II.
_The Fuehrer_
Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hindrance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of Prague. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of Bohemia will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of Verdun in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.
_v. Brauchitsch_
Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.
_The Fuehrer_:
The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations.
Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. _The Fuehrer_ gives orders for the development of the western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.
Certified. SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938
* * * * *
[In Schmundt's writing] [ITEM 19] [_In Schmundt's handwriting_]
S.O. Only MOST SECRET _DISCUSSION_
Nurnberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.
Present: Fuehrer Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch General Halder General Keitel Major Schmundt Hauptmann Engel Hauptmann v. Below [?]
_General Halder_ states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia-Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of Olmutz and Brunn to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz. forces. Several defensive lines favorable but terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz. retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz. line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.
_2nd Army._ Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olmutz will be reached on the second day. Oppa is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. Freudenthal only 35 men garrison. So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist partly of mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the Glaz mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.
On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.
_12th and 14th Armies_ will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.
_10th Army faces_ Pilsen Riegel which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridge-heads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.
_The Fuehrer_: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of
## action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two
factors are decisive: 1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between Trappau and Nikolsburg. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the Danube to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there--otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive; within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience it is difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks, and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid sets in (Verdun!!). Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large free space, the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward Brunn will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. _Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day._ The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.). Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the Reichenau Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward Prague may become necessary.
_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
_The Fuehrer_: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.
_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD [Labour Service] will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.
_Fuehrer_: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.
_Brauchitsch_: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.
_General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt (late brought into the conference)_: Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.
Certified /s/ SCHMUNDT Major on Gen. Staff
* * * * *
[ITEM 20] [_Typescript_] Schm [initialled by Schmundt] Nurnberg, 10 September 1938 [Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938 The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
TOP SECRET
1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.
3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
[signed] ADOLF HITLER
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces _No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc_ T 9.9
_Distribution_:
C-in-C of the Army Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force C-in-C of the Navy Reichsminister of the Interior for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danckwerts Head of Reich Labor Service through Admin Office (VOA)
_Distribution_:
Adjutant to the Fuehrer--1st Copy WZ, WH, WR--2nd to 4th Copies Armed Forces Ops. Dept.--5th Copy LIa, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA--6th to 10th Copies WNV--11th Copy Office for Ausl/Abwehr--12th to 14th Copies General Armed Forces Office--15th to 17th Copies Armed Forces Staff--18th to 20th Copies Spare--21st to 25th Copies
25 Copies 1st Copy A true copy: Hofmann Oberst (Reserve)
[ITEM 21] [_Typescript_]
Berlin, 14 September 1938 12 Copies
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc
[Stamp]
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938 Reg. No. 198/35 Despatched Schm Clerk [initialled by Schmundt]
_Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht._
I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army
1. The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.
2. Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.
3. _a._ The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).
_b._ Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the country's Kultur, etc., will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.
_c._ It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named in _a_ and _b_ above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.
4. The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.
II. 5. Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.
6. The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.
But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.
The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.
7. In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.
III. 8. Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By Order
Signed Keitel
_Distribution_:
C-in-C of the Army--1st to 3rd Copy Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces--4th to 6th Copy Head of Reich Labor Service--7th to 8th Copy L Ia, II, IV--9th to 11th Copy Draft (VOA)--12th Copy
_Distribution 2: 25 Copies_
Adjutant to the Fuehrer--1st Copy WZ, WH, WR--2nd to 4th Copy Armed Forces Ops Dept--5th Copy Armed Forces Ops Dept/L Ib, Ic--6th Copy Armed Forces Communications (WNV)--7th Copy Office of Ausl/Abwehr--8th to 10th Copy General Armed Forces Office--11th to 13th Copy Armed Forces Staff--14th to 16th Copy Draft--17th Copy Spare--18th to 25th Copy
A true Copy: HOFMANN Oberst (Reserve)
* * * * *
[ITEM 22] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 16 September 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia
S.O. Only Access only through Officer
7 Copies 5th Copy 19.9.38 Schm
_Subject_: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.
The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.
Therefore the train-loads for the Limes-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.
The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.
However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.
Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Signed Keitel
Distribution:
Supreme Command of the Army--1 (Copy 1) C-in-C of the Air Force (Ketzinger's staff)--1 (Copy 2) General Inspector for Roads--1 (Copy 3)
Certified Zeitzler Oberst on the General Staff
Major Schmundt [There is no ITEM 23 in the file]
* * * * *
[ITEM 24] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Berlin, September 16, 1939 30 Copies 4th Copy T 9.9
[Stamp]
Schm [initialled by Schmundt]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938, Enclosures Reg. No. 199138 Despatched Clerk
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc
_Subject_: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)
1. The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:
From the area of the--
IInd Army Korps (AKs) 7 Battalions IIIrd 2 Battalions IVth 31 Battalions Vth 1 Battalion VIth 78 Battalions VIIth 1 Battalion IXth 65 Battalions Xth 84 Battalions XIth 33 Battalions
For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.
2. The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.
For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
_Distribution_:
Supreme Command of the Army--1st Copy Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces--2nd Copy Head of Reich Labor Service--3rd Copy WZ, WH, WR--5th-7th Copies Armed Forces Ops Division--8th Copy L Ia, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA--9th-13th Copies Armed Forces Communications Dept.--14th Copy Office of Ausl/Abwehr--15th-17th Copies General Armed Force Office--18th-20th Copies Armed Forces Staff--21st-23rd Copies Spare--24th-30th Copies
* * * * *
[ITEM 25] [_Telegram_] [Handwritten note]
MOST SECRET
S.O. ONLY
LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUEHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL. KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUEHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
[Pencil Note] 1045, 18 Sept 38 RADIOED to Capt. Engel, Berlin.
* * * * *
[ITEM 26] [_Telegram_] [Handwritten note]
MOST SECRET S.O. ONLY
[In Ink] 18.9 38 1030 vb
GERMAN 2nd ARMY--COSEL--7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.
On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.
8th Army:--FREIBURG--4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps--Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.
10th Army:--SCHWANDORF--3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
12th Army:--PASSAU--7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
14th Army:--VIENNA--1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot [?] They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.
END
Reich War Ministry/Naval Communication Service
MOST SECRET 18.9
Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins--
[There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.]
Any questions?
* * * * *
[ITEM 27] [_Typescript_]
_Army Appointments Held_
Army Group Command: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. Adam CofS : Gen. of Inf. Wietersheim G-3 : Lt. Col. Muller
1st Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty Beck CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg
2nd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt CofS : Brig Gen v. Salmuth G-3 : Lt. Col. Hasse
3rd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Kuechler CofS : Brig. Gen. Hollidt G-3 : Lt. Col. Wagner
4th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) v. Hamerstein CofS : Maj. Gen. Viebahn G-3 : Lieut. Col. Metz
5th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern G-3 : Col. Duvert
7th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. (for special duties) Baron Zeutter v. Lotzen CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben
8th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber G-3 : Col. Hauffe
10th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard G-3 : Col. Dostler
12th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special duties) v. Leeb CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Lewinsky, known as v. Manstein G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt
14th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List CofS : Maj. Gen. Ruoff G-3 : Col. Wohler
* * * * *
[ITEM 28: _One Page Mobilization Schedule, not translated_]
* * * * *
Berlin, 21 Sept 1938
[ITEM 29] [_Typescript_]
Chief, OKW
If the Czech Government accepts terms:
_a._ Cession of Sudeten German territory
_b._ Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,
The following military measures are to be considered:
1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
a. German Police (originally)
b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.
13. _a._ Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.
_b._ Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.
14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.
15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5.)
16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.
17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.
18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.
19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.
20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.
21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock, undamaged.
22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.
23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.).
24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.
25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.
* * * * *
[ITEM 30] [_Typescript_]
Bayreuth 134 [Pencil note written by Schmundt:] Not sent off. Schm
26 September 1938
HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS
Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal (probably the first instance in the history of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.
Since 19 Sept.--in more than 300 missions--the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ (defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the _enemy_ (The Czech Terrorists).*
Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.
For Konrad Henlein The Chief of Staff
[*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 31] [_Typescript_]
Adj to the Fuehrer [Note in pencil] 28/7 Schm. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin 27.9.1938
MOST SECRET 1920 hours. WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II 45 copies, 16th copy
The Fuehrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the Todt organization.
It is left to the OHK--to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.
CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES. Signed: Keitel
Distribution: II.
* * * * *
[ITEM 32] [_Typescript_] [Stamp] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Recd. 3 Oct 1938 Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret
[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 27 Sept. 1938
Subject: Mobilization Measures
To: The Deputy Fuehrer, via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reischsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police attn: S.S. Oberfuehrer Petri.
Express 47 copies, 18th copy
As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.
Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.
The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.
OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.
Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:
1. The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.
2. Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School Kreischwitzsilesia).
3. Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organizations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported _in every case_ and _in plenty of time_ to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. KEITEL
Further: Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 33] [_Typescript_]
28.9.38
MOST SECRET MEMORANDUM
At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.
The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Gruen" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.
This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt.
[pencil note by Schmundt]
* * * * *
[ITEM 34] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
[initialled] Schm.
Recd: 3 October 1938 Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer Berlin, 28 Sept 38
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a 45 copies, 16th copy
MOST SECRET
To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:
Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely on to the army, that is on to the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.
No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.
For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.
Those units remaining forward of the frontier should--in their own interests--get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.
As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.
The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Keitel
Distribution II plus: Reich Minister of the Interior. Reich Finance Minister Deputy of the Fuehrer S.A. Hqs. Reichsfuehrer SS Reich Labour Service Free Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Koechling)
[The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33]
* * * * *
[ITEM 35] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor (pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)
Recd: 3 October 1938 Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret
Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET.
Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5
Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)
1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148--preparation of organization for the reception of refugees.
2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145--Preparation of employment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of reservists.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
(Signed) Keitel
Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 36] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
[pencil note:] Adjutant to the Fuehrer Schm.
Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 Req. No: 260/38 SECRET
Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET
45 copies, 16th copy
Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Battalions subordinate to the C in C Army.
To: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. (SS Central Office) (36 copies)
By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following battalions of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.
II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg, at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)
I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia, at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.
C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West (Upper Rhine), according to the Fuehrer's instructions.
These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.
It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuehrer-SS. (SS Central Office)
For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Jodl
Further: Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 37] [_Typescript_] L II b
28.9.38
MEMORANDUM
SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:
Reichsfuehrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps, Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret, according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuehrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.
The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.
J. [initialled by Jodl]
* * * * *
[ITEM 38] [_Typescript_] [Stamp--as usual] Recd 3 Oct 1938 Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a
Adjutant to the Fuehrer Berlin 30.9.38 1600 hrs 120 Copies, 16th copy
MOST SECRET
Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.
1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_:
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.
It is, therefore, not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.
2. _Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Krone_:
The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions and payments: 100 Cz. Kronen--10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone--10 Rpfg)
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution III
and Special Distribution (including Henlein Free Corps and Reichsfuehrer SS through OKW/L II)
* * * * *
[ITEM 39] [_Typescript_] [Stamp:] Recd 3 Oct 1938 Req No 265/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer Berlin, 30 Sept 1938
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret WFA/L I A
MOST SECRET
60 copies, 16th copy
DIRECTIVE #1
Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.
1. The sectors separated from Czechoslovakia will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:
The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.
The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.
2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:
The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.
The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Gruen".
The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.
_a. Army_: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bns. Motorized and Armoured Units Adolf Hitler SS Bodyguard Regiment I and II Bns of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayern) Henlein Free Corps All combat action on the part of the Free Corps must cease as from 1st October.
_b. Air Force_: Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the _air_ defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Gruen" in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.
3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.
4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.
5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.
6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.
7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.
For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
Distribution: III
[Attached map is not reproduced].
* * * * *
[ITEM 40] [_Typescript_] [Stamp:] Recd 3 Oct 1938 Req No. 264/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer Berlin, 30 Sept 1938
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces _OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a_
MOST SECRET Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1
Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.
1. _Operational Area of the Army_:
The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of the armies.
The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.
2. _Units under Command of Army_:
_a._ The units of the military SS (V.T.) and SS Totenkopf Regiments intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.
_b._ The Sudeten German Free Corps comes under the control of OKH. The Bn's of the Free Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps, after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.
_c._ The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Reichsfuehrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.
3. _Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations_:
_a._ All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories _by OKH_ in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. _By OKL_ if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)
_b._ The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.
4. _Signal Communications_:
_a._ The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.
Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.
5. _Customs Frontier Guard_
After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.
The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.
6. _Application of Laws_:
_a._ Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency).
_b._ Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.
7. _Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population_:
Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities.
The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.
_a._ Reichs Postal Ministry
Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Munchen, Vienna, Berlin. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.
_b._ Ministry of Propaganda:
Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 and 1600).
8. _Organizations of the Party_:
The Fuehrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organizations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.
9. _Economic Directives_:
Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplying of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: _100 Cz. kronen = 9.00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg)_ [the underlined crossed out.]
[pencil note: will be published this afternoon]
10. _Payment of the armed forces_
For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under
## chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury).
11. _Administrative Directives_:
The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)
12. _Supply Installations_:
For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin. Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s
------------+---------+---------------+------------ | | | App Time of Army H.Q. | Tech Hq | To | Arrival ------------+---------+---------------+------------ 12 | 13 | LANDAU/ISAR | 10.1 2000 10 | 4 | PLAUEN | 10.2 2000 8 | 3 | GORLITZ | 10.1 2000 2 | 8 | LAMSDORF | 10.5 2000 | | (SW/OPPELN) | ------------+---------+---------------+------------
13. _Propaganda Companies_:
Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
DISTRIBUTION: III and Special Distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 41] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 Req. No: 266/38 Most Secret
Berlin 30.9.38 200 copies, 153rd copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.
MOST SECRET
Subject: _OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY_
1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (or case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the time being, remain at their present posts.
2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied, together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.
The Commander in Chief can exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.
3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:
_a. Reich Postal Ministry_:
Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.
Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).
Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.
_b. Propaganda Ministry_:
Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)
_c. Reichsbank_:
Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) Part XVIII, Nr 8031)
4. _Application of Laws_:
_a._ There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the _German Criminal Code_ into the occupied territory.
_b. The Army Compensation Law_ [Wehrleistungsgesetz] will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency).
5. _Economic Directives_:
Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions [Kredit Instituten] is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:
100 Czech kronen--10.00 RM (1 Czech krone--10 Pfg)
6. _Payment of the Armed Forces_:
For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.
7. _Customs Frontier Guard_:
After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.
The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.
Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.
8. _Administrative Directives_:
The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc.). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
(signed) Keitel
Distribution: Overleaf
DISTRIBUTION
The Fuehrer's deputy for the attention of SS-Oberfuehrer Knoblauch--1st copy
Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the attention of Reichminister Dr. Lammers--2nd copy
Foreign Office for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch--3rd copy
Reichminister of the Interior for the attention of Min. Div. Dr. Danckwerts--4th copy
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police--Reich Defence (RV) Section--for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri--5th copy
Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda for the attention of Major (Reserve) Wentscher--6th copy
Reich Minister of Justice for the attention of Min. Rat. Haastert--7th copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Geh. Rat. Dr. Bender--8th copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Mitze--9th copy
Reich Minister of Communications--Motor Transport Service, Shipping Hydraulic Structures--for the attention of Min. Rat. Pigge--10th copy
Reich Minister of Transport--Railroad Dept.--for the attention of Div. Dr. Ebeling--11th copy
Reich Minister for Science, Education--National Culture for the attention of Min. Div. Prof. Dr. Krummel--12th copy
Reich Postal Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Honold--13th copy
General Inspector for German Roadways for the attention of Reg. Baurat Schaeffler--14th copy
Minister President General Fieldmarshall Goering, Director of the Four Year Plan and the Prussian State Ministry for the attention of Min. Rat. Bergbohm--15th & 16th copy
Operational Staff G B for the attention of Ministerial Director Sarnow--17th & 18th copies
Reich Minister of Economies for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. Dr. Burandt--19th copy
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Dietrich--20th copy
Reich Labour Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder--21st copy
Directorate of the Reichsbank for the attention of the Reichsbank dir. Dr. Mueller--22nd copy
Reich Conservator of Forests for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister Hausmann--23rd copy
Reich Office for long range regional planning (Raunoreburg) for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Schepers--24th copy
President of the Secret Cabinet Council Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath--25th copy
Reich Minister Frank for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Buhler--26th copy
Head of Reich Labour Service for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuehrer Richter--27th copy
_OKH_ (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X)--28th-107th copy
_Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force_ (2nd Div. Air Force General Staff) (30X)--108th-137th copy
_OKM_ (A II) (15 x)--138th-152nd copy
_Adjutant to the Fuehrer_--153rd copy
OKW: Chief of OKW--154th copy
WZ--155th copy
Ausl/Abwehr (with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (5 X)--156th-160th copy
General Armed Forces Office (with NA for J. Pressegr. Vers.) (4X)--161st-164th copy
Armed Forces Staff (with NA for WWi, WRo, WRue) (4X)--165th-168th copy
Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X)--169th-170th copy
L (Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K)--171st-180th copy
WH--181st copy
WR--182nd copy
Special Staff W--183rd copy
Stock kept at L IV--184th-200th copy
* * * * *
[ITEM 42] [_Typescript_] 200 copies, 153rd copy Supreme Command of the Armed Forces L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IV A
_Subject_: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area.
Berlin, 30.9.38 [STAMP] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor Rec. 3 Oct 1938 Enclosures: Reg. No. 267138 Dispatched-- Clerk
1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.
For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.
2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 Reichmarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. _Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense._
3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
[Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41]
* * * * *
[ITEM 43 is seven pages of handwritten notes too illegible to translate.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 44] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa Top Secret
Berlin, 1st October 1938 150 copies, 18th copy [Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct. 3rd 1938, Encl. 2-30 Reg. No. 268338 Secret Dispatched-- Check--
SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3 to DIRECTIVE No. 1
_Parts of the Army Employed._
In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:
Command (Generalkommando) III 10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf. Div)
The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army By direction
Jodl
_Distribution_: III and special distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 45] [_Telegram_]
Army Teleprint Network Teleprint Office Notes Received from
HDZG Pass to Date Time Re. No. by 9.10 Dept 9.10 Schm. [?] Klimnisch [?]
Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304
TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT FUEHRER'S TRAIN (FUHRERZUG)
1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS * * *
2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA, FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS. FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 * * *
signed KEITEL
[Ink Notes:--] Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuehrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 46] [_Typewritten letter_] The C-in-C of the Army
Berlin, W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 10 October 1938 [Pencil notes] 11.10.38 1800 hours Schm.
My Fuehrer!
I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service [Grenzaufsichtsdienst] in the next few days.
It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me--that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.
Heil my Fuehrer,
VON BRAUCHITSCH
[Handwritten Note:] Submitted to Fuehrer 11 October. Agreed. Schm.
[ITEM 47] [_Telegram_]
Remarks of teleprint office Army Telegraph Network
Pass to Date Time R. No. by Schmundt's 10.10 1940 Schm. Dept.
Received from HOZ6, 10.10, 1930
* * * * *
Telegram SECRET HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.
TELEGRAM TO FUEHRER'S TRAIN, LT. COL. SCHMUNDT IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION
PRINCIPLE: 1 TO SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUEN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.
2 ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.
3 TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.
4 IN THE WEST--GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LIMES.
5 INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15
FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED OKW
[_Handwritten notes_] Fuehrer's decision:
1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen. Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed
NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
[in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[Next page contains illegible notes] [_Handwritten notes_]
10.10.38 _What is in the Zone?_
_5_ 1 (motorized) For special duties 1 mountain 1 (light) 3 div 1 armoured 1 truck transport regt. 1 mountain 1 div.
_4_ 3 motorized div _3_ 4 div 1 light Germania 1 armoured 2 div Liebstandarte
_1_ 1 armoured 13 div 3 div 4 div (motorized) 3 armoured 2 mountain 2 light ------------- 24 divisions
[notes in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of Telegraph Office Received from HOZG 11.10.10.45
Pass to Date Time R. No. by Lt. Col. 11.10 Schm. Schmundt
HBZG 008 1040
TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUEHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15 AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUEHRER HAS BEEN DISPATCHED.
OKH 6th Div. (Five) General Staff of the German Army 11.37/38
* * * * *
[ITEM 48] [_Ink note_]
1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.
2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.
[Rest of note impossible to decipher completely]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of the telegraph office Received from HBZC 11.10.1955.
Pass to Date Time R. No. by 1)4 Mot. Lt. Col. 11.10 2030 Joe Div. Schmundt 1 B'n ready to March [?] 1 Arm'd Brig. 24 +5 -- 29 [Undecipherable note]
TOP SECRET
HBZG 13 1930.11.10 Lt. Col. Schmundt
Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?
Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS:
ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing
ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.
ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division
B LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.
Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?
Answer: A Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)
B Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME
Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?
Answer: A Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.
B Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION--THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE--LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.
Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?
Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.
Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 HOURS.
(signed) KEITEL
* * * * *
[ITEM 49] [_Typewritten table_] LI a
Berlin, 12 October 1938 3 copies, 1st copy
REFLECTIONS Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area
---------------+-------------------------------------+ | Present Strength | |-------------------------------------| | | Div. Nos. Earmarked | Army Group | No. of Divs. | for | | | Withdrawal | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+ Army Group | 5 1/3 | 1/3 44, _2 Mtn_, | Command 5 | | _3 Mtn_, _29th_ | | | _Mot_, 4 light, _2nd| | | _Armoured_ | | | | Army Group | 4 1/3 plus | _1/3 5th_, _7th_, | Command for | 1 SS Regt | _9th_, _45th_, _1st_| Special Duties | | _Mtn._ | | | | Army Group | 7 (plus 1 | 10th, 24th, _2nd_ | Command | SS Regt) | _(Mot)_, _13th_ | 4 | | _(Mot)_, _20th_ | | | _(Mot)_, 1st | | | Light, 1st Armd. | | | | Army Group | 3 (plus 1 | 4th, _3rd_, _18th_ | Command | SS Regt) | | 3 | | | | | | Army Group | 4 | 8th, 28th, 30th, | Command | | _3rd_ Arm'd. | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+ TOTAL | 22 2/3 (Plus | | | 3 SS Regts) | | | | | | _Namely_: | | | 11 2/3 Inf. | | | Div | | | 3 Mtn Divs | | | 3 Mot Divs | | | 3 Light Divs | | | 3 Armd Divs | | | | | ---------------+---------------+---------------------+
---------------+-----------------+----------------- | | | No. of Div. | Strength | To be Withdrawn | After Withdrawal Army Group | | | | ---------------+-----------------+----------------- Army Group | 3 | 2 1/3 1 1/3 Command 5 | | | | | | | | Army Group | 1 1/3 | 3 1 Command for | | Special Duties | | | | Army Group | 2 | 4 2 Command | | 4 | | | | | | | | Army Group | 2 | 2 1 Command | | 3 | | | | Army Group | 1 | 3 2 Command | | ---------------+-----------------+----------------- TOTAL | 8 1/3 | 14 2/3 (Plus | | 3 SS Regts) | | | _Namely_: | _Namely_: | 3 1/3 Inf Divs | 8 2/3 Inf Div | 2 Mtn Divs | 1 Mtn Div | 1 Mot Div | 2 Mot Divs | 1 Light Div | 1 Light Div. | 1 Arm'd Div | 2 Arm'd Divs | | | | 7 1/3 ---------------+-----------------+----------------
[ITEM 50] [_Telegram_] REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET Received on 17.10 from kg at 1535 by [Indecipherable] MBZ O 61 Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525 Lt. Colonel Schmundt
OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14-1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October--this is necessary for the building up of the Army--and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div, 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div). Fuehrer's decision requested today.
Signed Keitel
[Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:] The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct. By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel, Section L, OKW.
Schmundt, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 51] [_Typescript_]
The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938 Despatched 19 X 39 M
TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.
Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3-1/2 millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.
The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.
Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.
(signed) Adolf Hitler Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938 (signed) Schmundt, Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.
The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
After Delivery:
To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces I request that publication in the press be initiated from there.
1st Draft.
To The C-in-C of the Army
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3-1/2 million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.
You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.
My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.
J.
[Handwritten note] The military SS (SS Verfuegungstruppe), the SS and SA
* * * * *
[ITEM 52] [_Typescript_]
Berlin, 18 October 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces _No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a_ 1300 hours [Stamp] 60 copies Copy
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938 Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret Despatch Clerk W
MOST SECRET Directive No. 4
The Fuehrer has ordered:
1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.
2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution: III
* * * * *
[ITEM 53] [_Telegram_]
REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET
Received at 1040 by [Indecipherable] Initials MBZ 066 Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030 LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:
(SECRET)--OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38
Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL [Handwritten:] Consent given, 21 Oct 38. Passed to Colonel Jodl's Ante-Room at 1400 Sch 22/10
* * * * *
[ITEM 54] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET TOP SECRET Only through officer _Conference Notes_
L I a Berlin, 27.9.38 4 copies, 1st copy
[Pencil note] Time of Attack "Gruen". (Z. v. A. Gruen)
COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY
As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.
The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615; it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.
If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.
If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force,--desirable as it may be,--may possibly have to be dispensed with.
_Thus it is Proposed_:
Attack by the Army--independent of the attack by the air force--at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before them, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
J. [Initialled by Jodl.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS
The Social Life of New Germany with Special Consideration of the German Labor Front [Das Sociale Leben in neuen Deutschland unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront] (Berlin, 1938) by Prof. Willy Mueller. Pages 51-54. [Prof. Mueller was Reich Indoctrination Administrator in the German Labor Front].
"The Supreme Directorate of the Political Organization--The Staff Director"
Munich, 21 April 1933
Circular Letter Nr. 6/33
On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action [Gleichschaltungsaktion] of the free trade unions begins.
The direction of the entire action lies in the hands of the Action Committee.
The Action Committee is composed as follows:
Dr. Robert Ley, Chairman.
Rudolf Schmeer, Deputy.
Schuhmann, Commissar of the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB].
Peppler, Commissar for the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA].
Muchow Organization.
Bank Director Muller, Commissar, Director of the Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials.
Brinckmann, Commissar Chief Cashier.
Biallas, Propaganda and Press.
All the commissar directors of the unions belong to the broader Action Committee.
The essential part of the action is to be directed against the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB] and the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA]. Anything beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade unions is left to the discretion of the Gauleiter's judgment.
The Gauleiters are responsible for the execution of the coordination
## action in the individual areas. Supporters of the action should be
members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations [NSBO or National-Sozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation].
SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade union properties and for taking into protective custody personalities concerned.
The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of the closest understanding with competent regional factory cells directors [Gaubetriebszellenleiter].
The action in Berlin will be conducted by the Action Committee itself.
In the Reich the following will be occupied:
The directing offices of the unions;
The trade union houses and offices of the free trade unions, The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany insofar as trade unions are involved there;
The branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and officials, Inc.
The district committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The local committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The following are to be taken into protective custody:
All trade union chairmen [Verbandsvorsitzende];
The district Secretaries and the branch directors of the "Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc."
The Chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of unions are not to be taken into protective custody but are to be urged to continue their work.
Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gauleiter.
The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed in such a fashion that the workers and employees will not be given the feeling that this action is against them, but on the contrary, an action against a superannuated system which is not directed in conformity with the interests of the German nation.
The Provisional local direction of the General German Trade Union and of the General Independent Employees' Federations is to be taken over by a commissar of the National Socialist Factory Cells Organization [NSBO].
The dealings with the authorities and other organizations are to be handed over immediately to the newly installed commissars.
All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to be blocked immediately and remain thus until Thursday afternoon 1800 hours. Insofar as incumbent cashiers are permitted to remain in office they will be subject to the authority of the commissar. All payment receipts must be countersigned by a commissar.
After raising the blocking of funds the usual payments for the support of persons, etc. must be unconditionally assured in order not to create a feeling of uneasiness among the members of the trade unions.
As soon as possible mass assemblies are to be arranged for the free attendance by all trade union members. In these meetings the meaning of the action is to be set forth and it is to be explained that the rights of the workers and employees are being unequivocally guaranteed.
The following unions belong to the General German Trade Union Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 28 unions].
The following unions belong to the General Independent Employees Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 13 unions].
Up to the present time the following have been proposed for commissars: [Here follows an enumeration of 17 names as commissars for the most important arrangements of the General German Trade Union Federation].
For the rest, the newly installed commissars will be nominated by the Gauleiters in close cooperation with the Regional Factory Cells Office. [Gaubetriebszellenamt].
It is to be understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are responsible in this respect; they are to hold the direction of the action firmly in hand.
Heil Hitler! /s/ Dr. Robert Ley
* * * * *
The NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cells Organization) took over not only the administrative apparatus but the entire press of the "Free Trade Unions." The papers and magazines which had a pronounced party political [parteipolitisch] tendency had to stop their publication, while the other special publications continued. By all these measures Marxism was to be hit exclusively, but not the idea of trade unions as such, in which the right and defense of the German workers were embodied.
On 5 May 1933, the leader of the action committee reported to Hitler the success of the ordered action. Then, in a public mass demonstration, he reported about the events of 2 May to the workers of Berlin; at the same time, he unfolded before them his future plans which were to secure the maintenance of the financial efficiency of the trade unions in the interest of the worker.
Following the crushing of the free trade unions, the danger came, of course, that former functionaries would try to acquire money and other property items for themselves in an illegal manner. This, however, would have entailed damage to the members. To avoid these dangers on 12 May 1933, the Attorney General of the State confiscated the property of the free trade unions and of all of their affiliated unions and administrative agencies in order to secure an orderly disposition of the property of the German workers. Dr. Robert Ley was assigned as the attorney with the right to dispose of the confiscated property [vefuegungsberechtigter Pfleger der beschlagnahmten Vermoegen].
While the free trade unions were smashed [zertruemmert] in the action of 2 May, Dr. Ley granted the entire Union of the Christian Trade Unions with further full liberty of movement. For this purpose, he told it on the 6th of May 1933 that "nothing will be changed in the present situation until the return of the Saar to the Reich and that they (the Christian Trade Unions) should continue as before to represent and carry on the idea of the Christian Trade Unions and of Germandom as they see it". Therefore the Christian Trade Unions put on temporary constraint in their attitude toward the social political events of 2 May and participated in the Saar in forming the "German Trade Union Front" in order to help to secure the result of the Saar voting by achieving a unity of the people.
The former free trade union leaders behaved differently. These, with the assistance of their colleagues abroad and of the international union of the trade unions, tried to oppose the measures of the German government; this induced Dr. Ley to introduce the defense against sabotage by the legal authorities.
The hostile activities reached their peak at the International Workers Conference of Geneva which began on 8 June 1933. From the German side, Dr. Ley also took part in it; representatives of the Reich Cabinet and of the Christian Trade Unions were with him. The subjects for the meeting were labor mediation, work conditions in certain branches of industry, social insurance, provision for unemployed, and shortening of the working time. The participating states were to enter the basic rules, which were to be set up in an international agreement, into their social legislations. The Germans represented voiced the opinion that the situation of the working people could not be improved by international agreement but by providing work and bread for the workers. In spite of this opposite opinion, Germany took part at the conference; in this way the German government wanted to prove that it had no purpose whatever to smash the social achievements of the German labor but that, on the contrary, she endeavored to retain them and lead them further. However, she was not willing to approve of an international agreement by which the further development of the German social legislation could be hampered.
During the conference, a few foreign personalities opposed the German representatives in such a way that Dr. Ley was induced to reject the further participation of the German Delegation in the discussions.
The atmosphere of Geneva did not remain without influence upon the representatives of the Christian Trade Unions. As already mentioned, the Christian Trade Unions were first given opportunity to continue their social work without interference. They began to exploit this favor. Also formally they have asserted that they were subject to all governmental measures which have been already taken or were to be taken; but that they could not refrain in the course of time from striving for a special position, which was to protect them from being ideologically converted to the world of national socialistic ideas. This attitude, which was contrary to the general interests and was prone to bring again dissension in the ranks of labor, induced Dr. Ley on 24 June 1933 to order the complete incorporation of the Christian Trade Unions into the German Labor Front which had been founded in the meantime. It was again the NSBO to which this task was assigned. At the same time the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions lost their honorary positions which were granted to them by Dr. Ley in the new social order. Concerning this, Dr. Ley submitted the following statement:
I. With the formation of the German Labor Front the majority of workers' and capitalists' organizations should have an opposite orientation. Not only should the last refuge of Marxism be liquidated by this means, but also it should be possible to remove the unfortunate schism of the German laboring men. Petty and selfish persons do not wish to recognize this great and revolutionary fact and seek to weaken this work by imitations and self-help organizations. It is the will of the Fuehrer that outside of the German Labor Front no other organization (whether of worker or of employers) is to exist * * *
II. National Socialism is exercising the power in its strength most generously, however this proceeding is being interpreted here and there by its small opponents as weakness. This National Socialism believed that it could be generous in dealing with the Christian Trade Unions and other middle-class groups. This fact was answered by ingratitude and disloyalty. It turns out that the afore-mentioned unions have shown the greatest corruption in treasury matters and in economic affairs. Because of this knowledge I offer the following: All offices of the Christian Trade Unions and of employee unions are to be occupied by National Socialists * * *
(Signed) Dr. Robert LEY
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 404-PS
MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler German Edition, 1935
[Pages 456 to 457]
It is precisely our German people, that today, broken down, lies defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this _self-confidence has to be instilled_ into the young fellow-citizen from childhood on. His entire education and development has to be directed at giving him _the conviction of being absolutely superior to others_. With this physical force and skill he has again to win the belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once led the German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the individual and all in common had in their leaders. The confidence in _the possibility of regaining its freedom_ is what will restore the German people. But this conviction must be the final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals.
* * * * *
[Page 475]
The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a generation which, by a suitable education, will be ready for the final and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which enters first on this course will be the victorious one.
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler 41st Edition, 1933 Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, GMm. b.H. Muenchen.
[Page 607, line 37 to page 608, complete]
For this reason alone, The SA of the NSDAP could have nothing in common with a military organization. It was an instrument for defense and education of the National Socialist movement and its tasks lay in an entirely different province from that of the so-called combat leagues [Wehrverbaende]. But it could also constitute no secret organization. The aim of secret organizations can only be illegal. In this way, the scope of such an organization is automatically limited. It is not possible, especially in view of the talkativeness of the German people, to build up an organization of any size and at the same time to keep it outwardly secret or even to veil its aims. Any such intention would be thwarted a thousand times. Not only that our police authorities today have a staff of pimps and similar rabble at their disposal, who will betray anything they can find for the Juda's payment of thirty pieces of silver, and even invent things to betray, but the supporters themselves can never be brought to the silence, that is necessary in such a case. Only very small groups, by years of sifting, can assume the character of real secret organizations. But the very smallness of such organizations would remove their value for the National Socialist movement. _What we needed and still need were and are not a hundred or two hundred reckless conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of fanatical fighters for our philosophy of life [Weltanschauung]. We should not work in secret conventicles, but in mighty mass demonstrations, and it is not by dagger and poison or by pistol that the road can be cleared for the movement, but by the conquest of the streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future master of the streets is National Socialism, just as it will some day be the master of the state._
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF
Adolf Hitler
Munich, 1933, 39th Edition.
[Page 675]
The trade union in national-socialist interpretation, has not the mission to gradually transform into one class, through condensation, all the various individuals among the people, thereby to take up the fight against other similarly organized structures within the nation. On the whole we cannot assign this mission to the trade union, rather it was first conferred on it at the moment in which it became the weapon of Marxism. It is not that the trade union is imbued with the spirit of the class struggle, directly, on the contrary, Marxism has made of it an instrument for its class war. It created the economic weapon which the international world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic basis of free, independent national states, for the annihilation of their national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby for the enslavement of free peoples in the service of international world finance Jewry.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 405-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 285
Law concerning Trustees of Labor of 19 May 1933
The Reich Government has decided on the following law, which is hereby promulgated.
Section 1
1. The Reich Chancellor appoints trustees of labor for the larger economic areas upon the proposal of the competent provincial governments and in agreement with them.
2. The Reich Labor Minister will assign the trustees either to the
## participating provincial governments, if they agree, or to the
provincial authorities.
Section 2
1. Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all persons and replaces the system founded on combinations of workers, of individual employers or of combinations of employers. The regulations concerning the general application (par 2 ff of the tariff accord decree in the publication of 1 March 1928, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p 47) remain unaffected.
2. Moreover, the trustees are also to look after the maintenance of the labor peace.
3. Furthermore, they are to be convoked for their cooperation in the preparation of a new social constitution.
Section 3
The trustees are empowered to request aid of the competent Reich and provincial authorities for the execution of their regulations. They should contact the provincial government or one of their designated authorities before executing their measures, even though the danger of delay exists.
Section 4
The trustees of labor are bound by the directives and decrees of the Reich Government.
Section 5
The Reich Minister of Labor in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics issues the necessary regulations for the implementation.
Berlin 19 May 1933.
The Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
The Reich Labor Minister Franz Seldte
The Reich Economics Minister and Agriculture Hugenberg
The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance Count Schwerin von Krosigk
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 406-PS
Contents Memorandum by Gauleiter
Party Member Julius Streicher
_Enclosure 1_: First memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.
_Enclosure 2_: Second memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.
_Appendix 1_: Case Sandreuter
_Appendix 2_: Case Ritter
_Appendix 3_: Case J.M. Lang
MEMORANDUM BY GAULEITER PARTY MEMBER JULIUS STREICHER
## Action against the Jews on 9/10 November 1938.
I was no longer present at the traditional fellowship congregation in the old town-hall in Munich on the evening of 9 November 1938 when a speaker, who claimed to have higher authority, made it known that the party was launching an action against the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938. I was informed of this fact by the party members Obergruppenfuehrer von Obernitz and Obergruppenfuehrer Litzmann around midnight of 9 November 1938. I declared to both these party members that I myself did not approve of an action involving arson of synagogues and destruction of goods but that I would raise no objections, of course, if this action had been sanctioned by the party. _Therefore, what was done to the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938 happened without my direct or indirect assistance._
The consequences arising from the action against the Jews.
The action against the Jews of November 1938 was _not a spontaneous one_ emanating from the population, and therefore was incomprehensible to many party members also as to its effects. Units of the components of the Party had been ordered to carry out the action against the Jews. If there is evidence now that in isolated cases party members with immaculate police records have appropriated goods during this
## action it should not be over-looked in judging such incidents that _the
appropriation was committed in an instant, where all goods were being destroyed in accordance with the orders given_.
April 14, 1939
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS
Telegram GBA 760/43 [in ink crossed out in red]
10 March 3.
To the Fuehrer Fuehrer headquarters
_With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the Fuehrer in person and decision._
_Subject_: Difficulties in recruiting of workers [Arbeitsdienstverpflichtung] in the former Soviet territories.
My Fuehrer:
You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out by me with fanatical determination, but also with care and consideration for the economical and technical, as well as human, necessities and occurrences.
The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the reinforcement of the armament program with newly needed workers can and will be supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had to be overcome in the last two winter months. 258,000 foreign workers could be supplied during January and February to war industry, although the transports in the East were almost completely lacking. The commitment of German men and women is in full force.
Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing more and more the transports from the East can be put into full operation again on account of preparations arranged by me. Although the report and commitment-results of German men and women is outstanding, in the heavy industrial labor the commitment of productive foreigners who are used to labor cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief [Oberbefehlshaber] in the East mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories, as I was told by Gauleiter Koch--for political reasons.
My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these orders. I think it impossible that the former Soviet people should experience a better consideration than our own German people, on whom I was forced to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible anymore, then the German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent.
I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time.
I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly be substituted by German women, not used to work even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of the eastern territories.
I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and housed well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now happening in the hardest of all wars by the German people.
Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report to me kindly, whether the concept of the mission presented here is still right.
I would ask to talk to you personally about different important points of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possibly Tuesday.
Yours, always thankful, sincere and obedient
Signed: Fritz Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V AND VI-PS
District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour.
Weimar 15 April 1943 Nr. 435/43 10:25 o'clock
To the Fuehrer, Obersalzberg.
23 June 1943 [stamped]
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers from the East for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfillment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
Counting the manpower which comes into question from Poland and the remaining areas, and which is in the neighborhood of about 150,000, it will become possible again to place 5- to 600,000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1 million workers at the disposal of the armaments industry and the rest of the war industries by the coming summer months.
I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also come into the Reich under conditions similar to those which applied to the last group. I have kept in touch with the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer.
1. After one year's activity as plenipotentiary for the direction of labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war will be employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801 Mining industry 163,632 Building 218,707 Communications 199,074 Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544 Other economic branches 480,298
Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German men and women workers were transferred, inside the German economic structure, to the German war economy proper by being switched from businesses unimportant to the war effort to important ones, or by retraining.
All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the natural fluctuations, for example, through death, sickness, expirations or breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into the Armed Forces and the shifting of industries into other regions and to facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, the establishment of new factories and the fulfillment of new programs.
3. The result of the registration action for men and women up to the 7 April is as follows:
On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men and women have registered. The results are not yet final.
The number of men amounts to 553,415 that of women to 2,696,328
Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) have been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux.
Up till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the direction of labor as the majority do not fit in with the requirements as a result of old age or sickness.
Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 7 April 732,489 women were put to work.
This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these women, however, work less than 48 hours per week because of their domestic circumstances. The basic armament industry has received from the women and men employed
20,670 men 341,100 women
It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture and the rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc.
4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs includes 74,644 persons, of this group, mostly over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 women, only a third could be directed to industry, 10,108 men, 17,929 women, of these the armament industry received 5,258 men, 8,621 women.
The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war importance and to the Armed Forces.
5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women workers and the allocations of these from December 1942 until the end of March 1943 give the following result:
_Demand_ _Allocation_ December 1942 } 250,000 January 1943 } total 335,000 172,000 February 1943 } 235,000 ------- total-- 657,000
March 1943 225,000 450,000 replacements for those drafted from the armaments industry. 240,000 ------- --------- 800,000 1,107,000
In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into account by the registration-action.
* * * * *
Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces on the 20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my most fervent good wishes to you, along with those of my district and my family.
You can be assured that the district of Thueringen and I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all strength.
The warmest desire is that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.
Your faithful and obedient, [signed] Fritz Sauckel
Passed on: Puttig.
Received: Weismann Oberg.
Officially received: 1130 o'clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Section Roem. 3.
The above telegram was also sent in letter form. [in ink] WE 15 Apl.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus) 17 May 1943 Tel: 12 65 71
To the Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellery Berlin W8
Gauleiter Sauckel requests that the following telegram be transmitted to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich.
By direction
Heil Hitler! [signature illegible]
* * * * *
_a._ To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters
_b._ To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Headquarters
to _a._ My Fuehrer!
to _b._ Most respected Reich Marshal!
In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organization Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following figures:
In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. The total number of laborers employed by the OT amounted to 270,969 at the end of March 1942 and 696,003 at the end of March 1943.
In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated the OT in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the Atlantic Wall and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. This is all the more remarkable because:
1. In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the German war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied with labor in any case;
2. Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of the German economy within the Reich itself.
In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the west was raised from 66,701 at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 at the end of March 1943.
Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.
to _a_ Heil Hitler! Your obedient and faithful Fritz Sauckel to _b_ Your continually obliged Fritz Saukel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, 3 June 1943
1751/43 [pencilled] ab 6/4/43 To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany The Fuehrer's Hq My Fuehrer!
I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943.
For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry:
January 1943 --120,085 February 1943 --138,354 March 1943 --257,382 April 1943 --160,535 May 1943 --170,155 -------- Total --846,511
I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only after greatest difficulties were overcome which had not existed during the previous year; all those who have worked for the Arbeitseinsatz,
## particularly in the occupied territories, did so with the greatest
fanaticism and devotion.
Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees were victims of murders and attacks by partisans.
Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied territories through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as through the OT and the factories working in the East and the West for the German war industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht received a large number of laborers as well as labor volunteers.
Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requiring everybody to register, the following numbers of men and women were made available:
_Men_ _Women_ _Total_ February 14,594 163,012 177,606 March 45,606 494,931 540,537 April 19,315 269,374 288,689 May 11,405 186,683 198,168 ------ --------- --------- Total 91,000 1,114,000 1,205,000
Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.
Altogether, German war industry during the first 5 months of 1943 recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers.
Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regulations on the following points: Wage control and increased production in the various European territories especially in France, which enabled us to keep wages in the occupied European territories on a reasonable level, to stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers working for Germany in spite of the difficult conditions of war, to increase production by means of wage control in these territories. These measures were carried out in agreement with industrial and farming authorities as well as with the Commissioner of the Reich for the control of prices.
Heil! Your obedient and faithful Signed: Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS
[Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Poland, dated 19 June 1943--Pages 10 and 11.]
In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences of the German rule have led to a substantial _deterioration of the attitude_ of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernment. These measures have affected either individual professions or the entire population and frequently also--often with crushing severity--the fate of individuals.
Among these are in particular:
1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is working for German interests.
Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus of the former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the part of their former political leadership.
2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Polish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German settlements.
3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and trade and in the field of private property.
4. Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who applied the system of collective responsibility.
5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.
6. The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.
7. The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universities.
8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish influence from all spheres of State administration.
9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its extensive influence--an undoubtedly necessary move--and, in addition, until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, schools and charitable institutions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS
Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939 The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter) Department L (I)
8 Copies, Copy
Chief matter By officers only
TOP SECRET
Directive No. 8, for the conduct of the war.
1. The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be maintained, for the time being. Only this will make it possible to exploit favorable weather conditions immediately.
The various components of the Armed Forces will make arrangements enabling them to stop the attack even if the order for such action is received by the High Command as late as D-1 at 2300 hours. The keyword
"Rhein" (--start attack) or "Elbe" (--withhold attack)
will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this time.
The High Commands of the Army and the Air Forces are requested after having determined the day for attack, to notify Department L of the High Command of the Armed Forces immediately with regard to the mutually agreed hour of the commencement of the attack.
2. Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against the Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at the start of the general attack.
The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. The entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly occupation wherever no opposition is encountered.
3. The _Land-operations_ are to be carried out on the basis of the assemble directive of 29 October. The following is added to complete this directive:
_a._ All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if greater and quicker successes than at Army Group B should be obtained there as the present disposition of enemy's forces that would indicate.
_b._ The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands, without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice.
4. _The Navy_ is authorized to take blockage measures for submarines against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, also against Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before the attack and from the time of the start of the blockade activities and the time of the land attack must also be kept as short as possible in the case of the use of submarines.
Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, if they adopt a hostile attitude.
The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the coastal regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. Preparations have to be made accordingly.
5. The tasks of the _Air Force_ remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fuehrer, concerning the landing from the air and the support of the army by the seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht.
The 7th _Air_-borne Division will only be committed for landing
## activities from the air after the seizure of bridges across the Albert
Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission of this message between the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Air Force must be guaranteed.
Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg area, without (urgent) military reasons.
6. _The closing of the frontiers._ _a._ The border and news traffic across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be kept at its present volume _until the beginning of the attack_ in the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities are not to
## participate in the preparations for the closing of the border until the
start of the attack.
_b._ The Reich-Border is to be _closed_ towards the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news traffic _at the start of the attack_. The Commander-in-Chief issues the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities concerned. The Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be informed by the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) at the beginning of the attack that the measures for the closing of the borders will be issued immediately by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside of the operational territory.
_c._ At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders towards the neutral countries. Further prepared measures for the surveillance of personal and news traffic will be taken, if necessary.
By order Distribution: Signed: Keitel
High Command of the Army--1st Copy.
High Command of the Navy--2nd Copy.
R. d. L. [Reichs-Ministry of the Air] and the High Command of the Air Force--3rd Copy.
attested: von Trotha [?] Captain
_High Command of the Armed Forces:_ Chief WFA--4th Copy. L--5-8th Copy. _Distribution:_ _Copies_ K 1st Copy IV 2nd Copy II 2nd Copy for information [in handwriting] Acknowledged 21 October [initials illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 442-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 Top Secret The Fuehrer's hq. 16 July 1940 7 copies, 4th copy
TOP SECRET
Transmit by officer courier only
General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation against England.
Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.
The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a basis for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if it should become necessary to occupy it completely;
To this end I order the following:
1. The _Landing_ must be carried out in the form of a surprise crossing on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle of Wight, in which air force units will take the roll of artillery, and units of the navy the roll of the engineers. Whether it is practical to undertake subordinate actions, such as the occupation of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, before the general landing is to be determined from the standpoint of every branch of the armed forces and the result is to be reported to me. I reserve the decision for myself. The preparations for the entire operation must be completed by _mid-August_.
2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those conditions which make a landing in England possible.
_a._ The English air-force must morally and actually be so far overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack.
_b._ Mine-free channels must be created.
_c._ By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the straight of Dover on both _Flanks_ as well as the western entrance to the channel in the approximate line Aldemey-Portland must be sealed off.
_d._ The area in front of the coast must be dominated and given artillery protection by strong coastal artillery.
_e._ Tying down of the English naval forces in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) is desired, whereby it must now be attempted that the English naval forces which are in the homeland be damaged by air and torpedo attack in strength.
3. Organization of the leadership and of the preparations;
Under my command and according to my general directions the supreme commanders will lead the forces to be used from their branches of service. The command-staffs of the supreme commander of the army, the supreme commander of the Navy, and the supreme commander of the air-force must from 1 August on be located within a radius of at least 50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg). Lodging the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the army and navy together at Giessen appears practical to me.
Hence for the leadership of the landing armies the supreme commander of the army will have to employ an army group hq.
The project bears the code-name "Seeloewe" [Sea-lion].
In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the following tasks fall to the various branches:
_a._ _Army_: will draw up the operational plan and the transport plan for all units of the 1st wave to embark. The AA artillery to be transported with the 1st wave will at the same time be attached to the army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time as a division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops protection of the ports of debarkation and protection of the aerial strong points to be occupied can be carried out. The Army furthermore distributes the means of transport to the individual crossing groups and establishes the embarkation and landing points in agreement with the Navy.
_b._ _Navy_: will secure the means of transport and will bring them corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to the requirements of seamanship into the individual embarkation areas. Insofar as possible ships of the defeated enemy states are to be procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the necessary naval staff for advice on matters of seamanship with escort vessels and security forces. It will protect, along with the air forces employed to guard the movement, the entire crossing of the channel on both flanks. An order will follow on the regulation of the command relationship during the crossing. It is further the task of the navy to regulate, in a uniform manner, the building up of the coastal artillery, that is, all batteries which can be used for firing against sea targets of the Army as well as of the Navy, and to organize the fire control of the whole. As great an amount of _very heavy artillery_ as possible is to be employed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and to protect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available captured pieces) without the batteries (Ks and K12) provided for firing on targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up and emplaced by use of railway turntables.
Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries are to be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under concrete that they can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks and thereby dominate the Straits of Dover under any circumstances in the long run, within their effective range.
The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organization.
_c._ _Mission of the Air Force is_: To hinder interference from the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to the landing positions, to break the first resistance of enemy troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up. For this mission closest cooperation of individual units of the air force with the crossing units is necessary. Furthermore, to destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points. I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider troops. In this regard it is to be determined if it is worth-while here to hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a reserve to be quickly committed in case of emergency.
4. The armed forces chief of signals will carry out the necessary preparations for signal connections from France to the English mainland. The installation of the remaining 80km East Prussian cables is to be provided for in conjunction with the Navy.
5. I request the supreme commanders to submit to me as soon as possible:
_a._ The intentions of the Navy and Air Force for achieving the necessary conditions for the crossing of the channel (see figure 2).
_b._ The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy).
_c._ A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of getting it ready and fitting it out. Participation of civilian agencies? (Navy).
_d._ The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas for troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Air Force).
_e._ The crossing and operations plan of the army, composition and equipment of the first crossing wave.
_f._ Organization and measures of the Navy and the Air Force for carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, and support of the landing.
_g._ Proposals for the committment of parachute and glider troops, as well as for the attachment and command of anti-aircraft, after an extensive gain of territory on English soil has been made (Air Force).
_h._ Proposal for the location of the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the Army and of the Navy.
_i._ The position of army, navy, and air force on the question whether and what subsidiary actions _before_ the general landing are considered practical.
_k._ Proposal of army and navy on the overall command during the crossing.
A. Hitler [Initialled] J [Jodl] K [Keitel]
_Distribution_: Supreme Cmdr of the Army--1st copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Navy--2nd copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Air Force--3rd copy. Armed Forces Command Section [?]--4th copy. (WFA) Section L--5th and 7th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs Only by officer
_Directive No. 18_
Fuehrer's Headquarters 12 November 40 2F/408 10 copies, 4th copy 55
The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:--
1. _Relations with France._ The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power"--she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.
For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on--apart from the current work of the armistice commission--entirely by the foreign office [Auswartiges Amt] in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW].
More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.
2. _Spain and Portugal._ Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of _German_ intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:
_a._ Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
_b._ The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.
The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:
_Section I_
_a._ Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.
_b._ Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.
_c._ The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French-Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).
With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.
_Section II_
_a._ Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.
_b._ Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.
_Section III_
_a._ Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.
_b._ Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.
_Section IV_
Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.
As for the _strength_ of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:
_Army._ The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.
Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominately of a mobile nature.
_Air Force._ Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.
For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.
Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.
_Navy._ Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.
To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of _single_ coastal batteries.
An Italian participation is not envisaged.
As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the _Atlantic Islands_ (in
## particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased
importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.
I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.
3. _Italian Offensive against Egypt._ If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.
The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:
_Army._ Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).
_Navy._ Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.
_Air Force._ Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.
4. _Balkans._ The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.
In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.
So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.
_The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.
The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.
Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment.
5. _Russia._ Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.
6. _Landing in England._ Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seeloewe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.
7. I shall expect _the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions_ of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.
Signed: Adolf Hitler J [initialled: Jodl]
_Distribution_: Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.)--1st Copy. Ob.d.M (l.Skl.)--2nd Copy. Ob.d.L. (LwFueSt.Ia)--3rd Copy. O.K.W. SFSt--4th Copy. Abt. L.--5th-10th Copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs. SECRET The Fuehrer's Headquarters 18 December 40 (only through officer) 9 copies, 4th copy
_Directive Nr. 21_
_Case Barbarossa_
The German Armed Forces must be prepared _to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign_ before the end of the war against England (case Barbarossa).
For this purpose the _Army_ will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
For the Eastern campaign the _Airforce_ will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.
Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.
If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are--if this has not yet been done--to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.
The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:
I. _General Purpose_:
The mass of the Russian _Army_ in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian _Airforce_ is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.
II. _Probable Allies and their tasks._
* * * * *
[_Page 4_, _par. II_]
2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.
* * * * *
[_Page 8_, _par. IV_]
IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are _precautionary measures_, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.
V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.
[signed] Hitler [initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.]
_Distribution_: Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)--1. copy Ob. d. M. (Skl.)--2. copy Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)--3. copy _OKW_: _WFSt_.--_4. copy_ Abt.--5-9. copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
TOP SECRET
Top Secret Only thru officer
OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff Section L (IV/Qu) 44125/41 Top Secret
Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941 5 copies, 4th copy
_Subject_: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940 Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)
I. Area of operations and executive power
1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations _within the armed forces_ shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in _East Prussia_ and in the _General Gouvernement_ at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.
It is not contemplated to _declare_ East Prussia and the General Gouvernement _an area of operations_. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.
2. _The Russian territory_ which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with _governments of their own_, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:
_a._ _The area of operations_, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.
_b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_ is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for the preparation of the _political administration_, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own _political_ administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into _North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_ (_White Russia_) _and_ _South_ (_Ukraine_). In these territories _the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich_ who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, _commanding officers_ who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the Armed Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the _military sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial Commander_ and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).
_c._ Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
_d._ Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
_e._ Traffic regulations.
_f._ Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.
The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the _civilian_ agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.
Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.
_The time for the assumption of command_ by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.
4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the _Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt"_ with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rue Amt.
5. The majority of the _Police Forces_ shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense.
6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the _military courts_ shall be separately regulated, and commanded.
II. _Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic_:
7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary _before the beginning of operations_ for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.
8. _As soon as operations begin_, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.
The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.
Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.
III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland._
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.
10. _Police measures_ for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.
11. _Special orders shall be issued at a later date_ for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:
Procurement of food and feed. Housing and machinery. Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. Procurement of funds and wage-control. Salaries. Request for indemnity-payments. Postal and telegraph services. Traffic. Jurisdiction.
_Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW_ from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be _submitted_ to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.
IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._
12. Since Sweden _can_ only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Signed: KEITEL
_Distribution_: OKH--1st copy. OKM--2nd copy. R.d.L.u.O.K.L.--3rd copy. Armed Forces Operational Staff--4th copy. Section L--5th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs F.H.Q. 11th Jan 44 TOP SECRET 13 copies, 4th copy.
Order No. 22
## Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations.
The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.
Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.
I order therefore, the following:
1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli (starting approximately 20 February).
2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranean. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.
The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" [Sperrgebiet] in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.
3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.
The duty of the German forces will be:
_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;
_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:
To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,
To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.
4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.
5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.
Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
Distribution:
OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating--1st cy. OKM/Skl--2nd cy. Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a--3rd cy. OKW WFST--4th cy. --------L--5th to 9th cy. WNV--10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy. Armed Forces, Transport Chief--12th cy. German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
* * * * *
F.H.Q. 29th Jan 41
High Command of the Armed Forces WFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz.
13 copies, 4th copy.
Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW /WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th Jan. 41
The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:
Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume" Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
By order
(Signed) Warlimont
Distribution:
OKH/general staff of Army, operations--1st cy. OKM/SKL--2nd cy. Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest--3rd cy.
_OKW_: WFST--4th cy. Section L--5th to 9th cy. WNV--10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy. Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.--12th cy. German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt
Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942 12 copies, 12th copy.
1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.
2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.
5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive
## actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in
open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.
6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
_Distribution_: Copy No.
O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / General Staff of the Army). 1 O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy / Naval War Staff). 2 Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air Force Operational Staff). 3 W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, Norway) 4 W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander, Southeast) 5 Ob. West (C in C, West) 6 Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7 Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8 Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9 Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police). 10 OKW /WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces / Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS
Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942 No 32704 B Nr 40/42
TOP SECRET
To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:] Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers. R/29/5 Pradel n.R b/R
[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6
The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_) _stop completely in rainy weather_. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.
I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.
The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.
Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.------ is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.
The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.
Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached with further news.
Signed: Dr. Becker SS Untersturmfuehrer
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office Message Center
1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:] Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel Message No 152452 R 16/6 Wiederhausen
Riga 7082--15-6-42--1855--BE To Reichs Security Main Office--Roem. 2D3A--Berlin
TOP SECRET
_Subject_: S-Vans
A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.
The commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service "Ostland" Roem IT-126/42 GRS Stamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer No 240/42 II D 3a 16 June 42 Procedure: [handwritten] 1. When can we count on having another S-van ready? 2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered? 3. Request answer.
R 16/6
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
II D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945
TOP SECRET
Stamped: Message Nr 107903 Sent by message center 2016, 22 June 42
1. FS [?] To the Commandant of the Security Police and Security Service Ostland Riga
_Subject_: S-Van
The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle of next month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main Office for repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 meters of hose will be supplied.
By order of
[signature as in heading]
2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9) By direction
Rauff
* * * * *
Handwritten note:
Berlin, 13 July 1942
II D 3a (9)
_Nr I.Z. Widderhausen_ [?] for further action and attention to the note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. For the reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, can be supplied me.
By direction
[signature illegible]
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
Stamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942
handwritten: After return immediate repair
II D 3a No 964/42
10 June 1942
R 10/6 Notify about repair ND. Nr 144702 Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950--SOM
To: Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A--Z. HD. V. Major Pradel--Berlin.
Subject: Special-van-Saurer Preceding messages: None
The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled their special mission and could be ordered back with the van mentioned above. In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transportation cannot be made by car.
Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back to Berlin by railroad.
Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers Goetz and Meyer will escort the vehicle.
The commandant of Security Police and Security Service Belgrad--Roem I--BNR 3985/42. Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
* * * * *
[Handwritten note back page]
II D 3a (2) T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKEL
Berlin, 11 June 1942
For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to be informed about arrival of vans.
By direction:
signed: Just Berlin, 16 June 1942.
II D 3a (9)
_Note_
The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough cleaning the repairs will start immediately.
By direction
signed: [?] Berlin, 13 July 1942.
II D 3a 9
1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready.
2. Sent to the _motor-pool management T.F. Niederhausen_ for its information and further action.
By direction
signed: [?]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS
TOP SECRET
B 101 Enclosures 2 Berlin, 17 July 1941
Office IV
Regulations (directives) for the commandos of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, which are to be activated in Stalags.
The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure I). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limits of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the defense officers assigned to him.
The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further "treatment"
_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable elements among them.
_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.
For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be put at the disposal of the commandos. The "Deutsche Fahndungsbuch", the "Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste" and the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" will prove to be useful in only a small number of cases; the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" is not sufficient, because it contains only a small part of Soviet-Russians considered to be dangerous.
Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and ability and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. Therefore, they will be able to start carrying out their mission only when they have gathered together appropriate material.
The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.
Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.
By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos must learn for themselves, in every case by means of short questioning of the informers and eventual questioning of other prisoners.
The information of _one_ informer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a suspect, without further proof; it must be confirmed in some way if possible.
Above all, the following must be discovered:
All important functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries.
Functionaries of the Komintern.
All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.
All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.
All former Political commissars in the Red Army.
Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.
All Jews.
All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.
It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all those persons who could be used for the reconstruction, administration and management of the conquered Russian territories.
Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed for the completion of further investigation, regardless if they are police investigations or other investigations, and for explanations of questions of general interest. Among them are all those especially, who because of their position and their knowledge are able to give information about measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian State, of the communist party or of the Komintern.
In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity in all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando will give every week a short report by telephone or an express-letter to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing:
1. _Short_ description of their activities in the past week.
2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons. (report of number sufficient)
3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of the Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Commissars, leading personalities and Political commissars.
4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, with a short description of their position.
_A._ Prisoners-of-war.
_B._ Civilians.
On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main-Office will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. For the measures to be applied on the basis of this successive directive the commandos are to demand the surrender of the prisoners involved from the camp command.
The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see enclosure I).
Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory.
Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, then the leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp commander for it.
The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments carried out and must contain:
Current number. Family name and first name. Time and place of birth. Military rank. Profession. Last residence. Reason for special treatment. Day and place of special treatment (card file).
In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories.
Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior during and after duty, the best cooperation with the camp-commanders, and careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and members of the Einsatz-Kommando.
The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly impressed with the special importance of the missions entrusted to them.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
Top Secret
High Command of the Armed Forces. No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/Qu F.H. Qu., 19 October 1942
Top Secret By officer only 22 copies, 21st copy
Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands._
_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus._
The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
By order of
Jodl
1 enclosure (distribution list--over) _Distribution list_:
General Staff of the Army--1st copy.
Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army--2nd copy.
High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary--3rd copy.
High Command of the Air Force command staff--4th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway--5th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands--6th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the South-east--7th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Eastern Territory (Ostland)--8th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine--9th copy.
High Command West--10th copy.
High Command 20th Mountain army}--11th copy. (GEB.) AOH 20) }
Commanding Officer of German } troops in Denmark }--12th copy. (Bfh. d. dt. Tr. in Denmark }
High Command South--13th copy.
Tank Army--Africa--14th copy.
German General in Headquarters of Italian Armed Forces--15th copy.
Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main Bureau for Security Police--16th and 17th copies.
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Foreign Counter Intelligence--18th copy.
Armed Forces legal section (WR)--19th copy.
Armed Forces propaganda section (PR)--20th copy.
_Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy_--_21st copy_.
War Diary (KtC)--22nd copy.
* * * * *
Top Secret
By officer only
The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
18 K
I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.
As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.
In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps [Organization Todt], the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days, the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible, as well as wily, sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front thereby the entire conduct of the war.
It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organize special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.
Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.
_In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part._
As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.
Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put
## partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases
uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the
## activities of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:
1. to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,
2. to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,
3. to undertake sabotage activities which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.
Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.
The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these
## activities.
England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.
If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.
This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.
The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.
I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances--when there is danger in delay--to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.
These are the reason for the issuance of this decree.
If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.
(signed) A. Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS
Draft
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1) Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos
Fuehrer Headquarters, 22 June 1944
TOP SECRET
2 copies--1st copy
Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V--of
17 June 1944
Subject: Enemy agents--Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW /WFSt of 18 October 42
To: W R
WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Judge Advocate of the Army group with the Supreme Commander South-west of 20 May 44 (Br. B Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take
## part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of
## participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not
correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.
By direction
initialled: W 3 inclosures [Warlimont]
* * * * *
[Following is an attached handwritten note]
Qu 2 W
All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration.
[initial illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
TOP SECRET
WFSt/Op (L)
Fuehrer's Headquarters November 21, 1942 5 copies, 5th copy
Subject: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. [Illegible signature] 2/40/43
Note
Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42.
Air Force 5, G-2 Capt. S. Lilienskjold reports 21 Nov. by telephone to inquiry:
1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers in the night of November 11:
_a._ No firing on the part of German defense.
_b._ The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.
2. In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November 21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on the North shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Floerly (supplies Stavanger).
The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been initiated by the service district.
The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.
[signed] W Went out Nov. 11, 42
_Distribution_: Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone report). Asst. Chief (Ktb). Operations (Army). Operations (Navy). Operations (Air Force).
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
F. Amt. Ausl./Abw Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef F XVI, E 1/e
Berlin, 4 December, 1942 3 copies, 1st copy
To: WFSt For: Information From: Abw III.
Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy sabotage troops.
Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway counter intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military commander of Norway.
It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order.
By direction
[Illegible signature] [Warlimont's initials] 8/12
* * * * *
Copy
TOP SECRET
1. Teletype to: O K W/Abw III F _Subject_: Commando Raid.
On November 20, 1942, at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely the others slightly wounded.
All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skiis and radio, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns, and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund.
A second plane has crashed 5 km East of Helleland. It had a 6-man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider.
The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The competent commander's staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42
* * * * *
TOP SECRET III F
2. Teletype to: OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F _Reference_: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42. Subject: Commando Raid.
Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:
Besides the 17 member crew, extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th inf. div. ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks, and serial numbers.
The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the commander's staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 km East of Stavanger, 8 km East of the electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight gilder is supposed to have a 16-man crew. It is possible that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider found 15 km North East of Egersund. The armed forces commander of Norway was notified. Refer. at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.
In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the armed forces commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of no. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS.
Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS
TOP SECRET
Telegraph Office: GWNOL
Date: 7 Nov. 1943
SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ
To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/Roem I c GKDOS (TOP SECRET).
Subject: British Commando--Operation in Northwest. Pescara, 2 Nov. 43.
3 commandos--special treatment--remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital.
OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS
TOP SECRET
SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400--OKW/WFSt
According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Two man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, armed forces commander referred to above mentioned last sentence of the Fuehrer order (liquidation only after short interrogation).
The Red Cross and the BDS protested after the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer order in the case of Egersund and intend for their part to bring up the whole question as a matter of principle.
WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS
TOP SECRET
14 December 1942 SSD--Telegram [illegible pencil remarks]
To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign Department.
For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway Supreme Command Armed Forces Counter Intelligence Service.
Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 1942. (Commander Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 Top Secret of 13 December 1942).
Subject: Commando Operations.
It is reported that the armed forces commander Norway intends to spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have them interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last paragraph of the order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret _CHEFS_ of 19th October 1942.
OKW/WFSt/Qu (III) Number 004872/42 Top Secret W [Initialled Warlimont]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 526-PS
_WFSt/Qu (III)_ Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord.
10. 5. 1943
TOP SECRET
Notice
On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.
_Armament_: 2 Colt--MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 sub-machine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.
_Captain of the Cutter_: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.
_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strongpoints, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.
_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.
Fuehrer order executed by S.D. [Security Service].
_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:
In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS
Armed Forces Operational Staff Qm (Adm. 1) No. 006688/44 Top Secret
Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944
TOP SECRET
3 copies--1st copy
Reference: Fuehrer Order No. 003832/42/OKW/WFSt of 18 Oct 42.
Subject: Treatment of Commando Men.
Conference memorandum
Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:
The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command West is as follows:
A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5.
B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive maneuvers etc. The German combat soldier will not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already carried out or still being carried out.
C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to, which dates from more than 1-1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents become known.
D. The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_ penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Security Service) in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. _Supreme Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be applied in the whole occupied Western area._
_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:_
1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.
2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.
3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the commando order is to be applied or not.
4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explanation.
Proposal: Attached teletype message. signed: WARLIMONT
Distribution:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces--1 copy through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.
Ktb, 2 copies.
Qu--Draft, 3 copies.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 532-PS
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
24 June 1944
TOP SECRET
5 copies, 1st copy
SSD--Telegram.
To 1. Supreme Command West.
By mail to 2. Chief of General Staff, Army.
By mail to 3. Supreme Command of the Air Force/Air Force Staff Headquarters.
By mail to 4. Supreme Command Navy/1 Skl. By mail to 5. Reichsfuehrer SS Command Staff. By mail to 6. Military Commander, France. By mail to 7. Supreme Command of Armed Forces/WR.
Authority: 1. Order of the Fuehrer no. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 42/OKW/WFSt.
2. Telegram Supreme Command West no. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44.
Subject: Treatment of Commandos.
1. Standard operating procedure to (1) will be fully maintained.
2. Numeral (5) refers to enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in open combat by own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone of the beachhead or who surrender. "Own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone" applies in this sense to those of combat divisions on line as well as reserves up to and including general staffs.
3. In cases of doubt enemy personnel falling into our hands alive will be turned over to the SD, which will be responsible for the examination as to whether the order concerning commandos is applicable or not.
4. Accordingly, the paratroop saboteurs dropped by the enemy over Britanny will be treated as commando personnel, since this area is not at present an immediate combat zone. It is immaterial in this case whether the paratroopers dropped wear uniform or civilian clothes. The number of paratroopers captured in Britanny will be included in the daily report currently. In this respect an annex to the armed forces report of 7 October 1942 has already been published to the effect that such criminal elements should be massacred in combat.
(_Remark_: Enclosures of the order of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1942 as well as the further order regarding the treatment of Commando personnel of 25 June 1944 are attached. The latter mentions also paratroopers under number (2).)
_Distribution_: [signature illegible]
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces through Chief of the WFSt Qu (Entw.).
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS
Draft
The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 30 July 1944
_The High Command of the Wehrmacht_ 009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)
TOP SECRET
re: _Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans._
In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against
## partisans shall not receive the treatment as stipulated in the special
orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer's order the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).
This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being read.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
KEITEL
_Distribution_:
High Comd S/E--1st copy. High Comd S/W--2nd copy. General Staff of the Army--3rd copy. OKM/SKl.--4th copy. OKL/Lw.Fu.Stb.--5th copy.
Reichsfuehrer--and Chief of the German Police--Staff RF--Attention Major General and Major General of the Waffen SS Rhode, also for RSH--6th copy.
OKW/AWA--7th copy. /Chief PWs--8th copy. WR--9th copy. WFSt/W.Pr.--10th copy.
Op. (H-L-M)--11th copy. Org.--12th copy. Ktb.--13th copy. Qu. (Draft)--14th copy. Reserve--15-25 copies.
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1)
Chef OKW--[in pencil]
of
[initial] J
26 June 1944
TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp]
5 copies--1st copy Checked before Release } Chef WFSt } [in pencil] Remark 1 } _OB._ _WFSt_ } [in pencil]
_KR_--_Teletype_ To 1. Supreme Commander West. 2. Chief of Army General Staff. 3. OKL/Lw Fu Stab. 4. OKM/1.Skl. 5. Reichsfuehrer SS--Command Staff. 6. Military Commander, France. 7. Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France. 8. Armed forces Commander, Netherlands. 9. OKW/WR. 10. Supreme Commander Southwest [in pencil].
_Reference_: 1. Fuehrer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt.
2. Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).
_Subject_: Treatment of Kommando Participants.
1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force.
Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands, according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain exempted.
2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.
3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives issued for it.
4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the armed forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same manner.
[Initial] W [Warlimont] [signature] Keitel _OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1)_ Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret
_Addition for Supreme Commander_ } _Southwest_ } Similar action is to be taken in the} [Written by hand] Italian theater of war. } [initial] J [Jodl]
_After forwarding_: Qu (Verw. 1) Simultaneously teletype--1st copy. Op (H)--2nd copy. Op (M)/(L)/Ktb.--3rd copy. VO Foreign--4th copy. VO W Pr--5th copy.
Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 553-PS
Memo secret 7/4 (Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.l Page 7 current 1910.4) High Command of the armed forces WFSt. (Org.1) amt. AUSL.ABW/ABT ABW.III Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (IIIb 2) Berlin, 4 August 1942
SECRET
_Combatting of single parachutists_, 4 Aug. 1942. Unaltered reprint 1943 Reference: OKW/WFSt/ABt.L (II) Nr. 1858 geh.v. 10.8.40
I. In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made between:
A. Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to fighting
## activities.
B. _Single_ parachutists and small groups of parachutists who are dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, terror or disruption.
to _a_ The combatting of enemy airborne forces is the exclusive mission of the armed forces according to the reference orders. to _b_ For combatting _single parachutists_. In alteration of fig. 7 v.a. the following is decreed:
1. In territories (Reich territories and occupied territories) the combatting of _single parachutists_ is the mission of those agencies of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service [SD] designated as executive; in this matter it is immaterial whether the parachutists are in uniform or civilian clothes.
2. To what extent armed forces and agencies of the armed forces should be committed for these missions is to be decided directly by the district commanders [Wehrkreisbefehslhaber] or by territorial commanders [territorialen Befehlshaber] endowed with the powers of district commander with the competent agencies of security police and SD.
3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of the armed forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simultaneously reports must be made to the competent intelligence agency. The same procedure is also valid for combat action directed against parachute troops or airborne-landing troops, in case the troops realize that they have to do with saboteurs or spies. If it should be discovered that the parachutists brought to security police by armed forces, or captured directly by members of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and Chief of the German Police will take care that they will be transferred to the competent air forces agencies after the completion of the necessary inquiry.
4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be submitted without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of Security Police and of the SD, simultaneously informing the counter intelligence agency in charge which immediately has to forward the report to district command headquarters commander as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in principle fig. 4 of the reference order is applicable.
5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1, present regulations remain valid (transfer to secret field police).
II. With regard to the use of objects captured or discarded, in the case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage materials, or radio equipment, a supplementary order to fig. 9 v. a. is decreed:
1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest security police agency and SD.
The army will dispose of sabotage material captured by troops in the Eastern theater. With regard to further utilization of sabotage material delivered or reverting to the Security Police, agreements made between the Chief of Security Police and SD and foreign section of counter intelligence remain valid.
2. Captured radio equipment, including the directions for operations, code-material, voice material (Sprach-Material) in plain and in code text, are to be delivered immediately via local counter intelligence agencies to OKW (Ag WNV Fu III) for use. The agencies concerned will be informed of results. After a completion of investigations the captured radio equipment will again be at disposal, if needed. If further use of captured radio equipment is considered by either counter intelligence or Security Police, then the delivery of the equipment might be omitted, upon agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this case photostatic copies of the directions for use, the code keys, etc., as well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be forwarded quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III.
The Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces KEITEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-2-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht Fuehrer Hq September 8, 1942
The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers should be committed and should give the fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA [Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz] in agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.
A Hitler [initialled] K [Keitel]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-13-PS
Note for the files
1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 P.M. Minister Speer telephones from the Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the Fuehrer's decision, it is no longer necessary to give special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed with emphasis and sharpened measures.
2. Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in Holland just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P.M. and explains that on the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must achieve more recruiting in Holland.
3. He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regarding the endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due to labor shortage.
I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms.
He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will take the appropriate action.
For Information
(signed) SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 579-PS
Weimar, 5 January 1943 The District Commissar in Riga--Employment Office Section [Fachgebiet] 2 (Commitment of work) Riga, 6 July 1942
File note
_Subject_: Commitment of Jews.
here: cooperation with the administration offices of the armed forces.
For the last 10 days Jews have been picked up almost daily for commitment in the peat industry by units of the armed forces. While doing so, very considerable difficulties arose because the members of the armed forces who get the Jews from the ghetto daily do not want to comply with the regulations which are issued by the man responsible for work commitment.
It is agreed that the soldiers take over the Jews in columns at the exit of the ghetto. Actually, however, several soldiers enter the fenced-in ghetto and pick up the Jews in question without any permission. During the last week, government inspector Rottenberger and the undersigned were present, at an early hour, during the dispatching of the Jews. Some soldiers also did not follow the instructions of the Reich German workers, entered the ghetto, and themselves got the men who had worked so far for the units in question. It was pointed out to them that manpower had to be committed for specially urgent measures. These instructions were not followed by the soldiers, but they shouted around in the presence of more than 1000 Jews, and simply took the men away in spite of the order forbidding it. In one instance a soldier arrived the next morning in a steel helmet and again did not follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower. A German police sergeant was charged with banishing the soldiers from the ghetto. The sergeant had hardly turned around when the soldier entered the ghetto again and again got Jews whom he was not supposed to get, and took them away. In another case, the undersigned was just in time to prevent a pfc. of the air force from beating a Jewish policeman. The Jewish policeman beat a Jew who did not want to report for a certain work. The Jewish police is doing well with the daily commitment of about 4000 Jews. Therefore it must be prevented that Germans attack Jewish policemen in the presence of thousands of Jews.
As soon as German soldiers who pick up the Jewish manpower daily from the ghetto, follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower and, above all, keep discipline, it will be possible to get the Jewish manpower ready for work considerably faster every day. According to my opinion it is at least necessary that one German policeman who can prevent the illegal seizures by the German soldiers, be placed at the entrance of the ghetto daily from 0530 to 0800 hours.
For information:
signed Lippmann.
* * * * *
The District Commissar in Riga The Chief of The Employment Office Riga Azsargu Iela 29/31
Riga, 10 February 1942
Department File No.
To the Reich Commissar for the Baltic states
Work policies and social administration
_Riga_, _through_ the Commissar general in Riga.
_Subject_: Transport of Jews from Kauen. _Ref._: Your letter of 6 February 1942.
The transport of Jews from Kauen arrived here on 8 February 1942. However, instead of the requested 500 males only,
222 males and 137 females
were sent.
Due to the fact that there exists a considerable need of Jewish manpower for transport and construction work, I am requesting an additional 1000 Jewish males from Kauen.
I was informed by the transport leader that the Jews in Kauen, as far as their commitment for work is concerned, are not under the jurisdiction of the employment office, but that the Jewish manpower is distributed by the German police.
For:
[signature illegible] (Oberregierungsrat)
[ink note:] To the Commissar General [Initials illegible]
* * * * *
Command of Economic Affairs [Wirtschaftskommando] for the Territory of the former Latvia Department of Work
Riga, 21 July 1941
_Subject_: Work commitment of _Jews_.
File note
According to the Group Agriculture there is a considerable shortage of workers for farming in Latvia, which endangers especially the beet harvest. According to my findings and also those of the economy office North (Wi.-In. Nord) no prisoners of war are at present available for farming. It should be examined, therefore, to which extent and under which conditions other possibilities of commitment are available.
To clarify the possibility of committing Jews, a conference took place today between the economy office North and the chief war administration advisor (O.K.V.R.) Ellroth, from the department of work. Together with Mr. Ellroth we went to the _SS_ and conferred with the leader of the _SD_, Sturmbannfuehrer Batz, as well as his deputy, Hauptsturmfuehrer Kirsten. Our proposal to earmark the Jews, to put them together in a ghetto, then to establish a council for Jews, and to effect with it the extensive commitment of Jews for work, was favorably accepted. It was also agreed upon that the commitment of Jews for work should be effected _only_ through the special offices for commitment to be created by the employment office resp. offices, in order to make sure of leadership according to the necessities for war and state policies. The SS reserves only the right of the decision of political problems and the execution of political tasks. The ear-marking of the Jews and their collection in a ghetto is being done. It was furthermore announced that conferences had already taken place between the SS-SD on the one hand and the military administration headquarters (Feldkommandatur) on the other hand, with the result that a registration of the Jews at the police precincts, a daily report of the Jews there, and the establishment of a special office should be instituted for the execution of the commitment of Jews for work through the military administration headquarters.
After that a conference with the war administration council [Kriegsverwaltungsrat] Nachtigall took also place at the _military administration headquarters_, which had the same result. The military administration headquarters (Fk.) agrees also that the commitment of Jews for work is done by the employment office after the registration of the Jews. While registering, a special index card can be put aside for this commitment of work.
The discussions at the Fk. resulted furthermore in the issuing by the commander of the rear army district of a decree on _ceiling prices and wages_, already last Wednesday, because it is his opinion that he alone can issue official decrees with effective penalties. Furthermore, the locally customary prices and wages are already established.
[signature illegible] O.K.V.R.
Distribution: Wi.-In. Nord, Dept. for work Commandant SS.-SD. Fk.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 614-PS
"DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE REVOLUTION 1933", compiled by Dr. Axel Friedrichs (Berlin 1935, pages 151-3), [which is Volume I of the documentary collection entitled "DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK", published by the Director of the Hochschule fuer Politik.]
Proclamation of the Action Committee for the Protection of the German Labor 2 May 1933
German workers and employees! Working people in the town and country! The bells have tolled to honor work. The entire German people have sung the high psalm about the working man with a strength and enthusiasm which never before existed and thus has honored itself and the creative spirit. The wheels stopped, the anvil did not more resound, the miner came out of his mine: everywhere a holiday.
What trade unions of all shades, red and black, Christian and "free", have not even come close to accomplishing, what has been only a shadow even in the best years of Marxism, a puny miserable copy compared to the gigantic thing of yesterday, NATIONAL SOCIALISM achieves in its first effort.
It puts the worker and the peasant, the artisan and the employee, briefly all working people, into the center of the State and renders the grabbing and despotic ones harmless. Who was that servant of capitalism, who was the reactionary who intended to oppress you and bereave you of all rights? Those red criminals who have abused you, well meaning, honest and decent German workers for decades, in order to deprive you and thus the entire people of its rights and heritage, or we, who amidst unutterable sacrifices and suffering, fought against these insane and distorted ideas of devilish Jews and the associates of the Jews? Already three months of National Socialistic government prove to you: Adolf Hitler is your friend! Adolf Hitler struggles for your liberty! Adolf Hitter gives you bread!
Today we are entering into the second chapter of the National Socialistic Revolution. You may say, what else do you want, you have the absolute power. True, we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we do not have you workers a hundred percent, and it is you whom we want; we will not let you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine acknowledgment. You shall also be freed of the last Marxian manacles, so that you may find your way to your people.
For we know that without the German worker there is no German nation! And before everything else we must protect you, so that your enemy Marxism and its satellites cannot attack you from the back again.
Even though the Marxist Party such as the K.P.D. has been completely destroyed, or find themselves in complete dissolution as the S.P.D., even if the party leaders have fled in miserable cowardice or have deserted everything and everyone; and have forsaken you, workers, cowardly and miserably as never before, we know that it is all pretense. Marxism pretends to be dead in order to resurrect itself anew with favorable opportunity and again to plunge the Judas dagger into your back. Just as in 1914! Even at that time it sponsored the war debts and spread itself internationally in order to betray you to the imperialism of our enemies in 1918, and to sell you thereby to world capital.
The sly fox doesn't deceive us. Rather we will give him one last fatal shot so that we shall never again suffer with his resurrection. The Leiperts and Grossmaenner may pretend ever so much fidelity to Hitler, but it is better that they should be in protective custody. Therefore we shall strike the main weapon out of the hands of the Marxist group and thereby take from it its last possibility of renewed strengthening. The devilish teaching of the Jew Mardochai shall be destroyed wretchedly on the battlefield of the National Socialistic Revolution.
It is not as if we wanted to disrupt and destroy the unions. On the contrary, we have never disturbed anything which has, in any way, value for our people and we shall never do so in the future; that is a National Socialistic rule. This certainly goes for the unions which serve with hard work and were built up by the pennies taken from the mouths of the worker. No workers--your institutions are sacred and unimpeachable to us National Socialists. I myself am a poor peasant's son and understand poverty. I myself was 7 years in one of the biggest industries of Germany and I know the exploitation of anonymous capital, and I know, above everything else, of its stingy commercial methods, for, on account of my opinion I was fired from my occupation in 1928.
Workers, I swear to you we will not only keep everything which exists, we will build up the protection and rights of the worker even further, so that he can enter into the new National Socialistic State as a completely worthwhile and respected member of the nation.
Workers and peasants on a broad front together with the free occupations and skilled labor,--thus we shall build a new Reich of well being, honor and freedom. Forward with Hitler for Germany.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 615-PS
The Bishop of Limburg Limburg/Lahn, Aug 13, 1941 To the Reich Minister of Justice _Berlin_
[Various stamps and pencilled remarks appear on original]
Regarding the report submitted on July 16 (Sub IV, pp 6-7) by the Chairman of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Dr. Bertram, I consider it my duty to present the following as a concrete illustration of destruction of so-called "useless life."
About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of Hadamar, on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution which had formerly served various purposes and of late had been used as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and furnished as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the above mentioned euthanasia has been systematically practiced for months--approximately since February 1941. The fact has become known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, because death certificates from a Registry Hadamar-Moenchberg are sent to the home communities. (Moenchberg is the name of this institution because it was a Franciscan monastery prior to its secularization in 1803.)
Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a considerable number of such victims. School children of the vicinity know this vehicle and say: "There comes the murder-box again." After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured with the ever-present thought of the miserable victims, especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the direction of the wind.
The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call each other names and say, "You're crazy; you'll be sent to the baking oven in Hadamar." Those who do not want to marry, or find no opportunity, say, "Marry, never! Bring children into the world so they can be put into the bottling machine!" You hear old folks say, "Don't send me to a state hospital! After the feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters whose turn will come are the old people."
All God-fearing men consider this destruction of helpless beings as crass injustice. And if anybody says that Germany cannot win the war, if there is yet a just God, these expressions are not the result of a lack of love of fatherland but of a deep concern for our people. The population cannot grasp that systematic actions are carried out which in accordance with Par. 211 of the German criminal code are punishable with death! High authority as a moral concept has suffered a severe shock as a result of these happenings. The official notice that N.N. had died of a contagious disease and that for that reason his body has to be burned, no longer finds credence, and such official notices which are no longer believed have further undermined the ethical value of the concept of authority.
Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of severe threats. In the interest of public peace, this may be well intended. But the knowledge and the conviction and the indignation of the population cannot be changed by it; the conviction will be increased with the bitter realization that discussion is prohibited with threats but that the actions themselves are not prosecuted under penal law.
Facta loquuntur.
I beg you most humbly, Herr Reich Minister, in the sense of the report of the Episcopate of July 16 of this year, to prevent further transgressions of the Fifth Commandment of God.
[Signed] Dr. Hilfrich
I am submitting copies of this letter to the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister for Church Affairs.
[initialled by the above]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 621-PS
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Berlin, W.8, 2 October 1940 Voss Street 6
SECRET REICH MATTER
_Rk. 665 B gRs_ To the Reichsminister of Justice, Dr. Guertner
Dear Dr. Guertner:
I herewith acknowledge your letters of 26 August and 25 September forwarding to me further material about the death of inmates of nursing homes. I forwarded the enclosed reports of the Chief Prosecutors to Stuttgart and Naumburg to the Reichsminister of the Interior--Reichs Health Leader--for further action.
Heil Hitler! Sincerely yours [signed] Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 630-PS
[On letterhead A. Hitler] Berlin 1 Sept 1939 Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D.
are charged with the responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians to be designated by name in such a manner that persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy death.
signed: A. HITLER [Handwritten note] Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940 signed: Dr. Guertner III a 3/41 g Rs /
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 638-PS
Copy
M 5/42 SECRET
From the Reich Marshall's Plans of 24.9.42.
I. The Reich Marshall is looking for daring fellows, who will be employed in the East as Sonderkommandos [Special Purpose] and who will be able to carry out the task of creating confusion behind the lines. They are to be formed into bands under leadership and with interpreters allotted to them. For this purpose, the Reich Marshall is considering convicts who are first offenders, who have committed not particularly heinous offenses, for which there is human understanding.
The Reich Marshall first of all mentioned persons convicted of poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsfuehrer SS had picked out the so-called poachers and they were already in his hands. He requests, however, that the question be reexamined. The only suitable men are those with a passion for hunting, who have poached for love of the trophy, not men who have laid snares and traps. The Reich Marshall also mentioned fanatical members of smuggling gangs, who take part in gun-battles on the frontiers and whose passion it is to outwit the customs at the risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to bring articles over the frontier in an express train or by similar means.
The Reich Marshall leaves it to us to consider whether still other categories of convicts can be assigned to these bands or pursuit commandos.
In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands, whose first task should be to destroy the communications of the partisan groups, could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they would once again come under strict supervision. * * *
(signed) Dr. Joel, 24.9.42
* * * * *
Berlin, 6 October 1942
Staff of MD IV, V
The attached extract from the minutes of Cabinet Councillor Dr. Joel are submitted for the preparation of the report on Friday 9.10.
Copy to State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger for his attention.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 641-PS
File No. 927/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 District Attorney at the District Court Munich II (Tel: Local 5791, Long Distance 57801)
to the
Public Prosecutor "Generalstaatsanwalt"
at the
State Supreme Court MUNICH
Subject: Death of the prisoner in protective custody Dr. Alfred Strauss in the concentration camp Dachau
N-12432 in one copy submitted to the State Ministry of Justice Munich, 2 June 1933
The Public Prosecutor at the State Supreme Court
On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single attorney at law Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2 pistol shots by SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk prescribed to him by the camp doctor, outside of the fenced part of the camp.
Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.
On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head. Besides the body showed several black and blue spots and also open wounds. Coroner's inquest was ordered; it took place on 26 May 1933. According to the expert's opinion death was caused by cerebral paralysis due to one bullet penetrating and one bullet lodging in the right portion of the cerebrum. Older scars were found at the right hip and seat, as well as hemorrhages of the left abdominal wall. The direction of the firing channels further revealed that the bullets had been fired from low behind and upwards to the right. The distance from which they were fired could not be established by the autopsy; for this purpose chemical and microscopical examinations are necessary.
I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made application for opening and execution of the judicial preliminary investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest against him.
The District Court Public Prosecutor Attorney WINTERSBERGER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 642-PS
File No: G 866/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 State Prosecution at the State Court [Landgericht] Munich Local Telephone: 5791 Long Distance: 57801.
To the Prosecutor General at The Supreme State Court [Oberlandesgericht] Munich.
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody, Leonhard Hausmann in the Dachau concentration camp.
No. 12431 with one copy submitted to the State Minister for Justice, Munich, 2 June 1933
The Prosecutor General at the Supreme State Court.
[signature illegible]
On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old, married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS staff sergeant Karl Ehmann. According to the account of the latter, Hausmann was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was supervised by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him anymore. Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw him running away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, called "Halt" several times, once also "Stop", but in vain. Whereupon Ehmann raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming; Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a distance of 10 to 12 meters.
The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 33 with the assistance of the state court physician. It was found that death was due to a shot through the left side of the chest. According to the autopsy protocol, the shot was fired from a distance less than 1 meter. Meanwhile the legal-medical institute ascertained that the distance was less than 30 cm.
Today I have preferred public charges against Ehmann and have requested to begin and to carry out a preliminary court investigation and to issue an arrest warrant against him for danger of escape and of prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the course of the process.
The Supreme State Prosecutor [signed] Wintersberger
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 644-PS
File No. G 851/33 Munich, 22 May 1933 (Postoffice 35) Prosecution at the State Court Munich II (Telephone: Local 5791 long distance 57801)
To the Prosecutor General of the State Court [Oberlandesgericht]
Munich,
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss in the Dachau concentration camp.
_Annexes_:
1 copy of an autopsy protocol, 3 photos. W.V. 28923/33
In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau informed the state prosecution that an inmate of the concentration camp Dachau, the merchant Louis Schloss, from Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1880, has hanged himself in solitary confinement. At the request of the state prosecution, on the same day the legal inspection was performed with the assistance of the state court physician with the state court Munich II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous whip marks and as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an autopsy was carried out on 17 May 33. According to a preliminary certificate of the participating physicians, the autopsy did not prove death by hanging. The extensive destruction of the adipose tissue found in the corpse was considered to be adequate to cause death through autointoxication and fat embolism. We refer to the attached copy of the autopsy protocol. 3 photographic pictures of the corpse were taken before autopsy, of which prints are enclosed.
The investigation has not yet been concluded.
No. 11374
Supreme State prosecution: 22 May 33 [Signed]: Wintersberger
Submitted with 1 annex and 3 photos to the State Ministry for Justice Munich, 22 May 1933
The Prosecutor General of the Supreme State Court
* * * * *
File No. G 851, 924 ff/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 (Post office 35) Prosecution at the State Court Munich II (Telephone: Local 5791 Long distance: 57801)
* * * * *
To the prosecutor general with the Supreme State Court Munich.
No. 12430 with 1 extra copy.
[Stamp] Submitted to the State Ministry for Justice Munich, 2 June 1933 The prosecutor general with the Supreme State Court
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss in the Dachau concentration camp.
To my report of 22 May 1933.
In the above case I have today publicly indicted unknown culprits for injuries leading to death and the commandant of the camp, Waeckerle, the camp physician, Dr. Neurnbergk, as well as the first secretary of the chancellery, Mutzbauer, as accessories after the facts, and I requested that a preliminary court investigation should be started and carried out, furthermore that a warrant of arrest should be issued against above accused for danger of prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the progress of the proceedings.
The State prosecutor [Signed]: Wintersberger
* * * * *
Copy
Dachau, 17 May 1933
Protocol
_Subject_: Investigation and autopsy of Schloss, Louis, merchant from Nurnberg, deceased here by hanging.
_Present_: Court Counsellor [Amtsgerichtsrat] Dr. Guntz, State court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm, Instructor [Privatdozent] Dr. Mueller, Secretary of Justice Bruecklmeier.
Above court committee went today at 3 P.M. to the autopsy room in the cemetery of the village of Dachau. There was the corpse of the widowed merchant Louis Schloss, who was found hanged in the concentration camp Dachau, Prittlbach community, on 16 May 1933 and whose corpse is known to the state court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm from the cadaver inspection which has taken place on 16 May 1933 in the concentration camp.
The participating police sergeant Frey of the police station Pasing took three photographs of the deceased and these will be explained as part of this copy. The photographs will be sent directly from the photographic office Pasing to the state prosecutor Munich II.
* * * * *
Preliminary opinion
I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.
II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found, particularly on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as well as on both legs, abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In the region of the buttocks and the shoulders extensive destruction of adipose tissue was found together with the blood suffusions. This is adequate to explain death through autointoxication and fat embolism.
III. The proof has to be brought forth by microscopic examination of the parts of organs.
IV. Following were preserved: the organs of the neck and thorax, parts of the brain, the spleen, liver and kidneys, as well as the strangulation mark on the neck and blood for bacteriological examination.
Finished at 18.10 hours. Signed Dr. Flamm Signed: Dr. P. Mueller. The Court Commission of the Court Dachau Signed: Dr. Guntz, Court Counsellor Signed: Bruecklmeier, Secretary of Justice.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 645-PS
Reference Nr. G 928 ff/33 Munich, June 1, 1933 Office of the State Attorney of the Superior Court Munich II (tel. local 5791 long distance 57801). To: Attorney General of the Main Superior Court Munich.
SUBJECT: Death of prisoner Sebastian Nefzger in the Concentration Camp Dachau.
[written in ink]
No. 12434 with 1 part and 6 photos Presented to the State Ministry of Justice Munich, } June 2, 1933 } [Stamps] The Attorney General of the Main Superior Court } Sotier [? signature]
On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the lower court Dachau:
"Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933 to the Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the prisoner Nefzger, Sebastian, merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse 17/0, born: 1/10/1900 in Munich, religion Catholic, marital status: married--showed that death through the action of third persons must be excluded. Death was indubitably caused by excessive bleeding resulting from an opened artery of the left hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician."
Neither the lower court Dachau nor the state attorney Munich II had up to that time been informed of Nefzger's death reported in the letter in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in the night of the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The lower court Dachau informed the state attorney, Munich II of this letter. A coroner's inquest was ordered, which took place as late as May 27, 1933. Since the physician appointed by the superior court doubted that death had occurred due to excessive bleeding and identified marks of strings on the victim's neck, a judicial autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29, 1933. The resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I. the autopsy discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm must be excluded as a cause of death; II. the cut on the left wrist reveals three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are lacking. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the wound has been self-inflicted; III. It must be assumed that the cause of death was suffocation. As a cause for suffocation, strangulation and throttling must be considered. The characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree with those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by hanging.
6 photos were made of the corpse before the autopsy; one print is enclosed of each.
I have issued a public indictment, on the basis of murder, of the unknown perpetrators, and of camp commander Waeckerly, camp physician Dr. Nuernbergk, and chief secretary of the office Mutzbauer for having aided in the crime; and I have ordered the opening and execution of preliminary court proceedings, as well as the issuance of an arrest warrant for the said accused.
I shall make reports about the developments of the process.
The Chief State Attorney Wintersberger
_Deaths of the prisoners in protective custody_:
_Schloss, Louis_, merchant from Nurnberg (found hung on 5/16/1933).
_Hausmann, Leonhard_, unskilled worker from Augsburg, (shot by Scharfuehrer _Karl Ehmann_ on 5/17/33).
_Dr. Strauss, Alfred_, lawyer from Munich, (shot on 5/24/33).
_Kantschuster, Johann_, SS man for murder.
_Nefzger, Sebastian_, merchant from Munich, (died 5/25 to 5/26/33).
Indictment of _unknown_ perpetrators for murder and of _Waeckerle_, camp commander; Dr. _Nuernbergk_, camp physician; _Mutzbauer_, chief secretary of the office, for aiding in the crime.
_Lehrburger, Karl_, merchant from Nurnberg, (shot on 5/25/33) by SS man _Hans Steinbrenner_.
Z.d.A.: "Important Occurrences in the Concentration Camp Dachau."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 647-PS
(100 [crossed out, on top of it] "ten" [in pencil] photo copies copy [in ink])
Control number _Enclosure to number 1164/38 top secret WFA/L II_
Draft of June 3rd with changes Reichsfuehrer SS of June 10, 1938 and additions concerning signal corps unit.
[in ink] 1st Copy 3 copies 1st copy
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Reich's Chancellor. Berlin, 17 August 1938
[in ink]
10
[Signature illegible]
By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police in the ministry of the interior on June 17th 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 487), I have created the basis for the unification and reorganization of the German police.
With this step, the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP which were under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police even up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of the German police.
In order to regulate these tasks and in order to delineate the common tasks of the SS and of the Wehrmacht, I hereby order the following inclusively and basically:
[the above written in pencil]
I. General
1. Being a political organization of the NSDAP, the SS as such does not need any military set-up and training for its political obligations. It carries no weapons.
2. For special inner-political tasks for the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, tasks which I might have to assign to him from time to time, or for the mobile use within the wartime army (SS-Verfuegungstruppe). The following SS units which either already exist, or will be set up in case of mobilization, are exempted from the regulations of number 1:
The SS-Verfuegungstruppe. The SS-Junkerschulen. The SS-Totenkopfverbaende. The SS-reinforcement Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
In peacetime they are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, who, with the exception mentioned in paragraph II, _alone_ has the responsibility for the organization, training, arming, and full use in regard to inner-political tasks given him from me.
In peacetime, no organizational connection with the Wehrmacht exists in this regard. (See orders in II and III for the case of mobilization.)
Arms, ammunition, tools, equipment, and military handbooks for the armed SS units will be procured through the Wehrmacht, upon payment.
II. The armed units of the SS
A. _The SS-Verfuegungstruppe_
1. The SS Verfuegungstruppe is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit, exclusively at my disposal. As such, and as a unit of the NSDAP its members are to be selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the ideological and political standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln. Its members are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers from those who are subject to serve in the army who have finished their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period for volunteers is 4 years. It may be prolonged for SS-Unterfuehrer. Special regulations are in force for SS leaders. The regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount of time in the SS Verfuegungstruppe.
The SS Verfuegungstruppe receives its financial resources through the Ministry of the Interior. Its budget requires a check-up by the high command of the Wehrmacht.
2. The SS Verfuegungstruppe falls into the following parts:
1 headquarters staff. (Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler) motorized [in ink].
3 regiments 2 motorcycle battalions under a Standarte Staff. 1 engineer battalion motorized [in ink]. 1 signal battalion motorized [in ink]. 1 medical unit.
The complete strength, the organization, the arming, and the equipment of the SS Verfuegungstruppe depend on the task allocated in peace time and in case of mobilization.
In case of mobilization, the Standarten and independent Sturmbanne are organized like the corresponding units of an infantry division respectively of a motorized infantry division of the army [illegible remark in ink].
The engineer unit is fully motorized.
The signal unit (motorized) is organized like an infantry division signal unit (motorized).
The peacetime strength and equipment of the army are the pattern for the strength and equipment of the staffs and units of the SS Verfuegungstruppe. Personnel and material necessary above the peacetime strength and the table of equipment will be determined in cooperation with the high command of the Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
For use in the interior, the Standarten are reinforced by the following special formation:
(Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler)
reinforced by:
1 armored reconnaissance platoon. [Panzerspaehzug; the word "zug" is added in ink]. 1 motorcycle platoon. 1 motorized engineer platoon.
_the other Standarten_
by: _each_ 1 armored reconnaissance platoon. 1 light infantry motorcycle platoon.
and by additional telephone and radio units for the signal platoons.
_the non-motorized units_
by: 1 trucking platoon each.
The signal unit (motorized) with additional means of communication in order to safeguard the communication system of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police. The necessary personnel and material will be determined in cooperation with the high command of the Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
The final aim is the complete mobilization of all Standarten and independent units; in the case of mobilization, the skeleton corps of the reinforcement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to whom in peacetime the short training of replacements for the SS Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to be devoted to the task of insuring replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe (see C 2).
The supreme commander of the army prepares the SS Verfuegungstruppe for their use within the wartime army. He issues the necessary orders, regulates their working with reserve army authorities, supports the training and makes inspections. He is authorized to transfer these powers to lower echelon offices and to report to me about the state of combat training, after prior consultation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
A timely exchange of officers, respectively leaders between the army and the SS Verfuegungstruppe is to be carried out in mutual agreement as soon as the officer situation permits it.
Any changes in the organization, the strength and the arming of the SS Verfuegungstruppe have to be approved by me.
3. _Orders for the case of mobilization._
A. The employment of the SS Verfuegungstruppe in case of mobilization is a double one:
1. By the supreme commander of the army within the wartime army. In that case, it comes completely under military laws and regulation, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.
2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders. In that case, it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
In case of mobilization, I myself will make the decision about the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the SS Verfuegungstruppe into the wartime army; these things will depend on the inner political situation at that time.
During the war, the skeleton corps of the reinforcement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to whom in peacetime the short training of replacements for the SS Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to be devoted to the task of insuring a reserve which should meet the ideologic and political spirit of the Verfuegungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, all members of the SS who did their compulsory military duty in the SS Verfuegungstruppe are generally to be used to reinforce the SS Verfuegungstruppe. Older classes of the SS Verfuengungstruppe also may be used to fill up the ranks of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende police reinforcement which will be set-up in case of mobilization in so far as they are not needed as replacements for the SS Verfuengungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, the replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe also may be used to fill up the ranks of young, untrained draftees.
B. _The SS Junker Schools._
1. The SS Junker schools including the SS medical Junker school educate the officer replacements for the armed parts of the SS and for the German police.
2. The Junkers who have served at least one year of front line duty in the SS Verfuegungstruppe and have completed the SS Junker schools and subsequently the non-commissioned officer school successfully, and who have accordingly served more than two years under arms (see par. 8 of the military law), have fulfilled their compulsory military duty.
Leaders and leader aspirants who have successfully finished the non-commissioned officer school in service that is incorporated into the Wehrmacht, will be given a rank which corresponds to their rank, in the armed parts of the SS, or in the police.
3. The budgets of the SS Verfuegungstruppe, the SS Totenkopfverbaende, and the German police will bear the partial costs of the schools for that number of Junkers which corresponds to their calculated need for leaders.
4. These orders about the SS Junker schools are in force retroactive to March 15, 1935.
C. _The SS Totenkopfverbaende._
1. The SS Totenkopfverbaende are neither a part of the army nor of the police. They are a standing armed unit of the SS to clear up special tasks of police nature. I reserve the right to assign duties from time to time.
As such, as a unit of the NSDAP, they are to be selected and trained according to the ideological and political directives which I have issued for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln; they are to be replaced by the use of volunteers _capable of serving the SS_, who as a rule have served their compulsory military duty in the army. The army must give its agreement for special cases of exception. These units are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who is responsible to me for their organization, training, arming, and full readiness for action.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police is entitled to recruit suitable volunteers of the army before their discharge in cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
The service period for non-commissioned officers and men is 12 years. Service time in the army is to be counted. The necessary question of the pension will be taken up at a later date.
The SS Totenkopfverbaende receive their financial means through the ministry of the Interior.
Starting April 1st, 1938, the SS Totenkopfverbaende are organized as follows:
Directorate staff with signal unit,
4 Standarten with 3 Sturmbanne each with 3 infantry companies (each 148 men strong).
1 machine gun company (150 men strong).
1 medical unit.
1 medical group necessary for the medical care of those camp prisoners who work outside.
Besides, each Standarte:
1 motorcycle group (crossed out).
1 group with weapons suited for street fights to be set up in 1939 (crossed out).
1 trucking unit.
1 Signal platoon.
Besides 1 signal platoon for each Sturmbann to be set up in 1939 (crossed out).
2. Replacement units for the short time training for the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement). Strength corresponding to the reinforcement battalion of the army. All units of the SS Totenkopferbaende are to be motorized temporarily with 3-ton Opel-Blitz cars.
3. The strength and organization of the units will be determined by the extent of their special tasks of police nature (see fig. 1) and will be determined by me according to requirements upon suggestions of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
4. The armament and equipment of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depends on their special tasks (see fig. 1); both are to be suggested to me by the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, after he has discussed them with the supreme command of the army.
5. _Regulations for the case of the mobilization._
The SS Totenkopfverbaende form the skeleton corps for the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement) and will be replaced in the guarding of the concentration camps by members of the General SS who are over 45 years of age and had military training.
The skeleton corps which, up to now, were units of the two replacement units for the short time training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende will be transferred to the SS Verfuegungstruppe as skeleton crews of the replacement units for that unit.
D. Reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
1. The reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende is a police unit which will be set up and armed automatically in the case of mobilization, in an emergency, at my command.
2. The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police will decide its strength within the total strength of all police units which I shall determine for the territory of the Reich.
3. The organization, distribution of units, armament, and training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depend entirely on the police tasks they will have to handle.
The responsibility for the full readiness for action in that respect rests with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who will have to make suitable suggestions to me concerning armament and equipment, after prior consultation with the supreme command of the army.
4. The training of the reinforcements of the SS Totenkopfverbaende who are provided for the use of war and are between 25 and 35 years of age will be undertaken in peacetime by the replacement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (compare with C 2).
5. The ministry of the interior will request the financial resources for the training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende from the supreme command of the army, as R.V. special resources.
III. The General SS (Allgemeine SS)
All other members, not mentioned in I or II of the general SS (Allgemeine SS) which is unarmed, are at the disposal of the army in case of war (according to the regulations of the military law).
However, considering the special inner-political tasks which the SS has to solve in close connection with the German police in case of mobilization, I hereby order the following:
1. The staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, the staffs of the three main offices (SS, Sd, and RuS main officer, the SS Oberabschnittsstaebe and SS Abschnittstaebe) remain in case of war for tasks of police nature. The Reichsfuehrer SS regulates their strength which will be cut down to a minimum size for that purpose, SS members provided for those staffs are to be deferred from service in the army in case of war.
2. All clothing and equipment, motor cars, arms, ammunition and other equipment owned by the SS are regulated by the legal orders in case of mobilization; this, provided they are not necessary for the setting up of the armed SS units and staffs mentioned under I and II.
IV. Decrees of execution
The supreme command of the army issues the decrees of execution necessary to paragraph II in all questions concerning the army and the case of mobilization in cooperation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police issues the decrees of execution concerning the police and inner political measures in cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
/s/ Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 651-PS
Reich Minister of Justice
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 65 31 January 1938
Telephone: 110044
_4611--I a [7=] 194/38_ To the Presidents of the High Courts.
Subject: Representation by Counsel of Inmates of Concentration Camps.
VERY CONFIDENTIAL
In preparing a decision of Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police whether individual attorneys can be allowed in general to take over the representation of inmates in Concentration Camps, I ask you to scrutinize at once if and what attorneys in your district could be considered for this purpose. Representation of inmates of Concentration Camps requires a special measure of suitability and dependability. Severe scrutiny is to be exercised in making the selection. Membership in the NSDAP, in so far as it was not acquired until after January 30, 1933, will not of itself warrant the necessary dependability as a rule; on the other hand this prerequisite is not to be denied because the attorney is not a member of the Party. Consideration can only be given attorneys whose attitude leaves no doubt that their views coincide wholly with the political aspirations of the State and the ideology aims of the movement. Moreover, it can be assumed that attorneys whose field of activity does not extend to taking over the defense in criminal affairs, will as a rule not accept representation of inmates of Concentration Camps.
Attorneys suitable for representation of inmates of Concentration Camps who should, if possible, reside in different localities of your district, should be listed in sufficient number according to Offices of the State Police. With reference to the necessity of very confidential treatment, I beg therefore to consult as an expert the president of the Chamber of Counsel about their qualifications. A consultation of offices not within the Administration of Justice is to be avoided. I ask that two copies of the list be presented after receiving the advice of the President of the Chamber of Counsel. With regard to the attorneys names, proof of personal and professional qualification is to be submitted. Besides stating the attorney's characteristic and political attitude and especially his manner of practicing his profession as defense counsel in penal matters, it is also to be investigated, if possible, if reason exists to assume that the attorney has the confidence of the Office of State Police.
An eventual notice of non-compliance is required.
Deputy, sig. Schlegelberger [stamped:] Reich Ministry of Justice Office of the Ministry Certified sig. Schlichting Secretary of the Office of the Ministry
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 654-PS
U I _b_
Discussion with Reich Fuehrer of SS Himmler on 18.9.42 in his Field Headquarters in the presence of State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger, SS Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender.
1. Correction [2 illegible pencilled words] by special treatment at the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough. On the suggestion of Reichsleiter Bormann, the following agreement was reached between the Reich Fuehrer of SS and myself:
_a._ In principle the Fuehrer's time is no longer to be burdened with these matters.
_b._ The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
_c._ The Reich Fuehrer of SS will send the reports, which he sent hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for Justice.
_d._ If the views of the Reich Fuehrer of SS and those of the Reich Minister for Justice agree, the final decision on the case will rest with them.
_e._ If their views are not in agreement, the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on the case, and he will possibly inform the Fuehrer.
_f._ In cases where the Fuehrer's decision on a mild sentence is sought through other channels (such as by a letter from a Gauleiter) Reichsleiter Bormann will forward the report to the Reich Minister for Justice. The case will then be decided as already described by the Reich Fuehrer of SS and the Reich Minister for Justice.
2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann.
3. Administration of justice by the people. This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible, first of all in the villages and the small towns of up to about 20,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to carry it out in large towns. I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this scheme by an article in the Hoheitstrager (NSDAP publication). It is evident that jurisdiction may not lie in the hands of the Party. [Marginal note in pencil: according to the permanency of the courts (?)]
4. Orders regarding the police and justice are, in future, to be tempered, for example, not prosecuting unmarried mothers if they attempt to procure abortion.
5. The Reich Fuehrer of SS is agreed that the cancellation of sentence, even for members of the police, will rest, as in Article 8 of the law relating to the cancellation of sentence, with the Reich Minister for Justice.
6. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has given full consent to the ruling I have planned on the corporal punishment ordered by the Fuehrer.
7. I shall refer to the Common Law relating to Aliens and will give notification of the claims of Justice, e.g. in the identification of young people as anti-social elements and their arrest. Also, it seems to me that the actual circumstances which serve to stamp a person as anti-social are not laid down in the law with sufficient clarity. The Reich Fuehrer of SS is waiting for our opinion, and until then will not carry out the text of the law.
8. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has agreed to a clause for the Juvenile Court Law, whereby the age of discretion can be reduced to 12 years and the reduced age of discretion can be extended to over 18 years. [Marginal note in pencil: "by which he has made clear that a reduction in the age limit of full age of discretion is meant."]
9. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender, of the Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS, is appointed by the Reich Fuehrer of SS as liaison officer for matters which appear to necessitate direct liaison with the Reich Fuehrer of SS. He can be contacted any time by tele-printer in the Field Headquarters of the Reich Fuehrer of SS, and will come once every month to Berlin to report to me here. Hauptsturmfuehrer Wanniger is appointed as liaison officer for other matters, and he will be at Security Headquarters (Sicherheitsharuptamt).
10. The Reich Fuehrer of SS declared that, in the infliction of punishment, special establishments should be set up, on the principle that confirmed criminals should be confined separately and that those capable of improvement should be separated according to the nature of their crimes (e.g. impostors, thieves and those who have committed acts of violence). This was recognized as correct.
11. The Reich Fuehrer of SS demands that the penal register should be kept by the police. Arguments against this are to be examined (cancellation and tightening up of the Penal Register Bill and additions made to it). The question is to be further discussed with Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach.
12. The Reich Fuehrer of SS pointed out as reliable SS--Obersturmfuehrer Reichsgerichtsrat _Altstetter_, at present on
## active service as a Major, and also Landgerichtspraesident _Stepp_; he
designated as unreliable Generalstaatstanwalt _Jung_ in Dresden.
13. Finally, the Reich Fuehrer of SS broached the subject of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and its transfer to the police. I rejected it flatly. There was no further discussion of this subject.
14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial Lists.
Signed Th.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 656-PS
National Socialist German Workers' Party Party Chancellory
The Chief of the Party Chancellory
Fuehrer's Headquarters SECRET
[Stamp]
Circular No. 12/43g.
SECRET
Subject: Law of Self-Defense against P.O.W.'s
I acknowledge the copy of the annexed order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.
(s) M. BORMANN
F.d.R. Hilegardt _1 copy_ Distrb. Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Verbaendefuehrer.
index cards: Prisoners of War/Guard Personnel/Self-Defense/ Physical Punishment.
* * * * *
Copy
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht Berlin 29.1.1943 Az 2f 24.74 AWA/Prisoners of War. General (IA) No. 3868 142g
SECRET
Subject: Self Defense against Prisoners of War. Reference: None.
The question of the treatment of Prisoners of War is continually being brought up and discussed by Wehrmacht and Party bureaus, namely that the possibilities of punishment provided in the agreement of 1929 (M. Dr.-38/2) are not sufficient. Primarily neither the military punishment law nor the discipline law, which has been eliminated for German military personnel, offers a punishment which can be used with satisfactory success in case of an insubordinate and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War. The following is hereby fundamentally affirmed:
1. The M.Dr. 38/2 (Agreement 1929) article 46, states that Prisoners of War cannot receive any other punishments than those meted out to German military personnel. That applies to all Prisoners of War with the exception of Soviet Prisoners of War. For Soviet Prisoners of War the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 2 f 24.73 AWA/Prisoners of War, General (IA) No. 389/42g of the 24.3.1942 Article A, fourth paragraph is applicable.
2. Improper and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War toward German guard personnel as well as toward German contractors and workers forces and justifies this being enacted for the preservation of their own dignity and of national esteem. German law has an application for this; in the case of self-defense ST GB Art 53 is applicable. According to the existing law, self-defense occurs not only in the case of present actual attacks but also present attacks on one's honor, on one's property, etc. The law of self-defense concerns not only the party attacked, it applies also to the protection of a third party from attack. Third, in the sense of the N Art 53 a.a. G, are not only persons, but also the persons of the public and private law, as for instance the State, the municipality, society etc. The party attacked can use for protection any means that the situation requires and the use of which does not contradict healthy national interest [Gesunden Volksempfinden]. A _subsequent_ punishment of a prisoner of war for an improper and provoking attitude of _physical chastisement_ is not permissible since self-defense is no longer present.
3. In case of the diminishing of the effort to work only the guard and the assistant guard (for example among the farmers there is very often a personal union between assistant-guard and contractor) can interfere as the military superior of the Prisoners of War. In this he is not only authorized but also obliged by duty (see Order of the OKW A2 2f 2417a Chief of Prisoners of War/General (I)/Org (IIIb) No. 2916/42 of the 26.6.1942). Should the prisoners of war not fulfill his order, _then he has in the case of the most pressing need and danger,--the right to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means_. He can use the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal. If the assistant guard is not armed, then, he is authorized in forcing obedience by other applicable means.
4. The military personnel, officials, and assisting guard personnel who are charged with the duty of guarding prisoners of war are to be instructed accordingly. It is to be made clear to them what means the law puts at their disposal, in order that they may be able to combat insubordinations, provocative attitudes and abatement of the will to work on the part of the prisoners of war, and what also the limits are to which they can go.
Distribution: * * * D.d.R.d.A.: Weber Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht /s/ Reinecke F.d.R. /s/ v. Graevenitz Majorgeneral.
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 661-PS
[Secret Thesis from the Academy of German Law on Resettlement, January 1940]
Resettlement, mixed settlement, emigration, national biological power [biologische Volkstumskraft]
Short consideration of the prerequisites for a political legal system of the peoples. [Volkspolitische Rechtsgestaltung]
1 _a._ _Resettlement_ (pages 6-8).
For the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the increase of agricultural production, the Governmental-General can at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already over-populated. * * * By further absorption of 1.6 million resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of already existing rural over-population and lack of industry would result in a double over-population.
This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from the Reich:
The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether over 1 million).
The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in the past, and potential political leaders.
The leading economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates, industrialists and businessmen, etc.
The peasant population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry out by strips of German settlements the encirclement of Polish territories in the East.
6 to 7 million Poles (not including the majority of the Wasserpolen, Schlonsaken, Kaschuben) would therefore remain for an extended period of time in the liberated East, and it will be possible to accept only a small fraction of them into German folksdom. * * * A resettlement of many millions can only be undertaken after victory and only in connection with an overwhelming reorganization of the East, which would create space for the surplus Poles, be it in Siberia, or be it in the bordering territories, for example after the resettlement eastwards of the White Russians. A resettlement of several million Jews, perhaps in Madagascar, could also create space.
* * * * *
_c._ In regard to internal colonization of the East of the Reich, it might be expedient to envisage the carrying out of a planned encirclement of the districts with a Polish majority by wide strips of German settlements. Also, a concentration of the remaining Poles in order to create space can be considered.
_d._ In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should remove cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands, employ them for a few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into the old Reich must be prevented.)
If 1.5 million people are to be transferred in short order (in about 4 years, i.e., 1000 daily) from the East of the Reich and are to be absorbed by the Government-General, if among them there are barely 1 million Poles and the rest Jews, then 7 million Poles would remain in the Reich, including Poles in Germany proper and Austria, but not including prisoners of war, seasonal workers from the Government-General and for the time being also Kaschuben, and of course Masurians and other Slavic Germanic tribes. There would be 1 Pole for every 12 Germans in the Reich excluding the Government-General.
The figure of 7 million comprises for example the following peoples: Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians; it is double the number of Sudeten-Germans in former Czechoslovakia.
It is terrifyingly high and cannot be decreased considerably by emigration assimilation, or additional future transfer to the Government-General.
This mass of Poles is a great inconvenience, an obstacle to the Germanization of the country, and under certain circumstances a danger. It can be reduced by enlarging the Government-General.
In renouncing an area with a population of 1 million, it would be possible not only to get rid of this number of Poles but about 1.2 million, since the areas in question are sufficiently fertile to absorb 15 to 20% additional resettlers. For example, the territory of the former district of Lodz (19,000 square kilometers) had a population of 2.86 million (1938). One could take 150,000 Germans from their area and put over 3 million Poles into it. Or by giving up the Cracow Ural district (Olkusz) and the Zickenau district one could get rid of about 1.5 million Poles, including additional settlers from the Reich. The further deliberations presuppose that no areas of the Eastern districts (Ostgaue) will be renounced in favor of the Government-General. Therefore a major part of this Polish mass, which is much too large, could emigrate only to areas East of the Government-General. A prerequisite would be a thorough reorganization of the entire East and many of its numerous peoples, under the determining influence of the Reich (a memorandum is necessary). The total emigration of over 3 million Jews (possibly to Madagascar) would also create space for Polish resettlement.
About 1 million Poles could be taken out of their settlements, but not from the Reich, and used as agricultural and industrial itinerant labor. This would doubtless result in considerable relief, particularly from the biological viewpoint.
* * * * *
Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda and official correspondence which contains instructions detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in Paris or the USA.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 666-PS
SECRET
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
DIRECTIVES
for the prosecution of offences against the Reich or against the occupation authorities in the occupied territories.
7 December 1941
With the beginning of the Russian campaign, communist elements and other anti-German circles increased their attacks on the Reich and the occupation authorities in the occupied territories. The extent and the danger of these activities compel to most severe measures against the guilty for the purpose of intimidation.
For the time being the following directions shall be observed:
I
In regard to offences committed by non-German civilians in the occupied territories against the Reich or the occupation authorities which endanger their security or efficiency, the death sentence is adequate as a matter of principle.
II
The offences referred to in section I are to be tried in the occupied territories only if it is likely that the guilty persons, at least the main offenders, will be sentenced to death and if the proceedings and the execution of the death sentences can be carried out quickly. Otherwise the offenders, at least the main offenders, are to be brought to Germany.
III
Guilty persons who are brought to Germany are to be subject to court-martial proceedings there only if specific military interests make it necessary. German or foreign authorities making inquiries are to be told that the guilty persons had been arrested and that the state of the proceedings did not permit to give further information.
IV
The commanders in the occupied territories and the legal representatives are personally responsible for the execution of this decree within the framework of their competence.
VI
The chief of the high command of the armed forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized to explain, to make provisions for the execution of the decree and to supplement it. The Reich minister of justice issues the provisions for the execution of the law for his district.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces By order (I.A.) (signed) KEITEL
_DISTRIBUTION_:
Foreign Office
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Reich leader SS and Chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of Interior.
High Command of the Army (Chef H. Ruest u. BDE--HR) with 7 N.A.
High Command of the Navy (MR) with 1 N.A.
Reich Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air force (ZAR) with 1 N.A.
President of the Reich Court-Martial
Commander Southeast with 4 N.A.
Commander Norway
Commander Netherlands
Commander Eastland
Commander Ukraine
Plenipotentiary of the armed forces with the Reich Protector Bohemia and Moravia
Armistice Commission Wiesbaden
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Chief West Abt. L with 8 N.A. W Pr Amt Aus 1/Abw. (ZR) Abt. Ausl. Abw. III
AWA
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 668-PS
Copy
Chief of the Security Police and the SD--IV D 4--103/42 g--Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht Street 8, 24 June 1942
SECRET
To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for the attention of the Oberregierungsrat DOWALDT or his acting deputy.
Berlin W 35, at Tirpitzufer 72--76
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in occupied territories.
_Reference_: Circular dated 16 April 1942--14 n 16.18 WR (I 3/4) Nr 242/42 g.
By virtue of the above-named edict a considerable number of persons who were arrested in the occupied district of France have been transferred to camp Hinzert at Trier, pending commencement of the main proceedings before the competent special court in Cologne.
The 67-year old Frenchman, Louis Adolf Rousseau, died here recently of a stroke.
Thus the question has arisen--which has not been settled until now--as to what steps are to be taken in such cases of death.
It is the intent of the general directions of the Fuehrer and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht concerning prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in occupied territories, dated 7 December 1941, to create, for deterrent purposes, uncertainty about the fate of prisoners among their relatives and acquaintances, through the deportation into Reich territory of persons arrested in occupied areas on account of anti-German activity. This goal would be forfeited if the relatives were to be notified in cases of death. Surrender of the body for burial at home is inadvisable for the same reason, and also because the place of burial could be misused for demonstration purposes.
I therefore propose that the following general rule be decided upon for cases of death:
_a._ Notification of relatives is not to take place.
_b._ The body is buried at the place of death, in the Reich.
_c._ The place of burial is not made known for the time being.
In the case of the deceased Frenchman Rousseau, I have given orders which accord with the above proposal and I will do likewise in the future pending a decision by you.
pp. [signature illegible]
* * * * *
SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72--76, July 13, 1942 14 m 16.18 WR (I 3/4), No. 562/42 g To the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service Berlin SW11, Prinz Albrecht Str. 8 [Pencil alteration]
[Pencil note--] E46 E8/46 38/42 Reich Ministry of Justice 16th July 1942 Section
By way of information to:
Supreme Command of the Army
Supreme Command of the Navy
Reich Minister of Air Transportation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces
President of the Reich Court Martial
Reich Minister of Justice
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Headquarters
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in the occupied territories.
_Reference_:--IV D 4--103/42 g--of June 24, 1942. 1 enclosure.
The supreme command of the armed forces agrees to the suggested treatment of cases of death. The decree of April 16, 1942, will in due course be supplemented accordingly.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Per: Dr. Lehmann
[Handwritten note--largely undecipherable]
(Stamp of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) Checked: Bachmann, Justizoberinspektor d.Lw. IV a 863/42 g [Handwritten note]
1. _Note_: Procedure in cases of death has already been laid down by IX para. 5 of the draft of a second order for the carrying out of the general directions * * * of decree of the OKW dated 16.4.42.--
In my opinion the case of death quoted in the letter of the Reichfuehrer-SS dated 24.6.42 precludes the necessity of a supplement to the draft, mentioned.
2. Submit to me 3.8.
RM 29.7.
Submitted to OBGK (?) Dr. V. Ammon 3.8.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 674-PS
_1st copy_
President of the High District Court and Chief Public Prosecutor
Kattowitz, 3 December 1941
Nikolai Str. 1, Entrance Wilhemsplatz Tel.: 34608 and 34610
VS 4 E-1. 51 secret _file nr. 229_
[illegible notations]
"SECRET" only
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Attention: Chief Councillor to the Government Stadermann or Representative in Office.
Berlin
_Re_: Executions by the Police and Expediting of Penal Procedure Without Order.
Inclosure: 1 copy of report
About 3 weeks ago 6 chief agents (partially German) were hanged by the police in connection with the destruction of a treasonable organization of 350 members in Tarnowitz without notification of the ministry of justice. Such execution of criminal agents in the Bielitz district have already been made before also without the knowledge of the proper authority for criminal persecution. On 2 December 1941 the head of the state police at Kattowitz, chief councillor to the government Mildner, reported orally to the undersigned that he had ordered as necessary immediate action, with authority from the Reich-leader of the SS these executions by public hanging at the place of the crime; and that deterring measures would also have to be continued in the future until the criminal and actively anti-German powers in the occupied Eastern territories have been destroyed, or until other immediate actions, perhaps also by the courts, would guarantee equal frightening effect. Accordingly, 6 leaders of another Polish organization guilty of high treason in the district in and around Sosnowitz were to be hanged publicly today as an example.
About this procedure the undersigned expressed considerable doubts.
Besides the fact that such measures have been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are contradictory to the laws not put out of effect, a justified emergency for the exceptional proceedings by the police alone cannot, in our opinion, be lawfully recognized.
The penal justice in our district within the limits of our jurisdiction is quite capable of fulfilling its duty of immediate penal retribution by means of a special form of special judicial activity (establishment of a so-called rapid special court). Indictment and proceeding could be speeded up in such a way that between turning the case over to the public prosecutor and execution no more than 3 days would elapse if the practice of pardoning is simplified and if the decision, if necessary, can be obtained by long distance call. This was expressed yesterday to the head of the state police at Kattowitz by the undersigned.
We cannot believe that execution by the police of criminals, especially German criminals, can be considered more effective through shattering the sense of justice of many German countrymen. In the long run they might, in spite of public terrorizing, lead even more to further brutality of minds, which is contrary to the intended purpose of pacifying. These deliberations, however, do not apply to future lawful competence of a drumhead court-martial for Poles and Jews.
According to a recent report of the head of the Kattowitz state police to the district leader [Gauleiter] Bracht, the cases of 540 persons accused of high treason from the Kattowitz district have already been forwarded in December 1940 by the police to the board of arraignment of the people's court in Berlin without any sentences having been passed there as yet. This situation, which became known in the various branches of interested party circles and administration departments, injures the reputation of justice in general as well as the concept of the effectiveness of justice in the occupied Eastern territories especially because, with the exception of the court, the exclusive competence of the people's court for the sentencing of matters of high treason is not sufficiently known.
We are not informed as to how far the described situation of non-settlement is true.
As far as the proceedings of treasonable cases by the chief Reich prosecutor at the people's court in Berlin are concerned which were forwarded for prosecution to the co-undersigned public prosecutor (proceedings per par. 5 section 2 of the law about the competence of criminal courts dated 21 Feb. 40--RGBl I, p. 405--in connection with the AV of Reich justice ministry dated 7 June 45--German law, page 683) we should like to point out the following:
From July 1941 until today, the cases of 235 accused were forwarded by the chief Reich prosecutor; 122 of the accused have already been sentenced, indicted, or proceedings were suspended or transferred.
The co-undersigned president of the supreme country court has taken steps to expedite prosecution further by personally supplementing the criminal court for high treason. If it should become necessary in the future, a second court could be appointed for the prosecution of matters of high treason by putting aside less important work. All organizations charged with prosecuting and sentencing of high treason and also with other severe crimes have been impressed by the undersigned that a speedy treatment is essential for war and nation.
With these organizational measures intended and already partially introduced by us of creating a "Rapid Special Court" which should also be technically equipped with everything necessary, and with the likely establishment at any time of a second court for matters of high treason in Kattowitz, the executions by the police still remain necessary as immediate actions against traitors, according to the chief councillor to the government Mildner, for the anti-German treasonal activity is supposed to have increased to such an extent that comparisons with the situation in 1917 and 1918 are already permissible, and that the criminals draw courage and power from the drawn-out legal trials of the traitors. The situation in the Kattowitz district is supposed to be especially difficult because there are 1-1/2 million Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 7,000 Jews among the 3 million population whose anti-German attitude is being joined in a remarkable way by more and more Germans in the last months. A further worsening of the situation is to be counted on if the war should last longer; for the Poles are said to be fanatically convinced of the victory of the Western countries and of a resurrection of their country, and, without inhibition, risk everything which does not seem to be punishable by death. The terrorist activity of the last few months does not appear to leave the Reich Germans in the Eastern occupied districts unimperilled. The slightest military set-back could result in immediate danger due to the growing and immediate terrorist readiness of the anti-German organizations. These are the reasons why the head of the state police considers as necessary immediate measures also in the field of high treason. If such steps could be taken by judicial means, this would seem also to him the best solution since the state police is already overburdened and suffering from considerable personnel shortage.
After this discourse we cannot help but have the impression that the situation, especially with respect to high treason (terrorist) activity has grown serious since the spring of 1941 and that special measures have to be taken to subdue same effectively. We pointed out to the head of the state police our insufficient competence in this field, but have informed him that we would report this matter to the Reich minister of justice.
In view of the great judicial importance of the mentioned problems for the district of the Kattowitz high county court, we deem an early personal discussion at Kattowitz necessary, and that the chief councillor to the government Mildner and perhaps a representative of the people's court and of the chief Reich prosecutor at the people's court should be taken into consultation.
(signed) Dr. Heimer
[illegible notes showing that the conference had taken place]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 675-PS
SECRET
Nationalsocialist German Workers Party Berlin--Wilhelm Str. 64 Munich, Brown House The Deputy of the Fuehrer
To the Reichminister for Justice, Attn: Ministerial office director Stadermann or his deputy
[Rubber stamp] Reichministry for Justice 25 August 1938,
Dept V Gst a, 16 Aug 1938, III D--Es, 3315/0/31--3604 Secret Berlin W 8 Wilhelmstrasse 65
_Subject_: Austrian Concordat Your letter of 23 May 1938--Va 146/38 Secret
I have purposely not taken a hand in the letters, which I have received from various Reichministers as well as from the Reichfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, since the Fuehrer's decision on that was known to me already in connection with a lecture by the Reichcommissioner for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich. I therefore have refrained to take a standpoint again to the questions, mentioned in your letter, and have requested the Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory in a letter of 29 June 1938, to inform you about the Fuehrer's decision. Therefore, the questions, as far as they concern the validity of the Austrian Concordat, are taken care of by the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory of 12 July 1938--Rk 276 B Secret.
However, in order to be able to take into account the general political considerations in the measures, probably planned for Austria for the execution of this decision of the Fuehrer, and to keep to the church-political line of the Fuehrer, I request from you, to get into contact at the proper time before taking action in these measures besides with the Reich Commissioner for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich, also with the Reich Minister for church affairs and with the Fuehrer's deputy.
Heil Hitler! By order /s/ BORMANN (M. BORMANN)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 680-PS
SECRET
The Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior
Berlin, 5 May 1938 NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6
Phone: Dept Z, I, II, V, VIII 11 00 27, IV, VI, VII (Unter den Linden 70--72) 12 00 34
Cable address: Reichsinnenminister Nr I 176/38, 1014 g
Urgent
To:
_a._ The Reich- and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, attention: Government Councillor [Regierungsrat] URLAUCH or his deputy in office.
_b._ The Foreign Office, attention: Councillor [AMTS- and HOFRAT] SCHIMPKE or his deputy in office.
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice, attention: Ministerial Office Director STADERMANN or his deputy in office.
_d._ The Reich Minister for Education, attention: Government Councillor [Regierungsrat] JAEHNERT or his deputy in office.
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer, attention: SS-Inspector KNOBLAUCH or his deputy in office.
_f._ The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German Police attention: SS 2nd Lt, Government Councillor Dr. TANZMANN or his deputy in office.
SUBJECT: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
The question of further validity of the Austrian Concordat (Konkordat) which has already been brought up by the Reich- and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs in his letters to the Foreign Office of 22 March 1938--II 1563/38--and of 26 March 1938--G II 1596/38--, is one of fundamental importance for a number of matters to be worked out by the central office for the execution of the reunion of Austria with the German Reich as well as other offices of the Reich and Austria concerned with it. This question has to be brought to a conclusive clarification immediately.
I deem the following conceptions possible:
The Concordat will not be considered as binding already for the reason that it has not at all been reached _within the framework of the constitution_.
The more detailed reasons for that are evident from the following:
1. The negotiations for conclusion of the Concordat had come to an end already on 5 June 1933, on which day the Concordat had been initialed in Vatican City.
Regardless of that, the Concordat was not submitted for further constitutional processing by the federal government of Austria for almost a whole year, because the National Council of Austria was considered suspended in accordance with the so-called "self-elimination" thesis represented by the federal government due to the resignation of all its three presidents, and beyond that, the acceptance of the Concordat could not be expected because of the majority relationships as they existed at that time within the National Council.
The constitutional processing, in accordance with article 50 of the federal constitutional law as provided for in the version of 1929 (RGBl Nr 1/1930), would have had to consist of the fact that the Concordat, being a political and law-changing treaty of the State, would have to be presented to the National Council for approval in order to attain its validity, in which connection the respective decision regarding the character of this State treaty, which simultaneously changes the constitution, can only be made in the presence of at least half of the members of the National Council with a majority of two thirds of the votes cast; besides, the decision of the National Council would have had to be submitted to further prescribed procedure (presentation to the Federal Council).
The Concordat was processed further only in conjunction with the development which led to the constitution of 1934, and that in the following manner:
While, up to that date, the repeatedly uttered request for another session of the National Council had always been opposed on the ground that it was impossible to convoke it because of the so-called "self-elimination program" and whilst, on the basis of this claim, one had governed by means of the enabling act for war economy which had originally been passed for certain exclusively economic purposes (RGBl. No. 307/1917), now all of a sudden, also based on this act, by a decree dated 24 April 1934 (RGBl. I No. 238/1934), the federal act concerning the rules of procedure of the National Council was amended to the effect that, although a president did not exist, the National Council was in a position to reassemble.
This procedure was absolutely unconstitutional. The Federal Government prevented through police power the attempt of the last-retired president of the National Council to revive this body by summoning the National Council anew in his capacity as the last president. On the other hand, the Federal Government had also constantly refused to use the possibility given by article 18, paragraph 3-5 of the Federal constitutional Law of 1929, to set the National Council going again through an emergency decree of the Federal president. Instead of this, in the meantime, all possible legal measures were based upon the enabling act for war economy, which was entirely contrary to the realm of authorization of this law and entirely against the constitution. An especially notorious abuse of the enabling act for war economy was the employment of the enabling act for war economy for the issuance of the aforementioned decree with which the rules of procedure of the National Council were changed.
As it turned out, the National Council summoned on this basis no longer had the composition with which it had emerged from the last elections; on the contrary it was only a rump-parliament, because all mandates of the Social Democratic Labor Party in the meantime were also declared void by a decree of February 16, 1934 (RGBl. I Nr 100/1934) also based upon the before-mentioned enabling act for war economy.
This rump-parliament assembled on 30 April 1934 for a conference in which solemn declarations were made by the Gross Deutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund--the two parties with outspoken National character--in which the constitutional legality of the whole procedure was expressly disputed, after which all delegates of the two named parties left the conference, with the exception of one delegate of the Landbund who at the same time was holding a public office, so that for the further discussions and resolutions only the before-mentioned one delegate of the Landbund and the delegates of the Christian-Social-Party and the Heimatschutz remained who together comprised only 76 delegates.
These 76 delegates now passed the so called Federal Constitutional Law concerning extraordinary measures within the jurisdiction of the constitution (RGBl. I Nr. 255/1934). Through Art. I of which the above mentioned decrees of Art. 50 of the Federal Constitutional Law of 1929 concerning the co-operation of the National Council in National treaties were cancelled. This constituted, in addition to the unconstitutional manner of the summons, a further very substantial violation of the constitution, in that--as has been mentioned already in the beginning--according to Art. 44, section 1, of the Federal Constitutional Law in the version of 1929, constitutional laws could only be passed in the presence of at least one half of the members of the National Council with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, but the National Council consisted, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the election rules of 165 delegates and therefore the presence of at least 83 delegates would have been required in order to pass upon a resolution changing the constitution.
After the federal constitutional law of 30 April 1934 had also been presented to the Federal Council which for the same reasons as the National Council, held sessions as a rump body, and it had issued no protest, it was announced yet on 30 April 1934, causing the day of its taking effect to be 1 May 1934.
Already during the night of 30 April to 1 May 1934, the exchange of ratifications prepared with the Papal Nuntio took place and already on the 1 May 1934 the concordat was made public in the federal gazette.
From the preceding explanation it is evident, that the Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria has been concluded under circumstances which offer the possibility to represent, with reasons which cannot be contradicted, the point of view that the conclusion of the Concordat was completely in violation of the constitution and therefore no legal validity can be attributed to the Concordat. In this respect it has to be noted that the fact that the Concordat was concluded in violation of the constitution was regarded as a fact already at that time in all serious judicial circles in Austria. (Compare in this respect particularly also the remarks referring to the Concordat made in the work of Guerke on "The Austrian Constitution of 1934" in the archive of public law, new edition, volume 25, page 178 pp.).
This point of view would open up the following additional path:
The Reich government declares to the Holy See on the basis of these facts that, after examining the legal angle, it had come to the conclusion that for the reason stated it could not recognize the Concordat any longer and is combining with that also with the effect "ex nunc" and with simultaneous legal settlement of the questions remaining unclarified through the abrogation of the Concordat, the abolition of the Austrian legal regulations referring to the Concordat (Federal law RGBl II, Nr. 8/1934 in the version of RGBl Nr. 134/1935 and decree RGBl II Nr. 13/1934).
2. The Concordat has expired automatically, through the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, because Austria has vanished as independent state, has obtained the constitutional position of a German state and therefore lost the position as a subject of international law. This point of view which by reason of logic can surely only be taken _retroactive to 13 March 1938_, would be based more exactly on the following:
Within the international legal sphere there is no general legal succession of the territorial successor into the rights and duties of the territorial predecessor. It rather has to be scrutinized in each case separately, whether a legal succession in accordance with international law occurs. With the fall of the territorial predecessor, the bilateral state treaties concluded by him are as a rule void. However some exceptions to this principle are recognized: National practice has shown that state treaties will be renewed tacitly by the territorial successor simply by administering them further. But a new state may also be forced, in order to obtain desired recognition, to take over certain state treaties. A general _duty in accordance with international law_ for the fulfillment of obligations resulting from treaties made by the territorial predecessor, exists, however, only in the following cases: As a rule, state treaties which concern the territory of the state taken over as such, that is, so-called "ratifizierte" treaties (border treaties, treaties on rivers and roads of communication), will also fall to the territorial successor. Furthermore, those Concordats which have in accordance with customary law found recognition beyond the sphere of the partners of the treaty, will also be valid for the territorial successor. Lastly, rules can be established through a collective treaty which determines a certain order for a group of states. Those norms also remain in effect in case of territorial changes within that group and therefore also fall to the territorial successor. (Compare Verdross, international law 1937, Page 71.)
The following additional consequences would be combined with the conceptions mentioned above:
To 1: The establishment of the unconstitutional conclusion of the Concordat would first of all represent a strong moral verdict against the whole past system connected with the names Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, which could be politically very desirable for various reasons.
The attitude of the Reich government toward the other bilateral State treaties signed by Austria would not be prejudiced as no other state treaty of more importance was signed under the same circumstances as the Concordat. One would prefer this procedure in the expected discussions with other countries, some of which (Jugoslavia, Poland, England) have already referred to their stipulated rights in Austria.
The declaration that the Concordat will not be acknowledged on the grounds of unconstitutionality and the repeal of the connected Austrian legal provisions with "ex nunc" effect would not influence the validity of the legal acts based on the Concordat (especially on the field of matrimonial law as to states rights). An express legalization of the past is therefore not required.
Furthermore one could arrive at the point where the conception could be maintained that former Austrian territory, in contrast to remaining Reich territory, had become entirely free of the Concordat, an interpretation which would be especially unwelcome to the Holy See for various reasons, and would force open the entire question of the future relationship between the Reich and the Holy See with all the resulting consequences in favor of the Reich in eventual further conferences with the Holy See.
To 2: On a former occasion the church adopted this point of view, as the Reich- and Prussian Minister for church affairs has already pointed out in his letter to the Foreign Office of 22 March 1938.
Thus in a statement to the secret consistory of 21 November 1921 Pope Benedict XV discussed the question of the validity and tenure of the Concordats, since retroactive effects had arisen from the changes in state territories and organizations produced by the world war. Therein the Pope distinguished between countries which were newly created, countries with considerable territorial expansion, and countries which have changed so completely that they could not be considered the same "moral person". According to Pope Benedict XV opinion all these three classes of countries have "lost their privileges granted in former Concordats". It is quite evident, that Austria, after it became a part of the German Reich since March 13, 1938, cannot be considered the "same moral person" as before.
It has not yet been decided how the bilateral Austrian state Treaties of noneconomical nature which have been listed in the letter of the Foreign Office of April 6, 1938--R VII. 38 will be handled. One cannot yet perceive whether the Reich will take over one or the other of these treaties. This would no doubt be made use of by the Holy See to insist on the succession of the Reich as to the Austrian Concordat. On the other hand application of the theory of international law relating to succession of states as discussed above may lead to unnecessary suspicions in other cases, in which the Reich intends to bring about a peaceful solution with the other partner to the agreement.
If one is of the opinion that the Austrian Concordat is abolished by the actual reunion of Austria with the Reich then the question comes up whether, on account of the same fact of territorial expansion, the Concordat of the Reich logically would have to be regarded as applying to Austria too.
The Reich Concordat was, as far as I know, not expressly extended to the Saar-District, after the reembodiment of the latter into Germany; there can be no doubt, however, that the Reich Concordat has formal validity in the Saar-District today. Even though the Saar-District unlike the Federal State of Austria--had not concluded a Concordat of its own with the Holy See prior to its reembodiment, there can be no doubt as to the former independent legal competence in accordance with international law of the Saar-District. In view of a comparison with the Saar-District and the possible conclusion to be drawn with regard to Austria it seems advisable not to claim the expiration of the Concordat on the grounds that the Austrian independent state has ceased to exist.
The Austrian Concordat however, has established very incisive regulations in the sphere of matrimonial law as pointed out by the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, according to which the Canon Law alone is competent for marriages of Catholics; this law has the validity of a civil law; the publishing of bans and the laying down of obstacles to matrimony are stipulated according to Canon Law; Catholic Church authorities and law courts are competent for matrimonial affairs; the parson is a registrar at the same time. Should the Concordat therefore be considered as having expired as of March 13, 1938 a number of most complicated legal questions would arise; in
## particular the question as to what legal validity should be given to
catholic matrimonies concluded in Austria after March 13, 1938 and which other legal consequences are to be considered as connected with such matrimonies. It would be regrettable should one have to draw the conclusion that legal acts based on the expired Concordat had subsequently to be sanctioned by the state.
On weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the two conceptions both of which can be supported by good legal arguments I should like to speak in favour of the conception explained under 1.
I shall be glad if you will inform me of your opinion about the question raised by May 15, 1938. I am quite aware of the fact that in view of its great political importance the decision can only be made by the Fuehrer and Reich chancellor.
After receipt of your communication I reserve the right to summon a conference.
Signed: Frick
* * * * *
SECRET
D. RM.d.J. Berlin, May 13, 1938 _Special Delivery_
To The REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR c/o Ministerialrat Dr. Hoche
_Subject_: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
_Re_: Communication of the 5th of this month TO THE OFFICE May 14, 1938 signed: Templev(?)5/14/
Nr. 1-176/38 1014 g; Despatched May 14, 1938 signed: Templev [?] Not later than today
Your communication, as per description on the margin was received here on the 9th of May. Considering the importance a proper handling of this matter carries for the official business under my jurisdiction I shall be unable to announce a final statement before the 15th of this month.
I therefore request that the time allotted me for a reply to the communication be tacitly extended to May 25.
for the office 5/14/38, 10 o'clock I.V.
EK.
(S) [Illegible] Final regulation of 5/23/38 with V a 146/38 g page 13 V a 138/38 g
* * * * *
V a 138/38 g
1. _Note_: Of the 4 spare copies which were procured I have given one to Ministerialrat Ficker and at the same time one to KGR Kaulbach because of the question of canonical law and at the same time for the minister.
Ministerialrat Ruppert, who has already offered a preliminary opinion, wants to express his conclusive opinion at a later date, since, he will presumably not be present by the end of the week, because of his vacation.
The report on the matter will probably be made to Secretary of State, Dr. Schlegelberger's, on Saturday the 21st, the report to the minister's on the 23rd of May. The matter should be fully prepared by that time.
2. The office is requested to refer on Monday May 16 the occurrences, including any opinions of the Ministries concerned to Min-Rat Dr. Kriege who is handling the matter.
Berlin, May 14, 1938
Presented upon arrival from the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs on May 11, 1938.
The 4 duplicates have been placed in the file of papers to be destroyed.
* * * * *
To: Mr. Kriege, Counsellor of the Ministry of Interior, respectfully submitted:
Mr. Thees has asked me to give my opinion on the letter of the Ministry of Interior, dated 5.5, regarding the Austrian Concordat, insofar as the letter pertains to my sphere.
With regard to the reform work in the field of matrimonial law and, in close connection with it, the creation of a uniform matrimonial law for Greater Germany, two points are of decisive importance:
_a._ The Concordat must not offer any impediment as soon as this matrimonial law comes into force.
_b._ The legislation for the execution of the Concordat, namely the law of 4.5.1934, has to remain in force until this time.
This result, decisive for any further action, cannot be achieved, in my opinion, on the basis of the first proposal of the Ministry of Interior. If the Concordat were null and void on account of unconstitutionality, then the same would apply to the legislation for its execution; the marriages based on the law of 4.5.1934 would be void and would have to be sanctioned with retroactive force. It is not clear to me how, on the basis of this reasoning, the Ministry of Interior can achieve a non-retroactive result in the nullification (p. 5).
There remains, therefore, the second solution proposed by the Ministry of Interior. If the Concordat excludes state succession, it seems to me, nevertheless, that the expiration of the law of 4.5.1934 does not result with effective date of 13.3.38. Even if an international pact expires, it seems to me that the legislation for the execution would bind the subjects until it was abrogated by an act of the state. The statements on page 9 of the letter are inaccurate insofar as the marriages which were contracted after 13.3 were not contracted by virtue of the expired Concordat, but by virtue of the law of 4.5.1934. Accordingly, it seems to me that continuing effect of the law of 4.5.1934 can be achieved in this way.
/S/ Ficker 18/5
* * * * *
SECRET
Reich and Prussian Ministry for Church Affairs Berlin W.8., 3, Leipzigerstrasse, 11th May 1938 [stamp] Reich Ministry of Justice, 13th May 1938. Sect. V. Re: Austrian Concordat. Communication of the Reich Minister of the Interior, May 5, 1938 I 176/38 1014 g Va 138/38g (Contents noted for the Minister)
The question whether the Austrian Concordat should be considered by the Reich Government as having been illegal and invalid from the very start, or as having been abolished by the revolution or whether it should be expressly cancelled can not be decided from a legal point of view but has to be decided from a political point of view.
This political decision can only be taken by the Fuehrer. Suggestions to this effect will be made to him by the Ministers competent in questions of foreign policy and of church affairs, i.e., by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Minister for Church Affairs, who have already contacted each other for this purpose.
Also the question of the Reich Concordats to Austria (which, by the way, is utterly unbearable) is not a legal but a political matter. The question of the continuation of the Reich Concordat and of the "state"--Concordats is connected with this problem. Here, too, the decision rests with the Fuehrer.
With regard to the execution of the necessary laws in Austria, resp. to the introduction of Reich laws in Austria the only decisive factor is the political interest of the Reich, whereby the Austrian Concordat will be considered as non-existent.
Signed: KERRL.
To:
_a._ The Reich Minister of the Interior
_b._ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice
_d._ The Reich Minister of Education
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer
_f._ The Reich Leader of SS troops and Chief of the German Police
_g._ The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery
(In connection with a 146/38g) Va- 139/38g
* * * * *
SECRET
The Reich and Prussian Minister of Education, etc. Berlin W8, May 17, 1938 Z II a Nr. 10074 Geh/38 Reich Ministry of Justice May 18, 1938 Dept. V Off. a
In reference to the communication of May 5, 1938--I 176/38, 1014 g, V a 138/38 g, re: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
I agree with your conception in the final analyses.
The Austrian concordat did not--according to your arguments--enter into a due constitutional existence and is therefore without legal effect. However, in contradistinction to your arguments, I believe it correct to assume that the treaty was void from the beginning (ab initio) and not from now on. Therefore all legal acts which have taken place up to the day of establishment of invalidity of the Austrian concordat would have to be sanctioned retroactively.
Looking at both possibilities, as presented by you, the Austrian concordat is void ab initio, in the first case as represented by you and also by me from the very beginning, in the second case from March 13, 1938 on. For legal considerations, in both cases, the subsequent sanctioning of any legal acts, carried out meanwhile, is absolutely required.
By registered mail.
1. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Attention: Min. Buerodirektor Stoppel or acting deputy.
2a. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister for Church Affairs, Attention Regierungsrat Urlacher or acting deputy.
b. The Foreign Deputy Office, Attention Amts- and Hofrat Schimpke or
## acting deputy.
c. Reich Minister of Justice, Attention Min. Buerodirektor Stadermann or acting deputy.
d. Deputy of the Fuehrer, Attention SS-Oberfuehrer Knoblauch or acting deputy.
e. Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Attention SS-Untersturmfuehrer Reg.Rat Dr. Tanzmann or acting deputy.
to 2 Duplicate for taking note of. [In long hand:] Dr. Kriege V a 146/38/1 Encl. (2 dupl) Duplicate to file E 26
* * * * *
The first possibility, the establishment of the legal invalidity of the Austrian Concordat, has in its favor, as ably shown by you, that a moral condemnation of the past system in Austria is brought about. This system seized the power without a mandate of the Austrian people and concluded the concordat without authorization on the part of the Austrian people. Further, I don't think, that we have to fear the effects upon the Saarland, which you indicated. However, it seems to me of the utmost importance, that the treaties, concluded by Austria with other states, have not been concluded under similar circumstances; therefore these states do not have to fear similar consequences, a fact, which should be pointed out at the time of the declaration of the invalidity of the Austrian concordat.
However, I think it advisable, to refer while dealing with the Curia, especially since this point of view was also advocated by Pope Benedict XV in his statement of November 21, 1921, before the Secret Consistory (Geheimkonsistorium).
I also take the position that Austria is without any concordat after the establishment of the invalidity of the Austrian concordat. I do not consider an extension of the Reich-concordat to Austria appropriate from the point of view of my office.
By authority of the State Secretary.
Signed KUNISCH Certified: [signature illegible] Verwaltungssekretaer
* * * * *
19 May 1938
1. Minister of Education, signed Kunisch, May 17, secret, sends copy of his letter of May 17th to the Minister of the Interior, concerning the Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
I agree with your concept as far as results are concerned.
The Austrian Concordat is devoid of legal validity, since it was not concluded in an orderly fashion and in accordance with the constitution, as apparent from your explanations. However, I shall have to differ with you on the point that the contract is not merely invalid "ex nunc" (from now on) but "ex tunc", i.e., from the very beginning. The necessity arises therewith to sanction retroactively all legal acts executed by reason of the Concordat till the date when invalidity of the Austrian Concordat was proven.
Entering upon the two possibilities explained by you, the Austrian Concordat would therefore be invalid "ex tunc", as far as your first case and also mine is concerned from the very beginning, and in the second case as of 13 March 1938. In both cases the need arises on the basis of judicial-political considerations for retroactive sanction of legal acts executed in the meantime.
The first possibility, the proof of the constitutional invalidity of the Austrian Concordat, carries a moral condemnation of the former system in Austria, as you have explained so fittingly: a system that without the mandate of the Austrian people had usurped the power of state and concluded a Concordat without the official approval (legitimation) of the Austrian people. I should add, that I have no fear of possible conclusions a posteriori concerning the Saar-District, which you have mentioned. I consider it of highest importance that other treaties concluded with other States by Austria were not made under similar circumstances, thus those States had no reason to fear similar repercussions for themselves, a fact which should be emphasized immediately upon presentation of proof of the invalidity of the Austrian Concordat.
However, I consider it correct procedure, that we should assist the Curia (Kurie) by showing them the second possibility, specially that this conception was advocated by Pope Benedictus XV in his declaration of 21 November 1921 before the Secret Consistorium.
I also support the viewpoint that after proof has been presented of the invalidity of the Austrian Concordat, Austria will be free of concordats. An extension of the Reich Concordat to include Austria I would not consider advisable or within the interest of my sphere of competence.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 682-PS
DISCUSSION OF THIERACK WITH DR. GOEBBELS ON SEPT. 14, 1942 IN BERLIN
1--2.15 p.m.
2. With regard to the destruction of asocial life, Dr. Goebbels is of the opinion that the following groups should be exterminated: Jews and gypsies unconditionally, Poles who have to serve 3-4 years of penal servitude, and Czechs and Germans who are sentenced to death or penal servitude for life or to security custody [Sicherungsvorwahrung] for life. The idea of exterminating them by labor is the best. For the rest however, except in the aforementioned cases, every case has to be dealt with individually. In this case, of course, Czechs and Germans have to be differently judged. There may be cases where a German sentenced to 15 years of penal servitude is not to be considered asocial, but in contrast to this a person sentenced to penal servitude up to 8 years may be.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 686-PS
Copy to RK 26272 B
Decree of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor to strengthen German folkdom
Oct 7th 1939.
The consequences of the Versailles Treaty have been removed in Europe. Now the Greater German Reich has the possibility of admitting into its territory, Germans who had to live abroad, and to resettle them, and to arrange the settlement of the groups of people, within her sphere of interest, in a way that there will be better distinction between them. I entrust the Reichsfuehrer SS with the execution of this task according to the following regulations:
I
The Reichsfuehrer SS has the obligation in accordance with my directives:
1. to bring back for final return into the Reich all German nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries;
2. to eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the population, which represent a danger to the Reich and German folk community;
3. the forming of new German settlements by resettling and in
## particular by settling of the returning German citizens and racial
Germans from abroad.
The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary general and administrative measures for the execution of this obligation.
The Reichsfuehrer SS can assign certain living areas to the parts of the population in question in order to execute the tasks given to him in Article I, No. 2.
II
In the occupied former Polish territories the Administration Chief of the East [Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost] carries out the tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the latter's general orders. The Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost and the subordinated chiefs of administration of the military districts are responsible for the execution. Then measures have to be adjusted to the requirements of the military leadership.
Persons who are furnished special orders in execution of this task, are not subject to military jurisdiction in that respect.
III
The tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS, so far as the reorganization of German farmers is concerned will be executed by the Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture following the general directives of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Otherwise the Reichsfuehrer SS will make use, within the territory of the German Reich, for the execution of his task of the existing authorities and institutions of the Reich, the states and the communities as well as all other public institutions and the existing settlement societies.
In case an agreement required by law and administrative organization cannot be reached about a measure to be taken, between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the competent higher Reichs-authority in the operational territory of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, my decision has to be sought through the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellory.
IV
Negotiations with foreign governments and other authorities as well as with racial Germans, as long as they are still abroad, will be conducted in cooperation with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs [Reichsminister des Auswaertigen].
V
If land is required for the settlement within Germany of returning German citizens and racial Germans the law on providing land for purposes of the army of March 29th, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 467) and its executive regulations will be applied to provide the necessary land. The tasks of the Reich agency for providing land [Reichsstelle fuer Landbeschaffung] will be taken over by the agency designated by the Reichsfuehrer SS.
VI
The Reichsminister for Finance will provide the Reichsfuehrer SS with the necessary means for the execution of the measures.
Berlin 7 October 1939 The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor signed: Adolf Hitler. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers for all Defenses of the Reich signed: Goering General Field Marshal The Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery signed: Dr. Lammers The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces signed: Keitel.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 695-PS
SECRET
Copy
Berlin--Schoeneberg Badensche Strasse 51, March 24, 1942 Armed forces high command z 2f 24. 73 AWA/prisoners of war [general?] (Ia), p. 389/428 Reference:
_a._ armed forces high command/prisoners of war No. 3058/41 g of September 1941.
_b._ armed forces high command/prisoners of war No. 3624/41 g of November 2, 1941.
1. Treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
The necessity of increased use of the labor of Soviet prisoners of war necessitates a new regulation of their treatment. The statutes in reference to this matter are repealed, and the following regulation is in effect in the future for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war:
_A. Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War in General_
Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National Socialist Germany. The Soviet soldier must on principle be considered a carrier of Bolshevism. Therefore it answers political necessity and the authority and dignity of the German armed forces, for every German soldier to keep his distance from the Soviet prisoners of war.
With cool and correct treatment, avoidance of violence and insults, and protection from public curiosity, the work done by the Soviet prisoners of war can be increased. It is forbidden to carry out retaliatory measures against them.
On the other hand, any attempted fraternization is to be rejected. Even the public must at all times be aware of the feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier detailed to guard Soviet prisoners of war.
Ruthless and energetic action in cases of uncooperativeness, refusal to work, and negligence in work, especially toward Bolshevist agitators, is to be ordered; insubordination or active resistance must be completely removed _immediately_ with a weapon (bayonet, gun-butt, or firearm, no sticks). The decree concerning use of arms by the armed forces is to be interpreted strictly. Whoever does not use his weapon or does not use it energetically enough in seeing that an order is carried out is liable to punishment (see [volume?] VI, 12). Notation: also page 8).
2. _All traffic between the Soviet prisoners of war and the civilian population is to be prevented._ Special attention is to be given to the separation of the captured officers, which has in general already been carried out by the field army, in the territory of the armed forces commanders and in the Reich territory; especially since Soviet officers for understandable reasons frequently pass themselves off as enlisted men. Any communication between the Soviet officers and men, even by signs, must be made impossible. (see [volume?] V).
3. A _camp police corps_ is to be formed within the camps and the larger labor details of suitable Soviet prisoners of war. This police corps will be appointed and supervised by commandants to keep order and maintain discipline.
_B. Individual Instructions_
I. _Food and clothing_:
4. According to principle all prisoners of war receive equal treatment. In regard to the feeding of Soviet prisoners of war, however, the rates established in the armed forces high command statute Az. 62 f Va/AG V III/V 3 (V d) of February 27, 1942, is in effect in the home war area.
If the food is prepared without loss of food value and if the distribution times are sensibly spaced throughout the day, these food rations are adequate to feed the prisoners of war. Points to be especially considered in preparing food are contained in the "Collection of orders No. 11".
Especially in winter, the food is to be served warm if possible and is to be distributed as often as possible during the day. The contractors should distribute warm food not only after work but also in pauses in the work. The suitable feeding of the Soviet prisoners of war is especially important, since their physical efficiency is low, partly as a result of years of undernourishment, partly as a result of food difficulties in the Soviet army and as a result of war events.
Since the prisoners of war recover more easily on individual fare outside the camps than on mass feeding in the camps, it is recommended that Soviet prisoners be put to work even if they are not yet completely fit for work. Full achievement cannot, of course, be expected in that case (compare army high command of 19 February 1942, Az. 2f 24. 17 b prisoners of war Org. (III b) No. 678/42).
As far as possible, foreign _tobacco_ goods will be made available for Soviet prisoners of war in the camps. German tobacco is not to be given to Soviet prisoners of war.
The matter of _clothing_ was settled by decree army high command Az. 2f 24. 23a prisoners of war (II, 2) No. 5632/41 of 22 August 1941. According to this, the clothing debit of the Soviets corresponds to that of the other prisoners of war.
II. _Work_:
5. As a result of the general labor situation, the employment of the Soviet prisoners of war, including officers, derives decisive significance. In principle it is permitted everywhere, unless there are objections for reasons of defense in individual cases. (Compare enclosed statute Az. 2f 24. 17 b, chief of prisoners of war [organization?] III b No. 1474/42 of 1 April 1942, and No. 1396/42 of 9 April 1942)
In general labor columns of at least 20 men are to be provided for. In _industrial_ economy, however, it is permissible in cases of urgent business necessity to use smaller labor details down to 5 men in various departments of the * * * concern, even in "protected" concerns. However, in such cases the employment of smaller groups requires the special approval of the competent defense post and of the armament command. A prerequisite is the presence of an adequate number of reliable foremen who have been investigated in regard to defense as "auxiliary guards".
The employment of officers requires the special approval of the army high command in each case.
The responsibility for the orderly employment of the Soviet prisoners of war in the Reich rests exclusively on the bureaus ordering their employment:
_a._ Armed forces high command, chief of prisoners of war affairs;
_b._ Reich minister for armament and munitions;
_c._ General plenipotentiary for the labor supply in the four-year plan.
The borrowing of Soviet prisoners of war is regulated for the Reich by statute Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II, 2) No. 6999/41 of 29 September 1941, and supplementary statutes:
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 7645/41 of 23 October 1941
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 8218/41 of 14 November 1941
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 9170/41 of 22 December 1941
Az. 2f 24. 17s prisoners of war (I,5) No. 8102/41 of 22 December 1941
Az. 2f 24. 17s prisoners of war [org.?] (III b) No. 512/42 of 18 February 1942
and for the territories of Ostland (Baltic countries and White Russia) and the Ukraine by statute armed forces high command Az. 2f 24. 17s prisoners of war [organization?]
(III b) No. 463/42 of 29 January 1942. For the rest of the eastern territories and the Gouvernement General the following decrees are in effect:
Army high command/general staff of the army/ general quarters/ IVa (III,2) Az. 961/42 No. I/ 5784/42 of 12 January 1942
Army high command/ general staff of the army general quarters/ IVa (III,2) Az. 961/42 No. I/ 5784/42 of 4 February 1942.
The employment and work of the Soviet prisoners of war are to be under the strictest control. Strong measures are to be taken in any case of refusal to work.
Poor or mediocre work not due to weak constitution, exhaustion, physical condition, or a similar cause must immediately incur appropriate punishment.
III. _Free time_:
6. Musical instruments can be obtained and distributed. Arts and crafts in the sense of statute AZ. 2f 24. 72g prisoners of war Ch 2 No. 5671/41 of 9 August 1941 are to be encouraged.
They are not forbidden to organize religious services among themselves, whether _by captured priests of the camp_ or by laymen. Spiritual consolation for the dying as well as the presence of a captured priest or lay-priest at burials are permitted. (see VIII).
It is forbidden to bring in members of the clergy who are not prisoners of war. No religious writings may be distributed.
IV. _Treatment of minorities_:
7. Special orders are issued according to need regarding the majority of the peoples among the Soviet prisoners of war; as far as such orders have been issued, they remain fully in effect.
_For all members of the most important Soviet minorities_
_a._ The delivery of musical instruments (balalaika, etc.)
_b._ The supplying of well-heated rooms during the winter months;
_c._ The supplying of appropriate literature chosen in agreement with armed forces high command/WFST/A Pr and armed forces high command/A Qusl Abw/Abw are permitted. The camp funds which have been accumulated by Soviet prisoners of war are available for necessary procurement.
The extent to which special food and a better tobacco supply are to be granted is determined in special orders.
_d._ An available barracks room is if possible to be placed at the disposal of the _Mohammedan_ prisoners of war, where half-hour prayer sessions may be held several times a day.
_e._ In addition they are to be permitted to select a Mullah or Iman (priest).
V. _Separation of prisoners of war and civilians of the Eastern campaign_:
8. _Deserters_: The peculiar circumstances of the Eastern campaign in many cases made it impossible to guarantee the special consideration in captivity promised to deserters. The result of this fact on the Soviet front has made itself felt in a most undesirable way, through Soviet prisoners of war who have escaped and managed to reach their homes. The German troops on the Eastern front have now been instructed, therefore, to give every _deserter_ a certificate that he has surrendered voluntarily and that special treatment in captivity was promised him.
For the most part, the deserters will be employed with the troops. When they are sent to the armed forces commanders and to the Reich, however, they are to retain their deserter certificates.
They are to be given preferential treatment in billeting in the camp, in feeding, and in the assignment of work places. It is urgently desired that they be kept together, segregated from the other Soviet prisoners of war, in labor commands.
9. For the segregation of Soviet prisoners of war and the civilians present in the camps, the following is in effect, besides the division by nationalities in the prisoners of war camps, according to figure IV:
To be segregated:
_a._ Politically undesirable persons,
_b._ Officers,
_c._ Politically harmless persons,
_d._ Politically especially reliable persons (who can be used in the reconstruction of the occupied territories).
10. While the first _separation_ according to figure 9 is undertaken, as far as possible, by the camp organs themselves, the Reichsfuehrer SS makes _special details of the security police and the security service_ available to segregate the Soviet prisoners of war by their political attitude. They are directly under the chief of the security police and of the security service and have been especially trained for their special task. They take their measures and make their inquiries _before_ the Soviet prisoners of war are put to work within the framework of the camp order, according to directives which they have received from the chief of the security police and the security service.
The special details are instructed to work in the closest cooperation with the commandants, and especially with their defense officers. If the Soviet prisoners of war are put to work _without_ previous examination in exceptional cases because of the necessity for hastened commitment of labor the special details of the security police and the security service will undertake the _segregation_ at the place of the labor detail. The head of the labor detail and, if the occasion arises, the contractor will be consulted before the segregation in doubtful cases. The special details will then request of the prisoner of war camps the surrender of those Soviet prisoners of war who are then claimed. The approval of the chiefs of the security police and the security service in Berlin is to be submitted to the camp commandants. The request for surrender of the prisoners is then to be met.
Prisoners of war who are put to work after investigation are to be constantly watched by the guards in regard to their sentiments. If in time a Soviet prisoner of war proves himself to be unreliable, he is first to be turned over to the prisoner of war camp which will take care of turning him in to the security service if the occasion arises.
If on the basis of the decree armed forces high command Az. 2f 24. 17b prisoners of war [organisation?] (II b) No. 678/42 of 19 February 1942, Soviet prisoners of war who are not fully capable of working are given special fare in order that they may gradually be made fully capable of working, the contractor is to receive full compensation if for political reasons it becomes necessary to turn them over to the security service.
11. _Further treatment of the groups segregated under figure 9_:
_a. Military personnel_: Military personnel includes those soldiers who were captured in civilian clothes. Concerning those segregated as "politically undesirable elements" (see figure 9).
_Officers_ will not always but sometimes be subject to segregation as "politically undesirable persons".
Should individuals first considered undesirable later prove to be _trustworthy_, they will, as far as they had already been turned over, be transferred to the labor details assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS or to the nearest prisoner of war camp or officers camp.
_b. Civilians_: Concerning undesirable persons see figure 10. As far as they are not politically dangerous, their prompt return to the occupied territory is to be desired, except insofar as they do not volunteer for further work in Germany as civilian workers. The competent armed forces commander (or the commander of the army rear area) with the approval of the competent bureau of the chiefs of the security police and the security service, determines the time for possible return. A prerequisite for return is a guarantee of work at home in labor formations which are to be specially set up. The armed forces commander (or the commander of the army rear area) is responsible for guarding during the return journey. If possible the command posts are to supply escort details.
_c. Politically especially reliable persons_ (_see 9d_) are to be used for the segregation of politically undesirables and for work in the camp administration. (Racial Germans are especially pointed out; however, one must figure, that even among them there are elements, who must be considered "politically undesirable".)
Since the Reichsfuehrer SS for his own purposes must rely in the occupied territories on the conscription of natives, the conscription command will request from the ranks of the Soviet prisoners of war especially trustworthy persons for use and reconstruction in the occupied territory. Such requests for release by the conscription command of the security police and the SD are to be reported to the supreme command armed forces.
VI. _Procedure in case of escapes or punishable acts_:
12. Escaping Soviet prisoners of war are to be shot immediately _without previous warning_. Proclamation on the bulletin board and during roll call is necessary. Contrary directives of H Dv 38/11, Page 13, etc., are rescinded thus far.
No warning shots are to be fired. On the other hand, arbitrary use of firearms is forbidden. If a Soviet prisoner of war is shot by a guard, for the purpose of keeping up discipline and to prevent unjustified shooting, in every case a short description of the happening is to be presented to the camp commandant with the following details:
_a._ Whether anything is to be done.
_b._ Whether action appears necessary for disciplinary reasons.
_c._ Whether a report of the facts will be submitted.
13. The following order, published in the armed forces regulation, remains in force:
It is the duty of all soldiers to watch for every unguarded Soviet prisoner of war, to arrest him, and to deliver him to the nearest police station. If a prisoner of war camp is in the immediate vicinity, the prisoner of war is to be delivered there.
OKW Az 2f 24. 19m AWA/prisoner of war (I, 6) of 29 Oct 1941.
Civilians, as well as prisoners of war of other nations, who return escaping Soviet prisoners of war may be rewarded.
Compare:
OKW AZ 2f 24.20 PWs (II) No 4493/40 of 11 Dec. 40 OKW Az 2f 24.20a PWs (112) No 3572/41 of 26 May 41 OKW Az 2f 24.20a PWs (112) No. 8162/41 of 12 Nov 41
14. The recaptured Soviet prisoners of war, even if they were delivered to police stations, must be turned over by them to the nearest prisoner of war camp. Considering the danger of spotted fever, isolation is necessary.
The camp commandant must find out in every individual case the cause for escape. If the reason for the escape is only the longing for his family or hunger, and if the PW has not committed any crimes during his flight, then he is to be disciplined by the camp commandant and to be returned to work.
15. If a Soviet prisoner of war commits in camp on another prisoner of war murder, manslaughter or another crime, for which there is no punitive regulation in the German criminal code, which however demands the most severe punishment (for instance cannibalism, to bring about incapability to work by self-mutilation), then the criminal is to be turned over to the secret state police [Gestapo]. Also in the case of other crimes by a Soviet prisoner of war (for instance during flight), the camp commandant must turn over the criminal to the secret state police unless he is convinced a disciplinary measure or the judicial punishment which is to be expected after interview with the judge of the competent army court is sufficient to retain the discipline of the camp. Punishment for disobedience is only possible if the prisoner of war disobeys a _distinct_ order, given to _him_ and understood by _him_.
16. In the case of every transfer to the secret state police the prisoner of war is to be discharged from captivity, and the transfer is to be reported to the armed forces information bureau if a registration has already taken place.
VII. _Funerals_:
The following shall apply to funerals of deceased prisoners of war:
1. Funerals are to take place unobtrusively and in a simple manner. Treatment in the press radio or motion pictures is prohibited.
2. A German military delegation will not be provided. Participation by comrades of the deceased, who belong to the same prisoner of war enclosure is permitted. Civilians may not participate.
3. Gun salute will not be given.
4. Wreaths of Soviet prisoners, may, if allowed, only carry black or white ribbons; no wreath may be deposited by Germans.
5. Clergymen or their helpers may participate if they belong to the camp itself; in the case of Mohammedans, religious servants may be brought in if it is possible without special effort.
6. Coffins are prescribed; however each corpse (without clothes, if those are still in any way usable) is to be wrapped in strong paper or otherwise appropriate material.
In the mass graves, the corpses are to be placed next to each other at a depth of the grave, usual at the locality, and they are to be equipped with an identification tag as always, so that it can be determined later on, with the aid of a card file, which corpses are concerned.
7. In cemeteries, the graves are to be kept separate or at a proper distance from other graves; in camp cemeteries, the sequence of graves of other prisoners of war may not be disturbed.
8. If it is possible with special effort, cremation is permitted. In this case also, the camp must keep lists. However, corpses of Mohammedans must be interred in any case, and with the head facing East, the face South.
9. On the "Interment of corpses of Soviet prisoners of war by the communities", the decree IV e 10363/41, 3991 of 27 Oct 41 has been forwarded to them by the Reichsminister of the Interior.
10. The regulation, OKW Az. 29k AWA/W Allg. (II) No. 4470/41 of 29 July 41 on "Funerals for enemy military personnel, deceased or killed in
## action," will be synchronized in section D with the above regulation.
_Distribution_:
Armed Forces Command: I (21), II (21), III (22), IV (40), V (23), VI (26), VII (16), VIII (31), IX (25), X (17), XI (13), XIII (15), XII (18), XVII (13), XX (12), XXI (19),
with additional copies for: officer prisoner of war camps Base prisoner of war camps Interment camps Prisoner of war construction and work battalions Reserve hospitals (Prisoner of War) A S T E N (Branches?) Service command doctors Service command chaplains 345 Service Command administration with additional copies for the finance officers 34 Reichsminister for air and Airforce Supreme Commander/ LWEHR E with additional copies 40 Naval Supreme Command/N WEHR I with additional copies. For camp navy stations and finance officers 4 Armed forces commander OSTLAND, RIGA 1 Commander of prisoner of war with the armed forces commander Ukraine, ROWNO 1 Military commander of the Government General with 1 additional copy for each the chief quartermaster and the administration 4 Commander of prisoners of war in the Government General, Lublin 1 Armed forces commander, Norway Headquarters OSLO 1 Armed Forces Commander Norway Headquarters Finland 1
_By communications_:
Foreign office 1 Reichsminister for occupied Eastern territories 1 Inspector General for German roads 1 Inspector General for the Reich Capital 1 Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German police 1 SS Regulations administration in the SS High Command Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 188 1 Plenipotentiary general for labor allocation in the Four Year Plan 1 Reichsminister for labor 1 Reichsminister for nutrition and agriculture 1 Reichsministry for Economy 1 Reichsministry for Interior 1 Reichsminister for church affairs, Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3 1 The German General with the High Command of the Rumanian armed forces 3 Army high Command/ General Staff of the army/ Quartermaster General 1 Army administrator 1 Chief of the Army armament and Commander of the replacement army/VA (V I, V 9) 3 (V II, V 6) 1 (V, II, V 2) 1
For Army: officers (VII, V 10) 5 forestry (VII, V 3) 1 (V IV, V 4) 1 (V IV, V 7) 1 AHA/Staff 1 /AgEH/ Gr S 1 /Clothing 1 /S In 1 OKW/WFST/ Deputy Chief WFST 1 /Foreign 1 /C I II 1 /C I III 1 OKW/WR 1 /AWA/20 V Chief OKW 1 /Inspect of Prisoners of war 1 /T 1 /W Allg. 1 V A. OKW/Prisoners of War Major von Rosenberg, Paris 1 AWA/Prisoner of War Organisation 1 Ing. course Base camps II D Stargar 1 Reserve 68 ------ = 550 New Reserve (copies) 300 ------ 850
By order of the Chief, Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) /s/ REINECKE [Rubber stamp]: Certified v. Graevenitz Generalmajor
[in ink]
Certifying above copy Koerner (?) Captain
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 699-PS
Berlin W 8, August 25 39 Unter den Linden 13
Reich Minister Walter Funk
MY FUEHRER!
Let me thank you sincerely from the bottom of my heart for the good wishes you sent me for my birthday in such a friendly and kind manner. How happy and thankful we have to be to you that we are allowed to see these overwhelmingly great and world-shaking times and be able to cooperate in the mighty events of these days.
The information transmitted to me by Field Marshal Goering that you, my Fuehrer, have in principal approved last night the measures prepared by me for the financing of the war and for the shaping of wage and price conditions, and of the carrying out of an emergency sacrifice has made me extremely happy. Herewith I report most obediently that by the careful forethought of the last few months I succeeded in making the German Reichsbank so strong internally, so unassailable from the outside, that even the heaviest shocks of the international finance and credit system cannot touch us in any way. Meanwhile, I have quite inconspicuously transferred into gold all assets in any way available of the Reich Bank and the whole Germany economy abroad. Through the suggestions I have worked out to keep down ruthlessly any non-vital consumption and any public expenses and tasks of no importance to the war. We will be in a position to satisfy all demands to be made on the finances and economy without any serious shocks.
As the plenipotentiary general for economical affairs, called upon by you, my Fuehrer, I thought it my duty in this hour to submit this report and this vow.
Heil my Fuehrer WALTHER FUNK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 701-PS
The Reich Minister of Justice 4410 b-Vs 1 379/43 g Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 65 1 April 1943 Telephone 11 00 44 Long Distance 11 65 16
To The Public Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal,
To the Commissioner of the Reich Minister of Justice for the penal camps in Emsland.
_PAPENBURG_ (_Ems_)
Regarding: Poles and Jews who are released from the penal institutions of the Department of Justice.
Instructions for the independent penal institutions.
1. With reference to the new guiding principles for the application of Article 1, Section _2_ of the decree of 11 June 1940 (Reich Legal Gazette I S. 877)--attachment I of the decree (RV) of 27 January 1943--9133/2 enclosure I-III a_2_ 2629--the Reich Chief Security Office has directed by the decree of 11 March 1943--II A 2 number 100/43--176:
_a._ Jews, who in accordance with number VI of the guiding principles, are released from a penal institution, are to be taken by the State Police (Chief) Office competent for the district in which the penal institution is located, for the rest of their lives to the concentration camps Auschwitz or Lublin in accordance with the regulations for protective custody that have been issued.
The same applies to Jews who in the future are released from a penal institution after serving a sentence of confinement.
_b._ Poles, who in accordance with number VI of the guiding principles are released from a penal institution, are to be taken by the State Police (Chief) Office competent for the district in which the penal institution is located, for the duration of the war to a concentration camp in accordance with the regulations on protective custody that have been issued.
The same applies in the future to Poles who, after serving a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months, are to be discharged by a penal institution.
Conforming to the request of the Chief Office for Reich Security, I ask that in the future,
_a._ All Jews to be discharged,
_b._ All Poles to be discharged,
Who have served a sentence of more than 6 months be designated for further confinement to the State Police (Chief) Office competent for the district and are to be placed promptly at its disposal, before the end of sentence for conveyance.
2. This ruling replaces the hitherto ordered return of all Polish prisoners undergoing imprisonment in the Old Reich condemned in annexed Eastern territories. The decree (RV) of 28 July 1942--4410 _b_ Vs _1_ 1731--has lost its meaning. Imprisonment up to 6 months imposed within the incorporated Eastern territories, excluding exceptions, is to be carried out in these territories, and not in the Old Reich.
By order of
Dr. Eichler [Stamp: Reichministry of Justice, Office of the Ministry] Certified: [signed] Freyer Clerk of Justice
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 705-PS
The Reichsfuehrer SS Berlin-Grunewald 1. Feb 1943 SS Hauptamt, Office VI Hagenstrasse 45 VI/1--Ni-- VS--Tagbuch No 704/43 geh. VI-Tagbuch No 214/43 geh.
SECRET
[Stamped:] 000579 * 5 Feb 1943 Akt Z . . . G/S/23
To SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers Ahnenerbe Office Berlin--Dahlem Puecklerstr 16
By order of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg, Office VI--German Leitstelle--sends in the enclosed the minutes of the conference on the 12 Jan 1943 of the SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone, with a request for acknowledgement.
By direction
BERGER [?] (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer)
* * * * *
The Reichsfuehrer-SS Bln-Wilmersdorf 1, 20 Jan 1943 SS-Hauptamt, Office VI Hohenzollerndamm 31 VI/1--Dr. Schm/Ni.-- VS--Tgb Nr 704/43 geh. VI--Tgb Nr 214/43 geh.
SECRET
Minutes of the conference on the 12 Jan 1943 at 1200 of the SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone, took place at the SS-Hauptamt
The following participated in the conference:
1. SS-Brigadefuehrer SS-Fuehrungshauptamt, Kommando Bauer Allgemeine-SS. 2. SS-Oberfuehrer Kommandeur der SS-Mannschaftshaeuser Ellersieck 3. SS-Standartenfuehrer SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs-hauptamt Loerner 4. SS-Standartenfuehrer Fuersorge- u. Versorgungsamt Schmidt Ausland 5. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers Amt Ahnenerbe 6. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI 7. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr Stier Stabshauptamt of the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of the German nationality 8. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Paulus SS-Personal-Hauptamt 9. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr Tesch Amt Lebensborn 10. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr Sichelschmidt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle 11. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Harderer Race and Settlement Hauptamt 12. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr Schneider Amt Ahnenerbe 13. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr Schmidt SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI 14. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Ulrich SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
As introduction SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg delivered a report on conditions in the German territories.
During the period covered by the report, hostile circles in the German territories have made themselves more actively noticeable. Various measures have had an aggravating effect on the political developments, primarily the compulsory labor and service conscription in Flanders and the Netherlands.
The development of the conscription situation makes it necessary to have larger procurement programs organized even in Germanic regions. All Germans--with the exception of the Flemish--are collected in one German association. The Flemish remain in the "Langemarck" regiment.
Meanwhile, the "Prinz Eugen" division has been transferred to Croatia. Furthermore a Croatian legion is to be activated here, which is to be under the command of SS-Gruppenfuehrer Phleps.
Of great importance is the fact that the Fuehrer has assented to the
## activation of an SS-Standart of French volunteers, which is to be
called the "Karl der Grosse" standart.
_Norway_: Meanwhile in Norway Minister Fuglesang has succeeded the late Minister Lunde after the latter's unfortunate demise. In spite of promises made by the Quisling Party, one cannot count on Norway supplying a contingent of appreciable size.
_Denmark_: In Denmark the situation is especially favorable since SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best has taken over the control. One can be sure that here SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best will offer a good example of national Reich politics.
The situation in regard to Parteifuehrer Clausen has had unfavorable developments recently. Clausen agreed to the plan of activating a combat corps as introduction to the German Schutzstaffel in Denmark only on the supposition that membership in this corps would exclude membership in the Party. Negotiations for this very necessary collecting organization of the combat corps go on apace. The monopolistic position of the Party is not tenable; all recruits must be brought in, even if Clausen himself--however without his clique--is to stand in the foreground.
_Netherlands_: Meanwhile Reich Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart has proclaimed Mussert leader of the Netherland people. This measure has had an extremely disturbing effect on the other Germanic countries, especially in Flanders. The decisive role devolves again on the General Commissariat, whose principle of using Mussert too much, in order to disregard him, must be rejected on the part of German Reich policy in the sense of the Schutzstaffel.
_Flanders_: In Flanders the recent developments of the VNV have become even more unfavorable. Even the very clever policy of the new VNV-leader, Dr Elias, has been a disappointment; Dr Elias, moreover, once stated the opinion that Germany was ready for concessions in the natural political sphere, only when matters were going very badly for her.
Recently the Walloon question has been particularly accentuated. Leon Degrelle, who was a lieutenant in the Walloon Legion and earned there the Iron Cross First Class, is at present in Belgium and uses this time in testing the political barometer in all quarters. Degrelle's intention of founding a Wallonian Allgemeine SS has been rejected. Judging by the connection between religion and politics, it appears in Degrelle's case that he is a Frenchman in his thinking.
A favorable development has occurred in the case of the Flemish Arbeitsdienst. The negotiations carried out by the Reichsarbeitsfuehrer and especially by Oberstarbeitsfuehrer Mueller-Brandenburg with the assent of the Reichsfuehrer SS have had as a result that on the 1 April 1943 labor duty becomes obligatory in Belgium, both in the Flemish and Wallonian sectors. To bridge the gap students and apprentice officials were inducted into the Labor Service on the 15 Jan 43.
_Finland_: In Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim has been proposed as successor to the national presidency.
In correspondence with General Talvela particular discretion is suggested.
Just now wounded Finns (Officers, NCO's, men and Lottas) are in Germany as guests of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. This caring for the wounded has proved itself quite essential.
_Southeast_: Meanwhile in the southwest all volunteers from the Germans residing outside the Reich have been assigned to the SS.
In Hungary, as has been previously stated, there are difficulties in regard to the procuring of the necessary bills of exchange for the maintenance of the families of inducted volunteers. The suggestions of the Hungarian government are always only patch-work.
In general a strong violence manifests itself in the southeast as a consequence of the general military situation, and doubtless one must count on the existence of a certain sympathy with hostile powers through the Vatican.
After the order of the 12 August 42 by Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the competence of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in all German matters and the strict supervision of all Party units had been issued, a similar decree was prepared by Reich Minister Dr Lammers for the sphere of the State, which is soon to be issued. The new formulation demands even in sectors of the state the right of the Reichsfuehrer SS to a joint stipulation in fundamental national questions, that is to say, the Reich commissioners are to consult with the Reichsfuehrer SS in all actually fundamental questions regarding the nation.
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg reports again on questions of terminology which had been mentioned in the internal labor conference of the German Leitstelle in Copenhagen. Principally this terminology concerns the conceptions "Reich", "Nation", "Volk" and "Stamm", as well as "nordisch" and "germanisch".
In agreement with the Ahnenerbe office it was determined that the concept "Reich" is to remain reserved for the whole Reich of all German races and people. For Germany the official expression "Deutsches Reich" is to be used.
"Nation", being a concept stamped predominantly by liberalism, is no longer to be applied to the German peoples.
Difficulties arise also in differentiating between the concept "Stamm" and "Volk". The expression "Volk" is whenever possible to include the whole German area.
The word "Stamm", where it applies, is to be used for countries.
In regard to the definition of the term "nordisch" and "germanisch", the first expression must be used less and less. With the expression "nordisch", too high a position has been granted Norway, Sweden and Denmark at the expense of the west Germans.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers of the Ahnenerbe office states again the importance of the December conference of Office VI and reports on the conference of the scientific committee, which has been concluded there. A conference on the German historical work took place in the RSHA.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Loerner reports on an inventory of finances and affirms that a new agreement has been reached between the Reichs Treasurer and the Economic Administrative Office.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Schmidt still wishes a condensation of the bureaus on Flanders for the simplification of the work, in particular shifting the Antwerp bureau to Brussels. In addition he reports on the continuous difficulties in the work of family maintenance especially in Hungary.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 707-PS
SECRET!
The Fuehrer of the Reich Head of the main office VS-diary, number 507/44 secret CdSSHA/Be/We. Adjtr-diary, number 253/44 secret Please by way of reply give reference and date indicated above Berlin--Wilmersdorf 1, Hohenzollerndamm 31 Post office box 58
now: Berlin-Grunewald, 8 February 1944
Douglasstrasse, 7/11 001518 Feb. 14, 1944 Document Z G. IR 131 To the "Ancestral Heritage" leader of the SS Sievers Waischenfeld, Oberfranken
Dear comrade Sievers!
Enclosed herewith I transmit to you the attitude of the main leader of the SS group Jankuhn in regard to the evacuation of the museum of Charkow.
I have looked over the report hurriedly, I have not read it. It is superfluous to discuss it.
Heil Hitler W.G. Buegel SS leader
[Pencil note:]
It is a cheap method to do away with my report, which is supported by facts, by referring to matters that are not dealt with in the report because these matters do not pertain to the functions of the Sonderkommando Jahnkuhn, and were not within Jahnkuhn's jurisdiction. Transport space and transport facilities were not supplied by the Waffen SS but by the German Reich-Railroad. This opportunity was available to the opposing side, but was not utilized by them.
* * * * *
SECRET
The Ancestor's Heritage The Secretary for the Reich Organization [Der Reichsgeschaeftsfuehrer]
Berlin-Dahlem, 30 Oct 42 Diary # G/h/7 Wo/Bg
To Dozent Dr. Franz Hancar! Wien III/40, Hiessgasse 4
_Subject_: Commitment in Russia [Russland-Einsatz]
Dear Dr Hancar!
In order to secure the possessions of important museums and discoveries in the combat zone in the East, the Reichsfuehrer SS has ordered the creation of a special unit under Captain of the SS, Professor Dr. Herbert Jankuhn which has been operating together with an SS division very successfully for quite some time.
In the course of the execution of the order, the collections from Maikop, Pjatigorsk and Woroschilowsk have already been secured, besides other important scientific collections from the four important museums in Northern Caucasia. Work may already be done in these museums, and Professor Dr. Jankuhn proposes to set up a complete registration, by way of drawings and photography, of all prehistoric findings.
I am following a suggestion of Professor Dr. Herbert Jankuhn in asking you whether you would be willing to take over this job, mainly regarding Eastern European prehistoric problems, which ought to be of
## particular interest to you. In case you would accept, I would like you
to let me know when you could start working, and what should have to be done in order to secure your leave.
SS-Captain Professor Dr. Herbert Jankuhn shall return to Germany by the beginning of December. Therefore it will be possible without difficulties to discuss then all pertinent questions during a personal meeting.
Heil Hitler! signed: Sievers Lt Col of the SS
* * * * *
Leader of the Staff
Entered Jan. 20, 1944/185 Berlin, Jan. 14, 1944 H.A. II-Dr. Z/Do.
File note for the Leader of the Staff.
Subject: Reply with regard to the letters of the captain in the SS Jankuhn to the Personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS Office for the Ancestral Heritage, dates August 12, 13, and 22, 1943, respecting the evacuation and destruction of the Charkow Museum.
The criticism, which the captain in the SS delivers against the Special Purpose Staff for very evident reasons, can readily be answered, because he states things without any closer investigation, that should disparage the work of the Special Purpose Staff and the Office devoted to pre- and early historic research, because this latter work is apparently inconvenient to him.
In his letter of 13 August 1943, J. had forgotten to mention that the captain who had rebuilt the museum for prehistoric art was in fact a deputy of the Special Purpose Staff, namely, First Lieutenant Mueller, who by means of truly untiring and objective work during his free time had set up the museum to such an extent that it could again be opened to the public. The museum was visited by numerous officers and men, also by units of the Armed SS and the police. A thorough inventory had been taken, also many photographic copies were on hand. Thus First Lieutenant Mueller had performed a gratifying task in time of war which was generally recognized by the leaders of the units stationed in Charkow. The report of Jankuhn does not make any reference at all to this work of the Special Purpose Staff.
On 6 February 1943, the command was given for the first evacuation of the city. The Special Purpose Staff had then through untiring effort brought out the most valuable prizes of the museum; on 9 February it was necessary for the last members of the office to leave the city, which already had been almost abandoned by German troops. It was impossible at that time to bring out all the material, because the transportation situation did not permit this. It was not really necessary for SS leader Jahnkuhn to point out that these objects were important and worthy of being brought to safety. On the other hand, however, one must also consider the transportation problems that arise at the time of the evacuation of a city. It is evident that at such a time military transports receive unqualified priority, that even the most valuable possessions of culture cannot take precedence over them. Yet the Special Purpose Staff was able to salvage the most important articles of the museum. The remainder was entrusted to the care of the former curator of the museum, Professor Rudenski. Of this balance, again the most valuable was walled up within the enclosures of a bomb-proof cellar. For several days Professor Rudenski succeeded in saving the building from being blown up as intended. Finally, however, on the evening of February 14, 1943, as related by Professor Rudenski, by an oversight of a command of the Waffen SS, a fire broke out in the building and it burned down to the ground. Yet, later on, a large portion of the valuables from the cellar was salvaged again. However, a Gothic sword was missing. Now, as alleged by Jankuhn, it turns out that this sword was preserved by a unit of the Waffen SS.
Captain of the SS J. could have easily learned of these facts, if he had taken the trouble to contact the competent labor group Ukraine of the Special Purpose Staff and not Prof. Hornung, who had been installed in an entirely different district and who knew nothing about the developments in Charkow. At least he would not have exposed himself to the charge that he frivolously and without closer examination of the circumstances had claimed "that the Special Purpose Staff had not done the least for the preservation of the things that were found." The contrary is true.
After the recapture of the city, the valuables were reclaimed from the wreckage and the museum was opened again to the public on July 19, 1943. Thus it was proved anew that the Special Purpose Staff had done everything in the way of securing possessions of great cultural value and preserving them in the interests of the German administration.
Unfortunately, the second loss of Charkow in August 1943 rendered the work of restoration null and void. On August 6 the working staff received an evacuation summons with the order to leave Charkow immediately and without delay. Conditions affecting transportation were the same as in spring. If, indeed, valuable military installations had to remain behind, it is clear that, above all, objects from a museum had to remain behind. If the SS command had trucks at its disposal and could use the transportation facilities without consideration of military needs for the objects of the museum, then this is certainly a matter of very great appreciation. On the other hand, however, it cannot be charged to the Special Purpose Staff that it did not possess adequate transportation facilities. Nevertheless, the co-workers of the working staff have done what they could in order to preserve the most important part of the picture collection. In two days, already under hostile action, a large portion of museum collections was examined for the purpose of qualifying for transportation and then the selected assortment of 300 pictures of Western-European masters and Ukrainian painters and twenty-five costly Ukrainian carpets was packed and shipped. As already at an earlier date the most important collections of the museum, dealing with prehistoric art, had been carried off, the special command Jankuhn could only preserve third and fourth grade pieces of which several could be found in Kiev and other places.
The Special Purpose Staff under these circumstances sees no occasion for making any reproaches against the Special Command Jankuhn. If one was able to have at one's disposal transportation facilities and manpower in a more liberal manner, then it was easy to carry off larger collections. That the Special Command J. had done this is gratefully acknowledged by the Special Purpose Command; since it is being taken for granted that the collection was saved for the owner, namely, the Reichminister of the occupied Eastern districts and that correspondingly it is handed over to the Special Purpose Staff as the deputy of civil affairs. The Special Purpose Staff asks for the necessary action.
The staff command cannot rid itself of the impression that the Captain in the SS Jankuhn submitted his report frivolously on the basis of one-sided information. If he had made inquiries at the proper places without doubt he would have arrived at a different conclusion. At this juncture it is necessary to take a firm stand for the protection of the co-workers of the Special Purpose Staff and to ward off strongly every attack of a bureau that does not clearly understand the conditions.
Moreover, it could have been expected that Captain in the SS J. would have used the opportunity to get acquainted with the bureaus of the Special Purpose Staff and effected some cooperation. With the cooperation of both certainly more material could have been salvaged than had been done regardless (of the handicaps).
signed: Utikal
* * * * *
SS "Ancestral Heritage" _Research Organization_ Waischenfeld/Oberfranken, October 6, 1943 To the Chief of the SS Central Bureau SS Leader Berger, Berlin
Dear SS Leader!
Already on July * * * of this year the need arose to inform you about frictions that developed between co-workers of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization and the Special Purpose Staff R.R. in Dnjepropetrowsk. In this connection I did not neglect to mention that Reichminister Rosenberg complained that we had removed prehistoric discoveries from the Caukasus.
In order to complete the picture, I am turning over to you as supplement two reports from Captain in the SS (F) Jankuhn. They refer to the Museum in Charkow and they reveal with full clarity that the men of the Special Purpose Staff R.R.--insofar as we have met them heretofore--lack the simple prerequisites for the work in the East, namely, an unobjectionable, manly behavior.
I am summarizing the two reports and, briefly, I am able to conclude: 1. When the evacuation of Charkow became necessary in the winter of 1942, the Special Purpose Staff R.R. left the city without having done anything for the salvage of the museum.
2. On August 8, 1943 it became known that the possibility of a surrender of Charkow existed. On August 11 at nine in the morning the last man of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. left Charkow. Before August 15 no one considered any evacuation possible. In reality, Charkow was not evacuated until August 24. Not the least had been done for the salvaging of the collections of the museum, even though the care for the museum is in the hands of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. There were even documents on the desks, which leads one to believe that the men concerned abandoned their work as quickly as possible. Captain in the SS Jankuhn thereupon packed up the treasures and ordered them to be shipped.
This behavior of the men of the Special Service Staff R.R. could obviously be described by the most appropriate terms, and we are not at all surprised, if just these people "take a shot at" the men of the SS Reichsfuehrer, who really do nothing but fulfill the duties neglected by the former.
Heil Hitler! SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy
To the personal staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Command Post Division Std., September 25, 1943
Concerning the evacuation of the museum of Poltawa
When it became known that the evacuation of the city of Poltawa by September 21, 1943, was anticipated, I intended to examine personally the condition of the museum there and to order the necessary measures for preserving them, should the need arise.
Since the 03 of the division, SS Leader Daltweiler, had learned during a stay in P. that the salvaging of the museum through a specialist officer of the armed forces on the basis of a command from the O.B., already had begun, a trip to Poltawa was abandoned.
Heil Hitler! Signed: H. Jankuhn Captain in the SS (F)
For the correctness of this copy: SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy III Special Command, Fp. 16284 Command Post Division, Std., August 22, 1943 To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Regarding the destruction of the museum in Charkow.
On August 21, upon my suggestion, Sergeant in the SS, Dr. Zarp, from KB unit 5, visited the museum in Charkow. He found that the museum building had been burned down completely.
Since the more valuable pieces had been salvaged--as was pointed out in the report of December 8, 1943--no loss of more important objects of culture was sustained through the destruction of the museum.
Signed: H. Jankuhn Captain in the SS For the correctness of this copy SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy I Special Command Jankuhn, 16284 Command Post Division, Std., August 13, 1943 To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Regarding the destruction of the museum in Charkow in the spring of 1943.
Through the interrogation of Prof. Hornung, the curator of the museum in Dnjipropetrowsk, chosen by the Special Purpose Staff and on the basis of information that was supplied by the commander of the F.K.V. of the secret police and of the security service, the following could be brought to light concerning the fate of the museum of prehistoric art in Charkow in the spring of 1943.
In 1941/42 the museum of prehistoric art in Charkow was re-established anew in the main street of the city, the Sumskaja, by a captain, who for this purpose had been given a furlough. The exhibition is said to have been good and well arranged. Besides collections of prehistoric character there were to be found in the museum articles referring to folklore. When, during the winter campaigns of the months of February and March, the Special Service Staff R.R. left the city without having done the least for the saving of the collections. Merely a Gothic sword and a gold-plated handle are said to have been taken along by one SS unit. Since the salvaging of the piece was not effected through the Security Service Command in Charkow, it must be assumed that a unit of the II SS armored corps took this gorgeous weapon along.
After the retreat of the German troops, the museum was destroyed, apparently by explosion of fire. The Ukrainian collections stored there were destroyed almost completely.
Recent excavations undertaken in the ruins of the building have yielded only insignificant pieces of the material formerly stored there.
Thus one of the most important museums of Russia with collections of great cultural value was given over to destruction through the agencies of the German civil administration.
Signed: Jankuhn Captain in the SS For the correctness of this copy SS Leader
* * * * *
IIa
Exhibit i
To the report of 12 August 1943
This Institute of Culture is confiscated by the Charkow garrison!
It is secured for the Special Command R.R. and is placed under its professional supervision.
Outside of the rules for visit and use, it is forbidden to enter the institute, the taking of material is considered looting and will be punished as such.
Special permits through the Special Command R.R. Charkow, Sumskaja 48.
In the field, June 20, 1943 For the Commander of the garrison O.K.V.Rat
[Handwritten draft]
Copy 5 times
Special Command Jankuhn 16284 II
Command Post Division, August 12, 1943
* * * * *
SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin 034482 x-Oct. 9, 1943, Copy Z B/4r/r22 To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Subject: Evacuation of the museum in Charkow.
On August 8, '43 in the evening it became known that the possibility of an evacuation of Charkow until August 14 existed. On August 10, 1943, I went in the company of an interpreter, SS Sergeant Jacobsen to Charkow. In the afternoon I reported to the commander of the D.K._V_. of the SIPO and the SD, Major Krauebitter, and informed him that I was entrusted by the Reichfuehrer SS with the salvage of the museum in the field of operations of the Waffen SS on the Southern front. In this connection I learned of the fate of the museum in Charkow during the evacuation of Charkow in the beginning of 1943; a separate report on that subject is being prepared. At the same time Major Krauebitter informed me that the KVR with the garrison of Charkow, who was responsible for the museums had already left the city days ago. A further inquiry in the buildings of the bureau of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. revealed that this bureau already had left Charkow on the morning of August 10. A survey of the museum in the company of Major Krauebitter revealed the following picture:
The Museum contains a small prehistoric department after the really prehistoric museum had been destroyed in the winter after failure of evacuation. Moreover, it contained a good collection of Ukrainian art of folklore character, small objects of ecclesiastical art,
## particularly, however, mostly paintings of Ukrainian painters, as the
pictures of central- and west-European masters had been transported to Germany by the SD in 1942. The storehouse of the museum contains still numerous pictures. The key to the museum was given to the Ukrainian lady superintendent by the Special Purpose Staff R.R., who also related that at eight o'clock in the morning on October 8 a gentleman of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. had been in the museum and with several pictures had quickly departed at 8:30 o'clock. As a matter of fact, some pictures of the collection were missing, approximately 1%.
After no one had taken steps toward any real preservation of the museum, neither among the garrison nor among the Special Purpose Staff R.R., which according to the poster, referred to as Exhibit I, was responsible for the care of the collection, the packing was begun.
The prehistoric findings--almost exclusively ceramics of the bronze age--were packed in two wooden boxes and shipped by a truck of the EKV; they were to be sent from Kiev to Berlin.
The exhibit of Ukrainian popular art contained textiles, ceramics, glass, costumes, and objects of wood. The greater part is packed in two large wooden boxes and was shipped with the evacuation material of the EKV by rail to Dnjepropetrowsk. Among it was a large tapestry, which on account of its size could not be packed.
From the collection of paintings the most valuable pictures were selected and shipped by rail in the direction of Dnjepropetrowsk.
The documents that remained lying on the desk of the Special Purpose Staff R.R.--a work plan of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. signed by a section chief Schmidt and a report on Ukrainian art--were saved and turned over to the EKV of the SIPO and the SD.
Signed: Jankuhn Captain in the SS For the correctness of this copy SS Leader
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 710-PS
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense Berlin, 31 July 1941
To: The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service; SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich
Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with the carrying out of emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.
Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you.
I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.
signed: GOERING
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 728-PS
Copy
SECRET
DRAFT Ambassador RITTER No. 444, SALZBURG, 20 June 1944
1. To Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces With reference to your correspondence of 15 June 1944, Nr.
WFSt/Qu. (Verw.) Nr. 771793/44 gKChefs. II. Ang., concerning the treatment of enemy terror-aviators.
In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.
In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the S.D. [Security Service].
I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred, before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.
II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D. including subsequent publication, would be tenable, only if Germany, on this occasion simultaneously would openly repudiate the commitment of International Law, presently in force and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war. The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War, and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.
An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners of War but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not to go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel. Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing treaties and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case.
Of the acts deemed crimes listed under 1-4 by the letter of 15 June, we note that those listed under 1 and 4 are legally unobjectionable. Those under 2 and 3 are not. The Foreign Office, however, would be willing to disregard this. Perhaps it would be preferable to combine Nos. 1, 3, and 4 to the effect that all strafing attacks on the civilian population by an aviator will be dealt with as crimes. The various facts under 1, 3 and 4 would then be significant only as especially outstanding examples. The Foreign Office sees no reason why such attacks should not be expiated, when they are directed against the civilian population in ordinary dwelling houses, in automobiles, on riverboats, etc.
The Foreign Office bases its opinion on the fact that it is altogether forbidden to German fliers to strafe the civilian population during their attacks in England. According to information received by the Foreign Office, such an order was issued some time ago by the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces. In case of general publication, the existence of such an order could be pointed out.
III. It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: "the deterrence of enemy aviators" is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore; if not in the publicity for home consumption, then certainly in the propaganda directed to foreign countries. The pertinent German local departments, most likely the police, would have to be informed immediately to submit a short, truthful report to a central depository in Berlin giving particulars as to place, time, number of dead and wounded.
This central depository would at once forward these reports to the Foreign Office for exploitation. Since similar strafing attacks upon civilian populations have occurred in other countries, for example, in France, Belgium, Croatia and Rumania, the pertinent German departments or the governments in these countries are to be directed to collect the instances of such strafing attacks against the civilian population in the same manner and to exploit them propagandistically in foreign countries, in collaboration with German offices.
IV. In the letter of 15 June the intention was communicated that until further notice, an understanding with the Foreign Office would have to be reached prior to any publication. The Foreign Office attaches particular value to this point and also to the fact that this understanding be reached, not only until further notice, but for the entire duration of the campaign.
By order
(signed) RITTER [crossed out]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 729-PS
[Handwritten note:] 20 June Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces (Chef/OKW) K [Keitel] Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Nr.771793/44 gKChefs.II.Ang., WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1)
Fuehrer's Headquarters, 14 June 1944
Secret 2 Copies, Copy No. 2 Top Secret By Officer Courier only
Subject: Treatment of enemy terror aviators [hand written note: mailed 17 June]
To the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, Attention: Col. of the General Staff von Brauchitsch
1. On the basis of preliminary discussions and after consultation with the Foreign Minister and with the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, the following activities are to be considered the acts of terror, which are to be taken into consideration upon the publication of an instance of lynching and which will justify the transfer of enemy aviators from the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel to the S.D. [Security Service] for special treatment:
1. Low-level aerial attacks upon the civilian population--upon individuals as well as upon groups.
2. The shooting of our own downed (German) air crews, while parachuting to earth.
3. Low-level aerial attacks upon passenger trains engaged in public (civilian) transportation.
4. Low-level aerial attacks upon Army and Civilian Hospitals and upon hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross:
It is requested to secure the approval of the Reichsmarshall for this draft of prohibited acts, and if he does approve, orally to instruct the commandant of the Air Force (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel to proceed accordingly.
It is further requested that the approval of the Reichsmarshall be obtained, for the method intended to be used in the procedure of publication as expressed in the enclosed communication to the Foreign Secretary.
A written confirmation is requested, if feasible, by the 18th of this month.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [initialed] K [Keitel] 16 June 1 Enclosure
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 730-PS
MOST SECRET
Draft
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Fuehrer Hq, 15/6/1944 WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1) No. 77193/44 Most Secret S.O. only II.Ang. 3 Copies, 2nd Copy _Subject_: Treatment of enemy terror aviators S.O. only access only through officer Pencil note: dispatched 17/6 =1030.
To Foreign Office, for the attention of Ambassador Ritter, Salzburg.
For the announcement of such cases as have led to lynch justice being taken by the population or--in the case of capture by the armed forces or the police--to special treatment by the SD, it is necessary to determine clearly what facts should be regarded as evidence of a criminal action in this sense.
In agreement with the Commander in Chief of the air force, I intend to establish the following formula. It may also serve as instruction to the commandants of the reception Camp for Aviators at Oberursel in these cases, where investigation in that camp shows that it would be appropriate to segregate the offender owing to confirmation of the suspicion or to hand turnover to the SD.
1. Attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, whether on individuals or crowds;
2. Firing on our own (German) air crews while suspended by parachute after having been shot down;
3. Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains, if the public service.
4. Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and hospital trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.
Prior to any announcement of a case in the press, over the wireless, etc., it must be assured that name, unit, place of occurrence and other relevant particulars form a convincing picture, by whose publication the intended deterrent effect to further acts of murder could be achieved. In drafting the publications, it will have to be borne in mind that protests on the part of the enemy are to be expected from all quarters. It is therefore intended, in agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and with the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, that, prior to each publication, until further notice, agreement should be reached between the Supreme Command of the air force, the armed forces Ops Staff, the Foreign Office and the SD., to determine the facts, time and form of the announcement.
I would ask you to confirm, if possible by the 18th of this month, that you are in agreement with the above formula and with the intended procedure for the announcements.
3/96 K [initialled by Keitel] 16/6
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 731-PS
Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces Chef WFSt Please direct drafting of order W [Warlimont-?] K [Keitel] 21 May Deputy Chief of Command Staff of the Armed Forces. [note apparently written by Keitel] Must * * * go to the Reichsfuehrer SS
After a report of the Reichsmarshall [Goering] General Korten makes the following statement:
[Note: All the above remarks are handwritten.]
Memorandum
The Fuehrer has rendered the following decision in regard to measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews, in _special instances_; downed enemy airmen are to be shot without court martial proceedings in the following instances:
1. In the event of the shooting of our _own_ (German) downed air crews while they are parachuting to earth;
2. In the event of aerial attacks upon German planes, which have made emergency landings, and whose crews are in the immediate vicinity;
3. In the event of attacks upon railway trains engaged in public (civilian) transportation;
4. In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon individual civilians (farmers, workers, single vehicles, etc.). [Note--this paragraph was amended to read: In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon civilian population, single civilian vehicles, etc. The words "civilian population" are in Jodl's handwriting.]
[Note on bottom of page referring to item 2: "I consider this point dangerous. For, to attack an airplane which has made an emergency landing, can not be classified as Gangster Method but is in complete agreement with the strictest standards of civilized warfare."]
J. [Jodl]
[Note on left margin: The order should be preceded by a preamble in which the disregard of the most primitive laws--civilization--(balance unintelligible).]
J. [Jodl] 22 May
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 732-PS
The Reichsmarshall of Germany Adjutant's Office
Berlin W8 the Leipziger Str. 3
Teleph 120044 Headquarters June 19, 1944
_Adj. Nr. 1605/44 secret_
_Concerns_: Treatment of the Enemy Terror Aviators.
_Reference_: Letter Nr. 771793/44 top secret II Ang. WFST/Qu. Command Staff of the Armed Forces/Supply. (Verw. 1) June 15, 1944.
2 copies, Copy No. 1
To The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Generalfieldmarshall Keitel.
Mr. Reichsmarshall remarked to the above letter: "We cannot control the reaction of the population any way. Adequate _precaution_ has to be taken that the populace does not react in the same manner against _other enemy aviators_ not belonging to the category mentioned above. In my opinion facts of the above cases can be handled any time _by a court_, the acts being _murder_, forbidden by the enemy to its aviators."
Feske Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff 3/91
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 733-PS
WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1) Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces; Supply Section 26 June 1944
Subject: Treatment of Terror-aviators
Telephone Memorandum
Telephone call by Captain Breuer from the Adjutant's Office of the Reichsmarshall:
The Reichsmarshall agrees with the communicated wording of the definition of terror-aviators and with the proposed procedure. He asks that he be instructed today about the measures taken.
[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
TOP SECRET
Access only through officer Fuehrer Headquarters 6.6.1944 _Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff_ No. 771793/44 Top Secret, S.O. only
_Subject_: Treatment of enemy terror aviators
Minutes of a meeting
1. Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy Chief of WFSt in Klessheim on the afternoon of 6.6, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshall, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfuehrer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with A/C armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police.
2. Deputy Chief of WFSt stated the following:
a. First and foremost, following the lines of the generally distributed declaration made by Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels and numerous press notices written in the same vein, it is essential to announce any definitely established incident of this kind giving the names and units of the aviators, the place the incident occurred and any other relevant facts. The purpose of this would be to make clear the serious intentions of the Germans in the face of disbelieving enemy propaganda and especially to discourage effectively any further murderous action against our civilian population. Therefore the question is whether the SD knows of such a case or whether the necessary proof is available from which to construct a case like this with the required statements. Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner replied to both in the negative.
b. Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that, apart from Lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators, who are suspected of criminal action of this kind, until they are received into the Reception Camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment.
For this purpose the WFSt would cooperate with the Supreme Command of the Air Force to set out the necessary regulations for the use of the head of the camp at Oberursel.
Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner expressed his complete agreement with this view and that the SD take charge of those aviators segregated.
c. On the question of making announcements, it is settled that, for the present, agreement should be reached in every case between OKW/WFSt, OKL, and the Reichsfuehrer SS to decide the form that the announcement should take.
The participation of the Foreign office is to be assured by the WFSt.
3. At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Air Force) on 6.6, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror-action, justifying Lynch law.
a. Low level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.
b. Shooting on our own (German) air crews in the air who have bailed out.
c. Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service.
d. Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and hospital-trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.
The head of the Reception camp for aviators at Oberursel will be informed of these facts given in Section 3 above. If the facts of any case of this kind are established on examination, the prisoners are to be handed over to the SD. Colonel von Brauchitsch declared, at the end, that another report to the Reich Marshall on this subject would be superfluous.
sgd. Warlimont
_Distribution_: Chief OKW via Chief WFSt--1st copy Deputy Chief WFSt/Ktb.--2nd copy Qu (rough copy)--3rd copy
* * * * *
_Remarks by the Chief of OKW on_ the agenda dated 6.6.44 No. 771793/44
Top Secret S.O. only.
If one allows the people to carry out Lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules!
K
Min. Dir. Berndt got out and then shot the enemy aviators on the road.
I am against _legal_ procedure! It doesn't work out!
[sgd.] K. [Keitel]
* * * * *
_Remarks by Chief of WFSt_:
To 3. This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:
1. What do we consider as murder?
Is _RR_ in agreement with point 3b?
2. How should the procedure be carried out?
_a._ by the people?
_b._ by the authorities?
3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators?
4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
[sgd.] J. [Jodl]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 737-PS
WFst/ Qu. (Verw. 1) No. 771761/44 Top Secret [initial] W. [Warlimont] 4 June 4 June 1944 Top Secret 2 Copies, Copy No. 1 Top Secret Only by Officer
Subject: Treatment of the enemy terror aviators
Conference Notes
I. Pursuant to the order of the Chief of the Staff of the Armed Forces and Deputy Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces the following is decreed:
1. It is to be ascertained from the Reichfuehrer SS through SS Major Grothmann whether and in what form the information given by the Fuehrer to the Reichfuehrer SS, that in one or more instances fliers, who had been shot down during strafing attacks on the population, had been lynched by the latter, has meanwhile gone out. If the answer should be "no", in what manner does the Reichfuehrer intend to proceed in the near future.
2. From the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces (Colonel von Brauchitsch) it is to be ascertained what specific acts of enemy fliers are to be considered and handled as deserving death according to the opinion of the Reichsmarshall. Reference to this: The 4 points of the memorandum [731-PS] by the Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces (Chef, WFst.) of 20-22 May based on the information of General Korten after report of the Reichsmarshall. [L-166, par. 20] * * *
3. After the clarification of point 2, the preparation of a directive to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel stating in what cases the prisoners are to be turned over to the SD, specifying in a more detailed manner the cases which are to be treated as deserving of death, and the points of view which are to be followed in the subsequent procedure. Reference relative to this: Statement of Colonel von Brauchitsch according to the notes of 26 May.
This directive is to be prepared only in two copies and, after consultation with Colonel von Brauchitsch, it is to be forwarded to the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces with the instructions to communicate it to the commandant of the camp at Oberursel orally only.
4. It is to be ascertained from the Chief of the Armed Forces Propaganda whether he has any information concerning any new steps taken in this matter by the Reichfuehrer SS.
5. In accordance with the instructions issued in the evening of 3 June, by the Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Office is to be informed of the situation in the evening with the following purposes in view:
a. That the formulation of the notices of the Reich Fuehrer SS and the other measures should be undertaken in an appropriate manner and in accord with the Foreign Office; and
b. To be prepared in advance against protests by the enemy powers, so as to be in a position to answer them immediately, and thus to prevent occurrences such as those which took place in connection with the escape of the Anglo-American aviators from camp Sagan.
Ambassador Ritter has been already notified accordingly by the Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces.
II. It was impossible to clarify points 1 and 2 (in this connection point 3 as well) until 23 hours since neither Colonel von Brauchitsch nor an SS officer on the Command Staff Bergwald could be contacted. A telephone conference with Major Grothmann has been agreed upon for 4 June at 10:00 o'clock.
Distribution: Deputy Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces Copy No. 1 [pencilled notation] Qu. (Draft) Copy No. 2 destroyed according to-- [initials] 18 August [illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 740-PS
Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces (Verw.1) No. 006988/44 Secret
30 June 1944 Secret 3 Copies, Copy No. 1
Subject: Treatment of enemy terror-aviators
[Marginal note: "We must really do something about this now. What is still necessary?"]
[initialed] W. [Warlimont] [Initialed] K [Keitel] 30/6
Agenda
I. Enclosed I submit the _draft_ of a reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, which has been passed to the Armed Forces Ops Staff (WFSt) through Ambassador Ritter.
Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft, but that he has ordered Envoy Sonnleitner to present the attitude of the Foreign Office to the Fuehrer, _before_ the letter is sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The letter is to be forwarded to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces only after the approval by the Fuehrer of the principles established by the Foreign Office.
II. The Reichsmarshall agrees with the precise wording of the definition of the term "terror-aviators" as given by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and with the proposed procedure.
/s/ WARLIMONT Distribution: Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces via Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff Copy #1 KTB (War Diary) Copy #2 Qu (Verw.1) Copy #3 [pencil note illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 741-PS
Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces/G-4 5 July 1944
SECRET
Memorandum with reference to Terror-Aviators
In his midday report of 4 July the Fuehrer has issued the following directive:
According to press reports the Anglo-Americans intend to subject to air attack small localities without any war-economic or military value, as a reprisal against V-1. In the event this report proves true, the Fuehrer orders that notice be served via radio and the press that every enemy aviator who is shot down while participating in such an attack is not entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war but that he will be treated as a murderer as soon as he falls into German hands. This rule shall apply to all attacks on small localities which constitute neither military targets, nor communication targets nor armament targets, etc., and are therefore of no military significance.
Nothing is to be done at the moment; on the contrary, measures of this sort are only to be discussed with the Armed Forces Legal Section (WR) and with the Foreign Office.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 743-PS
_WFSt/Qu. 2 (Ost)_ SSD [stamped] _SSD_--_teletype_ [illegible pencil marks] September 8th, 1944. [illegible pencil marks] Secret [stamped] To 1. Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./Chefgr. (Anna) 2. Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K.Verw. (Anna-Bu) 3. Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord HM1X [in pencil] 4. Ob. Heeresgruppe Mitte 5. Wi Stab Ost 6. Wehrkreiskommando I. With addresses
Subject: Utilization of the soil in parts of the Reichskommissariat Ostland.
1. The Fuehrer has ordered the district leader (Gauleiter) Koch to carry out the utilization of the soil in the parts of the Reichskommissariat Ostland which are occupied by the Army Group Middle. Further, the Fuehrer has ordered that all German and local administrative authorities are bound by the directives of Gauleiter Koch. Concerning the exploitation of natural resources and other products, Gauleiter Koch has to keep in touch with the competent supreme authorities of the Reich.
2. All quarters of the Armed Forces are to give Gauleiter Koch their utmost support in the execution of this order.
3. The order of September 5th, 1944, concerning the full powers given by the Fuehrer to Gauleiter Koch is hereby cancelled.
[illegible pencil remark] (signed) Keitel. _OKW/WFSt/Qu.2 (East)_ number 0 6891/44 secret [in pencil] 5031 [in pencil] [illegible pencil remarks]
BOC--OKW--1620 [in pencil]
_Further Distribution_: Head of the Party Chancellery Minister of the Reich and Head of the Reich Chancellery Gauleiter Koch, Koenigsberg General Staff of the Army Gen.St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K. Verw. (Anna) [pencil note on the right side]; ab 9/9.44 [initials] (2 stamps)
* * * * *
SECRET [stamped]
_Teletype_
SSD [in red pencil] Fuehrer Headquarters, 5.9.44. Secret [in red pencil] 12F [in pencil] To: 1. Gen. St. d. H./Gen. Qu. 2. Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord 3. O.B. Heeresgruppe Mitte [in pencil] 4. Wi Stab Ost 5. Wehrkreiskommando I.
The Fuehrer will intrust Gauleiter Koch, East Russia, with the economic evacuation of the Ostland occupied by us and will give him all full powers necessary for that purpose. Apart from bringing food-stuffs back we mean to seize useful products, machines etc.
All quarters of the armed forces have to support Gauleiter Koch as far as possible.
The Chef OKW Certified copy [signed] Keitel [in pencil] Schlossmann Army Major. [stamped] _SSD_ FS _WNOF_ Number _4563_ arrived _September 5th, 1944_ _2240_ o'clock forwarded on......o'clock to..... by................
[illegible pencil remarks]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 744-PS
[Illegible pencil notes]
8 July 1943
SECRET
Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) _Armed Forces General Staff (WFST)_ _Organization (II) No. 02938/43 Secret_ _2235_ Ref. 2105 Subject: Manpower for Coal Mining
For the execution of the enlarged iron and steel program, the Fuehrer has ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee of the necessary _coal production_, and for that purpose he has ordered to cover the requirements for manpower with prisoners of war.
_The Fuehrer demands_ that the measures described below will be used to add 300,000 additional workers to the coal mining industry finally.
1. Of the _Soviet prisoners of war in our hands_--with the exception of those of Finland, Norway and those who are employed in T/O positions by the troops, 200,000 prisoners of war fit for coal mining are to be transferred immediately as the first installment by 1 Sept 43 by the plenipotentiary general for labor allocation with the consent of the chief, supreme command armed forces (AWA/chief prisoner of war affairs) trainload by trainload. As far as necessary the GBA (plenipotentiary for manpower) will provide substitutes.
2. In case of the _receipt of new Soviet prisoners of war_, the requirements of the coal mining industry have absolute priority over all other demands until further notice.
All prisoners of war, captured since 5 July 43 in the East, are to be sent to camps of the supreme command armed forces, and from there they are to be made available immediately or by exchange with other consumers to the plenipotentiary for labor allocation for use in the coal mining industry; the chairman of the national coal association has the immediate right of choice already in the prisoner of war camps of the supreme command armed forces area with the aid of his agencies.
3. Soviet professional coal miners are to be sent without exception from all prisoners of war allocation points according to their vocational training to the plenipotentiary for labor allocation against replacements for use in mining.
4. All male prisoners, from 16 to 55 years age, captured in _guerilla fighting_ in the operational area, the army area, the Eastern commissariats, the Government General and the Balkans, will in the future be considered prisoners of war. The same applies to those males in the newly conquered territories of the East. They are to be sent to prisoner of war camps, and are to be brought from there for labor allocation in the Reich.
The chief of the army general staff and the Reichsfuehrer SS after consultation will issue within their jurisdiction the necessary directives on the conscription and further treatment of family members.
For presentation to the Fuehrer, the chief of the affairs of prisoners of war reports to me _every ten days_ on the development of the action, T. _for the first time of 25 July 43_ as of 20 July 43.
Keitel [signed in ink]
_Distribution_:
Army General Staff
Supreme Commander Airforce
Airforce General Staff
Chief of army armament and Commander of the replacement army
General armed forces operation office (AWA) chief of prisoner of war affairs
Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of German Police
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, attention State Secretary Koerner
Reichminister for armament and nutritions
Chairman of the Reich coal association [Reichsvereinigung Kohle] State councillor Pleiger.
The necessary information of further agencies, who are also concerned will be given by AWA with the consent of the plenipotentiary for labor allocation (GBA).
* * * * *
The Reichsfuehrer SS Field Headquarters 5 Aug 1943 Adjutant Journal No. 891/43 secret
_Subject_: Manpower for coal mining industry.
_Reference_: Letter of the command staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS--journal No. Ia/1909/43 secret.
Secret
1. Chief of the personal staff of Reichsfuehrer SS
2. SS main office
3. Reich security main office [RSHA]
4. Race and resettlement main office--SS
5. Main office, ordinary police
6. SS economic administrative main office
7. SS personal main office
8. Main office SS court
9. SS Supreme command--Headquarters of the Waffen SS
10. Staff Headquarters of the Reich commissar for the consolidation of Germanism
11. Main office center for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle]
12. Office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer
13. Chief of the guerilla-fighting units
14. Higher SS and Police Leader Ostland
15. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-Center
16. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-South
17. Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast
18. Higher SS and Police Leader East
19. Higher SS and Police Leader Alpine territory
20. Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia
21. Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.
To figure 4. of the above mentioned order, I order that all young female prisoners, capable of work, are to be sent to Germany for work through the agency of Reich Commissioner Sauckel.
Children, old women and men are to be collected and employed in the women's and children's camps, established by me, on estates as well as on the border of the evacuated area.
/s/ H. Himmler For the Reichfuehrer Grothmann [in ink] SS Sturmbannfuehrer [Major]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 745-PS
Security Service of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
(SS) Security Service, Section Koblenz
111 .4 B No. 11/44 gKs-S/fd Koblenz, June 12, 1944 3 copies 3rd copy Top Secret
To the Inspector of Security Police and of SD SS-Colonel Bomann
Wiesbaden.
_For information_:
To the Director of the State Police Office Koblenz SS Major Dr. Christiann
_Koblenz._
Concerns: Enemy aviators who have been shot down Reference: Your letter--IV 2a (new) 43/44 gKs--of 21.4.1944
With reference to your letter and to the preceding oral consultations, it is announced that the OKW issued a similarly worded decree which was read to the company leaders. The appropriate wording of the decree was that German soldiers cannot be expected to give their protection to murderers of German people. Further confidential information was that the company commanders informed their companies accordingly and gave them to understand that value is no longer placed on imprisoned enemy aviators.
The decree of the OKW which was read as a top secret military document, was presented on 3.6.1944.
Acknowledgement is requested. The head of the SD Section Koblenz (SS) Lieutenant-Colonel [sig. illegible] Wiesbaden, 21 April 1944 Top Secret 9 copies 9th copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 754-PS
WFSt/Op (Army Command Staff) [Wehrmachts Fuehrungstab]
TOP SECRET
[pencilled notes illegible] 28 Oct 1944 6 copies 5th Copy
_KR--Teletype_
1. Geb [?] AOK (Army Supreme Command) 20 2. For information: (WB) Armed Forces Commander in Chief, Norway 3. For information: Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Norwegian Territories 4. OKM (Supreme Command, Navy) /1. Skl. (Koralle)
Because of the unwillingness of the north Norwegian population to voluntarily evacuate, the Fuehrer has agreed to the proposals of the commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, and has ordered, that the entire Norwegian population east of fjord of Lyngen be evacuated _by force_ in the interest of their own security, and _that all homes are to be burned down or destroyed_.
The supreme commander, Northern Finland, is responsible, that the Fuehrer's order is carried out without consideration. Only by this method can it be prevented, that the Russians with strong forces, aided by these homes and the people, familiar with the terrain, follow our withdrawal operations during this winter and shortly appear in front of our position in Lyngen. This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.
* * * * *
[Pencilled note bottom page 1: BDC--OKW 1612.]
[Stamped:] 13/184
* * * * *
It must be made clear to the troops, engaged in this action, that the Norwegians will be thankful in a few months that they were saved from Bolshevism, and that the barbarian methods of the air war against our German country and her cultural shrines have brought a thousand times more misery to our people if compared with the humane evacuation and destruction of homes in Northern Norway, which is necessary for our war effort, and which, if it is not done, must be paid for with blood of German soldiers.
The population--whose livelihood is fishing--in Northern Norway, furthermore has enough shipping space at its disposal to be able to get out of the way en mass across the water. A large part of the small Norwegian ships which are kept hidden at present can be used for this and can later also be used for our own transportation needs.
The danger of the formation of guerilla bands on the part of the Norwegians appears to be negligible since they can no longer use the houses during the winter.
I.A. [By order] signed: JODL Supreme Command Armed Forces/Armed Forces Command St/ Army Operations/North/No 0012887/44 top secret Distribution:
Chief Armed Forces Command St (1st copy)
Deputy Chief/Ktb (2nd copy)
Operations (Army) operations (Navy) (1 each 3rd & 4th copies)
Quartermaster and G-2 (1 each 5th & 6th copies)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 765-PS
Copy
Teletype Message Munich 47 767 10 November 1938--0120-- To all State Police Main Offices and Field Offices To all SD--Main Sectors and to SD--Sub-Sectors
SECRET
Flash Urgent to be submitted at once. Urgent--to be submitted immediately to the Chief or his deputy.
_Regards_: Measures against Jews to-night.
Because of the attempt on the life of von Rath, Legation Secretary in Paris, demonstrations against the Jews are to be expected in the entire Reich in the course of this night--from the 9th to the 10th of November 1938. For the handling of these actions the following directions are issued:
1. The chiefs of the State Police Offices or their deputies will immediately after receipt of this teletype message establish telephone contact with the political leadership offices--Gau Directorate or Kreis Directorate--within their region and arrange a conference about the handling of the demonstrations. The respective inspectors and commanders of the Order Police are to participate in the conference. In this conference the political leadership offices are to be informed that the German police have received the following directives from the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and Chief of the German Police, which directives are to be conformed to by the political leadership offices in an appropriate manner:
_a._ Only such measures may be taken which do not jeopardize German life or property (for instance, burning of synagogues only if there is no danger of fires for the neighborhood).
_b._ Business establishments and homes of Jews may be destroyed but not looted. The police have been instructed to supervise the execution of these directives and to arrest looters.
_c._ In business streets special case is to be taken that non-Jewish establishments will be safeguarded at all cost against damage.
_d._ Subjects of foreign countries may not be molested even if they are Jews.
2. Under the provision that the directives given under No. 1 are being complied with, the demonstrations are not to be prevented but merely supervised regarding compliance with the directives.
3. Immediately after receipt of this teletype the archives of the Jewish communities are to be confiscated by the police, so that they will not be destroyed in the course of the demonstrations. Important in this respect is historically valuable material, not recent tax lists, etc. The archives are to be delivered to the respective SD Office.
4. The direction of the measures of the Safety Police regarding the demonstrations against Jews is in the hands of the State Police Offices, in as much as the inspectors of the Safety Police do not issue different directives. For the performance of the measures of the Safety Police, officers of the criminal police as well as members of the SD, the special troops and the SS, may be used.
5. As soon as the events of this night permit the use of the designated officers, as many Jews, particularly wealthy ones, as the local jails will hold, are to be arrested in all districts. Initially only healthy male Jews, not too old, are to be arrested. After the arrests have been carried out the appropriate concentration camp is to be contacted immediately with a view to a quick transfer of the Jews to the camps. Special care is to be taken that Jews arrested on the basis of this directive will not be mistreated.
6. The content of this order is to be communicated to the respective inspectors and commanders of the Order Police and to the SD Chief Sectors and the SD Sub-Sectors with the notification that these police measures have been issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and the Chief of the German Police. The Chief of the Order Police issues appropriate orders to the Fire Department Police. The Safety Police and the Order Police are to work in closest coordination in the execution of these measures.
The receipt of this teletype is to be confirmed by the State Police Director or a deputy via teletype to the Secret State Police Office into the hands of SS Colonel [Standartenfuehrer] Muller.
Signed: HEYDRICH SS General [Gruppenfuehrer]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 775-PS
[Memorandum of Minister of Interior concerning the Clarification of Police Matters, 1935]
As chief of the department of police in the Reich and Prussian ministry of the interior, I have noticed lately an ever increasing internal political tension which makes a clarification of authority both as regards the general police and more especially the political police, evidently urgently necessary.
1. Fight against the Church
The Reich minister of the interior is the competent authority for general rules on confessional policy. Therefore, the leaders of the diverse confessional groups address their petitions to our office. Lately, half of the political police reports concerned clerical matters. We have untold petitions from all kinds of cardinals, bishops, and dignitaries of the church. Most of these complaints concern matters under the jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, although the respective rules were not decreed by it. It happens very often that we have in our capacity as a court of appeal to settle incidents, about which sometimes we know nothing at all until we receive the complaint. There does not seem to be any unity any longer between our principles as regards political, ecclesiastical matters and the executives thereof in the states. It is an inexcusable state of affairs to give directions to complainants and make promises to ecclesiastical leaders, if there is no reliability of their being carried out in the states. Therefore, I deem it an absolute necessity that full clarification be given on this controversial philosophical matter not only as regards the _principles but also the execution thereof_.
I would like to point out that, in my opinion, these principles should be both considered and executed not only from an internal political, but also from the foreign political viewpoint. I enclose an encyclical of the Pope that was submitted to me today. The question arises for instance as to whether the manner of treatment of returning Catholic young people in front of Swiss customs guards has something to do with the unfavorable foreign political commentaries which have been evoked by this action by the political police.
This concerns not only the political police; the whole police force as such will be implicated by the consequences resulting from the religious struggle. Instances of gross disturbance of congregations are mounting terribly fast lately, often necessitating intervention of the emergency squad. In the long run I cannot carry the responsibility, for officials will become involved and be forced to support one party or the other. The struggle [Kampfzeit] is so recent that we know from our own experience that in the end the police official will be blamed quite often for everything by both warring parties. After discarding the rubber truncheon, the idea of exposing executive officials to situations in which, during gross interruption of meetings, they may be forced to use cold steel, is unbearable.
It is my opinion that everything must be done to prevent the wearing out of the police force as well as the state authority in general with an untimely religious struggle. Should this philosophical conflict continue I would be forced,--incidentally this was proposed to me in a letter from the chief of the Gestapo, to give lectures to the police officials on Christian religions or the particular importance of the religious movement and the attitude of the party to these.
Neither do I believe that it is desirable if the lower grade police authorities carry out the handling and reporting of these religious matters in a certain one-sided manner.
2. Lately, there has been a marked increase of cases of protective custody. I demand urgently that in this matter also, final directives be given concerning _methods_, _proof_, _length of time_ and manner of _execution_. The decree on protective custody by the Reich Ministry of the Interior has been made invalid long ago by the actions of the political police. It is almost impossible to receive an adequate report on a case of protective custody. The petitions, addressed to us in this matter, all stress the same point which I also regard as important. The parties concerned and their relatives accept protective custody as a matter of fact, but not the complete uncertainty as regards the manner and principles by which it may or may not be imposed. This unquestionable _lawlessness_ fosters unrest and antagonism. It is intolerable for the Reich Ministry of the Interior, when there is a different interpretation and application of the law in the respective states, thereby obstructing a uniform execution of the law. The question must also be settled whether as approved by the judicial association N.S., in agreement with the Reichminister of Justice, in cases of protective custody a person is allowed a lawyer, or as is actually practised by the secret state police this is refused. I refer in this connection to the case of lawyer Puender. He was confined to protective custody with his colleagues for bringing an action, being forced to do this by a Reich law, after duly informing the Reich Ministry of Justice and our ministry. This complaint could not involve any complications, as it could immediately be legally restrained by us.
3. For _official political reasons_ I must object on principle to the fact that lately once more and without previous knowledge of the superior authorities, officials have been taken into protective custody or what is sometimes even more, they have been subjected to state police investigations. I cite here only the case of my teacher and Kreisleiter at Esterwegen, who was kept in protective custody for 8 days, because he had sent a correct report, as proved afterwards, to his district councillor on abuses by the SS. I remember the investigations by criminal assistants of the Gestapo in Kottbus, lasting two weeks, on the chief of police in that phase, by the way an SS Brigadefuehrer. Likewise I have already presented today a complaint by the Oberpraesident Lohse, concerning the order to an official of the gendarmerie for espionage on superior officials by officers of the political police.
It is intolerable from the point of view of the national socialist authoritarian form of state leadership that subordinate offices procure information on officials in this manner over the heads of their superior office. This will create a great deal of trouble quite apart from the fact that information obtained in this manner must be prejudiced and very often even actually false.
4. Abductions by officers of the political police on _foreign sovereign territory_ have lately created severe disturbances in the field of foreign politics. I cite the cases of Berthold Jakob (Switzerland), Gutzeit (Holland) and the latest incident at the Czech frontier. It is my opinion that in consideration of the foreign political complications, the police office should receive orders for such measures from the responsible Reich officer only, and not from subordinate offices.
5. Several times the Reich ministry of economics has pointed out to me the disturbing effect on the economic organization which must result from the various political incidents caused by the police, the atmosphere of insecurity caused by cases of protective custody (particularly in the case of economic leaders) and also in the latest cases of boycott of the Jews (Cologne, Duesseldorf).
6. I can only undertake the creation of the Fuehrer protection in my police department if I am completely responsible for the officials working there, their service, capabilities and their co-operation with the other departments of the criminal police.
7. I propose that it be settled once and for all, not only who is to bear the responsibilities for the directives but also who shall bear the responsibility for the carrying out of these directives in all matters appertaining to the political police.
_Either_: This responsibility rests with the Reichminister of the interior. Then he has to be vested with altogether different powers to give orders in political matters concerning the police.
_Or_: This responsibility with all its consequences is borne by the Reichfuehrer SS, who is already actually claiming the management of the political police in the Reich. In this case, I would propose that the law, laid down for Prussia by SS, Himmler, becomes Reich law immediately, elevating the office of the secret state police to the status of a ministry and the chief of the office of the secret state police undertakes the tasks which he--as is already stated in the draft of the law, "determines".
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 778-PS
Copy.
Concentration Camp _Dachau_ 1.10.1933. Commander's Office
Disciplinary and Punitive Regulations for the Internment Camp.
Introduction.
The following regulations, concerning punishment, for the maintenance of discipline and order within the limits of the Concentration Camp Dachau are released as part of the existing camp regulations.
Subject to these regulations are all internees of the Concentration Camp Dachau from the time of their imprisonment to the hour of their release.
Authority for ordering punishments lies in the hands of the camp commander, who is personally responsible to the political police commander for the execution of the issued camp regulations.
Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception, punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests of the fatherland warrant it. The fellow countryman who is decent but misled will never be affected by these regulations. But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians and intellectual provocators--regardless of which kind--: be on guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck and you will be shut up according to your own methods.
* * * * *
Article 6
The following are punishable with _8 days of close confinement_, and _25 thrashings_ to be administered before and after the serving of the sentence:
1. anyone making depreciatory or ironical remarks to a member of the SS, deliberately omitting the prescribed marks of respect, or in any other way demonstrating unwillingness to submit himself to measures of disciplinary order.
2. prisoner-sergeants and prisoner squad leaders or foremen who exceed their authority as orderlies, assume the privileges of a superior over other prisoners, accord likeminded prisoners special privileges in work or in any other way, tyrannize fellow prisoners who have political views different from their own, make false reports on them, or prejudice them in any other way.
Article 7
The following are punishable with _two weeks' close confinement_:
1. anyone exchanging by his own will the quarters to which he is assigned without being authorized by the company commander or instigating or inducing his fellow prisoners to do so;
2. anyone enclosing or hiding forbidden articles or articles produced in the camp in outgoing laundry bundles, or sewing them into pieces of laundry, etc.;
3. anyone entering or leaving barracks, shelters, or other buildings by other than authorized entrances, or creeping through window or other openings;
4. anyone smoking in shelters, toilets and places which are fire hazards, or keeping or depositing inflammable objects on such places. Should a fire result from neglect of this prohibition, then it will be considered as an act of sabotage.
Article 8
The following are punishable with _2 weeks of close confinement_ and _25 thrashings_ to be administered before and after the serving of the sentence:
1. anyone leaving or entering the internment camp without an escort or who joins an outgoing work detail without proper authority;
2. anyone making depreciatory remarks in letters or other documents about national socialistic leaders, the State and Government, authorities and institutions, glorifying marxist or liberal leaders or November Parties (November Parteien), or reporting on occurrences in the concentration camp;
3. anyone safe-keeping forbidden articles, tools, slashing and thrusting weapons in his quarters or in paillasses.
Article 9
The following are punishable with _3 weeks close confinement_: Anyone removing government property regardless of what kind, from its assigned place; deliberately damaging, destroying, wasting, transforming, or using same for purposes other than prescribed. Aside from the punishment the individual or the entire company of prisoners, depending on the circumstances, will be held responsible for the damage caused.
Article 10
The following are punishable with _6 weeks close confinement_ or an _indefinite term of solitary confinement_:
1. anyone making money collections inside of the camps, financing illegal activities, within or outside of the limits of the camp, or bribing fellow-prisoners into submission or putting them under obligation to keep quiet;
2. anyone receiving financial aid derived from illegal collections of the red aid funds, or distributing such money among fellow prisoners;
3. anyone making communications to a clergyman other than of problems pertaining to the soul, giving him secretly letters or communications for delivery, or attempting to win the clergyman's cooperation for illegal purpose;
4. anyone disparaging, slandering or slighting in any other way the symbols of the national socialistic state or its representatives.
Article 11
By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following offenders, considered as _agitators, will be hung_.
Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following in the camp, at work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and workshops, toilets and places of rest: politicizes, holds inciting speeches and meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with others; who for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false information about the concentration camp and its institution; receives such information, buries it, talks about it to others, smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles, throws stones and other objects over the camp wall containing such informations; or produces secret documents; who, for the purpose of agitating, climbs on barracks' roofs and trees, seeks contact with the outside by giving light or other signals, or induces others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advices to that effect or supports such undertakings in any way whatsoever.
Article 12
The following offenders, considered as _mutineers, will be shot on the spot_ or later hung:
Anyone attacking physically a guard or an SS man, refusing to obey or to work while on detail, asking or inducing others to join him in such acts of mutiny, leaving a marching column or a place of work as a mutineer or asking others to do likewise, or bowling, shouting, inciting or holding speeches while marching or at work.
Article 13
The following offenders, considered as _saboteurs_, will _be punished by death_:
Anyone deliberately causing a fire, an explosion, or any kind of damage such as by water in the camp, in the quarters, in the workshops, in the places of work, in the kitchens, store rooms, etc; also anyone manipulating contrary to given instructions with barbed wire installations, high voltage circuits, switch boards, telegraph or water lines, the camp wall or other security installations, heating and boiler installations, machines or motor vehicles. Should the act have occurred because of negligence, then the guilty person will be kept in solitary confinement. In cases of doubt, however, it will be considered as an act of sabotage.
* * * * *
Article 19
Confinement will be executed in a cell, with a hard rest, with water and bread. The prisoner receives warm food every four days. Punitive work consists of severe physical or particularly dirty work, performed under close supervision. Incidental punishments are: drilling, thrashings, foreclosure of mail and food, hard rest, tying to stakes, reprimands and warnings.
All punishments are being recorded in files.
Confinement and punitive labor prolong the term of internment by at least 8 weeks, an imposed incidental punishment by 4 weeks. Prisoners in solitary confinement will not be released within a measurable space of time.
The Commander of the Concentration Camp (L.S.)
[signed] EICKE SS-Oberfuehrer
* * * * *
Concentration Camp _Dachau_ 10.1.1933 Commanders Office
Service Regulations for Prisoner Escorts and Guards
_Guard Deputy._
Anyone letting a prisoner escape will be arrested and handed over to the Bavarian Political Police for liberating prisoners out of negligence.
If a prisoner attempts to escape, he is to be _shot without warning_. The guard who has shot an escaping prisoner in the line of his duty will not be punished.
In case of attack on a guard by a prisoner, the former is to resist the attack not by physical force but by the use of his weapons. A guard disregarding this regulation must expect his immediate discharge. Anyone keeping his back covered, will anyway seldom have to expect an attack.
If a prisoner unit mutinizes or revolts, it is to be shot at by all supervising guards. Warning shots are principally prohibited.
The time of work is determined by the camp commander. A prisoner escort who brings his prisoners back too early, is guilty of having badly failed to do his duty and can be discharged.
In case a work detachment must stop its work prematurely for some reason or other, then the work detachment leader must have the reason certified on the back of the work service slip [Arbeitsdienst Zettel] by either the construction division or the requisitioning office.
The Commander of the Concentration Camp L.S. EICKE SS-Oberfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 779-PS
[Directive by Wilhelm Frick Regulating "Protective Custody," 12 April 1934]
[Pencilled noted on top of page:]
(1) 3F _4_ 487
To reduce the abuses in connection with the infliction of _protective_ custody, the Reichminister of the Interior has decided in his directive on the infliction and execution of protective custody of 12 April 1934, directed to the state governments and the Reichsstatthalter, that orders for protective custody can only be issued. a) for the personal protection of the arrestee b) if the arrestee immediately endangers public safety and order by his behaviour, especially by activity, inimical to the state.
If therefore, as far as these prerequisites do not prevail a sentence of protective custody is not permitted especially a) against persons who only insist on the use of their civic or public rights (for instance report, complaint, grievance); b) against lawyers because of representation of their client's interests; c) because of personal affair (for instance libel); d) because of any economic measures (question of salaries, dismissal of employees and similar cases).
Protective custody furthermore is not permitted for the punishment of criminal acts, for the courts are competent for that. It cannot be applied only for the reason, that a person behaves asocially or otherwise in an obnoxious manner, unless the People has become aggravated by that, and this protective custody becomes necessary for the arrestee's own protection.
(2)
Regulations of Official Agencies--Regulations on Measures of Protective Custody in Prussia (taken for the administrative gazette of the Reich [Reichsverwaltungsblatt] No. 9 of 2 March 1935.) The _Prussian Prime Minister_. Secret State Police Insp. 946/11 March 1934 _Berlin, 11 March_.
Subject: Order for measures of protective custody.
1. The previous executory regulations, applying to measures of protective custody are rescinded. In the future, limitations of personal freedom, according to article 1 of the decree for the protection of people and state of 28 Feb. 1933, may be ordered by the Secret State Police office, effective in the whole state, and by the governors and cabinet presidents in Berlin and by the state police offices for their local jurisdiction.
The present competency of the district police authorities [Kreispolizeibehoerden], namely the state counsellors [Land-rate], is no longer applicable for such measures. The measures previously ordered by them, become void after 31 March unless a prolongation has been ordered before then by the State [Landes] police authorities.
2. If protective custody has been ordered as a provisional measure because of suspicion of a criminal act, the decision of the court must be obtained immediately for infliction of legal detention for investigation, and in the case of a refusal of a legal warrant for arrest, the police measure is also to be rescinded, unless their continuation in exceptional cases appears justified for other reasons.
3. Limitations of personal freedom, which are ordered by the Ober--and Regierungspraesidenten, by the president of the police in Berlin and by the state police offices, become automatically void on the 8th day after the end of the day, on which the order for protective custody has been executed, unless the continuation of the protective custody has been ordered specifically by me upon appropriate request.
4. Every case of protective custody, ordered by the Ober and Regierungspraesidenten, by the president of police in Berlin and by the state police offices, is to be reported to me personally (address Berlin W 9, Leipziger Platz 11a) by Telegram within 24 hours, mentioning exactly: name, age, occupation, political standpoint: of the one affected, as well as the cause of the measure; also if necessary, the necessity for apparently appropriate limitation of freedom beyond 7 days must be justified.
5. Arrests, which do not fall under the designation "protective custody", may only be made by the authorities, legally appointed for them. But in this case, a legal warrant for arrest must be obtained under all conditions within 24 hours. If such a warrant for arrest is refused by the competent judge, or if it cannot be obtained within 24 hours, the affected one is to be released immediately or, if the arrest is to remain in effect, action has to be taken according to #3 and 4 (report by telegram within 24 hours to the prime minister).
6. In the future, I will punish the abusive use of the arrest mercilessly.
Agencies of the party and the associations may not make arrests. In case of disregard of this order, the competent authorities must take
## actions against it immediately, and must report to me at once.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 781-PS
1. From a letter to Brigadefuehrer (Maj Gen) WOLFF (Secret State Police).
RJM Berlin, 23 March 1936.
OBERREGIERUNGSRAT von DOHNANYI
To: BRIGADEFUEHRER (Maj Gen) WOLFF _BERLIN S W 11_ Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Dear Mr Wolff,
As you doubtless know, the Reichsfuehrer, using the Hoppe case (shooting) in the concentration camp Columbia as an illustration, discussed on the 2 March the question of the use of arms by guard personnel of concentration camps with my minister. The Reichsfuehrer, according to the notes on the conversation made by the minister, on this occasion considered the idea of issuing a decree on use of arms by officials under his jurisdiction favorably. Could you possibly inform me at your convenience how far this matter has progressed with you?
* * * * *
With many regards and Heil Hitler your very obedient [signed] Dr. von Dohnanyi
* * * * *
2. After 2 weeks.
1. Notation:
On the 2nd of this month using the Hoppe case as an illustration, I discussed the question of use of arms by the guard personnel of the concentration camp with the Reichsfuehrer SS. I suggested to Himmler that he issue an order on the use of arms for the officials subordinated to him. * * * Himmler has promised me that such a decree will be issued and will grant us participation in the preliminary work. Initiative with Himmler.
2. To Secretary of state Dr. Freisler for acknowledgement.
3. After 2 weeks.
Berlin, 9 March 1936. seen 9/3 illegible. [signature illegible]
To Mr. von Donanyi with the request to remind the secret state police (Wolf) at his convenience.
17/3 [signed illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 783-PS
Copy For The Minister
Reich and Prussian Minister of Justice 2 F.g10 1696/34 Berlin, W.8, 18 January Wilhelmstrasse 65
Subject: Charges against members of camp personnel of Protective custody Camp Hohnstein.
To the communication of 19 December 1934. --ST. S.I.2593/34--
Most honored Reich Deputy [Reichstatthalter]!
In regard to your courteous communication of 19 December 1934, I inform you respectfully that, on the basis of the decree of the Reich president relative to exercise of the right of nolle prosse of 21 March 1934 (RGBl, I, page 211) in connection with Article 2, paragraph 1 of the first law for transfer of administration of justice to the Reich of 10 February 1934 (RGB1, I, page 91) the right to nolle prosse pending criminal cases wherein the deed was committed after 20 March 1934, belongs no longer to the Reich Deputy but exclusively to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Under the circumstances I consider myself not in a position to go to the extent of proposing a nolle prosse of the case to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
TO the Reich Deputy in Saxony in Dresden A1.
Insofar as the deeds were committed before 2 March 1934 and therefore the right of nolle prosse in the case belongs to you, most honored Reich Deputy, I allow myself to express the greatest scruples against the intended nolle prosse. The nature of the mistreatments,
## particularly the use of the drip-apparatus, is evidence of a coarseness
and brutality in the perpetrators which is completely alien to German sensibility and feeling. Such atrocities, reminders of oriental sadism, can find no explanation or excuse even in the greatest bitterness of combat. Crimes of this sort must find their lawful expiation for the very sake of the cleanness and respect of the movement. In view of experiences in other cases, of similar aspect in a certain sense, I am also unable to share the fear that execution of the legal proceedings would be detrimental to the movement. This is all the more true since the main proceedings can take place with complete exclusion of the public.
Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 784-PS
Copy
The Reichminister of Justice Z.F.g 10 1696.34
Berlin, June 5, 1935
1. A message to the deputy of the Fuehrer Reichminister Hess.
Confidential
Personal
Regarding: penal proceedings against the merchant and SA leader Lt. Colonel [Obersturmbannfuehrer] Jaehnichen and 22 companions on account of inflicting bodily injury on duty (protective custody Camp Hohenstein in Saxony).
Dear colleague!
With inference to the bill of indictment sent by me under my communication of March 20, 1935 regarding the penal proceedings mentioned above, I beg to inform you of the following:
After a main trial, lasting about six weeks, the assistant prosecutor Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther, proposed the following sentences on May 3, 1935:
Against Jaehnichen (Camp Commandant) 5 years penetentiary Against Zikera--1 year, 6 months prison Against Heinz Meier--3 years prison Against Herbert Meier--3 years, 2 months prison Against Tuerke--3 years prison Against Volkmar--2 years, 3 months penetentiary Against Leuschner--2 years, 3 months prison Against Romkopf--2 years, 6 months prison Against Karche--1 year, 8 months prison Against Hausch--1 year, 4 months prison Against Lehmann--3 years, 3 months prison Against Kuehnel--1 year prison Against Stachowski--1 year prison Against Ude--1 year prison Against Friedrich--1 year, 3 months prison Against Schmeling (Police)--1 year prison Against Konitz--1 year prison Against Uhlmann--1 year prison Against Sturzkober--10 months prison Against Schupp--1 year, 6 months prison Against Hensel--2 years, 3 months prison Against Heinicker--1 year, 6 months prison Against Putzler--3 years, 9 months penetentiary Against Liebscher--7 months prison Against Heger--Suspension on account of amnesty.
On May 15, 1935 the Criminal division number 12 of the Supreme Court in Dresden pronounced the verdict, by which on account of offences against Art. 340 of the Penal Code the following were sentenced:
Jaehnichen--to 6 years prison Zikera--to 1 year, 6 months prison Heinz Meier--to 3 years prison Herbert Meier--to 3 years prison Tuerke--to 3 years prison Volkmar--to 2 years, 3 months prison Leuschner--to 2 years, 6 months prison Romkopf--to 2 years, 6 months prison Karche--to 1 year, 8 months prison Hausch--to 1 year, 4 months prison Lehmann--to 3 years prison Kuehnel--to 1 year prison Stachowski--to 1 year, 6 months prison Ude--to 1 year prison Friedrich--to 1 year, 3 months prison Schmeling--to 1 year prison Konitz--to 1 year prison Uhlmann--to 1 year prison Sturzkober--to 10 months prison Schupp--to 1 year, 6 months prison Hensel--to 2 years prison Heinicker--to 1 year, 6 months prison Putzler--to 3 years, 9 months prison Against Liebscher and Heger suspension was authorized on the basis of the law governing amnesty.
After the proposal of the sentence, however, still before the announcement of the verdict, the chairman of the Criminal division number 12 received the following letter from the Reich governor [Reichsstatthalter] of Saxony:
"Official Seal
The Reich Governor [Reichsstatthalter] of Saxony II 84/35 Dresden-A.1, May 8, 1935 Mailbox 78 Telephone 24 371.
To the president of the Supreme Court Dr. Roth [Landgerichtsdirektor]
Dresden Pillnitzer Street 41
The President of the Supreme Court: Sir:
As I was informed, it is proposed to impose a punishment of 3-1/2 years of penal servitude upon the accused Standartenfuehrer Jaehnichen. Without wanting to interfere in the proceedings or intending to influence you as Judge in any way before the verdict is announced, I should nevertheless like to once more call your attention to the fact that the circumstances, as they had been brought about by the revolution of 1933 and as they, without doubt were still taking effect up to the beginning of 1934, cannot be overlooked, when pronouncing sentence.
A further point appears to me to be worth taking into consideration, namely, the fact that one cannot accuse Jaehnichen of having a low character and that, above all, in Hohenstein the scum of humanity had to be attended to. In consideration of this fact I should like to leave it to you to consider whether the lapses call for such a severe degree of punishment or rather whether a pardon could not be considered.
As Gauleiter of NSDAP I regard it as my duty to call attention again to the unusual circumstances.
Heil Hitler Signed: Martin Mutschmann."
Moreover the information has come to hand that the two magistrates (Schoeffen), who functioned as judges in the principal trial, namely, Regierungsamtmann Helbig and the merchant Pesler, had been expelled from the NSDAP after the announcement of the verdict. I do not know by whom this expulsion was ordered.
Finally it has been put to the assistant prosecutor, Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther, who is a storm trooper, after the pronouncing of the verdict on his Obersturmbannfuehrer, that he should resign from the SA.
The fact that these measures were taken at the same time as the verdict referred to above was pronounced, gives rise to the assumption that here also there is something below the surface. However, this would represent an extremely serious and highly undesirable conclusion to the legal and fully binding penal proceedings. If the letter from the Reich governor reproduced here gave the impression that his judicial decisions should be influenced from higher up, then this would certainly influence to an even greater extent any later measures instituted against the 2 magistrates. That kind of procedure against lay judges after the verdict had been pronounced would naturally and necessarily arouse the feeling that, when they are functioning as judges, they are responsible to a certain office for their work. Hereby the judicial unpartiality, which is the foundation of every orderly administration of criminal law becomes null and void. Moreover, the lay judge, who upon entering service, must swear an oath, that he will discharge his duties conscientiously and to the best of his ability, would find himself forced to battle with his conscience. No less serious would be the consequences of such measures for the assistant public prosecutor. This official would also have to battle with his conscience, while carrying out his duties. Thereby the orderly official work of the authorities for the administration of criminal law would be so seriously endangered that I would find myself obliged to consider the question whether in the face of such a state of affairs public prosecutors and judges could still be functionaries of the party or members of the SA at all.
Hence it appears to be necessary----
1. in the case in question to remove the confusion, resulting from the measures indicated above, by suitable countermeasures
2. to take steps that such occurrences altogether incompatible with the administration of criminal law and the public security guaranteed by the state are avoided.
I would respectfully request your comments and information with regard to any action in this direction. Considering the importance of this case, I would be obliged if you would reply as early as possible.
Heil Hitler! Signed: Dr. Guertner.
2. A letter to the Chief of Staff of the SA of the NSDAP with a copy of the following accusation enclosed.
* * * * *
In regard to: --to enter on page 1-- Confidential Enclosed 1 loose leaf Personal Chief of Staff:
Sir:
In the penal case, indicated above, which involved serious maltreatment of prisoners in the protective custody camp at Hohenstein in Saxony, the main trial was held in Dresden from 20th March to the middle of May 1935 before the 12th Criminal Division of the Supreme Court. In regard to the details of the incidents, may I refer to the enclosed copy of the Bill of indictment of October 1934 and particularly may I call attention to page 21 of the results of the inquiry. On May 3, 1935 the assistant prosecutor Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther imposed the following punishment:
* * * * *
Here has been received that it has been put to the assistant prosecutor Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther, who is a storm trooper, after pronouncing of the verdict on his Obersturmbannfuehrer, that he should resign from the SA. The fact that this measure was undertaken at the same time as the verdict referred to above was pronounced, gives rise to the assumption that here also then is something below the surface. However this would represent an extremely serious and highly undesirable conclusion to the legal & fully binding penal proceedings. The officials would have to battle with their conscience when carrying out their duties, if such procedure was in force. In this way the orderly official work of the authorities for the administration of criminal law would be so seriously endangered, that I would find myself obliged to consider the question whether in the face of such a state of affairs Staatsanwaelte could still be members of the SA at all.
Hence it appears to be necessary:
1. In the case in question to remove the confusion resulting from the measures indicated above, by suitable counter-measures.
2. To take steps that such occurrences altogether incompatible with the administration of criminal law and the public security guaranteed by the State, are avoided.
I would respectfully request your comments and information with regard to my action in this direction. Considering the importance of this case, I would be obliged if you would reply as early as possible.
3. to the Minister, confidential
4. 2 weeks.
Heil Hitler! Signed: Dr. Guertner.
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 785-PS
Z Stg. 10-9-35
_Subject_: Suit against Rudolf Jaehnichen and others for Mistreatment of Inmates of the Hohnstein Concentration Camp.
A further investigation which was ordered as well as a new verification of already known facts showed that the mistreatment of inmates which has led to the conviction of the accused were not carried out for any political purposes (to obtain a confession, to punish disciplinary infractions, etc.) or in response to previously suffered wrongs inflicted by Communists but were merely malicious torture or expressions of sadistic brutality.
A few cases of mistreatment occurred, however, where enemies of the State were involved. The Court in its sentence, however, considered that mistreatments in such cases to a certain extent were justified or at least understandable. But it expressly stated further that the mistreatments which occurred during interrogations had taken on proportions which were in no accord with the desired objective and that the defendants not only attempted to wring confessions from the inmates but that they acted in sheer lust for torture. (Compare Page 100 of the Sentence Document.)
The overwhelming majority of Cases, however, over which sentences were pronounced, represent mistreatments which occurred when the inmates first entered the institution, when they received their prison clothing, or during drill hours. These mistreatments were carried out without rhyme or reason. The fact that the defendants in these cases were motivated neither by political purposes nor by personal revenge against outrages suffered formerly can be learned from the following circumstances.
1. Amongst the mistreated persons there were quite a number that never belonged to any parties of the left. Some of them were even old members of the movement. The following cases are proof of that:
2. _Case Prueger_
On 6.3.1934 the Kreisleiter of the German Labor Front for the food industry, member of the Nazi Party, was brought in for offending the Kreisleiter and two other persons. When being brought in, Turke beat his face with his fist and subsequently, in a small room, he was heavily beaten with sticks, whips and other instruments. * * *
* * * 2. The methods as well as the detailed circumstances of mistreatment show that lust for torture was the only motivation in a great number of cases. The following case illustrates that fact especially well.
The defendant Schupp frequently had to supervise the drill of inmates. On 5 or 6 March 1935 he called the inmate Lindner out of formation without any apparent reason and asked him for his name and domicile. Then he pressed, without any cause, his burning cigarette upon the end of Lindner's nose with the result that the latter received a burn for which he later required medical treatment. The court in this case, as in several others, expressly maintains that Schupp only acted out of sheer lust of torture. * * *
* * * Furthermore, may I state as far as the question of further mitigation of sentences are concerned that the court in pronouncing sentence has already weighed to the fullest extent all possible mitigating circumstances, the awful consequences of cruel mistreatment of human beings should otherwise result in a far more severe judicial expiation. Also it must not be over-looked that altogether only those members of the concentration camp staff were brought into court who took an especially active and cruel part in the mistreatments. Furthermore, the sentence was not aggravated by the fact that the Court affirmed, for purely judicial reasons, that the defendants were officials and sentenced them for committing bodily harm while carrying out a public office. The sentence expressly states that the court did not stress the fact that the accused SA men were officials in determining the punishment because they had not received proper training as officials and they probably do not wish to be referred to as such. (Compare page 144 of the Sentence). In these circumstances the mitigation of sentences already granted in the decree of 31 October 1935 seem an extensive favor. If, nevertheless, I suggest subsequently a further reduction of sentence, based upon new evidence of some of the defendants, I can only justify my action because I believe that, according to circumstances, the defendants in one or the other case of mistreatment may have partly acted out of revolutionary motives.
As to what parts the individual defendants played in these criminal acts I refer to the last two columns in the table handed over with the report of 28 August 1935. The following statements as to the individual defendants may be made.
1. _Jaehnichen_:
Sentence: 6 years imprisonment.
Reduction of Sentence: to be released on probation after 4 years 6 months.
Jaehnichen is an old member of the S.A. who through his bad example has fostered the increase of excesses, but at first he was motivated undoubtedly by a certain revolutionary anger and by the fact that he wanted to maintain exemplary discipline amongst the inmates. A further mitigating fact is that his participation in the unusually serious mistreatment of the Jew Ambross, who later committed suicide, was inspired by the belief that he was dealing in this case with a despoiler of German girls. With these facts, being what they are, a further reduction in sentence, amounting to one year, seems justifiable.
2. _Putzler_:
Sentence: 3 years 9 months imprisonment.
Reduction of Sentence: to be released on probation after 2 years 6 months.
His sentence is based essentially on the especially cruel mistreatments during questionings of inmates. Even though his acts in this connection seem to be pure vindictive torture, as for example the use of the dripping device, one may, nevertheless, say that at least at first he was motivated by the desire to obtain truthful statements. On the other hand, Putzler participated in serious excesses also during times other than the questioning periods and played a leading part in them. To give an example, he tore out inmate Ricke's beard. A further reduction of the sentence by 6 months seems under these circumstances a far going favor * * *
* * * I want to remark, in conclusion, that the defendants as well as the defense, believe since 29.11.1935 that all defendants had been finally pardoned by the decision of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. It is further to be learned from remarks by defendants not in custody that in case of a complete pardon those still in custody would leave prison under the accompaniment of a band or would be solemnly received by a band on return to their home town.
Appendix
Upon application of the Reich Minister of Justice I hereby grant in the case against Rudolp Jaehnichen and others, for mistreatment of persons committed to protective custody in Hohnstein Concentration Camp (16. St. A. 3431 34 Dresden prosecutor) the following mitigation of sentences as enumerated in Column 6: ---+---------------+-----------+-------------------+----------------------+ | | | of Sentence | of the Reichs | | | | granted thus | Minister of | | | |far. To be released| Justice. To be | | |Sentence | conditionally |Released Conditionally| | |Prison Term| after | after | | +------+----+---------+---------+---------+------------+ # | Name |Yrs. |Mos. | Yrs. | Mos. | Yrs. | Mos. | ---+---------------+-----+-----+---------+---------+---------+------------+ 1 | Jaehnichen | 6 | | 4 | 6 | 3 | 6 | | | | | | | | | 2 | Putzler | 3 | 9 | 3 | | 2 | 6 | | | | | | | | | 3 | Hanz Meier | 3 | | 2 | 6 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 4 | Herbert Meier | 3 | 3 | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. | 5 | Tuerke | 3 | | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 6 | Lehman | 3 | | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 7 | Leuschner | 2 | 6 | 2 | | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | | 8 | Rohmkopf | 2 | 6 | 2 | | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 10 | Haensel | 2 | 6 | 1 | 6 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 11 | Karge | 1 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 12 | Sikora | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 28 days | | | | | | | | | 13 | Stachowski | 1 | 6 | No reduction | No reduction | | | | | | | | | 14 | Schupp | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 15 | Heinicker | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | | 9 | | | | | | | | | 16 | Hausch | 1 | 4 | | 8 | | 6 | | | | | | | | | 17 | Kuehnel | 1 | | | 9 | | 6 | | | | | | | | | 20 | Schmeling | 1 | | | 9 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 21 | Kahnis | 1 | | | 9 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 22 | Uhleman | 1 | | | 6 | No further reduct. | | | | | | | | | 23 | Stuerzkober | | 10 | | 6 | No further reduct. | ---+---------------+-----+-----+---------+---------+---------+------------+
Berlin December 1935 THE FUEHRER AND CHANCELLOR
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 786-PS
Note
1. Just now, at 1030, State Secretary Dr. Meissner telephoned and asked me to deliver the following message to the Minister, whom he had been unable to contact:
Concerning the pardon of those sentenced in connection with the maltreatment in the Hohnstein Concentration Camp, Herr Bouhler informed him yesterday that he had reported to the Fuehrer on the result of the fresh inquiries, which he and Reich Governor Mutschmann had instituted. The Fuehrer has now decided to remit all other sentences remaining. State Secretary Meissner wished to inform the Ministry of Justice of this, so that it might be made the subject of corresponding decrees. He, State Secretary Meissner, mentioned that the Minister of Justice had likewise been commissioned by the Fuehrer to carry out special inquiries, to determine in which cases the motives for maltreatment had been sadistic and therefore a pardon would be out of place. The Minister of Justice would have to be given the opportunity of reporting to the Fuehrer his ideas, based on his still inconclusive investigations. Herr Bouhler also stated that the Minister of Justice was still at liberty to do so. The Fuehrer merely desired that his inquiries be hastened as much as possible so that the statement could be made within the next few weeks and that, in any case, he submit a decree granting full pardon.
State Secretary Meissner, when finally summing up, therefore requested that, should the Minister not approve of a total pardon, a double decree be submitted.
2. The Minister for his favourable consideration.
Berlin, 29th November 1935 [Signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 787-PS
Berlin, 18 June, 1935
The Reich Ministry of Justice _Z.F. g 10 390/35_
1. Communication to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor with addition of a certified copy of B1. 9-10 d.A., thus far
Subject: Motion of the Reich deputy in Saxony concerning the nolle-prossing of the criminal procedure against Oberregierungsrat Vogel in Dresden on account of bodily injury while in office.
16 St.A 107/34 (StA.Dresden) Inclosure: 1 loose sheet.
The prosecuting authority in Dresden has indicated Oberregierungsrat Erich Vogel in Dresden (case designation 16 STA. 4 107/34) on account of bodily injury while in office. The following subject matter is the basis of the case:
Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the province of Saxony since its foundation and is chief of Main section II, which formerly bore the title Zub [Zentralstelle fuer Umsturzbekaempfung] (Central office for combatting revolt). In the process of combatting efforts inimical to the State Vogel carried out several so called borderland actions in the year 1933 in which a large number of politically unreliable persons and persons who had become political prisoners in the border territories were taken into protective custody [Schutzhaft] and brought to the Hohnstein protective custody camp. In the camp serious mistreatment of the prisoners has been going on at least since summer of 1933. The prisoners were not only, as in protective custody camp Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state of unconsciousness for no reason, with whips and other tools but were also tortured in other ways, as for instance with a drip-apparatus especially constructed for the purpose, under which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away with serious purulent wounds of the scalp. The guilty SA-leaders and SA-men were sentenced to punishments of 6 years to 9 months of imprisonment by the main criminal court of the provincial court in Dresden of 15 May 1935 (16 StA. 3431.34). Vogel, whose duties frequently brought him to the camp, took part in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened in the reception room of the camp during completion of the reception formalities, and in the supply room, during issuing of the blankets. In this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel was generally known to the personnel of the camp--exactly because of his function as head of the Zub--and his conduct became at least partly a standard for the above-named conduct of the SA-leaders and men.
One of the border actions took place on 3 August 1935. Vogel had ordered the arrest of the persons who were brought to the camp at that time, and therefore also had responsibilities relative to their proper treatment. On account of the large number of those who were brought in, a pay office of the administration building in the lower castle yard was adapted as a makeshift reception room to help dispose of the formalities. The reception was being taken care of by Truppfuehrer [T/Sgt] Felix Sikora. He hit every incoming person without cause violently across the face with a steel ruler, so that it resounded loudly. In addition the prisoners, when brought in, were spoken to roughly and at the same time beaten, partly even literally pushed into the room. Vogel stayed in the reception room a long time and watched these proceedings without doing anything about them. In his presence, for instance, the SA-man Mutze dealt such blows to one man, without provocation, that he turned around on himself. As already stated, Vogel not only took no steps against this treatment of the prisoners, but he even made jokes about it and stated that it amused him the way things were popping here.
In the supply room Vogel himself took a hand in the beating amid the general severe mistreatment. The SA-man there employed whips and other articles and beat the prisoners in such a manner that serious injuries were produced, the prisoners partly became unconscious and had to lie in the dispensary a long time. Vogel was often present in the supply room during the mistreatment. At least in the following cases he personally laid violent hands upon prisoners.
a. On the occasion of the borderland action of 3 August 1933 Vogel was in the chamber in the rear portion of the area, where the prisoners as a rule do not enter. At first Vogel observed from there the severe mistreatment which was administered to the prisoners at the counter where the blankets were issued. Then he had a prisoner brought to the rear chamber and swung several blows of his fist at his head.
b. On 12 November 1933 Vogel arrived at the camp together with Regierungsrat Dr. Wolf from Leipzig and again entered the chamber. On this day several prisoners were brought in. Vogel pointed out one of the prisoners to the SA-men present in the room, among whom were Sturmmann Walter Rohmkopf, Truppfuehrer Herbert Meier, and Truppfuehrer Georg Lehmann, and declared, in effect, that this man "should get his ass particularly full". He also stated that the prisoner had offended or threatened one of his people. Upon this invitation the prisoner was laid across the counter in the usual manner, held fast by the head and arms, and then beaten for a considerable time by the SA men with whips and other articles. Along with this Vogel himself took part in the beating for a time, and after this mistreatment slapped him again, so that the prisoner appeared green and blue in the face. The prisoner is the tinsmith Hans Kuehitz, who bore the nickname Johnny. Upon his departure Vogel gave the head of the supply room, Truppenfuehrer Meier from 5 to 6 reichsmarks with the stated reason that the SA men "had sweated so". The money was then distributed by Meier to those SA-comrades who had taken part in the mistreatment.
Under the date of 20 May 1935 the Reich Deputy in Saxony forwarded to me with a recommendation Vogel's petition for nolle prossing dated 10 May, 1935, which was addressed to him, and a copy of which is attached.
I do not wish to approve this petition. The mistreatments which took place in the camp of Hohnstein are more numerous and in their fashion more serious than the cases of mistreatment in the well-known protective custody camp Bredow, near Stettin. As in the case of Bredow an authoritative official of the State Secret Police, in like manner as SS-Sturmfuehrer Dr. Hoffmann, shot on 30 June, 1934, knowing of the mistreatment and for the most part instigating it himself, Oberregierungsrat Vogel, as an authoritative member of the supervisory agency of the camp for the State Secret Police of Saxony, knew of the mistreatment and to an extent even took part in it. By his actions he supported the convicted SA-leaders and men in their deeds and thereby bears the largest part of responsibility for the criminal acts committed there. It would not be right to let this participant, who in view of his training, his position of leadership, and his office, must have recognized the objectionability of the proceedings in the camp with particular clarity, go unpunished while the SA-leaders and men received considerable sentences--even if not very severe in comparison with their deeds. A nolle prossing of the case against Vogel would represent unearned granting of favors to a more highly placed
## participant, and therefore one endowed with more responsibility, and
would be considered as such by all persons involved. It would stand in starkest irreconcilable contradiction to the treatment of the Stettin cases.
Signed: Dr. Guertner
2. To the Minister, respectfully
3. 1 month.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 788-PS
The Secretary of the State and Chief of the Office of the President.
Berlin W8, 25 June 1935 Voss-Strasse 1
RP 3/52/35 _Your Nr. Z.F. g 10 398/35 of 18 June 1935_
Subject: Nolle-Prosse of Criminal Proceeding against Oberregierungsrat Vogel for committing bodily injury while in Office.
Before making a decision, the Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor wants to discuss personally with the Reich-Governor of Saxony the complaints brought forward against Oberregierungsrat Vogel and the events connected with them. Therefore I shall withhold further information and request that until then further action on this procedure be also withheld.--
/s/ Dr. Meissner.
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Berlin W 8.
* * * * *
The Secretary of the State and Chief of the Office of the President
Berlin W8, 9 Sept 1935 Voss-Strasse 1
_RP 3125/35 Your Nr. Z.F. g 10 398/35 of 18 June 1935_
Subject: Nolle-prosse of Criminal Proceedings against Oberregierungsrat Vogel for committing bodily injury while in Office.
With reference to my letter of 25 June 1935--RP 3152/35--I am able to inform you that the Fuehrer and Reichs-Chancellor has decided for annulment of the criminal proceedings against Oberregierungsrat Vogel for his having committed bodily injury.
On the Fuehrer's behalf I request presentation of the draft of the decree for annulment.--
/s/ Dr. Meissner
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Berlin.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
[Penciled note:] Duplicate
Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:
The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which governs me in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological [weltanschaulich] education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.
One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
## action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time
whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space [Lebensraum]. My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength to fight must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.
Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.
Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.
As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sterness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years [1-2 Jahren], I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.
After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.
In summary:
1. The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest. 2. Superiority of the Luftwaffe. 3. Anti-aircraft beyond all competition. 4. Tank corps. 5. Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns. 6. German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun. 7. French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.
Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhilaration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.
Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.
We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.
The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.
Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armament industry of the world.
I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.
We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralyzing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boats, mines, and Luftwaffe (also for mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.
Individual acknowledgments: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.
I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.
1. The decision is irrevocable.
2. The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.
The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.
If we come through this struggle victoriously--and we shall come through victoriously--our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 795-PS
CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KEITEL
on 17 August 1939
[Identified by General Keitel as a memorandum of Admiral Canaris]
I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him and had only let him know that we were to furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agreed that I instruct the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special
## action. In regard to Dirschau he has decided that this action would be
executed only by the army.
I then reported my conference with Roatta. He told me that he thought it very good if Mussolini would tell the Fuehrer in definite terms that he would not enter the war. He personally is of the opinion that Mussolini would join anyhow. I answered him that I believed this improbable by reason of the conference between Ciano and Ribbentrop which I reported to him once more in detail. He says that the Fuehrer had told him contrarywise. Based on my reports he had to conclude that the Fuehrer does not tell him--Keitel--everything. Furthermore, I told him that I had learned from Count Marogna that the King of Italy had told King Alfonse a few days ago that he would not sign under any circumstances if Mussolini should present the order for mobilization.
In connection with this Keitel expresses the opinion that it is quite interesting to note that even a country like Italy which is governed by a dictatorship does not think much of war. How much more so must it be in the democratic countries? He is confident that the English would not interfere. I tried to contradict his views and say that the English would certainly at once institute a blockade and would destroy our merchant shipping. Keitel believes this to be of no great importance as we would receive oil from Rumania. I answered that this is not the deciding factor and that we could not resist a blockade for a long time and that England would fight against this with all their means if we should use force against the Poles and if it were to come to bloodshed. I told him that the English would have acted in precisely the same manner, had any bloodshed occurred when we marched into Czechoslovakia. I tried to explain to Keitel the consequences of economic warfare for Germany and tell him that we have only very few means to counteract it. Just a short while ago I had heard that we could only send 10 submarines into the Atlantic Ocean. Keitel thinks that it should be easy to force Rumania to surrender her oil after the conquest of Poland. I called his attention to the actions of the English in the Balkans and tried to explain to him that the English would certainly have everything prepared in the Balkans for such an eventuality. Bulgaria would not be useful to us as an ally as it would be attacked at once by Rumania and Turkey.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 798-PS
The Fuehrer's speech to the Commanders in Chief on 22 August 1939
I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.
After this we will discuss military details.
It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essential points have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:
1. First of all two personal constitutions:
My own personality and that of Mussolini.
Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political
## activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again
have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.
On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.
For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.
Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.
Further favorable factors for us are these:
Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.
Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.
All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland (Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.
Reference to previous risks.
I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.
Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.
The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question: The Fuehrer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact? The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.
Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.
The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 millions pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.
France lacks men (decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:
1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.
2. Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.
Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of those countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a longer war. If Mr. von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.
We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.
The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.
I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victoriously or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.
We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinhund [literally, swineherd's dog; figuratively, filthy person] will make a proposal for mediation.
The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.
Today's publication of the non-aggression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.
Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 812-PS
[Seal] Salzburg, 22 Aug. 1939 The Gauleiter Chiemsee _Personal!_ _Only direct delivery!_ To the Reich Minister Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART, VIENNA I Ballhausplatz 2
Dear Dr. Seyss:
I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters, which among others, are the subject of your correspondence with Buerckel.
I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that has been brought to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.
On the 5th of July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleader Buerckel if I was in possession of the memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him that I do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of it, that I furthermore did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by Buerckel I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th July.
If Buerckel now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform Buerckel of this. I connect this with the declaration, that I have given--apart from those written explanations--no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.
Since the beginning of our collaboration I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since I considered the political success of the 11th March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.
As far as Globus is concerned you are fully aware of his species which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.
With the best regards and HEIL HITLER! Yours _2 enclosures._ [signed] Friedl Rainer
* * * * *
Copy.
Salzburg, 6 July 1939 To the Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel _Vienna I_ Parliament
Dear Party Member Buerckel!
Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler's deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler's own, was that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather than the party. To be more exact. Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.
This conception does not, however, correspond to the true proportions of powers and to the conditions of leadership which were completely clear until 12 March 1938. At that time I gave a short report in Klausner's behalf to the deputy of Hitler and also submitted a short summary of the developments since 1934. I made no single copy of this. I did not take part in further actions of this kind since they seemed to me to be too much connected with personal feelings. I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no position existed in the party from which one might have presented oneself to the public; and that there was no man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public. He who wanted to direct correctly the political battle of the Austrian nazism had to forego public fame. Leopold did not want to forego that and made such decisive political mistakes that his recall became necessary. The person of Klausner never longed for fame and was therefore not suitable to appear gloriously after the taking over of power. The two powers behind Klausner--I consider the dynamic part of Globocnik and the political part of myself--were bound from the beginning, as collaborators of Klausner's, to put him to the fore.
We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference of his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.
If I should be asked to describe--without personal interest--the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
Heil Hitler! Rainer e.h. 1 Enclosure
* * * * *
COPY.
Report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria since the beginning of the last stage of battle until the seizure of power on the 11th March 1938.
In 1933 the Party fought a parliamentary battle. By the seizure of power in the Reich it gained considerably in numbers. It started to try to enforce new elections in order to gain admission into the government. By these means it should have taken over the government. The enemies recognized this fact, and the Government Dollfuss preceded, while tolerating the reds, to force the NSDAP from its legal plane in order to render it innocuous. In this the government used legal tricks, thereby practically doing away progressively with the democratic constitution. The first attempts of the government were answered by the Party with an increase of pressure; and the government's breaches of constitution were answered by arbitrary acts with the assumption that it might thus be able to overthrow the government. This assumption was wrong; at that time the government had the backing of all anti-German foreign countries, and it felt sufficiently strong to prohibit the NSDAP, and confession of adherence to the NSDAP, and subsequently to treat as high treason the confession in favor of the "Anschluss".
Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, and the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the "Alt-Reich"; and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.
There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. New leaderships were forming in the mine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer Reinthaller (already appointed Landesbauernfuehrer [leader of the country's farmers] by Hess). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the N.S.D.A.P. legal status again, thus permitting its political
## activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of
the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer Neubacher.
The first attempt to create a legal political organization which was to negotiate with the Government while a secret illegal organization existed, did not succeed; it brought about quarrels in almost all Gaus and ended with pressure of the illegal branch against the policy of appeasement of Reinthaller, and with the latter's retirement as Landesleiter [country leader]. The successor, Neubacher, head of the illegal organization, was not recognized by all the Gaus, because meanwhile the former Gauleader of Lower Austria, Captain Leopold, was released; and he claimed the country leadership because of his seniority in the party. In Carinthia at about that time, Klausner with his collaborators Globocnik, Rainer, Longhin and Pawlowski had reconstructed and readied the Gau Carinthia. The Gau Carinthia kept away from the quarrels of the leaders, and arbitrated the differences between Leopold and Neubacher, and finally effected a solution in such a way that Neubacher and his adherents recognized Leopold as the country leader; and Leopold appointed Neubacher to be his deputy. The points of friction between those two groups were not yet eliminated. Those differences did not remain concealed from the police; and the police got hold of a polemic by the group of Leopold against the group of Neubacher, on the strength of this material they arrested Leopold and Neubacher.
At that time the success of the calm attitude of the Gau Carinthia was crowned by the fact that after these arrests the representatives of all the Gaus came to Carinthia to offer Klausner the country leadership. By order of Klausner Dr. Rainer reported at these conferences the political referendum and developed the political conception as adopted by the Gau Carinthia on the basis of which, as a matter of fact, an agreement was reached. In July 1935 Klausner became the head of the movement without, however adopting the title of country leader because he considered it wrong as long as the country leader Leopold was imprisoned, but he looked upon himself as the speaker of the college of Gauleaders. With the consent of the representatives of all the Gaus, Klausner at that time appointed Globocnik as co-worker for the organizational part, and Rainer as co-worker for the political part of his task.
In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria. In Spring of 1936 Schattenfroh was arrested; he had named party member Hinterleitner of Linz as his successor as managerial country leader. In March Klausner was arrested in connection with the arrest of about 60 leading Nazis, whereas Dr. Rainer was released. Hinterleitner again followed those directives which were set down at the conferences at Carinthia in the Spring of 1935; and in May 1936 he appointed Rainer, Globocnik and engineer Hiedler to the country leadership in the following spheres of influence:
Rainer to be chief of the political staff; Hiedler as chief of the organization; and Globocnik as liaison officer with the Reich and as organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria.
The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, co-operation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.
Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Wachter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and became a party member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz" was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Fuehrer as being a trusted person.
At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleiter was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the "Obersalzburg" where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler.
Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen. [Gruppenfuehrer] Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.
Regarding internal conditions, it was clear that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart. He was also in permanent contact with Capt. Leopold, and there were never any serious conflicts between them. But he also acknowledged the correctness of Dr. Rainer's political interpretations, and the actual leadership of Dr. Rainer in all political actions. The situation was much the same with Glaise-Horstenau who was whole-heartedly for Rainer and Globocnik but always carefully guarded the legal party position of Leopold.
Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as "Staatsrat" (councillor of state) in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called "satisfactory action". Through all this a new and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to the talks between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the "system apparatus" (Schuschnigg government) at a time when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.
Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Fuehrer of Leopold as a member of the Staff of Hess. After a long, personal talk with Klausner, the Fuehrer appointed him as leader of the Austrian National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free political initiative of the party leader of Austria.
The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all units leaders. During the night of the 10th to 11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did. Rainer then gave the final instruction for Friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might develop within the following days:
1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.
2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.
3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.
On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the "Landesleitung" had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political, "Front" men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.
Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquart 'phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered "No." Rainer informed the "Reichskanzlei" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to
## partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was
informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the "Gruppenfuehrer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.
Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party. * * *
The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer.
6.7.1939 Rainer e. h.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 829-PS
TOP SECRET
Copy
The Chief of the OKW WFST. / Abt. L (IV/Qu) Nr. 002060/41 g. Kdos.
F.H. Qu., 16 September 1941 40 copies, 32nd copy
_Subject_: Communist insurrection in the occupied territories.
1. Since the campaign against Soviet Russia started there have been communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single members of the armed forces to open revolt and spreading guerilla warfare.
It should be noted that this is a _mass movement which is centrally directed from Moscow_ and to which also the single and seemingly trifling incidents are to be ascribed occurring in areas which have been quiet so far.
Due to the manifold political and economic tensions in the occupied territories we must also expect _nationalistic and other groups_ to take advantage of the situation and to instigate difficulties for the German occupation troops by joining the communist insurrection.
This way an increasing _danger for the German conduct of the war_ arises which becomes apparent first by generally unsafe conditions for the occupation troops and already has led to troops being detached to the main centers of the unrest.
2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection have proved inadequate.
The Fuehrer has now ordered that _everywhere the most drastic means_ are to be employed in order to quench the movement within the shortest time possible.
Only in this manner which has always been employed successfully by great nations in the history of their conquests quiet can be restored.
3. The following _directives_ are to be observed:
_a._ In each case of _revolt_ against the German occupation force _Communist sources_ are to be suspected regardless of what the individual circumstances are.
_b._ To nip the plots in the bud the most drastic means are to be employed immediately at the first provocation in order to make the authority of the occupation force prevail and to prevent further spreading. Attention should be paid to the fact that a human life in the countries concerned often means nothing and only by unusual severity can a deterrent effect be achieved. In these cases the life of one German soldier must be atoned for by the death sentence for 50 to 100 communists, as a rule. The manner of execution shall further increase the deterrent effect.
The opposite procedure to use relatively mild punishment first and to do with the threat of more severe action as a deterrent is not in accordance with these principles and therefore should not be employed.
_c._ The _political relationships_ between Germany and the respective country in question are irrelevant for the attitude of the military occupation authorities.
To the contrary, it is to be considered and emphasized by propaganda that striking with energy will also liberate the native populations from communist criminals and result to their benefit.
Clever propaganda of this kind consequently will not cause undesirable reactions of the friendly parts of the population on account of the severe measures against the communists.
_d._ _Native men_ will generally be a failure in the execution of such measures of force. Their strengthening brings an increased danger for our own troops and therefore must not be allowed.
However, prizes and rewards should be lavishly offered to the population in order to ensure its cooperation in a suitable way.
_e._ If as an exception _court martial_ is to be opened in connection with communist revolts or other offenses against the German occupation force, the most drastic penalties are to be imposed.
In such cases the death penalty only can be an actual means having deterrent effect. Particularly acts of espionage and sabotage and attempts to join a foreign army are, as a rule, to be punished with death. Also in cases of bearing arms without permission the death sentence is to be imposed in general.
4. The _commanders in the occupied territories_ see to it that these principles are made known to all military offices without delay which have to deal with communist acts of revolt.
Certified /s/ Keitel [signature illegible] M.V.J.
_Distribution_:
Commander of Armed Forces South-East [W. Bfh. Suedost] 1st copy
with additional copies for Commander Serbia 2nd copy
with additional copies for Commander Salonika-Aegean Sea 3rd copy
with additional copies for Commander Southern Greece 4th copy
with additional copies for Commander Crete 5th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Norway 6th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Netherlands 7th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Eastern Territory 8th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Ukraine 9th copy
Plenipotentiary for the Armed Force with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia 10th copy
High Command of the Army--OKH (operational sec.) 11th copy
[O.Qu.IV] 12th copy
(Gen. Qu.) with additional copy for 13th copy
Mil Cdr. France 14th copy
Mil. Cdr. Belgium and Northern France 15th copy
Mil. Cdr. in the Gouv. Gen. 16th copy
Chief of Armament and Cdr. of Reserve 17th copy with add. copy for Cdr. German Troops in Denmark 18th copy
Chief of Air Force (General Staff) 19th copy
Chief of Navy [OKM] Chief of naval operations [SKL] 20th copy
Armistice Commission [W.St.K.] Wiesbaden 21st copy
Foreign Office, attention ambassador [?] Ritter 22nd copy
Verfuegungsstab Frankfurt/Oder } via L II 23rd copy
Verfuegungsstab Breslau } 24th copy _OKW_:
Operational Staff of the Armed Forces [WFST] 25th copy
Abt. L 26-32nd copy
WPr. 33rd copy
Office Ausl./Abw. 34th copy
Counterintelligence Abw. III 35th copy
Foreign department Abt. Ausl. 36th copy
Economic Armament office 37th copy
AWA 38th copy
WR 39th copy
Liaison-office [V.O.] at Gen. Gouv. Cracow 40th copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 833-PS
SECRET
High Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 2 February 1942.
_Foreign office/Intelligence/Intell. Dept. III No. 570/1.42 g (ZR/ III C 2_
Subject: Prosecution of crimes against the Reich or the occupying forces in the occupied territories
Wehrm. High Command 7 Feb. 1942 _No. 221 / 42 g_ _further_: to: 149/10 10
_Reference_: None _Inclosures_: 3
In the enclosure are transmitted
1. a decree of the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 7.12.41
2. an executory decree of the same day
3. a circular of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command of 12.12.41
The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces commands that crimes of the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts martial in the occupied territories _only_ when
(_a_) The sentence calls for the death penalty
_and_ (_b_) the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest.
Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces hope for the desired deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the occupied territories.
In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly brought to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies
(_a_) in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace,
(_b_) therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about their whereabouts and their fate.
This decree brings only insignificant changes of their activity to the intelligence [Abwehr] agencies. Now as before the intelligence agencies determine the time for the arrest of the espionage and sabotage suspect. However, in conjunction with establishment of the time it must however be considered now that previous to the arrest evidence fully sufficient for the conviction of the perpetrator must if possible be on hand, for further investigation hardly comes into question after the seizure, since a sentence must take place within 8 days, or on the other hand further investigation _on the spot_ by confrontation is made impossible by the evacuation of the prisoners to Germany. Therefore contact should be made with the pertinent military court previous to the arrest in order to check on the question as to whether or not the collected evidence suffices.
When in the opinion of the pertinent court martial and/or the military commander an immediate conviction on the spot is not possible, and the perpetrators are therefore to be evacuated to Germany, the intelligence agencies will inform Reich security headquarters [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8, attention of Herr Kriminaldirektor Fischer, directly, with a statement of the exact number of prisoners and the groups that belong together according to the circumstances of the individual case. Insofar as in individual cases the superior commander has an urgent interest in the conviction by a Wehrmacht court, this will be brought to the attention of Reich security headquarters. A copy of the whole report to Reich security headquarters is to be sent to the Foreign Office/Intelligence, Intelligence Department III.
The Reich security headquarters will determine a state police office, depending on accommodation possibilities, which will take over the prisoners. This state police office makes contact with the proper intelligence office and arranges the details of the evacuation,
## particularly if it will be handled by the secret military police,
military police, or by the Gestapo itself, as well as manner and place of transfer of subjects.
The decree of the Fuehrer is to be applied, to begin with, only in the occupied western territories (Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern France, France).
The intelligence agencies must make report to the chief of staff on the above regulations decreed by the foreign office intelligencer.
For the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command Signature: CANARIS _Distribution_:
To (Intelligence III) 127 _For information_: West (Armed Forces Operational staff.) 1 WR 15
Foreign Office Intelligence Z, ZR 2
Foreign Department 1
Intelligence III
W, H, M, Air FPdW, F, C, C1, C2, each 1 9
Wi 1
U 2
Reich Security Headquarters, Department IV E, attention of Kriminaldirektor Fischer 1
Original 1
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 835-PS
SECRET
High Command of the Armed Forces _14 n 16.18 WR_(_1/3_)
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 2 September 1944 Telephone Local 218191 Long distance 218091
Refer to file number date and content.
To the German Armistice Commission re letter of 10.8.44 Az. 630/44.
_For information to: OKW/WFSt/Qu/Verw.1_, WFSt/Foreign Office Group.
_Concerns_: Status of Political Prisoners.
_Reference_: Fuehrer decree of 30.7.44 (OKW/WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr. 009169 g.K.) and decree OKW of 18.2.44 (_WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr. 009169 g.K._) WR 1/3 Nr. 79/44 g.K.
Conforming to the decrees, all non-German civilians in occupied territory who have endangered the security and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in other ways are to be surrendered to the security police and to the security service (SD). Only those prisoners are excepted who were legally sentenced to death or were serving a sentence of confinement prior to the announcement of these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which endanger the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are also those of a political nature. The declaration of the senior office of the SS [Protection Corps] and Police with the Military Commander of France that he cannot answer questions about political prisoners during Anglo-American operations, includes therefore all political prisoners in the occupied French territories seized recently or to be seized in the near future.
The treatment of prisoners who are condemned according to the decree of the Fuehrer of December 7, 1941 OKW/WR (I/3/4 14 n 16 Nr. 165/41 g) and who have no communication with the outer world, will soon be discussed with all interested officers.
By order
Sig. Dr. Lehmann For correctness BDC--OKW--1643 [Signature illegible.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 837-PS
SECRET
National Socialist German Labour Party
Fuehrer's Deputy.
The Brown House, Munich-33, February 3rd 1939
SECRET
_Order No. 5/39 g_
(Not for Publication)
Subject: National league of Germans abroad [Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland] and the German Eastern League [Bund Deutscher Osten]
The Director of the Agency for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] SS-Gruppenfuehrer Lorenz, has instigated on my behalf the following new ruling for questions affecting racial work and work in the border country.
1. The National League of Germans abroad [VDA] is the association responsible for national work beyond the frontiers. At the head of the association, the new statutes of the VDA provide for a League Directorate consisting for the most part of leading party members in place of an independent League Director, whose office has been cancelled. Professor Karl Haushofer (Gen. ret.) has taken over the chairmanship of this Directorate. Party member Paul Meike is business manager of the League Directorate of the VDA and in this capacity he combines membership of the department of the Agency for Racial Germans with managing the VDA on lines which are in accordance with the instructions of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans. Thus the VDA can no longer take action on its own which affects the whole association. The VDA is organized into State Associations [Landesverbaende], which correspond in area to the Gaue of the NSDAP.
2. The German Eastern League [BDO] is the association responsible for work on the border country. SS-Oberfuehrer Dr. Behrends, the deputy of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans, is charged, until further notice, with its direction. Party Member Hoffmeyer is the responsible manager of the German Eastern League. He directs its business affairs according to the instructions of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans, and is a member of the staff of the Agency for Racial Germans. The BDO is organized into State Groups, whose regional borders correspond to those of the "Gaue" of the NSDAP.
3. All other associations for racial work and work in the border country (Patriotic Associations) [Heimattreue Verdaende] etc., are alternately transferred, according to their activities, to the associations mentioned under 1 and 2. The managers of VDA and BDO are commissioned to take the necessary measures for the incorporating of these associations.
4. The VDA is solely responsible for racial work beyond the frontiers. I herewith forbid the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations from all racial work abroad. The only competent body for this task is the Agency for Racial Germans, and the VDA as its camouflaged tool. Within the Reich the VDA, generally speaking, is responsible only for providing the means for racial work beyond the frontiers. The VDA must be supported in this in every way by the Party offices. Any outward appearance of a connection with the Party is, however to be avoided.
5. The BDO is at the disposal of the Gauleiters of the frontier "Gaue" for political duties on the frontiers. In addition, the establishment of a frontier territory bureau [Granzlandamt] for the following "Gaue" has been agreed to, in cases where such a bureau is not already in existence:
East Prussia, Pomerania, Mark Brandenburg, Silesia, Sudetenland, Bavarian Ostmark, Upper Danube, Lower Danube.
In all other "Gaue," special frontier territory bureaux or representatives would be superfluous and are therefore not to be established. Should they already exist, they are to be dissolved.
The activity of the BDO and the VDA is to be supported in every way by the Party offices. The National Socialist leadership of both associations will ensure energetic cooperation on their part in all tasks assigned to them by the NSDAP. Their nature is determined by considerations of foreign policy, and the associations must bear this in mind when representing them in public.
Signed: R. HESS
Certified [signed] Witt (WITT)
_Distribution_: II d
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 838-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
The Brown House, Munich 33, 3 June 1939
Stabsleiter
Circular No. 122139
Subject: Adherents to Christian Science who are members of the Party
In decree No. 51/1939, dated 6 March 1939 the deputy of the Fuehrer has forbidden that members of the Party be followers of Christian Science due to the outspoken international connections of Christian Science and he decreed that wherever double-membership exists it will have to be annulled immediately.
I request that the leaders of the organizations of the Party issue the necessary decree within the realm of their jurisdiction and also make sure that no double-membership of Christian Science and of party organizations exist.
I also request of the leaders of the affiliated organizations to make sure by issuing decrees that within their realm of jurisdiction members of the Christian Science will not hold official positions. I have no objection for members of the affiliated organizations to be members of the Christian Science.
Signed: M. Bormann
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 840-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Brown House, Munich 33, 14 July 1939 Regulation No. 140/39
Subject: Admission of Clergymen and Students of Theology into the NSDAP
In my regulation No. 24/37 dated 9 February 1937 I have decreed that in order to avoid the penetration of contrasts of ecclesiastical-political nature into the movement and to avoid the suspicion of a one-sided attitude for or against an existing denomination, the admission of members of the clergy into the Party is to be avoided. It turned out that the nonadmission of members of the clergy into the Party is not sufficient for the purpose in question.
In his regulation No. 34/39 on the lifting of the restriction of memberships dated 10 May 1939 the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP has done justice to this experience by decreeing that clergymen, _as well as other fellow Germans who are also closely connected with the church_, cannot be admitted into the Party.
_In addition to this I decree that in the future Party members who enter the clergy_ or who turn to the study of Theology have to leave the Party. This decree does not affect those students who are matriculated mainly in other factors and, not intending to become clergymen later attend only some lectures of the theological faculties.
Signed: for BORMANN
Attested: [Signature illegible] _Distribution_: IV b
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 841-PS
SECRET
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY
Fuehrer's Deputy Chief of the Staff Brown House, MUNICH 33, the 17 Jan. 1939
ORDER NO 1/39 SECRET
Subject: _Jews_.
Upon proposal of Field-Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer has made some basic decisions concerning the Jewish problem. I make these decisions known to you in the enclosure and request that you observe to take these directives under all circumstances.
Signed: M. BORMANN
_1 Enclosure_ _Distribution_: III b Certified Signed: [illegible]
* * * * *
SECRET
PRIME MINISTER FIELD-MARSHALL GOERING Commissioner for four year plan Berlin, 28. Dec. 1938
Upon my proposal, the Fuehrer made the following decisions concerning the Jewish problem:
A
_I. Housing of Jews_
1. _a._ The tenant protective law, as a rule, is not to be abrogated for the Jews. On the contrary, it is desired, if possible, to proceed in particular cases in such a way that the Jews are quartered together in separate houses insofar as the housing conditions allow that.
_b._ For this reason the aryanizing of the house ownership _is to be postponed until the end of the total aryanization_, that is to say, for the present the aryanizing of houses has to be carried out only where in individual cases urgent reasons exist. The aryanizing of industries, businesses, agricultural estates, forests, etc., is to be considered as urgent.
2. Use of sleeping and dining cars is to be forbidden to the Jews. At the same time, no special Jewish compartments to be established. As well, the use of trains, street cars, suburban railways, underground railways, busses, and ships can not be prohibited to the Jews.
3. Only the use of some public establishments, etc., is to be prohibited to the Jews. In this category belong the hotels and restaurants visited especially by party-members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof--Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten--Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof--Nurnberg; Hotel Drei Mohren--Augsburg, etc.). The use of bathing establishments, some public places, bathing resorts, etc. can be prohibited to the Jews; also medicine baths, so far as they are prescribed in particular cases by physicians, may be used by Jews, but only in such ways that no offense is created.
II. Jews who were officials and have been pensioned are not to be denied their pensions. Investigations though have to be made as to whether these Jews can get along with a reduced allowance.
III. The Jewish welfare organizations are not to be aryanized or abolished so that the Jews do not become a public charge, but may be supported by Jewish welfare organizations.
IV. Jewish patents are property, and as such have to be aryanized. (A similar procedure toward Germany was carried out by U.S.A. and other countries during World War I).
B
_Mixed Marriages._
I. 1. _With children_ (part Jews 1st class)
_a._ If the father is a German and the mother a Jewess, this family may stay in the future in its present lodging. The regulations for exclusion of Jews are not to be applied to such families as far as their housing is concerned.
In these cases, the property of the Jewish mother can be transferred to the German husband, or to the mixed children.
_b._ If the father is a Jew and the mother a German, such families also, are not to be moved for the present into Jewish quarters, because the children (part Jews 1st class) in the future, must serve in the labor service and the armed forces, and must not be exposed to Jewish propaganda. Concerning the property, one must for the present proceed in such a way that it can be completely or partly transferred to the children.
2. _Without children._
_a._ If the husband is a German and wife a Jewess, the provisions of 1_a_ are valid accordingly.
_b._ If the husband is a Jew, and the wife a German, these childless couples are to be proceeded against as if they were full-blooded Jews. The husband's property can not be transferred to the wife. Both, husband and wife can be moved into the Jewish houses or Jewish quarters.
Especially in case of emigration such married couples are to be treated as Jews, as soon as an increased emigration is gotten under way.
II. If a German wife divorces a Jew, she reenters the German racial community and all disadvantages for her discontinue.
Signed: GOERING
Certified copy [Signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 842-PS
THE KREISLEITER To The Area Staff Leaders [Gaustabsamtsleiter] Party member SELLMER, NURNBERG
LAUF (PEGNITZ), December 30, 1940
In addition to my last report on the situation, I report the following:
The district physician of Hersbruck, Dr. Loeffler, informs me that in Schupf near Kainsback (formerly Kreis Hersbruck) a young farmer, by the name of Koch, was turned over to an institution for sterilization, because of epileptic attacks.
A few weeks ago he wrote to his mother that he was feeling fine, and that she should send him some smoking tobacco. His mother wrote him in return that he should come back soon, as he is badly needed on the farm. It is remarked here that the young Koch was of great help to the mother Koch, a farmer's widow, as he managed the farm practically all by himself.
A week later the widow was informed that her son had suddenly died, and that she could obtain the urn containing the ashes.
As the young Koch had been known also in his neighborhood for his industry, it is natural that this "violent death" has caused great indignation.
When I proposed to district physician Loeffler to send a master mason from Osternohe for a few weeks to the institution in Ausbach for observation of his mental condition, he declared he could not take this responsibility as he did not know if same would return alive. The doctor informed me also that it was known that the commission consisted of an SS-physician with several subordinate physicians and that the "patients" were not even being examined, but judged solely by the patient's existing records. As far as he knew families refuse to send their sick members to the institutions as they do not know whether they would see them again alive.
The district physician in Nurnberg had informed him of two cases in the city of Nurnberg, where charges of murder have been preferred by relations of such patients.
The Party has up to now received neither such complaints nor accusations.
Heil Hitler! Signed: Walz Kreisleiter
_Pencil and ink notes_:
"investigate"
"Dr. Guesbert" [?]
"The staff reports: No case is known. The authorities have been instructed how to act. 1-7-41."
"Party member Walz has been informed; Party member Dr. Hummel has been informed; Party member Dr. Breilig [?] has been informed."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 847-PS
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 5, 1942 at present Fuehrer's Headquarters
All postal communication must be sent to the Berlin address without exception.
RK. 9495 B
Please use the above chiffre in further communications.
To the Highest Authorities in the Reich, and to all departments directly subordinate to the Fuehrer
The Fuehrer has charged Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as delegate of the Fuehrer with the supervision of the entire spiritual and political education and schooling of the NSDAP, with the spiritual fight against the Jews and Freemasons as well as against all allied with them in their doctrinal opposition to National Socialism, as the instigators of the present war. For this purpose the Fuehrer has ordered that the staff of the Reichsleader Rosenberg shall have the right, in occupied territories under Military Government and in occupied Eastern territories under civil administration (this does not include the General Government) to search libraries, archives, lodges, and other political and cultural institutions of all kinds for suitable material for the fulfillment of his task, and to ask the competent army and police offices to confiscate the material thus procured for the implementation of the world doctrinal tasks of the NSDAP, and for later scientific research work of the university, whereby the police political files will remain with the police, all other documents however to be turned over to the staff of the Reichleader Rosenberg. The same request to be made by this staff in regard to all cultural goods which are the property or in the possession of Jews which do not belong to anyone, or whose owners cannot be determined. The measures on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in accordance with Reichleader Rosenberg. The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken by Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories.
I am giving notice of this, the Fuehrer's order, and request to support Reichleader Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
SECRET
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery _Rk. 507 A g_
Please use this chiffre in all further communications
Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 16, 1942 Present field quarters. All mail to be sent to the Berlin address without exception. II 1C
II 1 C 791/42g, rec. 20 July 42
encl 1
To the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories
_Berlin W35_
Kurfuerstenstrasse 134
(Notes illegible)
_Concerning_: Fuehrer decree of March 1, 1942 To the letter of July 10, 1942-II 1 C 705/42g
The regulations of which you wish to be informed are contained in enclosed circular letter to the highest Reich authorities of July 5, 1942--Rk. 9495 B--which was also sent to you. A further copy of this circular is enclosed for your use.
Deputy
[signature illegible]
1. There is nothing to be done from here. 2. Mr. R.R. Guilleaume to be informed after his return (7 Aug).
[signature illegible]
[name illegible] Please ask in the Registrar's Office of the Reich Chancellery if the Fuehrer's decree of 1 March 42 exists. Apparently we have only been sent the measures of procedure.
(initials illegible) 3 July
The Fuehrer's decree of 1 March is enclosed. PR. 4 August.
The Reich Chancellery has received the Fuehrer decree of 1 March 42, as a copy from the Reichsleitung Rosenberg. I asked for it there.
Pr. 31/7
Give first to Ministerialdirector Dr. Runte with a request for his acknowledgment.
LABS, 5 August [illegible marks]
* * * * *
FUEHRER DECREE
Jews, Freemasons, and those allied with them in their world doctrinal conceptions are opponents of National Socialism and are the instigators of the present war directed against the Reich. The planned spiritual fight against these powers is a necessary war measure.
I have therefore, charged Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg to carry out this task in accord with the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. His staff for the occupied territories has the right to search libraries, archives, lodges, and other world doctrinal and cultural institutions of all kinds for pertinent material and to have it confiscated for the world doctrinal task of the NSDAP and the later research work of the university cultural values which are the property or are in the possession of Jews, which do not belong to an owner, or whose owners cannot be determined, are subject to the same regulation. The measures on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in accord with Reichleader Rosenberg.
The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken care of by Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories.
Fuehrer Headquarters, March 1, 1942
To all administrative departments of the Wehrmacht, the Party, and the State.
Signed: Adolf Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 848-PS
GESTAPO
NURNBERG-FUERTH OFFICE
TELETYPE SECTION
Teletype No. 12309
Received 24 July 1938, 1515 hours from WF via GM Dr. Berlin Nue 167 262 24 July 1938 1500 to Stapo Nurnberg-- Urgent--Transmit at once.
Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll in Rottenburg Reference: None
I request that the following text of a teletype just received here from Stuttgart be transmitted _at once by special messenger to Bayreuth_, Villa Wahnfried, to SS Brigadefuehrer Schaub, attention of SS Untersturmfuehrer Wuensche:
In connection with my report (special delivery of 23 July 1938) subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll of Rottenburg, I further communicate that the following teletype from the Gestapo office in Stuttgart just came in here:
"The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about 2,500-3,000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw files out of the windows, and rummaged through the beds in the rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies and gentleman of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the building. After the evacuation of the palace by the demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber who left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick anew. On the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act of suppressing counter mass meetings.
Gestapo Office Stuttgart."
In case the Fuehrer has instructions to give in this matter, I request that these be transmitted most quickly, best by telephone to Gestapo Office, telephone Berlin 12 00 40, attention of Regierung Assistant Freytag, so that corresponding instructions can be forwarded to Stuttgart.
Gestapo Office Berlin,
By direction,
Signed: DR. BEST
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 849-PS
Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs GII 3990/38
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3, 23 July 1938 Tel. 11 66 51 [Stamp]
Praesidium Chancellery Entered 24 July 1938
RP 6575/38
Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg (wttbg.) Ref: Letter of 22 July 1938 No. Er 41/38 III 3 enclosures
To the Minister of State and Chief of the Praesidium Chancellery in Berlin
The Catholic Bishop Dr. Sproll, as the only citizen of the city of Rottenburg and, as far as is known, as the only German bishop, did not take part in the plebiscite of 10 April. The absence from the plebiscite has evoked great and justified anger among the population. Apparently the bishop himself had a bad conscience and left town on the evening before the plebiscite for an unknown destination. Even on 10 and 11 April there were demonstrations at the bishop's residence in Rottenburg against the absent bishop. On 21 April Sproll returned to Rottenburg and on the same day there were renewed demonstrations in front of the bishop's palace. On 22 April Dr. Sproll again left Rottenburg in order to go to a Bavarian monastery.
As the bishop, since Hitler's rise to power, became prominent through a series of damaging sermons, the Governor of Wuerttemberg now came to the conclusion that Dr. Sproll, in the interest of preserving the state's authority and in the interest of quiet and order, could no longer remain in office. The Reich Governor had explained to the ecclesiastical board,
that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as Head of the Diocese of Rottenburg on account of his refraining from the election in the office; that he desired Bishop Sproll to leave the Gau area Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, because he could assume no guarantee for his personal safety; that in the case of the return of the bishop to Rottenburg he would see to it that all personal and official intercourse with him on the part of state offices as well as Party offices and the Armed Forces would be denied.
Moved by the reports from Wuerttemberg my Deputy, in my absence, directed the letter attached in copy G II 2277/38 2030 dated 5 May to the Foreign Office. In accordance with that the Foreign Office on 18 May turned to the German Embassy at the Vatican with the instruction that it should be urged on the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll that he should resign his Bishopric.
The bishop sojourning outside of his diocese had already received the instruction to return to his diocese. On 18 May Sproll quietly returned to Wuerttemberg and retired to St. Mary's Hospital in Stuttgart.
Since no answer to the instruction of 18 May had been received from the Embassy at the Holy See, on 1 July the settlement of the affair was again brought up in Rome. On 18 July the letter of the Foreign Office attached in copy--Pol III 1886 of 11 July--was received. Whether the affair has again been discussed with the Cardinal Secretary of State, as planned, is unknown to me.
In the intervening two months Bishop Sproll quietly resided in Stuttgart. On 15 July he returned to the Episcopal residence and on 16 July conducted a ceremonial divine service. On the evening of the same day there occurred among the population, aroused over the return of the bishop, great demonstrations before the ecclesiastical buildings of Rottenburg. On 18 July there were more even greater demonstrations. A report of the Reich Governor of 20 July is attached in copy. It is to be expected that on Saturday, 23 July, even greater mass meetings against continued remaining of the Bishop will be put on, so that Cardinal Bertram was impelled to send his telegram of 21 July to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
The content and tenor of this telegram are such that I cannot recommend a favorable consideration of it. Not the demonstrating people aroused over the subversive attitude of the Bishop are turning against the State, but the Bishop by his incredible behavior against the State and folk-community has turned against the State. In my estimation measures are not sufficient here, which merely produce the condition prior to 10 April. I could only recommend a cessation of further demonstrations if the action of the German Embassy initiated at the Holy See is accompanied by success. If it is unsuccessful, the Bishop would have to be exiled from the land, or there would have to be a complete boycott of the Bishop by the authorities, as the Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg at that time announced to the ecclesiastical officials.
I would notify Cardinal Bertram correspondingly, in case the Fuehrer does not reserve the notification for himself.
signed: KERRL
* * * * *
Copy
Berlin W8, 5 May 1938 Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs GII 2277/38
Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg, Wuerttemberg
The Catholic Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg (Wuerttemberg) on 10 April 1938, as the only non-voter of the Rottenburg District, aroused the greatest resentment of all racial Germans and especially gave to Catholic circles the worst example for their civic behavior. By his absence from the plebiscite, which is to be evaluated only as a demonstration, he moreover has violated the sense of the Episcopal oath of loyalty prescribed in Article 16 of the Reichconcordat.
The Bishop felt impelled to evade the just anger of the people and to leave his diocese. It is to be feared that upon his possible return and a possible appearance in public, even at church functions, renewed disorders and demonstrations would occur. It cannot be expected of the German police that they would protect a man who has not perceived his most primitive duties to people and Fuehrer, from the crowds of people who, in righteous wrath, are turning against this man. Also, it cannot be expected of the German authorities that they will carry on official business with a Bishop who in this manner has excluded himself from the folk-community. It is not to be expected that this Bishop can ever accomplish any more fruitful work in his diocese.
I therefore recommend that it be urged on the Holy See via the Apostolic Nuncio or via the German Embassy at the Vatican, to influence Bishop Sproll that he resign his Bishopric as soon as possible.
By direction
Signed: DR. MUHS To the Foreign Office in Berlin
* * * * *
Copy
Copy (indicated) Berlin, 11 July 1938 Foreign Office, Pol III 1886 _a._ Reference to the letter of 11 June--Pol III 1679 _b._ Reference to letter of 27 May 1938--II B 1-- / 574/38
The German Ambassador at the Vatican has discussed the matter of recalling Bishop Sproll with the Cardinal-Secretary of State. The Cardinal, who acted in a very reserved manner according to all appearance, did not approve the procedure of the Bishop, but remarked that according to reports he had received the participation in the plebiscite would be a voluntary act, nevertheless an offense against legal duties did not exist. The German Embassy reports, in addition, that in spiritual circles the behavior of the Bishop is designated as very inapt.
The German Embassy at the Holy See has been instructed to discuss the matter again with the Cardinal-Secretary of State.
Further information is reserved for the present.
By direction
Signed: Bismarck
To: _a._ Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg Gauleiter Murr, Stuttgart
_b._ Chief of the Security Police Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8
* * * * *
Copy
Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg Stuttgart, 20 July 1938 Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll Enclosures: None
As I am informed, Monday evening a demonstration again occurred in front of the Episcopal Ordinariat. Several thousand people gathered in front of the Episcopal Ordinariat and chanting in unison gave expression to their resentment about the absence of the Bishop. There were no further excesses of any sort.
I am reporting on this incident with the request that everything be attempted to get a recall or transfer of the Bishop, for it is not to be assumed that tranquility will return to the people--even in the more remote area around Rottenburg--as long as Dr. Sproll officiates as Bishop.
To the Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 862-PS
TOP SECRET
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.
TOP SECRET
(through officers only)
Re: Basic political principles in the Protectorate 4 copies, 1st copy
TOP SECRET
(through officers only)
1 Annex [Pencil marks]: K [Keitel] 21/X J [Jodl] Chief OKW through Chief WFSt W [Warlimont] 18/10
On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K.H. Frank spoke about the following:
Since creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.
After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three ways of solution were indicated:
_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and _reduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia_.
This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable space of time.
_c._ _Assimilation of the Czechs_, i.e. absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint [blut-und sonst wertmaessig Bedentunghat]. This will take place among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.
The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come.
From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as annex).
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
Signed: FRIDERICI Infantry Lt. General _Distribution_:
OKW-L--1st Copy OKH-O Qu V--2nd Copy Chief H Ruest and Bd E-Ic.--3rd Copy Draft--4th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 864-PS
TOP SECRET
L IV Berlin, 20 October 1939
Only copy Written by officer 20 Oct. [illegible initials]
Conference between the Fuehrer and Chief OKW
on the future shape of Polish relations
with Germany
(Evening of 17 October 1939)
1. The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of administrative questions in Poland.
On principle there cannot be 2 administrations.
2. Poland is to be made independent. She will neither be part of the German Reich nor a district administered by the Reich.
3. It is not the task of the Administration to make Poland into a model province or a model state of the German order or to put her economically or financially on a sound basis.
The Polish intelligensia must be prevented from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we only want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to be used for the administration of the country. However, the forming of national political groups may not be allowed.
4. The administration has to work on its own responsibility and must not be dependent on Berlin. We don't want to do there what we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the Berlin Ministries since there is no German administrative unit concerned.
The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial struggle [Volkstumskampf] which will not allow any legal restrictions. The methods will be incompatible with the principles otherwise adhered to by us.
The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare living conditions and is to maintain the basis for military security.
5. In Cracow German officers have visited the Bishops. Prince Radziwill is owner of his huge estates [Latifundien].
These problems cannot be solved socially.
6. _Our interests lie as follows_: Precautions are to be taken that the territory is important to us from a military point of view as an advanced jumping-off point and can be used for strategic concentration of troops. To that end the _railroads_, _roads_, and the _communications channels_ are to be kept in order and utilized for our purposes.
Any tendencies towards the consolidation of conditions in Poland are to be suppressed. The "Polish muddle" [polnische Wirtschaft] must be allowed to develop. The government of the territory must make it possible for us to purify the _Reich territory_ from Jews and Polacks, too. Collaboration with new Reich provinces [Posen and West Prussia] only for _resettlements_ (Compare Mission Himmler).
_Purpose_: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this racial struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on account of this country again.
[illegible initials] 20 Oct. W. [initialed by General Warlimont] 20 Oct.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.
An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him.
The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941. The Fuehrer Signed: Adolf Hitler Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, 21st April 1941 At present Fuehrer Headquarters. Mail, without exception, to be sent to the Berlin address.
To: the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel
Personal. By courier.
My dear General Field Marshal.
Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East-European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only, those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: the Commissioner for the Four-year Plan, the Reich Minister of Economies, and you yourself.
Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in carrying out of the task imposed upon him.
It is recommended, in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.
I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.
Heil Hitler Yours very sincerely Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
25 April 1941 By courier.
To The Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Personal.
Dear Reich Minister,
I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.
Heil Hitler Yours very sincerely K. 25/4.
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 25th April 1941. By courier
To Reichsleiter Rosenberg Personal
Dear Reichsleiter,
The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with solving these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.
Heil Hitler Yours very sincerely K. 25/4.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 870-PS
[Stamp:]
TOP SECRET
_Copy to Rk. 1952 German Secret Reich matter._
Information for the Fuehrer
I report the following, concerning the sabotage plot, through which at the two largest Oslo dockyards 23500 was sunk and 25800 tonnage was damaged:
I. _Backgrounds._
1. The personnel of both dockyards had the reputation of being extremely radical marxistic before the war. Both dockyards strikes were declared in September 1941. At the second day of the strike I have taken measures so harsh and decisive that starting there and then, and until this plot happened, peace and order prevailed at both enterprises.
2. In connection with the withdrawal of the 20th (mountain) Army, England has given out the following order to the personnel of the dockyards: "Either you blow up the ships or we shall be forced to shell town and port." The efficiency of that order of the day is confirmed not only by the plot itself but also by statements. Therefore it is clear that the saboteurs do not only have active helpers or groups of helpers amongst the personnel, but that they also enjoy passive support respectively protection by the rest of the crowd.
II. _Countermeasures._
1. My old method is entirely out of question. Countersabotage in Norway is useless on account of lack of objects. Counter terror in this instance would bypass its goal and in addition would lead to the most disadvantageous consequences, according to the opinion, shared by Reich Leader of SS Himmler and chief of the Security Police Kaltenbrunner.
2. A permanent and sufficient boarding of the ships by military guards must fail because, on account of lack of forces. Navy and army state that they cannot furnish additional units. Guarding by police is impossible, because only six under strength battalions of about 400 men are at my disposal in the entire country. [Pencilled note of Keitel: No, the Armed Forces can guard its ships itself?]
3. As much as a stronger and permanent military guarding of every ship is desirable, this measure would in no way exclude the possibility of further attacks, because such guards are not able to judge if the Norwegian specialists handle their jobs right or wrong. [Pencilled note of Keitel: But the Marines can do that.]
4. Just now I received a cable of Field Marshall General Keitel, in which the issue of a decree is demanded according to which members of the personnel and if the occasions arises their next of kin (liability of next of kin) are collectively kept responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their departments.
This demand makes only sense and promises success only, if I am actually allowed to perform executions by firing squad. [Pencilled note of Keitel: Yes, that is the best.] If this is not possible, such a decree would cause exactly the opposite reaction.
_a._ The Norwegian expects German defeat within a very short time. An arrest therefore, does not only frighten him, but gives him security on the one hand, and on the other hand an alibi with the Emigrant Government.
_b._ This decree would only add fuel to the fire of the Swedish agitators and would not be crowned by success. But such shootings by firing squads are prohibited by the Fuehrer decree. On the other hand, if I could get renewal liberty of action in this regard, and if I could use my old methods again, without considering Sweden, then such a decree would gain the necessary weight and, with that doubtlessly lead to success.
III. _Suggestion._
1. A military guard is ordered for every ship. The main dockyard committee has to submit specific suggestions regarding the respective strength and the methods of duty patroling.
2. So many workers, foremen, technicians, and engineers are to be taken from German dockyards that we are able to plant amongst personnel of the most important Norwegian dockyards at least 10 percent of German specialists. The dockyard main committee can also order the method of planting only if, on account of this--at the worst--the production capacity German dockyards decrease accordingly, one should consider that by such measures the tenfold of this waste will be secured on the Norwegian side, [Pencilled note of Keitel: I regard this measure as expedient, if decrees 3 and 4 should be declined. K.] For, only by employing these Norwegian Specialists forces it will be possible to keep the Norwegian experts under such constant control at their work, that it is made quite impossible for them to commit acts of sabotage.
3. Establishing of the three-shift system, in order that at any day or night time Norwegian personnel is on board and, in case, is also blown into the air. It is up to the dockyard main committee to decide if and to which extent this system is workable.
4. In this connection the dockyard main committee should be charged in principle with the central responsibility for the security in the dockyards: for the main committee in its competence has at its disposal the decisive prerogatives, which can warrant that security. Thereby it goes without saying, that it has at its disposal the Security Police with all its facilities and that the Armed Forces put at the disposal of the guards to the ordered extent.
5. While accomplishing these measures one has to take into account the possibility of a strike. As I possess only limited liberty of action, at present this would be more than unpleasant. In spite of this I am of the opinion that taking the danger into the bargain, the measures suggested should be ordered.
Signed: Terboven Reich Commissioner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 871-PS
Top Secret
WFSt/Qu.2 (North) 6 December 1944 2 copies, 1st copy
KR--Teletype to Reichminister and Head of Reich Chancellery, Reichminister Dr. Lammers.
Sir:
In the matter of checking sabotage in Norway, I agree with the view of the Reich Commissioner for Occupied Norwegian territory, to the extent that I expect results from reprisals only if they are carried out ruthlessly and if Reich Commissioner Terboven is authorized to carry out shootings.
Should the Fuehrer not grant this authorization, I consider the proposal of Reich Commissioner Terboven (No. III of his communication) as adequate to the purpose.
I note moreover that the mentioned 10% of German specialists [Fachraefte] would require from 800-1,000 persons. For guard duty it is possible to supply supplementary personnel from the Wehrmacht, to a limited extent.
In contrast to the view of Reich Commissioner Terboven, I anticipate a certain success from this procedure at least to the extent that Marines will be used.
For your information, there is going forward to you simultaneously a teletype addressed to the Wehrmacht Commandant (W. Bhf) Norway, through which the report of the Reich Commissioner, transmitted to me, evidently released.
Heil Hitler yours Signed: Keitel OKW/WFST/Qu. 2 (North) Nr. 0014371/44g.K.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
TOP SECRET
Armed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41. S.O. only 5 Copies, 5th Copy Access only through officer 44089/41 Top Secret S.O. only
Conference of "Fall Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume"
The following persons attended:
The Fuehrer Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff C-in-C Army Chief of the Army General Staff Chief of Army Op. section Colonel Schmundt Major Christian Major Engel
_Chief of Army General Staff_--1. Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions, 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions. _Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality._
In estimating the leading personalities, Timoshenko is the only outstanding figure. The only one, that is, according to Gen. Koestring.
Details of the strength and organization of the Russian divisions are _important only_ in that even the Infantry Divisions include a comparatively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and merely thrown together.
In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to tanks, weapons [Schuetzen] and artillery. The Russians are superior in numbers, we in quality.
The Russians are normally equipped in artillery. Materials likewise inferior. The Command of the Artillery is insufficient. The Russian operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the frontier. Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.
There is no fresh information on the communications system.
Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be split into 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Line prevented.
The Army Group North and Center ordered to press forward across the Duena in a north-easterly direction with concentrated armored forces in 3 armored groups (the strongest in the South).
The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with other two armored groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.
The Army Group South is to advance across the Dnieper in a south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Center is to carry out operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the North; army reserves are massed there.
6 armored divisions are required from the "Marita" operation; of these the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions are reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation (Turkey's attitude).
_Fuehrer_--When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make any further moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefore necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with unhampered forces.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--_Northern Group_ 50} divs, 13 armored divs, 9 motorized divs. Southern } Attack Forces Group 30 divs, 5 armored divs, 3 motorized divs. }
In addition: Supreme Command of the Army Reserves.
Assignment of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good by additional bridge-building units [Brueckenmaterial].
_Fuehrer_--agreed with the large dispositions.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--It is proposed to isolate a large number of Russian troops in various places at the time the split is effected. The early use of reserves is necessary for this purpose.
_Note_: the Pripet Marshes are not definitely _taboo_.
_Fuehrer_--mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--The cavalry divisions are particularly dangerous in this respect.
_Orders issued to date_: Orders for Army Group are binding. Orders for Armies set out the targets. Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.
He expounded on _the orders issued to Army groups, etc., up to the present_.
_Fuehrer_--mentioned that the operational areas were enormous, that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the encirclement were _complete_ (Cavalry divisions). (At the moment, there is a very biased play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine, cannot be expected at once. It is, however, possible that after the initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, will retreat on large scale and prepare for defense further East behind some barrier.
In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will be cleared. From there (a favorable supply-base) a thrust in the rear of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the center, he can be maneuvered out of it from the flanks.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--The Falkenhorst army can advance on Petsamo with 1-1/2 divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a further 1-1/2 divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and cutting off the Murmansk forces.
The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps [Aks] of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onegin, 2 divisions against Hango, they need strong support. There are 15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in Murmansk.
_Fuehrer_--assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question of a union between Finland and Sweden as this would not suit the European New Order.
Norway must be under protection; no repercussions are desired from that quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.
_In the South_: The most important task is the protection of the oil fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--Position of Hungary. If Hungary is not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it is a matter of life and death.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--Armored reconnaissance forces are still scarce.
_Flak question_ is still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the roads (to follow in writing).
The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set up by the Army.
_The Navy_ must hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.
_Supply_ is a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring supplies to supply bases.
Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the full.
Supply areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).
_In connection with Marita_, the difficulties of transporting back those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.
_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan. 1st Deployment Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] transfer now, Front-Germany-East. 2nd Deployment Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained.
_In industry_ the full capacity time table is in force. No more camouflage.
From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable.
The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
_C-in-C Army_--requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.
_Fuehrer_--When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.
_Chief of the Air Force General Staff_--joined the conferences.
_Fuehrer_--discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.
He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.
Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.
We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.
We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to render effective assistance in North Africa.
The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defense now only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in larger protection zones.
He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.
_What can be done?_
Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed, if possible with Stuka groups, with jumping-off bases and homefields in Lybia.
If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile unit (strong armored division).
The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German forces, the situation will soon alter.
Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armored division for this?
_C-in-C Army_--unwillingly from Marita.
_Fuehrer_--out of the question.
_C-in-C Army_--If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.
_Fuehrer_--
If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).
The primary consideration is: Can the Air Force intervene now.
The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking unit, and armored divisions must be established at once.
Then, what are the climatic conditions?
_C-in-C Army_--It is important that British supplies by land and sea are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.
_Fuehrer_--The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the transport of the above-mentioned German troops.
If necessary, transport groups must be employed.
Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from
Foggia.
_C-in-C Army_--proposed that the blocking unit should first be reinforced by 1 armored regiment. The rest to follow. The Fuehrer agreed.
_Chief of Air Force General Staff_--spoke of the position of the ground-organization in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces ready within range for operations.
Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters be placed under German orders.
It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.
_Fuehrer_--agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from the Channel coast. (He will speak to the Duce.)
_The Air Force_ must test immediately, the possibilities of intervening in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking unit.
The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armored regiment, further reinforcement up to an armored division, will be withdrawn from Marita. Flak forces on ahead.
_C-in-C Army_--proposed a united command of all mobile forces under 1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also commands the Italian naval air forces.
_Conclusions_:
1. _Barbarossa._
_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the _main aim_ is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
_c._ Agreements with neighboring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.
_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).
_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.
2. _Sonnenblume._
_a._ The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with decisions made in North Africa. It is desired that the Italian fighter forces be placed under German orders.
_b._ The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.
_c._ The 10th Flieger Korps is to strike a strong blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible (with the use of the heaviest bombs).
The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea; next, to combat the British fleet.
First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.
_d._ The _Army_ is to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This is, however, to be reinforced at once with armor. Preparations for adding one Armored Division (II Staffel from Marita). Flank forces on ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the Italians.
Certified _Distribution_: [signature illegible] Chef L Captain I H I K I L IV
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 873-PS
TOP SECRET
L IV/Qu
Fuehrer's Hq., 1 May 1941
For senior Officers only
Only by officer
1 original copy
Conference with Chief "L" on the 30 April 1941
1. _Timetable Barbarossa_:
The Fuehrer has decided: _Action Barbarossa_ begin 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves have not yet reached the appointed areas.
2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa_:
_Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.
_Sector Middle_: Great German superiority.
_Sector South_: Russian superiority.
3. _Russian strategic concentration_:
Continued movements of strong forces to the German-Russian boundary.
4. _Estimate by the Supreme Commander of the Army of course Barbarossa will take._
Presumably violent battles of the frontiers, duration up to 4 weeks. In course of the following development weaker resistance may be expected.
_Opinion of Russian soldiers_: A Russian will fight, on appointed spot, up to the last breath.
5. _Conversations with Finland_ are approved by the Fuehrer according to the OKW WFST part II Op. 44594/41 g.K. Chefs of the 28 April 1941.
6. _Conversations with Hungary_ are only possible in the last third of May. The Fuehrer believes the Hungarians will be prepared to carry out defensive operations on the Russian border, but they will not allow any German attack from Hungary.
7. _Conversations with Roumania_ will be possible only at a very advanced date.
8. _Concealment of conversations_ with friendly countries: projected German assault in the West, hence Eastern Front must be covered.
## Participation of friendly countries only as a purely defensive measure.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 874-PS
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Hq. of the Fuehrer, 9 March 41 DRAFT
Honorable Reich Minister (TODT)
For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuver to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the organization Todt.
[initials] K. J. W. [Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 876-PS
MOST SECRET
Fuehrer's Headquarters, 12 May 1941
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WFSt/Section L (I Op) No. 44699/41 most secret, S.O. only S.O. only; access only through officer 18 copies, 12th copy
_Subject_: Deception of the enemy _Reference_: OKW/WFSt/Section L (I Op.) No. 44277/41 most secret, S.O. only, dated 12,3,41
1. The second phase of the deception of the enemy commences with the introduction on 22.5. of the full capacity timetable. The efforts of the Supreme Commands and of any other authorities concerned must be aimed, more and more, at making the strategic concentration "Barbarossa" appear as a large-scale maneuver and also to continue the preparations for the attack on England with special energy. The following is the principle to be applied: the nearer the day of attack approaches, the more intensive methods can be employed (also in the communications service) for deception purposes.
2. All efforts will be in vain if our own units are aware of the approaching attack and spread news of it at home. On the contrary, the rumor of the "rear cover against Russia" and of the "feint assembly of forces in the East" must be circulated, and/or the troops on the Channel coast must believe in actual preparations. In this connection, dead-lines and the extent of army postal restrictions are important. They are to be regulated for the whole Armed Forces by the Supreme Command of the Army (in cooperation with the other branches of the Armed Forces and Ausl./Abw). It will be advantageous to issue orders for transport to the West to as many Eastern units as possible and thereby to give rise to a new wave of rumors.
3. If the occasion arise, Operation _Merkur_ is to be utilized in the communications service by the preparation of the slogan: "Crete was the general try-out for the landing in Britain!"
4. OKW (WFSt/Section L) will shortly increase the deception by having several ministries concerned with preparations for Britain. This is to be utilized by Ausl./Abw. in the communications service (counterespionage).
5. _Political steps_ for the deception of Soviet Russia have been taken and are further being considered.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [signed] KEITEL. Certified a true copy [signature illegible] Captain.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 878-PS
SECRET [Stamp]
Draft Copy
Fuehrer Headquarters, the 12th Sept. 1941.
Armed Forces High Command Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept L (_IV/Gu_) Nr. 02041/41 geh. _Reference_: Jews in the newly occupied Eastern territories.
Isolated incidents render it necessary to refer to the directives issued for the conduct of troops in the USSR (Armed Forces High Command/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept L (IV/Gu) Nr. 44560/41, top Secret of 19 March 1941).
The fight against Bolshevism necessitates indiscriminate and energetic accomplishment of this task, especially also against the Jews, the main carriers of Bolshevism.
For such reasons, any cooperation of the Armed Forces with the Jewish population, who are openly or secretly anti-German in their attitude, as well as the use of single Jew in any preferred auxiliary position, will have to cease. Legitimations, which certify the use of Jews for purpose of the Armed Forces, may under no circumstances be issued by military offices. Exceptions are solely the use of Jews in especially combined labor units [Arbeitskolonnen], who may be employed under German supervision only.
It is requested, to inform the troops of this order.
The Chief of The Armed Forces High Command. [Signed] Keitel
Certified [signature not legible] Lt. Colonel d. G. _Distribution_: * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 886-PS
SECRET
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Enclosure to 32/41 g.Kdos. Chefs. WR. 1st Copy. Fuehrer headquarters, 13 May 1941 [Initialed] "J 10/5"
TOP SECRET
Decree for the conduct of courts-martial in the district
"BARBAROSSA" and for special measures of the troop
[written in ink]
The armed forces court-martial serves primarily the purpose of maintaining discipline.
The great expanse of the Eastern theatre of operations, the kind of warfare necessitated on that account, and the peculiarity of the opponent present tasks to the armed forces courts-martial which they can accomplish during the course of the war and until the first pacification of the conquered territory--being short staffed--only if the court-martial is limited to its main task.
This is only possible if the troop itself defends itself ruthlessly against any threat by the enemy civil population.
Accordingly, the following is decreed for the territory "Barbarossa" (theater of operation, rear army area and area of the political administration):
I
_Treatment of punishable offenses of enemy civilians_
1. Punishable offenses committed by enemy civilians do not, until further notice, come any more under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial and the summary courts-martial.
2. Guerillas are to be killed ruthlessly by the troops in battle or during pursuit.
3. Also all other attacks of enemy civilians against the Wehrmacht, its members and employees are to be fought by the troops at the place of the attack with the most extreme means until annihilation of the attacker.
4. In cases where measures of this kind were neglected or not immediately possible, elements suspected of offense will be brought at once before an officer. He decides whether they are to be shot.
Against villages from which the Wehrmacht was insidiously and maliciously attacked, collective punitive measures by force will be carried out immediately under command of an officer with the rank of at least a battalion commander, if the circumstances do not permit an immediate identification of individual perpetrators.
5. It is expressly prohibited to hold suspected perpetrators in order to transfer them to the courts upon reinstitution of their jurisdiction over civilians.
6. The commanders in chief of the army groups can, in conjunction with the competent commanders of the air force and the navy, restore the Wehrmacht jurisdiction over civilians in districts which are sufficiently pacified.
For the area of the political administration this decree is issued through the chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht [marginal ink correction inked out: C-n-C of army in agreement with C-i-C of other branches.]
II
_Treatment of punishable offenses of members of the Wehrmacht and its employees against the native population_
1. For offenses committed by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees against enemy civilians, prosecution is not compulsory, not even if the offense is at the same time a military crime or violation.
2. While judging offenses of this kind, it should be considered in every case, that the break-down in 1918, the time of suffering of the German people after that, and the numerous blood sacrifices of the movement in the battle against national socialism were decidedly due to the Bolshevist influence, and that no German has forgotten this.
3. The judge examines therefore whether in such cases disciplinary
## action is justified or whether it is necessary to take legal steps.
The judge orders the prosecution of offenses against civilians through court-martial only if it is considered necessary for the maintenance of discipline or the security of the troops. This applies, for instance, to cases of serious offenses which are based on sexual acts without restraint, which derive from a criminal tendency, or which are a sign that the troop threatens to mutiny. The punishable offenses of destroying senselessly quarters as well as supplies or other captured goods to the disadvantage of the own troop should, as a rule, be judged as more leniently.
The order of the inquiry proceedings requires in every individual case the signature of the judge.
Extreme care must be exercised when judging the authenticity of the statements of enemy civilians.
III
_Responsibility of the troop commanders_
The troop commanders are, within the sphere of their competence, _personally_ responsible for the following:
1. that all officers of the units subordinated to them are very thoroughly and promptly instructed about the fundamentals of I,
2. that their legal advisors be _promptly_ informed about these instructions and _about the verbal statements with which the political intentions of the leadership had been explained to the commanders-in-chief_,
3. that only such sentences will be confirmed which are in accord with the political intentions of the leadership.
IV
_Protection of secret_
After end of camouflage the decree is to be considered only as secret.
For the chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht-- Signed: KEITEL
Note [in pencil]: This should, if possible, not be passed on before 1 June 41.
Certified
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 910-PS
SECRET
Government of the Governor General Chief Department Administration of the Interior
1. During his presence, the Reichsfuehrer SS explained his plans for the transplantation of the population of the East to the Governor General in my presence. He declared that he was very anxious
a. that the historic German town center of Lublin should be completely renovated as soon as possible and be placed at the disposal of the German functionaries.
b. that the same should be done to the market-place of Zamose. Here too, the residential buildings should be put into a state appropriate for the reception of German families and be placed at the disposal of German functionaries and other German families present.
c. soon German peasant families from Transnistria should be settled in Zamose County. In order not to alarm the domestic population,
## particularly the peasant population, and hereby to impair the result
of the harvest, those German peasant families should be placed only on the country estates and the big holdings. Insofar as peasants from Transnistria do not come into consideration, the transplanting of small but suitable landowners from the German parts near Petrikan (Pietrikow) into Zamose County should also be considered. As in that county already some villages exist the inhabitants of which are doubtlessly of German origin, that way a German bulwark could be created in Zamose County.
If it is possible in some way these three measures Lublin, Zamose rural area and Zamose town district should be achieved even this year.
Cracow, 3.27.1942 Dr. S.H. 218,005
* * * * *
Government of the Governor General Chief Department: Administration of the Interior
CONFIDENTIAL
1. The Reichsfuehrer-SS spoke at the time of his presence on March 13 and 14 in Cracow in detail about the plans of settlement for the next few years and about the planned Germanization. Among other things, he took the view the Gorales, Lemkes and Hutzules whose Germanic origin, or at least Germanic mixture is indubitable, in his opinion should be Germanized in the course of time. To this purpose he recommended to begin in the schools of the territory in question by establishing the number of blond and blue-eyed pupils in proportion to the total number of pupils. Then, one should begin to grant them gradually more favorable living conditions, however on the condition that they have their children learn the German language and get acquainted with the German cultural values. Eventually, one can settle still other Germans in the territory of these three peoples later on.
In this connection it is thought that sometime the Germans from Zips in Slovakia should move over into the Government General. The Reichsfuehrer-SS developed further trains of ideas to the effect that in the first five-year plan for resettlement after the war, the new German Eastern territories should first be filled; afterwards it is intended to provide at this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German upperclass at least. Into the Government General, perhaps further German island settlement should be newly transplanted from European nations. An exact decision in this regard, however, has not been issued. In any case it is wished that at first a heavy colonization along the San and the Brig be achieved so that the parts of Poland are encircled with alien populations. Hitherto, it has been always proved that this kind of encirclement leads most quickly to the desired nationalization.
Cracow, March 30, 1942 Dr. S/H
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 957-PS
Copy
24. 2. 1940 Reich-Minister von Ribbentrop, Berlin. Foreign Office.
Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop,
Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Privy Councillor von Grundherr who will address you on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that Privy Councillor Grundherr states that the second installment [Rate] can be made available only after 8 days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second installment is given to him at once. With a longer absence of Reichsamtsleiter P.M. Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavourable.
Therefore I trust that it is in everybody's interest, if P.M. Scheidt goes back immediately.
Heil Hitler /s/ Rosenberg
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 997-PS
TOP SECRET
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery RK 504B top secret Berlin W 8 Voss-Strasse 6 2 August 1940 [stamp] at present Headquarters of the Fuehrer all mail is to be sent to the Berlin address [stamp] Rosenberg office Rec. No. 2133, 5 Aug 40
To Reichsleiter Rosenberg Foreign political office of the NSDAP Berlin W 35 Margarethenstrasse 17
Re: Report about Holland
Dear Party Member Rosenberg:
I have presented the report of July 19 of this year, given to me by Stabsleiter Schickedanz on July 23 of this year, to the Fuehrer, together with the report delivered by Reich Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart about the period from May 29 to July 19, 1940.
I am enclosing a copy of this last-mentioned report for your _confidential_ information and submit an opinion on it.
Heil Hitler Yours very respectfully Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
1. Report about the situation and developments in the occupied territories of the Netherlands
Period covered by this report: 29 May to 19 July, 1940.
_Commission and task._
With the nomination as Reich Commissioner the commission is given * * * in serving the interests of the Reich to secure public order and public life. * * * and the task is connected * * * to bind the Netherlands, which have to remain independent for the purpose of the preservation of Dutch Indies territory, as much as possible to the Reich economically, apart from military security measures.
This task is to be solved if we succeed in bringing about a political attitude which would make it possible for the economic ties of the Netherlands to the Reich to appear to be the emanation of the will of the Dutch people.
It will not be possible in every individual case to combine fulfillment of the given commission with the solution of the assigned task, for the interest of the occupation power demands the extensive suppression of all possible public activities, while in order to create and lead a formation of a political will it would be necessary to grant such freedoms as would for the Dutch, make the final result their own decision.
[Page 2]
_Situation._
The situation at the time the decree of the Fuehrer went into effect (29 May 1940) is characterized by the position of the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army and Navy (General Winkelmann). He exercised all power in the administration of the country, under the powers he had received in consideration of the state of siege and beyond that from the government and the queen who had fled, and he was considered by the people as a sort of viceroy. He issued orders, the Dutch Secretaries General (offices corresponding to our State Secretaries) executed their orders in the name of Winkelmann within administrative machinery unchanged in personnel and functioning perfectly.
Wherever Winkelmann appeared in public he received ovations.
The Dutch Army was in only slightly reduced mobilization strength under the command of their own officers (Winkelmann's Staff) in the barracks and camps. The occupation force was not seen often.
The behavior of the Dutch population--glad that the war is over, pleasantly surprised by the conduct of the German troops, though at first the circles hostile to the Germans kept themselves reserved--concealed the real attitude of the Dutch toward the Germans. The Dutch population for many years, especially since 1933, were stirred up by the emigrants, who were tolerated here as in no other country, against the Reich and National Socialism. The ability of forming their own political opinion is limited for the majority. Politics and administration are in the hands of a [page 3] small group (ruling families), whose ideas and attitude are liberal and influenced materially and ideologically by the west.
The real wages of the employed population are generally higher than in the Reich. About 500,000 unemployed from about 2,000,000 people capable of working in non-independent industry, trade, or business are being carried along with unemployment compensation up to 70% of simple wages, thanks to the riches of the Dutch Indies possessions, just as agriculture, struggling with sales and price difficulties, is supported almost entirely by state subsidies.
The Dutch people are caught in political stagnation as well as in economic immobility. In spite of a good external impression (racial appearance, cleanliness of the buildings and gardens, etc.) one can observe extensive biological and even moral damage, such as unexpected uncleanliness among the unemployed and the country population in the Calvinistic districts, poor physical constitution, exclusive interest in material matters, and so on. The people are widely split confessionally and within the confessional groups bound and influenced by all kinds of activities (from political organizations to chess clubs).
The Royal House of Orange lives on the prestige won in the battles for freedom and is considered by the group oriented materially as in the west [page 4] (big businessmen, financiers, industrialists, higher officials, and court nobility) as a guarantee for their political predominance and economic positions. Additional motives, based on national conviction, for bourgeois the devotion of the Dutch people to the royal family which is more a matter of habit, cannot be found, unless they think by clinging to the royal family to banish the fear of being overwhelmed by the Reich.
There was no real opposition against the system among the representative bodies of the parliament. In the second chamber there were 4 NSB men among 100 Deputies; Fascist and National Socialist ideas, especially the latter--are tabooed, are considered evidence of being uneducated, and are now branded as the sentiments of traitors. There are concrete indications that NSB were in the uniform of Dutch soldiers intervened in support of the invading troops of the Reich.
In Dutch political life there are almost no personalities of any importance. Somewhat outstanding from the average is the 71 year old Colijn--although his basic character is domineering and energetic, he is completely bound up with western-liberal views and as a decided Calvinist he cannot be won for any National Socialist ideas. Noteworthy is his desire for importance, which might induce him to make a political deal with the occupation power, in which he might be conceited enough to think that he could outwit us and keep a distance from the Reich with the help of the House of Orange.
[Page 5]
The system parties--that is, the Catholic State Party, the Christian People's Party (reformed), the Anti-Revolutionists (Calvinists, descendants of the revolutionary Gueux), the Social Democrats, the Democrats, etc., were entirely undisturbed as far as their party organizations, trade unions, press, etc., were concerned, and their
## activities were only partly restricted by the state of siege. Apart
from a strong horror propaganda against the NSB people, the political factors and the greater part of the population were just biding their time.
The Rightist Parties, especially the NSB, were numerically an unimportant minority, against whom as a matter of course an arrogant rejection prevailed among the intellectuals, the capitalists, and also among the greater part of the officers' corps. This attitude, strengthened by the charge of treason, was carried over to the rest of the population. Of leading men among the Rightists the following are to be mentioned within the framework of the NSB:
Mussert: A liberal nationalist attempting to use Fascist methods, who is in the end afraid of the greater German Reich. His political qualities are not as great as those of an average Gauleiter in the Reich. In the Netherlands he plays a not inconsiderable role with them.
Rost van Tonningen: Ideologically perfectly adequate, adjusted to the Germanic idea and National Socialism, a temperamental and effective speaker yearning [page 6] for activity, does not find his strength in himself but tries to get support and steadiness from third persons.
Count Ansembourg: No outspoken personality, positively valuable in spite of his obligation of creed (Catholic), he is more a tactician and diplomatic mediator.
Geikerken: The representative of Mussert, with strong Walloon mixture, he is certainly a determined opponent of the system with reservations toward the Greater German Reich.
Woudenberg: Representing labor in the NSB, he is the type of a union man without special initiative but with common sense and confidence-inspiring simplicity.
Some younger men, such as Feldmeyer, Zondervan, and others, are--even according to the standards of the party within the Reich--types of absolutely good leaders of the rank and file. Special attention is due Arnold Meijer, the leader of the Black Front, a Catholic Fascist group, who has his followers in the southern parts, Brabant and Limburg, is without doubt bound to Catholism but strictly opposed to the liberal democratic course and is above all opposed to the political influence of the representatives of the Protestant North (Colijn, etc.).
The economic situation was nowhere threatening; supplies of all kinds available in abundance, only the traffic has been largely interrupted by the blowing up of bridges and the consequent shifting of the canals, which handle 70% of the total traffic; sea traffic has been stopped entirely. The [page 7] agricultural improvement economy, dependent on the import of disproportionately large quantities of fodder, possesses supplies sufficient until the gathering of the next harvest.
It is the almost unanimous opinion of the Dutch that they were unjustly attacked by the Germans. The charges of violation of neutrality as reported by the communique of the High Command of the Armed Forces are not known to the population or if known are rejected as justification. A certain impression is made by pointing out that on the soil of the Netherlands, with the cooperation of high Dutch officials, an attack on the life of the Fuehrer was prepared. It is also admitted that it was at least unwise and probably unjust, too, that the emigrants from the Reich in the Netherlands and the Dutch press were allowed to give news to their fury against the Reich and the National Socialist in such an unqualified form.
_Measures._
In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first to remove Winkelmann's influence. This was done by expressly advising the Secretaries General that they now have to accept orders only from the Reich commissioner, which they accepted explicitly. The institution of the Secretaries General as well as the persons themselves were retained, since it had to be considered improbable in case of their resignation to find Dutchmen--among the Rightists there are almost no suitable persons at all--who would have taken over the administration. It seemed politically necessary, however, that some measures, especially economic ones [page 8] but indirectly also police ones, had to be taken, carrying the signatures of the Netherlands Secretaries General, for the Dutch people. The attempt of one of the Secretaries General to call on Winkelmann as authority--in the question of the continuation of the work in armament plants for the German Armed Forces--was answered with the immediate dismissal of that Secretary General. Winkelmann had to admit in a public declaration that he had only to execute the demobilization under the command of the Commander of the Armed Forces, but that otherwise he had nothing to say. This acknowledgment as well as the fact that he publicly dropped a Secretary General reduced Winkelmann's influence considerably. Finally he could be quietly made a prisoner of war in connection with the known events of June 29.
In order to execute the given commission, an administrative body as small as possible was set up, divided into four working fields of the commissioners-general. The individual specialists of these commissioners-general, as for instance the ones for finance, justice, etc., are sitting as liaison men in the respective Dutch ministries. Importance was attached to an immediate and clear distribution of competences and determination of the performance of the work, because of the Dutch people, being very formal and casuistic by nature, need such a determination. This distribution has proved its worth so far, as there has been no friction either within the administrative machinery or with the Dutch authorities for reasons of organization.
[Page 9]
Commissioners are provided for the provinces, which have extensive autonomy. We hesitated to create this office, as it was necessary first to investigate conditions. Now it is seen that for this office politically experienced men were needed rather than administration officials. Therefore, through Reich Office Director Schmidt we requested from Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess staff) some men who, almost entirely members of the party, are on their way here and can be put into office in the provinces in a few days.
It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a large number of economic but also police measures had to be taken, the first ones of which had the purpose of reducing the consumption of the population in order to get supplies for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. In consideration of the assigned task, we had to endeavor to see to it that all these measures carried the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries-General to take all the necessary measures by means of ordinances.
As a matter of fact, up to today almost all orders concerning the seizure of supplies and their distribution to the population and decrees about restrictions in the formation of public opinion have been issued but also agreements concerning the transport of extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have [page 10] been made, all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were told in the first conversation that loyal cooperation was expected of them, but it would be their privilege to resign if something should be ordered which they felt they could not endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General has made use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that they have complied with all requests of their own free will.
Almost the entire seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have been executed, at least all the respective orders have been issued and are being executed.
A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of agriculture have been issued and are being executed; essentially it is a question of seeing to it that the available fodder is used in such a way that as large a stock as possible of horned cattle is carried over into the next farming period, about 80% at the expense of the over-dimensional stock of chickens and hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the organization of traffic and the principles for the regulation of gasoline as in the Reich were carried out here.
Restricting the right to quit jobs as well as to cancel leases have been issued in order to check the liberal-capitalistic customs of the Dutch employers [page 11] and to avoid unrest. In the same way, the period for repayment of debts have been extended under certain conditions.
Ordinances concerning news service, radio, etc., prohibit listening to foreign radio stations and introduce all other restrictions necessary in this field for defense reasons. The ordinance about registration and control of enemy property as well as about confiscation of the property of persons who act hostile to the Reich and to Germans were in this case issued in the name of the Reich commissioner. On the basis of this ordinance an administrator for the property of the royal family has already been appointed.
The supplies of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent of the General Field Marshal, distributed according to this system: the Dutch keep enough raw materials to maintain their economy for half a year, whereby they receive the same distribution quotas as in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is being used in the supply of food, etc. This enabled us to secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half of the amount which the Reich lacks.
The bank moratorium could be canceled, bank deposits are increasing, the stock exchange has been reopened to a limited extent. Bills concerning the control of foreign currencies have been introduced according to the standards in the Reich.
Finally it was achieved that the Dutch state makes available in sufficient quantities all means needed by the Reich, including the German administration so that these expenses do not burden the Reich budget in any way.
[Page 12]
A sum of guilders has been liquidated to redeem the fiduciary monetary tender to the amount of about 36 million, further 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army, especially the extension of the airports; further 50 million for raising the raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, insofar as they are not booty; further for unrestricted transfer to guarantee the remittance of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the Reich to their families, etc. Finally the rate of exchange of the fiduciary monetary tender, set at first by the army high command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33 RM.
Above all, however, it was possible to get the consent of the president of the bank of the Netherlands, Trip, to a measure suggested by Commissioner General Fischboeck and approved by the General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation of accepting each other's currencies, that means that the Bank of the Netherlands is bound to take over any amount of Marks offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to make available Dutch guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 RM is 75 cents. Only the Reich bank has control over this, not the Bank of the Netherlands, which will be notified only about the individual transactions. This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings made hitherto with the political economies of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step toward a currency union.
In consideration of this significance of the agreements, which already touches the independence of the Dutch State, it is of special weight that the [page 13] president of the Bank, Trip, who is unusually well-known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense.
Furthermore, military jurisdiction was introduced, and at present German criminal jurisdiction is being set up; for special cases not only the Special Court but also SS and Police jurisdiction have been provided for as substitutes for court-martial jurisdiction, which was not introduced. Subject to German criminal jurisdiction are: all citizens of the Reich or the Protectorate without restriction and all Dutch citizens and aliens in cases of crimes against the honor and security of the Reich, the Armed Forces, etc.
The experiences with the Dutch officials show that these people, like all Dutchmen, are basically difficult. One has to negotiate with them very much; if they say no, it does not mean definitely no, if they say yes they still think the matter over for a long time, but in the end they will do as one wants them to. Besides, they want someone else to carry the responsibility; since the Dutch still do not really believe that England, which for centuries was the overwhelming power in Europe, is finally eliminated from the continent, in many cases they want a direct order which they then obey, so that one day they will be able to refer to this pressure. In general, however, one cannot complain about the behavior of the officials in the execution of the administration. One cannot say that the officials are delaying any vital work. For instance, in restoring traffic routes, especially in clearing canals, the respective ministry worked extremely to the purpose and fast. In the fields, however, entirely liberal methods and principles prevail.
The Police itself is much split and is subordinated in the most important parts to the ministry of justice and not to the ministry of the Interior. The special troops, the motorized and mounted units, are relatively good, the Marechaussee, a sort of troop gendarmerie, is very good. Among the latter we have already won some agents in the higher ranks which makes probable a further extension in a sense favorable to us.
The Marechaussee will therefore be brought to a correspondingly high standard by selected non-commissioned officers of the army and will be the backbone of the executive.
The dismissal of two mayors (in the Hague and in the provincial capital of Zwolle) had an extraordinary effect. The moment will come when it will be possible to exchange some of the Secretaries General and possibly also other officials, but in any case mayors.
Concerning the right of assembly and association, we introduced the obligation of giving notice. The interdiction comes from the public prosecutors of the court of appeals (Subordination of the Police to the Justice) who are working almost without complaint under the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. The states-general were eliminated from public representative bodies; the provincial states and the town councils were kept for the time being, but they are under the supervision of the provincial commissioner. Politics in these is not tolerated for the present. The reconstruction of the country--except in Rotterdam, Middelburg, and Rehnen the devastation is not very extensive--was placed in the foreground of a visit to Middelburg the importance of the preservation of historic monuments as an expression of the will for formation of a people has been emphasized, and the social side of such
## action stressed by raising a fund for reconstruction. In the handling
of this reconstruction fund the reactionary spirit of the Dutch administration is especially evident.
It is necessary to give special attention to the reconstruction of Rotterdam. Rotterdam, thanks to its position at the mouth of the Rhine, the possibility for sea-going vessels to sail far inland, and the harbor conditions, which are in every respect favorable, is doubtless a place which disposes of the best natural port facilities in Central Europe, which can even be increased by the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, as its sphere of action will reach from Rotterdam to Constanta. With regard to developments in the more distant future one must consider whether one should not exercise influence on the reconstruction of Rotterdam in such a way that the city with this unique opportunity for construction should receive the imprint of a big sea-port of the Germanic area. The demobilization of the Dutch Army, which has now finally been accomplished, was carried out without complaints. The officers and men not taken over into other occupations were transferred, with the exception of the higher ranks, to construction service. This is to be the basis for a future Labor Service. It is led by the Dutch Major Breunesse, who has long been in contact with the men of the Reich Labor Service in the Reich (Mueller-Brandenburg) and has always taken the part of the Reich. The impression this man makes is an excellent one, at present decidedly non-political, as is usual among officers, [page 16] ideologically all right. It is assumed that within three to six months the present construction service can be liquidated, that is, the men will be inducted into economic operations and there will be a basis for a real Labor Service. The organization is already being built up with the co-operation of the head of the Reich Labor Service, Hierl.
The extremely ramified and numerous Dutch press has not been submitted to a preliminary censorship, as that would have destroyed all press life immediately. By holding press conferences under the supervision of Schmidt the big press is managed well and successfully. The danger of some slips, becoming more and more rare, was accepted in view of the necessity of keeping the press alive. Circulation is falling off, however--a not unusual phenomenon, which has the advantage, though, that the newspapers get into difficulties and can therefore be folded up or taken out of the hands of the present owners. The NSB press is already completely available, there is a personal influence at the Telegraph and within the next few days the entire S.D.P. Press is going to be taken over in connection with a corresponding political
## action which is already underway. The German newspaper has reached a
circulation of 30,000. About half of the subscribers are Dutch. A quite extensive press front is therefore available.
From the point of view of the occupation power the present development can be considered satisfactory. The supplies for the occupation army are being delivered, the work, etc., is being done in order, and there are almost no cases of sabotage. There is [page 17] no need at all to fear active resistance by the population. There are, however, signs of rather extensive espionage, at any rate there is contact with England, probably by short-wave radio. In this respect there is close cooperation between the Counter-Intelligence posts of the Armed Forces and the Security Police posts, since it seems necessary to ascertain such cases as soon as possible and to punish them exemplarily (death sentences).
Concerning the political developments in regard to the assigned task, I have the following to say: The Dutch have stepped out of their political reserve. Disregarding the continued or rather increased animosity among the circles which heretofore formed political interest for the Reich is increasing. It is noteworthy in this connection that the former opponents, insofar as they are beginning to change their opinion, want to establish contact not with the N.S.B. but rather directly with the N.S.D.A.P. and the Reich. A conversation with Colijn, who thereupon wrote a pamphlet, did much to help overcome the reserve. The main points of this pamphlet are summarized in the statement that in Continental Europe, England has doubtless been eliminated by the Reich and that the Reich will lead this continental Europe. The Netherlands must adjust itself to that fact if they hope, in closest economic cooperation with the Reich, to retain their independence in clinging to the House of Orange. This attitude of Colijn has had a very great effect, as it was the cue for Protestant and especially Calvinist circles to discuss the new situation, whereby Colijn's statement on the importance of the Reich was considered as an authoritative declaration, but his [page 18] conclusions were subjected to lively criticism. Colijn later in his newspaper (Standard) questioned the correctness of a document of the last White Book. The Standard was thereupon banned for 8 weeks and Colijn got a warning. At the moment he is designated not only by the N.S.B. but also by the group of Arnold Meijers as a worn-out politician who himself has to take the blame for developments, and he is holding back. His importance is not actual but potential.
At the moment many efforts toward concentration are to be noted, which make it their task to appear as partners in a contract with the Reich. The attempt of the system parties to regain influence through Colijn has been, at least for the moment, rejected by the public. His place was taken by a group of the commissioners of the province of Groningen Lindhorst-Homann and of the Catholic politician De Quai. They presented a proclamation to Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt. He refused to authorize it and pointed out that a profession of loyalty to the House of Orange could not be tolerated by the occupation power. This group was confused thereby and lost much of its prestige among the people, which had not been too great, anyway.
Right now a political action against the K.P. (Communist party) and the S.D.P. (Social Democrat Party) is in progress. The K.P. does not exercise any activity, the S.D.P. has its main support in the free trade unions. The heads of these free unions have now been dismissed and the above-mentioned Woudenberg has been appointed provisional head. This reorganization took place--as far as we can see--[page 19] without complaint and the former functionaries offered their cooperation willingly. In direct connection with this action the political organizations of the Communist and Social Democrat parties are being subordinated to Rost Van Tonningen as liquidation commissioner, who has orders to liquidate the K.P. entirely and to transfer its funds to the assets of the S.D.P., which are administered by him. By taking over the leadership of the free unions and the SDP organizations, especially its press, we gained a broad basis political influence on the Dutch people, for this party represented 20 to 22% of the Dutch population.
Arrangements have been made with the N.S.B., according to which the organizations corresponding to the SA and the SS, as well as the youth organization will be built up. It will be of special importance that through the disciplined marching of these organizations an appropriate impression is made, especially on the working classes but also on the rest of the Dutch population.
Aside from these arrangements in the political field we have now begun gathering together pro-German and obliging circles in the field of economy especially agriculture, culture, art, and science, first in a loose social form in order to create a circle of friends of the new Germany or the new Europe, who will gradually become the carriers of opinion and will in the corresponding fields. The first step has been taken successfully in the field of the press. Under the leadership of Prof. De Gudewagen a sort of press committee has been formed, to which the right-thinking press people belong. After initial reluctance, today all the journalists of the Netherlands are aspiring to this association, in which the press people hostile in the past [page 20] toward the Reich are not accepted even if they are considered especially leading.
The attempt is made to establish contact with the Dutch Indies. There are daily radio broadcasts on the regular wave length, bringing reports from the homeland, even news about individual persons and families, so that we can assume that in time the Dutch people in the Dutch Indies will tune their radios to this wave length.
It can already be said today with some confidence that it is only a question of time until the Dutch people can be won also in their political formation of will for a program of a close connection of the independent Netherlands and the Dutch Indies with the Reich (union of currency and economy). The decision boils down to the question of the monarchy. In that question it has gone so far that some leading people already realize that Queen Wilhelmina is opposed to this development and that Crown Princess Juliana is also rather out of the question on account of her marriage with Biesterfeld. The royalists therefore now speak only of holding to the house of Orange, and individual voices are already heard advocating the appointment of a regent to take care of affairs until the question of the monarchy is ripe for a final decision.
Any manifestations for the Queen or for the House of Orange, which is represented only by Crown Princess Juliana, who is married to Biesterfeld, will no longer be tolerated, with the explanation that the Queen persistently remains in the ranks of the enemy and does not oppose the British air-raids on the Netherlands. From the view point of the occupation power a manifestation for the Queen must be considered in the same light as a manifestation for Churchill, for example. [Page 21] This point of view will be enforced with increasing severity. Since the Queen apparently hopes to be supported by Dutch Indies circles, there is danger that this legitimistic attitude could lead to a break between the Netherlands and the Dutch Indies. The Dutch people show increasing understanding for these arguments, and there is really no longer any doubt that the Dutch, at least in Europe, are ready to renounce the Queen and probably also the crown princess, if the Reich could offer them a guarantee that the Dutch Indies will be kept by the Dutch even against possible endeavors of the United States or Japan.
In this connection the possibility should be discussed of transferring the province of Zeeland to a new territorial formation around Antwerp and the province of Limburg to a new Gau-division. In this regard it must be mentioned that such a transfer at this moment would probably destroy all prospects of a political solution. That is certainly true of Zeeland. The people living here are really of Frisian origin and have nothing in common with the population around Antwerp. In the post-war period of 1918-20 they were strongly opposed to an incorporation into Belgium. It could even be used as a pressure on the Netherlands to reach a currency and economy union if we demand the cession of Zeeland as the economic passage area for the port of Antwerp. The Dutch people will certainly be ready to agree to a far-reaching economic union if in return they can retain politically the province of Zeeland.
[Page 22]
_Statements._
In conclusion it is stated that--
1. Order and security are perfectly secured.
2. The administration is at present sufficiently and for the future increasingly under the direction and control of the German authorities.
3. Economy and traffic have been set going and converted to war conditions, plans for a large-scale transformation to continental economy have been started, the preparation for it is almost universal, the supplies of the country have been conducted into the war economy of the Reich, the financial sources for it have been widely opened up and joined with the management of the Reich, all on the basis of extensive cooperation of the Dutch.
4. The necessity of deviating from the democratic party system is becoming more and more the general opinion. The endeavor to get into a close friendly relationship with the Reich is increasing. That the question of the House of Orange arises in this connection is becoming more and more evident. The fate of the Dutch Indies is more significant, however.
If we succeed in retaining the people belonging to the free trade unions and to the SDP organizations, and if the NSB makes a further progress, one-fourth to one-third of the Dutch people will in well-organized form be going the same road as the Reich, whereas the other groups will be split and undecided. Moreover, the workers and farmers--the latter, if the worst comes to the worst [Page 23] by the suggestion of the idea of agrarian reform, for almost half of the farmland is divided into small tenant farms--will only gain from a union with the Reich. The labor service is being used for ideological training, and the intellectual circles are being used in social form as needed. The question, in what way the political opinion which is being formed can be used, remains open. The answer depends partly on the conditions of the moment.
Signed: SEYSS-INQUART
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 998-PS
GERMAN CRIMES AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czechoslovak Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal, established according to the Agreement of the Four Great Powers of August 8th, 1945. London, September, 1945. Excerpts from pages 9 to 18.
* * * * *
The Criminal Plan
(4) _The Chief Instrument: The Sudeten-German Henlein Movement_
(a) _Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei_ (DNSAP).
Fundamental parts of the national socialist ideology derived from the Czechoslovak Germans Knirsch, Krebs and Jung who, in Bohemia in May 1918, had reconstituted the German National Socialist Workers' Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei--DNSAP). Hitler's party to come was the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei NSDAP.
In permanent contact with the National Socialists of the Reich, the German National Socialists in Czechoslovakia founded an organization called "Volksport" (People's Sport) for youth over 21, modeled exactly on the Storm Troops (S.A.) of the Reich.
Headstrong youths of the "Volksport" sailed nearest the wind. In 1932, its student ringleaders were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and sentenced for conspiring against the Republic, for having openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's programme, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Great German State.
This incident was greatly exploited against the so-called Activists (German parties cooperating with the Czechs), who were accused of complacence to the Czechs and failure to vindicate German rights. It coincided with Hitler's accession to power.
Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. This caused in German press and radio an outburst of violent threats against Czechoslovakia.
For a year the Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia was continued but underground.
(b) _Deutsche Heimatfront._
On October 1st, 1934, Konrad Henlein, the "unpolitical" gymnastic instructor of the German Gymnastic Federation [Turnverband] of the Republic, established the "German Home Front" [Deutsche Heimatfront]. He denied any relation to the late German National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia and any connection of the "German Home Front" with the Nazi Party in Germany as well. He even refused to organize the German Home Front on party lines, although he built it up on the basis of the Nazi "Fuehrerprinzip" (principle of leadership), and himself became the "Fuehrer" of the "Heimatfront." But he attempted a camouflage: he rejected pan-Germanism, he insisted that Fascism and Nazism alike lost their natural "raison d'etre" at the Czechoslovak frontiers; he declared himself against the revision of the Versailles Treaty, he professed the unconditional respect for individual rights and liberties, he argued with great fervour that loyalty of the "Sudeten Germans" to the German nation and at the same time to the Czechoslovak State were not mutually exclusive.
(c) _The "Sudetendeutsche Partei"_ (SDP).
The Czechoslovak election system is based on Party representation. Henlein, therefore, changed the German Home Front into the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (Sudeten Germans' Party), for the purpose of
## participation in the General Elections of May 1935 for the National
Assembly.
Economic distress owing to the trade crisis increased the susceptibility of the German population in Czechoslovakia for the new German Messiah and Henlein won a resounding victory over all other German parties.
When the election results were made known--the Henleinists won 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the National Assembly--Henlein sent a loyalty telegram to President Masaryk.
(5) _The Policy and Tactics of the "Sudetendeutsche Partei."_
(a) _1935-1936: Still "for Democracy."_
Henlein continued to present himself as a friend of democracy especially in London where he lectured in 1935 at Chatham House in the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He stated there that he refused the totalitarian principle and that he was in favor of "an honest democracy." "We want a democracy such as is recommended by Masaryk," he emphasized. He denied "Nazism" or "Hitlerism" to be a doctrine "suitable for exportation," he rejected anti-Semitism.
(b) _1937: For complete Autonomy of Sudeten Germans but still within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic._
In 1937 Henlein struck a somewhat shriller note than before demanding, without defining "complete Sudeten autonomy." The "Sudetendeutsche Partei" laid draft proposals before Parliament amounting to little short of creating a state within a state. The whole document, though moderately worded, was already based on totalitarian principles.
(c) _1938: For Nazism and for Incorporation of the Sudeten Areas into the German Reich._
After the occupation of Austria (March 1938) the Henleinists openly jubilated. Nearly all German "Activist parties" were now stampeded into the Henlein camp leaving the fight against the "Sudentendeutsche Partei" only to the German Social Democrats and Communists. The terrorism of the Henleinists increased. They intensified their campaign against "Bolshevism." Open anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press.
On April 24th, 1938, Henlein came into the open with his "Karlsbad Programme," set forth in his speech made to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary. In every line of it could be heard not so much Herr Henlein himself as his master's voice. In the Karlsbad Programme among others the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess "German political philosophy" in other words, National Socialism, was claimed.
In May 1938, Henlein visited Hitler in Berlin and after obtaining his master's instructions was back in London at his old game of intriguing against the Czechoslovak Republic.
The Local Government elections in May 1938--well prepared by the Henleinists by vast propaganda, opened terrorism, unscrupulous using of money, bribery of electors, etc.,--showed 80-90% of votes for Henlein. So almost the whole German population stood behind Henlein.
The Czech Government continued to negotiate with Henlein, but on September 14th,--two days before Hitler fulminated in his Nurnberg speech against "this Benes" and accused him of "torturing" and planning the "extermination" of the Sudeten Germans--he threw off his mask, fled to the Reich declaring on the wireless: "We want to go home to the Reich," and denouncing "the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague."
K.H. Frank, interrogated by Colonel Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at Wiesbaden, stated that the slogan "Heim ins Reich" (Homewards to the Reich) was backed by 90% of the Sudeten Germans.
Few people knew before that Henlein went on Hitler's pay roll already in 1933.
(d) _"Sudetendeutsche Partei" changed into a Nazi Party._
After Munich the "Sudetendeutsche Partei," in the areas ceded to Germany, entered as a whole into the Reich's Nazi Party. In the not yet occupied parts of the Republic, the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" constituted itself as "Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei" (German Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia).
After the total occupation (March 15th, 1939) of Bohemia and Moravia this party too became part of the Reich Nazi Party. (About their
## activity after Munich see Section 7.)
(e) _Henlein's Admission._
In a speech made on March 4th, 1941, in Vienna, published in official Nazi papers, Henlein stated: "In order to protect ourselves against Czech interference, we were compelled to lie and to deny our allegiance to the National Socialist cause. We should have preferred advocating National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether in doing so, we would have been able to perform the task of destroying Czechoslovakia."
(6) _System and Methods of Nazi Pre-War Infiltration._
(a) _Seeds of Discord._
The Nazi Party's study and research groups had long been instructed not only to establish close cooperation with the German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic, but also to win over adherents from the Slovak autonomist opposition. Long before the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, Nazi circles were not only in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile (most of whom were directly employed by the Hungarian irredentists), but also tried to establish contacts in the organizational machinery of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples' Party (the Slovak Catholic Peoples' Party of the late Monsignor Andrew Hlinka). When the traitor Bela Tuka (later to become Prime Minister of "independent" Slovakia) was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established the Nazi connections with him.
The Nazi Party had paid agents among the higher staff of the Hlinka Party. Their task was to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the slovak parties in the Government of Prague.
K.H. Frank, interrogated by Col. Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at Wiesbaden, confirmed the close cooperation between the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (Sudeten German Party, headed by Konrad Henlein; details see Sections 4 and 5) with the Slovakian Peoples' Party.
(b) _Espionage._
Military espionage was conducted by members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. The Republic had to amend in 1936 the "Act for Protection of the Republic" of 1923 to cope with the widespread treason
## activity of the Henleinists and of the Reich Germans from beyond the
frontier.
Plans of Henleinists discovered by the police showed that the Henlein Nazis had, in every district, compiled lists of all German democrats, socialists and communists as well as of Czechs of all parties, and were planning to round up and arrest them on the anticipated arrival of the Reichswehr.
(c) _Murder, terrorism, anti-Semitism._
The Nazis from the Reich sent directly to Czechoslovakia their terrorists and murderers; thus the anti-Nazis, Professor Theodor Lessing and Ing. Formis who escaped after 1933 from Germany and were given refuge in Czechoslovakia, were murdered in Czechoslovakia by Nazi agents, Lessing in 1933 and Formis in 1935. The Nazis from the Reich sent their Gestapo into the border districts to drag Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. They also sent money and arms to the Henleinists who time and again provoked incidents in order just to keep permanent unrest. They attacked gendarmes, customs officers and other State officials who time and again suffered casualties. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and in several cases murdered political foes.
Anti-semitic propaganda was carried through in the Henlein press and boycott set in against Jewish lawyers, doctors, tradesmen, shops, etc.
(d) _Propaganda._
Disruptive propaganda came from Germany especially through the German broadcasts. Dr. Goebbels launched "The-Nest-of-Bolshevism" campaign against Czechoslovakia and the lie of "Russian-troops-and-airplanes-in-Prague," etc. The Nazis from the Reich directed the whispering propaganda of the Henleinists, thus maintaining a permanent state of high tension in the war of nerves.
The Henleinists spread more or less openly the Nazi ideology among the German population through their press and publications and smuggled illegal Nazi literature into the border regions from Germany.
(e) _Headquarters in Germany._
The Nazis entertained in Stuttgart the "Ausland-Organisation der NSDAP" for German propaganda in other countries in cooperation with the German population of those countries. This organization was headed by Gauleiter Bohle, who had the task of administering the "Gau Ausland" (district: foreign countries). A comprehensive system with scientific methods of penetration was worked out. In Czechoslovakia the tool of German infiltration through Fifth Columns was the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (see Sections 4 and 5).
(f) _Nazification of German Institutions in the Czechoslovak Republic._
The Henleinists penetrated systematically step by step into the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia.
All institutions underwent gradually "Gleichschaltung," i.e., the prevailing domination of all Associations, social and cultural centres, etc., by the Henleinists. Sport societies, football, light athletics, rowing clubs, etc., were "conquered," just as associations of ex-service men, choral societies or associations for diet reform.
Nearly all theatres in German parts of Czechoslovakia were "conquered" by the Nazis, and all German orchestras as well.
It goes without saying that the Henleinists were greatly interested in penetrating into as many economic institutions as possible and to bring over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, commercial firms, etc. In cases of Jewish owners or directors they tried to secure the cooperation of possibly the whole clerical and technical staff of the respective institutions.
(g) _Orders from Berlin._
The Henleinists entertained permanent contact with their German masters.
Attendance of Sudeten Germans at Reich German celebrations, Saengerfeste (Choral Festivals), Gymnastic Shows and Assemblies, the Leipzig Fair, etc., were often the pretext for organized meetings to instruct the native Fifth Columnists and to inspire their activity.
Whenever Hitler, in his War of Nerves against Czechoslovakia, needed incidents, the Henleinists supplied them promptly.
As one instance of many we quote Sir Nevile Henderson who reports in his book "Failure of a Mission," London, April 1940, the meeting of Chamberlain and Hitler in Berchtesgaden on September 15th, 1938:
* * * there was a constant influx of German Press telegrams about incidents in the Sudeten lands. One, I remember, reported that forty Germans had been killed in a clash somewhere with Czech gendarmes. A British observer, of whom there were already a number in Czechoslovakia, and who was immediately sent to verify the facts of the case, subsequently ascertained that there had, in fact, been one death.
Henderson adds that it was a typical example of the method of exaggeration and actual falsification of news.
(7) _Intensified Activity of the Henlein Nazis after Munich._
After Munich Henlein's deputy Kundt became the leader of the German minority still left inside the mutilated Republic and created unscrupulously as many artificial "focal points of German culture" as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague, and to make it a centre of aggressive Nazism. The post-Munich government had to allow the German minority in Prague and other Czech parts of the country "to develop freely in conformity with the Nazi theories and not to prohibit its political activity."
It goes without saying that that "political activity" pursued only the aim to undermine and to weaken the Czechs' resistance against the commands from Germany.
The Henleinists cooperated with the Gestapo from the Reich infiltrating into the Republic.
The press was, via facti, subjected to censorship exercised by Germans.
German civil servants who, before Munich, had become members of the SDP, attained dominating influence in their positions and assisted the Nazi infiltration into Czechoslovak public and private institutions.
(8) _Conclusion._
The separation of "Sudetengebiet" was the death blow for the economic independence of Czechoslovakia. The frontiers imposed on her by the Agreement of Munich and Vienna cut her railway lines at many places, thus making impossible any strategic defence of the mutilated country, which soon fell a victim to the German aggression.
Henlein's Fifth Columns in Czechoslovakia as described above, had their big part in assisting Hitler to achieve his aim.
As Henlein put it (see Section 5, (e)): "We should have preferred advocating National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether in doing so we would have been able to perform the task of destroying Czechoslovakia."
* * * * *
II. DESTRUCTION OF CZECH CULTURAL LIFE
Par. 5. Religious Persecution.
(c) _Protestant Churches._
[Page 62]
Reference to Hus, Zizka, and the Hussites and their achievements as well as to Masaryk and his Legions were strictly prohibited, even the religious text books were changed. Church leaders were especially persecuted, scores of ministers were imprisoned in concentration camps, among them the General Secretary of the Students' Christian Movement in Czechoslovakia. One of the vice-Presidents was executed.
Protestant Institutions such as the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. were suppressed throughout the country.
Among the murdered Czech ministers was a pastor of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church, who was killed with his wife among the hostages executed for the assassination of Heydrich.
The leading Theological School for all Evangelical denominations, Hus Faculty in Prague and all other Protestant training schools for the ministry were closed down in November 1939, with the other Czech universities and colleges.
(d) _Czech Orthodox Church._
The hardest blow was directed against the Czech Orthodox Church. The Orthodox churches in Czechoslovakia were ordered by the Berlin Ministry of Church Affairs to leave the Pontificat of Belgrade and Constantinople respectively and to become subordinate to the Berlin Bishop. The Czech Bishop Gorazd was executed together with two other priests of the Orthodox Church. By a special order of the Protector Daluege, issued in September 1942, the Orthodox Church of Serbian Constantinople jurisdiction was completely dissolved in the Czech lands, its religious activity forbidden and its property confiscated.
All Evangelical education was handed over to the civil authorities and many Evangelical teachers lost their employment; moreover the State grant to salaries of many Evangelical priests was taken away.
(e) _Jews._
The racial persecution of the Jews is dealt with separately (Section IV).
In connection with religious persecutions, we may mention the statement of K.H. Frank, made on June 11, 1945 when interrogated by Col. Dr. Ecer at Wiesbaden. Frank stated that in November 1938 the Jewish places of worship in the "Sudeten" province were torn down by express order of the Party, i.e. the Party Chancellery of Munich at the head of which at that time was Rudolf Hess, and in the autumn of 1941 it was Heydrich who ordered all synagogues to be closed, because "they had served as meeting places for aggressive Jewish elements." Many synagogues were demolished, others transformed into marketing halls or into auction halls for the sale of confiscated Jewish furniture and household goods.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1012-PS
Copy
SSD--TELEGRAM
Anna 4873 3 February 42 1650
SECRET
To the Military Commander of France Attention of Infantry General Von Stuelpnagel, Paris. Reference: Telegram of 1 Jan. 1942.
General Field Marshal _Keitel_, after a conference with the Fuehrer, refuses to consider the plan of sole judging and arbitrary final decision for measures in cases of assault and acts of violence with explosives which was proposed from there as long as the measures which are proposed from there do not take into consideration in their type and magnitude the fundamental attitude of the Fuehrer for assaults and violent acts with explosives which have been reported since Jan. 15, and which have not yet been clarified but are on the increase. Sharp and deterring punishment must be instituted by shooting a large number of arrested Communists and/or Jews and persons who have previously committed assault and by arresting at least one thousand Communists, and/or Jews for shipment. Field Marshal Keitel awaits corresponding instructions for submission to the Fuehrer.
OKW Gen QU (V) Nr. II 1887/42 SECRET 1830 1 B 0 M HRRXMV
France
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 AUG 1939
It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing.. It is not machines that fight each other. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.
Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line: Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.
I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war--never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.
Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.
Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.
First aim; advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of attrition.
New German frontier according to healthy principles. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.
Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-B-PS
SPECIAL STAFF FOR PICTORIAL ART
Report of work during the period from October 1940 to July 1944
On the basis of the decree of the Fuehrer of 17 September 1940 relative to the seizure of ownerless works of art formerly possessed by Jews in the occupied Western territories, the special staff for pictorial art commenced at the beginning of October 1940 in Paris with the seizure of the works of art abandoned by the internationally known Jewish Rothschild family, which was also famous as the possessor of great art collections. It was not possible for the various members of the Jewish Rothschild family, nor for many other rich French Jews, to take any considerable part of their part possessions to England and America in their precipitous flight before the German occupation. The staff has not only seized very great parts of the art treasures abandoned in the Paris City Palaces of the Rothschilds, but it also systematically searched the country-seats of the individual members of the Rothschild family, such as the famous Loire castle, for art treasures and thereby safeguarded for the Reich very important parts of the world famous Rothschild art collection. The art possessions of the Rothschild's were traced not only to cleverly hidden places in the individual castles but also to depots and warehouses, as for example in Bordeaux and other coastal cities, where these art treasures had already been packed for transport to America. In this same manner the art possessions of other French Jews famous as art collectors such as Kann, David-Wlil, Levy de Benzion and Seligmann were traced by the staff and seized in their entirety.
After the seizure of the most famous Jewish art collections in Paris, all abandoned dwellings of the wealthy Parisian Jews, as well as the warehouses of all shipping firms and many other art depots of emigrated Jews, which were very often camouflaged by French gentiles, were systematically searched by the special staff for pictorial art and very considerable art treasures found in this manner. These seizures were carried out on the basis of preliminary exhaustive investigations into the address lists of the French police authorities, on the basis of Jewish handbooks, warehouse inventories and order books for French shipping firms as well as on the basis of French art and collection catalogs. The clearly established Jewish origin of the individual owners was proved in each case in cooperation with the French police authorities and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), as well as on the basis of the political secure material of the staff itself.
According to the same system, the seizure of ownerless Jewish works of art was gradually extended over the whole French territory. The investigations of the special staff for pictorial art were often made extraordinarily difficult by proven sabotage by French authorities, as well as by camouflaging of Jewish possessions by trusteeship of French gentiles covering up for the Jews. In spite of this, Jewish art possessions in the occupied French territories was seized to such an extent as to justify the assumption that, in spite of all opposition and camouflaging, the most important part of the art possessions which had been in the hands of Jews in France, insofar as these had not already been removed before the occupation, was safeguarded by the staff. _The wholesale removal of irreplaceable European art values was thereby prevented and the highest artistic products of all European nations assured for Europe._
In the course of this art seizure by the staff in the occupied Western territories, the following were seized from 203 locations (collections).
21903 art objects of all types, as counted and inventoried up to now.
A seizure record was made for each location, recording the origin of the objects with exact individual data. All seized art treasures were first taken to a collection warehouse at the former Jeau de Paume Museum and then to rooms of the Louvre which had been placed at their disposal. They were scientifically inventoried and photographed by scientific art workers of the special staff for pictorial art and carefully packed there by experts for transport to the Reich. These jobs were especially difficult, since the majority of the collections and individual art objects were taken over without any inventories or indications of origin, and the scientific cataloguing had to be carried out by the scientific art workers of the staff.
Since the beginning of 1943, art seizures of the staff have been extended to include also furniture seizures of the East Ministry, whereby a great number of individual valuable art works could be seized from individual dwellings and warehouses.
During the period from March 1941 to July 1944, the special staff for pictorial art brought into the Reich: _29 large shipments_ including _137 freight cars with 4174 cases of art works_.
These shipments were taken to 6 shelters in the Reich, unpacked and stored with observation of all conservation, air raid and fire protection precautions. At the shelters the inventories, which had served in Paris only for indentification were supplemented according to scientific view-points, and the results of the scientific cataloguing were recorded on inventory lists and thoroughly indexed. With this scientific inventory of a material unique in its scope and importance and of a value hitherto unknown to art research, the special staff for pictorial art has conducted a work important to the entire field of art. _This inventory work will form the basis of an all-inclusive scientific catalog, in which should be recorded history, scope and scientific and political significance of this historically unique art seizure._
A restoration work shop equipped with all technical aids was established by the special staff at one of the shelters, and has been occupied with the care and restoration of seized articles of artistic value as well as with their permanent observation at the shelters. Several hundreds of the works of art that had been neglected by their Jewish owners or had earlier been inexpertly restored were restored in this workshop and their preservation assured.
In addition, all seized articles of artistic value were photographed by the photography workshop of the special staff and included in a film library. Thereby not only the identity of each individual art work was recorded, but also material of permanent value for study and publication in the field of art was created.
Up to 15 July 1944 the following had been scientifically inventoried:
_21,903 art works_
_5,281 paintings, pastels, water-colors, drawings._
_684 miniatures, glass and enamel paintings, books and manuscripts._
_583 plastics, terra-cottas, medallions and plaques._
_2,477 articles of furniture of value to art history._
_583 textiles_ (Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, Coptic materials).
_5,825 hand-made art works_ (porcelains, bronze, faiences, majolica, ceramics, jewelry, coins, art objects made with precious stones).
_1,286 East Asiatic art works_ (bronzes, plastics, porcelains, paintings, folding screens, weapons).
_259 art works of antiquity_ (sculptures, bronzes, vases, jewelry, bowls, cut stones, terra-cottas).
These figures will be increased, since seizures in the West are not yet completed, and it has not been possible to make a scientific inventory of part of the seized objects because of the lack of experts.
The extraordinary artistic and material value of the seized art works cannot be expressed in figures. The paintings, period furniture of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Gobelins, the antiques and renaissance jewelry of the Rothschilds are objects of such a unique character that their evaluation is impossible, since no comparable values have so far appeared on the art market.
A short report, moreover, can only hint at the artistic worth of the collection. Among the seized paintings, pastels and drawings there are several hundred works of the first quality, masterpieces of European art, which could take first place in any museum. Included therein are absolutely authenticated signed works of Rembrandt van Rijn, Rubens, Frans Hals, Vermeer van Delft, Velasquez, Murilio, Goya, Sebastiano del Piombo, Palma Vecchio, etc.
Of first importance among the seized paintings are the works of the famous French painters of the 18th century, with masterpieces of Boucher, Watteau, Algaud, Largielliere, Kattier, Fragonard, Pater, D Nloux and de Trcy.
This collection can compare with those of the best European museums. It includes many works of the foremost French masters, who up to now have been only inadequately represented in the best German museums. Very important also is the representation of masterpieces of the Dutch painters of the 17th and 18th centuries. First of all should be mentioned the works of van Dyck, Salomon and Jacob Ruisdar Wouvermann, Terborch, jan Weenix, Gabriel Metsu, Adrian van Ostade, David Teniers, Pieter de Hooch, Willem van der Velde, etc.
Of foremost importance also are the represented works of English paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, with masterpieces of Reynolds, Romney and Gainsborough. Cranach and Amberger, among the German masters, should be mentioned.
The collection of French furniture of the 17th and 18th centuries is perhaps even more highly to be evaluated. This contains hundreds of the best preserved and, for the most part, signed works of the best known cabinet-makers from the period between Louis XIV to Louis XVI. Since German cabinet-makers played an important part in this golden age of French cabinetry, now recognized for the first time in the field of art, this collection is of paramount importance.
The collection of Gobelins and Persian tapestries contains numerous world famous objects. The collection of handicraft works and the Rothschild collection of renaissance jewelry is valuable beyond comparison.
Very many works of art were seized by the staff from the luggage of Jewish emigrants in Holland as well as in the occupied territories of France and Belgium.
_Work in the Eastern territories._
The activity of the special staff for pictorial art was limited in the occupied Eastern territories to a scientific and photographic recording of public collection and their safeguarding and care in cooperation with the military and civil services. In the course of the evacuation of the territory several hundred most valuable Russian Ikons, several hundred Russian paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual articles of furniture and furniture from castles were saved in cooperation with the individual army groups, and brought to a shelter in the Reich.
A collection of degenerate Bolshevist art, as well as a collection of degenerate Western art, was also made for political study purposes. In addition, a rich collection of material concerning Soviet architecture was made.
25 portfolios of pictures with the most valuable works of the art collections seized in the West were presented to the Fuehrer on 20 April 1943, together with three volumes of a provisional catalog of paintings and an interim progress report. Additional portfolios of pictures are in preparation.
Robert SCHOLZ Bereichsleiter Chief of the Special Staff for Pictorial Art
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-I-PS
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich Berlin W8, 30 May 1942 Leipziger Str. 3
Dear Party member Rosenberg:
Your Einsatzstab for the seizure of cultural goods in Paris, I believe, has been wrongly reported to you as if it were dealing in works of art itself. I know the task of the Einsatzstab very well and must assert that there is no agency to which I am able to express such unrestricted praise for its continued work and readiness as to this agency proper with all its collaborators. Presumably I have given cause for the reputation of dealing in works of art because I have asked some especially experienced gentlemen if anywhere during their stay in Paris or France they should hear of any pictures or other art objects to be sold by art dealers or private individuals to look at those objects and to inform me if there should be anything of interest for me. Since the latter was often the case, I have then again asked the gentlemen to do me the favor to acquire the objects for me for which purpose I have kept a depot ready for them. If thus some gentlemen got very busy to make contacts with art dealers it was exclusively a personal favor which was done for me for the benefit of building up my collection. Since very many prospective buyers endeavor to seize art objects in the occupied territory, I can well imagine that perhaps out of ignorance of the circumstances, but perhaps also out of envy they have caused the gentlemen of your Einsatzstab to be suspected wrongly.
I feel it my duty to give you this information and to ask you that it may remain this way. On the other hand I also support personally the work of your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to assist the Einsatzstab by my organization.
With best regards and Heil Hitler! Yours Signed: Hermann Goering
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-GG-PS
Statement of art objects counted and inventoried
I. _Paintings_ Oil paintings 3,027 Water-colors 766 Drawings 1,332 Pastels 156 Engravings 1 4,525 Miniatures--portraits 442 Miniatures--parchments--initial letters 51 Persian miniatures 49 Glass paintings 19 Porcelain--enamels--paintings 455 Books and manuscripts 55 Reproductions 13 ------ 10,890
II. _Plastics_ Bronze and other metals including statuettes 129 Marble and other stones 110 Wood 65 Terra-cotta, clay and porcelain 74 Reliefs 52 Medallions and plaques 121 Ivory 3 Wax 3 Plaster 26 --- 583
III. _Furniture_ Chests of drawers 241 Clothes-presses 33 Writing tables 86 Secretaries 69 Sewing tables 11 Tables 255 Sideboards 5 Kitchen tables 26 Cupboards 155 Chairs and sofas 979 Clocks of various types 115 Chandeliers, etc. 277 Miscellaneous 143 Mirrors 21 Consoles 61 ----- 2,477
IV. _Textiles_ Gobelins 66 Carpets 291 Cloths 104 Coptic cloths 36 Embroidery, weavings (Including fragments) 86 ---- 583 V. _Hand-made art objects_ Porcelain (cups, plates, vases) 335 Ceramics (cups, bowls) 252 Faeence, Majolika 324 Glass 140 Porcelain figures 92 Bronze and other metals 371 Objects of rare metals 189 Articles of daily use 308 Jewelry 243 Coins 844 Weapons 206 Orientalia and exotica 388 Objects of rare gems 74 Other art works 2 2,059 ----- 5,825
VI. _East-Asiatic_ Plastics 48 Bronzes to 1500 and later 26 Porcelains and stone-ware before 1644 472 Porcelains and stone-ware after 1644 101 Clay-ware 19 Semi-precious gems and ivories 92 Netsuka (Japanese art objects) 68 Paintings 72 Wood-carvings 183 Lacquers 27 Folding screens 6 Weapons 31 Miscellaneous 141 ----- 1,286
VII. _Antiquities_ A. Greek Sculptures, including reliefs 3 Bronzes, including statuettes 6 Terra-cottas and other clays 14 Vases, bowls, pitchers 6 Jewelry, about 40 Miscellaneous 6
B. Roman Sculptures, including portraits 15 Bronzes, including statuettes 19 Clay 1 Jewelry, about 83 Miscellaneous 15
C. Egyptian Sculptures, including reliefs 20 Bronzes, including statuettes 11 Cut stones 5 Miscellaneous 10
D. Asia-Minor Reliefs 1 Clay 1 Cut stones 3 --- 259 Total 21,903
Remarks:
1. In enumerating engravings in portfolios, the sheets were counted individually. In bound volumes the engravings were considered as one number.
2. Among the other art works are also included antique and East-Asiatic miniatures from the Kann Collection, which up to now have received no exact classification.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1017-PS
Copy
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
[Handwritten note] 1. Memorandum
2.4.41
_Subject: The USSR._
Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come into being through the annexation of states of a related or even of an essentially alien character.
A military conflict with the USSR will result in an extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section of the USSR. It is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of the USSR. The occupation of these areas would then present not so many military as administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question:
Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the _political_ goal which is to be obtained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations.
If the political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one may conclude that:
1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;
2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain;
3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, such as, in particular, the assurance of essential supplies for the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this necessitates and the general directives for the completely separate areas, had best be dealt with all in one.
It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to Greater Germany for the continuation of the war, has been assured.
Anyone who knows the East, sees on a map of Russia's population the following national or geographical units:
a. Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.
b. White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.
c. Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
d. The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.
e. The Don area with Rostov as its capital.
f. The area of the Caucasus.
g. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.
_A. Greater Russia_
After the rule of the Tartars, the Russian Empire, Czarist in character developed out of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. This nucleus area possesses even today the greatest driving power. The political aim of operations against the USSR, therefore, would be the permanent weakening of this area, in order to secure possibilities of expansion for the other areas. By means of a temporary occupation of this area, this weakening could be brought about in a way comprising the three following measures:
1. The total destruction of the Jewish Bolshevik state administration, without helping to set up a new and comprehensive state system;
2. very extensive utilization of economic resources such as the removal of all non-essential stocks, mechanical installations, and, in
## particular, of any available means of transport, small river craft,
etc.;
3. the allocation of considerable sections of this Russian nucleus territory to the fresh administrative units which are to be formed, as, in particular, to White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Don territory.
In this way all other areas would be offered at the same time the possibility of making extensive use of that part of Russia controlled by Moscow as a dumping ground for undesirable elements of the population.
_B. White Russia._
White Russia comprises a part of the USSR which is very backward culturally as well as economically. At the same time it contains the second largest Jewish community in the USSR, with towns which are completely Jewish, such as Bialystok, Minsk, Polodzk, Vitebsk, and others.
The awakening of an independent life, and the setting up of a living state system must be considered as an extremely tedious and difficult undertaking. White Russia is far more backward in culture than, for instance, Lithuania, and more exploited by the Jews than Poland. Nevertheless, having regard to the necessity of weakening the Russian nucleus area, such an attempt should be advocated.
The USSR has confined White Russia to the area between the Polish North-West frontier and approximately as far as the Pronja. But the real capital of the whole area would be Smolensk. The half administrative district of the same name and also a section of the administrative district of Kalinin (formerly Twer) could count, by population, as belonging to it, or could be added to it for administration purposes. In this way the frontier of White Russia would be moved forward to within about 250 kilometres of Moscow.
If the creation of independent political life is considered desirable, it would not be advisable to carve up this area to the benefit of the General-government of Poland.
_C. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania._
In the case of these areas the question arises, whether they should be allotted the special task of becoming a German settlement area of the future, the racially most suitable elements being assimilated.
If this is set up as an aim, the areas also require very special treatment in the general task.
The necessary removal of considerable sections of the intelligentsia
## particularly _Latvian_ ones--to the Russian nucleus area would have
to be organized. The settlement of a German rural population in considerable quantities would have to be started--possibly a large contingent of German settlers suitable for this purpose could be taken from among the Volga Germans, after the undesirable elements have been eliminated. There might also be the possibility of the settlements of Danes, Norwegians, Dutch and--after the war has been brought to a victorious end--of Englishmen too, so that, in the course of one or two generations, this area can be joined up with the German nucleus area as a new Germanised country.
In this case we should also not have to neglect to deport considerable groups of racially inferior sections of the population from Lithuania.
_D. The Ukraine (Border territory)._
Kiev became the main centre of the Varangian state with its superimposed Scandinavian character. But even after the rule of the Tartars Kiev was for a long time diametrically opposed to Moscow. Its independent national life is based, contrary to the assertions of Muscovite historians, whose ideas also dominated the whole of European learning, on a tradition which is really almost unbroken.
As far as this area is concerned, the political task would be the encouragement of independent national life until, possibly, an independent state could be created, with the object, alone or in conjunction with the Don area and the Caucasus as a _Black Sea Union_, of holding Moscow constantly in check and ensuring Lebensraum for Greater Germany to the East. In the economic field, however, this area would at the same time, have the task of forming a powerful base for raw materials and a supplementary nutrition centre for the Greater German Reich.
Strips of border territory from the Russian nucleus area, too, would have to be added to that part which is regarded by the USSR as purely Ukrainian--as has already been mentioned--in order to weaken this nucleus area and at the same time to keep alive constant opposition to it. In this matter, parts of the administrative districts of Kursk and Voronesch might be possibilities.
The administrative and economic handling of the whole area would then have to be directed towards the attainment of the political aim.
_E. The Don Area._
It is inhabited by the Don Cossacks. As a nation they are far less independent than the Ukrainians, culturally they are saturated with Moscow ideology, and politically they tend chiefly towards Moscow, but are more developed than the White Russians. The task in this area would be similar to that in White Russia.
Similarly, it would be desirable to extend this area northwards up to the Administrative Districts of Szaratow in order to link up its administration with that of the territory of the Volga Germans.
_F. The Caucasus._
The Caucasus is inhabited by sections of the population which are, racially, entirely different, and also by national units. The river plain of the Kuban and Terek, and the present Administrative Districts of Krasnodar and Ordschjonokidze are inhabited by Cossacks, the majority of whom consider themselves to be Ukrainians. The most advanced nation as regards culture is the Georgians, between the Great and Lesser Caucasus, who can point to a centuries old cultural tradition and independence of their own. Then comes Aserbeidschan, peopled by Mussulmen of Ugrotatarian origin, with its centre at Baku. The Armenians live in adjacent territory to the South, while the northern mountain slopes are inhabited by quite a number of mountain peoples of the most varied origins.
The area is Russia's oil centre. The material output, and indeed the existence of the other mainly agricultural areas of the USSR, such as the Ukraine, the Don-Kuban, and the Terek district, and also to a certain extent the Russian nucleus area, largely depend on keeping this area in production. Owing to the introduction of the Bolshevik system of running villages on communal lines without individual ownership, and of Kolchoses (collective farms), with mechanical cultivation of the soil, the production of grain and food depends on the regular supplying of the necessary fuel. As a result of the sharp drop in the number of draught cattle, and the fact that these are, numerically, very unevenly distributed, any strangulation of the oil supply--quite apart from the maintenance of the motor repair depots and the availability of the necessary servicing personnel for this--tends to famine.
_G. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan._
We can assume that, after the military collapse of the Soviets in Europe, very small forces would be needed to dispose of the Moscow tyranny in Central Asia. This area too, is inhabited by peoples of very different types, mainly Turano-Mongoloid, and who are followers of Mohammed. They feel themselves to be in long-standing racial and religious opposition to the Soviets, and at the same time to the Russian people too, without being able, for the time being, to throw off the Russian yoke by their own efforts. This should not be considered too difficult to carry out, however, with German help, and in view of the confusion which would arise among the Soviets.
The area is Russia's cotton store, with an annual production, according to Bolshevik figures, of 400,000-500,000 tons of cotton.
The entry of Germans into Central Asia would mean powerful rear support for Iran and Afghanistan. It is a matter for conjecture whether these states would not possibly be impelled by this means to undertake more
## active operations against India--if there is any such intention--in
the event of Turkey too, having altered her attitude by that time. The threat to the British lines of communication to India thus acquires real significance, and will, without doubt, compel Britain to deploy greater forces in this area, which she would have to take from Europe or elsewhere.
_General Questions of Economy from the Legal Angle._
The acquisition of oil, mainly in the Caucasus, immediately brings with it the question of its transport, in order to maintain agricultural production in the occupied areas. The question of transport, however, which is of decisive importance to the cultivation of the soil, is bound up again with settling the coal problem. At the same time, the question of finance in these areas appears of primary importance.
A question which likewise affects all areas is that of the almost complete abolition, under the Soviet system, of private property. It is not improbable that this question will have practical consequences immediately the area is occupied. Spontaneous action taken by a completely uneducated rural population, if and when they dissolve the Kolchoses by their own efforts, could result in untold material harm.
For this reason these problems require to be settled, not regionally, but as extraordinary matters for all areas, and local variations, and perhaps also differing tactical action could easily be combined with this.
_Summary._
The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points briefly outlined here:
1. the creation of a central department for the occupied areas of the USSR, to be confined more or less to wartime.
Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would be the task of this department--
a. to issue binding political instructions to the separate administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at the time and the goal which is to be achieved.
b. to secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the occupied areas.
c. to make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and food;
2. the carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them.
_As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its purpose._ Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the _political_ task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent it.
The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning when organising the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of the USSR would require different treatment from that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.
2.4.41
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1019-PS
Appendix to Memorandum No. 2
Recommendations as to the personnel for the Reich Commissariats in the East and for the Political Central Office in Berlin
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
Surveying the requirements in regard to personnel as a whole, the following considerations must be taken into account. On psychological and historical grounds it would not appear politic to put the immediate political direction of the Baltic Provinces into the hands of the Balts. Although it must be admitted that they know the conditions best and also know the languages, so many historical memories and complexes are involved, that it would appear inexpedient if we are to attain our final political goal to allow people who formerly had dealings with the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians once more to appear politically in positions of authority. On the other hand, it is necessary to send people to these parts who are intimately acquainted with the problems of the East and North and are also able, from the point of view of temperament to bring a particular understanding to bear on the situation there. When, in addition, there are still interests in connection with Scandinavia and Finland, indeed altogether a Hanseatic trend, then in the opinion of the undersigned, such persons would be most suited for the political direction of the Eastern Provinces. On these grounds the undersigned suggests the following to the Fuehrer: As Reich Commissar for the Baltic Provinces and White Russia: Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, Kiel. Headquarters: _Riga_.
Further positions to be filled: a Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, a Reich Commissariat for the Caucasus and a Reich Commissariat for the Don and Volga Areas. Here also it would appear necessary to entrust this task to people who already have a previous knowledge of the Russian, Ukrainian and Caucasus problems, who have been in contact with the country and people, and if it is at all possible, who speak Russian, the language with which one can make oneself generally understood there. The undersigned suggests to the Fuehrer as Reich Commissar for the Ukraine and Caucasus, as they may be suitable: Secretary of State Backe and Stabsleiter Arno Schickedanz. Party member Backe himself comes from the Caucasus and will quickly be able to acquaint himself with the conditions, speaks fluent Russian and has never quite broken off his connections with the Caucasus. Pg. Schickedanz has been working in the Russian sphere for 20 years, formerly with Dr. Scheubner-Richter and then with the undersigned. He helped the latter with politically cautious advice, particularly in connection with Norway. He knows many of the people concerned with Russia, the Ukraine and the Caucasus so that he appears suitable for one of these posts, in order to survey the political situation correctly and serve the political aims for which we are to strive. If the undersigned could make a choice for this recommendation, he would name Backe for the Caucasus and Schickedanz for the Ukraine. As second in command to the Reich Commissar in the Caucasus, the Commissioner for the 4 year plan would have to name someone to lead an authoritative Oil Commission. For the Ukraine an agricultural department of particularly capable men would have to be established. Headquarters of the Reich Commissariats would be _Kijew_ and _Tiflis_.
Prime Minister D. Klagges is recommended as Reich Commissar for the Don-Volga Area. As a result of his initiative in connection with the establishment of the Hermann-Goering Works in Salzgitter he knows the problems of mining and as Prime Minister of Brunswick he has collected all the administrative experience. At the moment the undersigned can call to mind no one else who speaks _Russian_. Headquarters of the Reich Commissar: _Rostov_ on Don.
In addition, it will eventually become necessary to occupy with troops not only Petersburg, but also Moscow. This occupation will definitely differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces, in the Ukraine and in the Caucasus. It will be accomplished by suppressing any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will necessitate an absolutely ruthless person, both as regards the military representation and also the _eventual_ political direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch as Reich Commissar in _Moscow_.
A consideration of the problems as a whole shows that in order to overcome them a _Central_ Office to direct the work of the various Reich Commissariats is urgently necessary. First of all in order to relieve the Fuehrer, so that he does not have to deal continuously with four or five Administrative Offices in the East, and secondly since it is necessary, from an authoritative and political point of view, for all these areas to be surveyed and supervised by _one_ office, and for the tasks allotted to be carried out in the manner desired by the Fuehrer by means of directives to the personalities in charge. The Fuehrer instructed the undersigned, on 2nd April 1941, to establish a central political office to deal with work in the East in anticipation of the eventuality mentioned in the introduction to this memorandum. Bearing in mind the political aims described above, the most important task of such a central political office, immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer, would be the adaptation or actual preparation of suitable leaflets, as the first proclamation of the Military Commander. It would then have to take care that all proclamations and decrees issued later by the political directors of the Occupied Territories conform to the varied aims, that measures resulting from this central attitude, both cultural and economic, are in agreement with these, that mistakes which do not correspond to the political intention are, if possible, avoided or, if they have already occurred, remedied in a sensible manner. Furthermore the office would have the task of writing and editing the necessary enlightening articles on the history and relations with Germany of the various territories, or of finding collaborators who can write them. It would also be a good thing to have translations made of those articles and speeches which can be shown to have expressed a German-Ukrainian solution in the course of the national-socialist struggle. Scientific literature on this subject has been in preparation by colleagues of the undersigned for a considerable time. A basic work has been published ("Um die Neugestalt Europas"--"The Changed Face of Europe," Central Party Publishers), a new book is in preparation and extensive research on the whole continental European question is well under way. In addition speeches must be composed in German, Ukrainian, Georgian etc., to be made into gramophone records. A large number of loudspeaker cars must be available in view of the widespread illiteracy still existing. In addition this Central Office would already have to have such authority, that the most efficient of the top-ranking Reich Authorities concerned, of the O.K.W. as well as the authorities controlling the 4 year Plan would be at the disposal of its chief, so that all future measures necessary for the realization of our political goals, political, economic, cultural, scientific and propaganda, may be instituted even now in such a way as to further these central ideas. Only by such a central direction of _basic_, decisive orders will it be possible to avoid confusion later on and will the enormous difficulties and misunderstandings unavoidably connected with the occupation of almost devastated areas be reduced to the minimum. The undersigned therefore makes the suggestion to the Fuehrer that _when the eventuality arises_ this Central _Office_, which is fully empowered and is to be set up, should be changed into a component authority immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer, i.e.--in order to avoid a repetition of existing official designations--into a General Protectorate for the occupied Eastern territories with its seat in Berlin. The Head of this Protectorate could then obtain the official designation of "The Protector-General of the German Reich for the Occupied Eastern Territories." (The name Commissar-General is already in use, e.g. as the subordinate of the Reich Commissar in Holland.) The Fuehrer would then nominate and recall the Reich Commissar for the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, Caucasia and the Don-Volga area (eventually Moscow and Turkestan) on the recommendation of the Protector-General. The official communications of all top-ranking Reich Authorities to the Reich Commissariats in the occupied territories would go through the Protectorate-General, whereby all technical, economic, etc., directions would be issued entirely authoritatively by the top-ranking Reich officials in question. It is therefore _not_ necessary to found a new large Reich Office, but rather a political _centre_ for the East provided with all necessary powers, in combination with an Inspectorate and State Secretariat to control all questions concerning the connection between the Protector-General and the Reich Commissariats and top-ranking Reich Authorities. Should the Fuehrer agree to the proposal to alter the political central office, which is to be established shortly and with whose direction the undersigned is charged, when the eventuality arises into a General protectorate under the same direction, then the undersigned recommends Gauleiter Dr. Meyer of Munster as Secretary of State. Dr. Meyer is an old national-socialist fighter who sees the political problems clearly and from a national-socialist point of view. He has occupied himself so exhaustively in the last few years with State Law and administrative measures, that he can also carry out this work in addition to his burdensome work as Gauleiter. It is clear that from Dr. Meyer extraordinary service would be asked, but on the other hand he would certainly consider such an appointment a particular honour.
The Fuehrer has already granted to the undersigned the budget for a central office. If the Fuehrer approves the above trains of thought and proposals, as they are or in modified form, they could be set in motion immediately.
Berlin, the 7th April, 1941
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1024-PS
29 April 1941
General organization and tasks of our office for the general handling of problems in the Eastern territories
The Chief of this office under whom a personal expert plus the necessary office staff is to be placed, is to be assisted in all general problems of the office by his permanently assigned representative (Gauleiter Dr. Meyer). The permanent representative heads a main office which organizes the whole interior service as well as a number of departments which have to work on special problems.
1. _Political department._
This department is charged with the task of further working out the staked-out political goals in the several projected _five areas_, and to sum up the historical reasons for the new partitioning of the whole east European area. It must result from this work, that the proposed district shall not be of a haphazard nature, but are due rather to the historical and national developments, and thus represent a political necessity for the future. The substantial treatment of those problems is closely connected with the history and nature of the several _nationalities_ in the East, which also will have to be treated. To this is to be added the appraisal of the individualisms of these nationalities which live within or out of Europe for the purpose of a later outside commitment in the projected administrative districts.
A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.) The church problems of the whole East are of a varying nature (character) and require an intensive treatment in relation to the past, to the now existing laws and to the interested future relationship.
While the work itself is being done, there will arise a great number of special problems out of the whole of the general problems. With the present state of the work, one should not anticipate the special problems.
Rank of the Chief and his representative: Ministerialdirector and Ministerialdirigent. Proposed as the Chief of this office: Reichsamtleiter Dr. Georg Leibbrandt. His representative: Consul general Dr. Brautigam.
2. _Economic-Political Coordination._
Until further final decisions have been reached about the substantial treatment of economy, technics, traffic, postal service, highway dept., labor service, this dept. has no immediate pertinent tasks to solve, such as the political dept. The main task of the dept. of economic-political coordination will consist rather of coordinating the different above mentioned territories in their demands and their utilization so that the known political goal can be attained as quickly as possible in the five large districts by the use of the psychological possibilities.
The top priority of the demands of the occupational force is the assured supplying of the Germans with raw materials and food. In the long run in certain districts this goal may be attained with less force, through an understanding, special treatment of the individual nationalities rather than by this national and political situation, the solution of this problem is forced by means of the military or police strength.
The Chief of this dept. of economic-political coordination will have the task to coordinate the orders of the plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan with the wishes of the economical and financial resources by cooperation with the representatives of the highway dept. and labor dept. in order to assure the utmost safety and by using the existing files of the people who know Russia to secure the biggest possible assistance in all these economic-political necessities. Connected with this is the contingency of all the desired amounts of raw materials and food, namely in this respect that those districts, in which a political autonomy and a lasting cooperation is projected are to be considered more than other ones for which such a possibility does not seem indicated for the future. One must proceed in the same way to solve the currency question. After a certain period of transition, it must be decided where national currency issuing banks will have to be created in connection with the overall, political solution, and where this is not deemed necessary. The same holds true for postage stamps and other questions, which will arise in concrete forms, in connection with the course of this work.
According to the decisions of the Reichsmarshall, the economy is to be coordinated under the authority of one person. Consequently, the representatives of the brands for food, the currency and financial questions, the industrial economy and the question of utilization of labor are subordinated to the plenipotentiary for the whole economy. Therefore, the Deputy of the Four-year plan represents all of the economic branch in discussion about economic-political coordination, while the representatives of the other mentioned depts. will enter the conferences under his direction. In other words the head of the department of economic-political coordination has to bring about a combination [Gesamtheit] with the political goal of
1. Safeguarding of the German War Effort and supplies.
2. Attaining of political goals in the East.
The conferences will take place, if necessary, under the leadership of the permanent representative of the Chief, or in the form of a round table discussion of the participants under the presidency of the head of the economic-political coordination dept.
Position (Rank): Ministerialdirector. Representative: Ministerialdirigent.
Proposed as the head of the Dept. for economical-political coordination: Reichsamtleiter Walter Malletke. Representative Reichshamptstellenleiter Hermann Freiherr von Harder. In addition, a small number of permanent assistants and the necessary office are envisaged.
The supreme headquarters of the Armed Forces has appointed as representative to the director of this office the Chief of the Armed Forces operational staff [Wehrmachts fuehrungstab] General of the Artillery Jodl, and as his representative Brigadier General Warlimont. General Jodl or Brig. Gen. Warlimont are to be included in conferences of the political dept. and the dept. of economic-political coordination, held under the chairmanship of the director or his representative, during which military matters are being discussed.
3. _Legal Dept._
It is the task of the Legal Dept. to prepare those drafts for laws which are deemed necessary for the governing of the Eastern territories, with due consideration to general directives of the director or his representative. If called for, a representative of the Legal Dept. is to sit in on the conferences of the Political Dept. and the dept. of economic-political-coordination in order to keep abreast with the problem arising from this subject matter and accordingly to make the draft for the necessary decrees or, otherwise, to formulate the presented drafts of the various depts. in accordance with the general goals and future constitutional demands. The ordinances for the execution of the decrees of the director of the office are to be agreed upon in advance with the head of the Legal Dept; these (decrees) are to be brought before the representative of the director in case no argument can be reached. Rank of the head of the dept: Ministerialdirector. Representative: Ministerialdirigent. Proposed for the job; proposal is asked of the Reichsminister and Chief of the Chancellory. Experts of the constitutional conditions in the East should be consulted as advisors, first of all Staatsrat Freiherr von Freitagh Lorringhoven (other proposal: Regierungspresident Dr. Runte from Brusberg.)
4. _Dept. for Culture and Science._
The work of this dept. does not seem as pressing as the political, economic-political and legal-political problems. However, now is the time to project the installation of these cultural and educational institutions for those territories that are in need of special care on the part of Germany. The task would be to further those national sciences and history of literature and universities which conform with the political goal. Rank of the director: Ministerialdirector. Representative: Ministerialdirigent. The director has not been proposed as yet.
5. _Enlightenment and Press._
It is the task of this dept. in an active manner, to publicize the substantially worked out decision of the several depts. for all of those circles for which these decisions are meant. Furthermore, to maintain the entire connections with the Reichs ministry for the Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda and to employ the facilities of this ministry in the fields of radio, public address systems, films, etc., in order to obtain the political goals in the Eastern European area. Furthermore, the enlightenment of the whole German people and the army is to be promoted in such a way as is deemed necessary by the hand of this office. During press conferences, the representative of the dept. for enlightenment and press has to acquaint Germany's newspapers and magazines with the necessary instructions, and to make statements for the foreign press, if deemed necessary. This task to be carried out in agreement with the Chief of the German press. It is furthermore the task of the head of this dept. to establish the fastest possible connection for communication between the main office and the future administrative offices of the Eastern European area. The additional influence upon the foreign nationalities should be the presentation of the aims of National Socialist Germany, given in the individual languages of the various people.
Rank of the head of the dept.: Ministerial-director. Representative: Ministerialdirigent. A number of necessary officials and expert and usual staff. Proposed; General commissioner Fritz Schmidt den Haag. Experts Dr. Karl Neuscheler, at the present in Meuskan, and Dr. Gamber, at present in Belgrad (DNB). At present further necessities cannot be foreseen and if necessary an enlargement upon the work will be contemplated with new demands.
The representative of the Fuehrer is to be contacted (asked) whether or not he desires to be represented at the director of the dept., or his representative. Furthermore, it is deemed necessary that the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German police appoints a permanent representative to this office with whom administrative decrees concerning safeguarding by police forces are to be discussed. The representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police can be consulted in all conferences pertaining to the security of the Eastern territories.
The Reichs commissioner for the solidification of the Germanic National Characteristic will also appoint his representative, who, at the proper time, will take over the task on orders of the head of the administrative district, the tasks in those administrative districts where this employment is deemed necessary.
_Communications to the Administrative districts in the East_
Each administrative district in the Eastern European area will establish a representative in Berlin, which is to be immediately subordinated to the permanent representative of the director of the office. These representatives have the task to regulate all questions of entering and knowing their respective areas and to receive and work out all wishes of the various Reichs Offices of party and state, which pertain to the represented administrative areas.
The directives to the heads of the administrative districts will originate only from the head of the office. This representative will tend all the other pending negotiations.
The administrative districts in the East European areas will be organized according to the needs of the main office, so that in general, one section of the office in Berlin corresponds to an office in the administrative districts. This is a process through which will require a much higher specialization.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1028-PS
[Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May 1941]
[Translation of Only Typewritten Material]
After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution, through the institution of Ghettos. Insofar as the Jews have not been driven out by the Ukrainians themselves, the small communities must be lodged in large camps, in order to be kept busy by means of forced labor, in the same way as it has already been the practice in Letzmanorstadt (Lodz).
[Translation of paragraph, excluding all crossed out words.]
After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to undergo a decisive solution through the institution of ghettos or labor battalions. Forced labor is to be introduced.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1029-PS
Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia [Ostland]
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
All the regions between Narwa and Tilsit have constantly been in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a European direction, and has added this region to the living space of Greater Germany.
The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanising racially possible elements, colonising Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.
For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of germanising or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly germanised to the extent of 50% by Danish, German and Swedish blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller than in Esthonia. In this country, stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with, and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanisation (on the East Prussian border).
White Russia is directly joined to these three territories. For a long time, White Russia had a strong Separatist movement, but presumably Bolshevist has succeeded in suppressing it. In any case, White Russia will first of all have the difficult task of admitting some of those elements who are expelled from Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania and from the Polish section of the Warthe territory. It seems expedient not to accommodate the Poles in the General gouvernement but in the East of White Russia (Smolensk District) and to form there a buffer against Russianism. In addition, the Commissar-General in White Russia would have the task of rousing this country, which cannot be considered as a land of surplus, to productive activity by employment of labour on a vast scale. [Marginal note in pencil: Every autonomous White Russian awareness against Russia is to be encouraged.]
The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily _positive_ one. A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights, built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly Germanised land, is to be established as a mighty German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilisation from Bolshevism.
For the rest, the solution of the colonisation problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.
The Reich Commissar, together with the other Reich Commissars, must strive to introduce the improvement of water-way communication between the Black Sea and the Baltic, i.e., start the construction of the Duena-Dnieper Canal. In this way the circulation of a great European economic system can be completed, which will guarantee the future exchange of goods, and render it independent of any overseas blockade. Thus the Reich Commissar in the Baltic lands will have great problems to solve in the realm of economics, and particularly in the domain of racial politics.
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1030-PS
8th May 41
General Instructions for all Reichcommisars in the occupied Eastern Territories
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
The contingency, that the German Reich may find herself confronted by Soviet Russian policy of aggression and of anti-German alliances, makes it obligatory to have a clear conception about the political aims of a German counterblow.
* * * * *
The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from Pan-Slavic [Grossrussisch] pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader's political testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever.
Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commissariat Eastland including White-Ruthenia will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in the following instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for all Reich Commissars.
* * * * *
As far as currency policy is concerned, a transitional state similar to that in other occupied territories shall be provided for, but with an early beginning of a new orientation, which has to correspond to the political goal to be achieved. In the Reich Commissariat Eastland, we will have to introduce as currency German marks, in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine a national "Karbowanez" currency (Ukrainian National bank), in the Reich Commissariat Caucasia a national currency too for the future Federal State.
The German people have achieved, in course of centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real estate property was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of compensation and restitution of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich Commissariat.
The moment for declarations of this kind will be determined by the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern territories. [This sentence was added in pencil]
From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is in a position to promote and direct national culture and science in many fields. It will be necessary, that in some territories an uprooting and resettlement of various racial stocks will have to be effected.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1034-PS
SECRET
Rosenberg Chancellery Received 22nd June 1941 No. 059
Construction and Administration
Minutes of a discussion with Reichsleiter Rosenberg on Saturday 21st June 1941 from 1100-1200 hours.
Present: Reichsleiter Rosenberg Gauleiter Dr. Meyer (at the beginning of the discussion) Landeshauptmann Kolbow Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht Brigadefuehrer Girgenson Burgkommandant Gohdes Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt Landespraesident Dreier
Reichsleiter Rosenberg asked how many men in all had so far been made available for employment in the East--Brigadefuehrer Girgenson and Party Member Gohdes stated that the German Labour Front was willing to provide 261 Regional Commissioners and the Storm Troops 144. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht informed him that the Reich Minister of the Interior would provide about 450 officials as Regional Commissioners--that would still leave 200 positions as Regional Commissioners to be filled, and these should, as far as possible, be occupied by personnel from the Schubert staff.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed his willingness to take over politically suitable individuals from the ranks of these specialists. Therefore immediate contact should be made with General Schubert and the Quartermaster General. An order to this effect was given to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht--Burgkommandant Gohdes wished to ensure that considerable reserves of men in a state of operational readiness should be held at our disposal in the Reich, to provide for unavoidable changes in the theatre of operations.
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer thereupon declared that most of the personnel just mentioned would only be made available gradually, since most of them would first have to be released from the Armed Forces. It was important that lists of the individuals actually available should be made immediately, and that these persons should be placed together in Special Purpose Staffs. Then the question was cleared up as to who was to be responsible to the Reichsleiter for the concentration of the Staffs. Decision: Burgkommandant Gohdes, S.A.--Brigadefuehrer Girgenson and Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht, each of whom made personal suggestions for his own section, would have to deliberate together on the persons who were to form the different Staffs and submit the result of their deliberations to Landespraesident Dreier, who was responsible for this. The political section (Dr. Leibbrandt) would advise Landespraesident Dreier on the subject. It was clear, that Landespraesident Dreier was the Head of the Department in whose hands lay the sole and final responsibility for the composition of the Staffs.
Burgkommandant Gohdes undertook to arm the men to be appointed, and to give them the firing instruction which might be necessary.
With regard to the question of putting the commissioners to be employed into uniform, Dr. Rosenberg stated that the organizations did not wish to give up their own (field-grey) uniforms and badges. The general opinion was that it was impossible for German government officials to enter the Eastern territories in different uniforms; also, the field-grey colour, in which the Armed Forces in the East would have provoked awe and respect for the German people, was held to be indispensable for the successful carrying-out of their government functions. Party Member Gohdes said that Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. Ley recommended the creation of a new unitary uniform for the Commissioners serving in the East. The Armed Forces were willing to set aside dark-brown cloth for 5,000 uniforms. Reichsleiter Rosenberg took it upon himself personally to submit the question of supplying uniform to the decision of the Fuehrer.
Arising from the question of supplying uniform, it was then discussed whether a special "Ostfuehrers Corps" as an organization of the National-Socialist Party should be created. An organization of this kind would then not only have the right to wear a unitary uniform, but it would imbue its members with the esprit de corps which was necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks which were to be carried out in the East. If the German was to enter the Eastern territory as master, he must be moulded as a unit both inwardly and outwardly. This inner regimental training could exert a certain positive counter-effect above all against the moral danger of "Space-Experience" and the depressing effect of foreign nationality. When this subject had been further discussed, it seemed more urgent than ever to achieve the purpose of creating an Ostfuehrer-Corps of this kind which would be a unit in itself.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1039-PS
Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20.4. 1941 a conference with the chief of the OKW (armed forces high command) took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment [UK-stellung] would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation [Abkommandierung] by command of the chief of the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative to all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office. A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of the people of the East-European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.
Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done.
Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy [Reichswirtschaftsminister] Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff [Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab] East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the Eastern questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economics, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.) After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners.
The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department "Enlightenment and Press" [Aufklaerung und Presse] and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.
Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommisariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24), Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional [Gebiet] Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgouvernment, a Main Commissariat to a Main-Government. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts [Kreise]. In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.
In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader [Reichsaerztefuehrer] Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service.
Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present.
Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff [Stabschef] of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter], who has instructed the commander of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in conjunction with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions.
Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer (SS Lt Gen) Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.
Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements.
The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine, influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.
As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and the State.
I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General and Chief commissariats more than 900 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces--not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefore all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree.
The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantial work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have been scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all these, with the exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisers for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic-political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. Department of "Law, Finance, and Administration" has been taken over by Regierungspraesident Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department "Enlightenment and Press." It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief [Reichspressechef] for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.
Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military
## action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be
able to report to the Fuehrer for reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1056-PS
First Section: The Organization of the Administration of Occupied Eastern Territories
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
A. _Construction._
I. _Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories._
The newly occupied Eastern Territories are subordinated to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. By directions of the Fuehrer he establishes a civil administration there upon withdrawal of the military administration. He heads and supervises the entire administration of this area and represents the sovereignty of the Reich in the occupied Eastern Territories.
The Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories is organized into the following main departments and departments under the permanent and general deputy of the Reich Minister:
_Main Department I: Central Administration_.
_Main Department II: Policies:_
Department II a : Policies, Department II b : Enlightenment and Press, Department II c : Labor and Tax Policies.
_Main Department III: Administration:_
Department III a : General Administration, Department III b : Health System, Department III c : Veterinary System, Department III d : Law, Department III e : Finance, Department III f : Science and Culture.
_Main Department IV: Economic-political and Technical Cooperation:_
Department IV a : Industrial Economy, Department IV b : Food and Farming, Department IV c : Forest and Lumber Economy, Department IV d : Price-fixing and Price-control, Department IV e : Labor, Department IV f : Technology, Department IV g : Transportation.
To the Reich Ministry is assigned a deputy of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
II. _General Territorial Organization._
The Occupied Eastern Territories are organized into Reich Commissariats.
The Reich Commissariat "Ostland" is subdivided into _General Districts_ [Generalbezirke] which are in turn subdivided into _Main Districts_ [Hauptbezirke] and _Circuit Districts_ [Kreisgebiete].
The boundaries of the Reich Commissariats will be established according to political, ethnic, economic and commercial-political aspects. The boundaries of the areas of command of the Wehrmacht commanders correspond to those of the Reich Commissariats.
III. _Subordinate Offices._
_1. Reich Commissars._
In the Reich Commissariats, Reich Commissars are responsible for the entire civil administration under the supreme authority of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. According to the instructions of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories the Reich Commissar, as a functionary of the Reich heads and supervises, within his precincts, the entire civil administration. Within the scope of these instructions he acts on his own responsibility.
Subordinate offices of the Reich Commissar are:
General Commissariats, Main Commissariats, District Commissariats.
The boundaries of the General Districts are established by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories upon proposal by the Reich Commissar. The boundaries of the Circuit Territories are determined by the Reich Commissar upon proposal by the pertinent General Commissar, in as far as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories has not reserved this right for himself in individual cases. Furthermore the Reich Commissar determines--with approval of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories--the sphere of the Main Commissars.
An administrative staff is subordinated to the Reich Commissar in his Administrative grade. It is organized into:
I. Main Department: Central Administration.
II. Main Department: Policies:
Department II a : Policies, Department II b : Labor and Tax Policies, Department II c : Administration, Department II d : Health system, Department II e : Law, Department II f : Finance, Department II g : Science and Culture.
III. Main Department: Economy:
Department III a : Industrial Economy, Department III b : Food and Farming, Department III c : Forestry and Hunting, Department III d : Price-fixing and Price-control.
IV. Main Department: Technology, Transportation, Labor:
Department IV a : Technology, Department IV b : Transportation, Department IV c : Commitment of Labor.
The heads of the Main Departments have the rank of General Commissars.
Furthermore a Higher SS- and Police Leader is subordinated directly and personally to the Reich Commissar. In addition one official of the Reich Railways and one of the Reich Post Office are assigned to the Reich Commissar who are at the same time liaison officials with the transport and communications offices of the Wehrmacht commander.
Main Department Heads, Department Heads, and Consultants are appointed and dismissed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories upon proposal by the Reich Commissar. The Reich Commissar appoints one of the Main Department Heads to be his chief of staff. He has the task of assuring the smooth coordination of the individual departments and is responsible for the internal affairs of the office. For this purpose he is entitled to have himself constantly informed about their sphere of activity by the Main Department Heads.
The Higher SS- and Police Leader is directly subordinated to the Reich Commissar. However the chief of staff has the general right to secure information from him also. His official title is:
"The Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territory The Higher SS- and Police Leader."
Great stress is to be placed on close cooperation between him, the Chief of Staff, and the other Main Department Heads of the office of the Reich Commissar, particularly with the one for Policies.
Insofar as the Reich Commissar is prevented from performing his duties for a prolonged period of time, a deputy will be provided by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories upon his proposal. This deputy signs with the notation: "for the Reich Commissar." The Main Department Heads and Department Heads sign, insofar as the Reich Commissar has not reserved the final signature for himself, or in case it is not a matter of so much importance that it must be signed by the Reich Commissar, with the notation: "By order" [Im Auftrag]. The Main Department Heads regulate the manner of signing for their department and consultant heads. These must likewise always sign with "by order."
2. _General Commissars._
The General Commissar forms the administrative office of intermediate appeal. Within his jurisdiction he heads the administration according to the general directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the prescriptions of the Reich Commissar.
His office is organized like that of the Reich Commissar, except that in the place of Main Departments, there are Departments whose spheres of work in turn are organized into Consulting Offices which are collected into Groups according to necessity. The General Commissar appoints one of the Department heads as Chief of Staff who has the corresponding position and corresponding rights of the Reich Chiefs of Staff of the Reich Commissars.
For purposes of representation of the General Commissar in cases of prolonged incapacity, the same provisions apply as for representation of the Reich Commissar.
The SS- and Police Leader assigned to the General Commissar is directly subordinated to him; however the Chief of Staff has the general right of requiring information from him. The SS- and Police Leader employs the following official designation:
"The General Commissar . . . . The SS- and Police Leader."
Department Heads, Group Heads and Consultants sign with the remark: "By order." The Department Heads regulate the manner of signing for their consultants.
3. _Regional Commissars._
The Regional Commissar heads the entire administration of the lower administration office in the Circuit District in accordance with the instructions of the General Commissar and the superior offices. With him therefore lies the main weight of the total administrative set-up. The officials to whom the Regional Commissar has granted the right of signing sign with the notation "By order." The leader of the police unit assigned to him is directly subordinated to him.
4. _Main Commissars._
Upon recommendation by the Reich Commissar the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories appoints Main Commissars for Main Districts formed by the consolidation of several Circuit Districts. They are to take care of coordination of administration of the Circuit Districts placed under him by order of the General Commissar. They can have themselves informed concerning all matters by the District Commissars subordinated to them in all decisive points of view of the administration and in urgent cases provide them with instructions. Cautious use is to be made of this right to instruct, as the Main Commissars are not to interpose themselves as a special authority between the District and General Commissars. In every case of instruction to a District Commissar the General Commissar is to be notified in conjunction with an account of the reasons. The Main Commissars are to keep themselves informed of all important matters within the sphere of their authority, by means of numerous conferences, and to inform the General Commissars of important observations. Conduct of business between the General Commissar and the District Commissar takes place directly. General Commissars inform the Main Commissars involved in writing about their orders issued to District Commissars. The same is to take place with bulletins of the District Commissars. The affairs of the Main Commissars are to be elaborated in bulletins.
The responsible office of the Main Commissar requires an understanding of the political and economic-political needs of the region to be supervised, by an exact knowledge of the existing circumstances. The Main Commissar, as representative of the General Commissar, is called upon in his sphere of office to keep Regional and City Commissars spatially in touch with the General Commissar through constant and close liaison with them, and to contribute to the speeding up of necessary decisions, namely such as go beyond the boundaries of the territory. The activity of a Main Commissar, rightly conceived and purposefully conducted, shall and must contribute, to give District and City Commissars increased certainty in their decision, to give the latter a materially and spatially strengthened effect, and to relieve the General Commissar of part of the burden of supervising his subordinated administration. The office of the Main Commissar is politically of special significance. It includes the task of leadership in the official realm subordinated to it.
IV. _Relationship of Superiors in the Service._
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories is the service superior of the Reich Commissar and the officials and the employees subordinate to them. The Reich Commissar is the superior of all officials and employees of his office and of the offices subordinate to him. The General Commissar is the superior of the officials and employees of his office and of the officials and employees of the offices of the Main and Regional Commissars. The Main Commissar and the Regional Commissar are superior of the officials and employees of their offices.
B. _Jurisdictions._
The Reich Commissars, General Commissars, Main Commissars and Regional Commissars (City Commissars) are--aside from the military agencies--the only Reich authorities in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Other Reich authorities may not be established alongside them. They handle all questions of administration of the area which is subordinate to their sovereignty and all affairs which concern the organization and activity of the administration including those of the police in the supervision of the native agencies and organizations, and of the population.
The Reich Minister governs the occupied Eastern Territories by order of the Fuehrer. He can make the law for all the territories.
The Reich Commissar directs and supervises the entire German civil administration as well as the existing and reestablished native administration in his Reich Commissariat. He can decree law (ordinances) for his territory, insofar as the law has not been or will not be decreed by the Reich Minister.
The General Commissar directs the administration of his district and supervises the Main and Regional Commissars as well as the native administration.
The Regional Commissar directs the administration of his territory as a subordinate administrative office and supervises the native offices in the lowest and county echelons.
The following are particularly important administrative tasks:
_a._ Police measures,
_b._ Making the economic forces of the territory available for the maintenance of the occupation troops and the purposes of the German war economy,
_c._ Caring for the population,
_d._ Securing of supplies and installations of all kinds which are important for life and for war,
_e._ Collaboration with the maintenance as well as reestablishment of inland water communications of rail and postal communications,
_f._ Supervision of the civil population, collaboration with the counter intelligence [Abwehr], interesting the population in rendering service,
_g._ Dissolution of enemy organizations which might still exist.
The Armed Forces Commanders exercise the rights of military sovereignty and the territorial power of command in their areas of jurisdiction. Their demands will be carried out in the civilian sphere by the Reich Commissars and their subordinate agencies. The military agencies are neither superior nor subordinate to the agencies of the civilian administration. The Armed Forces Commanders can provide even civilian agencies with directives in urgent cases, however, in accordance with the Fuehrer's decree of 5 June 1941. All agencies of the civilian administration are obligated to inform the military agencies of all affairs which might affect the sphere of their assignments.
Considerable value is to be laid upon a frictionless collaboration. The Commissars are to have themselves thoroughly informed by the Armed Forces Commanders, respectively by the agencies subordinated to them about their observations, experiences, and the measures already taken after taking over the administration. The laws decreed by them and the administrative orders given by them remain in effect insofar as the decrees and ordinances are not abrogated.
The Fuehrer has entrusted Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, as Commissioner for the Four-year Plan, with the supervision of the tasks of the war economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories. The economic inspectorates and economic commands are active there as his representatives (see green folio). These economic inspectorates and economic commands will be substantially absorbed in the agencies of the civil administration after the establishment of the civil administration.
If basic differences of opinion should arise between the agencies of the civil administration and the military agencies or, insofar as they still exist, the economic inspectorates and economic commands, and these cannot be settled in direct conversations, then it is to be reported to the superior civil authority immediately so that the latter can, in cooperation with the superior military agency, bring about an amicable unification.
C. _Business Communications._
After taking over the businesses, the current state of affairs is to be reported briefly to the next superior agency, in particular the taking over of the administration from the hands of the agencies of the military administration as well about the state of the population and the capacity for work of any existing native authorities. It is further to be reported which office buildings have been occupied and which lines of communication are available. The Reich and General Commissars will determine the periods at which the subordinate agencies are to report regularly about the general situation without prejudice to the duty to provide individual reports and special delivery reports (at first, at short intervals which can be later lengthened). At first the Reich Commissars will give the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories a comprehensive report on the situation in brief form twice a month, on the first and fifteenth of each month. The Reich Minister is to be given a report by the Reich Commissar immediately about incidents of an especially important nature. The General Commissars and Regional Commissars must report directly to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories by the quickest means particularly important incidents, as, for example, widespread unrest, more important acts of sabotage and strikes, great natural catastrophes and the like, and at the same time report them to the next superior agency.
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories will publish an official gazette under the title
"Official Gazette of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories" (VBldRM Ost),
in which all the decrees of the Reich Minister will be published. At first the official gazette will only appear when necessary. In addition there will appear the "Reich Ministerial Gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RMBl. dRM Ost)," in which all executive decrees and other administrative directives of general validity will be published.
The Reich Commissars will publish the decree of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, as well as their own decrees and decrees of general interest, in two or more languages according to need in official gazette (Gazette of the Reich Commissar for......).
The General Commissars will publish official papers, likewise in two or more languages, in which they will publish their ordinances and orders of general interest as also the police orders of the Regional Commissars without prejudice to other means of publishing in individual instances.
The title of these official papers will read:
"Official paper of the General Commissar in....."
In cases of doubt the _German_ text of the ordinances, decrees, and orders is valid.
Moreover, all publications of German agencies are to be made known in otherwise usual form, e.g. by publishing in the press which has already been allowed, by placard, public reading, loudspeaker and the like.
The Official Gazette of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories is to be kept by all the agencies within the Occupied Eastern territories. The same applies for the gazettes of the Reich Commissars and the official papers of the General Commissars within their official spheres.
"The operation procedure for the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories" will be valid for the internal conduct of business of the agencies of the Reich Commissars; for communications with secret matters "The directives for secret matters for all administrative authorities."
The last is valid until suitable safes are obtained, with the provision that secret documents may be kept in strong and well locked wooden chests, which are to be kept in rooms which are to be kept locked.
All incoming documents are to be opened by an especially trustworthy official of the Central Administration and/or of the main office and then introduced into the prescribed order of business.
Further orders about the internal operating procedure are to be decreed by the director of the office.
Second Section: Working directives for the Civil Administration
I. _General._
The first task of the Civil Administration in the occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interests of the Reich. This highest fundamental is to be considered first of all measures and deliberations. It is time the occupied Eastern territories are to be able to lead a certain life of their own in the more distant future in this or that not yet determined form. They remain however parts of the Greater German sphere and are always to be governed from the viewpoint of this main thought.
The regulations of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare which deal with the administration of a country occupied by a foreign armed power are not valid since the USSR is dissolved and the Reich, as a result, has the duty of exercising all the powers of government and the other usual powers of sovereignty in the interest of the inhabitants. All measures therefore, which the German administration deems necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive task are permissible.
II. _Political Directives._
(Are being worked on by the political department. See next page).
III. _Administration, Law, Finances._
1. _Administration._
_a._ The specially assigned administration of the country will already be broken up upon the beginning of the Civil Administration. Its representatives will have fled or have been removed by the Soviets. Village Soviets will exist only in individual cases. These are to be dissolved immediately as a rule.
_b._ The Reich Commissars are to make sparing use of the authority to decree laws above all at first, so that the administration is not choked by red tape. The exact knowledge of the territory and its inhabitants, which naturally is not available at present, is essential for an extensive legislation. Likewise the fewest possible binding ordinances are to be decreed. The higher authorities must rather take the path of work directives which will give the subordinate authorities sufficient leeway for the consideration of the local conditions.
_c._ As far as the boundaries of the Regional Commissariat are concerned, at first the boundaries of the corresponding Soviet administrative regions are to be the basis, since the population is accustomed to these and bases for any other determination of boundaries are lacking. As soon as another determination of boundaries appears more to the purpose, in the course of time, it can be done later.
_d._ The handling of cases of sabotage is the concern of the Senior SS- and police leader, of the SS- and Police leader and/or the police leaders of the lower echelon. Insofar, however, as collective measures against the population of a definite region appear appropriate, the decision about them rests with the competent Commissar on the proposal of the Police leader. The calling of the population for the tasks of guarding can be ordered by the Regional Commissar.
The assessment of fines of money or goods, as well as the ordering of the seizure of hostages and the shooting of inhabitants of the territory in which the acts of sabotage have taken place, can only be done by the General Commissar, insofar as the Reich Commissar himself does not intervene. The most sparing use of the seizing of hostages is to be made. Above all it is only to be ordered when the desired result can be forced by this measure and when the case is such that if necessary, in the case of negative results, the consequences of the seizure can be neutralized.
_e._ In cities, villages, worker settlements, city settlements, etc., the interest of reliable persons is to be acquired as soon as possible. From the ranks of these reliable persons a local commissioner (similar to our Buergermeister) and confidential councillors can later be appointed, so that in this way the local life will be set in motion again and the Regional Commissar will have organs under him who will carry out his orders. Insofar as such commissioners and confidential councillors have already been set up by the military administration, they are to be taken over by the Civil Administration at first. In case financial means are necessary for the fulfillment of urgent tasks within individual communities, they are to be supplied by means of credits. The credits are to be charged to the banking institutions of the country, or, in case this is not possible, to the Reich credit bank.
_f._ Where an urgent need of the population for provision goods exists, this is to be satisfied within the range of possibility so that famines can be avoided. It may be desired to grant assistance in money and in goods to urgently needy persons (unemployed and the like).
_g._ With the dissolution of the USSR which accompanied the defeat of this state there is no longer any state structure in the Eastern Regions and consequently no state citizenship for the inhabitants. However, for practical reasons with respect to citizenship the further existence of a common state must be assumed for the time being, so that the inhabitants should not be considered as stateless, which is undesirable for various reasons. The final question of state citizenship can only be decided later since it depends on the state development in the East. Since this problem can only be solved for the whole Eastern Territory, the subordinate authorities must refrain from every independent ruling. At a given time the Reich Minister for the Eastern territories will issue appropriate decrees.
The racial Germans present in the Eastern territories do not become German Reich citizens automatically with the dissolution of the USSR, but rather they are, for the present, placed on a par with the other inhabitants as regards citizenship. Petitions from racial Germans for naturalization are not to be accepted at first, since a general regulation will be executed. Independent of this is that racial Germans, confirmed as such without objection, should already enjoy privileges which are generally granted only to Reich citizens.
_h._ The prohibition of entering or leaving the occupied Eastern territories which was issued by the Supreme Commander of the Army remains effective even after the withdrawal of the military administration. Exceptions to this prohibition of entering and leaving will be granted by the Permit Office attached to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and Permit Offices attached to the Reich Commissars and if necessary to other authorities of the occupied Eastern territories. Entering and leaving may only be allowed on urgent political, economical or other service reasons.
The following are not affected by the prohibition of entering and leaving:
(1) Members of the Armed Forces and members of the Armed Forces personnel with proper identification and travel orders.
(2) Members of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and of the authorities subordinated to it with valid official identification.
No application need be made to the Permit Office or Permit Branch Offices for minor frontier traffic. By "minor frontier traffic" is meant those journeys which have to be made on account of economic contacts over the frontier with the neighbouring countries on either side and are merely to some place lying not more than 50 km. from the frontier. Only the lower-ranking administrative authorities, that is the Regional Commissars, can give permission for frontier traffic.
Permits and frontier traffic passes can be issued for single or several journeys over the frontier. In every case, their validity is limited to a definite period.
The examination of claims, for the issue of permits, is made from political, security police and economic points of view. In cases of doubt, therefore, the Permit Branch Offices attached to the Reich Commissars must obtain the approval of the appropriate department of the Reich Commissars before the permit is issued.
The Permit Branch Offices issue permits merely for journeys from the former territory of the USSR. For journeys into the Occupied Eastern Territories, the Permit Office attached to the Reich Minister is, for the present, the only competent office.
The question, whether a ban on journeys from one Reich Commissariat to another is to be decreed, cannot yet be decided. Only the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories has the authority to make the decision.
_i._ The attitude of the German authorities to the native population is determined, on the one hand, by the political and economic aims, and, on the other, by the attitude of the inhabitants to the Germans. Unprovoked severe measures against the population of the country are not desired and must therefore not be taken.
For reasons of security, it may be necessary, especially in towns and cities, to establish a curfew-hour, which means that, after that hour the population may no longer walk the public thoroughfares and squares. As the time of the curfew can be decided only in accordance with local requirements, the Regional Commissar must be made responsible for imposing it on the instructions of the Reich Commissar and/or the General Commissar.
The same applies to the police closing-time, i.e. the time after which taverns may no longer be opened and no guests may remain in the tavern rooms. The establishing of the curfew and of the police closing-time is to be effected by Police Decree and/or Police Order with appropriate threat of punishment. Apart from this, breaking the curfew order is punishable under the Decree concerning the liability for registration and limitation of sojourn.
2. _Health._
It is of great importance that the health and veterinary services be reestablished as quickly as possible. Doctors, veterinary surgeons or medical personnel on the spot are to be instructed to continue with their work or start it again. In times of emergency, especially in the case of epidemics, a request that doctors, veterinary surgeons and medical supplies be made available is to be sent to the Military Authorities, should it be impossible to overcome the emergency in any other way.
3. _Law._
The Reich Commissars are responsible for controlling the Special Courts set up and attached to the Reich Commissars. These are also Senior Officials of the Prosecuting Authorities attached to these Courts. The SS Executive and Police Officers and Senior SS Executive and Police Officers are in charge of the Courts Martial.
It is desirable (in the Eastern regions first of all) that the country's own jurisdiction be reestablished, formed of reliable persons where they can be found. This is all the more necessary in that the German Courts, on account of the scarcity of personnel, can pass judgment only on offences which are punishable under German Laws and the punishment of which is of urgent German interest. The punishment of other criminals, however, can only remain in abeyance for a short period. The concerns of the civil administration of justice can remain in the background for the time being and some honorary Courts of Justice may suffice at first. Wherever the country's own jurisdiction is still intact, which may be the case in the East, it is to be instructed to continue its work immediately after unreliable elements have been removed.
Those arrested by the Soviet Legal Authorities on account of sentence which has been passed may only be released after each individual case has been examined.
This examination is to be carried out with the greatest speed in regard to convicted nationalists and other political prisoners. In cases of doubt the opinion of the Political Department attached to the Reich Commissar or the General Commissar or the Executive SS and Police Officer should be obtained.
The District Commissar is responsible for the supervision of all prisons, insofar as the Reich Commissar does not decree otherwise.
As it is impossible at the moment to produce a comprehensive new Penal Code, the Soviet Penal Law (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the pre-Soviet Laws) are for the time being still applicable to the country's own courts, nevertheless without those regulations which apply to political offences. This also applies with regard to the Civil Law, the right of voluntary jurisdiction and to the right of procedure.
4. _Finance._
It is intended to draw up a unified General Budget for the complete Administration of the Eastern Territories, in other words from the Reich Minister downwards to the District Commissar. Whether there is any point in separating this plan into separate budgets for the various Reich Commissariats, or whether credit accounts will simply be established for the subordinate administrative bodies, can only be decided after the whole Administration has been set up. The basic principle of this General Budget must be that the cost of the whole administration shall be borne by the country itself. Until such a budget has been drawn up and further regulations have been issued regarding the use of the income derived from taxes and from balances from the State undertakings, the Reich will use credits to cover public expenditure. These credits which will be allotted to the Reich Commissars and from there on to the subordinate offices by the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Eastern Territories are to be administered in accordance with the directives as per printed Appendix.
Until further notice taxes are to continue to be paid by the inhabitants in accordance with the existing Soviet taxation system (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in accordance with the taxation system of the pre-Soviet era) if nothing is decided to contrary. The taxation officials in question who are still capable of working are to take up their duties immediately and/or continue them. The same applies to the utilization of the balances from the State undertakings.
The country's own authorities are forbidden to dispose of the amounts collected without the permission of the German authorities (for the time being Reich Commissars).
5. _Learning and Education._
Schooling will, in most parts of the country, have ceased due to the military events. There is in general no particular need for schooling to be put into operation again quickly, as long as there are other urgent tasks to carry out. In the East the resumption of schooling in the near future should be aimed at, insofar as there are suitable and reliable teachers to hand. For the time being further directives from the Reich Minister should be awaited with regard to Universities and other Academic Institutions and with regard to cultural establishments.
IV. _Economic Administration._
As the Reich Marshall in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four-year Plan has been charged by the Fuehrer with the supreme coordination of the Economy of the whole Eastern Region, his directives are applicable to the economic measures which are laid down in the printed collective folder attached. When carrying out these directives the general political aim as laid down in figure 2. of this section should be minutely observed. If in individual cases, the aims of economic policy conflict, in the opinion of the German department dealing with the matter, with this general political goal, the Reich Commissar should be informed, where a matter of principle is involved, and his decision requested.
V. _Engineering and Communications._
With regard to urgent constructional measures, particularly the repairing and improving of highways, the necessary directives are likewise given in the "Green file," published by the Reichsmarschall. The departments of the Civil Administration should most emphatically support the carrying out of these directives.
The Reich Railways and the Reich Post Office are under the control of the military departments for the duration of the war. Thus the Reich Commissars and the authorities under their orders have no power to issue instructions to the Reich Railways and the Reich Post Office. Each Reich Commissar, however, is allotted a delegate of the Reich Railways and the Reich Post Office who will hear the wishes of the Civil Administration and submit them to his administration.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1058-PS
Extract from a speech of Reichsleiter Rosenberg before the closest
## participants in the problem of the East, on 20 June, 1941.
The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus-territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (wagon factories etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation in consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a _coming_ Russian later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from those of the Western people. The fight between Turgnjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. A historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1060-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGES 249-250, of 16 March 1938
Supplementary Ordinance to the Law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, of 16 March 1938
On the basis of the law of 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I. p. 237) concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, I order:
Paragraph 1
1. The Reichsminister of the Interior is the central office for the accomplishment of the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich.
2. He can delegate his authority to a deputy, whose office is in Vienna and who holds the official title of "Reichs deputy for Austria."
Paragraph 2
The deputy for the four-year plan can delegate authority to the Reichs deputy for Austria.
Paragraph 3
The Reichs deputy for Austria is therefore appointed jointly by the Reichs minister of the interior and the deputy for the four-year plan.
Munich, 16 March 1938
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler The Reichs Minister of the Interior Frick The Deputy for the Four-year Plan Goering General Field Marshal
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1061-PS
THE WARSAW GHETTO IS NO MORE
For the Fuehrer and their country the following fell in the battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former Ghetto of Warsaw:
[follow 15 names]
Furthermore, the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielinski, born 13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat * * * fell on 19 April 1943 while fulfilling his duty. * * * They gave their utmost, their life. We shall never forget them. The following were wounded:
[follow the names of--
60 Waffen SS personnel. 11 "Watchmen" from Training Camps, probably Lithuanians, to judge by their names. 12 Security Police Officers in SS Units. 5 men of the Polish Police 2 regular Army personnel engineers]
|_Average number | of personnel _Units used in the action_ | used per day_ ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- SS Staff & Police Leader | 6/5 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- _Waffen SS_: | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion| 3, Warsaw | 4/440 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- SS Cav. Training and Res Bat. Warsaw | 5/381
SS Staff & Police Leader | 6/5 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- _Police_: | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- SS Police Regiment 22 I. Bat. | 3/94 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- III. Bat. | 3/134 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Engineering Emergency Service | 1/6 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Polish Police | 4/363 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Polish Fire Brigade | 166 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- _Security Police_: | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Wehrmacht | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Light AA Alarm Battery III 8 Warsaw | 2/22 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Engineers Det. of Railway Armored Trains | 2/42 Res. Bat. Rembertow | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- Res. Eng. 14 Gora-Kalwaria | 1/34 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- _Foreign Racial Watchmen_: | ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- 1 Bat. "Trawniki" men | 2/335 ------------------------------------------------------+----------------- | Total: 36/2054
[Translator's note: This obviously means, 36 officers, 2054 men]
The creation of special areas to be inhabited by Jews, and the restriction of the Jews with regard to residence and trading is nothing new in the history of the East. Such measures were first taken far back in the Middle Ages; they could be observed as recently as during the last few centuries. These restrictions were imposed with the intention of protecting the aryan population against the Jews.
Identical considerations led us as early as February, 1940 to conceive the project of creating a Jewish residential district in Warsaw. The initial intention was to establish as the Ghetto that part of the City of Warsaw which has the Vistula as its Eastern frontier. The particular situation on prevailing in Warsaw seemed at first to frustrate this plan. It was moreover opposed by several authorities particularly by the City Administration. They pointed in particular that disturbances in industry and trade would ensue if a Ghetto were founded in Warsaw, and that it would be impossible to provide the Jews with food if they were assembled in a closed area.
At a conference held in March 1940, it was decided to postpone the plan of creating a Ghetto for the time being, owing to the above objections. At the same time a plan was considered to declare the District of Lublin the collecting area for all Jews within the Government General, especially for the evacuated or fugitive Jews arriving from the Reich. But as early as April 1940, the Higher SS and Police Leader, East, Cracow, issued a declaration that there was no intention of assembling the Jews within the Lublin District. In the meantime, the Jews had increasingly taken to crossing the frontiers without permission and illegally. This noted especially at the limits of the Districts of Lowicz and Skierniewice. Conditions in the town of Lowicz became dangerous from the point of view of hygiene as well as from that of the Security Police, owing to these illegal migrations of Jews. The District President of Lowicz therefore, began to install Ghettos in his district in order to avoid these dangers.
The experiences in the district of Lowicz, after Ghettos had been installed, showed that this method is the only one suitable for dispelling the dangers which emanate repeatedly from the Jews.
The necessity of erecting a Ghetto in the City of Warsaw as well became more and more urgent in the summer of 1940, since more and more troops were being assembled in the district of Warsaw after termination of the French campaign. At that time the Department for Hygiene urged the speedy erection of a Ghetto in the interest of preserving the health of the German Forces and of the native population as well. The original plan of establishing the Ghetto in the suburb of Praga as intended in February 1940, would have taken at least 4 to 5 months, since almost 600,000 persons had to be moved. But since experience showed that greater outbreaks of epidemics might be expected in the winter months and since for this reason the District Medical Officer urged that the resettling action ought to be completed by 15 November 1940 at the latest, the plan of establishing a suburban ghetto in Praga was dropped; and instead, the area which hitherto had been used as a quarantine area for epidemics was selected for use as a Jewish residential area. In October 1940, the Governor ordered the Commissioner of the District, President for the City of Warsaw, to complete the resettlement necessary for establishing the Ghetto within the City of Warsaw by 15 November 1940.
The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews. It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of 2-1/2 rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by partition and other walls and by walling-up of thoroughfares, windows, doors, open spaces, etc.
It was administered by the Jewish Board of Elders, who received their instructions from the Commissioner for the Ghetto, who was immediately subordinated to the Governor. The Jews were granted self-administration in which the German supervising authorities intervened only where German interests were touched. In order to enable the Jewish Board of Elders to execute its orders, a Jewish Police force was set up, identified by special armbands and a special beret and armed with rubber truncheons. This Jewish Police force was charged with maintaining order and security within the Ghetto and was subordinated to the German and Polish Police.
II
It soon became clear, however, that not all dangers had been removed by this confining the Jews to one place. Security considerations required removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw altogether. The first large resettlement action took place in the period from 22 July to 3 October 1942. In this action 310,322 Jews were removed. In January 1943 a second resettlement action was carried out by which altogether 6,500 Jews were affected.
When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943 he ordered the SS and Police Leader for the District of Warsaw to _transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance which were installed within the Ghetto including their personnel and machines_. The execution of this transfer order proved to be very difficult, since the managers as well as the Jews resisted in every possible way. The SS and Police Leader thereupon decided to enforce the transfer of the enterprises in a large-scale action which he intended to carry out in three days. The necessary preparations had been taken by my predecessor, who also had given the order to start the large-scale action. I myself arrived in Warsaw on 17 April 1943 and took over the command of the action on 19 April 1943, 0800 hours, the
## action itself having started the same day at 0600 hours.
Before the large-scale action began, the limits of the former Ghetto had been blocked by an external barricade in order to prevent the Jews from breaking out. This barricade was maintained from the start to the end of the action and was especially reinforced at night.
When we invaded the Ghetto for the first time, the Jews and the Polish bandits succeeded in repelling the participating units, including tanks and armored cars, by a well-prepared concentration of fire. When I ordered a second attack, about 0800 hours, I distributed the units, separated from each other by indicated lines, and charged them with combing out the whole of the Ghetto, each unit for a certain part. Although firing commenced again, we now succeeded in combing out the blocks according to plan. The enemy was forced to retire from the roofs and elevated bases to the basements, dug-outs, and sewers. In order to prevent their escaping into the sewers, the sewerage system was dammed up below the Ghetto and filled with water, but the Jews frustrated this plan to a great extent by blowing up the turning off valves. Late the first day we encountered rather heavy resistance, but it was quickly broken by a special raiding party. In the course of further operations we succeeded in expelling the Jews from their prepared resistance bases, sniper holes, and the like, and in occupying during the 20 and 21 April the greater part of the so-called remainder of the Ghetto to such a degree that the resistance continued within these blocks could no longer be called considerable.
The main Jewish battle group, mixed with Polish bandits, had already retired during the first and second day to the so-called Muranowski Square. There, it was reinforced by a considerable number of Polish bandits. Its plan was to hold the Ghetto by every means in order to prevent us from invading it. The Jewish and Polish standards were hoisted at the top of a concrete building as a challenge to us. These two standards, however, were captured on the second day of the action by a special raiding party. SS Untersturmfuehrer Dehmke fell in this skirmish with the bandits; he was holding in his hand a hand-grenade which was hit by the enemy and exploded, injuring him fatally. After only a few days I realized that the original plan had no prospect of success, unless the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance distributed throughout the Ghetto were dissolved. It was therefore necessary to approach these firms and to give them appropriate time for being evacuated and immediately transferred. Thus one of these firms after the other was dealt with, and we very soon deprived the Jews and bandits of their chance to take refuge time and again in these enterprises, which were under the supervision of the Armed Forces. In order to decide how much time was necessary to evacuate these enterprises thorough inspections were necessary. The conditions discovered there are indescribable. I cannot imagine a greater chaos than in the Ghetto of Warsaw. The Jews had control of everything, from the chemical substances used in manufacturing explosives to clothing and equipment for the Armed Forces. The managers knew so little of their own shops that the Jews were in a position to produce inside these shops arms of every kind, especially hand grenades, Molotov cocktails, and the like.
Moreover, the Jews had succeeded in fortifying some of these factories as centers of resistance. Such a center of resistance in an Army accommodation office had to be attacked as early as the second day of the action by an Engineer's Unit equipped with flame throwers and by artillery. The Jews were so firmly established in this shop that it proved to be impossible to induce them to leave it voluntarily; I therefore resolved to destroy this shop the next day by fire.
The managers of these enterprises, which were generally also supervised by an officer of the Armed Forces, could in most cases make no specified statements on their stocks and the whereabouts of these stocks. The statements which they made on the number of Jews employed by them were in every case incorrect. Over and over again we discovered that these labyrinths of edifices belonging to the armament concerns as residential blocks, contained rich Jews who had succeeded in finding accommodations for themselves and their families under the name of "armament workers" and were leading marvelous lives there. Despite all our orders to the managers to make the Jews leave those enterprises, we found out in several cases that managers simply concealed the Jews by shutting them in, because they expected that the action would be finished within a few days and that they then would be able to continue working with the remaining Jews. According to the statements of arrested Jews, women also seem to have played a prominent part. The Jews are said to have endeavored to keep up good relations with officers and men of the armed forces. Carousing is said to have been frequent, during the course of which business deals are said to have been concluded between Jews and Germans.
The number of Jews forcibly taken out of the buildings and arrested was relatively small during the first few days. It transpired that the Jews had taken to hiding in the sewers and in specially erected dug-outs. Whereas we had assumed during the first days that there were only scattered dug-outs, we learned in the course of the large-scale
## action that the whole Ghetto was systematically equipped with cellars,
dug-outs, and passages. In every case these passages and dug-outs were connected with the sewer system. Thus, the Jews were able to maintain undisturbed subterranean traffic. They also used this sewer network for escaping subterraneously into the Aryan part of the city of Warsaw. Continuously, we received reports of attempts of Jews to escape through the sewer holes. While pretending to build air-raid shelters they had been erecting dug-outs within the former Ghetto ever since the autumn of 1942. These were intended to conceal every Jew during the new evacuation action, which they had expected for quite a time, and to enable them to resist the invaders in a concerted action. Through posters, handbills, and whisper propaganda, the communistic resistance movement actually brought it about that the Jews entered the dug-outs as soon as the new large-scale operation started. How far their precautions went can be seen from the fact that many of the dug-outs had been skilfully equipped with furnishings sufficient for entire families, washing and bathing facilities, toilets, arms and munition supplies, and food supplies sufficient for several months. There were differently equipped dug-outs for rich and for poor Jews. To discover the individual dug-outs was difficult for the units, as they had been efficiently camouflaged. In many cases, it was possible only through betrayal on the part of the Jews.
When only a few days had passed, it became apparent that the Jews no longer had any intention to resettle voluntarily, but were determined to resist evacuation with all their force and by using all the weapons at their disposal. So-called battle groups had been formed, led by Polish-Bolshevists; they were armed and paid any price asked for available arms.
During the large-scale action we succeeded in catching some Jews who had already been evacuated and resettled in Lublin or Troolinka, but had broken out from there and returned to the Ghetto, equipped with arms and ammunition. Time and again Polish bandits found refuge in the Ghetto and remained there undisturbed, since we had no forces at our disposal to comb out this maze. Whereas it had been possible during the first days to catch considerable numbers of Jews, who are cowards by nature, it became more and more difficult during the second half of the action to capture the bandits and Jews. Over and over again new battle groups consisting of 20 to 30 or more Jewish fellows, 18 to 25 years of age, accompanied by a corresponding number of women kindled new resistance. These battle groups were under orders to put up armed resistance to the last and if necessary to escape arrest by committing suicide. One such battle group succeeded in mounting a truck by ascending from a sewer in the so-called Prosta, and in escaping with it (about 30 to 35 bandits). One bandit who had arrived with this truck exploded 2 hand grenades, which was the agreed signal for the bandits waiting in the sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews--there were Polish bandits among these gangs armed with carbines, small arms, and in one case a light machine gun, mounted the truck and drove away in an unknown direction. The last member of this gang, who was on guard in the sewer and was detailed to close the lid of the sewer hole, was captured. It was he who gave the above information. The search for the truck was unfortunately without result.
During this armed resistance the women belonging to the battle groups were equipped the same as the men; some were members of the Chaluzim movement. Not infrequently, these women fired pistols with both hands. It happened time and again that these women had pistols or hand grenades (Polish "pineapple" hand grenades) concealed in their bloomers up to the last moment to use against the men of the Waffen SS, Police, or Wehrmacht.
The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken only by relentlessly using all our force and energy by day and night. _On 23 April 1943 the Reichs Fuehrer SS issued through the higher SS and Police Fuehrer East at Cracow his order to complete the combing out of the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest severity and relentless tenacity._ I therefore decided to destroy the entire Jewish residential area by setting every block on fire, including the blocks of residential buildings near the armament works. One concern after the other was systematically evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The Jews then emerged from their hiding places and dug-outs in almost every case. Not infrequently, the Jews stayed in the burning buildings until, because of the heat and the fear of being burned alive they preferred to jump down from the upper stories after having thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles into the street from the burning buildings. With their bones broken, they still tried to crawl across the street into blocks of buildings which had not yet been set on fire or were only partly in flames. Often Jews changed their hiding places during the night, by moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings, taking refuge there until they were found by our patrols. Their stay in the sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the first week. Frequently from the street, we could hear loud voices coming through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the Waffen SS, the Police or the Wehrmacht Engineers courageously climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already dead, or were shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the Jews. Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes and at a fixed time lowered smoke candles into them, with the result that the bandits fled from what they believed to be gas to the center of the former Ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the sewer holes there. A great number of Jews, who could not be counted, were exterminated by blowing up sewers and dug-outs.
The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.
Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS had only been trained for three to four weeks before being assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the pluck, courage, and devotion to duty which they showed. It must be stated that the Wehrmacht Engineers, too, executed the blowing up of dug-outs, sewers, and concrete buildings with indefatigability and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of the Police, a large part of whom had already been at the front, again excelled by their dashing spirit.
Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires but whose numbers could not be ascertained.
During the large-scale operation the Aryan population was informed by posters that it was strictly forbidden to enter the former Jewish Ghetto and that anybody caught within the former Ghetto without valid pass would be shot. At the same time these posters informed the Aryan population again that the death penalty would be imposed on anybody who intentionally gave refuge to a Jew, especially lodged, supported, or concealed a Jew outside the Jewish residential area.
Permission was granted to the Polish police to pay to any Polish policeman who arrested a Jew within the Aryan part of Warsaw one third of the cash in the Jew's possession. This measure has already produced results.
The Polish population for the most part approved the measures taken against the Jews. Shortly before the end of the large-scale operation, the Governor issued a special proclamation which he submitted to the undersigned for approval before publication, to the Polish population; in it he informed them of the reasons for destroying the former Jewish Ghetto by mentioning the assassinations carried out lately in the Warsaw area and the mass graves found in Catyn; at the same time they were asked to assist us in our fight against Communist agents and Jews (see enclosed poster).
The large-scale action was terminated on 16 May 1943 with the blowing up of the Warsaw synagogue at 2015 hours.
Now, there are no more factories in the former Ghetto. All the goods, raw materials, and machines there have been moved and stored somewhere else. All buildings etc., have been destroyed. The only exception is the so-called Dzielna Prison of the Security Police, which was exempted from destruction.
III
Although the large-scale operation has been completed, we have to reckon with the possibility that a few Jews are still living in the ruins of the former Ghetto; therefore, this area must be firmly shut off from the Aryan residential area and be guarded. Police Battalion III/23 has been charged with this duty. This Police Battalion has instructions to watch the former Ghetto, particularly to prevent anybody from entering the former Ghetto, and to shoot immediately anybody found inside the Ghetto without authority. The Commander of the Police Battalion will continue to receive further direct orders from the SS and Police Fuehrer. In this way, it should be possible to keep the small remainder of Jews there, if any, under constant pressure and to exterminate them eventually. The remaining Jews and bandits must be deprived of any chance of survival by destroying all remaining buildings and refuges and cutting off the water supply.
It is proposed to change the Dzielna Prison into a concentration camp and to use the inmates to remove, collect and hand over for reuse the millions of bricks, the scrap-iron, and other materials.
IV
Of the total of 56,065 Jews caught, about 7,000 were exterminated within the former Ghetto in the course of the large-scale action, and 6,929 by transporting them to T.II, which means 14,000 Jews were exterminated altogether. Beyond the number of 56,065 Jews an estimated number of 5,000 to 6,000 were killed by explosions or in fires.
The number of destroyed dug-outs amounts to 631.
_Booty_:
7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle
59 pistols of various calibers
Several hundred hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones
Several hundred incendiary bottles
Home-made explosives
Infernal machines with fuses
A large amount of explosives, ammunition for weapons of all calibers, including some machine-gun ammunition.
Regarding the booty of arms, it must be taken into consideration that the arms themselves could in most cases not be captured, as the bandits and Jews would, before being arrested, throw them into hiding places or holes which could not be ascertained or discovered. The smoking out of the dug-out by our men, also often made the search for arms impossible. As the dug-outs had to be blown up at once, a search later on was out of the question.
The captured hand grenades, ammunition, and incendiary bottles were at once reused by us against the bandits.
_Further booty_:
1,240 used military tunics (part of them with medal ribbons--Iron Cross and East Medal)
600 pairs of used trousers
Other equipment and German steel helmets
108 horses, 4 of them still in the former Ghetto (hearse)
Up to 23 May 1943 we had counted:
4.4 million Zloty; furthermore about 5 to 6 million Zloty not yet counted, a great amount of foreign currency, e.g. $14,300 in paper and $9,200 in gold, moreover valuables (rings, chains, watches, etc.) in great quantities.
State of the Ghetto at the termination of the large-scale operation:
Apart from 8 buildings (Police Barracks, hospital, and accommodations for housing working-parties) the former Ghetto is completely destroyed. Only the dividing walls are left standing where no explosions were carried out. But the ruins still contain a vast amount of stones and scrap material which could be used.
Warsaw, 16 May, 1943. The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
* * * * *
Copy
Warsaw, 20 April 1943. Journal No. 516/43 secret.
(Daily reports)
SS Service Teletype message
_From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw_ Ref. No.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07 Re: Ghetto Operation. To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, Cracow
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 19 April 1943:
Closing of Ghetto commenced 0300 hrs. At 0600 order to Waffen-SS (strength: 16/850) to comb out the remainder of the Ghetto. Hardly had the units fallen in, strong concerted fire-concentration by the Jews and bandits. The tank used in this action and the two heavy armored cars pelted with Molotov cocktails (incendiary bottles). Tank twice set on fire. Owing to this enemy counterattack, we had at first to take the units back. Losses in first attack: 12 men (6 SS-men, 6 Trawniki-men). About 800 hrs. second attack by the units, under the command of the undersigned. Although the counterattack was reported, this time we succeeded in combing out the blocks of buildings according to plan. We caused the enemy to retire from the roofs and elevated prepared positions into the cellars or dug-outs and sewers. During this combing-out we caught only about 200 Jews. Immediately afterwards raiding parties were directed to dug-outs known to us with the order to pull out the Jews and to destroy the dug-outs. About 380 Jews captured. We found out that the Jews had taken to the sewers. Sewers were completely inundated, to make staying there impossible. About 1730 hrs. we encountered very strong resistance from one block of buildings including machine-gun fire. A special raiding party invaded that block and defeated the enemy, but could not catch the resisters. The Jews and criminals resisted from base to base, and escaped at the last moment across lofts or through subterranean passages. About 2030 hrs. the external barricade was reinforced. All units were withdrawn from the Ghetto and dismissed to their barracks. Reinforcement of the barricade by 250 Waffen-SS men. Continuation of operation on 20 April 1943.
_Units at my disposal_: SS-Panzer-Gren. Res. Batl. 6/400 SS-Cav. Res. Batl. 10/450 Police 6/165 Security Service 2/48 Trawniki-men 1/150
Wehrmacht: 1 10-cm-Howitzer 1/7 1 Flame thrower 1 Engineers 2/16 Medical detachments 1/1 3 2.28-cm A.A. Guns 2/24 1 French tank of the Waffen-SS 2 heavy armored cars of the Waffen-SS -------- Total: 31/1262
I put Major of Police _Sternagel_ in command of today's operations subject to my further instructions if necessary.
At 0700 hrs. 9 raiding parties were formed, each 1/36 strong, consisting of mixed units, to comb out and to search the remainder of the Ghetto intensively. This search is still in progress; its first objective will be completed by 1100 hrs. In the meantime it has been ascertained that part of the Ghetto which is no longer inhabited but not yet released and which contains several armament factories and the like, there are several centers of resistance, which were so strong that the tank could not go through. 2 raiding parties defeated these centers of resistance and made a passage for the tank men. In this operation we already had two wounded (Waffen-SS).
Enemy is much more cautious than yesterday, since he has of course learned of the heavy arms at our disposal.
My intention is first to comb out completely the remainder of the Ghetto and then to clean out in the same manner the so-called uninhabited Ghetto, which so far has not been released. It had been ascertained in the meantime that the latter part of the Ghetto contains at least 10 to 12 dug-outs, some of which are even in armament factories. The whole operation is made more difficult because there are still factories in the Ghetto which must be protected against bombardment and fire, because they contain machines and tools.
A further report will follow tonight.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
/s/ Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 20 April 1943.
Ref. No. I ab St/Gr 16 07--Journal No. 517/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Supplementing my teletype message of 20 April 1943--Ref. St/Gr 16 07, re Ghetto Operation--I beg to report as follows:
The resistance centers ascertained with the uninhabited but not yet released part of the Ghetto were crushed by a battle group of the Wehrmacht--Engineers and flame throwers. The Wehrmacht had one wounded in this operation, shot through the lungs. Nine raiding parties broke through as far as the northern limit of the Ghetto. 9 dug-outs were found, their inmates crushed when they resisted, and the dug-outs blown up. What losses the enemy suffered cannot be ascertained accurately. Altogether the 9 raiding parties caught 505 Jews today; those among them who are able-bodied were kept ready for transport to Poniatowo. At about 1500 hrs. I managed to arrange that the block of buildings occupied by the Army Accommodation Office said to be occupied by 4,000 Jews is to be evacuated at once. The German manager was asked to call upon the Jewish workers to leave the block voluntarily. Only 28 Jews obeyed this order. Thereupon I resolved either to evacuate the block by force or to blow it up. The A.A. Artillery--3 2-cm. guns used for this operation had two men killed. The 10-cm howitzer, which also was used, expelled the gangs from their strong fortifications and also inflicted losses on them, as far as we were able to ascertain. This action had to be broken off owing to the fall of darkness. On 21 April 1943 we shall attack this resistance center again, as far as possible it will remain blocked off during the night.
In today's action we caught, apart from the Jews reported above, considerable stores of incendiary bottles, hand grenades, ammunition, military tunics, and equipment.
_Losses_: 2 dead (Wehrmacht) 7 wounded (6 Waffen SS, 1 Trawniki-man)
In one case the bandits had laid pressure mines. I have succeeded in causing the firms W.C. Toebens, Schultz and Co., and Hoffman to be ready for evacuation with their entire personnel on 21 April 1943 at 0600 hrs. In this way, I hope to get the way free at last for cleaning out the Ghetto. The Trustees Toebens has pledged himself to induce the Jews, numbering about 4,000 to 5,000, to follow him voluntarily to the assembling point for being resettled. In case this has as little success as was attained in the case of the Army Accommodation Office, I am going to clean out this part of the Ghetto as well by force. I beg to acknowledge receipt of the order which the Obergruppenfuehrer communicated to me by telephone today, and of the powers granted to me.
Next report on 21 April 1943 at noon.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 21 April 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab/St/Gr--16 07 --Journal Nr. 527/43.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police, _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 21 April 1943.
Supplementing the report which I made today about 1400 hrs. by telephone, I beg to report:
Forces at my disposal as of 20 April 1943.
Start of operation: 0700 hrs. The whole of the Ghetto has continued to be cordoned off since the start of the operations on 19 April 1943.
Inasmuch as the special operation concerning the block of buildings occupied by the Army Accommodation Office had to be interrupted yesterday because of darkness, one battle group reinforced by Engineers and heavy artillery was again sent into the block of buildings, which was found to contain an enormous quantity of dug-outs and subterranean passages firing from time to time. I resolved therefore to blow up these passages which we had discovered and subsequently to set the entire block on fire. Not until the building was well aflame did screaming Jews make their appearance, and they were evacuated at once. We had no losses in this operation. Precautionary measures were taken in order to ensure that the conflagration remained localized.
The main body of our forces was detailed to cleanse the so-called uninhabited, but not yet released, part of the Ghetto by proceeding from South to North. Before we started this action, we caught 5,200 Jews who had been employed in enterprises under the supervision of the Commissioner for Armament [Ru Ko-Betrieben] and transported them under armed guard to the Railway Station which had been chosen for use in the resettlement. I formed 3 search-parties to which were attached special raiding parties who had the duty to attack or blow up the dug-outs which were known to us. This operation had to be interrupted when darkness set in, after one half of the area mentioned had been combed out.
Continued on 22 April 1943, 0700 hrs.
Apart from the Jews who were to be evacuated, 150 Jews or bandits were killed in battle and about 80 bandits were killed when their dug-outs were blown up. The enemy today used the same arms as on the previous day, particularly home-made explosives. Samples have been kept by the SS and Police Fuehrer. For the first time we observed the participation of members of the Jewish Women's Battle Association (Chaluzim Movement). We captured rifles, pistols, hand grenades, explosives, horses, and parts of SS uniforms.
Own losses: 2 policemen, 2 SS-men, 1 Trawniki-man. (light wounds)
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref._ No. I ab St/Gr 16 07--Journal Nr. 530/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation. (supplement to par. 1 of letter of 21 April 1943).
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find despite all our search operations left their hideouts under the roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere, and appeared at the outside of the buildings, trying to escape the flames. Masses of them--entire families--were already aflame and jumped from the windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once. During the whole night there were shots from buildings which were supposed to be evacuated. We had no losses in our cordoning forces. 5,300 Jews were caught for the evacuation and removed.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref_. Nr. I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 531/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of the Ghetto Operation on 22 April 1943 up to 1200 hrs.
One raiding party was dispatched to invade once more the block of buildings which for the greater part had burned out or was still aflame, in order to catch those Jews who were still inside. When shooting again started from one block against the men of the Waffen-SS, this block also was set on fire, with the result that a considerable number of bandits were scared from their hideouts and shot while trying to escape. Apart for those, we caught about 180 Jews in the yards of the buildings. The main body of our units continued the cleansing
## action from the line where we terminated this action yesterday.
This operation is still in progress. As on the preceding days local resistance was broken and the dug-outs we discovered were blown up. Unfortunately there is no way of preventing part of the Jews and bandits from taking refuge in the sewers below the Ghetto, where we can hardly catch them since they have stopped the flooding. The city administration is not in a position to frustrate this nuisance. Neither did the use of smoke candles or the introduction of creosote into the water have the desired result. Cooperation with the Wehrmacht splendid.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref._ Nr.: ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 532/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation of 22 April 1943. Report on action up to 1200 hrs. has already been submitted by my message of today. Continuing, I beg to report:
When the special raiding party searched the remainder of the blocks as already reported, they met with resistance at some places; they had the following success: 1,100 Jews caught for evacuation, 203 bandits and Jews killed, 15 dug-outs blown up. They captured 80 incendiary bottles and other booty. Units at my disposal: as reported by teletype message on 20 April 1943. Journal No. 516/43 secret.
_Our losses_: SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dehmke (dead); enemy hit a hand grenade which he carried. (SS-Cav.Res. Batl.)
1 Sergeant of Police (shot through the lungs)
When the Engineers blew up the dug-outs, a considerable number of Jews and bandits were buried under the ruins. In a number of cases it was found necessary to start fires in order to smoke the gangs out.
I must add that since yesterday some of the units have been shot at time and again from outside the Ghetto, that is, from the Aryan part of Warsaw. Raiding parties at once entered the area in question and in one case succeeded in capturing 35 Polish bandits, Communists, who were liquidated at once. Today it happened repeatedly when we found it necessary to execute some bandits, that they collapsed shouting "Long live Poland," "Long live Moscow."
The operation will be continued on 23 April 1943, 0700 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Maj. Gen. of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 23 April 1943.
Ref. No.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 538/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 23 April 1943. Start: 0700 hours.
The whole of the former Ghetto had been divided for the purposes of today's combing-out operations into 24 districts. One reinforced searching party was detailed to each district with special orders. These assignments had to be carried out by 1600 hours.
Result of this action: 600 Jews and bandits ferreted out and captured, about 200 Jews and bandits killed, 48 dug-outs, some of them of a quite elaborate character, blown up. We captured apart from valuables and money--some gas masks.
The units had been informed that we intended to terminate the operation today. In the morning the Jews had already become aware of this instruction. This is why a renewed search by the searching parties was undertaken after an interval of 1 to 1-1/2 hours. The result was, as always, that again Jews and bandits were discovered to be in various blocks. From one block shots were even fired against the cordoning units. An attack by a special battle group was ordered and in order to smoke the bandits out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews and bandits held out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews and bandits held their fire up to the last moment and then concerted their fire against the units. They even used carbines. A number of bandits who were shooting from balconies were hit by our men and crashed down.
Furthermore, today we discovered a place said to have been the headquarters of the "P PR"; we found it unoccupied and destroyed it. It was on this 5th day of operations that obviously we found the worst of the terrorists and activists, who so far had always found ways and means to dodge every searching or evacuation action.
A racial German reported that again some Jews had escaped through the sewers into the Aryan part of the city. We learned from a traitor that there were some Jews in a certain house. A special motorized raiding party invaded the building and caught 3 Jews, 2 of them females. During this operation their motor-car was pelted with one incendiary bottle and one explosive; 2 policemen were wounded.
The whole operation is rendered more difficult by the cunning way in which the Jews and bandits act; for instance, we discover that the hearses which were used to collect the corpses lying around at the same time bring living Jews to the Jewish cemetery, and thus they are enabled to escape from the Ghetto. Now this way of escape also is barred by continuous control of the hearses.
At the termination of today's operation about 2200 hours, we discovered that again about 30 bandits had passed into a so-called armaments factory, where they had found refuge. Since the forces are storing goods of great value in this enterprise, this factory was requested to evacuate the building by noon on 24 April; this will enable us to cleanse that labyrinth of a building tomorrow.
Today 3,500 Jews were caught who are to be evacuated from the factories. A total of 19,450 Jews have been caught for resettlement or already evacuated up to today. Of these about 2,500 Jews are still to be loaded. The next train will start on 24 April 1943.
Strength as of 22 April 1943, without 150 Trawniki men; these have already been put at the disposal of the Eastern Command as reinforcement for another assignment.
_Our losses_:
2 Police corporals ("SB") wounded 1 Trawniki man wounded.
The operation will be continued on 24 April 1943, 1000 hours. This hour was chosen so that Jews who may still be in the Ghetto will believe that the operation was actually terminated today.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major general of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 24 April 1943.
Ref. Nr.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal No. 545/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.
The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and general of the Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 24 April 1943, start 1000 hours.
Contrary to the preceding days, the 24 searching parties which had again been formed did not start at one end of the Ghetto, but proceeded from all sides at the same time. Apparently the Jews still in the Ghetto were deceived by the fact that the operation did not start until 1000 hours into believing that the action really had been terminated yesterday. The search action, therefore, had especially satisfactory results today. This success is furthermore due to the fact that the noncommissioned officers and men have meanwhile become accustomed to the cunning fighting, methods and tricks used by the Jews and bandits and that they have acquired great skill in tracking down the dug-outs which are found in such great number. The raiding parties having returned, we set about to clean a certain block of buildings, situated in the north-eastern part of the former Ghetto. In this labyrinth of buildings there was a so-called armaments firm which reportedly had goods worth millions for manufacture and storage. I had notified the Wehrmacht of my intentions on 23 April 1943 about 2100 hours, and had requested them to remove their goods by 1200 hours. Since the Wehrmacht did not start this evacuation until 1000 hours I felt obliged to extend the term until 1800 hours. At 1815 hours a search party entered the premises, the building having been cordoned off, and found that a great number of Jews were within the building. Since some of these Jews resisted, I ordered the building to be set on fire. Not until all the buildings along the street and the back premises on either side were well aflame did the Jews, some of them on fire, emerge from these blocks, some of them endeavored to save their life by jumping into the street from windows and balconies, after having thrown down beds, blankets, and the like. Over and over again we observed that Jews and bandits, despite the danger of being burned alive, preferred to return into the flames rather than risk being caught by us. Over and over again the Jews kept up their firing almost to the end of the action; thus the engineers had to be protected by a machine gun when toward nightfall they had to enter forcibly a concrete building which had been very strongly fortified. Termination of today's operation; on 25 April 1943 at 0145 hours. 1,660 Jews were caught for evacuation, 1,814 pulled out of dug-outs, about 330 shot. Innumerable Jews were destroyed by the flames or perished when the dug-outs were blown up. 26 dug-outs were blown up and an amount of paper money, especially dollars was captured; this money has not yet been counted.
Our forces: as on the preceding day, minus 50 men of the Waffen-SS.
Our losses: 2 SS men and 1 Trawniki man wounded.
Altogether there have now been caught in this action 25,500 Jews who lived in the former Ghetto. Since there are only vague estimates available of the actual number of inhabitants I assume that now only very small numbers of Jews and bandits still remain within the Ghetto.
Operation will be continued on 25 April 1943, 1300 hours.
I beg to acknowledge receipt of teletype messages Nos. 1222 and 1223 of 24 April 1943. As far as can be predicted, the present large-scale operation will last until Easter Monday inclusive.
Today large posters were affixed to the walls surrounding the Ghetto, announcing that everybody who enters the former Ghetto without being able to prove his identity will be shot.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 25 April 1943
Ref. No. I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal No. 549/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 25 April 1943, start 1300 hours.
For today 7 search parties were formed, strength 1/70 each, each allotted to a certain block of buildings.
Their order was: "Every building is to be combed out once more; dug-outs have to be discovered and blown up, and the Jews have to be caught. If any resistance is encountered or if dug-outs cannot be reached, the buildings are to be burnt down." Apart from the operations undertaken by these 7 search parties, a special operation was undertaken against a center of bandits, situated outside the wall surrounding the former Ghetto and inhabited exclusively by Poles.
Today's operations of the search parties ended almost everywhere in the starting of enormous conflagrations. In this manner the Jews were forced to leave their hideouts and refuges. A total of 1,960 Jews were caught alive. The Jews informed us that among them were certain parachutists who were dropped here and bandits who had been equipped with arms from some unknown source. 274 Jews were killed. As in the preceding days, uncounted Jews were buried in blown up dug-outs and, as can be observed time and again, burned with this bag of Jews today. We have, in my opinion, caught a very considerable part of the bandits and lowest elements of the Ghetto. Intervening darkness prevented immediate liquidation. I am going to try to obtain a train for T II tomorrow. Otherwise liquidation will be carried out tomorrow. Today also, some armed resistance was encountered; in a dug-out three pistols and some explosives were captured. Furthermore, considerable amounts of paper money, foreign currency, gold coins, and jewelry were seized today.
The Jews still have considerable property. While last night a glare of fire could be seen above the former Ghetto, today one can observe a giant sea of flames. Since we continue to discover great numbers of Jews whenever we search and comb out, the operation will be continued on 26 April 1943. Start: 1000 hours.
Including today, a total of 27,464 Jews of the former Warsaw Ghetto, have been captured.
Our forces: as on the previous day.
Our losses: 3 members of the Waffen-SS and one member of the Security Police wounded.
_Total losses up to date_:
Waffen SS 27 Wounded Police 9 Wounded Security Police 4 Wounded Wehrmacht 1 Wounded Trawniki men 9 Wounded ----------- 50 Wounded
and 5 dead:
Waffen SS 2 Dead Wehrmacht 2 Dead Trawniki men 1 Dead -------- 5 Dead
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 26 April 1943.
Ref. No.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal Nr. 550/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation--supplementary report.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
1. The operation on 25 April 1943, was terminated at 2200 hrs.
2. General effects of the execution of this operation.
The Poles resident in Warsaw are much impressed by the toughness of our operations in the former Ghetto. As can be seen from the daily reports, the general situation has greatly calmed down since the beginning of that operation within the city area of Warsaw. From this fact one may conclude that the bandits and saboteurs resided in the former Ghetto, and that now all of them have been destroyed.
In this connection the fact may be of some interest, that an illegal ammunition store was seen to explode when we burned down a certain building in the dwelling area on which we were working at the time.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified Copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 26 April 1943.
Ref. Nr.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07 Journal Nr. 551/43 secret.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Start of operation: 1000 hrs.
The whole of the former Ghetto was once more combed through today by the same search parties, each of them allotted to the same district as before. In this way I tried to bring about that the leaders of these
## parties work in thoroughfares, blocks of buildings, and courtyards
which they know already and that thus they are able to penetrate deeper and deeper into the maze of dug-outs and subterranean passages. Almost every search party reported resistance, which however they broke either by returning fire or by blowing up the dug-outs. It becomes clearer and clearer that it is now the turn of the toughest and strongest among the Jews and bandits. Several times dug-outs have been forcibly broken open, the inmates of which had not come to the surface during the whole of this operation. In a number of cases the inmates of the dug-outs were hardly in a condition, when the dug-out had been blown up, to crawl to the surface. The captured Jews report that many of the inmates of the dug-outs became insane from the heat, the smoke, and the explosions. Several Jews were arrested who had kept close liaison with the group of Polish terrorists and collaborated with it. Outside the former Ghetto we arrested 29 Jews. During today's operation several blocks of buildings were burned down. This is the only and final method which forces this trash and subhumanity to the surface. We again captured arms, incendiary bottles, explosive charges and considerable amounts of cash and foreign currency. Today I also arranged that several so-called armament and defense enterprises will evacuate their stores from the buildings at once, so that these buildings in which the Jews now have taken refuge, under the protection of the army of the German Wehrmacht and police, can be combed out. In one case we again discovered, as previously, that in a building which had been said to contain a giant enterprise there existed in fact almost no stores or goods. One factory was closed without further ado, and the Jews were evacuated.
Result of today's operation:
30 Jews evacuated, 1,330 Jews pulled out of dug-outs and immediately destroyed, 362 Jews killed in battle. Caught today altogether: 1,722 Jews. This brings the total of Jews caught to 29,186. Moreover, it is very probable that numerous Jews have perished in the 13 dug-outs blown up today and in the conflagrations.
At the time of writing not one of the Jews caught still remains within Warsaw. The scheduled transport to T. II had no success. [Note of translator: This probably means that no Jews were available for regular transport to the extermination camp.]
Strength: as on preceding day.
Our losses: none.
End of today's operation at 2145 hrs. Will be continued on 27 April 1943 at 0900 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 27 April 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 555/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation
To: the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 27 April 1943. Start: 0900 hrs.
For today's operation I formed 24 raiding parties with the same task as on several days of last week; they had to search the former Ghetto in smaller groups. These search parties pulled 780 Jews out of dug-outs and shot 115 Jews who resisted. This operation was terminated about 1500 hrs.; some of the parties had to continue to operate because they had found more dug-outs.
At 1600 hrs. a special battle group, 320 officers and men strong, started cleansing a large block of buildings situated on both sides of the so-called Niska Street in the Northeastern part of the former Ghetto. After the search the entire block was set on fire, after having been completely cordoned off. In this action a considerable number of Jews were caught. As before, they remained in the dug-outs, which were either below the ground or in the lofts of the buildings until the end. They fired their arms to the last moment, and then jumped down into the street, sometimes from as far up as the fourth floor, having previously thrown down beds, mattresses, etc., but not until the flames made any other escape impossible. A total of 2,560 Jews were caught today within the former Ghetto, of whom 547 were shot. Moreover, Jews in a not ascertainable number perished when dug-outs were blown up, or in the flames. The sum total of Jews, formerly residing in the Ghetto caught in this action, now amounts to 31,746.
We learned from an anonymous letter that there were a considerable number of Jews in a block of buildings adjoining the Northeastern part of the Ghetto, but outside of it. A special raiding party under the command of 1st. Lt. of Police Diehl was dispatched to attack these buildings. The raiding party discovered a gang of about 120 men, strongly armed with pistols, rifles, hand grenades, and light machine guns, who resisted. They succeeded in destroying 24 bandits in battle and arresting 52 bandits. The remainder could not be caught or destroyed, since darkness intervened. The buildings, however, were surrounded at once, so that an escape will hardly be possible. This cleansing action will be continued tomorrow. Moreover, we arrested 17 Poles, among whom 2 Polish Policemen, who should have been aware, among other things, of the existence of this gang. In this operation we captured 3 rifles, 12 pistols, partly of heavier caliber, 100 Polish "pineapple" hand grenades, 27 German steel helmets, quite a number of German uniforms, tunics and coats which were even furnished with ribbon of the East medal, some reserve magazines for machine guns, 300 rounds of ammunition, etc. The leader of the raiding party had a difficult task because the bandits were disguised in German uniform, but despite this fact, he did his duty with great efficiency. Among the bandits who were caught or killed, there were some Polish terrorists who were identified with certainty. Today we succeeded furthermore in discovering and liquidating one of the founders and leaders of the Jewish-Polish resistance movement. The external appearance of the Jews whom we are catching now shows that it is now the turn of those Jews who were the leaders of the entire resistance movement. They jumped from the burning windows and balconies, abusing Germany and the Fuehrer and cursing the German soldiers.
SS-men who descended into the sewers discovered that a great number of corpses of perished Jews are being washed away by the water.
_Our strength_:
288 German Police } 200 Trawniki-men } From 0700 to 1900 hrs. 140 Polish Police } Cordoning From 1900 to 0700 hrs. 288 German Police } forces. 250 Waffen-SS } 140 Polish Police }
_Strength in the operation_:
3/115 German Police 4/400 Waffen-SS 1/6 Engineering Serv. 2/30 Security Police 2/21 Engineers.
_Our losses_:
3 wounded: 2 Waffen-SS 1 Trawniki-man
Termination of operation: 2300 hrs. Will be continued on 28 April 1943 at 1000 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Maj. Gen. of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 28 April 1943.
Ref. Nr. I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 562/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 28 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs.
Today, 10 raiding parties were formed for combing out the whole of the Ghetto. These raiding parties again discovered proceeding step by step, a number of dug-outs, which were found to have been prepared as far ago as the middle of last year for use in the resistance of the Jews. A total of 335 Jews were forcibly pulled out of these dug-outs. Apart from these operations, we continued to cleanse the resistance center used by the Jewish military organization, situated at the borders of the Ghetto. We succeeded in shooting 10 more bandits, and in arresting 9, beyond those caught yesterday, and in capturing more arms, ammunition, and military equipment. In the afternoon a battle group again was directed against a block of buildings which had already been combed out; the block was set on fire during this operation. As on previous days, masses of Jews emerged, forced out by the flames and the enormous clouds of smoke. At another point an Engineer officer, attached by the Wehrmacht to the units with great trouble opened a dug-out situated about 3 meters below ground. From this dug-out, which had been ready since October of last year and was equipped with running water, toilet, and electric light, we pulled out 274 of the richest and most influential Jews. Today again we encountered very strong resistance in many places and broke it. It becomes clearer every day that we are now encountering the real terrorists and activists, because of the duration of the operation.
Result of today: 1,655 Jews caught for evacuation, of whom 110 were killed in battle.
Many more Jews were killed by the flames; moreover, Jews in an unascertainable number were destroyed by the dug-outs being blown up. By the results of today the number of Jews caught or destroyed rises to 33,401 altogether. This number does not include the Jews who were killed by fire or destroyed in the dug-outs.
Our strength: as on the previous day. Our losses: 3 wounded (1 Police, 2 Waffen-SS)
Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 29 April 1943. 1000 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 29 April 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 566/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation of 29 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs. As on the previous day I formed search parties, who had the special task of searching those blocks of buildings which had been recently separated. A larger raiding party was detailed to clean a certain block of buildings (formerly the Hallmann concern) and to burn this block down. 36 more dug-outs used for habitation were discovered altogether, and from them and other hideouts and from the burning buildings, 2,359 Jews were caught, of whom 106 were killed in battle.
Captured are 2 rifles, 10 pistols, 10 kilograms of explosives, and ammunition of various types.
When a large dug-out was blown up, the entire building collapsed and everyone of the bandits perished. In the ensuing conflagration loud detonations and darting flames showed that the building must have contained large stores of ammunition and explosives. Some sewer entrances were blown up. Two exits discovered outside the Ghetto were also made unusable by blowing them up or walling them up.
The depositions of some of the inmates of the dug-outs are to the effect that these Jews have been unable to leave the dug-outs for the last 10 days and that their food, etc., is now beginning to grow short because the large-scale operation has lasted so long. Furthermore, the Jews testify that bandits appeared at night who were Jews or sometimes Poles, wearing black masks, who walled the dug-outs up from the outside and admonished them not to give any signs of life, so that they could continue to live in the Ghetto when the action was finished. Some of the armaments factories are being evacuated very slowly. In several cases one gains the impression that this is done intentionally. Thus I discovered with regard to one firm, Schulz and Co., which I had visited on Easter Monday and then instructed to start evacuation at once and to have it completed within 3 days, that up till today, Thursday, nothing had been done.
_Our strength_: as on the previous day. _Our losses_: none.
Termination of operation at 2100 hrs. Will be continued on 30 April 1943, 0900 hrs.
Total caught or destroyed: 35,760.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 30 April 1943.
_Ref No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 579/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 30 April 1943. Start 0900 hrs.
Combing out by search parties was continued. Although some giant blocks of buildings now are completely burned out, the Jews continue to stay in the dug-outs 2 to 3 meters below ground. In many cases we are not able to discover those dug-outs unless some Jew, whom we have already caught, gives us a hint as to their whereabouts. Repeatedly, during the last few days, Jews have testified that some armed Jews emerge at night from some hideouts or dug-outs and threaten the other Jews with shooting if they give any signs of life. We were able to ascertain beyond all doubt that several dug-outs had been closed from the outside by these bandits, who tried in this manner to prove that they meant business. Altogether, 30 dug-outs were discovered, evacuated, and blown up today. Again we caught a great number of bandits and subhumans. Apart from the bombing-out operations effected by small parties, two larger battle groups were occupied with bombing out and destroying by fire several inter-connected blocks of buildings.
A total of 1599 Jews were caught today, of whom 179 were killed in battle. The sum total of Jews caught up to date thereby rises to 37,359. 3,855 Jews were loaded today. The number of Jews in possession of arms was much higher than before among the Jews caught during the last few days. Today, we again captured arms and particularly parts of German uniforms from them. The operation against Fort Traugutta did not have any positive results. So far as we were able to discover subterranean exits, we either occupied them or blew them up. In attacking one of the blocks we had to use a gun today.
Our strength: Used in the operation: Police 5/133 Security Police 3/36 Waffen SS 6/432 Engineer 2/40 Staff 3/7 Cordoning forces: Waffen SS 3/318 German Police 2/89 Trawniki men 200 moreover some Polish Police Our losses: 1 wounded (Police)
Termination of today's large scale action: 2100 hours. Will be continued on 1 May 1943, 0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, May 1, 1943.
_Ref_: Nr.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 583/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large scale operation on 1 May 1943. Start 0900 hrs.
10 searching parties were detailed, moreover a larger battle group was detailed to comb out a certain block of buildings, with the added instruction to burn that block down. Within this block of buildings there existed a so-called armament factory which had not yet been entirely evacuated, although it had had enough time to do so. It was not exempted from the operation. Today's operation a total of 1,026 Jews were caught, of whom 245 were killed, either in battle or while resisting. Moreover, a considerable number of bandits and ringleaders were also caught. In one case a Jew who had already been made ready for transport fired three shots against a 1st Lieutenant of Police, but missed his mark. All the Jews caught today were forcibly pulled out of dug-outs. Not a single one gave himself up voluntarily, after his dug-out had been opened. A considerable part of the Jews caught were pulled out of the sewers. We continued systematically blowing up or blocking up the sewer entrances. In one case the Engineers laid a strong concentrated charge and had to proceed to an adjoining entrance where they had something to do. In the meantime a Jew emerged from the sewer, removed the fuse from the concentrated charge, and appropriated the charge. In the further course of this operation we succeeded in catching the Jew, still in possession of the concentrated charge.
In order to ascertain the movements of the Jews during the night, today I used for the first time 5 scouting parties, each 1/9 strong, at irregular intervals during the night. In general, it has to be stated that our men need extraordinary diligence and energy to discover the Jews who are still in so-called dug-outs, caves, and in the sewerage system. It can be expected that the remainder of the Jews who formerly inhabited the Ghetto will now be caught. The sum total of Jews caught so far has risen to 38,385. Not included in this figure are those who died in the flames or in the dug-outs. One patrol discovered an unascertainable number of corpses floating in a main sewer under the Ghetto. Outside of the Ghetto, in the immediate vicinity of Warsaw, the gendarmerie has shot a total of 150 Jews who could be proved to have escaped from Warsaw.
Again we captured pistols and explosives.
_Our strength, used in operation_: Police (German) 4/102 Waffen SS 7/350 Engineers (Wehrmacht) 2/38 Engineering Emergency Service 1/6 Security Police 2/1 _Cordoning units_: Waffen SS 300 German Police 1/71 Trawniki 250 _Our losses_: 1 policeman--wounded yesterday, died from wounds.
Termination of today's large-scale action: 2200 hours. Will be continued on 2 May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 2 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 584/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 2 May 1943, start 1000 hrs. 9 raiding parties combed out the whole area of the former Ghetto; moreover a larger detachment was detailed to clean out or destroy one block of buildings grouped around the two armament enterprises Transavia and Wischniewski. To find more dug-outs, the raiding parties took along with them some Jews caught on the previous day to act as guides. In these operations the raiding parties pulled out 944 Jews from dug-outs; 235 more Jews were shot on this occasion. When the block of buildings mentioned above was destroyed, 120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were destroyed when the dug-outs and sewer entrances were blown up. The Jews were removed from two armaments concerns and the managers were requested to evacuate within a short time.
Altogether we caught today: 1,852 Jews. The sum total of Jews caught thereby rises to 40,237 Jews. 27 dug-outs were discovered, forcibly opened and destroyed, arms and ammunition captured. When the external barricade was shot at and when some Jews who broke out from a sewer entrance outside the Ghetto made an attack, we suffered 7 losses, 4 Policemen and 3 Polish Policemen. The scouting parties used during the night encountered armed resistance from some Jews who under the protection of darkness ventured to emerge from their holes and dug-outs. We did not suffer losses thereby. On the other hand, a considerable number of Jews were killed or wounded in this operation.
_Our strength, used in operation_: German Police 3/98 Engineering Em Service 1/6 Security Police 3/12 Engineers (Wehrmacht) 2/37 SS-Gren 11/409 SS-Cav. 3/7
_Cordoning forces_: German Police 2/9 SS-Gren. 1/300 Trawniki 200 _Our losses_: 4 Policemen wounded 3 Polish policemen wounded
Present at today's large-scale operation was the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police Krueger.
Termination of operation: 2030 hours. Will be continued on 3 May 1943, 0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 3 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 597/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 3 May 1943, start 0900 hrs. In the combing-out operation of the former Jewish Ghetto today 19 more dug-outs were discovered and the result was as follows:
Pulled out of dug-outs 1,392 Jews Shot 95 Evacuated from former armament factories 177
The sum total of Jews caught thereby rises to 41,806 Jews. In most cases the Jews offered armed resistance before they left the dug-outs. We had two casualties (wounded). Some of the Jews and bandits fired pistols from both hands. Since we discovered several times today, that Jewesses had pistols concealed in their bloomers, every Jew and bandit will be ordered from today on, to strip completely for the search. We captured among other things, one German rifle, model 98, two 08 pistols and other calibers, also home-made hand grenades. The Jews cannot be induced to leave their dug-outs until several smoke candles have been burned. According to depositions made yesterday and today, the Jews were asked during the second half of 1942 to erect air-raid shelters. At that time under the camouflage of erecting air-raid shelters, they began to build the dug-outs which they are now inhabiting, in order to use them for an anti-Jewish operation. Some of the scouting parties used in the Ghetto were shot at last night. One casualty (wounded). These scouting parties reported that groups of armed bandits marched through the Ghetto.
Strength: as on the previous day. Losses: 3 SS-men wounded.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hrs. Will be continued on 4 May 1943. 0900 hrs.
3,019 Jews were loaded.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 4 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 603/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 4 May 1943, start 0900 hrs.
For mopping up the dug-outs a raiding party was used, 1/60 strong and reinforced by an Engineers' detachment provided by the Wehrmacht. This raiding party pulled 550 Jews out of dug-outs and killed in battle 188 Jews. Discovering the dug-outs becomes more and more difficult. Often they can only be discovered by betrayal through other Jews. If the Jews are requested to leave their dug-out voluntarily, they hardly ever obey; they can only be forced to do so by the use of smoke-candles.
The main forces were detailed about 1100 hours to comb out, mop up, and destroy two large blocks of buildings, containing the former firms Toebbens, Schulz and Co., and others. After these blocks had been completely cordoned off, we requested the Jews who were still within the buildings to come forward voluntarily. By this measure, we caught 456 Jews for evacuation. Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were about to collapse did a further considerable number of Jews emerge, forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and again the Jews try to escape even through burning buildings. Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the conflagration perished in the flames. Others emerged from the upper stories in the last possible moment and were only able to escape death in the flames by jumping down. Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews, of whom 204 were shot and innumerable Jews were destroyed in dug-outs and in the flames. The sum total of Jews caught rises to 44,089.
As is learned from depositions made by the Jews, today we caught part of the governing body of the so-called "Party." One member of the committee which leads the gang will be used tomorrow for mopping up some more fortified dug-outs with armed Jews inside. When the armament enterprises were evacuated, we again observed that the goods carted away were by no means valuable military equipment, as had been pretended, but trifles, like used furniture and other requisitioned items. We took appropriate measures against this at once.
The scouting parties who patrolled during the night in the former Ghetto again reported movements of the Jews in the burned out and destroyed streets and courtyards. In order to be better able to take the Jews by surprise, the scouting parties at night tie rags and other stuff round their shoes. In skirmishes between the scouting parties and Jews, 30 Jews were shot.
We captured 1 carbine, 3 pistols, and some ammunition. During the conflagration a considerable amount of stored ammunition exploded.
_Our strength, used in operation_: German Police 4/101 Engineering Em. Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 2/41 Waffen SS 11/407 _Cordoning forces:_ _Day_ _Night_ German Police 2/87 1/11 Waffen SS 25 1/300 Trawniki 200 Polish Police 1/180 1/180
_Our losses_: None.
Termination of operation: 2330 hours. Will be continued on 5 May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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_From:_ The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 5 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 607/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 5 May 1943. Start 1000 hrs. In the beginning of today's operations the raiding parties seemed to have less results than on the preceding days. When the operation terminated, however, quite a number of dug-outs had again been discovered, owing to the tracking ability of the men and to betrayal; 40 of these dug-outs were destroyed. As far as possible, the Jews in these dug-outs were caught (1,070 altogether). The combing out patrols shot about 126 Jews. Today again the Jews resisted in several places until they were captured. In several cases the entrances (hatches) of the dug-outs were forcibly held or bolted from the inside, so that only by using a strong explosive charge could we force them open and destroy the inmates. Today, we again captured arms and ammunition, including one pistol. From one enterprise still in existence (so-called Prosta) 2,850 Jews were caught for evacuation. This figure was included in the sum total reported earlier, so that only 1,070 have to be added; the present sum total therefore is 45,159.
Our strength: as on the preceding day. Our losses: 1 SS man wounded, 1 Policeman wounded. Sum total of losses to date: 8 dead, 55 wounded.
Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 6 May 1943, 0900 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop. SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 6 May 1943.
_Ref. Nov_: ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 614/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto large-scale operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 6 May 1943, start 0930 hrs.
Today we combed especially those blocks of buildings which were destroyed by fire on 4 May 1943. Although it was hardly to be expected that any living person could still exist in those blocks, we discovered quite a number of dug-outs in which a burning heat had developed. From these dug-outs and from other dug-outs which we discovered in other parts of the Ghetto, we pulled out 1,553 Jews. While resisting, and in a skirmish, 356 Jews were shot. In this skirmish the Jews fired from 08 pistols and other calibers and threw Polish "pineapple" hand grenades. One SS Unterscharfuehrer was wounded and a total of 47 dug-outs were destroyed.
2 men of the external cordoning forces were wounded. The Jews who had broken out from the Ghetto seem to be returning now with the intention of assisting the Ghetto Jews by force or liberating them. One Jew who had escaped from Lublin was caught just outside of the Ghetto wall. He was armed as follows: 1 08 pistol, ample reserve ammunition, 2 Polish "pineapple" hand grenades. It could not be reliably ascertained so far whether the so-called "Party Directorate" of the Jews ("PPR") have been caught or destroyed. We are on their traces. It is to be hoped that tomorrow we shall succeed in tracing down this so-called Party Directorate. In order to enable us to intercept more effectively the Jews and bandits who approach the Ghetto, covering detachments of the external barricade were shifted farther inside the Aryan part. The former miniature Ghetto "Prosta" was searched by raiding parties today. We caught some Jews who had stayed behind. The firm Toebbens was requested to evacuate, this miniature Ghetto by noon on 10 May 1943. The so-called library, situated outside the Ghetto, was put at their disposal for temporary storage of their raw materials, etc.
The sum total of Jews caught so far rises to 47,068. The Polish Police take pains to deliver to my office every Jew who turns up within the city, because they are eager to win such premiums as have been paid in earlier cases. The undersigned received some anonymous letters in which he was notified of the fact that some Jews are staying in the Aryan part of the city. One anonymous letter draws a parallel between Katyn and the large-scale action within the Ghetto.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/101 Engineering Em. Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 3/72 Waffen SS 10/500
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_ German Police 2/87 1/11 Waffen SS 25 1/300 Trawniki 200 -- Polish Police 1/180 1/180
Our losses:
1 Policeman dead 1 Policeman seriously wounded 1 SS Unterscharfuehrer less seriously wounded
Termination of operation: 2100 hours. Will be continued on 7 May 1943, 0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 7 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 616/43 secret
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
_To_: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 7 May 1943, start 1000 hrs.
The combing-out parties today obtained the following results: 49 dug-outs discovered. Part of the Jews were caught. A considerable, not ascertainable, number of Jews who refused to leave the dug-outs and offered armed resistance were destroyed when the dug-outs were blown up. Altogether 1,019 Jews were caught alive today, 255 shot. The sum total of Jews caught so far rises to 48,342. Today we again encountered armed resistance in several cases, whereby we lost 1 SS man (wounded). We captured 4 pistols of various calibers and some stores of ammunition.
The location of the dug-out used by the so-called select "Party Directorate" is now known. It is to be forced open tomorrow. The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air, since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dug-outs owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these statements it was to be inferred that a considerable number of Jews are still underground in the Ghetto. Today we blew up a concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire. In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews therefore still remains the setting of fires.
Our strength: as on the preceding day. Our losses: 1 Waffen-SS man wounded.
Termination of operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 8 May 1943 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy; SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 8 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 624/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 8 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The whole former Ghetto was searched today by raiding parties for the remaining dug-outs and Jews. As reported some days a number of subhumans, bandits, and terrorists still remain in the dug-outs, where heat has become intolerable by reason of the fires. These creatures know only too well that their only choice is between remaining in hiding as long as possible or coming to the surface and trying to wound or kill off the men of the Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht who keep up the pressure against them.
We continued today the operation against the dug-out of the so-called select "Party Directorate" which we had discovered yesterday, as reported in my teletype message yesterday. We succeeded in forcing open the dug-out of the Party Directorate and in catching about 60 heavily armed bandits. We succeeded in catching and liquidating Deputy Leader of the Jewish Military Organization "ZWZ" and his so-called Chief of Staff. There were about 200 Jews in this dug-out, of whom 60 were caught and 140 were destroyed, partly owing to the strong effect of smoke-candles, and partly owing to heavy explosive charges which were laid in several places. The Jews whom we caught had already reported that innumerable Jews had been killed by the effect of the smoke-candles. The fight of the first six days was hard, but now we are able to state that we are catching those Jews and Jewesses who were the ringleaders in those days. Every time a dug-out is forced open, the Jews in it offer resistance with the arms at their disposal, light machine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. Today we again caught quite a number of Jewesses who carried loaded pistols in their bloomers, with the safety catch released. Some depositions speak of 3 to 4,000 Jews who still remain in underground holes, sewers, and dug-outs. The undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.
A total of 1,091 Jews were caught today in dug-outs; about 280 Jews were shot in battle, innumerable Jews were destroyed in the 43 dug-outs which were blown up. The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 49,712. Those buildings which had not yet been destroyed by fire, were set on fire today and we discovered that a few Jews were still hiding somewhere within the walls or in the staircases.
Our strength:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/101 Engineering Em Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 3/69 Waffen SS 13/527
Cordoning forces:
_Day_ _Night_ German Police 1/87 1/36 Waffen SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 160 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses:
2 Waffen SS dead 2 Waffen SS wounded 1 Engineer wounded
A policeman wounded on 7 May 1943 died today from wounds. We captured about 15 to 20 pistols of various calibers, considerable stores of ammunition for pistols and rifles, moreover a number of hand grenades, made in the former armament factories.
Termination of action: 2130 hours, will be continued on 9 May 1943 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 9 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr 1607 Journal No. 625/43.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 9 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The operation carried out today had the following result: The raiding
## parties at work today discovered 42 dug-outs. From these dug-outs we
pulled out alive 1,037 Jews and bandits. In battle 319 bandits and Jews were shot, moreover an uncertain number were destroyed when the dug-outs were blown up. The block of buildings which formerly contained the "Transavia" concern was destroyed by fire; in this operation we again caught a number of Jews, although this block had been combed through several times.
Again we captured some pistols and hand grenades.
Our strength: Used in operation: German Police 4/103 Security Police 2/12 Engineers 3/67 Waffen SS 13/547
Cordoning Forces: _Day_ _Night_ German Police 1/87 1/36 Waffen SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 160 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
_Our losses_: None.
The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 51,313. Outside the former Ghetto 254 Jews and bandits were shot.
Termination of operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 10 May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw, Warsaw, 10 May, 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 627/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale action on 10 May 1943 start 1000 hrs.
Today raiding parties again combed out the area of the former Ghetto. As on preceding days we again pulled out of the dug-outs, against all expectations, a considerable number of Jews. The resistance offered by the Jews had not weakened today. In contrast to the previous days, it seems that those members of the main body of the Jewish battle group who are still in existence and have not been destroyed have retired into the ruins still within their reach, with the intention of firing from there against our men and inflicting casualties.
Today we caught a total of 1,183 Jews alive, 187 bandits and Jews were shot. Again a not ascertainable number of Jews and bandits were destroyed in the blown-up dug-outs. The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 52,693.
Today at 0900 hours a truck drove up to a certain sewer in the so-called Prosta. Someone in the truck exploded two hand grenades, which was the signal for the bandits who were standing ready in the sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews--there are always some Polish bandits among them--armed with carbines, small arms, and one machine gun, climbed into the truck and drove away in an unknown direction. The last man of the gang, who stood sentry in the sewer and had the duty of closing the sewer lid, was captured. It is he who gave the above information. He testified that most of the members of the gang, which had been divided into several battle groups, had either been killed in battle or had committed suicide because they had realized the futility of continuing the fight. The search for the truck, which was ordered at once, had no results. The bandits testified further that the Prosta is now the refuge for the still existing Jews because the Ghetto has become too hot for them. For this reason, I resolved to deal with the Prosta in the same manner as with the Ghetto, and to destroy this miniature Ghetto.
Today, we again captured small arms and some ammunition. The Security Police yesterday succeeded in capturing a workshop outside the Ghetto which manufactured 10,000 to 11,000 explosive charges and other ammunition.
Our strength: as on the preceding day. Our losses: 3 SS men wounded.
Owing to the excellent understanding between us and the Wehrmacht, the detachment of Engineers was reinforced. Moreover, a considerable amount of explosives was put at our disposal.
Termination of operation: 2200 hours. Will be continued on 11 May 1943, 0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 11 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07 Journal No. 629/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto large-scale Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 11 May 1943, start 0930 hours.
The scouting parties sent out last night again reported that there must still be some Jews within the dug-outs, since some Jews were seen in the ruined streets. The scouting parties shot 12 Jews. On the basis of these reports, today I again formed raiding parties who in combing-out operations discovered, captured, and destroyed a total of 47 dug-outs. Today again we caught some Jews who had taken refuge in ruins which were still protected by a roof. The Jews and bandits are still seeking this new refuge, because staying in the dug-outs has become unbearable. One dug-out was discovered which contained about 12 rooms equipped with plumbing, running water, and separate bathrooms for men and women. Considerable amounts of food were captured or secured, in order to make it more and more difficult for them to get necessary food.
A total of 931 Jews and bandits were caught. 53 bandits were shot. More of them perished when dug-outs were blown up and when a small block of buildings was destroyed by fire. The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 53,667. We captured several pistols, hand grenades, and ammunition.
We have not been able to smoke out the sewers systematically once more, since we are short of smoke-candles. "OFK" is ready to provide new smoke-candles.
_Our strength_: Used in operation: German Police 6/126 Engineering Em. Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 4/76 Waffen SS 12/308
_Cordoning forces_: _Day_ _Night_ German Police 1/112 1/86 Waffen SS ---- 1/130 Trawniki 160 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 1 SS man wounded.
Total of losses up to date: 71 wounded, 12 dead.
Termination of today's operation: 2145 hours, will be continued on 12 May 1943, 0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
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From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 12 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 637/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 12 May 1943, start 0930 hours.
When the raiding parties combed out the area for remaining dug-outs in which Jews were hiding, they succeeded in discovering 30 dug-outs. 663 Jews were pulled out of them and 133 Jews were shot. The sum total of Jews caught has arisen to 54,463.
Furthermore today the units cordoning off the miniature Ghetto were reinforced and destroyed by fire. Probably a considerable number of Jews perished in the flames, no accurate information in this regard could be obtained since the fire was still burning when darkness set in. One concrete building in the Prosta, from which Jews had been removed, was heavily damaged by blowing-up operations in order to make it impossible for the bandits to use it as a base later.
It is noteworthy that the Poles, without having been warned, took appropriate measures for protecting their window-panes, etc., before the blowing-up started.
The transports of Jews leaving here will be directed to T.II beginning today.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation: German police 5/126 Engineering Em. Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 4/74 Waffen SS 12/508
_Cordoning forces_: _Day_ _Night_ German Police 1/112 1/86 Waffen SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 160 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
_Our losses_: 1 Waffen SS man wounded.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 13 May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 13 May, 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/ St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 641/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 13 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
In combing out the Ghetto and the miniature Ghetto (Prosta) today we found 234 Jews. 155 Jews were shot in battle. Today it became clear that the Jews and bandits whom we are catching now belong to the so-called battle groups. All of them are young fellows and females between 18 and 25 years of age. When we captured one, a real skirmish took place, in which the Jews not only fired from 08 pistols and Polish Vis pistols, but also threw Polish "pineapple" hand grenades at the Waffen-SS men. After part of the inmates of the dug-out had been caught and were about to be searched, one of the females as quick as lightning put her hand under her shirt, as many others had done, and fetched from her bloomers a "pineapple" hand grenade, drew the safety-catch, threw the grenade among the men who were searching her, and jumped quickly to cover. It is only thanks to the presence of mind of the men that no casualties ensued.
The few Jews and criminals still staying in the Ghetto have for the last few days been using the hideouts they can still find among the ruins, retiring at night into the dug-outs whose location is known to them, to eat and get provisions for the next day. Lately we have been unable to extract information on the whereabouts of further dug-outs from the captured Jews. The remainder of the inmates of that dug-out where the skirmish took place were destroyed by using heavier explosive charges. From a Wehrmacht concern we evacuated 327 Jews today. The Jews we catch now are sent to T.II.
The total of Jews caught has risen to 55,179.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German police 4/182 Engineering Em. Service 1/6 Security Police 2/14 Engineers 4/74 Waffen SS 12/517
_Cordoning forces_: _Day_ _Night_ German Police 2/137 1/87 Waffen SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 270 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 2 Waffen SS dead 3 Waffen SS wounded 1 Policeman wounded.
The 2 Waffen SS men lost their lives in the air attack against the Ghetto.
33 dug-outs were discovered and destroyed. Booty: 6 pistols, 2 hand grenades, and some explosive charges.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 14 May 1943, 1000 hours.
My intention is to terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943 and to turn all further measures over to Police battalion III/23.
Unless ordered otherwise, I am going to submit to the conference of SS and Policefuehrers a detailed report of the operation, including an appendix containing photos.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 14 May 1943.
_Ref. No._ I ab/St/G 16 07 Journal No. 646/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 14 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The raiding parties formed today went to work within the areas allotted to each of them under orders to force open further dwelling dug-outs and to catch the Jews. In this way a considerable number of bandits and Jews were caught, especially as some traces had been discovered during the night which were now followed up with good results. The night patrols clashed with armed bandits several times. These bandits fired a machine gun and small arms. In this operation we had four casualties--3 Waffen-SS men and 1 Policeman. Repeatedly, shots were fired from the Aryan part against the external barricade. In the skirmishes about 30 bandits were shot and 9 Jews and bandits, members of an armed gang, were captured. One dug-out was taken during the night, the Jews captured, and some pistols, among them one of 12-mm caliber, were captured. In one dug-out inhabited by 100 persons, we were able to capture 2 rifles, 16 pistols, some hand grenades and incendiary appliances. Of the bandits who resisted, some again wore German military uniform, German steel helmets and "knobeloecher." Apart from the carbines, we captured 60 rounds of German rifle ammunition. One raiding party had a skirmish with a gang, 10 to 14 strong, on the roofs of a block of buildings at the border of the Ghetto (Aryan part). The bandits were destroyed; we suffered no losses.
The captured bandits repeatedly testify that still not all persons in the Ghetto have been caught. They confidently expect that the action will soon be over, and that they will then be able to continue to live in the Ghetto. Several bandits stated that they had long been in a position to kill off the leader of the action, the "General," as they call him, but that they would not do so, since they had orders to that effect to avoid the risk of a further intensification of the anti-Jewish measures.
Today again some concrete buildings in which the bandits find refuge time and again were blown up by the engineers.
In order to force the bandits in the sewers to come to the surface, 183 sewer entrances were opened at 1500 hours, and smoke-candles were lowered into them at an ordered x-time, thereupon the bandits, seeking escape from what they supposed to be poison gas, crowded together in the center of the former Ghetto, and we were able to pull them out of the sewer entrances there.
I shall come to a decision after tomorrow's operations regarding termination of the action.
Today SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of Waffen-SS von Horff was present during the operations.
_Our strength_: Used in operation: German Police 4/184 Engineering Em. Serv. 1/6 Security Police 2/16 Engineers 4/73 Waffen-SS 12/510
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_ German Police 2/138 1/87 Waffen SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 270 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160 Our losses: 5 wounded, 4 Waffen SS, 1 Police
A total of 398 Jews were caught today, furthermore 154 Jews and bandits were shot in battle. The total of the Jews caught has risen to 55,731.
Booty: rifles, pistols, and ammunition. Further, a number of incendiary bottles (Molotov cocktails).
Termination of action: 2155 hours, will be continued on 15 May 1943 0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, May 15th 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 648/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 15 April 1943. Start 0900 hours.
The 5 scouting parties who patrolled the Ghetto last night reported that they encountered Jews only sporadically. In contrast to the preceding nights, they were able to shoot 6 or 7 Jews. The combing-out
## actions today also had little result. 29 more dug-outs were discovered,
but part of them were no longer inhabited. A total of 87 Jews were caught today and 67 bandits and Jews were shot in battle. In a skirmish which developed around noon, and in which the bandits again resisted by using Molotov cocktails, pistols, and home-made hand grenades, the gang was destroyed; but subsequently a policeman was wounded by a shot through the right thigh. A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings which was still intact in the Ghetto, and subsequently destroyed it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings on the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.
The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 55,885.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/184 Engineering Em. S. 1/6 Security Police 2/16 Engineers 4/74 Waffen-SS 12/510
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_ German Police 2/138 1/87 Waffen-SS ---- 1/300 Trawniki 270 ---- Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 1 Policeman wounded.
We captured 4 pistols of larger calibers, 1 infernal machine with fuse, 10 kilograms of explosives, and a considerable amount of ammunition. Termination of operation: 2130 hours. Will be continued on 16 May 1943, 1000 hours.
I will terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943 at dusk, by blowing up the Synagogue, which we did not succeed in accomplishing today, and will subsequently charge Police Battalion III/23 with continuing and completing the measures which are still necessary.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, May 16th, 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 652/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 16 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
180 Jews, bandits, and subhumans were destroyed. The former Jewish quarter of Warsaw is no longer in existence. The large-scale action was terminated at 2015 hours by blowing up the Warsaw Synagogue.
The measures to be taken with regard to the established banned areas were handed over to the commander of police battalion III/23, whom I instructed carefully.
Total number of Jews dealt with 56,065, including both Jews caught and Jews whose extermination can be proved.
No losses today.
I will submit a final report to the Conference of SS Police Fuehrer on 18 May 1943.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigade Fuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw Warsaw, 24 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 663/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
_Ref_: Your teletype message Nr. 946 of 21 May 1943.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
I beg to reply to the above teletype message:
_No. 1_:
Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in the former Ghetto during large-scale operation. 6,929 Jews were destroyed by transporting them to T.II; the sum total of Jews destroyed is therefore 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated number of 5 to 6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up or by perishing in the flames.
_No. 2_:
A total of 631 dug-outs were destroyed.
_No. 3_ (_booty_):
7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle.
59 pistols of various calibers.
Several 100 hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones.
A few 100 incendiary bottles.
Home-made explosive charges.
Infernal machines with fuses.
Large amounts of explosives, ammunition for all calibers, including machine-gun ammunition.
With regard to the bag of arms one must take into consideration that in most cases we were not able to capture the arms themselves, since the Jews and bandits before they were captured threw them away into hideouts and holes which we could not discover or find. The smoke which we had developed in the dug-outs also prevented our men from discovering and capturing the arms. Since we had to blow up the dug-outs at once we were not in a position to search for the arms later on.
The hand grenades, explosive charges, and incendiary bottles captured were used at once against the bandits.
Furthermore, we captured:
1,240 used uniform tunics (partly equipped with medal ribbons, Iron Cross, and East Medal).
600 pairs of used trousers.
Pieces of equipment, and German steel helmets.
103 horses, 4 of them in the former Ghetto (hearse).
We counted up to 23 May 1943:
4.4 million Zloty. We captured moreover about 5 to 6 million Zloty, not yet counted, a considerable amount of foreign currency, including--
$14,300 in paper. $9,200 in gold.
Large amounts of valuables (rings, chains, watches etc.)
_No. 4_:
With the exception of 8 buildings (police barracks, hospital and accommodations for working parties) the former Ghetto has been completely destroyed. Where blowing-up was not carried out, only
## partition walls are still standing. But the ruins still contain
enormous amounts of bricks and scrap material which could be used.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw. Signed: Stroop SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police. Certified copy: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
_Pictorial report_
[Translator's note: captions of photos follow in order]
1. The building of the former Jewish Council.
2. Out of the factories.
3. Discussion of the evacuation of a factory.
4. The Jewish section chiefs of the armament factory Brauer.
5. Brauer Company!
6. Column marching to the railway station.
7. On the way to the transhipping place.
8. Search and interrogation.
9. Jewish Rabbis.
10. Jewish Rabbis.
11. A patrol.
12. Dregs of humanity.
13. Forcibly pulled out of dug-outs.
14. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
15. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
16. These bandits resisted by force of arms.
17. Bandits destroyed in battle.
18. A dug-out is opened.
19. Jewish traitors.
20. Bandits!
21. Smoking-out of the Jews and bandits.
22. A place which had been prepared for escape and jumping down.
23. Destruction of a block of buildings [2 photos].
24. Destruction of a block of buildings.
25. [no caption]
26. On the way to the transhipping place.
27. Jews are marched away.
28. On the way to the transhipping place.
29. Photos showing parts of so-called dwelling dug-outs.
30-33. [no caption]
34. Measures for covering a street.
35. They were found in underground dug-outs.
36. (1) These bandits are avoiding arrest by jumping down.
(2) Bandits after having jumped down.
37. The radio car of the command post.
38. Ascaris who were used in the operation.
39. The C.O. of the large-scale action.
40. This is how the former Ghetto looks after having been destroyed.
41-48. [no caption]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-A-PS
SECRET
Berlin 2 Jan 1941 The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service State Police Headquarters, Duesseldorf
15 Jan 1941 _IV C2 general Nr. 4685/40 g_ [rubber stamp]
To:
a. Reichs security headquarters (Distributor B).
b. All State police headquarters.
c. All commandants of the security police and security service.
_For the information of_:
d. All inspectors of the security police and security service.
e. The inspectors of the concentration camps (with 15 copies for the camp commandants).
f. The commanders of the security police and security service in Krakow and Prague.
_Subject_: Classification of the concentration camps.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German police has given his approval to classify the concentration camps into various categories which take into account the personality of the prisoner as well as the degree of his danger to the State. Accordingly, the concentration camps will be classified into the following categories:
_Category I_: For all prisoners with only little accusation and definitely qualified for correction, also for special cases and solitary confinement, the camps:
Dachau
Sachsenhausen
Auschwitz I
(The latter also applies in part to category II)
_Category Ia_: For all old prisoners and conditionally qualified for work, who can still be used in the medicinal herb gardens, the camp:
Dachau
_Category II_: For prisoners with heavy accusations, but still qualified for reeducation and correction, the camps:
Buchenwald
Flossenbuerg
Auschwitz II
_Category III_: For the heavily accused prisoners, at the same time also for those who have been previously convicted for criminal offences, for social prisoners that is to say, those who can hardly be corrected, the camp: Mauthausen.
Not to be included in category Ia are old prisoners not qualified for work and in need of medical treatment. They are therefore to remain in the specifically provided sections for this purpose of the respective concentration camp. More serious cases are to be transferred to the hospital section of the concentration camp Sachsenhausen.
A regrouping of the prisoners within the camps according to the new classification cannot be undertaken right now in view of the current measures for the execution of the prisoner commitment. New dispositions will be made, however, in accordance with the classification.
I ask therefore, that in the future, with the arrest warrant and the transfer to a concentration camp, suggestions be made as to the category of the prisoner with regard to his personality as well as the degree of his danger to the State.
I therefore order that a complete record of the political life, previous convictions for criminal offences and conduct of the prisoner since the taking over of the power be established, and that request for assignment into category III be specifically and carefully motivated.
This decree does not apply to the district and local police authorities.
[seal of the secret state police] /s/ HEYDRICH certified correct /s/ BLEECK
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-B-PS
Headquarters of the Reichs Security Service II C 3 Nr 5028/43-273-2 (General)
Berlin 26 July 1943
To the higher SS and Police Chiefs
the commanders of the security police and the security service
the inspectors of the security police and the security service
the deputy of the chiefs of the secret police and the security service within the territory of the military commander in Belgium and northern France in Brussels
the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppe B and D
For the information of:
the state police headquarters
the commandants of the security police and the security service
Reich's security main office--office IV
[seal] State Police Hq Duesseldorf 16 Aug 1943
Subject: Organization of labor reformatory camps
The Reichsfuehrer SS has given his consent that besides concentration camps, which come under the jurisdiction of the SS economical administration main office, further labor reformatory camps may be created for which the security police alone is competent. These labor reformatory camps are dependent on the authorization of the Reichs security main office, which can only be granted in case of emergency (great number of foreign workers, etc.).
At the same time, the Reichsfuehrer SS has forbidden that prison camps of all sorts (among others, enlarged police prisons, labor reformatory camps, transient camps) be placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the higher SS and police chiefs or the commanders and inspectors of the security police and of the security service. He has ordered that those camps come for administration and command under the jurisdiction of the state police headquarters, commandants of the security police and the security service or the immigration and transient agencies. Thus the general supervision of the superior offices remains undisturbed by this affiliation.
The decrees of 28.5.1941 and 12.12.1941 concerning the organization of labor reformatory camps remain also in effect. For the General Government and the occupied territories, reference is made to the decree from 29.3.1943 II c 3 Nr. 5028/43273-2.
[seal of the Reichsleiter] SS and chief /s/ Dr KALTENBRUNNER of the German police Certified correct in the Reichministry /s/ Riemer of the Interior
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS
SECRET
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service B. Nr. IV* 656/42 SECRET
Berlin 17 Dec 1942
_Secret To_:
All commanders of the security police and the security service
All inspectors of the security police and the security service
All commandants of the security police and the security service
All chiefs of the State police headquarters
_For the information of_:
The chief of the SS economic and administration headquarters, SS Lt Gen Pohl
All higher SS and police chiefs
The inspectors of the concentration camps
For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 December 1942, has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the concentration camps.
In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps. For this, the most necessary formalities, as listed under N. 3 must be observed.
In order to eliminate and to avoid complaints, each and every one of these measures in the individual cases must be presented to third authorities, by giving careful reasons, as being irremissible security police measures.
2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police and the security service, and the chiefs of the State police headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and strict ruling.
_a._ the prisons.
_b._ the labor reformatory camps.
All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary confinement can be left there.
_Every single laborer counts!_
The checking must be taken up at once. All withholding of prisoners qualified for work is prohibited. My approval is required for exceptions.
3. The prisoners who are committed to concentration camps till the 1 Feb 1943 will be seized under reference to this decree, solely according to a list (present number, first and second name, place of birth and date, residence, reason for arrest with short commentary). One list will be sent to the Reichs security headquarters as a collective request for both protective custody as well as for commitment to a concentration camp, for which the confirmation can be assumed.
In regards to eastern workers, that is to say for such workers who have to wear the insignia "EAST", it is sufficient to give the total number of the arrested.
One copy goes with the transport to the commander of the concentration camp, and another copy remains with the authorities who are making the commitment.
In order to facilitate the necessary exploitation, the lists are to be made up on single pages and in such a way that enough space be left between the data of the individual prisoners, so that the lists can be cut out.
The lists are to be sent to the Reichs security headquarters, Referat IV c 2.
By direction
signed: MUELLER certified correct
[seal of the secret state police]
signed: HILLMUTH Chief Secretary of Police
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-E-PS
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD) _IV-C-2 General No. 656/42 g_
[Initials] B.R. [Stamp] Bureau of State Police, Duesseldorf Berlin, 25 June 1943
TO:
_a._ All commanders of the security police and the security service
_b._ All inspectors
_c._ All commandants
_d._ All chiefs of the directing office of the state police
_e._ All groups and sub-divisions [Referate] of Bureau IV of the Reichs Central Office of Security
_For information purposes to_:
_f._ The chief of the SS central administrative office of economy, SS Obergruppenfuehrer (Lt Gen) POHL
_g._ All higher SS and police chiefs
_h._ SS central administrative office of economy, office group D--Concentration Camp--in Oraninburg (with 30 copies for the camps)
_i._ Referate II C3
Subject: Increased shipments to concentration camps.
Reference: My decrees of 17 Dec 1942--IV 656/42 g and of 23 March 1943--IV C 2, Gen No 656/42 g
The regulations for exceptions contained in the above mentioned decrees, which achieved their intended goal, are hereby revoked immediately.
The given directives have not been observed everywhere during the execution of those shipments to concentration camps. Subjects of allied, friendly or neutral states, as well as minors, have, for instance in several cases, been committed to concentration camps in spite of the strictest orders to the contrary. Their re-transfer will lead to difficulties and cause an unnecessary, supplemental effort.
In order to prevent justified complaints, especially of a diplomatic nature, I request to _check_ the shipments which have been carried out _immediately_. Commitments contrary to the regulations must immediately be reported, since the cases have already been classified according to the general rules of protective custody, in every single case, and the release or other dispositions of such prisoners effectuated as quickly as possible.
This decree does not concern district and local police authorities.
By direction
signed: MUELLER
Stamp: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police.
The Reichs Ministry of the Interior
[Pencil note:] Duesseldorf Certified: signed: BLEECK [?] Employee of the Chancellery
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1099-PS
The Commissar General for White Ruthenia Minsk, 29 September 1941
To: The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Berlin W 35 Rauchstrasse 17/18
_Personal_
My dear Party Comrade Reichsleiter Rosenberg!
Only today, after extensive investigations, was I able to locate the rest of the art treasures in Minsk and store them away in a safe place. Minsk had a large, in part very valuable, collection of art treasures and paintings which were removed almost in their entirety. On an order of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Reichsleiter Heinrich Himmler, most of the paintings, some still during my term of office, were packed by the SS and shipped to the Reich. They are worth several millions of marks and were all taken from the general district of White Ruthenia. The paintings were supposedly sent to Linz and to Koenigsberg in East Prussia. I beg to have these valuable collections, insofar as they are not needed in the Reich, again placed at the disposal of the general district of White Ruthenia, in any case, however, to have the money value secured for the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
According to the report made by a Major of the 707th Division who today handed the remaining treasures over to me, the SS has left the rest of the paintings and works of art to the Wehrmacht for further pillaging, including very valuable paintings and furniture from the 18th and 19th centuries, vases, marble objects, clocks, etc. General Stubenrauch has taken a valuable part from Minsk with him up to the front. "Sonderfuehrer" whose names have not yet been reported to me, have carried away furniture, paintings and art objects * * * in 3 trucks, without giving a receipt. I shall ascertain which unit it was, in order to carry out the punishment of those who have made themselves guilty of looting. From the material that was left, local authorities of the Wehrmacht and of the SS took away more art treasures and paintings without my permission; those, however, may still be found in Minsk.
I request that the national socialist painter, Willi Springer, Berlin SW 29, Hasenheide 94, be sent here to restore those paintings which were in part thoughtlessly damaged by knife slashings, so that under his supervision whatever can still be salvaged, should be salvaged. Unfortunately, many valuable vases, china, cupboards, and period furniture from the 18th and 19th centuries were also badly damaged or destroyed. Altogether it is a question of irreplaceable valuables worth millions of marks. I request that for the future the Ministry for Eastern Affairs take action with the competent authorities of the Wehrmacht so that such vandalism be stopped and that those responsible to be threatened with the heaviest possible punishment and that such punishment be inflicted if necessary.
The prehistoric museum also is in a completely devastated state. Valuable precious and semiprecious stones were stolen from the geological section. At the university, instruments worth hundreds of thousands of marks were thoughtlessly destroyed or stolen. May I suggest, my dear Reichsleiter, that you report these events to the Fuehrer? White Ruthenia, already rather poor, has suffered a heavy loss through these actions. I hope that specialists will be employed in Leningrad, and in Moscow, as well as in the old cultural cities in the Ukraine, to prevent occurrences of this kind; otherwise the civilian administration shall find everywhere the same devastation as was found here.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully,
(signed) Wilhelm KUBE Commissar General for White Ruthenia
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1104-PS
The Personal Reviewer of the Permanent Deputy of the Minister of the Reich
Berlin, 21 November 1941 _Bi/T Nr 58 A/41 Secret_ _To Dr. Marquart_
Enclosed herewith I transmit to you the copy of an incident regarding the measures against the Jews in the general-district of Minsk, with the request to submit the same to the Minister of the Reich.
On order of the Gauleiter I have sent one copy to Lieutenant General of the SS, Heydrich, with the request for investigation of the incident.
signed: BIGENWALD 3 enclosures
* * * * *
Copy /T
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia Dept Gauleiter/Ka Minsk, 1 November 1941
To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories, Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, Riga
Today, money, valuables and other objects were deposited at the cashier of my office against receipt, in the presence of Government Councillor Dr. Idelberger of the Police Battalion 11. These matters were from Sluzk and other regions which the Police Battalion 11 had included in its action without my order and without my knowledge. All objects and the money have been safely deposited by officials of Commissariat General with the Reich Credit Institute [Reichskreditanstalt] and are held at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. Reserve officer 1st Lieutenant of the Police Brodeck attempted in the course of this incident to purchase gold for private purposes in order to use it for a personal affair, as witnessed by Government Councillor Dr. Idelberger, my adjutant, SS-2nd Lt Wildenstein and myself.
I have immediately reported the case to the responsible field command post at Minsk and requested the arrest of the police officer. 1st Lt Brodeck was immediately set free by the investigating court martial officer as the court martial officer did not find any basis for charges in this incident. This is contrary to the legal conception of my office. Any private dealing in gold is prohibited in the German Reich. Aggravating in this case is furthermore the fact that an officer of the same unit is involved which has effected the liquidation of the former possessors of gold.
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia signed: KUBE
* * * * *
SECRET
Copy / T
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia Dept Gauleiter/Ka Minsk, 1 November 1941 _Personal_
To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories Gauleiter Hinrich LOHSE Riga
Enclosed I submit a report of the Commissioner for the territory of Sluzk, party member Carl, with the request not to let this matter rest. Herewith I propose to prosecute the guilty officers commencing with the battalion commander of the security police to the last lieutenant.
For about the last three weeks, I have discussed the Sluzk action against the Jews with the responsible SS-Brigadier General and Brigadier-General of the Protection Police, Zenner, Member of the Reichstag, and I have pointed out that the tradesmen should be spared by all means and that the commissioner responsible for the territory should be contacted prior to the action. Above all, any act lowering the prestige of the German Reich and its organizations in the eyes of the White Ruthenian population should be avoided.
The police battalion No 11 from Kauen has as a unit, directly subordinate to the armed forces, taken independent action without informing me, the SS-Brigadier-General or any other office of the Commissariat General, thereby impairing most seriously the prestige of the German nation. I request to have the commissioner of the territory Carl and all his officials and collaborators from Riga questioned under oath and to record the hearing. Then, in order to set an example, I request to grant my motion to prosecute the entire staff of officers of the police battalion 11.
I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves again, is such a base and filthy act that this incident as such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reich Marshal. The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes very strenuous efforts to win the population over to Germany in accordance with the instructions of the Fuehrer. These efforts cannot be brought in harmony with the methods described herein.
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia signed: KUBE
Enclosures
* * * * *
Riga 11 November 1941
_Original_ with two enclosures to the Reich minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin with the request for consideration. It is deemed necessary that higher authority take immediate steps.
By order of
The Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories signed: WICHMANN
* * * * *
Copy/T of the copy
The Commissioner of the Territory of Sluzk Sluzk, 30 October 1941
SECRET
To the Commissioner General Minsk _Subject_: Action against Jews
Referring to the report made by phone on 27 October 1941 I now beg to inform you in writing of the following:
On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o'clock a first lieutenant of the police battalion No 11 from Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the
## action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to
work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. I immediately protested violently against it, pointing out that a liquidation of Jews must not be allowed to take place in an arbitrary manner. I explained that a large part of the Jews still living in the towns were tradesmen and families of tradesmen respectively. But these Jewish tradesmen were not simply expendable because they were indispensable for maintaining the economic life. Furthermore, I pointed out that White Ruthenian tradesmen are so to say non-existent, that therefore all vital plants had to be shut down all at once, if all Jews would be liquidated. At the end of our conference, I mentioned that all tradesmen and specialists, inasmuch as they were indispensable, had papers of identification and that these should not be pulled out of the factories. Furthermore, it was agreed that all Jews still living in the town should first be brought into the ghetto in order to segregate them, especially with regard to the families of tradesmen which I did not want to have liquidated either. Two of my officials should be assigned to segregate them. The commander did not in any way contradict my idea and I had therefore the firm belief that the
## action would be carried out accordingly. However, a few hours after the
beginning of the action the greatest difficulties already developed. I noticed that the commander had not at all abided by our agreement. All Jews without exception were taken out of the factories and shops and deported in spite of our agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was moved by way of the ghetto where many of them were processed and still segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on trucks and liquidated without further delay outside of the town. Shortly after noon complaints came already from all sides that the factories could not function any more because all Jewish tradesmen had been removed. As the commander had proceeded on his way to Baranowitschi I got in touch with the deputy commander, a captain, after searching a long time, and demanded to stop the action immediately because my instructions had been disregarded and the damage done so far with respect to the economic life could not be repaired any more. The captain was greatly surprised at my idea and stated that he had received orders from the commander to clear the whole town of Jews without exception in the same manner as they had done in other towns. This mopping up had to be executed on political considerations and economic reasons had never played a role anywhere. However, due to my energetic intervention, he finally halted the action toward evening.
For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a revolution. I myself with all my officials have been in it without interruption all day long in order to save what could yet be saved. In several instances I literally had to expel with drawn pistol the German police officials as well as the Lithuanian partisans from the shops. My own police was employed for the same mission but had often to leave the streets on account of the wild shooting in order to avoid being shot themselves. The whole picture was generally more than ghastly. In the afternoon a great number of abandoned Panje carriages with horses were standing in the streets so that I had to instruct the municipal administration to take care of the vehicles immediately. Afterwards it was ascertained that they were Jewish vehicles ordered by the armed forces to move ammunition. The drivers had simply been taken off the carriages and led away, and nobody had worried in the least about the vehicles.
I was not present at the shooting before the town. Therefore I cannot make a statement on its brutality. But it should suffice, if I point out that persons shot have worked themselves out of their graves some time after they had been covered. Regarding the economic damage I want to state that the tannery has been affected worst of all. 26 experts worked there. Of them, fifteen of the best specialists alone have been shot. Four more jumped from the truck during the transport and escaped, while seven others were not apprehended after they fled. The plant barely continues to operate today. Five wheelwrights worked in the wheelwright shop. Four of them have been shot and the shop has to keep going now with one wheelwright. Additional tradesmen such as carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. are still missing. Up till now it was impossible for me to obtain an exact survey. I have mentioned already in the beginning, that the families of tradesmen should be spared too. But now it seems that almost in all families some persons are missing. Reports come in from all over, making it clear that in one family the tradesman himself, in another family the wife and in the next one again the children are missing. In that way, almost all families have been broken up. It seems to be very doubtful whether under these circumstances the remaining tradesmen will show any interest in their work and produce accordingly, particularly as even today they are running around with bloody and bruised faces due to the brutality. The White Ruthenian people who had full confidence in us, are dumbfounded. Though they are intimidated and don't dare to utter their free opinion, one has already heard that they take the viewpoint that this day does not add to the glory of Germany and that it will not be forgotten. I am of the opinion that much has been destroyed through this action which we have achieved during the last months and that it will take a long time until we shall regain the confidence of the population which we have lost.
In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the street, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.
Also within the ghetto, the different barracks which had been nailed up by the civil administration and were furnished with Jewish furniture, have been broken open and robbed. Even from the barracks in which the unit was quartered, window frames and doors have been forcibly removed and used for campfires. Although I had a discussion with the adjutant of the commander on Tuesday morning concerning the looting and he promised in the course of the discussion that none of the policemen would enter the town any more, yet I was forced several hours later to arrest two fully armed Lithuanian partisans because they were apprehended looting. During the night from Tuesday to Wednesday the battalion left the town in the direction of Baranowitschi. Evidently, the people were only too glad when this report circulated in the town.
So far the report. I shall come to Minsk in the immediate future, in order to discuss the affair personally once again. At the present time, I am not in a position to continue with the action against the Jews. First, order has to be established again. I hope that I shall be able to restore order as soon as possible and also to revive the economic life despite the difficulties. Only, I beg you to grant me one request: "In the future, keep this police battalion away from me by all means."
signed: CARL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1107-PS
SECRET
The Leader of Directorate Group, Cultural Missions _P / 551a/44g_ Expert: Goepel Berlin, 17 May 1944.
To the Chief of Operational Staff Politic [Fuehrungestabes Politik] Inter-office Memorandum.
Subject: Bringing of Museum Objects and Works of Art from the Occupied Eastern Territories into the Reich.
Information received concerning the bringing back of museum objects and other works of art now public property in the occupied Eastern Territories into the Reich has shown that the interests of the ministry of the East, i.e., of the Reich in this matter are not being presented with sufficient stress. There is no reason for leaving these museum stocks, some of which are extremely valuable, in the hands of various offices and authorities without establishing unmistakably the claim of possession, i.e., the right of disposal of the Reich. The atrocity propaganda of the enemy side has taken up this question at large and has retained with it evident success in the incitement against Germany in this and foreign countries.
Besides the department of archives in the Reich Ministry, the following have brought back works of art from the occupied Eastern Districts (place of deposit Troppau):
Reich Commissioner for Ukraine.
(East and West European Museum--place of deposit Kiew in the district Reichau (Wehlau)).
(Museum Charkow--place of deposit Wildenhof near Zinten. Various museums of the Ukraine--place of deposit--Troppau)
Reich Commissioner for the East.
(Stock of Museum Minsk--place of deposit Koenigsberg and Castle Hochstedt/Donau)
Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
(Museum objects from the Ukraine--place of deposit Krakau)
Armed forces from various places.
(places of deposit unknown)
For political reasons I consider it important that the rights of possession of the evacuated museums be kept up fully, respectively in all cases where no owner is known, the right of possession of the Reich is to be clarified. I, therefore, ask for approval of the following measures:
1. A decree is to go to all offices involved according to which all works of art of public property which have been brought back should be put under direct control of the ministry of the East.
2. Action should be taken to inventory all returned objects of art and have their art and material values determined.
3. The places of deposit of these objects of art seized in this way are to be examined by experts and, if necessary the required measures taken to secure these objects from air damage or other destruction. A checking at regular intervals of the conditions and intactness of the stocks should be made as is done at the places of deposit of the German museums.
MS 18/5 [v.d. Milwe-Schroeden]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1109-PS
Draft Copy
Z.f.O.
Berlin, 17 June 1944.
SECRET
_Note_ for the Director of Operational Group [Fuehrungsgruppe] P-4, Herrn v.d. Milwe-Schroeden, in the building
Concerning: Bolshevic Atrocity Propaganda. Case: Memoranda of the Special Staff RR dated 15 April 1944.
1. _Evacuation of the Population._ The undersigned was in Kiev during the whole of October 1943 until the beginning of November, shortly before the occupation of the city by Soviet Russia. At the beginning of October a part of the population had been evacuated especially in the parts of the town by the Dnieper and the areas in question were declared "battle zones". During October the population of the city was further evacuated quarter by quarter. This evacuation took place by order of the military authorities; it was, however, carried out by the civil administration [Stadtkommandantur]. The trolley line and the railway trains had already been put in readiness by the German civil administration. Nonetheless, the greater proportion of the inhabitants listened to the Soviet counter-propaganda, with the result that they did not wish to abandon the city; they sought accommodation in quarters still untouched by the evacuation or went off on foot to the neighboring areas of the city. There was an uninterrupted stream of homeless people wandering through the streets, with a few belongings. Hardship was unavoidable as a result of the evacuation, but it was still further increased by the passive resistance of the population. Protection could not be set up in the evacuated sections of the city, so there were very soon no locked doors. It was probably mainly members of the local bands dressed in field gray, who are to be held responsible for the plundering of empty dwellings, etc. At this time much property belonging to museums and institutions was destroyed.
2. _The Removal of Cultural Property._ A great deal of material from museums, archives, institutions and other cultural institutions was taken out of and away from Kiev in the autumn of 1943, in the proper way. These actions to safeguard the material were carried out by the Special Purpose Staff RR as well as by the individual institute directors etc. at the instigation of the Reich Commissar. At the beginning a great deal of the evacuated property was taken only to the rear areas; later on this material was forwarded to the Reich. When the undersigned, towards the end of September, received the mission from the cultural division of the Reich Commissar to take out of Kiev the remaining cultural effects, the most worthwhile materials from the cultural point of view had already been removed. During October some 40 carloads of cultural effects were sent to the Reich. In this case it was chiefly a question of valuables which belonged to the research institutions of the national Research Centre of the Ukraine. These institutions are continuing their work at the present time in the Reich and are being directed in such a manner that at a given moment they can be brought back into the Ukraine. The cultural valuables which could not be promptly safeguarded, were plundered. In this case, it was always a question, however, of less valuable material, as the principal valuables were taken away in accordance with orders.
In October 1943 factory, workshop etc. plants were taken out of Kiev by order of the Reich Commissar. To what place they were removed I do not know. At the time of the entry of Soviet Russia there was nothing valuable in this respect left in the city.
[Signature] Dr. Ulmann
## PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1113-PS
Higher SS- and Police Leader for the East 2000/42 g 11 Jacobstr, Riga, November 6, 1942
SECRET
* * * * *
Final Report "Marshfever"
9. _Miciajewicze (p. 2479)_
9 Feb--9 Mar 1942
By motorized Gendarmery--patrols and a company from the 15th Latvian Police Battalion. Seventy bandits shot. By carrying out these actions the following successes were obtained:
_a._--49 bandit camps, pill-boxes and strong points, as well as several villages in the swamp-areas which were used as hideouts were smoked out and destroyed.
_b._--389 armed bandits shot in combat.
1274 suspicious persons sentenced and shot.
8350 Jews executed.
_c._--1217 persons evacuated.
_d._--3 anti-tank guns,
2 heavy machine guns,
3 light machine guns,
1 radio set (sender and receiver),
some radio equipment, rifles and small arms,
large amount of explosives and ammunition, hand grenades, Teller mines, pieces of equipment and other material, as well as
1 truck, 1 passenger car,
80 panji-carts (peasant carts),
42 bicycles,
62 horses,
5 cows as well as food supplies have been captured.
Besides the above stated objects the enclosed 14 sketches were found during actions against bands in the territory of Smolewicze north-eastward of Minsk in a camp abandoned shortly before the two bandits whose portraits are enclosed were recognized by comparison with captured bandits and shot. One of them is the leader of the bandits, a Bolshevist commissar.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1117-PS
The Reichs Marshal of the Greater German Reich Headquarters, 1, May 1941
The battle against Jews, Freemasons and other affiliated forces of opposite "Weltanschauung" is a foremost task of National Socialism during the war.
I therefore welcome the decision of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to form staffs in all occupied territories for the purpose of safeguarding all research material and cultural goods of the above-mentioned groups, and transporting them to Germany.
All party, State and Wehrmacht Services are therefore requested to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg's staffs, Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade Utikal, and his deputy DRK-Feldfuehrer Party Comrade von Beer, in the discharge of their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to report to us on their work, particularly on any difficulties that might arise.
signed: GOERING.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1118-PS
To the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3 18 June 1942 U/Sz 1073/42 i Dear Reich Marshal:
From your letter of 30 May 1942, I see that Oberfeldfuehrer von Behr of the German Red Cross informed you of certain matters on which he has not been able to report to me yet. I am pleased by the appreciation which you express for my Einsatzstab for the occupied territories. It is, for me, self-evident that the members of my Einsatzstab will continue to be at your disposal as much as is at all possible.
Since the new M-action to secure Jewish house furnishings for the establishment of the administration in the East, which is purely a state measure, has been added to the former tasks of my Einsatzstab, it has been necessary to undertake an organizational separation of duty fields according to my party and state bureaus. In order that the interests of the Einsatzstab may be protected within the framework of the M-action, I have appointed Oberfeldfuehrer von Behr of the German Red Cross, head of the bureau West of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, while the party bureau of the Einsatzstab Paris will be restaffed.
In consideration of the importance of the work of the Einsatzstab in history and in order to relieve my fellow workers, I have directed that in the interest of a correct documentary grasp of the securing of art objects hitherto undertaken, all evidence on this subject will be checked. This work is at present in progress.
Since in certain circles, as you write, the conjecture was expressed that one of my bureaus would deal in art objects, I have ordered this check. I have entrusted it to the head of my office for plastic art, Bereichsleiter Scholz, and Abschnittsleiter von Ingram who wears the Knight's Cross. Furthermore some time ago I explicitly approved the measures of the chief of staff of my Einsatzstab, Stabsfuehrer party member Utikal, that party member Dr. Lohse of the office of formative art is at your disposal for your personal wishes. This will be managed in the same way in the future. I should like to emphasize explicitly that the new arrangement made in my bureaus in the West will in no way prejudice your wishes, but that the gentlemen of my Einsatzstab are at your disposal in the same way as before. I may ask you however, to continue to further the work of my Einsatzstab in the same way as you have done hitherto, which is so worthy of thanks. I ask you especially to continue to give the chief of staff of my Einsatzstab, Reich office leader [Reichsamtsleiter] Utikal, the opportunity to report to you in especially important cases on the total work of the Einsatzstab. I have instructed party member Utikal to give you a report on the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Fuehrer edict of 1 March 1942. It is so grotesque that difficulties should arise for my Einsatzstab from this liberal Fuehrer edict, you should know about it for curiosity's sake alone. If you could intercede for my Einsatzstab in this connection, I would be very grateful to you in the interest of the cause.
Since you have already deposited sums in a special account for the art objects which you have acquired, I would be grateful for information as to what use you had intended for the funds of this account. Please do not take this question amiss or misinterpret it. I believe, however, that we agree that the tasks of my Einsatzstab could and can be carried out only on the basis of the fight of the NSDAP. Moreover, the Reich Treasurer has liberally made available the means for carrying out these tasks. Therefore I believe that we also agree that the art objects secured from Jewish possessions must be considered sequestered for the benefit of the NSDAP. In regard to the research material the Fuehrer has already decided that the supply secured by the Einsatzstab be dedicated to the Hohe Schule. It would be no more than right for the great values of the secured art treasures to be transferred to the NSDAP some day. Of course it remains up to the Fuehrer himself to dispose of this matter. Since the NSDAP has financed the 20 year battle against Jewry, however, such a settlement would no doubt be admissible.
I would be grateful to you if you could let me know your opinion on this question some time, so that the corresponding suggestions can be made to the Fuehrer at the proper time. Since the Reich Treasurer is continually making considerable means available for my Einsatzstab, you can understand that I am interested in clearing up this question.
As I have been informed there are good working connections with various offices of your jurisdiction, especially in the work of the Einsatzstab in the East. In the future I shall continue to see to it that everything of importance for your field of activity reaches you.
I am enclosing a document from the work of my Einsatzstab in the East, which may interest you, the personally written biography of the Russian parachutist K. Kaitanow.
Heil Hitler [no signature]
* * * * *
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich Berlin W8, Leipziger Str. 3, 30 May 1942 [stamped] Ministerial Office, received
4 June 1942, No 01141 [partly illegible notation] * * * 4 June * * * GR (2?) Utikal * * *
Dear party member Rosenberg:
Your Einsatzstab for the seizure of cultural goods in Paris has, I believe, received the false repute of dealing in art goods itself. I know the work of the Einsatzstab very well and must say that there is no bureau which I can praise so unreservedly for its continued work and initiative as this bureau with all its staff. I presumably gave occasion for the repute of dealing in art goods, because I asked several gentlemen who are especially well versed in the field, if during their stay in Paris or France they should hear anywhere that pictures or other art objects are to be put on the market by art dealers or private individuals, to look at these things and let me know whether there is anything of interest for me among them. Since the latter has often been the case, I then asked the gentlemen to do me a favor and acquire the things for me, for which purpose I placed a warehouse at their disposal. Therefore, if some gentlemen were eager to establish contact with art dealers, it was exclusively a personal favor which was being done for me and which benefits the expansion of my collection. Since many would-be purchasers are looking for art objects in the occupied territory, I can imagine that they, perhaps in ignorance of the situation, or perhaps out of jealousy, falsely suspected the gentlemen of your Einsatzstab.
I feel obligated to offer you this explanation and to ask you that this procedure may continue. On the other hand, I do support the work of your Einsatzstab personally, wherever I can, and the fact that I was able to aid the Einsatzstab through my agencies is responsible for a large part of the seized cultural goods.
Greetings and Heil Hitler, Your
[signed]: HERMANN GOERING
* * * * *
To the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, Prime Minister Hermann Goering Berlin W9, Leipziger Platz 7
11 January 1943 Charlottenburg 2 Bismarckstrasse 1
Dear Party member Goering:
My most cordial congratulations on your 50th birthday.
On this occasion I think back to the first fighting years of our movement, when I met you as a German officer at Adolf Hitler's. I think of your unqualified efforts for the Fuehrer and the long years of battle, which finally led our movement to victory. Please be assured how well I believe I understand what you have accomplished for the people and the Fuehrer, and I wish you further determined, unbroken strength to hold on to the victorious conclusion of this decisive battle for the Reich for the coming years.
I take the liberty of giving you, as a friend of the plastic art, a Dutch painting as a little remembrance for your museum. It was painted by Jacob Adriaensz Bellevois, comes from the 17th century, and is called "Seascape".
Tomorrow I shall offer you my personal congratulations on your anniversary.
Heil Hitler, Yours respectfully, [No signature]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1130-PS
Col. i.G. v. Altenstadt OKH/Gen Qu Department War Administration II/2120/43 secret
11 April 1943 Main Department I
Tgb No. I 784/43 secret Received 6 May 1943 Encl. 1
Dear Mr. Braeutigam:
Enclosed I am sending you for your personal information a report of a speech which Gauleiter Reichkommissar Koch made in Kiev on 5 March 1943. May I ask you to regard this report as solely meant for yourself.
With best regards,
Heil Hitler! Sincerely yours, Altenstadt [signature] N.R. Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kinkelein [initialed] 8 May The speech is known, isn't it? Yes. [initials illegible] 1 enclosure. File Koch.
* * * * *
Copy
High Command Army, Group B O.Qu./VII (Mil. Govt.) B.B.Nr.83/43 secret. Headquarters, 1 April 1943
SECRET
To the OKH/Gen Staff Army/Gen Qu Dept. War Administration (Admin.)
_Subject_: Treatment of the civilian population in the Ukraine.
Reference: OKW/Gen St d H/Gen Qu Obt.Kr.Verw(Qu 4) Nr. II/1736/43
secret of 23 March 1943.
Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Claassen participated in the meeting of the NSDAP in Kiev on March 5, 1943 and gave a verbal report on the contents of the Reich Commissar's speech. Other documents on the contents of the speech are not available here.
I. On the _treatment of the population_ the Reich Commissar remarked in the course of his speech in several places as follows:
1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just * * *
2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss, I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population must work, work, and work again * * * for some people are getting excited, that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * * We definitely did not come here to give out manna, we have come here to create the basis for victory.
3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here * * *
II. Furthermore, the speech was primarily an appeal to all party members stationed in the Reich Commissariat of the Ukraine, to conduct themselves perfectly in every respect and in any situation. In this connection the Reich Commissar said the following among other things:
1. * * * In the days of the crisis, one could differentiate between three groups of people:
1. The group of those, that went about asking where one might be able to buy another suitcase;
2. The group of slogan manufacturers with the main slogan: "One has to wait and see."
3. The group of real National Socialists, who said: "Now of all times we will not move an inch from here!"
With this third group we say: Whoever wallows in defeatism, who gripes, will have trouble with this National Socialist community, gathered here; he will get a slap in the face * * * We owe such conduct to the front, which we would prefer to join if the Fuehrer would give us permission * * * There is not a single place at the front, at which the Russians could have forced us to retreat. The Russian has not been able to force his will upon us * * *
* * * * *
2. * * * Nowdays, one often hears: "Had we," or "Were we." I only tell these people one thing: Had one had more faith in Adolf Hitler and had one taken a firmer grip at the sword, everything would have been different * * *
3. * * * We have brought you, my fellow party members to the Ukraine as personalities but not for the purpose that you should write your papers as in a paper war. I have no objection if you want to get yourselves a rubber stamp, say "Not important for the war." This stamp you can then apply to those files which you consider superfluous or unnecessary for these times. If your superiors do not understand this, tell them so. It is not the question to build up staffs, but to decrease them. I have reduced mine in Rowno from 800 to 250 staff members.
For the High Command of the Army Group B
Chief Quartermaster
Faehndrich
For correctness of copy: [signature illegible] Lt.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1138-PS
SECRET
(II 1 d 3000) THE REICH COMMISSAR FOR EASTLAND RIGA Riga, 13 August 1941
TO: The Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin W 35.
I beg to enclose an account of planned provisional directives for treatment of Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ostland. [Translator's note: Baltic States and White Russia.]
[Signed] BANSE [?] To Department [Hauptabteilung] II with request for opinion. (By order) (Habs, 24 August) (Gauleiter has taken cognizance) (return to Dr. Runte) (19 August 1941) Enclosure: (III a/13/ ei Grh)
[Translator's note: All lines enclosed in parentheses were added to the original typewritten document in pencil or ink. There is also a slip attached to the document, initialed by Dr. Runte, Gauleiter M. and R.]
* * * * *
Reich commissar for Eastland Kommissariat Ostland, 13 Aug. 41 Habs 4 Sept.
SECRET!
Provisional directives on the treatment of Jews in the area of the Reichs-Kommissariat Ostland.
My instructions in my address of 27 July 1941 in Kowno determine the final settlement of the Jewish question in the area of the Reichskommissariat Ostland.
Insofar as further measures are taken, especially by the Security Police (SIPO), to carry out my oral instructions, they will not be affected by the following _preliminary_ directives. It is merely the job of these preliminary directives to assure these, and for such length of time, minimum measures by the General or Regional Commissars, where and for as long as further measures are not possible in the direction of the final solution of the Jewish question.
I. _a._ For the time being only those Jews will be subject to these directives who are citizens of the German Reich, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of the former Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, of the USSR or of its component states, or stateless Jews.
_b._ Other Jews of foreign nationality, others of mixed blood and spouses of Jews who are not ready to share the fate of their Jewish spouses are to be denied permission to leave the area of the Reichskommissariat Ostland because it is a military area. They are to be watched. In addition they can be subjected to the following measures, among others: obligation to report daily, prohibition of moving, or assignment to specific dwelling, prohibition of leaving the municipal area limitations on circulation. In case of necessity they are to be taken into police custody until further decisions can be made.
II. A Jew is, whoever descends from at least 3 grandparents who were full Jews by race.
A Jew is also whoever descends from one or two grandparents who were full Jews by race, if he
_a._ belongs or belonged to the Jewish denomination, or
_b._ on 20 June 1941 or later was _married_ to, or living in common-law marriage with, a person who is Jewish within the purview of these directives, or who now or in future enters into such a relationship.
III. In cases of doubt, the district (or municipal) Commissar decides, according to his best judgment, who is a Jew within the purview of these directives.
IV. General Commissars will immediately order the following measures, as soon as or insofar as civil administration has been introduced in their areas:
_a._ The Jews are to be listed, through imposition of the duty to report, by name, sex, age, and address. Furthermore the rosters of Jewish congregations, and the statements of trustworthy natives, will serve as bases for their listing.
_b._ It will be decreed that Jews distinctively mark themselves by prominently visible yellow hexagonal stars of at least 10 cm. in diameter worn on the left side of the breast and in the center of the back.
_c._ Jews are prohibited from:
1. Changing of their home town and their homes without permission of the area (municipal) Commissar.
2. Use of sidewalks, public means of transportation (i.e., railroad, streetcars, bus, steamer, horse-drawn taxis) and automobiles.
3. Use of public facilities and institutions serving the population (resorts and bathing facilities, parks, meadows, playgrounds, and athletic fields).
4. Attendance at theatres, movies, libraries, museums.
5. Attendance at schools of any type.
6. The possession of automobiles and radio sets.
7. Kosher slaughtering.
_d._ Jewish doctors and dentists may treat or advise only Jewish patients. If Ghettos or camps are erected, they are to be distributed among them for the care of their inmates. Jewish druggists are to be permitted practice of their profession according to need, but only in Ghettos or camps. Drug stores previously managed by Jews are to be transferred to trusteeship of Aryan druggists.
Practice of their profession is prohibited to Jewish veterinarians.
_e._ Jews are to be forbidden exercise of the professions and
## activities designated below:
1. Activity as attorney, notary-public or legal adviser.
2. Operation of banks, money-changing offices and pawn shops.
3. Activity as representative, agent, and intermediary.
4. Trade in real estate.
5. Migratory trade.
_f._ The following will be decreed for the handling of Jewish property:
1. _General._ The property of the Jewish population is to be confiscated and secured. The previous Jewish legal owner, from the moment of confiscation, is no longer authorized to dispose of his property. Legal transactions which violate this prohibition are null and void.
2. _Duty to report._ The entire property of the Jewish population is to be reported. The deadline for reporting is determined by the General or area Commissars. It is mandatory for anyone who owns or stores Jewish property and anyone who, without being owner, proprietor or custodian, legally or actually disposes of, or can dispose of, Jewish property, to report it.
The duty to report not only applies to the legal Jewish owner, but also to anyone who, for example, administers Jewish property, who has taken it into safe-keeping or obtained it in any other manner.
The reporting must be done on a form according to the attached model.
The General Commissars regulate reporting procedure with regard to local conditions and determine the officials to whom the reports are to be submitted. The reports should be submitted, if possible, to the area commissars. The area commissars are, however, empowered also to be in charge of the giving out and the receiving of forms; this applies also to government offices which are not supplied or equipped by the civil administration. These offices are to forward the forms handed in to the area Commissars.
3. _The duty of delivery._ Jewish property is to be delivered on special demand. The demand can take place by general proclamation or by order to definite individuals. The General Commissars order through proclamation immediate delivery of the following articles:
_a._ Domestic and foreign currency.
_b._ Securities and financial records of every sort, (i.e., stocks, promissory notes, exchange, debt records, bank and savings-bank books).
_c._ All articles of value (coined and uncoined gold and silver, other precious metals, jewelry, precious stones, etc.).
Articles turned in are to be entered in a serially numbered receipt
## book in two copies (carbon) according to the attached model. The
entries are to be signed for by the person delivering the article and by the receiving office. The carbon copy of the entry is to be transmitted immediately by the receiving office to the area Commissar. The delivered articles are to be transmitted to the fund of the area Commissar and to be safeguarded by the latter. A special order will be issued on their utilization.
4. _On the Question of Subsistence_: The Jewish population is left with the following:
_a._ that portion of their household articles necessary for scanty subsistence (furniture, clothing and linen)
_b._ A daily amount of money 0.20 RM (2 Rubles) for each Jewish member of the household, the amount of money for a month to be released in advance.
V. The following further measures are to be emphatically striven for, with due consideration for local and especially economic conditions:
_a._ Jews are to be cleaned out from the countryside.
_b._ The Jews are to be removed from all trade, especially from trade with agricultural products and other food-stuffs.
_c._ The Jews are to be forbidden residence in resorts and spas, and in localities that are economically, militarily, or spiritually of importance.
_d._ Jews are to be concentrated, as much as feasible, in cities or in sections of large cities, whose population is already predominantly Jewish. Ghettos are to be established there, and the Jews are to be prohibited from leaving these Ghettos. In the Ghettos they are to be given only as much food as the rest of the population can do without, but no more than suffices for scanty nourishment of the Ghetto inmates. The same applies to supply with other consumer goods. The inmates of the Ghetto regulate their internal conditions by self-administration which is supervised respectively by the city, area Commissar or his deputy. Jews can be assigned as police for internal order. They are to be equipped with rubber truncheons or sticks at most and are to be distinguished by the wearing of the white arm bands, with the yellow Jewish Star on the right upper arm. For the external hermetic sealing of the Ghettos, auxiliary police from among the natives are to be used as much as is feasible. Permission from the area Commissar must be obtained before anyone may enter the Ghetto.
_e._ Jews, capable of working, are to be drafted for forced labor according to the need for work. The economic interests of natives worthy of assistance must not be interfered with by Jewish forced labor. Forced labor can be performed in working parties outside the Ghettos or in the Ghettos, or, where Ghettos are not yet established; also individually outside (i.e., in the work-shop of the Jew). Pay need not correspond to work done; it need only correspond to the need for scanty subsistance for the forced laborer and the non-employable members of his family, taking due consideration to his present cash holdings. (cf. IV f 4 b) Those private establishments and persons, for whose account the forced labor is done, pay an appropriate fee to the pay office of the area Commissar which, in turn, disburses pay to the forced laborers. A special order will be issued for the accounting on amounts of money received.
6. It is left up to the General Commissars to order measures mentioned in par. 5 uniformly for their area or to turn over their promulgation in detail to the Area Commissars. Likewise the General Commissars are authorized to issue more detailed orders within the framework of this policy or to authorize their area Commissars to do it.
DISTRIBUTION: Reichskommissariat 12 Higher SS and Police leaders 20 General Commissar: Estonia 10 Lithuania 10 Latvia 10 White Ruthenia 60 Surplus supply 28
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1141-PS
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THE REICHMINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY.
Rk 25018B BERLIN 17 September 1939.
TO: the President of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich [Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung] General Field Marshal Goering. Through the Director of the Ministry, Marotzke.
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, through the Director in the Ministry, Somler.
The Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration [Generalbevollmaechtigten fuer die Reichsverwaltung] through State Secretary Stukkart.
The Plenipotentiary for Economy [Generalbevollmaechtigten fuer die Wirtschaft] through the Director in the Ministry Sarnow.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht] through Colonel Gause.
Subject: Handling of matters submitted to the Council of ministers for the Reich Defense.
Matters submitted to the Council of ministers for the Reich Defense have heretofore been distributed only to the members of the Council. I have been requested by some of the Reichministers who are not permanent members of the Council to inform them of the drafts of decrees which are being submitted to the Council, so as to enable them to check these drafts from the point of view of their respective offices. I shall follow this request so that all the Reichministers will in the future be informed of the drafts of decrees which are to be acted upon by the Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request to add forty-five additional copies of the drafts, as well as of the letters which usually contain the arguments for the drafts, to the folders submitted to the Council.
DR. LAMMERS.
* * * * *
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Rk 25018B
BERLIN W 8, Voss St. 6, 17 September 1939 To the Reichsministers.
Following a request of the Reichsministers who are not permanent members of the Council for the Reich Defense, I shall in the future notify all Reichsministers of the drafts of decrees submitted here for the decision of the Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request the Reichsministers who are not associated with the Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration, the Plenipotentiary for Economy, or the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, and who therefore submit their proposals directly to the Council for the Reich Defense, to add forty-five copies to all papers directed to the Council, drafts as well letters which usually contain arguments for the draft.
SIGNED: DR. LAMMERS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1143-PS
VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER Editor: Adolf Hitler Central Organ of the National-Socialistic German Labor-Party Berlin Editor Berlin W.9, Linkstrasse. 20 Oct. 32 Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, M.d.R. _Munich 13._
Dear Alfred:
I am sending you enclosed a communication from the R.W.M. forwarded to me by our confidential man [Vertrauensmann] which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm.
This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our own long friend. I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess, by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere.
With best regards. Yours Amo.
* * * * *
AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION
Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the air force.
Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Colonel von Willberg (at present Commander of Breslau) who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence.
A. Organizing the pilots of civilian airlines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.
B. Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm which is being turned over to Colonel Haenel, retired, all existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying.
Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by the Stahlhelm directorate.
The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots MK 50 per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight.
They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane between flight organization proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10 to 20 to 20.
Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organizations.
My own note: Hereby the entire organization of military flying is being turned over to the Stahlhelm.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1151-P-PS
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SS Main Management and Administrative Office [WVHA] Department D--Concentration Camp-- D I/1/ AZ: 14 f 13/Ot./U. Secret Nr. 177/42 Oranienburg, 26 March 1942 [Stamp] Concentration Camp Gross-Rosen Entered 28 March 1942 _Subject_: Special Treatment 14 f 13 _Reference_: None _Annex_: None
To the Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camps, Da., Sar., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Aw., Gr.-Ro., Nie., Rav.,
It became known through a report of a Camp Commandant that 42 prisoners out of 51 which were mustered out for the special treatment 14 f 13 "again became capable of work" after a period of time and therefore do not have to be directed to the special treatment. From this it appears that the selection of the prisoners will not be handled according to given directives. Only those prisoners are allowed to be directed to the examination commission who fulfill the given stipulations and who, above all, are no longer capable of work.
In order to be able to fulfill the designated missions of the concentration camps, the working capabilities of every prisoner must be retained for the camp. The camp commandants of the concentration camps are requested to especially make this their aim.
The Chief of the Central Office Liebehenschel SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1156-PS
Appendix 6 21 March W Chief of the Office for War Mobilization of Economy [Wi Rue Amt] Berlin, 20 March 1941
TOP SECRET
6 Copies 3rd Copy
Report
to Reich Marshall Goering on 19 March 1941
The following points were reported:
1. _Organization Barbarossa._ The Reich Marshall fully agrees to the proposed organization.
The following to join the Ops. Staff: Koerner, Backe, Hanneken, Alpers and Thomas.
Its management will be with the Office for War Mobilization of Economy.
The Reich Marshall attaches importance to the creation of a unified organization. He agrees to direction of offices by officers, in individual instances, particularly in the case of General Schubert. _The Reich Marshall will talk personally to the Directors of the Economy Inspectorates._ Hanneken is to name the best personnel in Economy.
2. The directives worked out by the Wi for destructive measures to be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in the "Fall Barbarossa" were agreed to by the Reich Marshall. One copy was handed to Captain von Brauchitsch to be forwarded to the General Staff of the Luftwaffe.
3. _Report on the India-rubber situation._ The Reich Marshall agrees that from now on transportation of India-rubber shall be carried out by ship using blockade runners, also utilizing the Japanese for these purposes.
4. _Report on storage of fuels_ in Holland and security measures against bombing attacks.
[in pencil] BDC--GOTHA--Old I
5. Report on the demands of the Ministry for Economy re the securing of personnel for the main industry [Grundindustrie].
[Marginal notes in blue pencil: IV. Armament (Rue)]
The Reich Marshall is of the opinion that the most important people in the factories stay and less important people must go to the front.
6. Report on differences between the Navy [Kriegsmarine] and Ministry for Labor concerning the wage increase in Naval dockyards.
The Reich Marshall wishes that the measures proposed by Reichtrustee should be carried out, will however still call a meeting on the problem personally. [IV. Armament (Rue)]
7. The organizing of additional fire-guards because of increasing danger from the air to factories important to war economy [Wehrwirtschaftsbetriebe] is authorized. [Armament (Rue) III]
8. The Reich Marshall has already given his directives to the Luftwaffe in the exports sphere [Auslandslieferungen] concerning the Finnish deliveries. He wishes _delivery of a number of anti-aircraft gun-batteries and some airplanes_. [Armament (Rue) II]
The Hungarian demands for search lights and listening devices shall be negotiated once more with General [Generaloberst] Udet. [Economy (WI)]
9. The Reich Marshall is informed that a large number of foreigners are still working in the fuel-production [Treibstoffbetriebe]. [III Armament (Rue)]
He wishes that Poles, French and Russians disappear from the fuel and buna factories and be replaced by other people. The Reich Minister for Labor is to institute further action. [--enclosure--finished 21 March]
10. Report on the demands of Governor General Frank concerning Armed Forces Factories [Wehrmachtsbetriebe] in Poland.
The Reich Marshall decides that purely Armed Forces Factories are to belong to the Sections of the Armed Forces concerned, the factories for raw material to the Reichworks. Appropriate directive shall be submitted to him. [II Armament (Rue)]
11. Orientation of the Reich Marshall on the negotiations between France and America with regard to fuel supplies to North Africa.
He is of the opinion that it is important to get the fuel to Africa, it is unimportant which ships are used.
Colonel Spalcke informs the Reich Marshall of the orders which General Antonescu has given to Germany, of the capacities of Rumania and of the collaboration as regards fuel.
The Reich Marshall's opinion is that Rumania should supply at the most 20 divisions and that the point must be reached where supplies for the Rumanian Army in Rumania should eventually be provided by Rumania herself.
At the same time, Rumania must be fully utilized to provide means of transportation and for the establishing of repair shops on a large scale.
Concerning the collaboration as regards fuel with the Neubacher Office, agreement must be reached first of all between the Four Year Plan, the Ministry of Economy and the Office for War Mobilization of Economy.
The Reich Marshall was then further informed by me of the purchase of trucks from France and of the negotiations in regard to the India-rubber contract.
The Reichmarshall then demanded the following himself:
1. He wants to know if the dockyards in Rumania could be used for the building of submarines. [Armament II (Rue)]
2. He wishes a report on the negotiations of the Ministry for Communications [Verkehrsministerium] with regard to the transit-difficulties with Russia. [Economy (Wi)]
Who has been the negotiator?
3. He wishes a report on how the whale-oil transports are forwarded from Bordeaux and whose responsibility it is and furthermore, who is responsible for the forwarding of fuel-transports, which are being brought in as prizes by the Navy. [Food Ministry (Ern. Min.) Ro.]
1 Copy Office Chief 2 Copy Economy _3 Copy Armament_ 4 Copy Ro 5 Copy Colonel Jansen 6 Copy Draft
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1157-PS
TOP SECRET Rue. I c. [Handwritten note:] 2nd Copy Kapitaen Zdd [?] has come back. 3rd destroyed 12 May [initials] 4th Copy to Maj. Gaedke. 16 May Ha. 4 Copies, 1st copy [illegible notations] _Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941_ I. _Welcome_
Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.
_Barbarossa--Oldenburg._
As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of _all_ economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.
The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office [Chef Wi Rue Amt].
Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the _Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties_ under the command of Major General [Generalleutnant] Schubert.
His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:
5 economic inspectorates
23 economic commands and
12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.
These offices are used in the _military rear area_; the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group, an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.
A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the _battle area_ proper and the _rear area of the army_ on the other hand. In the last two, economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the _battle area_, he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.
In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the _rear area of the Army_, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarter commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country's resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.
While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.
The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the _entire_ economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands etc.
This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.
_Group M_ dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization
_Group L_ which concerns itself with all questions of food and agriculture, and
_Group W_ which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers, further questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation.
Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.
Before giving further details of the particulars of organization and staffing of Group M, of which we have to take charge, here is a short summary on the plans.
II. _Local Sub-Division_
(Map already handed over) may entries explain code-names?
Of the 5 inspectorates, 4 have been established from the outset, while the 5th remains in reserve for an assignment temporarily undecided.
{ Vilna 1. _Leningrad_ (_Holstein_) { Riga with economic commands at { Reval { Leningrad { Murmansk
and sub-offices at { Wologda { Archangel
{ Minsk 2. _Moscow_ (_Saxony_) { Moscow with economic commands at { Tula { Gorki
{ Briansk and sub-offices at { Jaroslawl { Rybinsk
{ Lddz { Kiev { Kishinev 3. _Kiev_ (_Baden_) { Odessa with economic commands at { Charkov { Knjepropetrovsk { Stalino { Rostov { Stalingrad
{ Sevastopol and sub-offices at { Kerch { Voronesh { Kursk
Finally
4. _Baku_ (_Westphalia_) { Krasnodar with economic commands at { Grozny { Tiflis { Baku
and a sub-office at Batum.
Besides the 5th inspectorate, with the code-name of Hesse, an economic command (Borkum) and 2 sub-offices are held in reserve.