Part 31

The bad harvest of 1874 was the immediate cause of the outbreak, for the farmers of the taxes refused to make any concessions. It was, in the first instance, directed rather against the Moslem landowners and the local Turkish officials than against the Sultan, but it rapidly developed into a general insurrection against the Sultan’s government. Every effort was made by Austria and Russia to localize it and to induce the Porte to make concessions. Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, drew up a scheme for the pacification of the two provinces. It proposed that the system of farming the taxes should be abolished, that the taxes raised in the provinces should be expended locally for their benefit, that complete religious equality should be established, and that a mixed commission should be appointed to supervise the carrying out of these reforms. The scheme was agreed to by Russia, Great Britain, and the other Powers, and was presented to the Sultan, who acquiesced in it. But it proved, like other promises of reform in Turkey, to be a dead letter. Not a single step was taken to give effect to any part of it. The rebellion in the two provinces continued. The insurgents increased their demands. They insisted that one-third of the land should be given up to the rayas. The movement soon extended to Bulgaria, which was seething with disaffection.

On April 21, 1876, an outbreak of Bulgarians occurred on the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, of which Batak was the centre. It was put down without difficulty by a small Turkish force sent from Constantinople, under Achmet Agha, with little loss of life to the troops engaged, but with relentless cruelty, not only to the actual insurgents who surrendered on promise of life, but to the whole population of the district. Bands of Bashi-Bazouks, consisting of Tartars from the Crimea who had been planted in Bulgaria, were let loose on them. Indiscriminate murders, rapes, and rapine took place. Sixty villages were burnt. Twelve hundred persons, mostly women and children, took refuge in a church at Batak and were there burnt alive. In all about twelve thousand persons perished in these brutal reprisals. Achmet Agha received a high decoration from the Sultan for this performance. There was nothing new in this method of dealing with an outbreak by the Porte. It was in accord with its traditional system and policy to wreak vengeance on those revolting by orgies of cruelty, which would strike terror among subject races and act as a warning to them in the future.

What was new in the case of the Bulgarians in 1876, and was fraught with misfortune to the Turkish cause, was that full and graphic accounts of the horrors committed at Batak, written by Mr. Edwin Pears (now Sir Edwin), the correspondent at Constantinople of the _Daily News_, appeared in the columns of that paper. They produced a profound impression on public opinion in England. Discredit was thrown on the story in the House of Commons by Mr. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, but it was fully confirmed by Mr. MacGahan, another correspondent of the same paper, who visited the district, and later by Mr. Walter Baring, a member of the British Embassy at Constantinople, who, by the direction of the Government, made full personal inquiries on the spot. He described what had taken place as “perhaps the most heinous crime that has stained the history of the present century.”

It was also unfortunate for the Turks that Mr. Gladstone, the only survivor in the House of Commons of the British statesmen responsible for the Crimean War, who had recently retired from the leadership of the Liberal party, was fired by the description of these horrors in Bulgaria to emerge from his retirement and to take up the cause of the Christian population of European Turkey, for which he held that the treaty of Paris had made his country responsible.

Meanwhile the horrors at Batak had also aroused the indignation of Russia and the fears of Austria. A fanatical outbreak of Moslems at Salonika resulted in the murder of the Consuls of France and Germany. Serbia and Montenegro, impelled by sympathy for their fellow Slavs in Bosnia, declared war against Turkey. A Turkish force defeated the Serbians, who appealed to Russia for assistance. At this stage another effort was made by Russia and Austria, supported by Germany, to avert a general conflagration, and a scheme was embodied in what was known as the Berlin Memorandum for compelling the Porte to carry out the reforms which it had admitted to be necessary. The British Government, however, very curtly refused to be a party to the scheme, on the ground that they had not been consulted in framing it and did not believe in its success. About this time also the British fleet in the Mediterranean was ordered to Besika Bay, a step taken avowedly for the purpose of protecting British subjects in the turmoil which had arisen, but which seemed to the Porte to indicate an intention to support them against the demands of the other Powers.

Mr. Gladstone, fearing that these actions indicated the intention of the British Government to withdraw from the concert of Europe and to renew the separate policy which had led to the Crimean War, made a vehement attack on it in the House of Commons for refusing to agree to the Berlin Memorandum. Later, in September 1876, he published his well-known pamphlet on “the Bulgarian Horrors,” in which, with passionate language, he dwelt at length on the massacres at Batak and denounced the Turkish Government. He protested that he could no longer bear his share of responsibility for the Crimean War. Otherwise he might be accused of “moral complicity in the basest and blackest outrages upon record in that century.”

Those [he wrote] who opposed the Crimean War are especially bound to remember that the treaty of Paris made Europe as a whole, and not Russia alone, responsible for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, which had given this licence to Turkish officers to rob, murder, and ravish in Bulgaria.... As an old servant of the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and insist that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour, in common with the other States of Europe, in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves. Their zapties and their mudirs, their bimbashis and their yuzbashis, their kaimakans and their pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.[42]

The pamphlet produced an immediate and profound effect on public opinion in Great Britain. It was followed up by speeches of the same force and eloquence on the part of the veteran statesman. Meetings took place in every part of the country, at which sympathy was expressed for the Christian populations of Turkey. The Turks were denounced for their cruelties and bad government. Resolutions were unanimously passed in accord with the policy recommended by Mr. Gladstone. Lord Stratford himself expressed sympathy with the movement, differing only in this from Mr. Gladstone, that England, in his view, should exert its influence not only for the Bulgarians, but for all the oppressed subject races in Turkey. Many of the most cultivated men in England joined in the movement quite irrespective of party politics.

Mr. Disraeli, who was created Earl of Beaconsfield in the course of these events, on his retirement from the House of Commons, showed great courage and persistence in resisting the movement. His sympathies lay wholly in the opposite direction. His Eastern policy was in accord with that of the previous generation of statesmen, such as Palmerston, and, indeed, Gladstone himself in his earlier stage of opinion, who believed that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire was essential to the integrity of the British Empire. He saw no reason for change. He dreaded the further advance of Russia. He did not believe in the honesty of the professions of its Emperor. He enforced his views at a public meeting at Aylesbury on September 20th, and endeavoured to stem the movement. He scoffed at the Bulgarian horrors. He declared the perpetrators of them were not so bad as those who made them the subject of agitation for their political purposes. He was evidently prepared to support the Turks against any invasion of their country by Russia, and to renew the policy of the Crimean War. But it was in vain.

Though the agitation promoted by Mr. Gladstone did not result in inducing the Government to join the other Powers in compelling the Turkish Government to concede autonomy to its Christian provinces, or to carry out reforms, it had two effects of great historical importance, which must be our justification for referring to the subject. It made impossible the renewal of the policy of the Crimean War—the armed support by Great Britain to the Turks against an invasion by Russia on behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans. It paralysed the hands of those, like Lord Beaconsfield, who desired to support the Turks and the _status quo_. On the other hand, it doubtless stimulated Russia to armed intervention, by making it clear that there would be no resistance on the part of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield’s Cabinet was divided on the subject. A majority of its members evidently concurred with Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, in opposition to war with Russia on behalf of Turkey.

On September 21st, the day after Lord Beaconsfield had delivered his fiery pro-Turkish speech at Aylesbury, Lord Derby, on behalf of the Government, in a despatch to the Ambassador at Constantinople, directed him to inform the Porte that the atrocious crimes of the Turkish authorities and troops in Bulgaria had aroused the righteous indignation of the British people, and that Great Britain, as signatory to the treaty of Paris, could not be indifferent to them. He demanded that examples should be made of the perpetrators of these crimes.

On October 30th Lord Derby further informed the Russian Government, through the ambassador at St. Petersburg, that, however strong the feeling in England against the Turkish cruelties, it would be superseded by a very different sentiment if it were believed that Constantinople was threatened, or that British interests in the Suez Canal were in any danger. This message to the Emperor could only be interpreted as meaning that the British Government would not interfere with any action that Russia might take against Turkey, provided it did not involve the conquest of Constantinople or endanger British interests in Egypt. It was evidently so understood by the Emperor, for immediately on receipt of the above despatch, on November 2nd, he gave his word of honour to the British Ambassador that he had no designs on Constantinople and no intentions whatever to annex Bulgaria.

In spite of this explicit announcement on the part of the Emperor, in response to the despatch from the British Foreign Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, a few days later, on November 9th, at the annual civic banquet at the Guildhall of London, delivered himself of a most bellicose speech on behalf of Turkey, practically threatening war with Russia, without any reference to the pacific assurance of the Czar, which, as we now know, was in his hands at the time when he made this speech. There could not well be a clearer intimation on the part of the British Premier that he had no belief in the good faith of the Emperor.

This menacing speech of the British Prime Minister was telegraphed to Russia, with the result that the Czar was greatly incensed, and on the next day, November 10th, he made a public pronouncement at Moscow to his people of the gravest importance, to the effect that, if he could not obtain adequate guarantees from the Porte for the protection of its Christian subjects, he would act independently of other Powers, relying on the loyalty of his people to support him.

In the meantime, through Lord Derby’s efforts, it had been arranged with Russia and the other Great Powers that a Conference should be held at Constantinople of representatives of all the Powers, for the purpose of deciding what administrative changes should be proposed to the Sultan, with a view to the common purpose—namely the better protection of his Christian subjects in Europe.

Lord Salisbury, as a member of the British Cabinet and Secretary of State for India, represented England at this Conference. It met at Constantinople on December 23, 1876. On the day before the meeting of the Conference at Constantinople a firman was published by the Sultan, at the instance of Midhat Pasha, promulgating a scheme of constitutional reform, which had been agreed to by the ministers of the Porte in the short reign of Murad, but which Abdul Hamid on his accession had refused to sanction. A National Assembly was convoked, to be elected by universal suffrage, without distinction of race or religion, throughout the Empire. It was hoped to anticipate the demands of the Conference by a scheme of reform wider than they were likely to advise. This was effected with perfect good faith by Midhat, who was earnestly in favour of reform. But subsequent events showed that the Sultan adopted this course for the purpose only of throwing dust in the eyes of the Conference, and with the full intention of setting aside the Constitution as soon as the Conference had broken up. The Conference might perhaps have acted more wisely in treating this act of the Sultan as an honest proposal, and in making it the basis of a wide reform of the Ottoman Empire. They held it to be a sham. They proceeded with their discussions as if it had not been issued. They preferred an alternative scheme of providing autonomous institutions for the Christian provinces of Turkey, and for the appointment of governors subject to the approval of the Great Powers. There was practically no difference of opinion at the Conference between the British and Russian delegates, Lord Salisbury and General Ignatief. The Conference, at their instance, reduced its demands on the Porte to the most moderate minimum.

The Sultan refused point-blank to entertain the proposals of the Conference, on the ground that they interfered with his sovereign powers. He pleaded the new Constitution which he had just accorded to the Empire. There never was any intention on his part to make any concessions. He was under the belief that if war resulted with Russia from his refusal to agree to reforms his country would not stand alone. He took the policy of England from the speech of Lord Beaconsfield at the Guildhall; and not from Lord Derby or Lord Salisbury. Lord Beaconsfield had, in fact, thrown over his colleague, Lord Salisbury, in that unfortunate utterance and had insured the failure of the Conference at Constantinople.

A few days after the break-up of the Conference, Midhat Pasha was ignominiously dismissed from office. The new Constitution did not long survive its author. In May, 1877, Abdul Hamid suspended it and dismissed the National Assembly which had been convoked. During the two months of its existence its members had shown a determination to expose the scandalous abuses of the Hamidian system. Later Abdul Hamid trumped up a charge against Midhat of having been responsible for the murder of Sultan Aziz. Two men employed by that Sultan, a wrestler and a gardener, were suborned to confess that they strangled Aziz at the instance of Midhat. Midhat was tried by corrupt judges and was not allowed to cross-examine these men. He was found guilty and condemned to death. At the instance mainly of the British Government the sentence was commuted to banishment to Arabia. Midhat was there strangled by order of Abdul Hamid in 1882, and his embalmed head was sent to Constantinople, in order that the Sultan might be assured of his death. The two men who had confessed to the murder of Aziz were released and were pensioned by the Sultan. Sir Henry Elliot, who was British Ambassador at Constantinople at the time of the death of Sultan Aziz, put on record his conviction that it was a case of suicide, that the charge against Midhat was trumped up, and that the whole proceedings are an indelible stain on Abdul Hamid.

Meanwhile, in 1877, another attempt was made by the Great Powers to effect a settlement of the Eastern question. Count Schouvaloff was sent to London by the Emperor of Russia on a special mission for the purpose. Agreement was arrived at between the Powers. It was embodied in a protocol, and was presented to the Porte. It was promptly rejected on April 10th by the Sultan as inconsistent with the treaty of Paris by interfering with the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Russia thereupon declared war against Turkey, justifying it in a dignified manifesto, on the ground that the Sultan, by rejecting the protocol, had defied Europe. Russia, therefore, held the strong position of

## acting on behalf of Europe. England was the only Power to take

exception to this. Lord Derby, in a despatch to the Russian Government, said that he and his colleagues regarded the action of Russia as an obstacle to reform in Turkey, and held that the plight of the Christian population could not be improved by war—a most unfortunate prediction, as the result proved. More fortunate was the prediction of Mr. Gladstone at the close of a speech which he made in the House of Commons, on April 24, 1877, immediately after the declaration of war by Russia, when moving a resolution intended to prevent the Government from taking up a hostile attitude to Russia in the coming war.

I believe, for one [he said], that the knell of Turkish tyranny in these provinces (the Balkan provinces) has sounded. So far as human eyes can judge, it is about to be destroyed. The destruction may not come in the way or by the means that we should choose; but come from what hands it may, I am persuaded that it will be accepted as a boon by Christendom and the world.[43]

The answer of the Government to Mr. Gladstone was given in the debate by the Home Secretary, Sir Richard Cross, later Lord Cross. It showed that the policy of Lord Derby, and not that of Lord Beaconsfield, had prevailed in the Cabinet. The Government, he said, regretted the war which had been declared by Russia, and did not believe that it would do any good, but it would not give support to either side, unless the Suez Canal or Egypt or Constantinople were threatened.

It followed from this decision of the British Cabinet that the hopes which the Sultan had formed from the speeches of Lord Beaconsfield were not realized. He was left alone to fight against Russia in another attack on his Empire. Immediately after the declaration of war, on April 24, 1877, two Russian armies invaded Turkey—the one in Europe, of two hundred and fifty thousand men, under the nominal command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the other in Asia, of a hundred and fifty thousand men from the Caucasus, under that of the Grand Duke Michael. The former crossed the Pruth into Roumania, which was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire. But on April 15th the Roumanian Chamber had given its assent to a convention with Russia providing for the passage of the Russian troops through the principality and otherwise giving promise of friendly support. The Porte, as was to be expected, treated this as a hostile act, and directed the bombardment of Calafat, a Roumanian fortress on the Danube. The Roumanians thereupon, on May 21st, declared war against Turkey. They gave most effective support to the Russians throughout the campaign. Indeed, it may be fairly said from the course of the campaign that the invasion of Bulgaria would not have been successful without the help of the Roumanians.

The Emperor of Russia had further prepared the way for the invasion of Turkey by securing the neutrality of Austria-Hungary. At a personal meeting in the previous year at Reichstadt, he had assured the Emperor of Austria that he had no intention of taking possession of Constantinople. He further promised that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be handed over for occupation by Austria-Hungary as a reward for neutrality in the event of success in his war against the Turks.

Owing to unprecedented inundations in the valley of the Danube, it was not till two months after the commencement of the campaign that the Russian army was able to cross that river. It did so at two points, the one in the Dobrudscha, the other at Hirsova. In neither case did it meet with serious opposition. The Turkish army of defence was little inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, but its general, Abdul Kerim, proved to be quite incompetent. He spread his forces in detachments over a front of five hundred miles, and was too late in concentrating them. The Russians, after capturing Nicopolis, the Turkish stronghold on the Danube, advanced into Bulgaria and captured Tirnovo, its ancient capital. Everywhere they were received by the Bulgarians with rapturous demonstrations of delight at the prospect of deliverance from Ottoman rule.

General Gourko, with a flying corps, then made a very hazardous but successful march across the Balkans by the Hainköi Pass, and advanced into Bulgaria along the Trudja Valley as far as Eski Zagra. Thence, turning back, he attacked the more important Shipka Pass from the south, and defeated a Turkish force in occupation of it. Meanwhile, early in July, the main Russian army from Tirnovo came in contact at Plevna, twenty miles south of the Danube, with a Turkish army of fifty thousand men under Osman Pasha, who had been sent in relief of Nicopolis, but was too late for the purpose.