chapter 1

, page 7 of the Secret Service manual?

Mr. ROWLEY. I think what happened in this instance, we responded to the broadcast of Mr. Pearson and his charge that the men were inebriated. We were primarily concerned with that at that time. And to get the statements from the men. But I do know that in the course of his interviewing of these individuals at the time, and taking their statements, he impressed upon them the fact that there was a violation.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any report made to the Commission to the effect that there was any violation of----

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; unless it is contained in this document here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not seen anything in there. It seems to me they were all given a complete bill of health. And I just wonder if that is quite consistent with the facts that the Commission should have.

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; as I said earlier, we don't condone their actions, nor do we try to belittle the violation. But in the circumstances, I took the decision that I thought right in view of the tragedy and so forth. In any other circumstance it would have been entirely different. But as I said earlier, I don't think that these people should be blamed for the tragedy that happened at that time, and that any attempt to assess formal punishment would in the light of history stigmatize them for the rest of their life, as well as their families.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I plan to leave that subject now--unless there is some further question.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Very well.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, will you tell us whether you learned anything about the preparations in Dallas for the visit of the President on November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I read the report of Special Agent Lawson, who was designated as the advance agent for that visit.

Mr. RANKIN. And do you know that that report has been furnished to us?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. A copy of it.

And have you examined it to determine whether it is accurate, as far as you can determine?

Mr. ROWLEY. It is accurate; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I have no corrections to make, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Were you--are you satisfied, now examining that report, with the manner in which the advance preparations for the trip of the President were handled?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

The report follows the standard procedure that we have exercised over the years, and in many of the trips we had taken with the late President. He covered everything with the police and all that we have normally covered on such visits.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have enough agents at that time to perform the required duties in connection with this trip for both Dallas and the other cities in Texas to be visited?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we never have enough agents for the activities that the President today is engaged in. We draw from the field to supplement or augment the agents from the White House detail. We move the agents from one point to another where we can--particularly in the area of the advance men.

But in Dallas we had sufficient agents with prior experience in Presidential protection who assisted Mr. Lawson in the advance preparations.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you furnish to the Commission a statement of the preparations that were made for the trip?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that included the various protective activities, did it?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1021, and ask you if that is the report you made in regard to the trip.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1021 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any corrections or additions that you care to make to it?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1021.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1021, was received in evidence.)

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, I have wondered about this question. Some months before Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been handled very roughly in Dallas. Did you make--did your people make any investigation as to that group that caused that disturbance for him, to see if there might be some possibility of the same thing happening to the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not immediately at the time of the incident that occurred to Mr. Stevenson, but when the advance man came down, that was one of the things that we assigned a local agent to inquire into, to ascertain the hard core of that group, if you will, that were responsible for stimulating that activity. And he contacted an informant, and with the local police, who are members of a special squad that are involved in this kind of activity, they went and identified through pictures, which they saw in the newsreel, the principal members. They had photographs made, and they issued them to the agents on their visit there, to be on the lookout for these men as potential troublemakers.

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Did they do the same thing concerning the incident that Vice President Johnson had a year or so before that?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir; not at that time. That was more or less in the heat of a political campaign. I don't think that was a similar type of

## activity.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

But you did do it with the Stevenson matter?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you make a report to the Commission with regard to the publicity concerning the trip of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is Commission Exhibit No. 1022 that report?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1022 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to make any additions or corrections of that letter?

Mr. ROWLEY. Of that letter? No.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1022.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1022, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, could you inform the Commission about the advance publicity concerning trips of the President to various parts of the country? There has been the question raised as to whether that is a threat to the President, and might make the work of the Secret Service and others who are doing protective work more difficult.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have found that it is. And we always consider it as a potential threat in that it might give someone the opportunity who had any plans, whether it be an individual as in this case, or a group, to select an area, if they knew what the route was, or conduct a reconnaissance, if you will. I have always been opposed to it, and I have always tried to prevail upon the staff of the various Presidents who might be responsible for the release, not to release it too far in advance.

Mr. RANKIN. Could you tell the Commission what the problem is in that regard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, in this regard, it is a political thing, and the President cannot be contained in a vacuum. If he wants to go out and meet the people under our form of government, he will in his own way. Each and every President has his own thoughts and methods as it pertains to these visits, and the need for publicity. This trip in Dallas was an opportunity for the people to see the President, as are the trips of any President. I remember well when President Truman started his trip across the country in June 1948, the purpose being to get the feel of the people and let the people see him at the time.

And it was then, as a result of that trip, that he determined he would run for reelection. That I know of my own personal knowledge.

But these are the things that are hard in security, as far as developing a close screen on the President.

Mr. RANKIN. Is the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service under your direction, too?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; that is part of the White House area, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you familiar with the testimony of Robert Bouck concerning that Section?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether that accurately describes the conduct of that Section?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, at that time. The Section was established by us some 20 years ago, and primarily to process threats, obscene letters and suicide notes. Over the years, and particularly during the last 9 years, the work has evolved to a point where we find that it requires further expansion.

It had a broad and general concept in the criteria of what it needed for Presidential protection in knowing what risks were about the country.

Mr. RANKIN. Did the Secret Service have a written communication to other intelligence agencies as to the criteria for information that they sought?

Mr. ROWLEY. At that time?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; at that time.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it was more or less of an informal arrangement that we had with the agencies, as we developed the Section.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell the Commission what the standard was that you told the agencies you would like to have information concerning?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, if there were any threats to the President, we were interested in being informed about it. We were in touch with the FBI, the CIA and others.

In the basic schools of the Treasury, and through coordination, our agents in charge of the areas, in coordination meetings, would inform representatives of other agencies of the type that we were interested in, the nature of the threats that we asked that they refer to us.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know that this standard only developed about 400 names from all over the country?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that it produced none in the immediate Dallas vicinity?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, have you done anything about that standard since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have had a complete reexamination of the Protective Research Section.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you describe----

Mr. ROWLEY. We infused new blood. We have asked the Rand Corp., the Research Analysis Corp., the President's Scientific Advisor, and the medical people for a study of this, and we are in constant consultation. We have brought in experienced agents who now are processing, evaluating, and analyzing all reports we receive, and indexing the information as we receive it from the various agencies. We have more recently issued and forwarded to the intelligence community in Washington our criteria at the present time regarding what we would ask them in a more formal manner. This is the beginning of what we hope to be a more thorough and practical approach to this problem.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief, I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1023, dated June 17, 1964, and ask you if that is a communication from you to the Commission describing the new criteria.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1023 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Does it accurately state that criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1023.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1023, was received in evidence.)

Mr. ROWLEY. If I may read----

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us the gist of the new criteria, and what the difference is as you conceive it from the old standard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, if I may do this. We have sent this criteria to the intelligence agencies that we think would be of help to us, with a covering letter in which we say that studies are now underway, "by which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view towards amendments if required. We will appreciate your cooperation and suggestions concerning these guidelines, so that the person of the President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and resources."

Another thing today now that we have to concern ourselves with, is that we get an expanding file of information.

Mr. RANKIN. Has that happened since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well yes; we have gotten some 9,000 reports on the members of the Communist Party from the FBI. At this time we have read and evaluated and catalogued them and indexed them. There has been a small percentage that have been to date of interest to us. But this is the beginning. And except for the indexes, we are more or less current as a result of that. This is through the long hours and hard work by the new group that I brought in to develop this department.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, how is the standard described in Exhibit No. 1023 different from the prior standard?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have always had the basic standard. The other standard was the threat to harm or embarrass the President, however, this time we added three factors.

Mr. RANKIN. And these are in addition to the threat of harm to the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. All right, proceed.

Mr. ROWLEY. The interest of the individual or the organization, capabilities of the individual or the organization, and the activities of the individual or organization. The interests of the individual or organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria, but must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.

"The interest must be towards the President, or others named, or other high Government official in the nature of a complaint, coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. After the interest phase of the criteria is met, then the activity which encompass previous history, that is, mental instability, history of violence and the capability of the individual or organization for furthering this interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service. In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating to each of the three factor criteria."

Mr. RANKIN. Now, is the Secret Service operating under the standard or criteria described in Exhibit No. 1023 at the present time?

Mr. ROWLEY. At the present time, it is, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And when did that become effective?

Mr. ROWLEY. That became effective in the last 3 weeks as we developed and explored and examined the many reports that we were receiving.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, the language that you read into the record, where you invited comment and suggestions from the various other agencies to whom you sent communication, what did you mean by that? Is that asking them for their ideas so that you may further change the criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Where we may get in a position later on to break it down into categories. In other words, if every agency forwards and inundates us with many reports--say we expand to 3 million, obviously, the whole intelligence family could not cope with that. You have to get it down to a workable number. On the other hand, if you try to restrict the categories too much, then you find yourself in a position that you may miss another Oswald, and then the utilities of your file are of no consequence. So you have to try to reach the level in between there where it is going to be practical for us to react or develop the type of risks that we think should be covered by our organization in the protection of the President of the United States.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you doing anything about the use of equipment that might help you to secure information about any particular locality the President was going to travel to more readily?

Mr. ROWLEY. In connection with the PRS?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have conferred with the IBM. Can I go off the record on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, you have described off the record certain matters that involve the security of the country and cannot be made public. But can you tell us whether you have done anything in the past to try to improve your methods in testimony that can be made public?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I have tried to secure in the appropriations funds to enable us to procure the equipment and personnel that we thought would be necessary.

With the approval of the Congress, we were able 2 years ago to secure funds to enable us, in our check forgeries program, to try to adapt the characteristics of handwriting to an ADP processing program. We are hopeful this will work out. And we have used the Bureau of Standards to assist us in this program. We have prints out and have programmed part of the operation.

Now, it was my thought that if we succeeded in that area, we could also apply it to PRS. So we are working quite hard on this other area. And I knew the need would be eventually for us to get into the PRS stage on the electronic machine situation.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you know that we had asked Mr. Bouck when he testified if he could inform us at a later date about people who were in institutions or otherwise might be dangerous, and with regard to whom you asked that the Secret Service be notified, so that they could make adequate protection for the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know how many such cases you now have?

Mr. ROWLEY. Approximately a thousand.

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell the Commission what your practice was for the Secret Service concerning the route of the motorcade at the time of the assassination--that is, whether you made inspection of adjacent buildings?

Mr. ROWLEY. At that time, and prior to that time, except for the inaugurations in Washington, and other parades, involving the visit of foreign dignitaries in Washington, in which the President would ride in the motorcade with the head of state, where we had ample time to make these surveys, we had never conducted on trips out of Washington surveys of this nature. I have here a statement of the conditions that prevailed in Dallas as well as other areas--if I may read this.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. "Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.

"In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for a motorcade of 10 miles, including many blocks of tall commercial buildings, is not practical. Nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.

"In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot."

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I will ask you not to describe any procedure, because of security considerations, but I would like to have you tell on the record, as I think it is proper, whether there has been a change in this regard in the procedures of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. There has been a change in this regard.

Mr. RANKIN. I will not make an inquiry about that, unless the Commission wishes to go into it off the record.

Representative FORD. Is it my understanding that the Commission has such documents that we could analyze ourselves as to these changes?

Mr. RANKIN. I don't think we have any report of this.

Representative BOGGS. Why can't we get it off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question with regard to Exhibit No. 1023?

This, as I understand it, is the new specifications with regard to persons with respect to whom you wish to have alert information.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. It is called, "U.S. Secret Service Protective Information Guidelines." The top of page 2 of this exhibit is a paragraph that reads, "The interest"--and that is the interest of the suspect, I assume----

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. "The interest must be towards the President, or others named, or other high Government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance real or imagined."

I wonder if you could explain that a little more? I ask this question because I have been studying the previous assassinations a good deal. And in many of these cases, it seems to me this definition would not have covered the assassin. That is, there has been in some cases opposition to government, opposition to people in authority, but there has been no expressed hatred toward or animus against a

## particular President. And I was wondering whether this went too far on

a definition to meet your purposes.

Mr. ROWLEY. This is a beginning, as I indicated to you here. We hope to improve it. But this is one of the things where we want to include the Oswald-type individual.

Now, Oswald wrote to the Governor intimating that he would use whatever means was necessary to obtain the change of his undesirable, or as he called it, dishonorable discharge. All legal means had been used in his case, where the Navy Review Board had examined it and came to a decision.

And this is an example of what we were trying to include in the area of this type of individual. Now, the other people----

Mr. DULLES. But that was not a threat directed against the President. That was directed against the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but then, on the other hand, they transfer the threats. I am quite sure that the Congressmen here get many threats, and that sometimes they may not come off. But these people are obsessed.

You take the individual that attempted the assassination of the late President Roosevelt in Miami that time. His original purpose was to shoot President Hoover. But then when he heard Roosevelt was there, he transferred.

Now, I remember a situation involving a member of Truman's staff, where a fellow stalked this man at his home. And finally we got into the case on his request. We satisfied ourselves that he wasn't a real threat to him--but we picked up the paper a year later and found out he shot at an assemblyman in Staten Island. So if they make a threat or something like this, even though it is against the Government as a group, or have some grievance, they transfer it--particularly, to the President. They use that father complex, as indicated in the research work that these different agencies have submitted to us.

Representative FORD. Under these criteria, which you are now following, Oswald would have been designated? Is that your judgment?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I had some questions about that in reading it. That did not occur to me, because Oswald had never expressed any antagonism toward the President, as far as I know, up to this time--the President personally, or even afterward.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but under this criteria he would. Namely, he had the interest because of the letter he wrote to Governor Connally. The activity, because he was a defector, and he demonstrated for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. The capability, because he traveled, and he had knowledge of firearms.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; but those do not come, it seems to me, within this definition. Maybe I interpret it differently than you. The last interest Oswald showed was directed toward General Walker. It wasn't against--of course, that wasn't known.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it wasn't known but the first interest of this type was the letter to Governor Connally as Secretary of the Navy, in which he said he would use whatever means he could to correct that discharge, inferring, of course, that he would apply illegal means if he could.

Representative FORD. If we only had the letter that he wrote to Governor Connally, and no other information, how would that threat, or that course of action, become known to the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. It would not, unless it was furnished by the Navy Department or Secretary of the Navy's office.

Just like you gentlemen get letters that never come to our attention. But you might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.

Representative FORD. Would this criteria be circulated among the 50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are received against a Governor, then the Governor's staff in that

## particular State would so notify the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. It could. In this case it would be a help. But they refer all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.

Representative FORD. The State?

Mr. ROWLEY. The Governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this system would bring it to our attention.

Mr. DULLES. I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, this is something--actually, we have to develop something, and we have to, if you will, have a crash program; we are working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I indicated earlier.

(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1024, and ask you if that is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements that you have just described from the various agents about the events at Dallas.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024 for identification.)

(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1024.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1024, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back of the car?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1025, and ask you if that is your transmittal letter with the statements attached.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1025.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1025, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in making these statements was understood by you or properly could have been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility about the protection of the President.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; I would not so construe that, Mr. Rankin. The agents would respond regardless of what the President said if the situation indicated a potential danger. The facilities were available to them. They had the rear steps, they would be there as a part of the screen. And immediately in the event of any emergency they would have used them.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know why there was no one riding on the rear step at the time of the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. From normal practice, based on my own experience over the years, I know that the agent in charge in the front or any experienced agent, who is either on the right front or the left front of the followup car, without being told, will react immediately. If he determines there is a situation here, there is a big crowd, and so forth, he will immediately leave that followup car.

Now, the running board on the followup car has an important place in the setup. It is a much better place to be than on the rear step if you see a situation, and you want to move fast. Suppose someone is coming toward the President's car--you would be surprised how fast you are propelled by jumping off that car, and you are in motion fast, where you can either tackle somebody, or block him or anything like that. So this is an important part. You cannot do that from the rear step of the President's car.

Now, when the agents are in a heavy crowd, as we have been abroad, in places where we had to run, say, for 10 miles alongside the car, agents could stand on the rear steps and screen the President. In addition, there would be agents on the side, protecting him on his right side. The crowd is surging close to him, you are bouncing off the car, and the people, trying to ward them off from touching the President.

After a period of time you are weary. But with the aid of this step, you can be replaced by the agent there, and he takes your place until you revive yourself, and you are acting as a screen.

Now, if the thing gets too sticky, you put the agent right in the back seat, which I have done many times with past Presidents.

When you come out of a big crowd like that, and the crowd is sparse, and it doesn't look like there is a potential danger, you return to the followup car to be ready for any emergency in the event somebody darts across.

In this instance, when the Presidential car was coming toward the freeway and the people were sparse, the men at some point came back to this car. This is one of the automatic operations, if you will, that the agents respond to. So it wasn't until the first shot was fired that, as I said earlier, Hill had the opportunity to scan from his left to his right, that he saw the President--the action of the President. Then he responded immediately. That is why he got up to the President's car.

Mr. RANKIN. Has it ever been the practice of the Secret Service to have an agent ride all of the time on the back step?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it hasn't. Because there are times when you pick up your speed, for instance on a freeway. And when you pick up your speed, it is the most difficult thing on a step maybe 10 to 12 inches wide, and a grip, to stand up. And you would not be a very good screen going that fast, because you would have to bend down. That has happened to me, because I have been caught on it.

Now, I was in Costa Rica and worked the followup car. Whenever I was on a trip abroad, I would work the followup car to see how the agents work, and work myself, because it wasn't what you might refer to as a routine trip.

But the followup car conked out. The crowds were surging around the President's car. We had two men next to the President's car. I left the followup car immediately, from my experience, and jumped on the step, to the right rear of the President, and held onto the handgrip, and was there. And then when the man came back, I relieved him and took my position on the side--until, for a distance of a mile or two, until such time as the followup car got underway, and the other people came up. But you had to stay with the President under those circumstances.

So those are the different things that occur in a given situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, as I understand this, President Kennedy did not give any general instructions to the agents never to ride on his car. It was only in specific circumstances where for one reason or another he did not want them on there at that particular time.

Mr. ROWLEY. No President will tell the Secret Service what they can or cannot do.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Sometimes it might be as a political man or individual he might think this might not look good in a given situation. But that does not mean per se that he doesn't want you on there. And I don't think anyone with commonsense interprets it as such.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective

## activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be--that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you answered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they would?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out--we haven't gotten any reaction--we asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley----

Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Representative BOGGS. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times--he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.

Mr. ROWLEY. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security. And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual, whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or something like that.

Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and

## particularly to the President of the United States. If someone said

that Henry Smith didn't like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?

Representative BOGGS. Well, that is right.

Mr. ROWLEY. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start going into individuals----

Representative BOGGS. And if I remember correctly, there has never been--we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the President of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. RANKIN. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. That was the only question I had.

Mr. DULLES. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go around and talk about it and threaten it.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.

As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to themselves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim. Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.

Mr. DULLES. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be done on that.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI. And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.

Senator COOPER. I understood that was the procedure before. But my question is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you would take protective measures?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, no, sir; not unless we had----

Senator COOPER. Since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just enunciated.

Senator COOPER. I would suggest--first, I understand there are not many defectors who have returned to the United States.

Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong convictions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about his mental processes.

I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his

## activities when he came back.

Mr. ROWLEY. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the investigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report. And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Rankin. I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes. There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.

Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That you do guard the life of the President. And that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote. So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy about the methods you employ.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart anything we might set up.

Representative BOGGS. Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a few--we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947--I am not quite certain--with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I communicated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you" and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation, when I was at the White House, with the FBI.

Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the person of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. You know of that, do you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that appropriation--a certain given figure--was to be used by the U.S. marshals to assist the Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appropriation act for the FBI?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I started to say, Mr. Rankin--subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that appropriation.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting to; is that right?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; that has to do with the codification, wherein it states that the Attorney General will appoint--I think, in substance--officials for the protection of the President of the United States. And this is a feature in the codification of the law we object to, because the Secretary of the Treasury authorizes and directs the protection of the President.

Representative FORD. Is that a bill, Mr. Rankin, that is before the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Judiciary Committee?

Mr. ROWLEY. They are preparing it, and they asked for our opinions. It must be now. This is a month or so ago, Mr. Ford.

Mr. RANKIN. I think I can give the Commission the exact language. It is