CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

For Survival

In the anteroom to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, Fred Rentschler and I waited our turn. A stream of visitors, mostly naval officers of high rank, swept in and out of the sanctum. The men who were furnishing the leadership for this war were contemporaries of mine back in those brave days at the turn of the century when Pax Britannica still reigned and when the chances for professional advancement or even a career looked slim indeed. Now as they moved in and out, many paused to greet us and say a word of congratulation on our industry’s production miracle. Meanwhile, we wondered what the secretary might have in store for us.

Jim Forrestal sat behind his desk, taking a telephone call. As we took chairs in front of him, I glanced around at the flag-draped room and its collection of trophies. Jim had made a bid to refurnish the long room, decorating the walls with blow-up photos and seagoing mementos but even a powerhouse like Jim could not dispel the musty odor of the temporary structure or paint out its shabbiness. By 1945 that collection of shacks had served twenty-five years and seen two world wars, and it bid fair to go on indefinitely. Jim hung up the telephone, flicked a switch to his “intercom-squawker,” barked a sharp order at the answering voice, and then turned to us.

James Forrestal, like Fred Rentschler, was a Princeton man. Curious how you can spot the stamps of Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Dartmouth, and other Ivy League colleges. Schools like this leave as much of an imprint upon their alumni as do West Point and Annapolis. Jim was a close-knit, clean-cut, youngish fellow, dark-complexioned, with the muscles of an intercollegiate boxer bulging around his shoulders and upper arms. A man of few words, he packed almost as much meaning in them as did Fred Rentschler.

“I am going to tell you fellows something, now,” he began, “and if you repeat it, I’ll deny I ever said it.” He paused to pull open the upper left-hand drawer of the desk and remove a packet of gum. After offering us some, he wadded the wrapper of his own piece, flicked it into the wastebasket, and went on.

“You fellows are swamping us with your production,” he said. “Engines, propellers, and airplanes are running out of our ears. The time has come to slow down.”

I couldn’t resist a crack. “So it’s now ‘too much and too soon.’”

Fred Rentschler looked serious.

“Jim,” he began, “that remark of yours gives us the opening we have been waiting for. We have been worried about the same thing for some time, but with the criticism that has been leveled at us, we just didn’t think it was time to bring the matter to you.” He lighted a cigarette.

“Of course you know,” he said, “that the aircraft industry has been blown up like a balloon. Our present output is all out of proportion to our own meager resources. If there should be a sudden cessation of hostilities, as in World War I, and that seems highly probable, and if no more preparation has been made for such an event than now exists, the whole aircraft industry will be wiped out in a matter of days. If any company could survive such a catastrophe, it would be United Aircraft, for we have been ultraconservative and taken every possible precaution against just this contingency, but I promise you even United would go out like a light.” Jim Forrestal sat silent, watching Fred as he went on.

“We have made a quick study of our own situation,” he said, “and concluded that, upon the sudden termination of existing war contracts, which under the law occurs immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, we could not complete the mechanics of paying off our employees in time to prevent liquidating our resources. The pay roll is so big,” he added, “and the job of paying off is so complex, that the outgo would break us before we could finish the task.” He paused.

“To sum up our position,” he concluded, “the disorderly reconversion that seems sure to follow this war will wipe us out even more completely than it did after the Armistice. In our opinion,” he added, “it’s up to you military fellows to do something about it.”

Jim Forrestal nodded. “I go along with you,” he said, “up to the last statement. There is nothing the Army and Navy can do about this. We are public servants and, even under Franklin D. Roosevelt, subject to the people’s will. The only people that can do anything about it,” he added, “are you men. Your industry has got to carry its story to the public.” Again his telephone rang; again Jim handled the call. He turned back to us.

“Your industry,” he went on, dead-pan, “is the choicest collection of cutthroat competitors in the country. Maybe it’s because pioneers still manage it. But if you pioneers expect to survive,” Jim went on, “the industry must unite and do battle for its existence. Frankly, I doubt if anyone can unite the aircraft industry, but someone has got to try it.” He glanced my way.

“If anyone can do it,” he added, putting a finger on my knee, “you can.”

He might as well have landed a fist on my chin. What he meant was that having come out of the Navy, and escaped the early personal rivalries, I was freed of a handicap.

Even as Jim had talked, orderlies had entered the room and begun shifting chairs, lining them up in an arc around the secretary’s desk. Through the open door I caught glimpses of the uniforms and gray thatches of ranking department heads, standing by for a council meeting. As Fred and I stood up to leave, Jim walked us to the door.

“Why not stay for the council meeting?” he asked me, as we shook hands. “You’ll see a lot of old shipmates.”

“Thanks,” I replied, “I guess we’d better go home and digest what you’ve just told us.”

Back in Hartford, the four members of United’s war council gathered around the long table in the board room where Fred Rentschler had his office. On the walls hung the portraits of men who had helped make the company—men like Chance Vought, George Wheat, George Mead, and Don Brown.

After discussing the problem Jim Forrestal had put up to us, we agreed that this new responsibility would require rearrangement of our own topside organization. An effort to organize the aircraft industry for a public relations effort just didn’t fit in with the detailed administration of any single company. I would have to relinquish my job as chief executive.

And so I came face to face with the decision that I had known to be inevitable the moment Jim Forrestal put the finger on me. I had been in at the inception of Pratt and Whitney and United Aircraft. I had managed three of its four divisions and participated in vital decisions as to the other. I had helped hold it together in the trying days following the Black and Nye investigations, and had been its chief executive through the critical phases of the war expansion. Now that we were over the hump, I would have to give up my cherished title of president in order to try to help the company to survive.

As a matter of fact, we had long discussed the possibilities of a reorganization following the war. We well knew that the reconversion job would try the nervous and physical capacity of a man younger than any of us four seniors, and that our duty to the company demanded that we start bringing juniors along. We four would graduate into the category of elder statesman while my successor took over the reins. The logical man was Jack Horner, of Pratt and Whitney. Ray Walsh and I would fleet up to vice-chairmen and Jack in due course would become president. Meanwhile I would assume responsibility for “general-industry” matters and retain supervision of research. Jack would take over operations, and Fred would continue to exercise authority over the business affairs of the company. Ray Walsh, who had a unique capacity for handling policy, personnel, and legal matters, would continue on his course.

With these decisions reached, we began a discussion of the course to be followed in getting our story before the public. Had there been some independent aviation organization capable of doing the job, we should have looked to them, but under the circumstances, it seemed clear that we must depend upon our trade association, the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, in Washington. The war production councils, then functioning effectively, would automatically disband upon cessation of hostilities; the Aeronautical Chamber must be rejuvenated.

Discussion of the course to be followed brought out a key suggestion by Raycroft Walsh. Ray had been in the Air Corps in Washington during the Moffett-Mitchell dogfight and had participated in the hearings before the Morrow Board. Having in mind the constructive influence of the Board, he now suggested that we campaign for a new public air policy commission.

Fred Rentschler rather pooh-poohed the suggestion but, when I supported it, finally agreed wholeheartedly. Here was a little indicator of how difficult it might prove to sell the idea to the company presidents; if Fred Rentschler needed selling, how about the others less profound in their mental processes than he? We now decided that I should make a swing around the circuit to appraise the states of mind and try to plant the idea before we committed ourselves irrevocably to changes in our own organization that our directors might not approve. On our board, aside from the principal officers of the company, we had enlisted the help of several distinguished “outside directors.” Joseph P. Ripley, president of the New York investment house of Harriman Ripley, had been active in the original incorporation of United Aircraft and Transport. Harry G. Stoddard, president of Wyman Gordon, had long served on our executive committee. Morgan B. Brainard, president of Aetna Life and Affiliated Companies, was a man of broad wisdom and wide business experience. Francis W. Cole, a prominent Hartford lawyer and later board chairman of the great Traveller’s Insurance Company, brought us mature counsel. Mr. Peter M. Fraser, later president of the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, completed our coterie of able men. And if at times the technicalities of our business confused them somewhat, nonetheless, their unexcelled fundamental business knowledge was a priceless asset to the company. We outlined the plan to them but decided to defer final decision until I could check industry sentiment and determine if the Forrestal suggestion could command its support.

This check took me westward to Los Angeles, the center of the air-frame section of aircraft production. As our representative in that territory, Russell R. Vought, younger brother of Chance Vought, had long maintained an office in Beverly Hills. Russ had gone west while still a young man, and founded his own business in San Francisco. Then back in 1928, when we had equipped the _Langley_ with the new Corsairs, and especially the single-float amphibians, he had agreed to represent Chance Vought Aircraft on the West Coast on a part-time basis. Now he made his home in Beverly Hills and had a bungalow in Palm Springs. Arrived in Beverly Hills, I called up John G. Lee, the manager of the West Coast War Production Council, and asked him over to the office with a view to getting his appraisal of the problem.

John Lee, through his close association with the presidents of the West Coast companies, was able to give me an authoritative estimate of the sentiment out there. The presidents, he thought, were too much engrossed with their own immediate problems to become interested in the long-term difficulties. They were aware of the threat to survival but not as yet concerned with it. Like many other business chief executives, they were groggy and punch-drunk, and you couldn’t blame them. As a reward for their pains they had found themselves characterized as munitions racketeers, war profiteers, and merchants of death. Now, through production miracles, they had given the lie to their detractors. The profit motive no longer provided an incentive to creative endeavor.

“Take Mr. Douglas, for instance,” John summed up. “He is the key to the West Coast situation. If you could enlist his support, you could also get the help of the others; without it you’d be licked before you started. _Time_ magazine recently quoted him as saying he had the perfect postwar plan: ‘lock the door and throw away the key.’ Of course Mr. Douglas didn’t say that, even though he may have thought it, but the quote is significant.”

Ever since that day in Jim Forrestal’s office, I had been mulling over an idea evolved one evening at Admiralty House, Bermuda, where my wife and I had been the dinner guests of Vice Adm. Sir Charles E. Kennedy-Purvis, RN, K.C.B., Commander in Chief of British Forces in the Western Atlantic. As Comdr. Charles E. Kennedy-Purvis, Executive Officer of the light cruiser _Southampton_, I had known him well in the old Grand Fleet days. “K-P,” as we called him, had recently been advised of his pending assignment as First Deputy Sea Lord, at the Admiralty, London, where he would be charged with responsibility for recreating the British carrier force after the decline suffered under the Air Ministry. He had asked us down for a visit in order to get my slants on the principles involved.

My idea had first come to me the evening following the German surrender in World War I when several of us wardroom officers had gone ashore to pay a social call on K-P and his wife in their tiny apartment over a cottage in the village of Limekilns. Upon my referring to Beatty’s congratulatory signal to the Grand Fleet, K-P had taken pains to remind me that the message had been addressed to the British Empire.

“Beatty,” he had said, “was not talking to the fleet but reminding the people that it had been the nine-knot tramps, the rusty colliers, the huge transports, the drifters and trawlers, all the ‘Merchant Men’ which had kept the Empire lifeline open. These,” he had added, “are the backbone of our sea power.”

K-P, who like most English officers was much better schooled in public affairs than were we, had gone on to give us a discourse on transportation. From the days of the aborigines’ pursuit of game herds, the progress of civilization was marked by the milestones of the development of transport. In America, the railroads had sparked reconstruction after the Civil War by opening up the resources of the West. Following the World War, the automobile would likely perform the same function. Improved transportation had always increased the number of persons who could subsist on a given area and had always increased the wealth and living standards of lands in which it had been exploited.

When I had inquired what future K-P foresaw for the airplane he had shaken his head.

“The economics of the thing are all against it,” he had replied. “The cost and complication of the airplane are out of all proportion to its limited useful load.”

Subsequently, with the coming of age of air transport, I had begun to visualize an analogy between sea power and air power, a line of thinking that had led naturally to Pax Britannica and Pax Aeronautica. About this same time John W. Donaldson published a paper on the same subject. This would become the keynote of the aircraft manufacturing industry’s struggle for survival, but first we must establish a wholly new definition of air power. Instead of its being synonymous with air force, the term must incorporate such other elements as aircraft production, airline transport, private flying, finance, public support, in fact everything that helps make a nation strong in the air. While advocating the preservation of our industry, we must predicate the need upon the public interest.

When I outlined this idea to John Lee, his eyes lighted up.

“It will take an idea like that to interest Don Douglas,” he said. “Remember,” he advised, “Mr. Douglas responds to the eye rather than to the ear.”

In order that we might concentrate on this job, the Voughts now suggested that my wife and I join them at their cottage on the desert. Here at Palm Springs, the task was to do a sort of Mahan analysis of air power in history, and boil it all down to the simplest terms. After a lot of head-scratching, pencil-pushing, and earnest discussion, I finally got it in form.

Feeling now the need for the best possible counsel on this important matter, I wangled an invitation from Rear Adm. John H. Towers, then on duty at Pearl Harbor, and hopped out to Honolulu in a Pan American Boeing Clipper that left San Francisco before supper and arrived at Pearl before breakfast next morning.

Curiously enough, Jack had as his guest a young English lieutenant commander of the Royal Naval Flying Service, who had been sent out by my friend K-P to observe American carrier operations. After two decades, he was doing the Godfrey de Chevalier act in reverse.

During my two-day visit at Pearl Harbor, Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, entertained at a luncheon for his top commanders who had been called in by air for briefing on the next operation, and he invited me to join the party. As I sat down, the single civilian in a galaxy of top brass, I estimated that the average number of gilt stars among thirty-odd officers must be about two and a half per man. These fellows, all either contemporaries at Annapolis or men with whom I had been shipmates prior to leaving the Navy, had fought through two world wars and participated in world events none had even remotely foreseen.

After a review of my program with Jack Towers and Forrest Sherman, the latter now Nimitz’s planning chief, I caught the Clipper back to San Francisco. We had a full load, top brass returning to Washington and young bluejackets returning home on top priority because of illness in their families or other personal difficulties. Arrived back at Beverly Hills in time for lunch, I called Don Douglas on the telephone, and made a date with him for the morrow.

As our company car pulled up at the entrance to Don’s plant in Santa Monica, the California sun shown on the camouflaged village, which so completely concealed the sprawling plant that it was hard to find the gate. Don sat behind the desk in the shadow of his lightproof and soundproofed ground-floor office, and stood up to greet me as I came in. After a few words to state my business, I handed him his copy of the air-power statement and as Don sat down to read it, I opened my copy with a view to pacing his reading. Don Douglas read carefully, noting every word.

“I’ll go for this,” he said simply, speaking in the soft voice that made it difficult to hear him at times. Then after a moment he added, “What do you want me to do?”

I explained the need for a meeting of our Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce at which the board of governors should adopt the program. We must reorganize the Chamber and give it a set of officers who could direct the program; I suggested that he become chairman of the board of governors. He countered with the statement that this job should be mine, but agreed to accept the vice-chairmanship of the board. I suggested that we borrow John G. Lee from the West Coast Aircraft War Production Council to head up the reorganization of the chamber and, after some consideration, he agreed. We would bring in Clyde Vandenburgh, of the East Coast Council, and Frank Russell, of the National Council, to assist. A meeting of the National Council was scheduled to take place in Los Angeles late in April, 1944, which would be attended by all the company presidents. We would call a simultaneous meeting of the Chamber and put the air-power program before the Board for consideration at that time.

On April 26, 1944, the board of governors of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce met in Los Angeles. In presenting the program, still in its tentative typewritten form, I pointed out that this was a preliminary statement and subject to revision by the members. After all, the Constitution of the United States had been no one-man job but the painstaking effort of many men of different minds; we needed the thoughts of everyone on what would prove an important action by the board. A number of constructive suggestions were offered and voted, after which the revision was adopted unanimously. The preamble to the resolution ran as follows:

The Board of Governors of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, in order to “provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” and in order to ensure that the airplane which America created shall be used to maintain peace and secure the blessings of peace to mankind, does unanimously recommend the early formulation of an American Air Power Policy under the following guiding principles:

And the essence of these principles was summarized toward the end of the pamphlet in this paragraph.

The public character of aviation imposes upon it a dual role. Commercial companies, to advance their private interests and stimulate technical progress, must compete in the realm of operations. At the same time, they must collaborate in the realm of policy to promote the public interest.

We had naturally expected that when this document was released to the aviation press it would create something of a stir, but in this we were disappointed. After this warning that the idea would need to be sold, even to aviation writers, we began to appreciate the fact that we had a job on our hands. Through Deac Lyman, an old _New York Times_ reporter, we were invited to lunch with Arthur Sulzberger and his editors in the executive dining room of the Times Building, where we briefed our situation. The _Times_, always alert to aviation matters, subsequently covered aviation news and handled aviation editorials against the background of the policy. The magazine _Aviation_, whose editor, Leslie Neville, was author of numerous books on aviation, caught the new spirit and developed the theme. Soon all the members of the Aviation Writers’ Association took a hand in developing the broad background of air power as a trinity of commerce, industry, and security.

Subsequent events proved that we had acted none too early. Within a matter of weeks, we were haled before a Congressional investigating committee, the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.

CHAPTER THIRTY

Toward Public Inquiry

Having developed a certain gun shyness before such Congressional inquiries as the Nye inquisition and the air-mail investigation conducted by Senator Hugo Black, now Mr. Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court, we air craftsmen might have shied away from Senator Murray save for a bit of sage advice given me by Mr. Sam Rayburn, then Speaker of the House. When I called on him for counsel as to how we should proceed with our air-power program, the Speaker offered it as his opinion that we should avoid lobbying as we would a plague. All trade associations were suspect; they usually devoted their energies to the search for special advantage for their clients. And the munitions business was condemned out of hand. Besides, that was the wrong way under any circumstances. Congressmen, the Speaker assured me, were just average people, no wiser, no dumber than anyone else. But there was one thing a Congressman had to understand if he wanted to stay in politics, and that was the will of the people. He thought we had a good case for public approval in our air policy, and he advised following Jim Forrestal’s advice and taking it direct to them.

He thought one of the best ways to get our story to the public was to appear at the public hearings held by Congressional committees. These, according to the Speaker, were good sounding boards from which to beam your point of view. Besides, you might actually influence a committee if you had an especially strong case. But it was a mistake to send lawyers or staff members of an association to these hearings. The company presidents should appear themselves; they were more convincing, and Congressmen liked to look them over. They respected men who had won their spurs in competition, especially if they also knew how to stand up and speak their pieces.

“Don’t send a boy,” the Speaker concluded, “to do a man’s work.”

By the middle of 1944, with the outcome of the war no longer in doubt, men began worrying about postwar and the inevitable letdown of peace. Nation-wide unemployment was taken for granted, and what to do about it became a live political issue. The aircraft industry, now one of the largest industries in the history of the world and one wholly dependent upon an inflated demand for war materials, seemed headed for the biggest bust imaginable.

And while this was a problem of national interest, it had its focus in Southern California. Thousands of people had left their homes and jobs and migrated toward the setting sun there to do their several bits and incidentally enjoy the climate. Almost immediately, public officials sensitive to the reactions of the working class began proposing legislation to meet the problem; a ticket back home for the dispossessed worker and six months’ unemployment compensation were widely advocated. The fact that high wages had been paid them and that the thrifty could probably take care of themselves seemed to have been lost in the shuffle.

Looking back on this situation now, we can see how completely wrong the forecasts were. Most of those workers, having basked in the California sunshine, had already determined to settle there and could not have been driven out by an air raid. Their newly acquired mechanical skills would find ready employment in new industries. The war demand and the “total war” policy had drained all the pipe lines of consumer goods while the cold fear of the ’thirties had frozen the investment market and stopped the normal expansion of housing, plant construction, and so on. What the country really faced was a pent-up demand that would lead to a postwar boom, and a dearth of labor. The automotive industry, for instance, could expect to reconvert to a demand of unprecedented proportions; the aircraft industry, on the other hand, would face an overwhelming war surplus. The problem that faced the country was not that of unemployment; the real job was to keep alive a remnant of vital defense industry.

But this was not the problem before the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and its chairman, Senator James E. Murray, of Montana. “Full employment” was the war cry of that era, and the C.I.O. echoed it through the halls of Congress. Full employment, it appeared, was the right of every citizen, and the government must guarantee it to him whether he wanted to work or not. Some industrialists applied similar thinking to their corporations; the idea of government-guaranteed corporate social security had prompted the creation of the NRA and the formulation of its monopolistic codes. Now labor unions on the one hand and trade associations on the other vied with each other in bringing pressure to bear on Congress to relieve them from the necessity for struggling to survive.

And so when Senator Murray extended us an invitation to appear at a hearing to be held on July 10, 1944, we decided to conform with the Speaker’s advice. The C.I.O. had tipped its hand in a circular distributed in advance, castigating aircraft manufacturers as profiteers who had averaged as high as 3,000 per cent on war contracts. Since we manufacturers were scheduled to make the first appearance and be followed by the C.I.O., it was a fair guess that we had been selected as whipping boys.

And so our association, using the air policy as its bible, prepared its case with a special slant at this matter of war profits. We divided our presentation into four parts, with a separate witness for each. I was to make the general introduction of the industry viewpoint, and submit our statement of air-power policy. J. C. Ward, president of Fairchild Aviation Corporation and a convincing witness, was to cover postwar national defense and the aircraft industry. Harry Woodhead, president of Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, was to discuss the George-Murray bill, manpower demobilization, contract termination, disposal of war surplus, and reconversion. Joseph T. Geuting, chairman of the Personal Aircraft Council of the Chamber, was to discuss the role of personal aircraft in postwar readjustment.

When the hearing opened in one of the large committee rooms of the Senate Office Building, the place was crowded and the press table filled by Washington correspondents attracted by the C.I.O. handout. Senator Murray sat on the dais while the witnesses were called to testify from a table at his feet. This layout put the witness at something of a disadvantage and news photographers sometimes used it to get worm’s-eye shots of bigshots looking anything else but. I recalled one taken of a friend of mine in the Black investigation, and widely used by the press, in which my friend, who was really a good egg, looked like nothing so much as a praying mantis.

This inquiry, however, appeared friendly. It wasn’t important enough to warrant klieg lights or a radio hookup, but attracted the usual barrage of flash bulbs touched off at the instant best calculated to catch the witness with his mouth open or his guard down.

In my extemporaneous introduction, I pointed out to the Committee that we welcomed this inquiry and especially the Committee’s interest in postwar unemployment. We had taken the position early in the war that the government should permit us to earn enough money on war contracts so that we might discharge our responsibilities to employees terminated by the cessation of hostilities. We had had in mind that, by adjusting each case on its merits, and out of funds set aside from earnings for that purpose, the employer could handle the problem with fairness to the employee as well as to the public which, after all, was the customer in this case.

However, Congress had disapproved that procedure and, through the excess profits tax, the Price Adjustment Act, the cost inspection service, and all other controls, had so limited our earnings that we now had no funds available for the purpose. As a matter of fact, our companies had been so blown up by war demands that a sudden cessation of hostilities must inevitably wipe out all our resources before we could reduce our working forces in any orderly manner. In short, our problem was not one of war profits; it was rather a question of how to survive.

But while on the subject of profits, it might be noted that only recently the National City Bank of New York had printed in its _Bulletin_ an analysis of profits as a percentage of sales of the several groups of industries doing war work. This report had shown that the aircraft industry ranked lowest of all industries, with a record of approximately 1½ per cent. The same table had revealed that the automotive industry, now busy manufacturing products designed and developed by the aircraft companies, had earned nearly twice as much. This fact had resulted from the automotive industry’s better tax base.

Meanwhile, I pointed out, my own company, United Aircraft, had from the beginning voluntarily stabilized its earnings at a figure based on the use of its own facilities and resources prior to the commencement of the United States aircraft production program. All these figures were, however, quite academic; they were simply estimated results of current operations based on an assumption that the war contracts might be terminated in an orderly manner. In the last war, no such thing had taken place; contracts had been closed out so brutally that, according to another National City Bank _Bulletin_, many companies had gone through the wringer and even the strongest, in the number of some sixty-six representative suppliers, had been forced to write down their apparent net worth by approximately one billion dollars, or 50 per cent. Our present “profit” was therefore but a temporary bookkeeping entry; no company could even guess where it would come out unless Congress proceeded with all speed to write new legislation that would facilitate orderly reconversion.

While I developed this testimony, our staff circulated a summary of the figures among the men and women at the press table, some of whom had, no doubt, read the C.I.O. pamphlet charging us with having made 3,000 per cent. C.I.O. figures showed gross profit before taxes as a percentage of net worth and, while accurate enough, manifestly emphasized what wide variations can result from the mere definition of the naughty word “profit.”

In continuing my testimony, I went on to point out that the aircraft industry, now the biggest industry, was a vital factor in our domestic economy and that the public interest as well as the worker’s interest demanded that we not upset the whole national picture through disorderly or even punitive procedure. By this we did not mean for a moment that our industry should be subsidized in any way; we hated subsidy because it tended to throttle technological progress. We had made rapid strides only because we had had rough going; in our struggle to exist at all we had been forced to conceive and create devices that would otherwise have never seen the light of day. What we asked of the government was that it make up its mind as to what it needed and then let us go back to cutting each other’s throats in that exciting way which had kept United States technology in the forefront of world progress.

At this remark, I noted a stir among the newsmen and women; long accustomed to hearing special pleaders demand special privilege, they were taken aback by the aircraft industry’s expressed preference for competition. Such unheard-of conduct was news of the “man-bites-dog” variety.

From this beachhead I went on to urge the appointment of a presidential advisory commission on aviation, one like the Morrow Board of 1925. After reviewing some of the background, I pointed out the rapid advances in technology since the day of that report, especially in the key element of air transport. This alone would seem to warrant a reappraisal of air policy, one based on the new concept that air power was not a military striking force but a trinity composed of air commerce, aircraft industry, and the armed service as well as all the other factors that went to make a country powerful in the air. All these factors were mutually interdependent and must be closely integrated if we were to employ our air power to keep the peace. The need for thinking through a new policy based on these ideas was obvious; it concerned government, labor, management—all the elements of the community.

In summing up, I pointed out again that our problem had never been a matter of profits but one of survival and that survival was our immediate concern. However, we were confident that, given an orderly reconversion and the necessary constructive air policy, air power could become the new reagent for keeping the peace of the world and better still, through the medium of improved transport, lead to the era of prosperity so vital to keeping the peace.

Following me, Harry Woodhead gave specific answers to eight questions propounded by the Committee and concerned with the industrial and human aspects of demobilization. Speaking in his clear, strong voice he made a convincing impression. Following Harry Woodhead, Joseph T. Geuting, Jr., submitted a comprehensive summary of things necessary to the orderly development of personal airplanes during the postwar adjustment period. Both Joe Geuting and Carl Ward, who now followed with his presentation, had been selected because of their knowledge of their subjects but even more important because both were good extemporaneous speakers and both had strong convictions as to the soundness of the industry policy. Carl Ward especially handled a complex subject with a knack rare in professional men; he reduced technical jargon to popular language.

At the close of the day, Senator Murray thanked us warmly for our constructive approach to the problem. During the sessions of the following days, Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, endorsed the industry stand. Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War; Charles E. Wilson, executive vice-chairman of the War Production Board; and representatives of the U.A.W.-C.I.O. and I.A.M.-A.F. of L. made recommendations generally in accord with the suggestions of the industry representatives. The C.I.O. barrage on profits broke down against the record established by the industry, and Senator Murray himself later introduced a bill in Congress calling for the appointment of a new presidential advisory commission, like the Morrow Board. However, many critical months must pass before such a board would see the light of day.

Meanwhile, press comment on the hearing was favorable and David Lawrence dug the meat out of the cocoanut in an article in which he said that the aircraft industry had revealed its postwar plan to a startled Congressional committee. The industry, he said, had thought its problem through. And to the surprise of all, it had not asked for subsidy. It had asked only that the government make up its mind what it wanted and leave the rest to competition within the industry.

We drew encouragement from all these events. We knew that Senator Murray was close to the White House and that his introduction of the bill implied at least that the President was not unfavorably disposed to it. For prior to the hearing, Fred Rentschler and I had taken pains to cover this angle, by making a call on John W. Snyder. Mr. Snyder had recently come to Washington at President Truman’s request and was destined to do a statesmanlike job in many fields for the Truman administration. We found him well informed on the whole air-power problem and fully prepared to advise the President on the industry’s plans to bring the matter before the public. Early in the program we even hoped that the President might appoint the committee himself, even as President Coolidge had done, but now to our surprise we found active opposition in two quarters.

The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air, William A. M. Burden, developed no enthusiasm for the idea, and when Don Douglas, Bob Gross, and I called on him one day, he explained why. He felt that the existing legislation on the subject of air commerce was adequate and feared that a protracted public inquiry might hamper things already in the works and thus retard progress. But the big complication we faced came from the Army Air Forces.

The ancient Army-Navy rivalry had not died down under the impact of war but had flared anew and on many fronts. At heart it was the same old dogfight that had engaged Billy Mitchell and Billy Moffett twenty years earlier. The Army Air Force still battled for control of all military aviation, and the Navy scratched gravel to hang onto its own. Within the industry itself, whatever might be our private views, we took no position on the matter. After all it was a private grudge fight between two customers. We had hoped that the Air Force, now that it had won its battle for autonomy and demonstrated its decisive character, would welcome an opportunity to plead its case before a public tribunal. Instead, it resorted to the same tactics Billy Mitchell had used and thus confused the whole matter of air-power policy. The fact was that the Army Air Force, for all the miracles performed by the military air-transport services—managed as it was by personnel from the commercial air-transport lines—still remained blind to the significance of air transport.

In an effort to overcome this resistance we now asked the National Planning Association to study air power, hoping that this distinguished organization might support us with a recommendation for a national air policy board. For the National Planning Association, a private organization comprising men in all walks of life and of all shades of opinion had been organized to study just such problems as ours, namely those of vital import to national policy. Before a matter could be studied at all it must first be passed upon by a tough board of trustees who carefully screened out all subjects not included in its charter. Then after a problem had been accepted for study, it had to be debated by a selected panel in an open forum before which the burden of proof lay upon the proponents. The association finally accepted our request for study and numerous meetings were held under the supervision of competent moderators. Some of the labor representatives on the panel were especially keen, and since the industry’s position safeguarded the working man and the public as well as the industry, we found ourselves on the strongest possible grounds.

Our problem lay with some of the many government agencies on the panel, for aviation concerned a whole flock of such agencies, many of whom were naturally more concerned with protecting their vested interests than with advancing the art of aviation as a whole. Debates before the panel helped us to crystallize our own ideas and to adjust them to practical circumstances. When, for instance, the representative of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget questioned the soundness of our view as to the fundamental economics of air power, he started me off on an expedition the results of which startled even our research group.

Having in mind, from my youth in the Northwest, the story of the land-grant railroads, I had begun a search for a factual basis with which to support the air-power theme. I knew that, following the Civil War, the whole force of the United States government had been placed behind the expansion of the railroads as a means of opening up the great West, providing jobs for discharged war veterans, and developing a vast area of rich territory. To encourage this expansion the government had given some 180,000,000 acres of undeveloped land to certain roads and in return had passed legislation requiring the railroads to rebate to the government a percentage of the charge for hauling government freight and passengers. The balance sheet on this project, if one could be found, might prove interesting to the air-transport situation.

Inquiry among railroad operators disclosed no record of the transaction and little interest in it, but research in the government records produced the surprising information that the roads had repaid their debt to the government however one might figure the original land values. If the figure selected was $1.00 per acre, the estimate at the time of the gift, the roads, having at the time of inquiry rebated some $640,000,000, had paid the debt back threefold. If the figure selected was $3.00 per acre, a fair average of the selling price the roads had received for the land, then they had still broken even. In other words, the government had not subsidized the roads with this grant; it had made instead a profitable investment. A short while after this inquiry was made, Congress revoked the land-grant rebates.

Similar inquiry into the air-mail situation now revealed an even more startling figure. At the time of the inquiry, the airlines were still making money. Having lost half of their equipment to the military air-transport services, and having supplied a large part of the operating leadership, they had stepped up their utilization of equipment, and reduced their costs, to the point where they were earning satisfactory profits from mail and passengers without yet having exploited the possibilities of air cargo. Had they been “reasonably regulated” as required by law, they might have continued their record instead of running into serious losses as they have since done. But at the moment of the inquiry, the Post Office Department could make the proud boast that receipts by the government from the sale of air-mail stamps alone had already exceeded payments made to the operators for carrying the mails, even after a heavy loading of Post Office Department overhead. The United States government was not subsidizing the airlines with mail pay; it was taking a nice profit from that operation. Post Office subsidies were granted for several different classes of mail by palpably low rates but the special air-mail stamp carried its own freight.

And so, out of the need for justifying our theory of air power, we discovered the greatest possible justification of it, namely, its economic soundness. The Post Office Department, like all government departments subjected to the handicaps of political patronage, was notoriously uneconomical, yet the air-mail operation could support a large slice of this excessive overhead and still show the department a profit on the operation. The railroads argued that the hidden subsidy of government airports and airways nullified the arguments, yet there was a long history of similar government support for highways and waterways. Meanwhile the Post Office subsidized directly the carriage of periodicals, and took serious losses on rural delivery and other classes of service. Here was a fact of profound importance to our air-power program: air mail was already self-sustaining and if subsequently the situation changed, losses could not be charged to air mail as such, but must be credited directly to inept management; that is, government regulation.

This raised the whole question not alone of the reasonableness of the “reasonable regulation” but also of the principle itself. There is nothing in the history of the railroads to support the principle; cutthroat competition could hardly have been more disastrous than the present regulation. When, earlier, the railroads had found themselves face to face with the penalties of their own mistakes, they had sought to lean on government; they had asked for regulation and they had got it. Of course they had sacrificed their birthright for a mess of pottage because, having eased the economic pressure of the struggle to survive, they had removed the chief incentive to technological development.

This point was admitted by Fred Williamson, then president of the New York Central, when he and I discussed the matter on a salmon-fishing trip to Anticosti Island. It had started as a bantering argument at a time when the New York Central was giving consideration to a suggestion that the railroad start its own airline. After I had set forth the case for air transport, Fred Williamson looked off down the Jupiter River and remarked in all earnestness:

“You know, if the railroads had invested in engineering all the money they have spent seeking to gain legislative advantage over motor and air transport, we’d be in a far better competitive position today.”

This whole matter of “reasonable regulation,” so critical with respect to a healthy air-transport industry, the key to air power, was one we had hoped to have studied by our air policy board, but in that hope we were disappointed. The National Planning Association issued a fine report on air-power policy, but certain government agencies blocked its support of our recommendation for the appointment of a presidential aviation commission. Under the circumstances we were not surprised when the President withheld

## action.

Now since one of the most important questions to come before a new board must be that of the long-term programs of procurement for air-force naval and commercial needs, we suggested that a study of this should be inaugurated. Meanwhile, in order to bring the many government agencies now concerned with aviation into some semblance of accord, the President had appointed an informal group called the “Air Coordinating Committee,” an organization which included the Assistant Secretaries for Air of the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments. This committee now initiated a study by the Harvard School of Business Administration, to determine the absolute minimum of aircraft production of all types under which an aircraft industry might exist. Such an industry must, of course, keep in the forefront of world technological progress and be capable of rapid expansion in times of emergency. As the keystone of air commerce and air forces, the public interest seemed to require at least a minimum industry. The report, when finally issued, clearly indicated the vital need for a long-term, continuing program that would correlate all needs, public and private, and it specified the size of a minimum program in pounds of air frames to be built each year.

In order to remove any misunderstanding as to the character of our association we had earlier changed our name to the Aircraft Industries Association of America, and to help direct our public-opinion work, we employed skilled public relations counsel. From them we learned that one of the first steps in creating public opinion is to bring your case before writers and speakers everywhere whose comments and opinions command public respect. One method of accomplishing this is for industry speakers to address public gatherings, where writers and speakers are in attendance, and to bring a message that will command sufficient attention to warrant comment by the public press. Our air-policy program contained such a message and it now devolved upon me to carry the message to Garcia.

Time was, in this land of ours, when public speakers were few and far between; today they are many and underfoot. When any organization decides to hold an annual dinner, it must first recruit a speaker whose name may attract enough customers to help the dinner committee break even. And since the audience are themselves all public speakers, they will be less interested in what the speaker has to say, and more in how he says it; a new technique or a new story is of unusual interest. Having had no other training in public speaking than that which goes along with standing in front of a squad of bluejackets and selling them on hitting the target, my technique was informal, conversational, and flowing. I might have memorized and carefully prepared my extemporaneous address, but I tried not to reveal the fact. And when, after giving my air-power theme the

## particular twist that belonged with the particular audience, some of

them came up to congratulate me, I soon discovered that few ever remembered the words, though some recalled the music. With this in mind, it is often more effective to slant the speech at the newsmen or the newsreaders; the listening audience is only waiting to get it over with anyway—even as you and I.

Meanwhile our several companies used their own resources to carry our story to their own localities where workers and businessmen were interested in the survival of the enterprise. Some of this, as Speaker Rayburn had foreseen, percolated back to Washington whether in the form of resolutions by various farm, labor, or business organizations, or just by letter or word of mouth. And so, with the hand of some government aviation agencies against us, we were encouraged by the reception given us by a group of senators and representatives who had come to dinner.

At an informal affair arranged to introduce our company presidents to some of the leaders in Congress on aeronautical matters, men who had previously known each other by name only, we divided our guests among small tables at each of which one of our presidents acted as host. Afterward, we called on our guests to speak to us and to our surprise found the burden of their discourse to be something like this: “You fellows have sold the public on air power, what do you think we ought to do about it?” In reply we pointed out that the whole problem was too complex for us; neither we nor anyone else could have the answers. We thought the matter deserved an airing before a public commission like the presidential advisory committee of twenty years ago.

Concrete action along these lines was forthcoming at the instigation of an able senator, Mr. Hugh B. Mitchell, from my native state of Washington. As chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, one that contained a number of outstanding men, the senator began conducting hearings on the subject. Our company presidents who appeared before this committee to present our case were much impressed by the fact that committee members attended the hearings and took an active interest in the problem. Before going back home to stand for reelection, Senator Mitchell introduced a bill calling for the appointment of a board to be constituted along the lines of the old Morrow Board. When the senator failed of reelection in the Republican year of 1947, a Democratic colleague, able Senator Brian MacMahon of my own state of Connecticut, reintroduced the Mitchell bill. Not to be outdone in courtesy, Republican Senator Brewster of Maine introduced the Brewster bill, one that differed from the MacMahon bill in that it provided for a purely Congressional committee.

From this point forward, matters dragged interminably. Most of us manufacturers, sold on our own doctrine, had now moved into the design and production of new transport aircraft intended to replace the war-weary war surplus. In United Aircraft, for instance, we had undertaken to expand the power output and increase the dependability of our current commercial engines and had at the same time inaugurated a wholly new engine, a twenty-eight-cylinder Wasp Major with a capacity of 4,360 cubic inches and an initial rating of 3,000 horsepower. This was over three times the cylinder displacement of the original Wasp but over seven times the power output, with possibilities of reaching ten times that output. It was expected to cost ten million dollars for development alone, or some ten times the original investment in Pratt and Whitney at the inception of the Wasp production.

Around these new models and the competitive engines under development by our rivals, Wright Aeronautical, the airplane manufacturers had gone overboard on new transports designed to carry increased loads at greatly reduced costs, and at much higher speed. All these companies appreciated the risks involved, but faith in the future of air transport justified to them the investment of their war earnings in the expansion of American air power. And this faith might have been justified had we been able to bring about the formulation of a dynamic national air policy, for the designs were sound in conception and well executed.

But now as time passed without concrete action, both air-transport and aircraft production drifted into severe difficulties. Save for a curious chain of circumstances, it is unlikely that the aircraft industry could have survived the long wait for an air policy board. Following the resignation of Charles E. Wilson, the great president of General Electric, from the War Production Board where he had been a bulwark of strength, and the subsequent departure of Donald Nelson, Julius Krug became chairman. By that time reconversion had become a live subject and a young lawyer on Cap Krug’s staff, Mort Wilner by name, had become much exercised over the threatened extinction of the aircraft industry. While, under existing law, cessation of hostilities would automatically cancel all aircraft-production contracts, a provision in Section 102 of the Reconversion Act authorized the President to continue such contracts as could be shown to be clearly in the public interest. At Mort Wilner’s suggestion I took John E. P. Morgan, able manager of the association, and called on Cap Krug to suggest that he obtain in advance a list from the War and Navy Departments of such contracts as could be shown to be in that category, and hold it in readiness against an emergency.

Thus it happened that when President Truman returned from Potsdam, Cap Krug gave John Snyder a letter for the President’s signature, which John Snyder carried to Norfolk with him. In this letter addressed to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the President directed that the specific contracts primarily connected with research and development be continued in effect. On this slender thread the aircraft industry subsisted until Congress could make appropriations for a temporary program.

Meanwhile with both the aircraft manufacturers and the transport operators hanging on the ropes, a fortunate break occurred. Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols, United States Air Force, returned from duty with the military government in Germany and asked for retirement. Oliver had been to the Air Force Matériel Command what Admiral Moffett had been to BUAERO. Having lacked any interest in personal publicity, his name was not widely known, but his achievements had long been recognized by all those in a position to appreciate them. In a way he was reminiscent of the old aviation story about Charlie Lawrance, designer of Lindbergh’s Wright Whirlwind engine. When asked why he had received so little recognition, Charlie is reported to have asked, “Whoever heard of Paul Revere’s horse?” Now Oliver Echols had the qualities required of the president of the Aircraft Industries Association. He had the respect of the industry, the Air Force, and the Navy; he knew aviation; he was familiar with the routine of Washington; he had the respect of legislators; he was in sympathy with the principles of the association; and finally, because he had zeal for air power, he was willing to accept the appointment, though tired by arduous service.

Meanwhile, in an effort to crystallize opinion as to air policy, I had published a book called _Air Power for Peace_, which was issued early in 1945. Patterned on Mahan’s method, this little book reviewed the history of aviation and appraised the impact of air power upon the war. And though history was still in the making and available only in censored headlines, the conclusions drawn in the book were later supported by the reports of the postwar Strategic Bombing Surveys. In light of the extravagant claims that had been made for aviation, it was necessary to keep the book wholly objective and, therefore, like Mahan, hard reading.

The outstanding conclusion drawn from this study was the important place air transport had held in the war. When the sea had been blockaded by enemy submarines, air transport had retained freedom of movement. With the Japanese in control of sea communications to China, air transport had hurdled the Himalayan Hump. With access by sea to Europe and Africa denied by German submarines, air transport, even though hastily improvised, had not only surmounted the barrier, but had become in fact the safest, cheapest, and often the only means of communication. Important persons and critical materials were delivered at critical points often just in time to exercise decisive influence on the outcome.

This fact was the result of the mobility of the airplane. On the ground, where movement can take place in but two dimensions and is often restricted by physical obstacles, blockade is relatively simple. At sea, where movement is still in two dimensions, obstructions are fewer and blockade is more difficult. In the air, where movement is three dimensional, and fixed obstructions few, effective blockade becomes almost impossible. And since freedom of communication is vital to security, the basic strategy in both war and peace is to guarantee freedom of communication to one’s self and to deny it to an enemy. This must be the beginning and end of foreign policy and the basis of strategy in both war and peace. The actual performance of air transport in World War II therefore becomes one of the most vital factors of modern times. By comparison, the atom bomb is a dangerous explosive; air transport is a new key to economic, social, and military security.

While writing _Air Power for Peace_, I had been impressed by the need for presenting this point of view in another manner. In the case of sea power, Mahan, the historian, had deduced the lessons of history. But Hakluyt, the author, had helped create the history that Mahan recorded three hundred years later. Born in England, somewhere around 1553, Hakluyt had been depressed by the backwardness of his people. While on a visit to the Temple, his uncle had shown him a map of the world and had given him “a lesson in geography,” which had inspired him to “prosecute that knowledge and kind of literature.” After studying languages so as to be able to read whatsoever printed or written discoveries and voyages he found extant in many lands, he made himself acquainted with the chiefest captains at sea, the greatest merchants, and the best mariners. Hearing other nations extolled for their discoveries and notable enterprises, and depressed by the sluggishness of the English and their neglect of the opportunities afforded them, he undertook to edit the original journals and narratives with a view to showing that in sea power lay the means for abolishing squalor and poverty in England. Today Richard Hakluyt’s _The English Voyages_ is one of the English classics.

Having in mind the possibility of utilizing his method for the air-power story, I looked around for material. However, Americans seldom pause to record their observations, as did the explorers and merchants of the pre-Elizabethan era, and I was forced to fall back on my own experience. Fortunately, this had been varied and I had played in the backfield of a number of Bowl games. The air-power story might be told from my own point of view.

Decision to undertake this, plus a number of other circumstances, including a visit to a hospital, prompted me to resign from business. In order to approach the task objectively, I found it necessary to detach myself from active operations. Since we had long ago laid the groundwork for bringing a younger generation into the picture, nothing seemed to stand in the way.

With the passage of time, the situation in aviation became more critical. Then at the moment when both air transport and aircraft production showed staggering losses, we got an unexpected assist from the Bear That Walks Like A Man. When he began showing his claws, a great public clamor arose in the United States and was quickly heard by sensitive Washington ears. Whatever the politicians may have missed about air power, the American people knew the answer. On July 22, 1947, the United States Congress passed an act to provide for the establishment of a temporary Congressional Aviation Policy Board. Four days earlier, on the eighteenth of July, the President appointed his temporary Air Policy Commission. The Congressional Aviation Policy Board, under the chairmanship of Senator Owen Brewster, of Maine, was made up of senators and representatives. The President’s Air Policy Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, consisted of the chairman and four civilians. Now where we had asked for one investigation, we got two.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

Before the Bar of Public Opinion

The Finletter Board, convened by the President under date of July 18, 1947, held extensive hearings and on December 30, 1947, submitted its report, “Survival in the Air Age.” Like the Morrow Board before it, the Board comprised able and distinguished men, including besides its chairman, Mr. Finletter, its vice-chairman, George P. Baker, and members, Palmer Hoyt, John A. McCone, and Arthur D. Whiteside. Prior to the Board’s being convened, a step of far-reaching importance had been taken—the reorganization of the armed forces and the establishment of the Department of Defense, under the able leadership of James V. Forrestal.

Prior to this step, the Aircraft Industries Association had inaugurated an annual conference of its board of governors held in Williamsburg, Virginia, to provide a forum for the interchange of ideas among the representatives of industry and those of government and military services concerned with aeronautics, with a view to acquainting industry and government with each other’s problems and responsibilities and to aid in finding solutions to these problems. At the first conference in 1946, it developed that the Army and Navy had become concerned over their faulty public relations and wanted advice and assistance.

Of course their unfavorable press had resulted from the ancient feud still being carried on in the press by Army and Navy over the problem of “integration” and “unification.” Behind its façade, the battle was still the same jurisdictional dispute that had agitated Admiral Moffett and General Mitchell back in the early ’twenties. From the industry point of view, the dogfight tended to neutralize our efforts to develop a public understanding of air power in its broad aspects, and the board of governors now asked me to confer with Army, Navy, and Air Force with a view to relieving the situation.

Since the industry had always refrained from participation in the old feud, this mission posed a problem. To me, the arguments against the organization of a separate air force had always outweighed those for it, but I now realized that I had been influenced against the project by the Army’s insistence on trying to grab off naval aviation. The record of what had happened in England under the Air Ministry had always stood out in my mind. But now, with commercial air transport coming of age, and with the brilliant record of military and naval air transport in the war, I began to see the problem in a different light. Air transport had opened up a new frontier. If the mission of the ground forces was the defense of the land frontier, and the mission of the seaborne forces was the defense of the sea frontier, then, logically, the mission of the air force must be the defense of the air frontier. The key to the problem was the advent of commercial air transport.

Pursuing this idea further, I came to the conclusion that our thinking had been confused by two unsound concepts. First, we had tended to organize the military on the basis of types of weapons or vehicles, and second, we had looked at the airplane as a weapon instead of a vehicle. Clearly, if the ground, sea, and air forces were to be held responsible for the defense of their frontiers, then each must have the implements essential to the discharge of that responsibility, and must have full authority over their design, development, and use. The ground, sea, and air forces must each have the aircraft necessary to the discharge of their responsibilities. The air is an ocean that gives uninterrupted access to every corner of the land and every reach of the sea. The air force is charged with responsibility for keeping the airlanes open to aerial commerce and should be provided with the ground or sea transport necessary to that job, but by the same token the ground and sea forces must develop and control all the instruments they require to perform their functions. And aside from the sound basis for this concept that lies in logic, the record is clear that it is equally sound in practice.

With this idea clarified in my own mind, I called on Vice Adm. de Witt C. Ramsey, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and later on Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commander, United States Army Air Force, to sound them out on this concept as a solution to the conflict. In the Navy, Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman, when called in by Admiral Ramsey, pointed out that this was the traditional position of the Navy but that they had been forced to fight to retain their own aviation. However, Vice Adm. Arthur Radford, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, looked at the matter somewhat differently. He saw the Naval Air Force as a mobile air force, one, to quote Admiral Moffett, “able to go anywhere on the backs of the fleet.” The Army Air Force, anchored as it was, to the ground, was less mobile. From the Army’s point of view, the vulnerability of the carrier to submarine attack compromised its usefulness. And here, I found, lay the nubbin of a great conflict of opinion. For my part, this difference of opinion was not one to be resolved on theoretical grounds alone. Our whole experience showed how dangerous it was to take decisions, especially those involving the national security, on the basis of prejudice or partisanship. The only safe course was to pursue both developments with an open mind and be ready to adapt either or both in support of national policy.

General Spaatz, after our interesting discussion, suggested that I call on Mr. Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, and lay these ideas before him, in the hope of contributing something to the solution of the ancient dispute. I did so, but was disappointed. Mr. Symington, recalling my old Navy background, apparently recognized in me a trojan horse, a partisan bent on dividing the Army and its Air Force so that the Navy might defeat both in detail. Wholly unprepared for this novel reception, I was forced to retire in disorder. As time passed, however, it became clear that my one-man foray in the role of interservice peacemaking had not been without result. After my visit with “Duke” Ramsey, Secretary Forrestal abandoned his opposition to autonomy for the Air Force and supported reorganization along lines recommended to him by Ferdinand Eberstadt. That my visit may have helped tilt the scales in favor of unification is indicated in a letter to me from Jim Forrestal dated August 4, 1947, in which he said, “Your thinking and mine has had an evolution which has been more or less in phase.”

A few months later, prior to the publication of the report of the Finletter Board, I discussed with the secretary some of the problems he faced in his effort to get agreement among the military with respect to a long-term program for aircraft procurement, development, and research. He expressed deep concern over the implications of the many major decisions he was called on to make in areas where no precedent or experience existed and asked me if I were in a position to help him.

To men like Jim Forrestal who understood the principles of war, catch phrases like “strategic bombing” and “unification” aroused deep concern. The first phrase overemphasized that doubtful tactic of indiscriminate bombing of nonmilitary objectives, and obscured the decisive character of such real strategic bombing as the assault on the Ploesti oil fields which brought German transport to a clanking halt. The second phrase screened a dangerous drift toward such a national general staff as had cost Germany two wars. Earnest students, fearing a dominant Air Force, leaned toward the opposite idea that the Ground Forces, like the Navy, must control its own air arm. Civilians like myself hoped to see such fundamental questions of national policy resolved by an informed public opinion through an air policy commission, but such was not to be. What might have been a decisive moment in history proved but another victory for the Douhet doctrine.

Even though Congress had supposedly integrated the armed forces by the time the Finletter Commission convened, the interservice feud raged worse than ever. The Board was unable to draw from Defense Secretary Forrestal any concrete program for aircraft procurement; the Chiefs of Staff had not been able to agree on one. Thus died the first objective of the manufacturing industry’s air-power program.

However, when the Air Force took the stand before the Board, Stuart Symington, now its secretary, moved swiftly and decisively to the attack with a concrete recommendation for a “seventy group” air force. Out of his forceful presentation came ultimately appropriations by Congress which proved to be the salvation of the aircraft manufacturing industry. Congress, fully alive to the role of the aircraft industry in national security, was largely motivated by considerations of preservation of the establishment.

The air-transport people, shoved into the background by superior showmanship, made a sorry presentation. It had fine leadership in Adm. Jerry Land, its president, and in two vice-presidents, Bob Ramspeck and Milton Arnold. But its membership was torn by dissension over that time-worn conflict, the “chosen instrument.” President Juan Trippe, whose creation of the great Pan American Airways system is one of the shining examples of inspired leadership in private enterprise, favored the policy of a single overseas American-flag airline, as the only means of competing with foreign, government-owned, or subsidized air lines. Other operators strongly opposed this concept as constituting a monopoly, and favored the system of “reasonable regulation” as practiced with domestic airlines.

This fundamental issue, long bitterly fought behind the scenes, had previously burst into the open at Chicago during the first meeting of the International Civil Aviation Conference. The United States State Department, ably represented by Adolphe Berle, had fought hard for the “five freedoms,” a modern counterpart of the old doctrine of freedom of the seas. Against the powerful opposition of certain foreign governments, notably that of Great Britain, the United States, weakened by the inner controversy, had been forced to settle for three of its five freedoms. This same issue now confused the Air Transport Association’s presentation before the Finletter Board. On this rock, a second great objective of the inquiry, an investigation of the reasonableness of regulation, was scuttled.

After exhaustive inquiry, the Finletter Board recommended numerous improvements as to policy in its report “Survival in the Air Age.” The Congressional Aviation Policy Board, after waiting for this report, issued its findings on March 1, 1948, in a joint-committee print entitled “National Aviation Policy.” But with echoes of Hiroshima still ringing in the ears of the investigators, air force displaced air commerce in top billing. The Congressional Board held frankly that a strong, stable, and modern civil aviation component is essential to air power for national security and that domestic and foreign commerce of the United States should be promoted by whatever means appear most practical until it reaches such stature in passenger and cargo capacity as to constitute in a crisis an adequate logistical arm of the national defense establishment. In other words, air commerce exists to support the armed forces. We in the aircraft industry had naïvely insisted that it must be the other way around. With the Congressional Committee’s profound observation on the place of civil air transport in air power, and its denial of the first premise of the aircraft industry’s air-power policy, we lost our third great objective.

While appropriations for military aircraft served momentarily to preserve the manufacturing industry and keep the military establishment from further deterioration, funds were forthcoming only on a hand-to-mouth basis. So long as Stalin continued pressure on Europe, Congress would appropriate; the moment he eased up, Congress would revoke. The essential long-term continuing program so necessary to technological progress went by the board. Even Representative Carl Vinson, whose vision had built the Navy of World War II and whose leadership had implemented the aviation programs, seemed unable to formalize a program to put into effect this generally accepted principle. Adding up the results of five years’ effort, the Aircraft Industries Association had to admit failure to reach its goal. To me the reason was abundantly clear. We had failed to enlist the cooperation of the armed forces and airline transport operators under the basic precept of cooperation in public policy and competition in operations.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

The Hand on the Stick

Early in 1949 the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the Senate, under the chairmanship of Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, began inquiring into the ills of the airline transport industry. Senator Johnson had sat at my table at the dinner given by the aircraft manufacturers to Congressional leaders in aviation in Washington some five years earlier. A man well informed on the whole subject, he now began directing an inquiry that promised to initiate an important forward step in the formulation of American air policy. Unlike the Finletter Commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, both of which had been held under the overcast produced by the cold front of fear incident to the Berlin crisis, the Johnson inquiry, following close on the brilliant success of the Berlin Airlift, focused attention solely on airline transport.

Curiously enough, the underlying significance of the Berlin Airlift was seldom touched upon in the flood of commentary that accompanied the lifting of the blockade. While it was generally recognized as a defeat for the Soviet, and served to ease the tensions and allay the fears of war, the epochal character of the operation went almost unrecognized. Paul Fisher, in the _Bee Hive_, house organ for United Aircraft Corporation, in a brilliant article written on the spot, hailed the victory of air freight. For the first time in world history, commercial air transports—not combat aircraft—had spearheaded United States foreign policy in a victorious action against the swashbuckling Soviet. The very forces which had once reduced Berlin to rubble with bombs had now saved the population from starvation with air cargo.

Meanwhile, rapid progress in the development of guided missiles had raised the question of the future of the airplane as a major weapon carrier. Some strictly military manufacturers had already begun giving serious consideration to the problem of whether to continue to specialize in aircraft or to shift over to the development of guided missiles. And once experimental aircraft had exceeded the speed of sound, some began to wonder if that velocity might not one day mark the division between combat aircraft and those designed for commercial purposes. In other words the Johnson Committee began its hearings against the background of a changing weather map.

Airline testimony before the Committee revealed some wide divisions within the transport industry itself. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker for example blamed the ills of the airlines on “too much coddling and wet nursing,” while Carleton Putnam ascribed them to “slow starvation.” The individual outlook reflected the color of the financial statement. And the airline operators, in making their “policy” recommendations, seldom came to grips with fundamentals but focused their attentions on revisions of administrative procedure. In this respect they reflected their long association with government agencies to whom policy so often means the detailed management of public affairs rather than a course of conduct. If the airline operators’ recommendations seemed slanted toward measures calculated to advance the special interests of their individual companies, the fact was entirely understandable.

To us aircraft manufacturers who, five years earlier, had covenanted to cooperate in the public interest where policy was concerned, while continuing to compete with each other in operations to our own—and likewise—the public interest, it appeared that a precarious existence under government economic regulation had blinded the operators to the broad public interest, and hence, to their own enlightened self-interest. Leaning on government for a guarantee of their economic security, they competed with each other for legislative or administrative advantage, and primarily before Congressional committees or government agencies. And if some of them made forays into politics and acted more like rusty railroad executives than like jet-propelled pioneers, it was in keeping with the principles under which they operated.

Yet out of the confusion of conflicting testimony it was possible, by keeping in mind certain fundamentals learned from the history of aviation, to arrive at certain conclusions. The airline operators for all their controversies were unanimous on at least two points: they endorsed the principle of “reasonable regulation” upon which the Civil Aeronautics Act had been founded, and they condemned the administration of the Act by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Yet in the face of the airlines’ unanimous approval of the Act, an objective study of the testimony raises a serious question as to its soundness. Sifting out the wheat from the chaff, one could not help wondering whether Solomon himself, with the aid of all of his wives, could have administered such a document. Providing as it does for economic regulation of privately owned industries by political appointees, the Act flies in the face of the fundamental fact that politics and economics function under different basic precepts; in the one the ballot box calls the turn, in the other the cold arithmetic of an inescapable financial statement. But if the airlines’ endorsement of “reasonable regulation” proved open to question, the testimony before the Committee left no doubt that recent regulation had been, in fact, wholly unreasonable.

It developed that the Civil Aeronautics Board had cut the mail rates in 1945 to a point well below the actual cost of transporting the mail. Furthermore it had authorized widespread duplication of existing services and had subsidized these duplicating services in competition with those already established. And when this action resulted in crippling losses, the Board compounded its blunder by making retroactive increases in mail which had the effect of putting the whole rate structure on a cost-plus basis. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, of Eastern Airlines, voiced the position of the “Big Four” when he said, “The confused state of mail rates destroys all incentive for economy and efficiency—it discourages good management and high performance. It puts a penalty on accomplishment, and rewards the wasteful and inefficient.”

Another diagnosis of the airline ills was offered by Harold A. Jones, a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board itself, when speaking before the San Francisco Advertising Club. The airlines, he thought, were ill from a “mysterious disease known as ‘subsiditis,’” which disease he ranked “somewhere between bubonic plague and leprosy.” However his shotgun diagnosis lacked clinical confirmation before the Senate Committee by his boss, Joseph J. O’Connell, Jr., chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

“We are not in a position,” testified Mr. O’Connell, “to give an accurate estimate as to the amount of the total air-mail pay bill which represents fair compensation for the carriage of the mail, and that portion that represents subsidy.”

Postmaster General Donaldson agreed with the Board chairman and stated that the Post Office had long held the opinion that the mail rate, if shorn of its subsidy elements, should not in any case be greater than the passenger rate. On this basis the Post Office Department would have been credited with approximately one-half its present transportation expenditures inasmuch as passengers were paying approximately 50 cents per ton mile, while the Post Office was paying more than double that amount. This over-all figure, of course, obscured the wide variations between the compensations paid airlines thought to be self-sufficient and the much larger payments to those known to be heavily subsidized.

In the absence of even the most elementary data it is difficult to see how any regulation could be called reasonable or how the government could support any subsidy charge either against the industry as a whole or against any segment of it. The situation was further obscured by the Postmaster General’s estimate of the total domestic and foreign air-mail subsidy for this year.

Using the excess of the cost of the service to the Post Office Department over the department’s air-mail revenues, he arrived at the figure of $35,000,000. The cost to the department included of course all expenses allocated to air mail including department overhead, but it did not substantiate the reasonableness of any allocation. Under questioning by one of the senators of the Committee, this all inclusive definition of “subsidy” was discounted. Under business accounting principles the figure might have been labeled “deficit” and would have been charged against the Post Office rather than pinned on the airlines as a “subsidy.” After all, the Post Office Department overhead, an item perhaps more political than economic in character, was not subject to airline control and was therefore the responsibility of the department. A subsidy is a public grant or subvention to aid an enterprise for the public convenience and not the deficit of a government department.

In the face of such fuzzy accounting the figure is interesting chiefly because of its small size. The Postmaster General, after referring to statistical exhibits, reported the total deficit incurred from the inauguration of the first air-mail service in 1918 up to 1948 as a little over three and one-half million dollars per year for the thirty-year period and added, “Probably no investment made by this government ever returned greater national benefits in commercial and cultural progress, and national security. The over-all value of air transportation system to the nation, particularly as an arm of defense, has been incalculable.”

It is interesting in passing to compare the air-mail deficit with others submitted by the Postmaster General: penny postcards, $57,000,000; fourth-class mail, $82,000,000; third-class mail, $139,000,000; and second-class mail, $237,000,000—a total of $515,000,000. And so the air-mail deficit is but one of many and the least of them all. On the basis of such approximations as have been presented by government agencies, the airlines might have argued that by absorbing a portion of the vast overhead of the Post Office Department they were actually “subsidizing” other types of mail service.

In light of the dearth of figures that would indicate an approximation to the true air-mail subsidy, if any, Carleton Putnam, of Chicago and Southern, made an exhaustive analysis of government cost records, during which he checked his assumptions with responsible persons in the government. This indicated that from the inception of the air mail down to the year 1948, the postal revenues had exceeded the added costs of air mail to the Post Office by some $54,000,000. Summing up for the Committee, in a statement which was not challenged by the government, he testified, “Hence the American taxpayer has not only gained the greatest air transportation system on earth ... plus an adjunct to the national defense which would otherwise have cost him untold millions to provide—he is $54,000,000 ahead in cash as well.”

And after charging the airlines for their share of the cost of building and maintaining the nation’s airways and airports, an expenditure which would in any case have had to be made for the Army and Navy, the airlines would still owe the taxpayer but $61,000,000, all of which relates to maintaining the national airways system. Furthermore this clear demonstration that the air mail has not been subsidized comes in the face of grievous blunders by the Civil Aeronautics Board in certifying uneconomic competing services at extravagant mail rates.

One of the most extreme cases of this kind was reported by Captain Eddie Rickenbacker. The Civil Aeronautics Board had in the past two years certified twenty-one “feeder lines,” some of which had been authorized to divert mail poundage from some stations which Eastern had served for twenty years without subsidy, and to charge ten times as much to transport the same mail between the same points. In other words, the Civil Aeronautics Board, impelled by some sense of political necessity to provide competition for the major airlines, had in effect forced them to subsidize competition for themselves. Meanwhile the government had paid such niggardly rates to others that the stockholders of the enterprises had been forced to subsidize the United States.

Such “reasonable” regulation had reduced the airlines from their once proud state of self-sufficiency to a critical status, and at the very moment when their futures should have looked the brightest.

“There can be little doubt,” stated the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, “that if our airline system were today the same size as it was in 1941 in terms of routes, points served, and service provided, it would be completely independent of government support.” It was certain additions to the service, he further pointed out, and the fixing of certain “fair” compensations by the Board that slowed all airlines save Eastern down to stalling speed and all but put them into a flat spin. He shared his responsibility with the appropriation committees of Congress and thought that if funds were provided for an adequate staff the Board might do a competent job. However the fact that the Civil Aeronautics Authority and Civil Aeronautics Board already had 18,000 employees as compared with approximately 80,000 employees for all domestic and overseas scheduled airlines rather discounted this opinion.

That the damage did not end with heavy losses imposed by arbitrary rates but was multiplied by the award of retroactive payments is evidenced in the testimony of Roger F. Murray, vice-president of the Bankers Trust Company of New York.

“The Board’s thinking,” he said, “has apparently been that rates should be set so that _each_ carrier will break even and perhaps earn some so-called ‘fair’ rate of return on it’s ‘used and useful investment.’ Under these circumstances, enlarged payments have been made to rescue some airlines in difficulties or keep others going on a subsistence basis. While this may be reassuring to creditors of the airlines, it is the poorest kind of an appeal to potential purchasers of equity securities.”

Translating this into lay language, the private investor or his agents just cannot be interested in buying stock in enterprises which are suffering economic regulation by political agencies. And once an enterprise is denied access to the highly competitive markets for risk capital, it is indeed on the verge of bankruptcy or about to crash into the abyss of nationalization. And if the government, after having reduced the market value of the airlines by its own mismanagement, then takes possession of them, it becomes guilty of expropriating the capital of private investors, some of whom had risked their savings in an enterprise they deemed secure because it was government regulated.

Now mismanagement of the airlines was not necessarily the fault of wicked or even stupid men. As Speaker Sam Rayburn had pointed out to me in the case of Congressmen, government administrators are no smarter nor more stupid than the average. But they hold their jobs by knowing which side their bread is buttered on and making the correct estimate of what action will produce the most votes.

The Civil Aeronautics Board, in light of current public opinion with respect to the profit motive, could hardly be expected to accept public responsibility for such economic regulation as would permit any airline to make a profit, especially one such as might be subject to political attack. Nor could it be expected to muster courage to defend such an apparent monopoly as its own route pattern had created, even though the law authorized it. Although the Board was directed to so administer the Act as to prevent “unfair or destructive practices,” it must permit “competition to the extent necessary to insure sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and the national defense.” Its decisions, predicated on an attempt to administer such complex mandates and still keep out of hot water, brought the airlines into jeopardy at the very moment when they had established their economic self-sufficiency and faced the brightest futures of their turbulent careers. In other words, economic regulation by political agency is an anachronism.

Meanwhile, with the real solution to the Board’s competition problem ready at hand, the Board even messed that up. This drama was unfolded before the Committee by a group of enterprising young veterans who, having participated in such wartime miracles as the transportation of air cargo over the Himalayan Hump, had concluded that this and other services as yet unexploited by the certificated passenger carriers offered unique opportunities for their postwar reconversion. Perhaps the gist of their testimony can be extracted from the statement of Amos E. Heacock, executive committee chairman of the National Independent Carriers, and president of Air Transport Associates.

“Let me review briefly,” he said, “the near miracles that have been wrought in the development of air transportation by United States veterans.... In the international contract air carrier field, Transocean Airlines, Seaboard and Western, Pacific Overseas Airlines, etc., have found an entirely new market for air transportation, formerly practically untouched by the scheduled airlines.... I want to point out to you an additional and perhaps the greatest air transportation feat performed by the veterans of World War II. I am referring to the amazing record of the Pacific Northwest-Alaska nonscheduled carriers.... The scheduled carriers that were subsidized to do the job of developing air transportation to Alaska were a miserable failure. The bulk of the cargo, 73.6 per cent of the northbound and 83.5 per cent of the southbound, was transported by the much maligned nonscheduled air carriers.... The records show that the non-skeds pioneered a wealth of new business.”

After referring to Section 2(d) of the Act, which provides for competition, the witness stated, “With an unprecedented opportunity to preserve competition to develop the air transportation system and so provide adequate and economical service, the Board’s actions have provided for just the reverse.”

One explanation of the Board’s action might be derived from the statement of C. R. Smith, chairman of American Airlines, one of the largest of the “Big Four.”

“If the law of the land is to be enforced against the certificated air carriers,” he said, “it should have similar enthusiasm of enforcement against the irregular carriers who compete directly for the same business of air transportation. We cannot live with economic health in an atmosphere half legal and half illegal. If this business is to be regulated, all should be regulated.” It would be interesting to know just what significance attaches to the use of the word “against” in this statement.

“If the Civil Aeronautics Act is to mean but little,” continued “C.R.,” “then let us return to the rules of the road which obtained before the Act was passed, when competition was direct and unregulated.” Had “C.R.” gone on to urge this course, he might have given a demonstration of the rugged individualism for which he is credited; instead he summed up, “We were in favor of the Act, we are in favor of the continuation of the Act, but if we are to abide by the terms of the Act, we ask that our competitors be bound by the same rules of public conduct.”

Juan Trippe, president of the Pan American Airways System, stated the issue in similarly clear terms:

“The fundamental problem, both domestically and internationally, is that although Congress intended to place the airline industry in the category of regulated public utilities, the airlines, while treated on one hand as public utilities, have, at the same time, been made subject to all of the competitive pressures proper and appropriate only in an unregulated industry. There is no precedent in American industry that I know of for such a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde arrangement.”

After developing the principles under which public utilities are regulated and financed and suggesting that Congress should make up its mind as to whether or not they want to return the airline industry to its intended status as a regulated airline industry, Juan, like “C.R.,” mentioned the alternative of eliminating the relative provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and exposing the airlines to the full competitive force which exists and should exist in ordinary commerce.

“There will be no real progress in the solution of the airline problems,” he summed up, “until this issue is met squarely. An airline can’t be a regulated public utility and a free enterprise at the same time.”

However, the witness did not waste further time on this alternative but, acting on the assumption that the doctrine of regulating the airlines as a public utility would be preserved, went on to develop his own case with all the unique persuasiveness that had helped him pioneer Pan American in one of the most impressive displays of self-reliance, individual initiative, and private enterprise of modern times. His discussion led up naturally to the merger of Pan American with American Overseas Airlines which he and “C.R.” had earlier submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board. In justifying this, Juan expounded his well-known thesis of the “chosen instrument” advocating a government policy of maintaining one American-flag system—Pan American Airways—in the international field, supported with frank outright subsidies such as those paid under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. He justified his position by citing its benefits to the stockholders of the company and argued that the higher wages thus made available to American workmen employed in international aviation would constitute a subsidy to them.

With the major certificated airlines mobilized solidly in support of the “chosen instrument” policy, the Committee received a clear statement of the opposing point of view from Raymond A. Norden, president of Seaboard and Western Airlines, Inc. One of the independents who had been characterized by Captain Eddie Rickenbacker as “irregulars,” “latecomers,” “interlopers,” “pretenders,” and so forth, Mr. Norden undertook to support Eddie’s contention that the airlines were suffering from too much coddling. In perhaps the outstanding statement to be made to the Committee, he put his finger on the crux of the airline controversy.

“The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,” he said, “is unusual among regulatory statutes in one very important respect. Other forms of transportation have not customarily been subjected to comprehensive regulation until the pattern of growth has been assured and until the industry has become so highly developed competitively that there is need for rigid controls and restraints in order to prevent destructive practices.” Out of the background of the airplane story to date, one might argue the other way around, namely that once the rigid controls and restraints are imposed, the growth pattern becomes stabilized. Mr. Norden went on to argue with persuasion:

“Aviation is relatively a new business. Air freight, as distinguished from other forms of aviation business, is in its infancy. Yet the entire aviation industry is hedged about with red tape, the like of which has never been encountered in any other form of American industry. One has merely to look at legal payments made by some of the certificated carriers. TWA, for example, in 1948 alone, paid a single law firm the sum of $340,000. My own small company spent in excess of $50,000 in legal expense. Sometimes I feel as though I had more lawyers than pilots.”

When the Russians blockaded Berlin in June, 1948, according to the witness, the Air Force, lacking reserve planes, called upon three certificated, subsidized North Atlantic carriers, Pan American, TWA, and American Overseas Airlines, to lift essential material between this country and Germany. Those carriers failed miserably; of the three irregular international carriers called upon to assist, Seaboard and Western lifted more than twice as much tonnage over the North Atlantic in the next six months as Pan American, TWA, and American Overseas combined. Yet under pressure from the certificated carriers, the Civil Aeronautics Board revoked Seaboard’s authority to fly under its Letter of Registration, as of May 20, 1949, along with all other large irregular airlines in this country. In his indictment of the certificated carriers the witness said, “In their zeal to keep the air transportation field to themselves and to obviate the chance that a measurement will be set up against their operational efficiency, the North Atlantic carriers are doing a great disservice to the country. To put it bluntly, they are sabotaging the development of airlift which is vital to national security.”

Mr. Norden then went on to quote from an article by J. A. Durham and M. J. Feldstein in the _Virginia Law Review_ entitled “Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight Industry”:

“But where an agency is charged with creating new national wealth by developing an infant industry, the consequence of permitting established interests to employ the forms of justice to obstruct the attainment of statutory objectives may well destroy the value of the administrative process.”

A less reasoned but even more revealing statement was that of Charles F. Willis, Jr., president of Willis Air Service, Inc., one of the “irregulars”:

“Consequently it is with great bitterness that we have seen ourselves singled out by the Civil Aeronautics Board for denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.... It is even harder to accept the decision because the only reason we are given for it is that we don’t have a million dollars. We never had a million dollars and we never needed a million dollars to perform our operations, but we do have almost all the dollars we started with. We feel that we have successfully demonstrated that an airline can be kept going, at a profit, if hard work, ingenuity, and a desire to make a profit are substituted for lavish spending of other people’s money.”

In such a sketchy review of the reams of testimony submitted to the Committee it is quite impossible to do more than attempt to summarize the major points of view and try to pan out the nuggets that reveal the vital issues. After sluicing away the rubble and uncovering bed rock, my own impression is largely one of intense sympathy for the Civil Aeronautics Board. Charged with an almost impossible task, it has been subjected to terrific forces by organizations skilled in the art of influencing public opinion. I also come away with a feeling of regret that airline management could not have approached the problem under the precepts adopted by the Aircraft Industries Association.

Most American early birds will recall with a nostalgic smile a cartoon that once adorned the walls of many a pioneer flight school. Entitled “His First Solo,” it depicted a forlorn fledgling perched out on the end of a bare limb. Near its root poised an impatient mother bird from whose beak floated the command, “Come on, kid! Give ’er the gun!”

One day, while studying the conflicting testimony of airline operators in an endeavor to predict the next twist of the slipstream, I recalled this early masterpiece of contemporary art. The fledgling on the end of the limb seemed now to have feathered out; he appeared, in fact, almost overgrown. The mother bird cocked her head questioningly, “I wonder if he’s got what it takes?”

* * * * *

From the days of Wilbur and Orville Wright on down to the present, aviators have groped for an understanding of the airplane’s destiny. Charles A. Lindbergh, in his book _Of Flight and Life_, has stated the problem:

The tragedy of scientific man is that he has found no way to guide his own discoveries to a constructive end. He has guarded none so carefully that his enemies have not eventually obtained it and turned it against him. He has developed a system in which his security today and tomorrow seems to depend on building weapons which will destroy him the day after. He has become so hypnotized by his search for knowledge that he must go on discovering and experimenting even though it leads to his own annihilation. With the key to science he has turned loose forces which he cannot re-imprison.

In the closing paragraph of his book Lindbergh states, “Our salvation, and our only salvation, lies in controlling the arm of western science by the eternal truths of God.”

Igor I. Sikorsky, in _The Invisible Encounter_, goes back two thousand years for his solution. In a chapter called “Kingdoms of the World,” he quotes from the Gospel according to Matthew: “Again the devil taketh Him up into an exceeding high mountain, and sheweth Him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them and saith unto Him. All these things will I give Thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me.”

Mr. Sikorsky then goes on to say:

The crown and recognition as Messiah the king were offered to Christ. But He refused to accept them. However, He offered his spiritual leadership to the whole Jewish nation but his offer was disregarded.... The real cause of the tragedy was the irreconcilable conflict between the Divine ideology of Christ and the supremely evil spirit of the impending revolution.

After drawing an apt parallel in current history, Mr. Sikorsky remarks, “If the world is to be controlled by spiritually dead men, it is as if an unconscious crew were placed at the controls of an airliner.”

* * * * *

Civilization stands today at the same crossroad. It need but accept the proffered leadership to commence an era of spiritual and material progress such as it has not yet known.

A single characteristic differentiates America from all other lands. Ours is a nation created by God-fearing men and women in search of liberty. Liberty is a force more explosive than atomic bombs. It created America. America stands today both as God’s living proof of the power of human freedom and as the negation of conflicting human doctrine.

As we have seen from the record, the airplane is one of the miraculous creations of liberty. No result of human foresight or planning, it is a Divine revelation. And though, as yet, largely prostituted to the folly of war, it embodies in itself the potential of world peace and freedom.

For always the hand on the stick has been the Hand of God. The Berlin Airlift, hastily improvised amid the rubble of war, contrived out of dire necessity, uncertainty, and fear, gave the world an American answer to that eternal question, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” The unequivocal answer came, not in a rain of destruction but on a flood of life-giving necessities.

“Yes, I am his keeper. I am the keeper of the peace!”

The triumph of the airlift was not one of men and machines but of the Christian spirit.

Index

A

Aeromarine Airplane and Motor Corporation, 18, 32-33

Aeromarine Inertia Starter, 33, 40-41

Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, 213, 264, 268-269 Personal Aircraft Council, 273 reorganization of, 269-270

“Affair Fleet,” 47-48, 99

Air cargo (_see_ Air carrier service)

Air carrier service, 280, 296, 306 certified, 303-304, 306-307 international, 303-304 uncertified, 304, 307 (_See also_ Air transport; Airlines)

Air Coordinating Committee, 282

Air Corps Act of 1926, 69, 72, 244-245

Air Force, appropriations for, 293-295 and Berlin blockade, 307 created by Navy, 10, 20, 148 mobility of, 292 independent, 10, 25-26, 58-70, 107, 278-279, 291 and procurement, 282, 293 seventy-group, 293 and strategic bombing, 293 unification of, 293 (_See also_ Army Air Corps; Aviation, naval)

Air France, 208

Air freight (_see_ Air carrier service)

Air mail, 280 ocean, subsidies for, 187 revenues from, 300-301

Air-mail contracts, canceling of, 181-182, 186, 209

Air-mail rates, 298-299, 301 cut in, 298 and subsidies, 298-301

Air Policy Commission, temporary, 289

Air power, 5, 267-268, 285, 293 American, Lindbergh’s influence on, 103-104 economics of, 279-282 and foreign policy, 288 new concept of, 276-277, 287-288 public relations program for, 270, 283-284 and sea power, 267 studies of, 279-283

_Air Power for Peace_, 287-288

Air transport, commercial, 97, 186-187, 255, 267, 285, 288, 291, 294-296 and foreign policy, 295 military, 279-280, 291 veterans’ development of, 303-304 wartime importance of, 287-288 (_See also_ Air carrier service)

Air Transport Association, 294, 303

Air Transport Command (ATC), 255, 279

Aircraft, 4 carrier, 21-22 combat, 195 experimental, 297 foreign, 95-96, 204 personal, 96, 273, 277 rigid, 10, 56, 58, 67, 70, 181 styling of, 110 and world freedom, 310 (_See also_ kinds of aircraft, as Bombers)

Aircraft carriers, 5, 21-22, 127-128, 182, 190, 257-258 deck landings on, 116, 122, 125, 249-250 number of planes on, 116, 194 in relation to battleships, 134-135, 141-142, 147-148 vulnerability of, 292

Aircraft Industries Association of America, 283, 287, 290, 295, 308

Aircraft industry, 16, 23, 29-36, 51, 66-67, 72, 109-111, 183, 197, 199-203 air-power policy of, 276-277, 295, 297 assembly line in, 240-241 conference of, 1938, 213-216 consolidations in, 153-154 foreign, 196 and foreign markets, 188-192, 204, 220-222, 229 and foreign policy, 195 importance of, 275-276 investigations of, 181-182, 187, 249, 258, 270-287 nationalization of, 23 postwar difficulties of, 285-286 and public relations, 262-271, 283-284, 297 reconversion in, 260-262, 272 and red tape, 306-307 unification of, 262-263 and the unions, 249-251, 273 wartime criticism of, 242

Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet (FLEET AIR), 111-112, 117-118, 121, 123-124, 126, 129-130, 137, 151-152, 157, 183, 187, 202

Airfoil, wing-flapped, 179

Airline operators, policy recommendations of, 297

Airlines, 280 “Big Four,” 298, 304 feeder lines for, 301 legal fees paid by, 306-307 mismanagement of, 302 monopoly in, 303 number of employees in, 302 overseas, 294, 305-306 private investment in, 302 reasonable regulation of, 280-281, 294, 298, 303-308 and subsidies, 299-301, 306 (_See also_ Air carrier service; Air transport)

AIRONS (_see_ Aircraft squadrons)

_Airplane, The_, 91, 188

Airplane catapults, 5-6, 21, 49

Airplane engines, 9, 27, 222 air-cooled, 18, 30-31, 35, 38, 44-45, 49, 50-51, 78-80, 119, 134, 147, 188, 196-200, 203, 206, 217-218 commercial, 14 cost and price of, 243-244 early history of, 13-18 government building of, 231-232 Japanese, 193 licensing production of, 232, 239 liquid-cooled, 13-14, 18-19, 30-31, 35, 50-51, 74-75, 78-79, 134, 147, 196-200, 202-203, 217-218 military, 14, 22 precision tools for, 247-248 types of, 12-13, 16-18, 49, 193 variations in, 243 (_See also_ kinds of engines, as Liberty)

Airplanes (_see_ Aircraft)

Airports and airways, 301

Aktiebolaget Aerotransport, 207

_Akron_, dirigible, 70, 181

_Alabama_, battleship, 25

Alaska, air transportation to, 304

Allison Engineering Company, 197

Allison liquid-cooled engines, 217, 238

Altitude, high, research on, 257

Alvis, Limited, Coventry, 171

Amphibians (_see_ Sikorsky planes)

American Airlines, 304

American Export Airlines, 183

American Overseas Airlines, 305, 307

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 93

Anacostia Naval Air Station, 99, 104

Andrews, Frank, 214

Annapolis, 2, 142, 268 (_See also_ U.S. Naval Academy)

Approved Type Certificate (ATC), 176-177

Argentine Navy, 189-190

_Argus_, carrier, 5

_Arkansas_, battleship, 4, 121

_Arklight, The_, 259

Armed forces, 295 procurement for, 66, 187, 232 reorganization of, 290 (_See also_ Army; Navy)

Arms Embargo Act, 210, 218, 221-222 repeal of, 222

Army, 19, 25, 35, 41, 58, 72, 147, 290, 292-293 and aircraft industry, 23, 65, 172, 213-216, 243, 262 General Mitchell’s attack on, 58-59 Personnel Procurement Branch, 251 and procurement, 66, 187 war plans effort of, 213-216 war schedule of, 241

Army Air Corps, 196, 203, 214, 216-218, 229, 278, 292

Army Air Service, 9, 23-24, 71, 98, 148

Army Engineering Division, 33, 39, 191, 197

Army-Navy rivalry, 10-11, 24-27, 34, 43, 278, 290-292

Army Ordnance, 24

Army planes, C-54’s, 256 DH’s, 17, 29, 110 F4B’s, 134 Jennys, 14, 43 Lightnings, 257 PT’s, 44 Thunderbolts, 195 (_See also_ kinds of aircraft, as Bombers)

Army Reorganization Act of 1921, 213, 233

Arnold, Gen. “Hap,” 213-214, 217

Arnold, Les, 118, 147-148

Arnold, Milton, 294

_Aroostook_, mine planter, 122

ATC (_see_ Approved Type Certificate; Army Transport Command)

Atkins, Capt. A. K., 17

Atom bomb, 288, 293, 310

Aunt Lucy, 85-86, 90, 92

Automotive industry, 237 and aircraft engines, 14-16, 238-240, 249 and foreign markets, 205 reconversion in, 272

_Aviation_, 270

Aviation, 9-10, 298 civil, 69, 76, 206 commercial, 110, 174, 179, 212, 276, 279 foreign, 205 overseas, 180, 183, 208-209 (_See also_ Air transport) government agencies concerned with, 279-282, 284, 297 government control of, 205-206 investigations into, 60-62, 181-182, 187, 289-290, 293-298 Lindbergh’s influence on, 103-108 and mass production, 14-15 naval, 5-8, 10, 19-20, 26-27, 68, 70, 278, 291-296 naval, five-year building program for, 71-72, 95 proposed advisory committee for, 276-277, 282, 284-285 appointment of, 289 opposition to, 278-279 service rivalry in (_see_ Army-Navy rivalry) (_See also_ Aircraft; Aircraft industry)

Aviation Game, 28

Aviation mechanic schools, during World War I, 5-6

Aviation Writers’ Association, 270

B

Baker, George P., 290

Balchen, Bernt, 207

Baldwin, Hanson, 149

Ballanca, Giuseppe, 96

Bankers Trust Company, New York, 302

Battle of Britain, 171

Battle fleet, 151 morale of, 132-133 organization of, 130

Battleships, 134-135, 141-142, 147-148, 152

Bavarian Motoren Werke, 208

Beach, Joe, 251-252

Beatty, Adm. Sir David, 4, 259, 266

Beaverbrook, Lord, 222, 233

_Bee Hive_, 296

Beisel, Rex, 186

Belgium, 207

Bell, Larry, 97

Berle, Adolphe, 294

Berlin Airlift, 296, 310

Berlin blockade, 307

Bermuda, 208, 266

Berrien, Capt. Frank D., 127

Bethpage, Long Island, 199

Beverly Hills, California, 265, 268

“Big Four” airlines, 298, 304

Bingham, Hiram, 61

Biplanes, passing of, 170, 190

Black, Hugo, 181, 187, 263, 271

Bloch, Capt. Claude C., 29, 138

Boeing, William E., 66, 76-77, 105, 110, 153-154, 182, 185, 200-201

Boeing Airplane Company, 48, 73, 76-77, 153, 169, 182-183, 194, 200-201, 251 fighters, 73, 75, 76, 134, 147 mail planes, 40-B’s (Monomail), 76, 169 Stratocruiser, 180 training planes, 98 transports, 169, 171, 208

Bogan, Gerry, 125-127

Bogusch, Harry, 89, 141, 147, 152

Bolling Field, 99

Bomb rack for Corsairs, 257

Bomber escort planes, 195

Bombers, 202 heavy long-range, 194, 251 twin-engined, 198

Borrup, Jack, 55

Boston, Massachusetts, 33

Botta, Lt. Ricco, 23, 38, 48, 78

Brainard, Morgan B., 264

_Breck_, destroyer, 144-145

Bremerton, Washington, 153

Brereton, Louis, 214

Brewster, Owen, 285, 289

Brewster Bill, 285

Bridgeport, Connecticut, 164, 172

_Bridgeport_, destroyer tender, 7, 11, 145

Bristol airplane factory, 188

Bristol Jupiter engine, 56, 193, 196

British Air Ministry, 10, 170, 266, 291

British Committee of Inquiry into Civil Aviation, 206

British Grand Fleet, 4-5, 21, 207, 259, 266

British National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 94

British Purchasing Commission, 224-225

British Spitfire fighters, 171

Brown, Admiral Moffett’s messenger, 60

Brown, Donald L., 55, 182, 185, 213, 216-220, 229, 239, 249

BUAERO (_see_ U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Aeronautics)

Buffalo, New York, 35, 43

Buick, 232, 237, 241, 252, 254

Buivid, Mr., 179

BUNAV (_see_ U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation)

Burbank, California, 201

Burden, William A. M., 278

Burns, Colonel, 213, 216

Business cycles, 163

Businessmen _vs._ professional men, 163-164 on United Aircraft board, 264

Butler, Admiral, 151

Butler, Congressman, 71-72

Byrd, Dick, 96, 104

C

Cadillac, 232

Cadman Report, 206

Caldwell, Frank, 78, 155, 165-167, 169-171, 256

_California_, battleship, 152, 182

Camp Perry, 2

Canadian Pratt and Whitney, 253

Carburetors, 42

Carriers (_see_ Aircraft carriers)

Champion, Lt. C. C., 38, 73, 96

Chance Vought Corporation, 17, 43, 47, 153, 170, 182, 185, 187, 190, 193, 196, 205, 230, 241, 265 (_See also_ Vought-Sikorsky; United Aircraft Corporation)

Chatfield, Hugh, 73

Chevrolet, 232, 237, 241, 252

Cheyenne, Wyoming, 168-170

Chicago-San Francisco contract air mail route, 76

Chilton, Roland, 32, 40-41

Chourré, Emile, 117

Christianity, 7, 88, 209-210, 212, 309-310

Churchill, Winston, 171

C.I.O., 273-275

Civil Aeronautics Act, 70, 298, 303-306

Civil Aeronautics Authority, 302

Civil Aeronautics Board, 298-299, 301-305, 307-308

Clerget engine, 17

Clippers, 176-177, 180, 200, 255 (_See also_ Transports)

Coco Solo, 151

Coffin, Howard, 61

Colbert, M., 205

Cole, Francis W., 264

Collective bargaining, 249-250

College Point, Long Island, 173

Collins, Capt. Harry, 218-219, 224

_Colorado_, cruiser, 143

COMAIRONS, 124, 127, 134-135, 138, 140

Combustion, principle of, 3

_Command of the Air_, 10

Competition, 24, 95, 97, 111, 161, 191, 230, 262, 276, 278, 297, 303-305 and foreign markets, 188 international, 205-208, 294 subsidized, 301 in transport planes, 202, 295, 297 unfair, 164-165

Conant, Hersey, 28

Congress, 71-72 appropriation committees of, 302 aviation appropriations from, 20, 53, 55, 95, 216-217, 229, 293-294

Congressional Aviation Policy Board, 289 report of, 294-295

Congressional committees, public hearings before, 271

Congressional investigations, 181-182, 187, 263

Connecticut State War Finance Committee, 246

Consolidated Aircraft, 43, 183, 202 army trainers, 43-46 Catalinas, 195 NY’s, 44, 84, 91

Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, 273

Cook, Capt. Arthur B., 127

Coolidge, Calvin, 8, 61, 69, 79, 94-95

Cowl-flaps, 188

Coyle, Mr., 241

Coyne, Bob, 246

Crane, Henry, 238

Curtice, Harlow, 241, 254

Curtiss, Glenn, 113

Curtiss Airplane and Motor Company, 16, 34-37, 51-52, 73-74, 97, 153 Hawks, 73-74, 99 TS’s, 43 (_See also_ Curtiss-Wright)

Curtiss engines, D-12’s, 35-36, 73, 75 R-1454’s, 35-36, 52, 56, 74

Curtiss-Wright, 153-156, 191, 230 (_See also_ Wright Aeronautical Corporation; Wright Martin)

Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, 172

D

Davis, Art, 141

Davis, Bill, 150

Davison, F. Trubee, 104, 168

Dayton, Ohio, 23, 34 (_See also_ Wright Field)

de Chevalier, Godfrey de Courcelles, 5, 21, 268

Defense Plant Corporation, 253

de Havilland Aircraft Company, Ltd., 171 DH’s, 15, 17, 110

de la Verne Machine Shop, 17

Delco Company, 39

Demobilization, 277

Dennison, Arthur C., 62

Depression, 163, 220

DESRONS (_see_ Destroyer squadrons)

de Steiguer, Adm. Louis R., 121

Destroyer Squadrons (DESRONS), 130, 140

_Detroit_, cruiser, 145-146

Detroit, Michigan, 134

Dexter, Mrs., 229-230

Diamond, Jimmy, 42

Dickinson, Arnold, 173, 175

Diesel engines, 197

Dive bombers, 147, 193 Corsairs as, 258 monoplane, 190, 198 two-seat, 188-190

Dive bombing, 121, 123, 193

Donaldson, John W., 267

Donaldson, Postmaster General, 299-300

Doolittle, Jimmy, 98, 214

Douglas, Don, 47, 97-98, 194, 198, 201-202, 251, 255, 265, 267-268

Douglas, Lt. Robert, 106-107

Douglas transports, DC-3’s, 194, 207 DC-4’s, 194, 256

Douhet, General Jiulio, 10, 206, 212

Douhet doctrine, 206, 293

DuBose, Lieutenant Commander, 62, 68, 71

Duralumin, 78, 155, 165

Durant, William F., 61

Durham, J. A., 307

E

East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 126

East Coast Aircraft War Production Council, 269

East Haddam Fish and Game Club, 198

East Hartford, Connecticut, 192, 234

Eastern Airlines, 298, 301-302

Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 292

Echols, Gen. Oliver P., 286-287

Eclipse Machine Company, 41

Edgar, Graham, 42

Egtvedt, Claire, 48, 76, 134, 185, 200

Engineering, 2, 8 intuitive, 177 and politics, 19

_Engineering Thermodynamics_, 3

Engineers, professional, 3, 177

Engines (_see_ Airplane engines)

England (_see_ Great Britain)

_English Voyages, The_, 288

Ethyl Corporation, 42

Ethylene glycol, 197

Export permits, 189-190

F

Fagan, Tom, 39, 42

Fairchild Aviation Corporation, 273

Farley, James, 181

Farmington, Long Island, 195, 199

Fechet, Jim, 134

Feldstein, M. J., 307

Fighter bombers, 134, 147, 193-194 long-range, 195

Fighter planes, 22, 73, 75-76, 99, 121-124, 127, 134, 140, 147, 191-192, 194, 195 single seat, 199 two-seated, 123, 187-188

Finland, 208

Finletter, Thomas K., 289-290

Finletter Board, 290, 293-294

Finletter Board, report of, 293-294

Fireside chat, on airplane production program, 229,233

Fisher, Paul, 296

Five freedoms, 294

Fleet, Reuben, 43, 195, 202, 250

FLEET AIR (_see_ Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet)

Fletcher, Adm. Frank J., 61

_Flight Manual_, 87, 98

Flying boats, 248-249

Flynn, “Tiny,” 252

Fokker, Anthony, 43, 47, 95

Fokker Universal, 96

Ford, Edsel, 239

Ford, Henry, 96, 256

Ford Motor Company, 232, 239-241, 252

Ford Trimotor, 153, 155, 204

Foreign policy, and aviation, 195, 288

Forrestal, James V., 260-263, 290, 292-293

Foster, Cedric, 242

France, 205-208, 210-212, 218-219 declares war on Germany, 221

Fraser, Peter M., 264

French Purchasing Commission, 218-219, 224-225

Fuel, aviation, 42

Fuel pumps, 42

G

Gamble, Ted, 246

Gates, Artemus L., 277

General Electric Company, 39-40

General Motors, 67, 197, 217, 237, 241

George-Murray Bill, 273

German High Seas Fleet, 4

German Lufthansa, 208

Germany, 196, 204, 208, 210-212, 293 attack on Russia by, 247 invasion of Poland by, 221 war production in, 235

Geuting, Joseph T., Jr., 273, 277

Gibson, Professor, 34

Gilman, “Pop,” 197

Gluhareff, Michael, 179

Gluhareff, Serge, 179

Gnome-Rhone engine, 17, 193

Goering, Hermann, 195, 210

Goldsmith, Mr., 42

Goodyear Rubber, 241

Gordon Wyman, 240

Grand Fleet, British, 4-5, 21, 207, 259, 266

Great Britain, and American aircraft, 222, 224-225 before World War II, 206-208, 211

Great Lakes Naval Training Station, 5-6, 25, 151

Great Seal of the Navy Department, 39

Green, Fitzhugh, 108

Green, Joseph, 189

Grey, C. J., 94, 188

Griffen, “Squash,” 141, 147

Gross, Bob, 194, 201-202, 251

Grumman, Roy, 199

Grumman Wildcats, 193

Guam, 151

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 6

Guggenheim, Harry, 108

Guided missiles, 296-297

Gunnery, 1, 4, 8, 21

H

Hakluyt, Richard, 288

Hall, Charles Ward, 80

Halligan, Capt. John, 127

Halsey, Bill, 127

Hamilton, Thomas, 96, 154-157, 160, 192, 204-207, 209-212, 218

Hamilton, Ohio, 51

Hamilton Aero Manufacturing Company, 154-156, 160, 204

Hamilton Metalplane Company, 154, 204

Hamilton-Standard, 165-166, 168-172, 177, 179, 182, 196, 204, 229, 241

Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 61

Harding, Warren G., 8, 94

Hartford, Connecticut, 51-52, 203, 206, 242

_Hartford Times, The_, 242

Harvard School of Business, 282

Hawaiian cruise, 1928, 122, 125-128

Hawthorne, California, 201

Heacock, Amos E., 303

Helicopters, 184, 241, 248

Herbster, “Spig,” 113

Herron, Sam, 34

Hillman, Sidney, 249-251

Himalayan Hump, air-transport service over, 256, 287, 303

Hirohito, 209

Hispano Suiza engines, 12, 16-17, 30, 43, 50, 53

Hitler, Adolf, 204, 209-212, 221

Hobbs, Leonard S., 42

Hobbs, Luke, 42

Holland, 207

Hoover, Herbert, 69, 104, 246

Hoover, Mrs., 106

Hopkins, Harry, 216

Horner, Jack, 192, 229, 243, 253, 263

Hoyt, Dick, 50

Hoyt, Palmer, 290

Hubbard, Eddie, 76

Huff-Daland training planes, 98

Hughes, Admiral, 64

Hughes, Howard, 249

_Hull_, destroyer, 2

Hunsaker, “Jerry,” 22-23

Hurley, Pat, 168

Hurley, Roy, 42

I

I.A.M.-A.F. of L., 277

Ickes, Harold, 216

Indianapolis, Indiana, 197

Inglewood, California, 201

Inspection, in war production, 258

Institute of Electrical Engineers, 93

International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 294

International free rifle matches, Milan, Italy, 7

_Invisible Encounter, The_, 209

_Iris_, destroyer tender, 219

Isthmian Airways, 204

Italy, 207-208

J

Jacquin, Col. Paul, 219, 224-225

Jap Zeros, 192

Japanese pilots, 192

Jet propulsion, 257

Jeter, Tom, 134

Johnson, Capt. Alfred W., 22, 29

Johnson, Edwin C., 296

Johnson, Louis, 213, 217, 220, 233

Johnson, Phillip G., 76, 182, 185, 201, 230, 251

Johnson Committee, 296-297

Joliet, Illinois, 2, 6

Jones, Ed, 34

Jones, Harold A., 298-299

Jorge Luro y Cia, Argentina, 189

Joyce, Temple, 74

Jugoslavia, 208

K

Kahn, Albert, 222

Kaiser, Henry J., 248-249

Kansas City, Missouri, 253

Kartveli, Mr., 195, 200

Kauffman, Freddie, 89

Kennedy-Purvis, Vice Adm. Sir Charles E., 266-268

Ketcham, “Dixie,” 91

Kettering, “Boss,” 110

Keyes, C. M., 65-66

Keyes, Roy, 36

Keyport, New Jersey, 18, 32

Kimball, Dr., 104

Kindleberger, Dutch, 47, 97, 194, 201-202, 214-215, 251, 254

King, Adm. E. J., 128, 136, 141-142, 181-182, 189

Kinney Manufacturing Company, 18, 33

KLM, 207

Knerr, Hugh, 214

KNILM, 207

Knudsen, Bill, 233, 237-241, 247, 252

Kraeling, Harry, 156, 160, 165

Kraus, Comdr. Sidney M., 17, 50, 54, 66, 72, 75

Krug, Julius, 286

L

Labor, 207

Labor unions, 249-251, 273

Lakehurst Naval Air Station, 56, 82

Lampert, Congressman, 60

Land, Capt. Emory S., 22

Land, Adm. Jerry, 65, 104-105, 294

Lang, Antone, 7

Lang, Frau, 7

_Langley_, carrier, 21, 111-128, 135, 265

Langley, Professor, 74

Lansing, Raymond P., 40-42

Lawrance, Charles Lanier, 17, 36, 39, 50, 286-287

Lawrance engines, 12-13, 17, 30, 38-39, 41

Lawrence, David, 277

Lebensky, Bob, 179

Lee, John G., 198-199, 256, 265, 267, 269

Leighton, Lt. Comdr. B. G., 9, 12-14, 17-20, 22-27, 29-38, 98, 123, 194

Leloir, Guillermo, 190

Lenin, 209

Lewis, Fulton, Jr., 242

_Lexington_, carrier, 21 new, 49, 77, 119, 121, 127-129, 135-136, 143-145, 152

Liberty, 310

Liberty engines, 12, 15, 17-18, 30, 35, 53, 95, 98

Licenses, to build aircraft engines, 231-232, 239

Limitation of Arms Conference, 9, 21, 64, 67

Lindbergh, Charles A., 40, 103-108, 134, 149-150, 176, 178, 256-257 address to Nazis, 210-211 Pacific mission of, 257 quoted, 309

Lindbergh Field, 133

Lobbying, 271

Lockheed, 194, 202

Lockheed fighters, Lightning, 194

Loening, Grover, 66

Loening amphibians, 138

Long Beach, California, 117, 129-130

Long Island City, New York, 17, 47

Los Angeles, 133-134, 153, 201, 265

_Los Angeles_, dirigible, 10, 56, 67

LOT, 208

Lowry, Jimmy, 84-85

Lucke, Charles Edward, 3, 5-6, 8, 92, 142, 158, 256

Luro, Jorge, 189

Lyman, Deac, 270

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 59

McCain, Adm. J. S., 258

McCarthy, Charles J., 77, 185-186, 229

McCarthy, Joseph F., 161, 164, 175, 229, 243

McCone, John A., 290

McCook Field, 23, 33-34, 42

McCracken, Bill, 104

MacIntyre, Marvin, 65, 71

MacMahon, Brian, 285

_Macon_, dirigible, 181

Magnesium, 167

Magnetos, 39-40

Mahan, 149, 287 on sea power, 129-130, 288

Mail planes, 76, 154, 169

Maile, Lt. Frank, 23

Maintenance crews, 132

Manly, Charles M., 74, 93

Manly engine, 74

Marcus, Charles, 40-41

Mare Island Navy Yard, 114, 121, 151

Marines, 67, 121, 257

Marks, Charles, 55

Martin, Glenn L., 47, 79-80, 97, 104, 195, 200, 214-216

Martin Company, 183, 200 Thunderbolt, 195 torpedo bombers, SC’s, 77-79 torpedo bomber scouts, T4M’s, 104-106, 134, 140

Mason, Mr., 241

_Mayflower_, yacht, 78-79

Mayo, William, 96

Mead, George J., 30-32, 37, 42, 55-56, 74, 93, 140, 185, 232-233, 238, 241

Mellon, Andrew, 95

“Memoranda for file,” 39

_Memphis_, cruiser, 103, 106-108

Menasco Company, 154

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 306

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 156, 160

Mines Field, 133

_Mississippi_, battleship, 5-6

Mitchell, Billy, 9-10, 25-27, 46, 56-59, 109, 213, 278-279 court-martial of, 70 and independent air force, 60-69, 291

Mitchell, Hugh B., 284

Mitchell, Gen. J. B., 148

Mitchell, Bill, 285

Mitscher, Pete, 98-99, 115, 146

Mobilization, 216, 235 for drill purposes, 214-215

Moffett, Rear Adm. William Adger, 1, 4-6, 8-11, 17, 19-20, 24-27, 45-46, 52-53, 55-57, 60, 62-68, 70-71, 80-81, 89, 93-95, 98, 101, 104, 109, 111, 119, 123, 128, 137, 142, 149, 151, 181, 278, 291-292

_Mongolia_, liner, 112

Monoplanes, 96, 169-170, 190, 204 metal, 154

Monopoly, 164, 207, 303

Montgomery, Monty, 115

Morale, 259

Morgan, John E. P., 286

Morgenthau, Henry, 218, 223-228, 230

Morrow, Dwight, 61

Morrow Board, 61-71, 95, 186, 188, 276-277, 285

Moulton, Bobby, 115-117

Mullinix, Henry, 38, 48, 96

Murphy, Francis S., 242

Murray, James E., 271, 273-274, 277-278

Murray, Roger F., 302

Mussolini, 209

Mustin, Capt. Henry C., 21, 68

Mustin plan for naval aviation, 68, 71

N

Nash-Kelvinator Company, 232, 241, 252

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 232-233

National Air Races, Los Angeles, 133-134 Philadelphia, 96

National Aircraft War Council, 269

National Association of Manufacturers, 242

“National Aviation Policy,” 294

National City Bank, New York, _Bulletin_, 274-275

National Defense Advisory Committee, 216

National Independent Carriers, 303

National Planning Association, 279, 282

National Rifle Association of America, 7, 24

National rifle matches, 1909, 2

NATS (_see_ Naval Air Transport Service)

Naval Air Stations (_see_ names of stations, as Pensacola)

Naval Air Transport Service (NATS), 255

Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, 23, 80, 124, 200 Aero Engine Laboratory, 38

Naval Operation (OPNAV), 20

Naval War College, Newport, 129

Navy, 19, 76, 202, 290, 292-293, 295 and air-cooled engines, 18, 31 and aircraft industry, 23, 52, 65-68, 172, 243, 260-262, 274-278 feuds in, 63 General Mitchell’s attack on, 58-61 growth of, 142 Hawaiian cruise of, 121-125 leadership in, 131-132 Panama maneuvers of, 135-148 procurement for, 66, 187 proposed reduction of, 25-26 public relations for, 291

Navy, and sea power, 129-130 war schedule of, 241 (_See also_ U.S. Navy Department)

Navy lend-lease, 252

Navy planes, Boeing fighters, 73, 75, 76, 134, 147 Catalinas, 195 Corsairs, 124, 140, 156, 187, 193, 257-258, 265 C-54’s, 256 F-5-L’s, 84 N-9’s, 43-44, 84, 91 P12’s, 134 SBU’s, 187-191 SC’s, 77-79 T4M’s, 104-106, 134, 140 UO’s, 43, 48, 50, 117 (_See also_ Kinds of aircraft, as Bombers)

Nazis, 210-212, 235

NC boats, 22

Nelson, Arvid, 160

Nelson, Donald, 286

Neutrality proclamation, 1939, 221

Neville, Leslie, 270

New Deal, 186

_New Knowledge, The_, 87

New York, New York, 3, 6, 60, 67, 93, 172

New York Central, 282

_New York Times, The_, 149, 270

Niles Tool Company, 51

Nimitz, Chester, 268

Noble, Warren, 33-34

Norden, Raymond A., 306-307

Norfolk Naval Air Station, 119, 121

North American, 194

North American Mustangs, 195

North Island Naval Air Station, 37, 128-129

Northrup, Jack, 169, 191-192, 201-202

Northrup Company, 154

Northrup-Vought fighter plane, 191-193 sold to Japan, 192

Norway, 207

NRA, 273

Nulton, Adm. Louis M., 151-153

Nutt, Arthur, 36, 42

Nye, Gerald P., 181, 187, 263, 271

O

Oberammergau, Passion Play at, 7

O’Connell, Joseph J., Jr., 299, 301-302

_Of Flight and Life_, 309

_Old Ark_ (see _Arkansas_)

_Omaha_, light cruiser, 136, 140, 143, 145

Oman, C. W. C., 250

OPNAV (_see_ Naval Operation)

_Oregon_, 112

P

Pacific air bases, 182

Pacific Northwest-Alaska carrier service, nonscheduled, 304

Pacific Overseas Airlines, 303-304

Pacific Torpedo Flotilla, 2, 112

Packard engines, 75, 78-79

Packard Motor Company, 16, 34-35

Palm Beach, Florida, 6

Palm Springs, California, 265, 267

Pan American Airways, 149, 174, 208, 294, 305-307 (_See also_ Clippers)

Panama Canal, 1929 maneuvers at, 135-150

Parker, James S., 61

Parkes, John, 171

Parsons, Lt. Ralph M., 23, 38

Passion Play, Oberammergau, 7

Patents, 41-42

Paterson, New Jersey, 29

Patrick, Maj. Gen. Mason M., 168

Patterson, Bill, 255

Patterson, Robert P., 277

Pearl Harbor, 29, 120-121, 125-127, 191, 219, 252, 267-268

Pensacola Naval Air Station, 38, 45, 81-96, 98, 112, 119, 130

Plant depreciation, 225, 227-228

Plevin, M. René, 222, 224

Ploesti oil fields, bombing of, 293

Poland, 208 invasion of, 221

Polish Airlines (LOT), 208

Pownall, “Baldy,” 89

Pratt, Admiral, 138-139, 148, 151-152

Pratt and Whitney engines, 216 1830’s, 193, 222, 241, 255 Hornet, 78, 80, 96, 104, 140, 187, 204, 208 2800’s, 194 two-row radial (R-1535), 188, 192 standardization of, 254-255 Wasp, 72-78, 98, 140, 154, 169, 187, 193, 196, 285 Wasp, Jr., 241 Wasp Major, 285

Pratt and Whitney Tool Company, 51, 66, 72-75, 154, 170, 177, 182, 196-198, 200, 202-203, 216-217, 219, 229, 251, 258, 263, 285 American addition for, 234, 238 British plant of, 224-228 as charge of Navy, 243 French plant of, 222, 226 War Plans Division, 218, 222, 226, 234

Press, the, 59-60, 67, 270, 274, 276, 290

Prestone, 197

Price Adjustment Act, 246, 274

Price Adjustment Board, 254

Profit control, 221, 246

Profiteering, 163, 210, 228, 245, 249, 265, 273, 275

Profits, 161-162, 274-277, 303

Propellers, 77-78, 154-157, 160, 204, 208, 241 controllable-pitch, 166-171, 174, 179 metal, 78, 164-165, 186

Public speakers, 283

Pursuit planes, 217-218

Putnam, Carleton, 297, 300

Putnam, George Palmer, 104

Q

_Queen Elizabeth_, flagship, 4, 259

Quisenberry, Alma, 23

R

Radford, Vice Adm. Arthur, 63, 292

Radio commentators, 242

Railroads, early expansion of, 280 government subsidizing of, 280-281

Ramsey, Vice Adm. de Witt C. (“Duke”), 63, 291

Ramspeck, Bob, 294

Rantoul, Illinois, 25

Rayburn, Sam, 271, 284, 302

Ream Field, 117

Reconversion, 256, 260-262, 272, 275-276

Reconversion Act, Section 102, 286

Reed, Sylvanus, 155-156

Reed Propeller Company, 155

Reeves, Rear Adm. Joseph M. (Bull), 111-112, 114-129, 131-133, 135-143, 145-146, 148, 151-152, 182-183, 193, 252

Reeves, Mrs., 118

Renegotiation, 246

Rentschler, Frederick B., 29-32, 36, 50-55, 66-67, 75, 77, 109-112, 153-157, 164, 167, 172-174, 182, 185, 205, 219, 229, 237-239, 247, 260-264, 278

Republic Aviation, 199

Rescue craft, 22

Reuther, Walter, 247-248

Richardson, “Captain Dick,” 174, 177

Richardson, Capt. H. C., 22

Richardson, Comdr. L. B., 243

Richthofen, Baron von, 58

Rickenbacker, Capt. Eddie, 191, 297-298, 301, 306

Ripley, Joseph P., 264

Roberts Board, 252

Rolls Royce engines, Merlin, 194 racing-plane, 196

Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, 211-212

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 181-182, 186, 221, 229, 246, 249, 256 airplane program of, 229, 233, 237, 251

Roosevelt, Theodore, quoted, 1

’Round the world flight, first, 98

Rowe, Gordon, 118, 122

Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 94, 208

Russell, Frank, 80, 269

Russia, 211-212, 289 attacked by Germany, 247 blockade of Berlin by, 307 (_See also_ Soviet)

Ryan, Claude, 105

S

Sabena, 207

San Diego, California, 2, 112-113, 117-119, 128, 130, 133-134, 152, 156, 193, 202

_San Diego Union_, 113

San Francisco, 265

San Francisco Advertising Club, 299

San Pedro, California, 117-118, 126, 138, 153

Santa Monica, California, 198, 201, 268

_Saratoga_, carrier, 21

_Saratoga_, carrier, new, 49, 77, 119, 127, 129, 135-141, 145-149, 152

Savoia Marchettis, 207

Schneider Trophy race, 98

Schwoble, Jake, 199

Scouts, long-range, 22

_Sea Cow_, SC-6, 77-79

Sea power, 4-5, 129-130, 288

Seaboard and Western Airlines, Inc., 303, 306-307

Seaplanes, 21, 43-44, 77-79, 84, 91

Seattle, Washington, 48

Secretary of the Navy, 40, 59

Selection Board, 9

Selective Service, 251

Self, Sir Henry, 222, 224, 226

Seligman, Mort, 134

Senn, Adm. Thomas J., 122, 136, 140

Service rivalry (_see_ Army-Navy rivalry)

_Seven Roman Statesmen, The_, 250

Seversky, Alex P. de, 191, 199-200

_Shenandoah_, dirigible, 56-58

Sheppard, Edgar W., 56-57

Sherman, Vice Adm. Forrest, 63, 268, 292

Shipbuilders, 248

Sidney, New York, 40

Sikorsky, Igor, 47, 96, 173-174, 177-180, 183-184, 200, 208, 248 quoted, 309

Sikorsky Aviation Company, 164, 170, 172-175, 182-183, 196, 200, 204-205 reorganization of, 176-179 (_See also_ Vought-Sikorsky)

Sikorsky planes, amphibians, S-39’s, 167, 173 clippers, S-40’s, 176-177 S-42’s, 180, 208

Sims, Admiral, 115

Sixth Battle Squadron, British Royal Fleet, 4

Slater, John, 183

Smith, C. R., 304

Smith, Karl, 112

Snyder, John W., 278, 286

Social security, 166 corporate, 273

Society of Civil Engineers, 93

Soleure, Switzerland, 39

Sorenson, Charles, 239-240

Soviet, 296 (_See also_ Russia)

_Southampton_, light cruiser, 266

Southern California, wartime migration to, 272

Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 214, 292

Spark plugs, 42

Speer, Albert, 235

Speer, Genevieve, 2 (_See also_ Mrs. Wilson)

Sperry Gyro Compass School, 74

_Spirit of St. Louis_, 103-106

Squadron commanders, selection of, 131-132

Stalin, 295

Standard Steel Propeller Company, 155-156, 160

Standley, Adm. William H., 189

Stark, Capt. Harold R., 136, 140

Starters, 33, 40-42

Stearman, Mr., 96, 172

Stewart, Sidney, 229

Stinson, Mr., 96

Stock-market crash, 1929, 158, 160, 172-173, 186

Stock-market speculation, 97-98, 154

Stoddard, Harry G., 264

Storrs, Put, 150

Strategic Bombing Surveys, 287

Stratford, Connecticut, 170, 173, 175

Strohm, “Matchew,” 142

Stromberg, 42

Studebaker, 232

Studley, Lt. Barrett, 87, 90

Stunt flying, 103

Submarine divisions (SUBDIVS), 130

Submarines, 292 German, 248, 287

Subsidies, 187, 280-281, 298-301, 306

Sullivan, Tiny, 117

Sulzberger, Arthur, 270

“Survival in the Air Age,” 290, 294

Sweden, 207

_Sylph_, yacht, 104, 106

Symington, Stuart, 292-293

T

Taxes, 95 excess profits, 245, 274 income, 160, 221, 227-228

_Teal_, sweeper, 122

Thomas, “Woody,” 89

Three Musketeers, 134, 150

Three Sea Hawks, 134, 141, 150

Tillinghast, “Tilly,” 214

_Time_ magazine, 265

Tomlinson, Tommy (“Injun Joe”), 126, 133-134, 150

Torpedo bombers, 22, 77-79, 97-98, 104-106, 140

Torpedoplanes, 104-106

Towers, Rear Adm. John H., 113-115, 119, 121, 124, 127, 267

Trade associations, 271, 273

Training planes, 98-99, 241

Trans-Canada Airlines, 182, 201

Transocean Airlines, 303

Transport planes, 95-96, 202 four-engined, 194, 255-256 (_See also_ Air transport; Clippers)

Trippe, Juan, 174, 294, 305

Truman, Harry S., 258, 278, 282, 286

_Truxtun_, four-piper, 219

Turbines, 4

Turner, Comdr. Richmond Kelly (“Spuds”), 168, 171

TWA, 306-307

U

Unemployment, postwar, 272, 274

Unemployment compensation, 272

Union League Club, Chicago, 254

_Unions_ (_see_ Labor unions)

United Aircraft Corporation, 182, 192, 204, 216, 229, 251-253, 256-257, 259, 260-264, 275, 285 board of directors of, 264 Kansas City plant of, 253 licencees of, 252-253

United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, 77, 153-154, 156, 161, 169-170, 172-175, 177-178, 180, 185-186

United Airlines Transport Corporation, 182, 255

U.A.W. of C.I.O., 277

U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 279

U.S. Department of Commerce, 69, 176, 180

U.S. Department of Defense, 290

U.S. House of Representatives, Naval Affairs Committee, 71 Report on War Department Appropriation Bill, 299

U.S. Naval Academy, 2, 112 (_See also_ Annapolis)

U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAERO), 1, 19-24, 29, 32, 38, 45, 47, 57, 59-60, 62, 70, 72, 94-95, 109, 122-123, 137, 139-140, 149, 157, 168, 181, 183, 187, 189-190, 194, 196, 216, 243-244, 253 Design Section, 22-23, 48, 180 Engine Section, 9, 12, 16-18, 22-23, 27, 32, 38, 44-45, 47-56, 77-78, 96, 186, 200 Matériel Division, 22, 65 need for, 6, 10 Plans Division, 123, 168 Stress Analysis Department, 185

U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Engineering, 4 Bureau of Navigation (BUNAV), 19-20, 80-81, 131 (_See also_ Navy)

U.S. Post Office Department, and air mail, 281, 299-301 deficits in, 300

U.S. Senate, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 296 Military Affairs Committee, 284 War Contracts Subcommittee, 270, 272

U.S. State Department, 189, 294

U.S. Treasury, 218, 225-228 Internal Revenue Bureau, 221, 227

U.S. War Department, 61 (_See also_ Army)

Upham, Rear Adm. F. Brooks, 81-84, 86-89

Upham, Madame, 86-89

V

Vanadium, 165

Vandenburgh, Clyde, 269

Vaughan, Guy, 37, 39, 50, 103-105, 112, 230-231, 239

Vaughan, Helen (Mrs. Guy), 104

V.D.M. propeller, 208

Veterans, and air-carrier service, 303-304

Vincent, Col. Jesse G., 35

Vinson, Carl, 61, 64, 295

Vinson-Trammel Act, 1934, amendment to, 245

_Virginia Law Review_, 307

Vought, Chance Milton, 47-48, 54, 66, 72-73, 109-112, 124-125, 140, 164, 185-186

Vought, Russell R., 265, 267

Vought airplanes, Corsairs, 124, 140, 156, 187, 193, 257-258, 265 dive bomber, SBU, 187-191 UO, 43, 48, 50, 117

Vought-Sikorsky Division, United Aircraft, 229 (_See also_ Chance Vought Corporation)

W

Wagner, Frank D. (Honus), 118, 123-124, 131-133, 137-138, 141, 144, 150-152, 182

Walsh, Raycroft, 168, 170-171, 205, 214, 229, 263-264

War contracts, 273-274 canceling of, 15-16, 237, 275, 286 escalator clause in, 250

War debt, 95

War Investigating Committee, 258

War production, 237, 247 and private industry, 235-236

War Production Board, 249, 277, 286

Ward, J. C., 273, 277

Warner, Ed, 104

Warner, Seth, 118

_We_, 104-108

Webb, Lt. L. D., 78

West Coast Aircraft War Production Council, 265, 269

Westover, General, 213, 216

Wheat, George S., 52, 67, 168, 185

White, Capt. R. Drace, 8, 145-147

Whiteside, Arthur D., 290

Whiting, Kenneth, 21, 145-146, 151

Wick, Skinny, 140, 147

Wilbur, Curtis D., 64, 103-104

Wiley, Admiral, 150

Willgoos, Andy, 30, 55

Williamson, Fred, 282

Willis, Charles F., Jr., 307-308

Willis Air Service, Inc., 307

Wilner, Mort, 286

Wilson, Charles E., 277, 286

Wilson, Eugene E., address before Union League Club, Chicago, 254 on Admiral Nulton’s staff, 151-159 airplane crack-up of, 100-101, 186 assigned to _Langley_, 111 as author, 93, 287-289 automobile accident to, 198 education of, 2-4 elected president of United Aircraft Corporation, 229 at Great Lakes, 5-6 on Hawaiian cruise, 122-128 joins Pratt and Whitney, 198 joins United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, 160 made president, 178 made senior vice-president, 182 as Lindbergh’s technical adviser, 104-108 made chief, Airplane Design Section, 93 made chief, Engine Section, 9 made president, Chance Vought Corporation, 164 made president, Sikorsky, 164 marriage of, 2 before Murray Committee, 274 on Panama maneuvers, 135-148 at Pensacola, 82-92 poem by, 83 private office of, 226-227 resignation from business, 289 resignation from Navy, 158

Wilson, Mrs., 2, 7, 27, 81, 92, 101, 109, 125, 158-159, 266

Wilson, Woodrow, 247

Wind tunnels, 188

Wing flaps, 174

Wing loading, 180

Woodhead, Harry, 273, 277

Woodring, Harry, 233

Woolson, Capt. Lionel, 35, 42, 78

World War I, 4, 14-16, 58, 95, 101, 115, 123, 208, 210, 213, 222, 246-247, 259, 266

World War II, 168, 171, 178, 191-192, 194, 195, 209, 222, 246, 288, 295

_Wright_, seaplane tender, 6, 22, 82, 84, 135

Wright Aeronautical Corporation, 16-17, 29-32, 43, 50-52, 54-55, 73, 106, 153, 197-198, 238-239, 285 fraud accusation against, 258 wartime plant of, 252 (_See also_ Curtiss-Wright; Wright Martin)

Wright Apache, 73

Wright brothers, 13-14, 113, 184, 308

Wright engines, 77 Cyclone, 49, 80, 193 1510 two-row, 191 Hispano E-4’s, 17, 30, 33, 43 radial, 196 P-1’s, 30 P-2’s, 35, 49, 54 (_See also_ Wright Cyclone) R-1200’s, 50, 54 (_See also_ Wright Simoon) Simoon, 50, 54, 73 T-3’s, 77 Whirlwind, 49, 54, 78, 96, 99, 103, 107, 200, 286-287

Wright Field, 191-192, 197-198, 217

Wright Martin Aircraft Corporation, 16

Y

Yarnell, Capt. Harry E., 136

Young, James, 253

Z

Zar, Capt. Marco, 190

Zeppelins, 10

Zeros, 192

Transcriber’s Notes

pg 5 Changed: some thought, had helped pursuade to: some thought, had helped persuade

pg 5 Changed: one of the few battleships with an airpline to: one of the few battleships with an airplane

pg 58 Changed: wiley as the famous German Baron von Richtofen to: wiley as the famous German Baron von Richthofen

pg 82 Changed: while the old seaplane tender and kite-ballon to: while the old seaplane tender and kite-balloon

pg 82 Changed: this fault immediately they would loose to: this fault immediately they would lose

pg 98 Changed: But aften Don had produced a masterpiece to: But after Don had produced a masterpiece

pg 103 Changed: make capital of it by pursuading to: make capital of it by persuading

pg 123 Changed: during tactical exercises, using Voughts to stimulate to: during tactical exercises, using Voughts to simulate

pg 155 Changed: To match Tom Hamilton’s propellor-design to: To match Tom Hamilton’s propeller-design

pg 159 Changed: professional slaves to every officier to: professional slaves to every officer

pg 184 Changed: When the final account is cast up, Igor Ivanovitch to: When the final account is cast up, Igor Ivanovich

pg 237 Changed: It would take some doing to pursuade to: It would take some doing to persuade