chapter xxi
., p. 488. Our envoy, Spencer Smith, at Stuttgart, was also taken in by a French spy, Captain Rosey, whose
## actions were directed by Napoleon. See his letter (No. 7669).]
[Footnote 291: "F.O.," Austria, No. 68 (October 31st, 1803).]
[Footnote 292: Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxiii.; "Georges Cadoudal," by Georges de Cadoudal (Paris, 1887).]
[Footnote 293: See his letter of January 24th, 1804, to Réal, instructing him to tell Méhée what falsehoods are to find a place in Méhée's next bulletin to Drake! "Keep on continually with the affair of my portfolio."]
[Footnote 294: Miot de Melito, vol. i., ch. xvi.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. vii. See also Desmarest, "Quinze ans de la haute police": his claim that the police previously knew nothing of the plot is refuted by Napoleon's letters (e.g., that of November 1st, 1803); as also by Guilhermy, "Papiers d'un Emigré," p. 122.]
[Footnote 295: Ségur, "Mems.," ch. x. Bonaparte to Murat and Harel, March 20th.]
[Footnote 296: Letter to Réal, "Corresp.," No. 7639.]
[Footnote 297: The original is in "F.O." (Austria, No. 68).]
[Footnote 298: Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 187.]
[Footnote 299: The Comte de Mosbourg's notes in Count Murat's "Murat" (Paris, 1897), pp. 437-445, prove that Savary did not draw his instructions for the execution of the duke merely from Murat, but from Bonaparte himself, who must therefore be held solely responsible for the composition and conduct of that court. Masson's attempt ("Nap. et sa Famille," ch. xiv.) to inculpate Murat is very weak.]
[Footnote 300: Hulin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," p. 118.]
[Footnote 301: Dupin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," pp. 101, 123.]
[Footnote 302: The only excuse which calls for notice here is that Napoleon at the last moment, when urged by Joseph to be merciful, gave way, and despatched orders late at night to Réal to repair to Vincennes. Réal received some order, the exact purport of which is unknown: it was late at night and he postponed going till the morrow. On his way he met Savary, who came towards Paris bringing the news of the duke's execution. Réal's first words, on hearing this unexpected news, were: "How is that possible? I had so many questions to put to the duke: his examination might disclose so much. Another thing gone wrong; the First Consul will be furious." These words were afterwards repeated to Pasquier both by Savary and by Real: and, unless Pasquier lied, the belated order sent to Réal was not a pardon (and Napoleon on his last voyage said to Cockburn it was not), but merely an order to extract such information from the duke as would compromise other Frenchmen. Besides, if Napoleon had despatched an order for the duke's _pardon_, why was not that order produced as a sign of his innocence and Réal's blundering? Why did he shut himself up in his private room on March 20th, so that even Josephine had difficulty in gaining entrance? And if he really desired to pardon the duke, how came it that when, at noon of March 21st, Réal explained that he arrived at Vincennes too late, the only words that escaped Napoleon's lips were "C'est bien"? (See Méneval, vol. i, p. 296.) Why also was his countenance the only one that afterwards showed no remorse or grief? Caulaincourt, when he heard the results of his raid into Baden, fainted with horror, and when brought to by Bonaparte, overwhelmed him with reproaches. Why also had the grave been dug beforehand? Why, finally, were Savary and Réal not disgraced? No satisfactory answer to these questions has ever been given. The "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien" and Count Boulay de la Meurthe's "Les dernières Années du duc d'Enghien" and Napoleon's "Correspondance" give all the documents needed for forming a judgment on this case. The evidence is examined by Mr. Fay in "The American Hist. Rev.," July and Oct., 1898. For the rewards to the murderers see Masson, "Nap. et sa Famille," chap. xiii.]
[Footnote 303: Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Nap.," p. 9.]
[Footnote 304: Miot de Melito; vol. ii., ch. i.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. ix.]
[Footnote 305: I cannot agree with M. Lanfrey, vol. ii., ch. xi., that the Empire was not desired by the nation. It seems to me that this writer here attributes to the apathetic masses his own unrivalled acuteness of vision and enthusiasm for democracy. Lafayette well sums up the situation in the remark that he was more shocked at the submission of all than at the usurpation of one man ("Mems.," vol. v., p. 239).]
[Footnote 306: See Aulard, "Rév. Française," p. 772, for the opposition.]
[Footnote 307: Roederer, "uvres," vol. iii., p. 513.]
[Footnote 308: Macdonald, "Souvenirs," ch. xii.; Ségur, "Mems.," ch. vii. When Thiébault congratulated Masséna on his new title, the veteran scoffingly replied: "Oh, there are fourteen of us." (Thiébault, "Mems.," ch. vii., Eng. edit.) See too Marmont ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 227) on his own exclusion and the inclusion of Bessières.]
[Footnote 309: Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 262. For Moreau's popularity see Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 422.]
[Footnote 310: At the next public audience Napoleon upbraided one of the judges, Lecourbe, who had maintained that Moreau was innocent, and thereafter deprived him of his judgeship. He also disgraced his brother, General Lecourbe, and forbade his coming within forty leagues of Paris. ("Lettres inédites de Napoléon," August 22nd and 29th, 1805.)]
[Footnote 311: Miot de Melito, vol ii., ch. i.]
[Footnote 312: Napoleon to Roederer, "uvres," vol. iii., p. 514.]
[Footnote 313: Lafayette, "Mems.," vol. v., p. 182.]
[Footnote 314: "Mémoires de Savary, Duc de Rovigo." So Bourrienne, who was informed by Rapp, who was present (vol. ii., ch. xxxiii.). The "Moniteur" (4th Frimaire, Year XIII.) asserted that the Pope took the right-hand seat; but I distrust its version.]
[Footnote 315: Mme. de Rémusat, vol. i., ch. x. As the _curé_ of the parish was not present, even as witness, this new contract was held by the Bonapartes to lack full validity. It is certain, however, that Fesch always maintained that the marriage could only be annulled by an act of arbitrary authority. For Napoleon's refusal to receive the communion on the morning of the coronation, lest he, being what he was, should be guilty of sacrilege and hypocrisy, see Ségur.]
[Footnote 316: Ségur, ch. xi.]
[Footnote 317: F. Masson's "Joséphine, Impératrice et Reine," p. 229. For the Pitt diamond, see Yule's pamphlet and Sir M. Grant Duff's "Diary," June 30, 1888.]
[Footnote 318: De Bausset, "Court de Napoléon," ch. ii.]
[Footnote 319: "Foreign Office Records," Intelligences, No. 426.]
[Footnote 320: "Life of Fulton," by Colden(1817); also one by Reigart (1856).]
[Footnote 321: Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii., p. 75; Chevalier, "Hist. de la Marine Française," p. 105; Capt. Desbrière's "Projets de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques," vol. i. The accompanying engraving shows how fantastic were some of the earlier French schemes of invasion.]
[Footnote 322: "Mémoires du Maréchal Ney," bk. vii., ch. i.; so too Marmont, vol. ii., p. 213; Mahan, "Sea Power," ch. xv.]
[Footnote 323: Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 494.]
[Footnote 324: Colonel Campbell, our Commissioner at Elba, noted in his diary (December 5th, 1814): "As I have perceived in many conversations, Napoleon has no idea of the difficulties occasioned by winds and tides, but judges of changes of position in the case of ships as he would with regard to troops on land."]
[Footnote 325: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 88, who says: "His mild and melancholy disposition, his sad and modest behaviour, ill suited the Emperor's ambitious plans."]
[Footnote 326: "Corresp.," No. 8063. See too No. 7996 for Napoleon's plan of carrying a howitzer in the bows of his gun vessels so that his projectiles might _burst in the wood_. Already at Boulogne he had uttered the prophetic words: "We must have shells that will shiver the wooden sides of ships."]
[Footnote 327: James, "Naval History," vol. iii., p. 213, and Chevalier, p. 115, imply that Villeneuve's fleet from Toulon, after scouring the West Indies, was to rally the Rochefort force and cover the Boulogne flotilla: but this finds no place in Napoleon's September plan, which required Gantheaume first to land troops in Ireland and then convoy the flotilla across if the weather were favourable, or if it were stormy to beat down the Channel with the troops from Holland. See O'Connor Morris, "Campaigns of Nelson," p. 121.]
[Footnote 328: Colomb, "Naval Warfare," p. 18.]
[Footnote 329: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 100. Nelson was aware of the fallacies that crowded Napoleon's brain: "Bonaparte has often made his boast that our fleet would be worn out by keeping the sea, and that his was kept in order and increasing by staying in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one year."--Nelson to Collingwood, March 13th, 1805.]
[Footnote 330: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 276-290; also Capt. Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power, etc.," vol. ii., ch. xv. _ad fin_. He quotes the opinion of a Spanish historian, Don José de Couto: "If all the circumstances are properly weighed ... we shall see that all the charges made against England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced to want of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect it."--In the Admiralty secret letters (1804-16) I have found the instructions to Sir J. Orde, with the Swiftsure, Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Ruby, Defence, Lively, and two sloops, to seize the treasure-ships. No fight seems to have been expected.]
[Footnote 331: "Corresp.," No. 8379; Mahan, _ibid_., vol. ii., p. 149.]
[Footnote 332: Letter of April 29th, 1805. I cannot agree with Mahan (p. 155) that this was intended only to distract us.]
[Footnote 333: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 121.]
[Footnote 334: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 367.]
[Footnote 335: Thiers writes, most disingenuously, as though Napoleon's letters of August 13th and 22nd could have influenced Villeneuve.]
[Footnote 336: Dupin, "Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne" (tome i., p. 244), who had the facts from Daru. But, as Méneval sensibly says ("Mems.," vol. i., ch. v.), it was not Napoleon's habit dramatically to dictate his plans so far in advance. Certainly, _in military matters,_ he always kept his imagination subservient to facts. Not until September 22nd, did he make any written official notes on the final moves of his chief corps; besides, the Austrians did not cross the Inn till September 8th.]
[Footnote 337: Diary of General Bingham, in "Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896. The accompanying medal, on the reverse of which are the words "frappée à Londres, en 1804," affords another proof of his intentions.]
[Footnote 338: Marbot, "Mems.," ch. xix; Fouché, "Mems.," part 1; Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. i.]
[Footnote 339: See Nelson's letters of August 25th, 1803, and May 1st, 1804; also Collingwood's of July 21st, 1805.]
[Footnote 340: In "F.O.," France, No. 71, is a report of a spy on the interview of Napoleon with O'Connor, whom he made General of Division. See Appendix, p. 510.]
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