardes, in common with many other persons, believed that the British government had pandered too much to the prejudices of caste, and that this system ought to be changed. Lawrence pointed out that it was mainly in the Bengal army that this prevailed, and that the custom arose out of very natural circumstances. Brahmins and Rajpoots were preferred for military service, because they were generally finer men than those of lower castes, because they were (apparently) superior in moral qualifications, and because they were descended from the old soldiers who had fought under Clive and our early generals. Our officers became so accustomed to them, that at length they would enlist no others. Being more easily obtained from Oude than from any other province, it came to pass that the Bengal army gradually assumed the character of a vast aggregate of brotherhoods and cousinhoods—consisting chiefly of men belonging to the same castes, speaking the same dialects, coming from the same districts, and influenced by the same associations. It was the gradual growth of a custom, which the Revolt suddenly put an end to. Lawrence denied that the government had shewn any great encouragement to caste prejudices, except in the Bengal army. He believed that an equal error would be committed by discouraging the higher and encouraging the lower castes. What is wanted is, a due admixture of all, from the haughty Brahmin and Rajpoot castes, down to the humble Trading and Sweeper castes. Whether all should be combined in one regiment, or different regiments be formed of different castes, would depend much on the part of India under notice. Christianised natives would probably constitute valuable regiments, as soon as their number becomes sufficiently great. On all these questions of caste, the two authorities differed chiefly thus—Edwardes would beat down and humble the higher castes; Lawrence would employ all, without especially encouraging any.
[Illustration:
Fort St George, Madras; in 1780. ]
4. _Observance of Native Holidays in State Departments._—Native servants of the government were usually allowed to absent themselves on days of festival or religious ceremony. Edwardes proposed to reform this, as being a pandering to heathen customs, unworthy of a Christian government. Lawrence contended that such a change would be a departure from the golden rule of ‘doing unto others that which we would they should do unto us.’ A Christian in a Mohammedan country would think it cruel if compelled to work on Sunday, Good Friday, or Christmas-day; and so would the Hindoo and Mussulman of India, if compelled to work on their days of religious festival. Lawrence thought that the number might advantageously be lessened, by restricting the list to such as were especial religious days in the native faiths; but beyond this he would not curtail the privilege of holiday (holy day). He adverted to the fact that the Christian Sunday is made obvious to the natives by the suspension of all public works.
5. _Administration by the British of Hindoo and Mohammedan Laws._—Edwardes deemed it objectionable that England should to so great an extent suffer native laws to be administered in India. Lawrence replied that it is the policy of conquerors to interfere as little as possible in those native laws which operate only between man and man, and do not affect imperial policy. He drew attention to the fact that Indian legislation had already made two important steps, by legalising the re-marriage of Hindoo widows, and by removing all possible civil disabilities or legal disadvantages from Christian converts; and he looked forward to the time when it might perhaps be practicable to abolish polygamy, and the making of contracts of betrothal by parents on behalf of infant children; but he strenuously insisted on the importance of not changing any such laws until the government can carry the good-will of the natives with them.
6. _Publicity of Hindoo and Mohammedan Processions._—It was urged by Edwardes that religious processions ought not to be allowed in the public streets, under protection of the police. Lawrence joined in this opinion—not, however, on religious grounds, but because the processions led to quarrelling and fighting between rival communions, and because the Hindoo idols and pictures are often of a character quite unfitted for exhibition in public thoroughfares.
7. _Display of Prostitution in the Streets._—This aspect of social immorality is far more glaring in many parts of India than in European cities, bad as the latter may be. Edwardes recommended, and Lawrence concurred in the recommendation, that the police arrangements should be rendered more stringent in this matter.
8. _Restrictions on Marriage of European Soldiers._—Great restrictions were, in bygone years, imposed by the Company on the marriage of European soldiers; and a shameful disregard shewn for the homes of those who were married. Edwardes condemned this state of things; and Lawrence shared his views to a great extent. He asserted that men are not better soldiers for being unmarried—rather the reverse; and that women and children, in moderate numbers, need not be any obstruction to military arrangements. Some change in this matter he recommended. He pointed out, however, that in reference to the comfort of married soldiers, great improvements had been introduced into the Punjaub, and improvements to a smaller extent in other parts of British India. He fully recognised the bounden duty of the government so to construct barracks as to provide for the proper domestic privacy of married soldiers and their families.
9. _Connection of the Government with the Opium-trade._—Edwardes dwelt on the objectionable character of this connection. Lawrence replied that the English were not called upon to decide for the Chinese how far the use of opium is deleterious; and that, until we checked our own consumption of intoxicating liquors, we were scarcely in a position to take a high moral tone on this point. He nevertheless fully agreed that it was objectionable in any government to encourage the growth of this drug, actively supervising the storing and selling, and advancing money for this purpose to the cultivators. It was a revenue question, defensive wholly on financial grounds. How to provide a substitute for the £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 thus derived would be a difficult matter; but he thought the best course would be to sever the connection between the government and the opium-trade, and to lay a heavy customs duty on the export of opium from India.
10. _Indian Excise Laws._—It was contended by Edwardes that the government encouraged intemperance by farming out to monopolists the right of manufacturing and selling intoxicating drugs and spirits. Lawrence contested this point. He asserted that there is less drunkenness in India, less spirit-drinking and drug-chewing, than under the former native rule, when the trade was open to all. As a question of morals, the Indian government does no more than that of the home country, in deriving a revenue from spirituous liquors; as a question of fact, the evils are lessened by the very monopoly complained of.
Sir John Lawrence, in a few concluding remarks, expressed a very strong belief that Christian civilisation may be introduced gradually into India if a temperate policy be pursued; but that rash zeal would produce great disaster. ‘It is when unchristian things are done in the name of Christianity, or when Christian things are done in an unchristian way, that mischief and danger are occasioned.’ He recommended that as soon as the supreme government had organised the details of a just and well-considered policy, ‘it should be openly avowed and universally acted on throughout British India; so that there may be no diversities of practice, no isolated or conflicting efforts, which would be the surest means of exciting distrust; so that the people may see that we have no sudden or sinister designs; and so that we may exhibit that harmony and uniformity of conduct which befits a Christian nation striving to do its duty.’ Finally, he expressed a singularly firm conviction that, so far as concerns the Punjaub, he could himself carry out ‘all those measures which are really matters of Christian duty on the part of the government:’ measures which ‘would arouse no danger, would conciliate instead of provoking, and would subserve the ultimate diffusion of the truth among the people.’
It wants no other evidence than is furnished by the above very remarkable correspondence, to shew that the future government of India must, if it be effective, be based on some system which has been well weighed and scrutinised on all sides. The problem is nothing less than that of governing a hundred and eighty millions of human beings, whose characteristics are very imperfectly known to us. It is a matter of no great difficulty to write out a scheme or plan of government, plentifully bestrewed with personalities and accusations; there have been many such; but the calm judgment of men filling different ranks in life, and conversant with different aspects of Indian character, can alone insure the embodiment of a scheme calculated to benefit both India and England. Whether the abolition of the governing powers of the East India Company will facilitate the solution of this great problem, the future alone can shew; it will at any rate simplify the departmental operations.
The Queen’s proclamation, announcing the great change in the mode of government, and offering an amnesty to evildoers under certain easily understood conditions, adverted cautiously to the future and its prospects. Before, however, touching on this important document, it may be well to say a few words concerning the military operations in the few weeks immediately preceding its issue.
These operations, large as they were, had resolved themselves into the hunting down of desperate bands, rather than the fighting of great battles with a military opponent. Throughout the whole of India, in the months of October and November, disturbances had been nearly quelled except in two regions—Oude, with portions of the neighbouring provinces of Rohilcund and Behar; and Malwah, with portions of Bundelcund and the Nerbudda provinces. Of the rest—Bengal, Assam and the Delta of the Ganges, Aracan and Pegu, the greater portion of Behar and the Northwest Provinces, the Doab, Sirhind and the hill regions, the Punjaub, Sinde, Cutch and Gujerat, Bombay and its vicinity, the Deccan under the Nizam, the Nagpoor territory, the Madras region, Mysore, the South Mahratta country, the south of the Indian peninsula—all were so nearly at peace as to excite little attention. Of the two excepted regions, a few details will shew that they were gradually falling more and more under British power.
In the Oude region the guiding spirit was still the Begum, one of the wives of the deposed king. She had the same kind of energy and ability as the Ranee of Jhansi, with less of cruelty; and was hence deserving of a meed of respect. Camp-gossip told that, under disappointment at the uniform defeat of the rebel troops whenever and wherever they encountered the English, she sent a pair of bangles (ankle-ornaments) to each of her generals or leaders—scoffingly telling him to wear those trinkets, and become a woman, unless he could vanquish and drive out the Feringhees. This had the effect of impelling some of her officers to make attacks on the British; but the attacks were utterly futile. There were many leaders in Oude who fought on their own account; a greater number, however, acknowledged a kind of suzerainty in the Begum. If she did not win battles, she at least headed armies, and carried on open warfare; whereas the despicable Nena Sahib, true to his cowardice from first to last, was hiding in jungles, and endeavouring to keep his very existence unknown to the English. The military operations in Oude during the month of October were not extensive in character. Sir Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde), waiting for the cessation of the autumnal rains, was collecting several columns, with a view of hemming in the rebels on all sides and crushing them. That they would ultimately be crushed, everything foretold; for in every encounter, large or small, they were so disgracefully beaten as to shew that the leaders commanded a mere predatory rabble rather than a brave disciplined soldiery. These encounters were mostly in Oude, but partly in Behar and Rohilcund. In the greater number of instances, however, the rebels ran instead of fighting, even though their number was tenfold that of their opponents. The skilled mutinied sepoys from the Bengal army were becoming daily fewer in number, so many having been struck down by war and by privation; their places were now taken by undisciplined ruffians, who, however strong for rapine and anarchy, were nearly powerless on the field of battle. Thousands of men in this part of India, who had become impoverished, almost houseless, during a year and a half of anarchy, had strong temptation to join the rebel leaders, from a hope of booty or plunder, irrespective of any national or patriotic motive. Sir Colin, when the month of November arrived, entered personally on his plan of operations; which was to bar the boundaries of Oude on three sides—the Ganges, Rohilcund, and Behar—and compel the various bodies of rebels either to fight or to flee; if they fought, their virtual annihilation would be almost certain; if they fled, it could only be to the jungle region on the Nepaul frontier of Oude, where, though they might carry on a hide-and-seek game for many months, their military importance as rebels would cease. In the dead of the night, between the 1st and 2d of November, the veteran commander-in-chief set forth from Allahabad with a well-selected force, crossed the Ganges, and advanced into Oude. His first work was to issue a proclamation,[203] sternly threatening all evildoers. A few days earlier, at Lucknow, Mr Montgomery, as chief-commissioner, had issued a proclamation for the disarming of Oude—requiring all thalookdars to surrender their guns, all persons whatever to surrender their arms, all leaders to refrain from building and arming forts; and threatening with fine and imprisonment those who should disobey. It was intended and believed that the three proclamations should all conduce towards a pacification—the Queen’s (presently to be noticed) offering pardon to mutineers who yielded; the Commander-in-chief’s, threatening destruction to all towns and villages which aided rebels; and the commissioners’, lessening the powers for mischief by depriving the inhabitants generally of arms. With Sir Colin advancing towards the centre of Oude by Pertabghur, troops from Seetapoor, Hope Grant from Salone, and Rowcroft from the Gogra at Fyzabad, the Begum and her supporters were gradually so hemmed in that they began to avail themselves of the terms of the Queen’s proclamation by surrender. It was to such a result that the authorities had from the first looked; but never until now had all the conditions for it been favourable. One of the first to surrender was Rajah Lall Madhoo Singh, a chieftain of great influence and energy, and one whose character had not been stained by deeds of cruelty.
In the Arrah or Jugdispore district, in like manner, the close of the scene was foreshadowed. Ummer Singh and his confederates had long baffled Brigadier Douglas; but now that troops were converging from all quarters upon the jungle-haunt, the rebels became more and more isolated from bands in other districts, their position more and more critical, and their final discomfiture more certain. Sir H. Havelock, son of the deceased general, and Colonel Turner, pressed them more and more with new columns, until their hopes were desperate. One excellent expedient was the cutting down of the Jugdispore jungle, 23 miles in length by 4 in breadth; this useful work was begun in November by Messrs Burn, railway contractors.
In the other region of India above adverted to—comprising those districts of Malwah, Bundelcund, &c., which are watered by the Betwah, the Chumbul, the Nerbudda, and their tributaries—the leading rebel was Tanteea Topee, one of the most remarkable men brought forward by the Revolt. He had most of the qualities for a good general—except courage. He would not fight if he could help it; but in avoiding the British generals opposed to him, he displayed a cunning of plan, a fertility of resource, and a celerity of movement, quite note-worthy. The truth seems to have been, that he held power over an enormous treasure, in money and jewels, which he had obtained by plundering Scindia’s palace at Gwalior; this treasure he carried with him wherever he went; and he shunned any encounters which might endanger it. He looked out for a strong city or fort, where he might settle down as a Mahratta prince, with a large store of available ready wealth at hand; but as the British did not choose to leave him in quietude, he marched from place to place. Between the beginning of June and the end of November he traversed with his army an enormous area of country, seizing guns from various towns and forts on the way, but usually escaping before the English could catch him. Former chapters have shewn by what strange circumvolutions he arrived at Julra Patteen; and a detail of operations would shew that his subsequent movements were equally erratic. He went to Seronj, then to Esagurh, then to Chunderee, then to Peshore, then arrived at the river Betwah, and wavered whether he should go southward to the Deccan or northward towards Jhansi. Everywhere he was either followed or headed, by columns and detachments under Michel, Mayne, Parkes, Smith, and other officers. Whenever they could bring him to an encounter, they invariably beat him most signally; but when, as generally happened, he escaped by forced marches, they tracked him. He picked up guns and men as he went; so that the amount of his force was never correctly known; it varied from three to fifteen thousand. One of the most severe defeats he received was at Sindwah, on the 19th of October, at the hands of General Michel; another, on the 25th, near Multhone, from the same active general. It was felt on all sides that this game could not be indefinitely continued. Tanteea Topee was like a hunted beast of prey, pursued by enemies who would not let him rest. When it had been clearly ascertained by General Roberts, in Rajpootana, that the fleet-footed and unencumbered rebel soldiery could escape faster than British troops could follow them, a new mode of strategy was adopted; columns from four different directions began to march towards a common centre, near which centre were Tanteea and his rebels; if one column could not catch him, another could head him and drive him back. Thus it was considered a military certainty that he must be run down at last. And if he fell, the great work of pacification in that part of India would be pretty well effected; for there was no rebel force of any account except that commanded by Tanteea Topee. After his defeat at Multhone, Tanteea was in great peril; Michel literally cut his army in two; and if he had pursued the larger instead of the smaller of these two sections, he might possibly have captured Tanteea himself. On the last day in October, the rebel leader crossed the Nerbudda river, thereby turning his back on the regions occupied by the columns of Roberts, Napier, Michel, Smith, and Whitlock. During November, he made some extraordinary marches in the country immediately southward of the Nerbudda—being heard of successively at Baitool, the Sindwara hills, and other little-known places in that region. He was no better off than before, however, for forces were immediately sent against him from Ahmednuggur, Kamptee, and other places; he had lost nearly all his guns and stores, his rebel followers, though laden with wealth, were footsore and desponding; and, for the first time, his companions began to look out for favourable terms of surrender. The Queen’s proclamation was eminently calculated to withdraw his misguided followers from him; and the Nawab of Banda, the most influential among them, was the first to give himself up to General Michel.
Not only was a large measure of forgiveness held out to those who would return to their allegiance; but the British troops in India were becoming so formidably numerous as to render still more certain than ever the eventual triumph of order and good government. The Queen’s troops in India at the beginning of November, those on the passage from England, and those told off for further shipment, amounted altogether to little short of one hundred thousand men. It affords a striking instance of triumph over difficulties, that between November 1857 and November 1858 the Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company conveyed no less than 8190 officers and soldiers to India by the overland route—in spite of the forebodings that that route would be unsuitable for whole regiments of soldiers; the burning Egyptian desert and the reef-bound Red Sea were traversed almost without disaster, under the watchful care of this company.
The 1st of November 1858 was a great day in India. On this day the transference of governing power from the East India Company to Queen Victoria was made known throughout the length and breadth of the empire. A royal proclamation[204] was issued, which many regarded as the Magna Charta of native liberty in India. At Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Lahore, Kurachee, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Nagpoor, Mysore, Rangoon, and other great cities, this proclamation was read with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendour that could give dignity to the occasion in the eyes of the natives; and at every British station, large or small, it was read amid such military honours as each place afforded. It was translated into most of the languages, and many of the dialects of India. It was printed in tens of thousands, and distributed wherever natives were wont most to congregate—in order that all might know that Queen Victoria was now virtually Empress of India; that the governor-general was now her viceroy; that the native princes might rely on the observance by her of all treaties made with them by the Company; that she desired no encroachment on, or annexation of, the territories of those princes; that she would not interfere with the religion of the natives, or countenance any favouritism in matters of faith; that creed or caste should not be a bar to employment in her service; that the ancient legal tenures and forms of India should, as far as possible, be adhered to; and that all mutineers and rebels, except those whose hands were blood-stained by actual murder, should receive a full and gracious pardon on abandoning their acts of insurgency. When these words were uttered aloud at Bombay (and the ceremony was more or less similar at the other cities named) the spectacle was such as the natives of India had never before seen. The governor and all the chief civilians; the military officers and the troops; the clergy of all the various Christian denominations; the merchants, shipowners, and traders; the Mohammedans, Hindoos, Mahrattas, Parsees—all were represented among the throng around the spot from whence the proclamation was read, first in English, and then in Mahratta. And then the shouting, the music of military bands, the firing of guns, the waving of flags, the illuminations at night, the fireworks in the public squares, the blue-lights and manning of the ships, the banquets in the chief mansions—all rendered this a day to be borne in remembrance. Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, the Parsee baronet, vied with the Christians in the munificence of rejoicing; and indeed, so little did religious differences mar the harmony of the scene, that Catholic chapels, Mohammedan mosques, Hindoo pagodas, and Parsee temples were alike lighted up at night. It may not be that every one was enabled to assign good reasons for his rejoicing; but there was certainly a pretty general concurrence of opinion that the declared sovereignty of Queen Victoria, as a substitute for the ever-incomprehensible ‘raj’ of the East India Company, was a presage of good for British India. At Calcutta, the proclamation had the singular good-fortune of winning the approval of a community always very difficult to please. The Europeans consented to lay aside all minor considerations, in order to do honour to the great principles involved in the proclamation. The natives, too, took their share in the rejoicing. A public meeting was held early in the month, at which an influential Hindoo, Baboo Ramgopal Ghose, made an animated speech. He said, among other things: ‘If I had power and influence, I would proclaim through the length and breadth of this land—from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, from the Brahmaputra to the Bay of Cambay—that never were the natives more grievously mistaken than they have been in adopting the notion foisted on them by designing and ambitious men—that their religion was at stake; for that notion I believe to have been at the root of the late rebellion.’ Some of the more intelligent natives rightly understood the nature of the great change made in the government of India; but among the ignorant, it remained a mystery—rendered, however, very palatable by the open avowal of a Queen regnant, and of a proclamation breathing sentiments of justice and kindness.
[Illustration]
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Footnote 194:
## Chapter xiii., p. 211.
Footnote 195:
_Account of the Mutinies in Oudh._
Footnote 196:
_Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow._
Footnote 197:
_Eight Months’ Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army._
Footnote 198:
_British India; its Races and its History._
Footnote 199:
_The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences._
Footnote 200:
_Notes on the Revolt in the Northwest Provinces._
Footnote 201:
_Letters of Indophilus to the ‘Times.’_
Footnote 202:
_The Indian Rebellion: its Causes and Results._
Footnote 203:
‘The Commander-in-chief proclaims to the people of Oude that, under the order of the Right Hon. the Governor-general, he comes to enforce the law.
‘In order to effect this without danger to life and property, resistance must cease on the part of the people.
‘The most exact discipline will be preserved in the camps and on the march; and when there is no resistance, houses and crops will be spared, and no plundering allowed in the towns and villages. But wherever there is resistance, or even a single shot fired against the troops, the inhabitants must expect to incur the fate they have brought on themselves. Their houses will be plundered, and their villages burnt.
‘This proclamation includes all ranks of the people, from the thalookdars to the poorest ryots.
‘The Commander-in-chief invites all the well-disposed to remain in their towns and villages, where they will be sure of his protection against all violence.’
Footnote 204:
See Appendix.
APPENDIX.
_East India Company’s Petition to Parliament, January 1858._—(See p. 563.)
To the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled; The humble Petition of the East India Company, Sheweth:
That your petitioners, at their own expense, and by the agency of their own civil and military servants, originally acquired for this country its magnificent empire in the East.
That the foundations of this empire were laid by your petitioners, at that time neither aided nor controlled by parliament, at the same period at which a succession of administrations under the control of parliament were losing to the Crown of Great Britain another great empire on the opposite side of the Atlantic.
That during the period of about a century, which has since elapsed, the Indian possessions of this country have been governed and defended from the resources of those possessions, without the smallest cost to the British exchequer, which, to the best of your petitioners’ knowledge and belief, cannot be said of any other of the numerous foreign dependencies of the Crown.
That it being manifestly improper that the administration of any British possession should be independent of the general government of the empire, parliament provided in 1783 that a department of the imperial government should have full cognizance of, and power of control over, the acts of your petitioners in the administration of India; since which time the home branch of the Indian government has been conducted by the joint counsels and on the joint responsibility of your petitioners and of a minister of the Crown.
That this arrangement has at subsequent periods undergone reconsideration from the legislature, and various comprehensive and careful parliamentary inquiries have been made into its practical operation; the result of which has been, on each occasion, a renewed grant to your petitioners of the powers exercised by them in the administration of India.
That the last of these occasions was so recent as 1853, in which year the arrangements which had existed for nearly three-quarters of a century were, with certain modifications, re-enacted, and still subsist.
That, notwithstanding, your petitioners have received an intimation from her Majesty’s ministers of their intention to propose to parliament a bill for the purpose of placing the government of her Majesty’s East Indian dominions under the direct authority of the Crown: a change necessarily involving the abolition of the East India Company as an instrument of government.
That your petitioners have not been informed of the reasons which have induced her Majesty’s ministers, without any previous inquiry, to come to the resolution of putting an end to a system of administration which parliament, after inquiry, deliberately confirmed and sanctioned less than five years ago, and which, in its modified form, has not been in operation quite four years, and cannot be considered to have undergone a sufficient trial during that short period.
That your petitioners do not understand that her Majesty’s ministers impute any failure to those arrangements, or bring any charge, either great or small, against your petitioners. But the time at which the proposal is made, compels your petitioners to regard it as arising from the calamitous events which have recently occurred in India.
That your petitioners challenge the most searching investigation into the mutiny of the Bengal army, and the causes, whether remote or immediate, which produced that mutiny. They have instructed the government of India to appoint a commission for conducting such an inquiry on the spot; and it is their most anxious wish that a similar inquiry may be instituted in this country by your [lordships’] honourable House, in order that it may be ascertained whether anything, either in the constitution of the home government of India, or in the conduct of those by whom it has been administered, has had any share in producing the mutiny, or has in any way impeded the measures for its suppression; and whether the mutiny itself, or any circumstance connected with it, affords any evidence of the failure of the arrangements under which India is at present administered.
That were it even true that these arrangements had failed, the failure could constitute no reason for divesting the East India Company of its functions, and transferring them to her Majesty’s government. For, under the existing system, her Majesty’s government have the deciding voice. The duty imposed upon the Court of Directors is, to originate measures and frame drafts of instructions. Even had they been remiss in this duty, their remissness, however discreditable to themselves, could in no way absolve the responsibility of her Majesty’s government; since the minister for India possesses, and has frequently exercised, the power of requiring that the Court of Directors should take any subject into consideration, and prepare a draft-dispatch for his approval. Her Majesty’s government are thus in the fullest sense accountable for all that has been done, and for all that has been forborne or omitted to be done. Your petitioners, on the other hand, are accountable only in so far as the act or omission has been promoted by themselves.
That under these circumstances, if the administration of India had been a failure, it would, your petitioners submit, have been somewhat unreasonable, to expect that a remedy would be found in annihilating the branch of the ruling authority which could not be the one principally in fault, and might be altogether blameless, in order to concentrate all powers in the branch which had necessarily the decisive share in every error, real or supposed. To believe that the administration of India would have been more free from error, had it been conducted by a minister of the Crown without the aid of the Court of Directors, would be to believe that the minister, with full power to govern India as he pleased, has governed ill because he has had the assistance of experienced and responsible advisers.
That your petitioners, however, do not seek to vindicate themselves at the expense of any other authority; they claim their full share of the responsibility of the manner in which India has practically been governed. That responsibility is to them not a subject of humiliation, but of pride. They are conscious that their advice and initiative have been, and have deserved to be, a great and potent element in the conduct of affairs in India. And they feel complete assurance, that the more attention is bestowed, and the more light thrown upon India and its administration, the more evident it will become, that the government in which they have borne a part, has been not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among mankind; that during the last and present generations in particular, it has been, in all departments, one of the most rapidly improving governments in the world; and that, at the time when this change is proposed, a greater number of important improvements are in a state of rapid progress than at any former period. And they are satisfied that whatever further improvements may be hereafter effected in India, can only consist in the development of germs already planted, and in building on foundations already laid, under their authority, and in a great measure by their express instructions.
That such, however, is not the impression likely to be made on the public mind, either in England or in India, by the ejection of your petitioners from the place they fill in the Indian administration. It is not usual with statesmen to propose the complete abolition of a system of government of which the practical operation is not condemned. It might therefore be generally inferred from the proposed measures, if carried into effect at the present time, that the East India Company having been intrusted with an important portion of the administration of India, have so abused their trust, as to have produced a sanguinary insurrection, and nearly lost India to the British empire; and that having thus crowned a long career of misgovernment, they have, in deference to public indignation, been deservedly cashiered for their misconduct.
That if the character of the East India Company were alone concerned, your petitioners might be willing to await the verdict of history. They are satisfied that posterity will do them justice. And they are confident that, even now, justice is done to them in the minds, not only of her Majesty’s ministers, but of all who have any claim to be competent judges of the subject. But though your petitioners could afford to wait for the reversal of the verdict of condemnation which will be believed throughout the world to have been passed on them and their government by the British nation, your petitioners cannot look without the deepest uneasiness at the effect likely to be produced on the minds of the people of India. To them—however incorrectly the name may express the fact—the British government in India is the government of the East India Company. To their minds, the abolition of the Company will, for some time to come, mean the abolition of the whole system of administration with which the Company is identified. The measure, introduced simultaneously with the influx of an overwhelming British force, will be coincident with a general outcry, in itself most alarming to their fears, from most of the organs of opinion in this country, as well as of English opinion in India, denouncing the past policy of the government on the express ground that it has been too forbearing, and too considerate towards the natives. The people of India will at first feel no certainty that the new government, or the government under a new name, which it is proposed to introduce, will hold itself bound by the pledges of its predecessors. They will be slow to believe that a government has been destroyed, only to be followed by another which will act on the same principles, and adhere to the same measures. They cannot suppose that the existing organ of administration would be swept away without the intention of reversing any part of its policy. They will see the authorities, both at home and in India, surrounded by persons vehemently urging radical changes in many parts of that policy. Interpreting, as they must do, the change in the instrument of government as a concession to these opinions and feelings, they can hardly fail to believe that, whatever else may be intended, the government will no longer be permitted to observe that strict impartiality between those who profess its own creed and those who hold the creeds of its native subjects, which hitherto characterised it; that their strongest and most deeply rooted feelings will henceforth be treated with much less regard than heretofore; and that a directly aggressive policy towards everything in their habits, or in their usages and customs, which Englishmen deem objectionable, will be no longer confined to individuals and private associations, but will be backed by all the power of government.
And here your petitioners think it important to observe, that in abstaining as they have done from all interference with any of the religious practices of the people of India, except such as are abhorrent to humanity, they have acted not only from their own conviction of what is just and expedient, but in accordance with the avowed intentions and express enactments of the legislature, framed ‘in order that regard should be had to the civil and religious usages of the natives,’ and also ‘that suits, civil or criminal, against the natives,’ should be conducted according to such rules ‘as may accommodate the same to the religion and manners of the natives.’ That their policy in this respect has been successful, is evidenced by the fact that, during a military mutiny, said to have been caused by unfounded apprehensions of danger to religion, the heads of the native states and the masses of the population have remained faithful to the British government. Your petitioners need hardly observe, how very different would probably have been the issue of the late events if the native princes, instead of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion, had put themselves at its head, or if the general population had joined in the revolt; and how probable it is that both these contingencies would have occurred if any real ground had been given for the persuasion that the British government intended to identify itself with proselytism. It is the honest conviction of your petitioners, that any serious apprehension of a change of policy in this respect would be likely to be followed, at no distant period, by a general rising throughout India.
That your petitioners have seen with the greatest pain, the demonstrations of indiscriminate animosity towards the natives of India on the part of our countrymen in India and at home, which have grown up since the late unhappy events. They believe these sentiments to be fundamentally unjust; they know them to be fatal to the possibility of good government in India. They feel that if such demonstrations should continue, and especially if weight be added to them by legislating under their supposed influence, no amount of wisdom and forbearance on the part of the government will avail to restore that confidence of the governed in the intentions of their rulers, without which it is vain even to attempt the improvement of the people.
That your petitioners cannot contemplate without dismay the doctrine now widely promulgated, that India should be administered with an especial view to the benefit of the English who reside there—or that in its administration any advantages should be sought for her Majesty’s subjects of European birth, except that which they will necessarily derive from their superiority of intelligence, and from the increased prosperity of the people, the improvement of the productive resources of the country, and the extension of commercial intercourse. Your petitioners regard it as the most honourable characteristic of the government of India by England, that it has acknowledged no such distinction as that of a dominant and a subject race; but has held that its first duty was to the people of India. Your petitioners feel that a great portion of the hostility with which they are assailed, is caused by the belief that they are peculiarly the guardians of this principle, and that, so long as they have any voice in the administration of India, it cannot easily be infringed; and your petitioners will not conceal their belief that their exclusion from any part in the government is likely, at the present time, to be regarded in India as a first successful attack on that principle.
That your petitioners, therefore, most earnestly represent to your [lordships’] honourable House that even if the contemplated change could be proved to be in itself advisable, the present is a most unsuitable time for entertaining it; and they most strongly and respectfully urge on your [lordships’] honourable House the expediency of at least deferring any such change until it can be effected at a period when it would not be, in the minds of the people of India, directly connected with the recent calamitous events, and with the feelings to which those events have either given rise, or have afforded an opportunity of manifestation. Such postponement, your petitioners submit, would allow time for a more mature consideration than has yet been given, or can be given in the present excited state of the public mind, to the various questions connected with the organisation of a government for India; and would enable the most competent minds in the nation calmly to examine whether any new arrangement can be devised for the home government of India uniting a greater number of the conditions of good administration than the present, and if so, which, among the numerous schemes which have been or may be proposed, possesses those requisites in the greatest degree.
That your petitioners have always willingly acquiesced in any changes which, after discussion by parliament, were deemed conducive to the general welfare, although such changes may have involved important sacrifices to themselves. They would refer to their partial relinquishment of trade in 1813; to its total abandonment, and the placing of their commercial charter in abeyance in 1833; to the transfer to India of their commercial assets, amounting to £15,858,000, a sum greatly exceeding that ultimately repayable to them in respect of their capital, independent of territorial rights and claims; and to their concurrence, in 1853, in the measure by which the Court of Directors was reconstructed, and reduced to its present number. In the same spirit, your petitioners would most gladly co-operate with her Majesty’s government in correcting any defects which may be considered to exist in the details of the present system; and they would be prepared, without a murmur, to relinquish their trust altogether, if a better system for the control of the government of India can be devised. But as they believe that, in the construction of such a system, there are conditions which cannot, without the most dangerous consequences, be departed from, your petitioners respectfully and deferentially submit to the judgment of your [lordships’] honourable House their view of those conditions, in the hope that if your [lordships’] honourable House should see reason to agree in that view, you will withhold your legislative sanction from any arrangement for the government of India which does not fulfil the conditions in question in at least an equal degree with the present.
That your petitioners may venture to assume that it will not be proposed to vest the home portion of the administration of India in a minister of the Crown, without the adjunct of a council composed of statesmen experienced in Indian affairs. Her Majesty’s ministers cannot but be aware that the knowledge necessary for governing a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, requires as much special study as any other profession, and cannot possibly be possessed by any one who has not devoted a considerable portion of his life to the acquisition of it.
That in constituting a body of experienced advisers, to be associated with the Indian minister, your petitioners consider it indispensable to bear in mind that this body should not only be qualified to advise the minister, but also, by its advice, to exercise, to a certain degree, a moral check. It cannot be expected that the minister, as a general rule, should himself know India; while he will be exposed to perpetual solicitations from individuals and bodies, either entirely ignorant of that country, or knowing only enough of it to impose on those who know still less than themselves, and having very frequently objects in view other than the interests or good government of India. The influences likely to be brought to bear on him through the organs of popular opinion will, in the majority of cases, be equally misleading. The public opinion of England, itself necessarily unacquainted with Indian affairs, can only follow the promptings of those who take most pains to influence it; and these will generally be such as have some private interest to serve. It is, therefore, your petitioners submit, of the utmost importance that any council which may form a part of the home government of India should derive sufficient weight from its constitution, and from the relation it occupies to the minister, to be a substantial barrier against those inroads of self-interest and ignorance in this country from which the government of India has hitherto been comparatively free, but against which it would be too much to expect that parliament should of itself afford a sufficient protection.
That your petitioners cannot well conceive a worse form of government for India, than a minister with a council whom he should be at liberty to consult or not at his pleasure, or whose advice he should be able to disregard without giving his reasons in writing, and in a manner likely to carry conviction. Such an arrangement, your petitioners submit, would be really liable to the objections in their opinion erroneously urged against the present system. Your petitioners respectfully represent that any body of persons associated with the minister, which is not a check, will be a screen. Unless the council is so constituted as to be personally independent of the minister; unless it feels itself responsible for recording an opinion on every Indian subject, and pressing that opinion on the minister, whether it is agreeable to him or not; and unless the minister, when he overrules their opinion, is bound to record his reasons—its existence will only serve to weaken his responsibility, and to give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures in the framing of which those qualities have had no share.
That it would be vain to expect that a new council could have as much moral influence, and power of asserting its opinion with effect, as the Court of Directors. A new body can no more succeed to the feelings and authority which their antiquity and their historical antecedents give to the East India Company, than a legislature, under a new name, sitting in Westminster, would have the moral ascendency of the Houses of Lords and Commons. One of the most important elements of usefulness will thus be necessarily wanting in any newly constituted Indian Council, as compared with the present.
That your petitioners find it difficult to conceive that the same independence, in judgment and act, which characterises the Court of Directors will be found in any council all of whose members are nominated by the crown. Owing their nomination to the same authority, many of them probably to the same individual minister whom they are appointed to check, and looking to him alone for their re-appointment, their desire of recommending themselves to him, and their unwillingness to risk his displeasure by any serious resistance to his wishes, will be motives too strong not to be in danger of exercising a powerful and injurious influence over their conduct. Nor are your petitioners aware of any mode in which that injurious influence could be guarded against, except by conferring the appointments, like those of the judges, during good behaviour; which, by rendering it impossible to correct an error once committed, would be seriously objectionable.
That your petitioners are equally unable to perceive how, if the controlling body is entirely nominated by the minister, that happy independence of parliamentary and party influence which has hitherto distinguished the administration of India, and the appointment to situations of trust and importance in that country, can be expected to continue. Your petitioners believe that in no government known to history have appointments to offices, and especially to high offices, been so rarely bestowed on any other considerations than those of personal fitness. This characteristic, but for which, in all probability, India would long since have been lost to this country, is, your petitioners conceive, entirely owing to the circumstance that the dispensers of patronage have been persons unconnected with party, and under no necessity of conciliating parliamentary support; that consequently the appointments to offices in India have been, as a rule, left to the unbiassed judgment of the local authorities; while the nominations to the civil and military services have been generally bestowed on the middle classes, irrespective of political considerations, and in a large proportion on the relatives of persons who had distinguished themselves by their services in India.
That your petitioners therefore think it essential that at least a majority of the council which assists the minister for India with its advice, should hold their seats independently of his appointment.
That it is, in the opinion of your petitioners, no less necessary that the order of the transaction of business should be such as to make the
## participation of the council in the administration of India a
substantial one. That to this end it is, in the opinion of your petitioners, indispensable that the dispatches to India should not be prepared by the minister, and laid before the council, but should be prepared by the council, and submitted to the minister. This would be in accordance with the natural and obvious principle, that persons, chosen for their knowledge of a subject, should suggest the mode of dealing with it, instead of merely giving their opinion on suggestions coming from elsewhere. This is also the only mode in which the members of the council can feel themselves sufficiently important, or sufficiently responsible, to secure their applying their minds to the subjects before them. It is almost unnecessary for your petitioners to observe, that the mind is called into far more vigorous action, by being required to propose, than by merely being called on to assent. The minister has necessarily the ultimate decision. If he has also the initiative, he has all the powers which are of any practical moment. A body whose only recognised function is to find fault, would speedily let that function fall into desuetude. They would feel that their co-operation in conducting the government of India was not really desired; that they were only felt as a clog on the wheels of business. Their criticism on what had been decided, without their being collectively consulted, would be felt as importunate as a mere delay and impediment; and their office would probably be seldom sought, but by those who were willing to allow its most important duties to become nominal.
That, with the duty of preparing the dispatches to India would naturally be combined the nomination and control of the home establishments. This your petitioners consider absolutely essential to the utility of the council. If the officers through whom they work are in direct dependence upon an authority higher than theirs, all matters of importance will in reality be settled between the minister and the subordinates, passing over the council altogether.
That a third consideration to which your petitioners attach great importance, is, that the number of the council should not be too restricted. India is so wide a field, that a practical acquaintance with every part of its affairs cannot be found combined in any small number of individuals. The council ought to contain men of general experience and knowledge of the world, also men specially qualified by financial and revenue experience, by judicial experience, diplomatic experience, military experience; it ought to contain persons conversant with the varied social relations, and varied institutions of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the Northwestern Provinces, the Punjaub, and the native states. Even the present Court of Directors, reduced as it is in numbers by the act of 1853, does not contain all the varieties of knowledge and experience desirable in such a body; neither, your petitioners submit, would it be safe to limit the number to that which would be strictly sufficient, supposing all the appointments to be the best possible. A certain margin should be allowed for failures, which, even with the most conscientious selection, will sometimes occur. Your petitioners, moreover, cannot overlook the possibility, that if the nomination takes place by ministers at the head of a political party, it will not always be made with exclusive reference to personal qualifications; and it is indispensable to provide that such errors or faults in the nominating authority, so long as they are only occasional, shall not seriously impair the efficiency of the body.
That while these considerations plead strongly for a body not less numerous than the present, even if only regarded as advisers of the minister; their other office, as a check on the minister, forms, your petitioners submit, a no less forcible objection to any considerable reduction of the present number. A body of six or eight will not be equal to one of eighteen in that feeling of independent self-reliance which is necessary to induce a public body to press its opinion on a minister to whom that opinion is unacceptable. However unobjectionably in other respects so small a body may be constituted, reluctance to give offence will be likely, unless in extreme cases, to be a stronger habitual inducement in their minds than the desire to stand up for their convictions.
That if, in the opinion of your [lordships’] honourable House, a body can be constituted which unites the above enumerated requisites of good government, in a greater degree than the Court of Directors, your petitioners have only to express their humble hope that your endeavours for that purpose may be successful. But if, in enumerating the conditions of a good system of home government for India, your petitioners have, in fact, enumerated the qualities possessed by the present system, then your petitioners pray that your [lordships’] honourable House will continue the existing powers of the Court of Directors.
That your petitioners are aware that the present home government of India is reproached with being a double government; and that any arrangement by which an independent check is provided to the discretion of the minister, will be liable to a similar reproach. But they conceive that this accusation originates in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive departments. The executive government of India is, and must be, seated in India itself. The Court of Directors is not so much an executive as a deliberative body. Its principal function, and that of the home government generally, is not to direct the details of administration, but to scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government—to lay down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance—and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures, which are referred home for approval. These duties are more analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive board; and it might almost as well be said that parliament, as that the government of India, should be constituted on the principles applicable to executive boards. It is considered an excellence, not a defect in the constitution of parliament, to be not merely a double but a triple government. An executive authority, your petitioners submit, may often with advantage be single, because promptitude is its first requisite. But the function of passing a deliberate opinion on past measures, and laying down principles of future policy, is a business which, in the estimation of your petitioners, admits of and requires the concurrence of more judgments than one. It is no defect in such a body to be double, and no excellence to be single, especially when it can only be made so by cutting off that branch of it which, by previous training, is always the best prepared—and often the only one which is prepared at all—for its peculiar duty.
That your petitioners have heard it asserted that, in consequence of what is called the double government, the Indian authorities are less responsible to parliament and the nation than other departments of the government of the empire, since it is impossible to know on which of the two branches of home government the responsibility ought to rest. Your petitioners fearlessly affirm that this impression is not only groundless, but the very reverse of the truth. The home government of India is not less, but more responsible than any other branch of the administration of the state; inasmuch as the president of the Board of Commissioners, who is the minister for India, is as completely responsible as any other of her Majesty’s ministers; and, in addition, his advisers also are responsible. It is always certain, in the case of India, that the president of the Board of Commissioners must have either commanded or sanctioned all that has been done. No more than this, your petitioners would submit, can be known in the case of the head of any department of her Majesty’s government. For it is not, nor can it rationally be supposed, that any minister of the Crown is without trusted advisers; and the minister for India must, for obvious reasons, be more dependent than any other of her Majesty’s ministers, upon the advice of persons whose lives have been devoted to the subject on which their advice has been given. But in the case of India such advisers are assigned to him by the constitution of the government, and they are as much responsible for what they advise, as he for what he ordains; while, in other departments, the minister’s only official advisers are the subordinates in his office, men often of great skill and experience, but not in the public eye, often unknown to the public even by name; official reserve precludes the possibility of ascertaining what advice they give, and they are responsible only to the minister himself. By what application of terms this can be called responsible government, and the joint government of your petitioners and the India Board an irresponsible government, your petitioners think it unnecessary to ask.
That, without knowing the plan on which her Majesty’s ministers contemplate the transfer to the Crown of the servants of the Company, your petitioners find themselves unable to approach the delicate question of the Indian army, further than to point out that the high military qualities of the officers of that army have unquestionably sprung, in a great degree, from its being a principal and substantive army, holding her Majesty’s commissions, and enjoying equal rank with her Majesty’s officers; and your petitioners would earnestly deprecate any change in that position.
That your petitioners having regard to all these considerations, humbly pray your [lordships’] honourable House that you will not give your sanction to any change in the constitution of the Indian government during the continuance of the present unhappy disturbances, nor without a full previous inquiry into the operation of the present system. And your petitioners further pray, that this inquiry may extend to every department of Indian administration. Such an inquiry your petitioners respectfully claim, not only as a matter of justice to themselves, but because, when, for the first time in this century, the thoughts of every public man in the country are fixed on India, an inquiry would be more thorough, and its results would carry much more instruction to the mind of parliament and of the country, than at any preceding period.
_E. I. Company’s Objections to the First and Second India Bills: April 1858._ (See p. 567.)
It is the duty of your Directors to lay before the Proprietors the two bills which have been introduced into parliament by the late and by the present ministry, for divesting the East India Company of all
## participation in the government of India, and for framing a new scheme
of administrative agency.
On former occasions, when the ministers of the Crown have submitted measures to parliament for altering, in any manner, the constitution of the Indian government, the substance of the measures has been officially communicated to the Court of Directors, and an opportunity allowed to them of offering such remarks as their knowledge and experience in Indian affairs might suggest. The correspondence being afterwards laid before the Court of Proprietors, formed the most appropriate report which the Directors could make to their constituents on the measures under consideration by the legislature. In the present instance, this opportunity not having been afforded to them, it appears desirable that they should adopt the present mode of laying before the proprietary body the observations which it is entitled to expect from its executive organ, on the bills now before parliament, and on the present posture of the Company’s affairs.
The Directors cannot but advert with feelings of satisfaction to the altered tone which public discussion has assumed in regard to the character of the East India Company, and the merits of the administration in which the Company has borne so important a part. The intention of proposing the abolition of the Company’s government was announced in the midst of, and it may be surmised in deference to, a clamour, which represented the government of India by the Company as characterised by nearly every fault of which a civilised government can be accused, and the Company as the main cause of the recent disasters. But in the parliamentary discussions which have lately taken place, there has been an almost universal acknowledgment that the rule of the Company has been honourable to themselves and beneficial to India; while no political party, and few individuals of any consideration, have alleged anything seriously disparaging to the general character of the Company’s administration. So far, therefore, the stand made by the Company against the calumnies with which they have been assailed, may be considered to have been successful.
But the admission generally made, and made explicitly by the proposers of both the bills, that the existing system works well, has not had the effect of inducing doubt of the wisdom of hastily abolishing it. Neither does it seem to have been remembered, that if the system has worked well, there must be some causes for its having done so, and that it would be worth while to consider what these are, in order that they might be retained in any new system. If the constitution which has made the Indian government what it is, must be abolished, because it is thought defective in theory, what is substituted should at least be theoretically unobjectionable. But the constitution of the East India Company, however anomalous, is far more in accordance with the acknowledged principles of good government than either of the proposed bills.
The nature of the case is, indeed, itself so anomalous, that something anomalous was to be expected in the means by which it could be successfully dealt with.
All English institutions and modes of political action are adapted to the case of a nation governing itself. In India, the case to be provided for is that of the government of one nation by another, separated from it by half the globe; unlike it in everything which characterises a people; as a whole, totally unacquainted with it; and without time or means for acquiring knowledge of it or its affairs.
History presents only two instances in which these or similar difficulties have been in any considerable degree surmounted. One is the Roman Empire; the other is the government of India by the East India Company.
The means which the bills provide for overcoming these difficulties consist of the unchecked power of a minister. There is no difference of moment in this respect between the two bills. The minister, it is true, is to have a council. But the most despotic rulers have councils. The difference between the council of a despot and a council which prevents the ruler from being a despot is, that the one is dependent on him, the other independent; that the one has some power of its own, the other has not. By the first bill, the whole council is nominated by the minister; by the second, one-half of it is nominated by him. The functions to be intrusted to it are left, in both, with some slight exceptions, to the minister’s own discretion.
The minister is indeed subject to the control of parliament and of the British nation. But though parliament and the nation exercise a salutary control over their own affairs, it would be contrary to all experience to suppose that they will exercise it over the affairs of a hundred millions of Hindoos and Mohammedans. Habitually, they will doubtless be hereafter, as they have been heretofore, indifferent and inattentive to Indian affairs, and will leave them entirely to the minister. The consequence will be, that in the exceptional cases in which they do interfere, the interference will not be grounded on knowledge of the subject, and will probably be, for the most part, confined to cases where an Indian question is taken up from party motives, as the means of injuring a minister; or when some Indian malcontent, generally with objects opposed to good government, succeeds in interesting the sympathies of the public in his favour. For it is not the people of India, but rich individuals and societies representing class interests, who have the means of engaging the ear of the public through the press, and through agents in parliament. And it is important to remark, that by the provisions of either of the bills, the House of Commons will be rendered even less competent, in point of knowledge of Indian affairs, than at present, since by both bills all the members of the Council of India will be excluded from it.
The government of dependencies by a minister and his subordinates, under the sole control of parliament, is not a new experiment in England. That form of colonial government lost the United States, and had nearly lost all the colonies of any considerable population and importance. The colonial administration of this country has only ceased to be a subject of general condemnation since the principle has been adopted of leaving all the important colonies to manage their own affairs—a course which cannot be followed with the people of India. If the control of parliament has not prevented the habitual mismanagement of countries inhabited by Englishmen like ourselves, who had every facility for representing and urging their grievances, it is not likely to be any effectual protection to Mussulmans and Hindoos.
All governments require constitutional checks; but the constitutional checks applicable to a case of this peculiar kind must be found within the governing body itself.
Though England, as a whole, while desiring nothing but to govern India well, is necessarily ignorant of India, and feels, under ordinary circumstances, no particular interest in its concerns, there are in England a certain number of persons who possess knowledge of India, and feel an interest in its affairs. It seems, therefore, very desirable, for the sake of India, that England should govern it through, and by means of, these persons. This would be the case if the organ of government principally consisted of persons who have passed a considerable portion of their lives in India, or who feel that habitual interest in its affairs which is naturally acquired by having aided in administering them; and if this body, or a majority of it, were periodically elected by a constituency composed of persons in England who have served the government for a certain length of time in India, or whose interests are connected with that country by some permanent tie. It would be an additional advantage if this constituency had the power of requiring information, and compelling a public discussion of Indian questions. These are conditions which, to a considerable extent, the existing constitution of the East India Company fulfils.
The other great constitutional security for the good government of India lies in the forms of business. This is a point to which sufficient importance is not generally attached. The forms of business are the real constitution of India.
From the necessity of the case, recognised in both the proposed measures, the administration must be shared, in some proportion, between a minister and a council. The council may consist of persons possessing knowledge of India. The minister, except in very rare cases, can possess little or none. He is placed in office by the action of political party, which is governed by considerations totally unconnected with India; and, in the common course of politics, he is removed from office by the time he has been able to learn his duty. Even in the unusual case, of which present circumstances are an example, when the minister has made himself acquainted with India through the discharge of high functions in India itself, his knowledge is but the knowledge of one man; and one man’s knowledge of a subject like India, until corrected and completed by that of other men, is, it may safely be affirmed, wholly insufficient, and if implicitly trusted, even dangerous. The good government, therefore, of India, by a minister and a council, depends upon the amount of influence possessed by the council; and their influence depends upon the forms of business.
However experienced may be the council, and however inexperienced the minister, he will have the deciding voice. The power will rest with one who may know less of the subject than any member of the council, and is sure to know less than the council collectively, if they are selected with ordinary judgment. The council will have no substantive power, but only moral influence. It is, therefore, all-important that this influence should be upheld. Unless the forms of business are such as to insure that the council shall exercise its judgment on all questions; that all matters requiring decision shall be considered by them, and their views recorded in the initiatory stage, before the minister has committed himself to an opinion—they will possess no more weight or influence than the same number of clerks in his office, whom also he can consult if he pleases; and the power of the minister will be practically uncontrolled.
In both the bills these considerations are entirely disregarded. The first bill does not establish any forms of business, but leaves them to be determined by the minister and his council; in other words, by the minister. Even, therefore, if the minister first appointed should be willing to establish forms which would be any restraint upon himself, a subsequent minister would have it in his power to alter the forms in any manner he pleased.
The second bill, unlike the first, does establish forms of business; but such alone as would effectually prevent the council from being a reality, and would render it a useless pageant.
To make the council a merely consultative body, without initiative, before whom subjects are only brought after the minister has made up his mind, is already a fatal inroad upon its usefulness. But by the second bill the council are not even a consultative body. The minister is under no obligation to consult them. They are not empowered to hold any regular meetings. They are to meet only when the minister convenes them, or on a special requisition by six members. He may send orders to India without their knowledge when the case is urgent, of which urgency he is the sole judge. When it is not urgent, his orders must be placed in the council-room for the perusal of the members for seven days, during which they are not required, but permitted, to give their opinion, not collectively, but individually. Their only power, therefore, is that of recording dissent from a resolution not only taken, but embodied in a dispatch. And as if this was not enough, provision is made that an office, always invidious, shall be incapable of being fulfilled in any but the most invidious manner. The members of council must come forward individually in declared opposition to the minister, by volunteering a protest against his announced intentions, or signing a requisition for a meeting of council to oppose them. Such a council is fitted to serve as a shield for the minister’s responsibility when it may suit him to seek, and them to accord, their adhesion; rather than as a restraint on his power to administer India according to his individual pleasure.
The Directors are bound to admit, that the first of the bills contains several provisions indicative of a wish to assure to the council a certain, though small, amount of influence. The administration is to be carried on in the name of the president in council, and not, as by the second bill, in that of the Secretary of State alone. The council, as well as the president, has a voice in the appointment of the home establishment; while in the second bill all promotions and all appointments to the principal offices under the council, rest with the Secretary of State, exclusively; a provision which divests the council of all control or authority over their own establishment. Again, by Section XII. of the first bill, no grant involving increase of expenditure, and no appointment to office or admission to service, can be made without the concurrence of half the council. This, as far as it goes, is a real power; but its value is much diminished by the consideration that those by whom it is to be exercised are the nominees of the minister, dependent on him for their continuance in office after a few years.
In some other points the provisions of the second bill seem to have the advantage. Its council is more numerous; to which, however, little importance can be attached, if the council has no substantial power. It also recognises that the whole of the council ought not to be nominated by the minister, and that some part of it should be elected by a constituency specially qualified by a knowledge of India. But even in these, the best points of the bill, it is, in the opinion of the Directors, very far from unexceptionable. The nomination of even half the council by the minister, takes away all security for an independent majority. It may, indeed, be doubted whether there is any sufficient reason for the minister’s nominating any portion, except the supposed reluctance of some eligible persons to encounter a canvass. The proportion of one-third, whom the minister now nominates to the Court of Directors, seems the largest which, consistently with full security for independence, can be so appointed.
The provision that each of the members nominated by the Crown shall be selected as the representative of some particular branch of the service in India, is still more objectionable. Not only would it preclude the nomination of the most distinguished man, if the seat in council appropriated to the department in which he had served were not at the time vacant, but it would introduce a principle which cannot be too strongly deprecated—that of class legislation. The council should comprise the greatest attainable variety of knowledge and experience; but its members should not consider themselves as severally the representatives of a certain number of class interests.
The clause which continues to the Proprietors the power of electing some portion of the council is, so far, deserving of support; and the principle of enlarging the constituency by the addition of persons of a certain length of Indian service and residence is, in itself, unexceptionable; but unless guarded by provisions, such as have never yet been introduced into any electoral system, so large and scattered a constituency as that proposed would greatly add to the inconvenience of canvass: especially as it is not certain that the new electoral body would adopt, from the old, the salutary custom of re-electing, as the general practice, whoever has been once chosen, and has not, by misconduct or incapacity, deserved to forfeit their confidence. The duties of a member of council would be entirely incompatible with a continually-recurring canvass of the constituency.
Respecting the proposition for giving the choice of five members of council to the parliamentary constituencies of five great towns, the Court of Directors can only express a feeling of amazement. It is not the mere fact of election by a multitude that constitutes the benefits of the popular element in government. To produce those benefits, the affairs of which the people are enabled to control the management must be their own affairs. Election by multitudinous bodies, the majority of them of a very low average of education, is not an advantage of popular government, but, on the contrary, one of its acknowledged drawbacks. To assign to such a constituency the control, not of their own affairs, but of the affairs of other people on the other side of the globe, is to incur the disadvantages of popular institutions without any of the benefits. The Court of Directors willingly admit the desirableness, if not necessity, of some provision for including an English element in the Council of India; but a more objectionable mode than the one proposed of attaining the object, could scarcely, in their opinion, be devised.
Besides the provisions which relate to the organ of government in England, the bills contain provisions relating to India itself, which are open to the strongest objection.
The appointments to the councils at Calcutta and at the subordinate presidencies, which are now made by the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Crown, are transferred by both bills to the governor-general, and to the governors of Madras and Bombay. The Court of Directors are convinced that this change would greatly impair the chances of good government in India. One of the causes which has most contributed to the many excellences of Indian administration is, that the governor-general and governors have always been associated with councillors selected by the authorities at home from among the most experienced and able members of the Indian service, and who, not owing their appointments to the head of the government, have generally brought to the consideration of Indian affairs an independent judgment. In consequence of this, the measures of a government, necessarily absolute, have had the advantage, seldom possessed in absolute governments, of being always preceded by a free and conscientious discussion; while, as the head of the government has the power, on recording his reasons, to
## act contrary to the advice of his council, no public inconvenience can
ever arise from any conflict of opinion. These important officers, who, by their participation in the government, form so salutary a restraint on the precipitancy of an inexperienced, or the wilfulness of a despotically tempered, governor-general or governor, are henceforth to be appointed by the great functionary whom they are intended to check. And this restraint is removed, when the necessity for an independent council will be greater than ever; since the power of appointing the governor-general, and of recalling him, is taken away from the Company, and from the body which is to be their substitute. It may be added that the authorities at home have had the opportunity of being acquainted with the conduct and services of candidates for council from the commencement of their career. The governor-general or governor would often have to nominate a councillor soon after their arrival in India, when necessarily ignorant of the character and merits of candidates, and would be entirely dependent on the recommendation of irresponsible advisers.
Another most objectionable provision demands notice, which is to be found only in the second bill. A commission, appointed in England, is to proceed to India, for the purpose of inquiring and reporting on the principles and details of Indian finance, including the whole revenue system, and, what is inseparably involved in it, the proprietary rights and social position of all the great classes of the community. The Court of Directors cannot believe that such a project will be persisted in. It would be a step towards the disorganisation of the fabric of government in India. A commission from England, independent of the local government of the country, deriving its authority directly from the higher power to which the local government is subordinate, and instructed to carry back to the higher power information on Indian affairs which the local government is not deemed sufficiently trustworthy to afford, would give a most serious shock to the influence of the local authorities, and would tend to impress all natives with the belief that the opinions and decisions of the local government are of small moment, and that the thing of real importance is the success with which they can contrive that their claims and objects shall be advocated in England. Up to the present time, it has been the practice of the home government to uphold in every way the authority of the governments on the spot; even when reversing their acts, to do so through the governments themselves, and to employ no agency except in subordination to them.
From this review of the chief provisions of the bills, which embody the attempts of two great divisions of English statesmen to frame an organ of government for India, it will probably appear to the proprietors, that neither of them is grounded on any sufficient consideration of past experience, or of the principles applicable to the subject; that the passing of either would be a calamity to India; and that the attempt to legislate while the minds of leading men are in so unprepared a state, is altogether premature.
The opinion of your Directors is, that by all constitutional means the passing of either bill should be opposed; but that if one or the other should be determined on for the purpose of transferring the administration, in name, from the East India Company to the Crown, every exertion should be used in its passage through committee to divest it of the mischievous features by which both bills are now deformed, and to maintain, as at present, a really independent council, having the initiative of all business, discharging all the duties, and possessing all the essential powers of the Court of Directors. And it is the Court’s conviction, that measures might be so framed as to obviate whatever may be well founded in the complaints made against the present system—retaining the initiative of the council, and that independence of
## action on their part which should be regarded as paramount and
indispensable.
_E. I. Company’s Objections to the Third India Bill: June 1858._ (See p. 570.)
1. Although the bill which has been newly brought in by her Majesty’s ministers ‘for the better government of India,’ has not yet been formally communicated to the Court of Directors, the Court, influenced by the desire which they have already expressed to give all aid in their power towards rendering the scheme of government, which it is the pleasure of parliament to substitute for the East India Company, as efficient for its purposes as possible, have requested us[205] to lay before your lordship,[206] and through you before her Majesty’s government, a few observations on some portions of the bill.
2. Having in documents which have been presented to parliament expressed their sentiments fully on all the general features of the subject, the Court refrain from offering any further arguments on points upon which the government and the House of Commons seem to have pronounced a decided opinion. The joint government of a minister and a council, composed in majority of persons of Indian experience, deriving their appointments only partially from ministerial nomination, and all of them holding office on a tenure independent of the minister, is a combination which fulfils to a considerable extent the conditions of a good organ of government for India. The Court would have much preferred that in the constitution of the council more extensive recourse had been had to the elective principle. But if they cannot hope that this course will be adopted, they see many advantages in the provision by which one-half the number, instead of being named by the government, will be selected by a responsible body, intimately connected with India, to whom the qualification of candidates will in general be accurately known, and who will be under strong inducements to make such a choice as will tend to increase the credit and consideration of the body.
3. With regard to the qualifications prescribed for members of council, the Court desire to offer a suggestion. Her Majesty’s present government have, on many occasions, expressed a desire to secure the Crown appointments against the evils of abuse of patronage. The security against such abuse has hitherto consisted in the strict limitation of the appointments to persons who have served a considerable number of years in India. While the Court fully agree with her Majesty’s government in recognising the desirableness of an English element, it does not seem to them advisable that this element should extend to nearly half the council, only a bare majority being reserved for persons of Indian experience. Knowledge of India is, after all, the most important requisite for a seat in the Indian Council; while it is chiefly in the English nominations that there is any present danger lest appointments should be obtained through political or parliamentary influence—from which influence, unless introduced through that channel, the council, like the Court of Directors, may be expected to be altogether free. The Court, therefore, recommend that the qualification of ten years’ Indian service or residence be made imperative on at least two-thirds instead of a mere majority of the fifteen members of council. They also think it questionable if the interests of India will be promoted by the exclusion of the whole of the members of the council from seats in parliament. These are the only modifications which we are requested to suggest in the provisions respecting the composition of the council.
[The remaining objections made by the Directors were little more than a repetition of those made against the first and second bills (given _in extenso_ in a preceding page); and need not be reproduced here. The Directors expressed a dislike or apprehension of the subordinate position in which the Council would be placed; of the autocratic power to be possessed by the Secretary for India; of the transference of the powers of the Secret Committee wholly and solely to him; of the proposed mode of making appointments and exercising patronage; of any disturbance in the mode of auditing accounts; and of the appointment of any Commission of Inquiry in India which should appear derogatory to the dignity of the local governments. Many of these objections were listened to, and were productive of modifications during the discussion of the bill. The result will be seen in the next article of this Appendix.]
_Abstract of Act for the Better Government of India—21 and 22 Vict. cap. 106.—Received Royal Assent August 2, 1858._ (See p. 573.)
_Transfer of Governing Powers._
I. Governing powers transferred from the East India Company to the Crown.
II. All rights, territories, revenues, and liabilities similarly transferred.
III. A Secretary of State to exercise all the governing powers heretofore exercised by Court of Directors, Court of Proprietors, and Board of Control.
IV. Provision concerning sitting of secretary and under-secretary in House of Commons.
V. Concerning re-election of secretaries to House of Commons.
VI. Secretary of State for India to receive salary equal to those of other secretaries of state.
_Council of India._
VII. A Council of India, of 15 persons, to be formed.
VIII. Court of Directors to elect 7 members of this Council, from among persons possessing certain qualifications; and the Crown to appoint the other 8.
IX. Vacancies among the 8 to be filled up by the Crown; and among the other 7, by election by the Council.
X. Nine members of the Council, at least, must have had not less than ten years’ experience in India.
XI. Members to hold office for life, or during good behaviour.
XII. Members not to sit in parliament.
XIII. Annual salary of £1200 to each member.
XIV. Members may resign; if after ten years’ service, on a pension of £500, subject to certain conditions.
XV. Secretaries and other officers of Company to become officers of Council of India—subject to any changes afterwards made by Privy Council and sanctioned by parliament.
XVI. Secretary in Council to make all subsequent appointments in the home establishment.
XVII. Compensation to such officers of the Company as are not retained permanently by the Council.
XVIII. Any officer of the Company, transferred to the service of the Council, to have a claim to the same pension or superannuation allowance as if the change of government had not taken place.
_Duties and Proceedings of the Council._
XIX. Council to conduct affairs of India in England; but all correspondence to be in the name of the Secretary of State.
XX. Secretary of State may divide the Council into committees.
XXI. Secretary of State to sit and vote as president, and appoint vice-president.
XXII. Five to be a quorum; meetings convened by Secretary of State not fewer than one each week.
XXIII. Secretary of State to decide questions on which members differ. Any dissentient member may require his opinion to be placed upon record.
XXIV. Secretary’s proceedings to be open to all the Council, except in ‘secret service’ dispatches.
XXV. Secretary to give reasons for any exercise of his veto against the decision of the majority.
XXVI. Secretary allowed to overrule the two preceding clauses in urgent cases.
XXVII. Functions of the ‘secret committee’ transferred to Secretary of State.
XXVIII. Dispatches marked ‘secret’ not to be opened by members of Council.
_Appointments and Patronage._
XXIX. Of the high appointments in India, some to be made by the Crown, some by the Council, and some by the Governor-general.
XXX. Inferior appointments to be made as heretofore, except transference of patronage from Court of Directors to Council.
XXXI. Special provision for civil service in India.
XXXII. Secretary in Council to make rules for examination of persons intended for junior situations in civil service of India.
XXXIII. Appointments to naval and military cadetships to vest in the Crown.
XXXIV. Competitive examinations for engineers and artillery of the Indian army.
XXXV. A certain ratio of cadetships to be given to the sons of persons who have served in India.
XXXVI. All the other cadetships to be in the gift of the members of the Council, subject to approval; the Secretary of State to have twice as many nominations as an ordinary member.
XXXVII. In all unchanged rules concerning appointments, power of Court of Directors to be vested in Council.
XXXVIII. The same in reference to any dismissal from service.
_Transfer of Property._
XXXIX. Company’s property, credits, and debits, to revert to the Crown—except the _East India Stock_ and the dividends thereon.
XL. Secretary in Council may buy, sell, or borrow, in the name of the Crown, for the service of India.
_Revenues._
XLI. Expenditure of revenues in India wholly under Secretary in Council.
XLII. Liabilities of Company, and dividends on India stock, to be borne by Secretary in Council out of revenues of India.
XLIII. Secretary in Council to keep a cash account with the Bank of England, and to be responsible for all payments in relation to India revenue.
XLIV. Transfer of cash balance from the Company to the Council.
XLV. A stock account to be opened at Bank of England.
XLVI. Transfer of stock accounts.
XLVII. Mode of managing Council’s finances at the Bank.
XLVIII. Transfer of Exchequer bills, &c., from Company to Council.
XLIX. Power of issuing bonds, debentures, &c.
L. Provisions concerning forgery.
LI. Regulations of audit department.
LII. The Crown to appoint auditor of Indian accounts, to whom all needful papers are to be sent by Secretary in Council.
LIII. Annual accounts to be furnished to parliament of the revenue and expenditure of India; accompanied by reports on the moral and material progress of the several presidencies.
LIV. War in India to be made known to parliament within a specified period.
LV. India revenues not to pay for wars unconnected with India.
_Existing Establishments._
LVI. Company’s army and navy transferred to the Crown, but with all existing contracts and engagements holding good.
LVII. Future powers as to conditions of service.
LVIII. All commissions held under the Company to be valid as under the Crown.
LIX. Regulations of service to be subject to future change, if deemed necessary.
LX. Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors cease to hold power in reference to government of India.
LXI. Board of Control abolished.
LXII. Records and archives of Company to be given up to Council—except stock and dividend books.
LXIII. Powers of Governor-general, on assuming duties of that office.
LXIV. Existing enactments and provisions to remain in force, unless specially repealed.
_Actions and Contracts._
LXV. Secretary in Council may sue and be sued as a body corporate.
LXVI. And may take the place of the Company in any still-pending
## actions.
LXVII. Treaties and covenants made by the Company to remain binding.
LXVIII. Members not _personally_ liable for such treaties or covenants.
LXIX. A Court of Directors still to exist, but in smaller number than before, and having powers relating only to the management of the Company’s dividend and a few minor subjects.
LXX. Quarterly courts not in future obligatory.
LXXI. Company’s liability ceases, on all matters now taken under the care of the Council.
_Saving of Certain Rights of the Company._
LXXII. Secretary in Council to pay dividends on India stock out of India revenue.
LXXIII. Dividends to constitute a preferential charge.
_Commencement of the Act._
LXXIV. Commences thirty days after day of receiving royal assent.
LXXV. Company’s orders to be obeyed in India until the change of government shall have been proclaimed in the several presidencies.
_The Indian Mutiny Relief Fund._ (See p. 226.)
This noble manifestation of kind feeling towards the sufferers in India, which originated in a public meeting held in London on the 25th of August 1857, assumed munificent proportions during the next following year, when the colonists and Englishmen residing abroad had had time to respond to the appeal made to them. In a report prepared by the Committee, on the 1st of November 1858, it was announced that the sum placed in their charge amounted, up to that time, to £434,729. They had remitted £127,287 to India, there to be distributed by auxiliary local committees; they had assisted sufferers after their return to, or during their residence in, the home country, to the extent of £35,757; and their management expenses had amounted to £6224. There remained, invested at interest, the sum of £265,461, applicable to further cases of need. It is interesting to notice the kind of persons to whom relief was afforded, on account of the varied privations to which the mutiny had subjected them. The sum of £35,757 expended in England, was mostly in donations to the following numbers and classes of persons:
32 Military officers. 86 Widows and children of officers. 25 Wives of officers. 25 Orphans of officers. 51 Other relatives of officers. 13 Disabled soldiers. 298 Widows of soldiers. 423 Children of soldiers. 82 Other relatives of soldiers. 10 Clergymen and missionaries. 6 Widows of Clergymen. 1 Wife of missionary. 23 Widows and orphans of civilians. 75 Planters, railway officials, &c.
_Queen Victoria’s Proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India.—Read in the principal Cities of India, November 1, 1858._ (See p. 612.)
VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.
Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company:
Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.
And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-general in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf: subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.
And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.
We hereby announce to the native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part.
We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.
We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.
Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.
And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.
We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.
We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shewn by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to shew our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.
Already in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-general has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who in the late unhappy disturbances have been guilty of offences against our government; and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-general, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:
Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects.
With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.
To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shewn to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.
To all others in arms against the government, we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.
It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first day of January next.
When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.
_Viscount Canning’s Proclamation.—Issued at Allahabad, November 1, 1858._ (See p. 612.)
Her Majesty the Queen having declared that it is her gracious pleasure to take upon herself the government of the British territories in India, the Viceroy and Governor-general hereby notifies that from this day all acts of the government of India will be done in the name of the Queen alone.
From this day, all men of every race and class who, under the administration of the Honourable East India Company, have joined to uphold the honour and power of England, will be the servants of the Queen alone.
The Governor-general summons them, one and all, each in his degree, and according to his opportunity, and with his whole heart and strength, to aid in fulfilling the gracious will and pleasure of the Queen, as set forth in her royal proclamation.
From the many millions of her Majesty’s native subjects in India, the Governor-general will now, and at all times, exact a loyal obedience to the call which, in words full of benevolence and mercy, their Sovereign has made upon their allegiance and faithfulness.
[Illustration]
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Footnote 205:
The chairman and deputy-chairman.
Footnote 206:
Lord Stanley, president of the Board of Control.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.
Events in India.
1857.
Jan. 22. Cartridge disturbances began at Dumdum. Feb. 6. Cartridge grievances inquired into at Barrackpore. Feb. 11. General Hearsey warned government of disaffection. Feb. 26. 19th Bengal N. I. riotous at Berhampore. Mar. 26. Cartridge disturbances at Umballa. Mar. 27. Proclamation explaining Cartridge question. Mar. 29. 34th B. N. I. riotous at Barrackpore. Mar. 31. 19th B. N. I. disbanded and dismissed. Apr. 24. Cartridge disturbances at Meerut. May 1. Cartridge disturbances at Lucknow. May 3. 7th Oude Infantry mutinied at Lucknow. May 5. 34th B. N. I. disbanded and dismissed. May 9. 3d B. N. C. punished at Meerut. May 10. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GREAT REVOLT AT MEERUT. May 10. Troops in Company’s pay on this day—38,000 Europeans, 200,000 Natives. May 11. Meerut mutineers (11th and 20th B. N. I., and 3d B. N. C.) marched to Delhi. May 11. 38th, 54th, and 74th B. N. I., mutinied at Delhi. May 13. 16th, 26th, and 49th B. N. I., and 8th B. N. C., disarmed at Meean Meer near Lahore. May 14. General Anson departed from Simla, to head troops. May 16. B. N. Sappers and Miners mutinied at Meerut. May 17. 25th B. N. I. riotous at Calcutta. May 19. Anson’s Proclamation concerning cartridges. May 20. 55th B. N. I. mutinied at Murdan. May 20. 9th B. N. I. mutinied at Allygurh and vicinity, May 21. First siege-column left Umballa for Delhi. May 21. Europeans at Cawnpore began their intrenchment. May 22. 24th, 27th, and 51st B. N. I., with 5th B. N. C., disarmed at Peshawur. May 24. Colvin’s proclamation—disapproved by Viscount Canning. May 24. Portion of Gwalior Horse mutinied at Hattrass. May 24. General Anson left Umballa for Delhi. May 27. General Anson died at Kurnaul May 27. Wilson’s Field-force left Meerut for Delhi. May 28. Reed succeeded Anson provisionally. May 28. 15th and 30th B. N. I. mutinied at Nuseerabad. May 30. Portions of 13th, 48th, and 71st B. N. I., with 7th N. C., mutinied at Lucknow. May 30. Wilson defeated Delhi rebels at Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur. May 31. Wilson defeated Delhi rebels, near the Hindoun. May 31. Barnard left Kurnaul to command army against Delhi. May 31. 28th B. N. I. mutinied at Shahjehanpoor. June 1. 44th and 67th B. N. I. disarmed at Agra. June 3. 17th B. N. I. mutinied at Azimghur. June 3. 41st B. N. I., 9th and 10th Oude Irreg. I., and 2d Oude Mil. Police, mutinied at Seetapoor. June 3. 29th B. N. I. mutinied at Mooradabad. June 3. 72d B. N. I., and a wing of 1st B. N. C., mutinied at Neemuch. June 4. 37th B. N. I., 13th Irreg. C., and Loodianah Sikhs, mutinied at Benares. June 4. 12th B. N. I., and 14th Irreg. C., mutinied at Jhansi. June 5. 1st, 53d, and 56th B. N. I., and 2d B. N. C., mutinied at Cawnpore. June 5. Wing of Loodianah Sikhs mutinied at Jounpoor. June 6. Barnard and Wilson joined forces at Bhagput. June 6. 6th B. N. I. mutinied at Allahabad. June 6. ? Hurrianah Battalion mutinied at Hansi. June 6. ? Bhurtpore Levies mutinied at Bhurtpore. June 7. 36th and 61st B. N. I., and 6th B. C., mutinied at Jullundur. June 8. 22d B. N. I., and 6th Oude I., mutinied at Fyzabad. June 8. ? Massacre of Europeans at Jhansi. June 8. Barnard defeated Delhi rebels at Badulla Serai. June 8. Barnard arrived with siege-army before Delhi. June 9. 15th Irreg. C. mutinied at Sultanpore. June 9. Europeans driven from Futtehpoor by rebels. June 10. 1st Oude Irreg. I. mutinied at Pershadeepore. June 10. Wing of 12th B. N. I., and 14th Irreg. C., mutinied at Nowgong. June 10. ? Europeans driven from Neemuch by rebels. June 11. Neill relieved Allahabad from the rebels. June 11. 60th B. N. I. mutinied at Rohtuk. June 12. First boat-party from Futteghur massacred by Nena Sahib. June 13. Press ‘Gagging’ Act passed at Calcutta. June 13. 45th and 57th B. N. I. mutinied at Ferozpore. June 14. 43d and 70th B. N. I. and 2d N. C. disarmed at Barrackpore. June 14. Gwalior Contingent mutinied at Gwalior. June 15. King of Oude under surveillance at Calcutta. June 18. 10th B. N. I. mutinied at Futteghur. June 19. Defeat of Nuseerabad rebels outside Delhi. June 23. Nagpoor Irreg. C. disarmed at Nagpoor. June 23. Severe Battle outside Delhi. June 26. 33d and 35th B. N. I. disarmed at Phillour. June 27. First news of the Revolt reached England. June 27. Boat-massacre at Cawnpore, by Nena Sahib. June 30. Disastrous Battle of Chinhut, near Lucknow. June 30. 4th Irreg. C. mutinied at Mozuffernugger. June 30. Europeans at Saugor intrench themselves in fort. July 1. Europeans driven out of Indore. July 1. 23d B. N. I. mutinied at Mhow. July 1. Siege of Europeans in Lucknow began. July 2. Severe Battle outside Delhi. July 2. Rohilcund mutineers entered Delhi. July 3. Mussulman Conspiracy discovered at Patna. July 4. Death of Sir H. Lawrence at Lucknow. July 4. Kotah Contingent mutinied at Agra. July 5. Death of Sir H. Barnard outside Delhi. July 5. Reed took command of siege-army. July 5. Disastrous Battle of Shahgunje, near Agra. July 7. 14th B. N. I. mutinied at Jelum. July 7. 58th B. N. I. disarmed at Rawul Pindee. July 7. Havelock’s column left Allahabad for Cawnpore. July 7. 42d B. N. I., and 3d Irreg. C., mutinied at Saugor. July 9. 46th B. N. I., and 9th C., mutinied at Sealkote. July 11. Second boat-party from Futteghur arrived at Bithoor. July 12. Nicholson defeated Sealkote mutineers. July 12. Havelock defeated rebels at Futtehpoor. July 12. Sir Colin Campbell left England for India. July 14. Severe Battle outside Delhi. July 15. Havelock defeated rebels at Aong. July 15. Havelock defeated rebels at Pandoo Nuddee. July 15. Massacre at Cawnpore, by Nena Sahib. July 16. Havelock defeated Nena Sahib at Aherwa. July 17. Havelock entered Cawnpore victoriously. July 17. Havelock defeated Nena Sahib near Bithoor. July 17. Reed resigned command before Delhi—Wilson succeeded. July 20. Fierce Attack by rebels on Lucknow Garrison. July 24. 12th Irreg. C. mutinied at Segowlie. July 25. Havelock crossed Ganges into Oude. July 25. 7th, 8th, and 40th B. N. I. mutinied at Dinapoor. July 26. Nearly 6000 persons sheltered in Agra Fort, of whom 2000 children. July 27. Mr Wake’s defence of Arrah commenced. July 29. 26th B. N. I. mutinied at Lahore. July 29. Havelock defeated rebels at Onao. July 29. Havelock defeated rebels at Busherutgunje. July 30. Captain Dunbar’s disaster at Arrah. July 31. Ramgurh Infantry mutinied at Ramgurh. July 31. Siege-army before Delhi = 6918 effectives, and 1116 sick and wounded. Aug. 1. 63d B. N. I. and 11th Irreg. C. disarmed at Berhampore. Aug. 1. Severe Battle outside Delhi. Aug. 1. 27th Bombay N. I. mutinied at Kolapore. Aug. 2. Vincent Eyre defeated Koer Singh near Arrah. Aug. 8. 59th B. N. I. disarmed at Umritsir. Aug. 8. Nicholson arrived with his Column at Delhi. Aug. 10. Severe Battle outside Delhi. Aug. 12. Havelock’s second victory at Busherutgunje. Aug. 12. Vincent Eyre defeated Koer Singh at Jugdispore. Aug. 13. Havelock retreated across Ganges to Cawnpore. Aug. 14. 5th Irreg. C. mutinied at Berhampore. Aug. 15-18. Hodson defeated rebels outside Delhi. Aug. 16. Havelock defeated Nena Sahib at Bithoor. Aug. 20. Fierce attack by the rebels on Lucknow Residency. Aug. 22. Jhodpore Legion mutinied at Erinpoora. Aug. 24. Montgomery defeated rebels at Allygurh. Aug. 25. Nicholson won Battle of Nujuffghur near Delhi, Aug. 25. Meeting in London at the Mansion-house, to establish Indian Mutiny Relief Fund. Aug. 28. 51st B. N. I. mutinied at Peshawur. Sep. 5. Outram’s Column left Allahabad for Cawnpore. Sep. 5. Fierce attack by rebels on Lucknow Residency. Sep. 7. Indore mutineers captured Dholpore. Sep. 7. Siege-army before Delhi = 13,000 men. Sep. 9. Mr Colvin died at Agra. Sep. 11. Cannonading of Delhi commenced. Sep. 11. Viscount Eyre defeated rebels at Koondun Puttee. Sep. 14. Delhi entered by storm—death of Nicholson. Sep. 15-20. Gradual Conquest of Delhi city and fortifications. Sep. 15-20. Outram joined Havelock and Neill at Cawnpore. Sep. 16. 50th B. N. I. mutinied at Nagode. Sep. 18. 52d B. N. I. mutinied at Jubbulpoor. Sep. 19. Outram and Havelock crossed Ganges into Oude. Sep. 20. Goorkhas defeated rebels at Mundoree. Sep. 21. Hodson captured King and Princes of Delhi. Sep. 23. Outram and Havelock captured the Alum Bagh. Sep. 25. Outram and Havelock entered Lucknow Residency. Sep. 25. Death of Neill at Lucknow. Sep. 27. Outram and Havelock besieged in Residency. Sep. 28. Greathed defeated Delhi rebels at Bolundshuhur. Oct. 3. Peel’s Naval Brigade arrived at Allahabad. Oct. 5. Greathed defeated Delhi rebels at Allygurh. Oct. 9. 32d B. N. I. mutinied at Deoghur. Oct. 10. Greathed defeated Indore rebels near Agra. Oct. 15. Gwalior Contingent took the field, as a rebel army. Oct. 15. Rajah of Kotah’s troops mutinied. Oct. 19. Greathed and Hope Grant retook Minpooree. Oct. 26. Greathed and Hope Grant arrived at Cawnpore. Oct. 28. Sir Colin Campbell started from Calcutta, for scene of hostilities. Nov. 1. Peel’s Naval Brigade defeated rebels at Kudjna. Nov. 9. Mr Cavanagh’s adventure at Lucknow. Nov. 9. Europeans besieged in Fort of Neemuch. Nov. 9. Sir Colin Campbell crossed Ganges into Oude. Nov. 12. Sir Colin Campbell captured Jelalabad Fort. Nov. 14-17. Sir Colin Campbell fought his way into Lucknow. Nov. 18. Wing of 34th B. N. I. mutinied at Chittagong. Nov. 20. ? 73d B. N. I. mutinied at Dacca. Nov. 23. British evacuated Lucknow. Nov. 24. Stuart defeated Bundela rebels near Mundesoor. Nov. 25. Death of Havelock, outside Lucknow. Nov. 27-28. Windham beaten by Gwalior rebels near Cawnpore. Nov. 29. Lucknow Garrison recross Ganges to Cawnpore. Dec. 6. Sir Colin defeated 25,000 rebels at Cawnpore. Dec. 9. Hope Grant defeated rebels at Serai Ghât. Dec. 14-17. Seaton defeated rebels in Minpooree district. Dec. 19. Government announced to East India Company an approaching change in Company’s powers. Dec. 28. Osborne reconquered Myhere from Bundela rebels. Dec. 30. Wood defeated rebels near Sumbhulpore. Dec. 31. East India Company protested against the proposed legislation for India.
1858.
Jan. 1. Bareilly mutineers defeated at Huldwanee. Jan. 3. Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Futteghur. Jan. 6. Jung Bahadoor and his Goorkha army entered Goruckpore. Jan. 6. Raines defeated a body of rebels at Rowah. Jan. 12. Outram defeated 30,000 rebels outside Alum Bagh. Jan. 27. Adrian Hope defeated rebels at Shumshabad. Jan. 27. Trial of the King of Delhi commenced. Jan. 28. East India Company petitioned Parliament against government proceedings. Feb. 3. Rose liberated the Europeans at Saugor. Feb. 4. Sir Colin returned to Cawnpore from Futteghur. Feb. 4. Maxwell repulsed Gwalior rebels at Chowra. Feb. 9. Sir Colin and Canning met at Allahabad. Feb. 9. Delhi and Meerut divisions placed under Punjaub government. Feb. 10. M’Causland repulsed Bareilly rebels at Sunda. Feb. 11. Great convoy of women and children left Agra. Feb. 12. Lord Palmerston brought in India Bill No. 1. Feb. 12-18. Debates thereon—government majority, 318 to 173. Feb. 19. Franks defeated Bunda Hossein at Chundah. Feb. 19. Franks defeated Mahomed Hossein at Humeerpoor. Feb. 20. Palmerston Ministry resigned. Feb. 21. Derby Ministry formed—Lord Ellenborough at the India Board. Feb. 21. Outram repulsed 20,000 rebels at Alum Bagh. Feb. 23. Hope Grant took Meeangunje from Oude rebels. Feb. 26. Goorkhas captured fort of Mobarukhpoor in Oude. Feb. 28. Sir Colin crossed Ganges, to head his army. Mar. 2. Sir Colin advanced to the Alum Bagh. Mar. 2-21. Gradual conquest of Lucknow from rebels. Mar. 3. Viscount Canning’s Proclamation to the Oudians. Mar. 4. Rose defeated Bundelas at Mudenpore Pass. Mar. 5. Rowcroft repulsed 12,000 rebels at Goruckpore. Mar. 5. Goorkhas defeated Oude rebels at Kandoo Nuddee. Mar. 10. Rose defeated rebel Rajah of Shagurh. Mar. 10. Roberts headed the Rajpootana Field-force. Mar. 11. Jung Bahadoor joined Sir Colin outside Lucknow. Mar. 11. Showers defeated a body of rebels at Bah. Mar. 16. Return of the Guide Corps to Peshawur. Mar. 17. Stuart captured Chendaree from rebels. Mar. 21. Rose with Siege-army arrived before Jhansi. Mar. 21. Lucknow finally conquered by British. Mar. 22. Millman repulsed by Azimghur rebels at Atrowlia. Mar. 22. Roberts with Siege-army arrived before Kotah. Mar. 25. Moncrieff routed a body of Coles at Chuckerderpore. Mar. 26. Mr Disraeli brought in India Bill No. 2. Mar. 29. Army of Oude broken up into separate columns. Mar. 30. Roberts captured Kotah. Apr. 1. Rose defeated Tanteea Topee outside Jhansi. Apr. 2. Rose captured Jhansi—Ranee escaped. Apr. 2. Kerr defeated Dinapoor rebels near Azimghur. Apr. 2. Death of Captain Sir William Peel at Cawnpore. Apr. 6. Seaton defeated Minpooree Rajah at Kankur. Apr. 7. East India Company protested against both India Bills. Apr. 12. House of Commons determined to proceed by Resolutions on India Bill. Apr. 14. Disaster at Rhodamow under Walpole. Apr. 14. Death of Adrian Hope at Rhodamow. Apr. 17. Rowcroft defeated rebels at Amorah. Apr. 17. Jones defeated Rohilcund rebels at Nagul. Apr. 18. Sir Colin resumed operations from Cawnpore. Apr. 18. Douglas defeated Koer Singh at Azimutgurh. Apr. 18. Douglas defeated Koer Singh at Muneer Khas. Apr. 19. Ellenborough’s ‘Secret Dispatch’ written. Apr. 19. Whitlock took Banda, and defeated Nawab. Apr. 21. Le Grand’s disaster at Jugdispore. Apr. 21. Jones defeated Rohilcund rebels at Nageena. Apr. 21. Koer Singh eluded Douglas, and crossed Ganges. Apr. 22. Walpole defeated rebels at Sirsa. Apr. 25. Jones recovered Mooradabad from Oude rebels. Apr. 25. Sir Colin reached Futteghur. Apr. 27. Sir Colin entered Rohilcund. Apr. 28. Sir Colin joined Walpole at Ramgunga. Apr. 30. Sir Colin entered Shahjehanpoor. Apr. 30. Penny’s Column won Battle of Kukerowlee. Apr. 30. Death of Penny at Kukerowlee. Apr. 30. Mr Disraeli brought in ‘Resolutions’ in House of Commons. May 3. Lugard crossed Ganges in pursuit of Koer Singh. May 3-11. Hall held fort of Shahjehanpoor against 8000 rebels. May 5. Sir Colin defeated rebels outside Bareilly. May 7. Sir Colin captured Bareilly—rebel leaders escaped. May 7. Corps of Bengal European Cavalry determined on. May 9. Lugard defeated Koer Singh at Jugdispore—Koer Singh killed. May 9. Rose marched in pursuit of Tanteea Topee and the Ranee. May 11. Rose defeated them at Koonch. May 11. Jones relieved Hall at Shahjehanpoor. May 11. Ellenborough resigned—Lord Stanley appointed to Board of Control. May 12. Lugard defeated Ummer Singh near Jugdispore. May 12. Hope Grant defeated 16,000 Oude rebels at Sirsee. May 14-21. Great debates in parliament, on Canning’s Proclamation and Ellenborough’s Dispatch. May 15. Jones attacked in great force at Shahjehanpoor. May 15-23. Rose in fierce conflict with Tanteea Topee in and near Calpee. May 17. Jung Bahadoor returned to Nepaul. May 18. Sir Colin repulsed rebels at Shahjehanpoor. May 21. Light summer clothing ordered for troops. May 22. Coke joined Sir Colin from Pileebheet. May 23. Rose captured Calpee—Tanteea Topee, Ranee of Jhansi, and Nawab of Banda, fled towards Gwalior. May 24. Incendiarism at Allahabad. May 24. Sir Colin captured fort of Mohumdee. May 26. Railway opened from Allahabad to Futtehpoor. May 28. Sir Colin returned to Futteghur from Rohilcund and Oude. May 28. Sir Colin thanked his army for past services. May 30. Rebel leaders from Calpee arrived at Gwalior. June 1. Scindia defeated by Tanteea Topee and Calpee rebels. June 2. Rebels captured Gwalior—Scindia fled to Agra. June 4. Lugard defeated rebels in Jugdispore jungle. June 7. Lord Stanley resumed India debates in House of Commons. June 9. Mahomed Hossein defeated at Amorah. June 9-11. Moncrieff defeated rebels at Chuckerderpore. June 13. Hope Grant defeated 16,000 rebels at Nawabgunge. June 15. The Moulvie killed in action at Powayne. June 16. Rose arrived near Gwalior. June 16-19. Great Battle in and near Gwalior. June 17. Death of the Ranee of Jhansi at Gwalior. June 17. Lord Stanley brought in India Bill No. 3. June 17. Canning’s reply to Ellenborough’s Secret Dispatch. June 18. Mahomed Hossein defeated at Hurreah. June 20. Rose recaptured Gwalior, and reinstated Scindia. June 21. Napier left Gwalior in pursuit of Tanteea Topee. June 23. East India Company’s objections to Bill No. 3. June 24. India Bill read second time in Commons. June 29. Mr Manson murdered by Rajah of Nargoond. End of month. 30th and 31st Bombay N. I. formed, to contain faithful men from mutinous 21st and 27th. End of month. Faithful men of mutinous 3d, 36th, and 61st Bengal N. I., formed into a new regiment in Punjaub. July 2. Roberts with Rajpootana Field-force reach Jeypoor. July 8. India Bill passed the Commons. July 9. India Bill read a first time in Lords. July 9. Tanteea Topee plundered Tonk—soon afterwards driven out by Holmes. July 12. Rajah of Nargoond hanged at Belgaum. July 13. India Bill read second time in the Lords. July 14-20. Berkeley captured several small forts in Oude. July 17. Rattray captured rebel chiefs at Dehree. July 21. Hope Grant set out from Lucknow to confront rebels. July 23. Roberts left Tonk in pursuit of Tanteea Topee. July 28. Hope Grant relieved Maun Singh from siege at Shahgunje. July 29. Hope Grant entered Fyzabad, and drove out rebels. July 30. Cavanagh defeated a body of rebels in Muhiabad. July 31. India Bill passed the Lords. July 31. Outbreak of prisoners at Mymensing. Aug. 1. Bundela rebels seized Jaloun—expelled by Macduff. Aug. 2. India Bill (Act) received royal assent. Aug. 3. Man Singh captured Paoree. Aug. 7. Court of Directors elected seven members for new Council of India. Aug. 8. Roberts defeated Tanteea Topee at Sunganeer. Aug. 11. Parkes headed a column from Neemuch, to check Tanteea Topee. Aug. 12. Tanteea Topee checked at Marwar frontier, by Erinpoora force. Aug. 13. Horsford retook Sultanpore from Oude rebels. Aug. 13. Carpenter defeated rebels near Kirwee. Aug. 14. Roberts defeated Tanteea Topee at Kattara. Aug. 20. Tanteea Topee crossed Chumbul to Julra Patteen. Aug. 23. Napier drove Man Singh out of Paoree. Aug. 25-29. Hope Grant fighting with Oude rebels outside Sultanpoor. Aug. 29. Brahmin plot discovered at Gwalior. Aug. 31. Disarmed 62d and 69th B. N. I. mutinied at Moultan. Aug. 31. Man Singh encamped at Sirsee, north of Goonah. Sep. 1. Ashburner defeated rebels near Mahoni. Sep. 1. Last day of E. I. Company’s governing power. Sep. 2. New Council of India commenced its sittings. Sep. 5. Napier defeated Man Singh at Bujeepore. Sep. 15. Michel defeated Tanteea Topee at Beora. Sep. 16-30. Continuous chase after Tanteea Topee, by various British columns. Oct. 3-8. Dawson besieged by Oude rebels at Sundeela. Oct. 5. Eveleigh defeated rebels at Meeangunje. Oct. 8. Barker and Dawson defeated rebels at Punno. Oct. 19. Tanteea Topee defeated by Michel at Sindwah. Oct. 25. Tanteea Topee defeated at Multhone. Oct. 29. Beni Madhoo defeated at Poorwa. Oct. 30. Mehndee Hossein defeated at Sufdergunje. Oct. 31. Tanteea Topee crossed the Nerbudda. Nov. 1. Queen’s Proclamation issued. Nov. 1. Sir Colin’s final plans laid. November. Gradual defeat and surrender of rebels in Oude and Behar. November. Gradual defeat and surrender of rebels in Central India.
Events in Persia.
1856.
(Summer). Persia sent an army against Herat. Aug. 22. Orders received at Bombay to prepare fleet and army against Persia. Oct. 22. East India Company protested against expense of Persian Expedition. Oct. 22. Orders received at Bombay for force to embark. Oct. 26. Persians captured Herat. Nov. 1. Governor-general declared war against Persia. Nov. 20. Outram departed from England to command Persian Expedition. Nov. 26. Stalker left Bombay for Persian Gulf. Dec. 7. Stalker and 1st Division landed near Bushire. Dec. 10. Stalker and 1st Division captured Bushire.
1857.
Jan. 30. Outram arrived at Bushire, with 2d Column. Feb. 3. Debates in Parliament concerning Persia. Feb. 3. Outram marched from Bushire to Borasjoon. Feb. 9. Night-attack by Persians at Khoosh-aub. Feb. 12. ? Havelock arrived at Bushire. Mar. 4. Treaty of Peace between England and Persis signed at Paris. Mar. 14. Suicide of Stalker at Bushire. Mar. 17. Suicide of Ethersey at Bushire. Mar. 19. Treaty of Peace ratified at London. Mar. 26. Outram defeated Persians at Mohamrah. Apr. 1. Rennie defeated Persians at Ahwaz. Apr. 5. News of the Treaty reached Bushire. Apr. 14. Treaty ratified at Teheran. May 9. Outram’s army in Persia broken up. May 12. ? Outram and Havelock left Persia for India. (Autumn). Evacuation of Herat by the Persians, and consequent evacuation of Persia by the British.
Events in China and Japan.
1856.
Oct. 8. Affair of the Lorcha _Arrow_ near Canton. Oct. 23-25. Seymour captured Forts in Canton river. Oct. 28-29. Partial Bombardment of Canton. Nov. 3. Yeh refused a personal conference. Nov. 6. Naval action with junks in Canton river. Nov. 8. Chinese employed fire-rafts against British ships. Nov. 26. British captured other Forts below Canton. Dec. 10. Bowring’s proceedings approved by home government. Dec. 11. Dispute at Nagasaki with Japanese authorities.
1857.
Jan. 1-4. Attacks and counter-attacks in Canton river. Jan. 10. Bowring’s further proceedings approved. Jan. 26. Japanese edict favourable to English ships. Feb. 3. Debates in parliament on Chinese affairs. Feb. 12. Partial destruction of Canton by the British. Feb. 24. Great debate in House of Lords on China. Mar. 3. House of Commons condemned Chinese War—Ministers therefore dissolved parliament. Apr. 6. War-junks destroyed in Canton river. Apr. 7. ? Ashburnham left England for China. Apr. 21. Elgin left England for China. May 25. Attack on junks in Escape Creek. June 1. Attack on junks in Fatshan Creek. July (early). Elgin arrived at Hong-kong. July (end). Elgin proceeded to confer with Canning at Calcutta. Sep. 9. Elliot made reconnaissance of Chinese junk-fleet. Dec. 12. Elgin sent formal demands on Yeh. Dec. 24. On Yeh’s refusal, Elgin resolved on stern measures. Dec. 28-31. Cannonading and fighting around Canton. Dec. 31. British captured all the defences of Canton.
1858.
Jan. 5. Parkes captured Commissioner Yeh. Jan. 9. Provisional government established at Canton. Feb. 10. Blockade of Canton river ended. Mar. (end). Elgin proceeded to Shang-hae. Apr. 24. Elgin sent his demands to the emperor at Pekin. Apr. 30. Emperor appointed a plenipotentiary. May 20. Negotiations failing, Elgin resumed hostilities. May 20. Forts on the Pei-ho destroyed by English. June 3. Straubenzee encountered Chinese outside Canton. June 26. Elgin signed Treaty with China at Tien-sing. July 6. Elgin returned to Shang-hae. Aug. 3. Elgin went to Nagasaki in Japan. Aug. 11. Namtow punished for breach of flag of truce. Aug. 16. Elgin arrived at Jedo. Aug. 26. Elgin signed Treaty with Japan at Jedo. Sep. & Oct. Gradual settlement of details of Chinese tariff.
[Illustration]
INDEX.
Act, abstract of, for changing government of India, 226
Agra, situation and description, 109
——, condition at different dates, 174, 284
——, number of persons in fort, 285
——, mutiny of Kotah Contingent, 283
——, battle near, and partial destruction of city, 283, 284
——, Greathed’s arrival, and victory over rebels, 352
Ahwaz. [Persia.]
AKBAR THE GREAT, 61
ALEXANDER, Mr, Civil Commissioner of Rohilcund, 496
Allahabad, head-quarters of Canning and Sir Colin, 546
——, situation and description, 107, 488
——, mutiny and devastation, 158
Allygurh, position and description, 111
——, mutiny at, 112
Almora, ladies and children at, 286
Alum Bagh, operations at, 262, 334, 363
AMHERST, Earl, power of Mogul lessened by, 67
Amorah, victory over 3000 rebels at, by Rowcroft, 470
ANDREWS, Captain, blown up at Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur, 233
ANGELO, Lieutenant, intrepidity at Mooradabad, 491
ANSON, General, Commander-in-chief in India, 118
——, operations, and death at Kurnaul, 118, 231, 233
Area and population of India, 31
Army, British, in India, details relating to, 24, 49, 118, 211, 220, 390, 426, 483, 495, 609
Arrah, disasters at, 270, 271, 470
——, Wake’s defence of Boyle’s House at, 269
——, operations in and near, 269, 272
_Arrow_, lorcha. [China.]
ASHBURNHAM, General. [China.]
Assam, operations against mutineers, 339
Aurungabad, disaffection at, 291
AURUNGZEBE, Mogul emperor, 62
Azimghur, mutiny and operations at, 154, 478
BABER, Mogul emperor, 61
Badulla Serai, engagement at, 235
BAJEE RAO MAHARAJAH, Peishwa of Mahrattas, 122
BANKS, Major, commissioner of Oude—death, 165, 325
——, house at Lucknow, fortified, 418
BARBER, Lieutenant, cut to pieces near Minpooree, 113
Bareilly, mutiny at, 114, 170
——, mutineers’ march to Delhi, 241
——, recaptured by Campbell and Jones, 492, 494
BARNARD, Sir Henry, takes command of Delhi force, 47, 233
——, engagements before Delhi, 236, 239
——, death, 242
Barrackpore, disturbances and inquiry at, 38, 39
——, 19th B. N. I. disbanded at, 400
Barracks, description of, at Company’s stations, 28
BATSON, Mr, eventful escape from Delhi, 80
BATTYE, Captain, of the Guide Corps, death at Delhi, 238
BEATSON, Captain, death at Cawnpore, 253
Begum Kothee, palace at Lucknow, 418
—— of Oude, character and proceedings, 610
—— Sumroo, convent of, at Sirdhana, 57
Behar. [Arrah; Jugdispore; Lugard; &c.]
Benares, situation and description, 104
——, mutinies and operations at, 105, 154, 156, 279
Bengal Army, proposed reconstruction of, 483
—— Presidency, description, &c., 16, 25
Beora, Tanteea Topee defeated by Michel at, 558
Berhampore, disaffection and disarming at, 40, 266
BERKELEY, Brigadier, operations near Soraon, 545
Berozepoor, fort taken by Goorkhas, 403
Bhotuck. [Rhotuk.]
Bithoor, situation and description, 122
——, battles at and near, 254, 258
——, massacres at. [Cawnpore; Nena Sahib.]
BOILEAU, Captain, won battle of Mundoree, 341
Bombay mutinous regiments erased from Army List, 534
—— presidency, description and army of, 16, 26
—— army strengthened, 559
——, rejoicings at Queen’s Proclamation, 611
Boodayoun, disturbances at, 115
BOURCHIER, Colonel, on causes of mutiny, 606
BOWRING, Sir John. [China.]
BOYLE’S House at Arrah, defence of, 269
British army in India. [Army.]
—— possessions in India, 4, 14
Bundelcund, situation and description, 179
Burmah, policy of king of, 430
BURTON, Major, and sons, killed at Kotah, 354
Busherutgunje, Havelock’s two victories at, 255, 256
Bushire. [Persia.]
Cadets, education of, 26
Calcutta, description and population, 98, 99
——, excitement and demonstrations, 99, 149, 264
——, rejoicings at Queen’s Proclamation, 612
Calpee, town and fort taken by Sir Hugh Rose, 506
Camp before Delhi, description of, 298
CAMPBELL, Sir Colin [Lord Clyde], characteristics of, 222, 496
——, left England for India, 222
——, at Buntara and Cawnpore, 364, 391
——, relieved garrison at Lucknow, 366
——, strength of his army of Oude, 409, 415
——, finally conquered Lucknow, 425
——, interview with Jung Bahadoor, 418
——, interview with Lord Canning, 466
——, general orders by, 423, 433, 547
——, at Futteghur, 473
——, victory near Shahjehanpoor, 497
——, troops thanked by, 498, 514
——, proceedings in Nov. 1858, 611
——, plan for final subjection of Oude, 611
CANNING, Viscount, hostility to, in Calcutta, 212, 213
——, orders and congratulatory letters, 214, 220, 312, 350
——, Oude Proclamation, debates on, 450
——, reply to Ellenborough’s dispatch, 541
——, Proclamation accompanying Queen’s Proclamation, 624
Canton, [China.]
Cartridges, commencement of troubles relating to, 36, 89
CASE, Colonel, death of, at Lucknow, 134
Cashmere Gate, Delhi, blowing up of, 307
Castes and Creeds in Indian army, 162
Cavalry, consequences of deficiency in, 212, 253
CAVANAGH, Mr, adventure at Lucknow, 371
CAVANAGH, Private, gallantry of, at Onao, 256
Causes of Mutiny, opinions on, 605-608
Cawnpore, position and description, 122
——, messages denoting insecurity, 124, 139
——, Wheeler’s preparations, 125, 126
——, sufferings in the intrenchment, 126, 130, 136, &c.
——, Nena Sahib’s deceitful promises, 126, 136, 137
——, boat massacre, and partial escapes, 137-139
——, death of Sir Hugh Wheeler, 139
——, frightful scenes in the house of slaughter, 131, 139, 141-143, 144-145
——, battle and capture by Havelock, 252, 253
——, Neill assumes military command, 254
——, Windham’s defeat by Gwalior rebels, 377
——, decisive victory by Sir Colin Campbell, 378
Central India Field-forces, services of, 507, 516, 553
Chandnee Chowk, Delhi, description of, 435
CHEEK, Ensign, heroism and death, at Allahabad, 159
CHESTER, Colonel, killed at Badulla Serai, 235
China, Retrospect of intercourse with England, 585
——, Lorcha _Arrow_, seized by Chinese authorities, 587
——, Sir John Bowring resolved on forcible measures, 587
——, Sir Michael Seymour captured forts near Canton, 588
——, Commissioner Yeh, correspondence with, 588
——, destruction of junks in Canton river, 589
——, European factories burned at Canton, 589
——, Canton partly burned by English, 590
——, debates in parliament concerning, 591
——, Bowring, Seymour, and Parkes, difficulties of, 592
——, Elgin, Ashburnham, and Straubenzee sent out, 593
——, great destruction of junks at Fatshan, 594
——, operations delayed by mutiny in India, 595
——, bombardment and capture of Canton, 597
——, Yeh sent as prisoner to Calcutta, 598
——, Elgin, Gros, Putiatine, and Reed, proceeded to Shang-hae and Tien-sing, 598
——, destruction of forts on Pei-ho river, 599
——, Plenipotentiaries sign treaties at Tien-sing, 600
——, untoward conflict at Namtow, 601
——, final pacification, 602
Chunar, sacred Hindoo fort near Benares, 106
Chupatties, mystery of their transmission, 35
Chuttra, English’s defeat of mutineers at, 343
Civil service, India, regulations, 5
Civilians, honours to distinguished, 485
CLARK, Lieut., at Jubbulpoor, frustrates conspirators, 346
CLYDE, Lord. [Campbell, Sir Colin.]
COCKBURN, Lieutenant, gallant services at Hattrass, 112
COKE, Brigadier, services against rebels, 241, 496
COLVIN, Mr, proclamation disapproved by government, 110
——, disarms 44th and 67th B. N. I. at Agra, 111
——, death, services, and character, 348
Compensation to sufferers, arrangements for, 484
Cost of English soldiers in the East, 26
COTTON, Colonel, supersedes Polwhele at Agra, 285
Council of India, names of members, 575
Courts-martial on mutineers, arrangements, 51
Covenanted and uncovenanted service of E. I. Company, 443
Crime, lessening of, under recent Indian reforms, 6
CROWE, Lieut., earns the Victoria Cross by gallantry, 258
CURRIE, Captain, mortally wounded at Cawnpore, 253
DALHOUSIE, Marquis of, career as Governor-general, 2, 87, 218
Darjeeling, proposed colonisation at, 518
Deesa, military operations at, 293, 550
DELAFOSSE, Lieutenant, gallantry at Cawnpore, 135
Delhi, history and description, 63, 67
——, arrival of mutineers from Meerut, 52
——, mutiny of native troops, 73
——, atrocities and sufferings at, 74-79
——, king of Delhi assumes command, 74, 75
——, operations of siege army, 231, 236, 239, 243, 301, 303
——, Cashmere Gate blown in, 307
——, storming and capture, 306-310
——, state of, after the siege, 311, 355, 383, 435
——, king of, mutineers sanctioned by, 74
—— ——, captured by Hodson, 313
—— ——, behaviour and treatment in confinement, 356
—— ——, submitted to trial, 404
DEWAN MOOLRAJ, rebellion of, 3
Dholpore, mutineers plan attack on Agra, 351
Dil Koosha, palace at Lucknow, 369
Dinapoor, mutiny, and its consequences, 268, 274
Distances in India, table of, 12
District-regulations, 15
Doab, important towns in, 107
——, operations in. [Allahabad; Cawnpore; &c.]
DORIN, Mrs, killed at Lucknow Residency, 327
Dorunda, plundered by Ramgurh mutineers, 342
DOUGLAS, Captain, killed at Delhi, 74
D’OYLEY, Captain, killed at Agra, 284
DUFF, Rev. Dr, on causes of mutiny, 606
Dumdum, cartridge troubles commenced at, 38
Dumoh evacuated by Europeans, 347
DUNBAR, Captain, killed at Arrah, 271
Dust and hot winds of India, 465
East India Company. [Army; British India; Covenanted Service, &c.]
East India Company, discussions concerning, 561-573
——, petition to parliament, 613
——, disclaim selfish policy in India, 615
——, object to 1st and 2d India Bills, 618
——, object to 3d India Bill, 621
——, statute ending governing powers, 622
ECKFORD, Lieutenant, narrow escape at Kukerowlee, 492
Educational establishments for natives, 6
EDWARDES, Colonel, Commissioner of Peshawur, 199
——, opinions on Indian government, 607
EDWARDS, Mr, exciting escape from Boodayoun, 115
Electric Telegraphs in India, 9, 416
ELGIN, Earl of. [China.]
ELLENBOROUGH, Earl of, secret dispatch, 541, 564, &c.
ELLIOT, Commodore. [China.]
ELPHINSTONE, Lord, governor of Bombay. [Bombay.]
Enfield rifles, effect on enemy, 250
ENGLISH, Major, defeats rebels at Chuttra, 343
ETHERSEY, Commodore. [Persia.]
Eurasians, or half-castes of India, 98
European troops. [Army, British.]
Europeans in India, and the government, 214
Excise laws in India, 609
EYRE, Major Vincent, defeats rebels at Koondun Puttee, 261
—— —— ——, defeats rebels at Arrah and Narainpore, 272
FAGAN, Captain, killed at Mhow, 186
Fatshan. [China.]
FAYERS, Lieutenant, killed near Minpooree, 113
Ferozpore, disturbances at, 195, &c.
FINCH, Captain, cavalry attack in Saugor territory, 553
FINNIS, Colonel, killed at Meerut, 52
FISHER, Colonel, killed at Sultanpoor, 168
Fort William. [Calcutta.]
FRANKS, Brigadier, operations in Oude, 402, &c.
FRAZER, Mr, killed at Delhi, 74
FRERE, Mr, Commissioner of Sinde, controversy with missionaries, 530
Fund, Indian Mutiny Relief, 226, 623
Furlough, peculiarities in native, 36
Futteghur, mutiny, flight, and murder of Europeans, 134
Futtehpoor, outbreak at, 172
Fyzabad, mutiny, flight of Europeans, 165-167
GABBETT, Lieutenant, killed at Nujuffghur, 300
Ganges, towns and canal of, 8, 104
GARDINER, Sergeant, gallantry at Bareilly, 494
GOLDNEY, Colonel, killed during flight from Fyzabad, 167
Goorkhas, characteristics and services, 378, 348, 393, 529
GORDON, Captain, killed at Delhi, 72
Goruckpore, contests with rebels at, 393, 431
GRAHAM, Dr, killed at Sealkote, 203
GRANT, Mr, temporary Lieutenant-governor of Central Provinces, 214-280
GRANT, Sir Hope, defeats rebels outside Delhi, 238
—— —— —— —— at Serai Ghat, 380
—— —— —— —— at Meeangunje, 404
—— —— —— —— at Towrie, 499
—— —— —— —— at Nawabgunge, 523
—— —— —— —— in Fyzabad district, 543
——, Sir Patrick, temporary Commander-in-chief, 211
GREATHED, Brigadier, services against rebels, 350, 352, &c.
——, Mr H. H., killed at Delhi, 314
GROS, Baron, French plenipotentiary. [China.]
GUBBINGS, Captain, killed at Sultanpore, 168
GUBBINS, Mr, Commissioner of Oude, on causes of mutiny, 605
Guide Corps, march, services, and return from Delhi, 234-437
Gujerat, disarmed by Sir R. Shakespear, 501
Gulowlie, Rose’s victory at, 506
Gwalior, position and description, 187, 510
——, mutiny at, 112, 188
——, capture and recapture of, 509-512
——, conspiracy defeated, 559
HALIBURTON, Captain, disperses rebels near Benares, 279
HALL, Colonel, gallant defence at Shahjehanpore, 495
HARRIS, Lord, on newspaper press of India, 217
——, Major, killed at Mhow, 186
Hattrass, refugees, and fighting at, 112
HAVELOCK, Sir H., commenced operations in the Doab, 247
—— —— ——, victory at Futtehpoor, 249
—— —— ——, —— at Aong, 251
—— —— ——, —— at Pandoo Nuddee, 251
—— —— ——, —— at Cawnpore, 251
—— —— ——, actions on road to Lucknow, 254, &c.
—— —— ——, second defeat of Nena Sahib, 258
—— —— ——, difficulties after retreat to Cawnpore, 259
—— —— ——, death at Lucknow, 369
——, Lieutenant, won Victoria Cross by gallantry, 253
HAYES, Major, killed near Minpooree, 113
Hazarebagh, mutiny at, 274
‘Headman’ of a village, position and duties, 119
Heat of India, influence on Europeans, 66, 519
Herat, cause of the Persian war. [Persia], 578
HEWETT, Major-general, conduct at Meerut, 53
Hindoos, characteristics of, 105, 438, &c.
HODSON, Major, defeat rebels near Rohtuk, 299
—— ——, capture King of Delhi, 313
—— ——, killed at Lucknow, 426
——, Mrs, account of visit to King of Delhi, 356
HOLKAR, one of the Mahratta princes, 182
HOLMES, Major, killed at Segowlie, 274
HOME, Lieutenant, services and death, 315, 351
Hong-kong. [China.]
Honours conferred on faithful natives, 546, 548
Hoogly river, described, 98
HOPE, Brigadier Adrian, services at Bithoor and Shumshabad, 391, 394
HOPE, Brigadier Adrian, killed at Rhodamow, 473
Hospitals, periodicals supplied to by government, 538
India Bills, discussions on, in parliament, 561-573
Indian Native army, on reorganisation of, 386
Indore, mutiny and murder of Europeans, 185, 186
Industrial development of India, 7
INGLIS, Sir J., heroic defence of Lucknow, 165, 259, 324, 327, 336
JACOB, Brigadier, of the Sinde horse, 206, 207, &c.
Jacobabad, station for Jacob’s Sinde horse, 207
JAMSETJEE JEJEEBHOY, Sir, Parsee baronet, 501, 612
Japan, Elgin’s expedition to Nagasaki, 603
——, thence to Jedo, 603
——, treaty of commerce signed by Elgin, 603
Jedo. [Japan.]
JEHANGHIRE, Mogul emperor, 61
Jelpigoree, conflict of mutineers, 375
Jelum, Sepoy mutinies at, 202
JENNINGS, Rev. Mr, killed at Delhi, 74
Jhansi, mutinies and fighting at, 179, 440, 478, 479
——, Ranee of, 180, 478
Jheend, Rajah of, rewarded for fidelity, 549
JONES, Brigadier, operations at Nageena and Shahjehanpore, 472, 496
Jowra Alipore, Gwalior rebels defeated by Napier at, 515
Jubbulpoor, precautions against mutiny, 178, 281, 346
Jugdispore taken by Lugard, 487
Jullundur, precautions against mutiny, 196
Julra Patteen, occupied by Tanteea Topee, 557
Jumma Musjid at Delhi, description, 65
Jumna, immolation of devotees in, 107
JUNG BAHADOOR, character and proceedings, 169, 423, 519
Junks, destruction of. [China.]
Kaiser Bagh, palace and garden at Lucknow, 421
KANTZOW, Lieutenant de, gallantry at Minpooree, 113
Kattara, Tanteea Topee defeated by Roberts at, 557
KERR, Lord Mark, contest with rebels at Azimghur, 469
KHAN BAHADOOR KHAN, rebel leader at Bareilly, 170
Khoosh-aub, victory at. [Persia.]
KIRK, Dr, killed at Gwalior, 189
Kirwee, treasure captured at by Whitlock, 552
KOER SINGH, leader of Dinapoor rebels, 269, 344, 469, 487
Kolapore, mutiny and murders at, 289
Kotah, recaptured from rebels by Roberts, 442
Kukerowlee, victory of Jones at, 492
Kumaon battalion, fidelity and bravery of, 529
Lahore, mutiny of native troops at, 204
——, position and description of, 193
LAKE, Lord, reminiscences of, 67
LAWRENCE, Colonel, in Rajpootana, 354
——, Sir H., difficulties of position at Lucknow, 89-95
—— ——, disastrous battle of Chinhut, 164
—— ——, Muchee Bhowan fort blown up by, 164
—— ——, death and character, 165, 322
——, Sir J., energetic measures in Punjaub, 199-204
—— ——, siege-army for Delhi formed by, 240
—— ——, invaluable services to India, 384
—— ——, pension granted to, 574
—— ——, opinions on government of India, 607
LESLIE, Sir Norman, killed at Rohnee, 151
LLOYD, Major-general, disasters at Dinapoor, 267, 268
Lorcha _Arrow_, cause of Chinese war. [China.]
Lotus flower, transmission among natives, 36
LOWTHER, Captain, Rajah of Assam captured by, 339
Lucknow, situation and description, 84
——, first symptoms of mutiny, 89, 96
——, invested by rebels, 164
——, details of siege by rebels, 317-333
——, effects of heat, flies, and impurities, 325, 326
——, sufferings of ladies and children, 325, 330, 335
——, scarcity, and high prices of provisions, 330, 332
——, brilliant achievements of defenders, 328, 331, &c.
——, great losses among garrison, 259, 263, 335, 366
——, relieved by Havelock and Outram, 263, 335
——, second relief, by Sir Colin Campbell, 368
——, spoliation of palaces, 360
——, evacuation by the British, 368
——, state of, after the evacuation, 413
——, reconquered by Sir Colin Campbell, 425
——, condition of in May 1858, 522
LUDLOW, Mr, on causes of mutiny, 605
LUGARD, Sir E., Koer Singh defeated by, at Azimghur, 469
——, ——, various victories over rebels, 487
LUMSDEN, Lieutenant, killed at Nujuffghur, 300
LYELL, Dr, killed at Patna, 153
M’CAUSLAND, Colonel, Bareilly rebels defeated by, 406
MADHOO SINGH, surrender to Sir Colin Campbell, 610
Madras presidency and city, 15
——, number of troops, 26
——, 8th native cavalry disarmed, 288
——, troops in Central Provinces, 280
——, general fidelity of native troops, 288
——, missionary dispute, 535
Magazine at Delhi, blown up by Willoughby, 71
—— at Lucknow, blown up by Lawrence, 164
MAHOMED HUSSEIN, rebel leader in Oude, 166, 487
Mahrattas, nation, territory, and characteristics, 62, 181
Mail post, Indian runners, dâks, and eckas, 22
Malagurh Fort, blown up—Lieutenant Home killed, 351
MAN SINGH, rebel chief in Gwalior territory. [Gwalior]
MANSON, Mr, assassinated near Nargoond, 532
March of Indian armies described, 29
Martial law proclaimed, 213
MARTIN, Lieutenant, shot at Mhow, 180
Martinière, college in Lucknow. [Lucknow.]
Massacres. [Cawnpore; Delhi; Jhansi; Meerut; &c.]
MAUN SINGH, of Shahgunje, 465, &c.
MAXWELL, Colonel, rebels defeated by, at Chowra, 403
MEAD, Mr, on causes of mutiny, 606
Meean Meer, cantonment for Lahore, 194, 287
Meerut, position and description of, 49
——, mutiny and massacre at, 50-53
—— mutineers march to Delhi, 52
——, Wilson’s brigade march from, 232
METCALFE’S House, outside Delhi, struggles at, 297
Mhow, mutiny at, 186
MICHEL, Major-gen., victories over Tanteea Topee, 558, 611
Military stations and divisions in India, 208, 209, 293
MILL, Major, killed near Fyzabad, 167
——, Mrs, and children, eventful escape of, 167
MILLER, Colonel, rebels defeated by, at Konee, 347
MILLMAN, engagement with rebels at Atrowlia, 431
Minpooree, re-occupation of, 353
Mirzapore, description and defences, 106, 279
Missionaries, controversy with, at Hyderabad, 530
Missionary dispute at Madras, 535
Mohamrah, victory at. [Persia.]
MONTGOMERY, Mr, Chief-commissioner of Oude, 465
——, proclamation for disarming Oude, 610
——, Major, defeat of rebels at Allygurh, 286
Mooradabad, mutiny at, 171
——, rebel chieftains captured, 491
Moosa Bagh, palace at Lucknow, 424
Moultan, disarming and mutiny at, 551
Moulvie of Fyzabad, stronghold captured, 425
—— ——, characteristics, 498
—— ——, killed at Powayne, 524
Muchee Bhowan, fort, at Lucknow, 322
Multhone, Tanteea Topee defeated by Michel at, 611
Mundoree, action at, 341
MUNRO, Sir T., opinions on press of India, 215
Murdan, mutineers captured at, 198
MURRAY, Honourable A. C. [Persia.]
Mutiny, discussions on causes of, 389, 605
—— Relief Fund, 623
NABAH, Rajah of, rewarded for fidelity, 549
NADIR SHAH, early conqueror of India, 62
Nagasaki. [Japan.]
Nagode, mutiny and disaster at, 282
Nagpoor, position and defences, 176
Namtow, operations at. [China.]
NAPIER, Brigadier R., operations against Gwalior rebels, 515, 555, &c.
Nargoond, Rajah, treachery of, 532
Narratives of Delhi fugitives, 75-77
Naval Brigade, arrived at Benares, 340
—— ——, services at Lucknow, 366
——, —— at Chuckerderpore, 518
——, —— at Hurreah, 525
—— value of services, 539
—— [Peel; Sotheby.]
Native regiments. [Army.]
Nawabgunge, Grant’s victory at, 523
NEAVE, Lieutenant, killed at Gwalior, 511
Neemuch, mutiny and contests, 184, 386
NEILL, Brigadier, services at Benares and Allahabad, 155, 157, 160
——, in command at Cawnpore, 144, 254
——, repulsed enemy at Cawnpore, 255, 258
——, killed at Lucknow, 632
NENA SAHIB, history and character, 122
——, treacherous promises, 126, 127, 130
——, joined the rebels as leader, 129
——, massacred fugitives from Futteghur, 133
——, dreadful massacre at Cawnpore, 142
——, issued vaunting proclamations, 146
——, defeated by Havelock at Bithoor, 253
——, second defeat by Havelock at Bithoor, 258
——, chosen as Peishwa by Gwalior rebels, 508
——. [Cawnpore; Havelock; Wheeler.]
Nepaul. [See also Goorkhas; Jung Bahadoor], 169
NEWBERRY, Cornet—killed at Nuseerabad, 183
Newspaper correspondents, 400
——. [Press.]
Newspapers of India, native, 46, 217
——, English, 205
NICHOLSON, Brig., character and services, 298, 314
——, operations against Sealkote mutineers, 204
——, disarmed native troops at Umritsir, 287
——, defeat of enemy at Nujuffghur, 299
——, killed at Delhi, 307
Nizam of the Deccan, fidelity to the English, 560
Non-regulation, provinces and districts, 15
Nowgong, mutiny and eventful escapes, 180, 181
Nowsherah, station destroyed by river-torrent, 551
Nujuffghur, Nicholson’s victory at, 299
Nuseerabad, mutiny at, 183
Nynee Tal, refuge at hill-station, 114, 115, &c.
Onao, battle won by Havelock, 255
Opium Trade. [See also China], 609
ORR, Mrs and Miss Jackson, sufferings at Lucknow, 423
Orthography of Oriental names and terms, 13
OSBORNE, Captain, skilful management at Rewah, 180
Oude, history and description, 83
——, royal family, relations of E. I. C. with, 84-88
——, queen, goes to England, 88
—— ——, petition from, 161
—— ——, discords in royal family, 520
——, army, mutiny, military events, 89, 399, 426, 543, 610, &c.
——, gradual pacification, 610
——. [Campbell; Havelock; Lawrence; Lucknow; &c.]
OUTRAM, Sir James. [Persia.]
——, plan for reconquering Oude, 250
——, nobly yielded command to Havelock, 262
OUTRAM, Sir James, wounded in entering Lucknow, 263
——, appointed to hold Alum Bagh, 370
——, defeated 30,000 rebels at, 391
——, defeated 20,000 rebels at, 401
——, operations in taking Lucknow, 415, 422
——, military councillor at Calcutta, 467
——, volunteer cavalry thanked by, 526
PALMERSTON, Lord, India Bill, 564
——. [India bills; Parliament.]
Paoree, Man Singh defeated by Napier at, 555
PARKES, Mr. [China.]
Parliament, discussions on the mutiny, &c., 218, 221, 448
—— discussions, on India bills, &c., 564
Parsee address to Lord Elphinstone, 289
—— rejoicings at Bombay, 611
Patna, disturbances and precautions, 152, 153, 267
PEEL, Captain Sir W., services with naval brigade at Kudjna, 364
PEEL, Captain Sir W., services with naval brigade at Lucknow, 366
PEEL, Captain Sir W., wounded at Lucknow, 417
—— —— —— ——, died at Cawnpore, 475
PEH-KWEI, governor at Canton. [China.]
Pei-ho, operations in river. [China]
PENNY, Colonel, killed at Nuseerabad, 183
——, General, operations against rebels, 355, 491
—— ——, killed at Kukerowlee, 491
Pershadeepore, mutiny at, 168
Persia, disputes concerning Herat, &c., 578
——, war declared against, 579
——, expeditions to, 580
——, capture of Bushire, 580
——, action at Khoosh-aub, 581
——, suicide of Stalker and Ethersey, 582
——, operations at Mohamrah and Ahwaz, 582
——, Treaty of Peace, 583
Peshawur, mutinies and precautions, 197-199, 204
Phillour, precautions against mutiny, 197
PLATT, Colonel, killed at Mhow, 186
PLOWDEN, Mr, his position at Nagpoor, 177
——, Captain, services with Goorkhas, 432
Plunder, Sir Colin Campbell’s order concerning, 423
POLEHAMPTON, Rev. Mr, killed at Lucknow, 329
Police system of India, 200, 480
Poonah, precautions against rebellion, 290
POWELL, Colonel, killed at Kudjna, 364
Presidencies, area and population, 31
Press of India, 46, 205, 215, 218, 400
——, liberty restricted, 215
——. [Newspapers.]
Proclamations, Viscount Canning’s, 450, 624
——, Sir Colin Campbell’s, 610
——, Mr Montgomery’s, 610
——, Queen Victoria’s, 611, 623
——. [Campbell; Canning; Ellenborough; &c.]
Prophecies and mysteries, native, 485, 531
Punjaub, history and description, 191, 192
——, precautions against mutiny, 200, 201
——. [Lahore; Lawrence; Moultan; Nicholson; Peshawur; Sealkote; Sikhs; &c.]
Putialah, Rajah of, rewarded for fidelity, 549
PUTIATINE, Admiral Count. [China; Japan.]
Queen of Oude. [Begum; Oude.]
Queen Victoria’s proclamation, 609-612, 623
RAIKES, Mr, on causes of mutiny, 606
Railways of India, lengths, &c., 119, 157, 224, 477
RAINES, Major, rebels defeated at Rowah, 395
Rajahs, honours for fidelity of, 549
Rajpootana, situation and description, 189
——. [Napier; Nuseerabad; Roberts; Tanteea Topee; &c.]
RAMSAY, Capt. (Major), operations near Nynee Tal, 115, 357
Ranee of Jhansi, killed at Gwalior, 511
——. [Calpee; Gwalior; Jhansi; Tanteea Topee.]
RATTRAY, Captain, services of Sikh battalion, 275, &c.
Rebels, discussions on punishment of, 455
REED, Mr, American plenipotentiary. [China.]
——, Major-gen., brief services against rebels, 235, 242
——, resigned command at Delhi, 243
REES, Mr, on causes of the mutiny, 605
Regiments. [Army; Stations; &c.]
Regulation districts, 15
REID, Major, gallant achievements outside Delhi— 241, 297, &c.
Relief Fund, Indian Mutiny, 623
Religions of India, discussions concerning, 607
——, orders for respecting, 41
RENAUD, Major, killed at Cawnpore, 254
RENNIE, Capt., defeat of Persians at Ahwaz by. [Persia.]
Residency at Lucknow. [Inglis; Lawrence; Lucknow; &c.]
Revolt. [Barrackpore; Cartridge; Meerut; &c.]
Rewah, gallantly held by Osborne, 180, 345, &c.
Rhodamow Fort, disaster at, 473
ROBERTS, General, operations against Tanteea Topee, 555, 557, &c.
Rohilcund, position and description, 170
——, operations in, 114, 467, 495, 496, 610
——, rebel leaders in, 467
ROSE, Lieutenant, killed at Gwalior, 513
——, Sir Hugh, operations at Mudenpore, 438
—— —— —— at Jhansi, 478
—— —— —— at Koonch, 505
—— —— —— at Gwalior, 510, 516
—— —— ——, address to his army, 516
ROWCROFT, Brigadier, operations against rebels, 470, 610
RUSSELL, Mr W. H., graphic descriptions by, 400, 414, &c.
SALAR JUNG, prime-minister to Nizam, 560
SALKELD, Lieutenant, heroism at Delhi, 315
Satara, Mahratta proceedings at, 290, 480
Saugor, fight between native troops at, 281
—— and Nerbudda territories, 178, 345, 553
SCINDIA, history and family, 182
——, offered aid to British, 110
——, difficulties with mutineers, 351, 507
——, expulsion from Gwalior, 508
——, reinstatement at Gwalior, 514
Sealkote, mutiny at, 202, 203
—— mutineers. [Nicholson.]
SEATON, Brigadier, services against rebels, 382, 475, &c.
Secrole, noticed, 105
Secunder Bagh, palace and garden at Lucknow, 365
Secunderabad, Rohillas defeated at, 291
Seetapoor, mutiny at, 168
——, operations commence from, 610
Seetabuldee, fort of Nagpoor, 177
Sepoys. [Army; Regiments; Troops.]
SEYMOUR, Admiral Sir Michael [China.]
SHAHJEHAN, Mogul emperor, 62
Shahjehanpore, mutiny and massacre at, 171
——, military operations, 495, 496, &c.
Shah Nujeef at Lucknow, 365
——, Peel’s services at, 366
Shang-hae. [China.]
SHOWERS, Brigadier, operations against Delhi, 297
Sikhs, origin and description, 192
——, fidelity during mutiny, 156, 275, 344
SIMPSON, Sergeant, gallantry at Rhodamow, 473
Sinde, details concerning, 205-207
Sirmoor battalion of Goorkhas, fidelity of, 529
SMITH, Brigadier, operations at Gwalior, &c., 511, &c.
Soldiers, English in India. [Army; &c.]
Sonthal Pergunnahs, mutiny at, 151
SOORUT SINGH of Benares, services to the English, 156
Soraon Field-force, services, 545
SOTHEBY’S Naval Brigade, services of, 402
SPENCER, Major, killed at Meean Meer, 287
SPOTTISWOODE, Captain, killed at Nuseerabad, 183
SPRING, Captain, killed at Jelum, 202
STALKER, Major-general. [Persia.]
STANLEY, Lord, India Bill and Council of India, 570
STEUART, Brigadier, operations in Deccan, 385
STEVENS, Captain, killed at Chinhut, 164
STRAUBENZEE, General. [China.]
STUART, Brigadier, at Mundisore and Chendaree, 385, 439
Sultanpore, actions by Franks and Hope Grant, 402, 610
Sunstroke, fatal effects of, 496, &c.
TANTEEA TOPEE, manœuvres and marches of, 478, 508, 555, 558, 611
——. [Michel; Napier; Roberts; &c.]
TAYLER, Mr, proceedings at Patna, 470, 476
——, removed from office, 476
Telegrams. [Electric telegraph.]
TIEN-SING. [China.]
Tola Narainpore, rebels defeated by Eyre at, 272
Thalookdars and Thalookdaree, 360, 525
Thugs and Thuggee, 11
Travelling in India, 18, 20
——. [Marching; Railways; &c.]
Troops, number, clothing, &c., 25, 26, 29, 224, 250, 302, 535, 609
——, disarming, 149, 150, 194, 198, &c.
——, marching and transport of, 29, 222, 501, 611
——. [Army; &c.]
TUCKER, Mr, killed at Futtehpoor, 172
Twigs, mystery of, in Gujerat, 531
Umballa, occurrences at, 118, 231
——, effects of cholera at, 201
Umritsir, position and description, 195
Vellore, revolt in, a premonitory symptom, 33
VENABLES, Mr, success against rebels, 278, 341
—— ——, death, and honourable testimonial, 519
Victoria Cross, bestowal for valour, 315, 464, 550
Vocabulary of Indian terms, 13
Volunteer cavalry of Oude, 526
WAKE, Mr, heroic defence of house at Arrah, 268
WALLEE DAD KHAN, rebel leader near Meerut, 174
WALPOLE, General, disaster at Rhodamow, 473
——, victory at Sirsa, 473
WATERFIELD, Major, killed near Ferozabad, 500
WHELER, Colonel, and the religion of the sepoys, 101
WHEELER, Sir Hugh, defensive operations, sufferings, and death. [Cawnpore; Nena Sahib.]
——, Miss, heroic conduct of, 139
WILLOUGHBY, Lieutenant, Delhi magazine exploded by, 71
WHITLOCK, General, operations in Bundelcund, 479
——, capture of treasure at Kirwee, 552
WINDHAM, General, disaster at Cawnpore, 376
WILSON, Sir Archdale, Meerut column headed by, 232
—— —— ——, victories of Ghazeeoodeen and Hindoun, 232
WILSON, Sir Archdale, at siege of Delhi, 243, 245, 298, 306, 311
——, honoured and rewarded, 314
——, commanded cavalry in Oude, 409
WINGFIELD, Mr, commissioner at Goruckpore, 487
YEH MINGCHIN, Chinese viceroy. [China.]
YULE, Colonel, killed outside Delhi, 238
[Illustration: THE END.]
Edinburgh: Printed by W. and R. Chambers.
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES
1. Corrected for to four on p. 96. 2. Corrected withinside to within on p. 314. 3. Silently corrected typographical errors. 4. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed. 5. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. 6. Superscripts are denoted by a carat before a single superscript character or a series of superscripted characters enclosed in curly braces, e.g. M^r. or M^{ister}.