CHAPTER VII

PENDLETON’S UNRELIABLE MEMORY

All the battle worthy the name for the Southern cause at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d was made by Longstreet. The whole superstructure of the contentions against his honor as a soldier is based solely on the statements since the war, and since Lee’s death, of two or three obscure individuals. They are easily exploded by the records of the battles; they are corroborated by none.

When the Rev. Dr. Pendleton told that dramatic story to his breathless hearers at Lexington in 1873, under “pressure of imperative duty,” had he forgotten the tenor of his official report, made in 1863? The story as modified by the prior report forms the greatest anticlimax in all history. Several decisive facts are disclosed by this unbiassed report.

1. Instead of being dilatory and obstructive, Pendleton himself establishes that Longstreet was personally exerting himself to “hasten forward” the very artillery of which he, Pendleton, was the chief.

2. As late certainly as eleven o’clock, if not noon, General Lee and his staff-officers were still rambling all over a front six miles long, yet undetermined either as to the point or proper route of attack. According to both Pendleton and Venable, they did not _begin_ this necessary preliminary survey until “about sunrise,” the specific hour at which General Lee on the night previous had already ordered Longstreet to begin his attack, as asserted by Pendleton at Lexington.

3. Not until Lee and Pendleton had devoted the entire forenoon to the examination of the ground, did Pendleton go to conduct Longstreet to the point of attack thereupon decided upon. Evidently Longstreet was not delaying action; he was awaiting their motions.

The following general conclusions upon the state of facts disclosed by Pendleton’s remarkable report are therefore inevitable and unavoidable.

1. At sunrise of the 2d, General Lee himself did not know where to attack. He did not know as late as ten or eleven o’clock. His mind was not fully made up until after he came back from Ewell’s front (about nine o’clock, according to all authorities), and had made the final examination on the right. General Longstreet says he received his orders to move about eleven o’clock, and this corresponds with Pendleton’s report. But if anything, it was later, rather than earlier.

2. These painstaking, time-consuming reconnoissances of the commanding general and his staff-officers, the journey of Colonel Venable to Ewell, three miles to the left, and Lee’s later visit to Ewell, together with the unavoidable absence of General Longstreet’s troops until late in the morning, prove absolutely that Lee issued no order for Longstreet to attack at any specific hour on July 2.

3. Longstreet’s preliminary movements from start to finish were under the personal supervision of Lee’s confidential staff-officer, Pendleton, and the subordinate staff-officers. So Longstreet has positively stated, so has General McLaws, and both are confirmed by Pendleton’s report. The staff guide caused a loss of three hours by putting the head of McLaws’s column upon a wrong road. This compelled Longstreet to “hasten matters” by assuming personal direction of the movement, and pushing Hood’s division rapidly to the front past McLaws.

4. Pendleton’s official utterances make it an “established fact” that General Longstreet made his tremendous and successful attack on July 2 at the earliest moment possible after receiving Lee’s orders to advance, under the conditions imposed by Lee,--viz., to be conducted to the point of attack by Pendleton himself and the other staff-officers.

Thus the misapprehensions respecting Longstreet’s great part at Gettysburg were cleared away, and a better general understanding of what actually occurred was obtained from the Rev. Mr. Pendleton’s report of September 12, 1863. Few military students now hold that Longstreet was in the remotest degree culpable for Lee’s defeat. On the contrary, most of them severely criticise Lee’s operations from start to finish, particularly the hopeless assaults he persisted in making, and for the lack of concert. It is held generally now that the dreadful result fully justified Longstreet’s protests against attacking the Federals in that position, and that his suggestion of a turning movement was far more promising of success.

In all the circumstances it is not only entirely improbable, but the developed facts of the battle make it impossible that “General Lee died believing that he lost Gettysburg at last by Longstreet’s disobedience of orders.” Longstreet disobeyed no orders at Gettysburg, and Lee was well aware of the fact. General Gordon has simply reiterated the claque set up after Lee’s death by his fond admirers to shift the responsibility of defeat from his shoulders upon Longstreet. It was necessary to the success of that folly to make the world believe Lee always quietly held that view, and only imparted it in the strictest confidence to close friends like the ex-army chaplain, Rev. J. William Jones, and the Rev. William N. Pendleton.

The evidence is totally insufficient. Its gauzy character is fully exposed by the Pendleton report. But apocryphal after-war evidence of this kind was the only reliance of the conspirators. It is absolutely certain that there is no evidence of any such belief in any of Lee’s official utterances during the progress of the war, nor a hint of it in his private correspondence then or afterwards, so far as has been produced. The whole superstructure of the contention is based solely on the statements since the war, and since Lee’s death, of two or three obscure individuals. Pendleton’s Lexington yarn is an example. They are easily exploded by the records of the battle; they are corroborated by none. All the battle worthy the name for the Southern cause at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d was made by Longstreet.

Another evidence of the falsehoods concerning Longstreet’s disobedience and Lee’s alleged belief is found in the relations of the two men. Their personal friendship continued after Gettysburg as it was before. It was of the closest and most cordial description. General Lee always manifested the highest regard for General Longstreet, and continued to manifest undiminished confidence in his military capacity, fighting qualities, and subordination. There is no manifestation of a withdrawal of that confidence after Gettysburg. I here cite a few illustrations of their relations after Gettysburg. Just after his corps was ordered to reinforce Bragg before Chattanooga, Longstreet wrote Lee from Richmond, where he had temporarily stopped on his journey to the new field:

“If I did not think our move a necessary one, my regrets at leaving you would be distressing to me.... Our affections for you are stronger, if it is possible for them to be stronger, than our admiration for you.”

[Illustration: RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG. ACCIDENT DURING THE NIGHT-CROSSING OF THE POTOMAC ON A PONTOON BRIDGE]

After the battle of Chickamauga Lee wrote to Longstreet:

“... My whole heart and soul have been with you and your brave corps in your late battle.... Finish the work before you, my dear General, _and return to me. I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon._”

These letters, printed in the official records, were written less than ninety days after the battle of Gettysburg.

“I want you badly” does not indicate that Longstreet had ever failed General Lee. They are significant words, so soon after the event wherein Longstreet, by mere obstinacy and obduracy, had defeated his chief’s plans, if we may believe Gordon, Pendleton, and Jones. After the forlorn campaign in East Tennessee against overwhelming numbers, when General Longstreet was on his way back to the Army of Northern Virginia with his troops to aid in repelling Grant, Lee’s adjutant-general wrote him as follows at Gordonsville or Orange Court-House:

“HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, “April 26, 1864.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,--I have received your note of yesterday and have consulted the General about reviewing your command. He directs me to say that he has written to the President to know if he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received, the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.

“Truly and respectfully yours, “W. H. TAYLOR, A.A.G.

“To GENERAL LONGSTREET.”

After the war was over and the Southern cause lost, there are warm letters from General Lee, written before Longstreet had accepted appointment at the hands of a Republican President. A few months after the surrender General Lee wrote:

[Illustration: Fac-simile of General Lee’s Letter to General Longstreet]

Lexington Va: 19 Jan ’66

My dear Genl

Upon my return from Richmond, where I have been for a week, on business connected with Washington College, I found your letter of the 26th ulto. I regret very much that you never recd my first letter, as you might then perhaps have given me the information I desired, with more ease to yourself, & with more expedition than now. I did not know how to address it, but sent it to a friend in Richmond, who gave it to one of our officers going south, who transferred it to another etc., & after travelling many weary miles, has been recently returned to me. I start it again in pursuit of you, though you did not tell me how to address you. I have almost forgotten what it contained, but I hope it will inform you of my purpose in writing a history of the campaigns in Viga, & of the object that I have in view so that you may give me all the information in your power. I shall be in no hurry in publishing, & will not do so, until I feel satisfied that I have got the true story, as my only object is to disseminate the truth. I am very sorry to hear that your records were destroyed too, but I hope Sorrel & Latrobe will be able to supply you with all you require. I wish to relate the acts of all the corps of the Army of N. Va. wherever they did duty, & do not wish to omit so important a one as yours. I will therefore wait as long as I can.

I shall be very glad to receive anything you may give to Mr. Washington McLean, as I know you recommend no one but those who deserve your good opinion.

I am delighted to hear that your arm is still improving & hope it will soon be restored. You are however becoming so accomplished with your left hand, as not to need it. You must remember me very kindly to Mrs. Longstreet & all your children. I have not had an opportunity yet to return the compliment she paid me. I had while in Richmond a great many inquiries after you, & learned that you intended commencing business in New Orleans. If you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier I shall be content. No one will then excel you, & no one can wish you more success & more happiness than I. My interest & affection for you will never cease, & my prayers are always offered for your prosperity--

I am most truly yours R E Lee

“If you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier I shall be content. No one will then excel you, and no one can wish you more success and more happiness than I. My interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are always offered for your prosperity.” Strange words from the commander to the subordinate whose disobedience at Gettysburg, according to Rev. Dr. Pendleton and others, led the way to Appomattox.

While General Longstreet held General Lee to be a great strategist, he thought him to be less able as an offensive battle tactician. Those views are shared by many other military officers, who have of late given free expression to them. The Gettysburg controversies, followed by such criticisms, led to the belief that Longstreet was the open enemy of Lee’s fame, and lost no opportunity to maliciously decry his military ability. But this is a mistake. General Longstreet’s intimate friends know that he has always born for General Lee the most profound love and respect, both as a man and as a commander. His views of Lee’s military capacity are discriminating and just, and they are probably correct. Longstreet saw things military with a practical eye. A fine professional soldier himself, who had taken hard knocks on many great fields, he clearly discerned General Lee’s incomparable attributes as a commander, and was never loath to praise them. He also knew Lee’s weaknesses, and has sometimes spoken of them, but never in malice or contemptuously. Those who read his utterances in that sense are very narrow indeed. He has never, like the mass of Southerners, looked upon Lee as infallible, yet in one particular Longstreet has held him to be one of the very greatest of commanders.

As an example of General Longstreet’s estimate of Lee’s professional place in history, one of his interviews when on a visit to the Antietam battle-field, published a few years ago, is quoted: “General Lee, as a rule, did not underestimate his opponents or the fighting qualities of the Federal troops. But after Chancellorsville he came to have unlimited confidence in his own army, and undoubtedly exaggerated its capacity to overcome obstacles, to march, to fight, to bear up under deprivations and exhaustion. It was a dangerous confidence. I think every officer who served under him will unhesitatingly agree with me on this point.”

In answer to a question as to which he regarded as Lee’s best battle: “Well, perhaps the second battle of Manassas was, all things considered, the best tactical battle General Lee ever fought. The grand strategy of the campaign was also fine, and seems to have completely deceived General Pope. Indeed, Pope failed to comprehend Lee’s purpose from start to finish. Pope was outgeneralled and outclassed by Lee, and through improper dispositions his fine army was out-fought. Still, it will not do to underrate Pope; he was an enterprising soldier and a fighter.”

General Longstreet, in the interview at Antietam, summed up Lee’s characteristics as a commander in the following succinct manner: “General Lee was a large-minded man, of great and profound learning in the science of war. In all strategical movements he handled a great army with comprehensive ability and signal success. His campaigns against McClellan and Pope fully illustrate his capacity. On the defensive General Lee was absolutely perfect. Reconciled to the single purpose of defence, he was invincible. But of the art of war, more

## particularly that of giving offensive battle, I do not think General

Lee was a master. In science and military learning he was greatly the superior of General Grant, or any other commander on either side. But in the art of war I have no doubt that Grant and several other officers were his equals. In the field his characteristic fault was headlong combativeness. His impatience to strike, once in the presence of the enemy, whatever the disparity of forces or relative conditions, I consider the one weakness of General Lee’s military character. This trait of aggressiveness led him to take too many chances--into dangerous situations. At Gettysburg, all the vast interests at stake and the improbability of success would not deter him. In the immediate presence of the enemy General Lee’s mind, at all other times calm and clear, became excited. The same may be said of most other highly educated, theoretical soldiers. General Lee had the absolute confidence of his own troops, and the most unquestioning support of his subordinates. He was wholesomely feared by the Federal rank and file, who undoubtedly considered him the easy superior of their own generals. These were tremendous advantages.”

It is very difficult to detect malice or hatred in these calm and dispassionate conclusions.

It is most probable that General Longstreet would have never written or uttered one word concerning Gettysburg had it not been for the attempt of wordy soldiers to specifically fix upon him the whole burden of that battle, their rashness carrying them so far as to lead them to put false orders in the mouth of the great captain, and charge Longstreet with having broken them. To disprove these untrue assertions, and to give the world the truth concerning the battle, then became what General Longstreet considered an imperative duty. He has always regretted deeply that this discussion was not opened before the death of General Lee. If the charges so vehemently urged had been preferred or even suggested in Lee’s lifetime, Longstreet does not believe they would have needed any reply from him. General Lee would have answered them himself and set history right.

But after all, Longstreet does not fear the verdict of history on Gettysburg. He holds that time sets all things right. Error lives but a day--truth is eternal.

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