Part II
are arranged in chronological order.—EDITOR.
Footnote 42:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 63–67.
Footnote 43:
An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of Jomini’s “History of the Wars of the French Revolution.” He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,—a description which can apply only to Great Britain.
Footnote 44:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 323–329. By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, England secured Canada, all French possessions east of the Mississippi, and Florida; she also retained Gibraltar and Minorca, and gained ascendancy in India.—EDITOR.
Footnote 45:
See Annual Register, 1762, p. 63.
Footnote 46:
Campbell, “Lives of the Admirals.”
Footnote 47:
These remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the introduction of steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent, more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. It is vain to look for energetic naval operations distant from coal stations. It is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands of the enemy. But the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling stations outside the national boundaries.
Footnote 48:
“Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 14–17.
Footnote 49:
A celebrated French admiral, in command at the battles of Beachy Head (1690) and La Hogue (1692).—EDITOR.
Footnote 50:
The most famous of these were issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, afterward James II, who was then Lord High Admiral. They were revised but not greatly altered in 1740 and again in 1756.—EDITOR.
Footnote 51:
Byng’s offense, for which he was sentenced to be shot, occurred in an
## action with a French squadron off Minorca in 1756.—EDITOR.
Footnote 52:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 377–380.
Footnote 53:
De Grasse, whose victory over Graves off the Chesapeake forced the surrender of Cornwallis, was afterward defeated by Rodney in the famous battle of the Saints’ Passage, April 12, 1782. Three days earlier, De Grasse had neglected an opportunity to attack in superior force.
While the battle of the Saints’ Passage is more celebrated, the action here described better illustrates Rodney’s merits as a tactician. In his later years Rodney wrote that he “thought little of his victory of the 12th of April,” and looked upon this earlier action as “one by which, but for the disobedience of his captains, he might have gained immortal renown.”—Mahan, “Types of Naval Officers,” p. 203.—EDITOR.
Footnote 54:
The black ships, in position A, represent the English ships bearing down upon the French center and rear. The line v r is the line of battle from van to rear before bearing down. The positions v´, r´ are those of the van and rear ships after hauling up on the port tack, when the French wore.—EDITOR.
Footnote 55:
In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding the leading ship of the English line, by Rodney, he says: “Your leading in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two cables’ length distance from each other, the van division was led by you to _more than two leagues distance_ from the center division, which was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy, and not properly supported” (Life, Vol. I, p. 351). By all rules of tactical common-sense it would seem that the other ships should have taken their distance from their next astern, that is, should have closed toward the center. In conversation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not in this action, Rodney stated that the French line extended Your leagues in length, “as if De Guichen thought we meant to run away from him” (_Naval Chronicle_, Vol. XXV, p. 402).
Footnote 56:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 387–391, 397.
Footnote 57:
Now Cape Haitien, Haiti.—EDITOR.
Footnote 58:
Bancroft, “History of the United States.”
Footnote 59:
With the reinforcement brought by De Grasse, Lafayette’s army numbered about 8,000; the troops brought by Washington and Rochambeau consisted of 2,000 Americans and 4,000 French.—EDITOR.
Footnote 60:
The action itself is more fully described in Mahan’s “Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence,” from which the diagram on page 167 is taken. In the diagram, a a indicates the positions of the two fleets when De Grasse came out of the bay; b b, the positions when the order to engage was given; f, Graves’s flagship, and h, Hood. Having approached the enemy with his twelve leading ships, Graves gave the order to bear down and engage, though he still kept the signal for “line ahead” flying. Whether through inability or misinterpretation of orders, the rear under Hood failed to get in range.
Hood afterward criticised his superior severely on the grounds, (1) that the fleet was not brought into proper position to engage, and (2) that, upon engaging, the “line ahead” signal should have been hauled down. He interpreted this signal as meaning that no ship could close beyond a line through the flagship and parallel to the enemy line.
Graves next day issued a memorandum to the effect that the line ahead was a means to an end, not an end in itself, and “that the signal for battle should not be rendered ineffective by strict adherence to the former.” The confusion was such as frequently arose in this period of transition from one system of tactics to another.—EDITOR.
Footnote 61:
“Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 35–37, 41.
Footnote 62:
Chevalier, “Mar. Fran, sous la République,” p. 49.
Footnote 63:
Nap. to Decrès, Aug. 29, 1805.
Footnote 64:
Troude, “Batailles Nav.,” Vol. III, p. 370.
Footnote 65:
Commodore de Rions, a member of the nobility, who was imprisoned at Toulon and afterward fled from the country.—EDITOR.
Footnote 66:
“Types of Naval Officers,” pp. 308–317. The “Glorious First of June” is one of the most important naval actions in the wars of the French Revolution, and illustrates the work of an officer who stood in his own day conspicuously at the head of his profession. The selection is interesting also as showing that, when it suited his purpose, Admiral Mahan could write with notable ease and pictorial vigor.—EDITOR.
Footnote 67:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 42–47. The campaign is treated more fully in “The Life of Nelson,” Vol. II, p. 70 _ff._—EDITOR.
Footnote 68:
Nelson’s Letters and Dispatches, Vol. IV, p. 295.
Footnote 69:
Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. IV., p. 355.
Footnote 70:
Nelson’s Dispatches, April 9, 1801, Vol. IV, pp. 339, 341.
Footnote 71:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 117–120.
Footnote 72:
_Ibid._, p. 106.
Footnote 73:
See “Naval Chronicle,” Vol. X, pp. 508, 510; Vol. XI, p. 81; Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. V, p. 438.
Footnote 74:
Pellew’s “Life of Lord Sidmouth,” Vol. II, p. 237.
Footnote 75:
Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. IV, p. 452.
Footnote 76:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,” Vol. II, pp. 184–197, 199–202, 356–357.
Footnote 77:
“The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire”, Vol. II, p. 181.
Footnote 78:
Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805.
Footnote 79:
Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15.
Footnote 80:
_Ibid._, Sept. 4.
Footnote 81:
Nelson’s Dispatches, Vol. VII, p. 80.
Footnote 82:
The following account of Nelson’s arrival and his plan of battle is taken from the fuller narrative in “The Life of Nelson,” Vol. II, pp. 339–351.—EDITOR.
Footnote 83:
Inserted by author.
Footnote 84:
Here the narrative is resumed from “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.”—EDITOR.
Footnote 85:
Fyffe’s “History of Modern Europe,” Vol. I, p. 281.
Footnote 86:
To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; “Corr.,” Vol. XXII, p. 19.
Footnote 87:
“Sea Power in its Relations with the War of 1812,” Vol. I, pp. 295–308; Vol. II, pp. 121–125.
Footnote 88:
Kingsford’s “History of Canada,” Vol. VIII, p. 111.
Footnote 89:
Drummond to Prevost, Oct. 20, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Upper Canada, p. 9.
Footnote 90:
_Ibid._, Oct. 15.
Footnote 91:
Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 14, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, p. 36.
Footnote 92:
“Travels,” J. M. Duncan, Vol. II, p. 27.
Footnote 93:
“Life of Brock,” p. 193.
Footnote 94:
Smyth, “Précis of the Wars in Canada,” p. 167.
Footnote 95:
The United States Secretary of War.—EDITOR.
Footnote 96:
December 17, 1813. Captain’s Letters, Navy Department.
Footnote 97:
“Lessons of the War with Spain” (1899), pp. 75–85.
Footnote 98:
_Ibid._, p. 157.
Footnote 99:
In this number is included the _Emperador Carlos V_, which, however, did not accompany the other four under Cervera.
Footnote 100:
“Lessons of the War with Spain” (1899), pp. 184–191.
Footnote 101:
“Naval Strategy,” pp. 383–401.
Footnote 102:
The Kobe _Chronicle_, February 25, 1904; an English newspaper published in Japan.
Footnote 103:
“Naval Administration and Warfare,” Retrospect upon the War between Russia and Japan (March, 1906) pp. 167–173.
Footnote 104:
“Naval Strategy,” pp. 416–420.
Footnote 105:
“The rise or fall of the Empire depends upon to-day’s battle. Let every man do his utmost.”—EDITOR.
Footnote 106:
“The Interest of America in Sea Power,” Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power (1893), pp. 51–54.
Footnote 107:
“The Problem of Asia” (1900), pp. 133–144.
Footnote 108:
“The writer has been assured, by an authority in which he entirely trusts, that to a proposition made to Great Britain (at the time of the Spanish-American War) to enter into a combination to constrain the Use of our power,—as Japan was five years ago constrained by the joint
## action of Russia, France, and Germany,—the reply was not only a
passive refusal to enter into such combination, but an assurance of
## active resistance to it, if attempted.”—Mahan, “The Problem of Asia”
(1900), p. 187.—EDITOR.
Footnote 109:
“Retrospect and Prospect” (1902), pp. 15–17.
Footnote 110:
“The Interest of America in International Conditions,” The Open Door (1910), pp. 198–202.
Footnote 111:
“The Interest of America in International Conditions” (1910), pp. 38–46.
Footnote 112:
_The Mail_, April 20, 1910.
Footnote 113:
“The Interest of America in International Conditions” (1910), pp. 161–164.
Footnote 114:
“Retrospect and Prospect,” Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies (1902), pp. 151–170.
Footnote 115:
“Naval Strategy” (1911), pp. 104–112.
Footnote 116:
Since this was written, a new Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan, operative for ten years, has been signed—July 13, 1911. By its terms either Power will be released from its military obligation to the other, as against a third with which it may have a treaty of general arbitration, such as that framed between Great Britain and the United States.
Footnote 117:
Since these words were written such formal announcement has been made by a member of the British Cabinet, Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on May 23, 1911. _The Mail_, May 24, 1911.
Footnote 118:
“Some Neglected Aspects of War” (1907), pp. 171–191.
Footnote 119:
The Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War. For the effect of commerce warfare in these struggles, see pp. 91–99.—EDITOR.
Footnote 120:
Vol. I, pp. 146–148.
Footnote 121:
The “Times” of October 14, 1905.
Footnote 122:
Indirect, I presume.
Footnote 123:
“Some Neglected Aspects of War,” The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of War (1899), pp. 45–52.
Footnote 124:
Lest this be misunderstood to be an allusion to the recent measures of Japan in Korea, I renew here the caution that in this article all references to the Peace Conference are to that of 1899.
Footnote 125:
“Some Neglected Aspects of War,” The Hague Conference and the Practical Aspect of War (1907), pp. 75–80, 90–93.
Footnote 126:
“Naval Strategy,” pp. 445–447.
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling. 2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 3. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.