II.

MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S "PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS" OF THE FORM AND NATURE OF GOD.

Mr. Van Der Donckt, at the beginning of his argument under his "philosophical proofs of God's simplicity or spirituality," again exhibits the fact that he misapprehends the doctrines of the Latter-day Saints. He says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God created the souls of men long before their conception." That is not the belief of the Latter-day Saints; and his misapprehension of what their doctrine is relative to man and God leads the gentleman to make statements, and indulge in lines of argumentation he would not have followed had he apprehended aright the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Since his philosophical argument has proceeded from a wrong basis, it becomes necessary to state what the "Mormon" doctrine is relative to the subject in hand, and then consider so much of his argument as may apply to the facts.

Latter-day Saints believe that the "soul of man" consists of both his spirit and his body united. "The spirit and the body is the soul of man; and the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 88:15, 16). This, I am aware, is not the usually accepted sense of the word "soul;" for it generally stands for what is regarded as the incorporeal nature of man, or the principle of mental and spiritual life of him. It is used variously in the scriptures. In one place, the Savior uses it in contrast with the body: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28). But the word as used in the passage above quoted from the Doctrine and Covenants also has warrant of scriptural authority: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Here body and "breath of life," the spirit, constitute the soul of man.

Of course, Mr. Van Der Donckt uses the phrase "souls of men" as we perhaps would use the phrase "spirits of men," and evidently makes reference to our doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, that is, the doctrine of the actual existence of the spirits of men long ages before they tabernacled in the flesh, when he says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." But again explanation is necessary, as that statement does not quite meet our belief. Our doctrine is that "Intelligences are begotten spirits," which spirits are in form like men, and are really, substance, that is, matter, but of a more subtle and finer nature than the matter composing man's tabernacle of flesh and bone.[A] Christians believe that "the Word," that is, Jesus Christ, was in the beginning with God; and not only that "the Word" was with God, but also that "the Word was God" (John 1:1, 2), Latter-day Saints not only believe Jesus was in the beginning with God, but it is their doctrine that man was "also in the beginning with the Father, that which is spirit" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 93:23). And again: "Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth _was not created or made, neither indeed can be._ * * * * Every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnation _for man is spirit_. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea man is the tabernacle of God, even temples" (Doc and Cov. sec. 93:29, 32-35). The point to be observed is that intelligences--whence the spirits of men--are not created or made, nor indeed can they be, for they are eternal--eternal as God the Father, and God the Son are. "The mind of man--the immortal spirit--where did it come from?" asks the Prophet Joseph Smith, in a discourse delivered at Nauvoo;[B] and then answers:

[Footnote A: The Prophet Joseph teaches that "all spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure [than the gross matter tangible to our senses] and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our bodies are purified, we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. and Cov. sec 137.)]

[Footnote B: April 7th, 1844, Mill. Star, vol. xxiii p. 245, et seq.]

All learned men, and doctors of divinity, say that God created it in the beginning; but it is not so; the very idea lessens man in my estimation. I do not believe the doctrine. I know better. Hear it, all ye ends of the world, for God has told me so. If you don't believe me it will not make the truth without effect. * * * * We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you so? It is correct enough, but who told you that man did not exist in like manner upon the same principle? God made a tabernacle and put his [man's] spirit into it, and it became a living soul. How does it read in Hebrew? It does not say in Hebrew that God created the spirit of man. It says, "God made man out of earth and put in him Adam's spirit, and so became a living body." The mind, or the intelligence which man possesses is co-eternal with God himself. * * * * * I am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man. Is it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal, and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of spirits had no beginning, neither will it have an end. That is good logic. That which has a beginning may have an end. There never was a time when there were not spirits, for they are co-eternal with our Father in heaven. I want to reason more on the spirit of man; for I am dwelling on the body and spirit of man--on the subject of the dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind of man--the immortal part, because it has no beginning. Suppose you cut it in two; then it has a beginning and an end; but join it again, and it continues one eternal round. So with the spirit of man. As the Lord liveth, if it has a beginning it will have an end. All the fools and learned and wise men from the beginning of creation, who say that the spirit of man had a beginning, prove that it must have an end: and if that doctrine is true, then the doctrine of annihilation would be true. But if I am right, I might with boldness proclaim from the house tops that God never had the power to create the spirit of man at all, God himself could not create himself. Intelligence is eternal, and exists upon a self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there is no creation about it. * * * * The spirit of man is not a created being; it existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity. Anything created cannot be eternal: and earth, water, etc., had their existence in an elementary state, from eternity.

Mr. Van Der Donckt will recognize quite a difference between the doctrine here stated as to the spirits of men, and the one he states for us when he says, "Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." There is that in man, according to our doctrine, which is not created at all; there is in him an "ego"--a "spirit" uncreated, never made, a self-existent entity, eternal as God himself; and of the same kind of substance or essence with him, and, indeed, part of him, when God is conceived of in the generic sense.

With the doctrine of "Mormonism" relative to man and God thus stated, the question is, what part of Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument touches it?

Mr. Van Der Donckt, it must be remembered, bases his philosophical argument upon the absolute "simplicity or spirituality" of God. "I Am Who Am," is the definition of God about which circle all his arguments. God is "the Necessary Being," is his contention; infinite, illimitable; not limited by his own essence, by another, or by himself. From which I understand him to mean, after the philosophers of his school, that God, the very essence of him, is pure being-"Actual being or existence" are his own words. (Page 53).

This his premise; and the part of his argument which affects our doctrine is the following:

If God were an aggregation of parts, these parts would be either necessary beings or contingent (that do not necessarily exist), or some would be necessary and some contingent. None of these suppositions are tenable, therefore God is not an aggregate of parts. * * * * If the parts of God were necessary beings, there would be several independent beings, which the infinity of God precludes. God would not be infinite, if there were even one other being independent of him, as his power, etc., would not reach that being.

The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are possible, therefore he is not compound.

Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last.

Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts.

If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God.

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

Of Mr. Van Der Donckt's Premise.

I have to do first of all with Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise--"the simplicity or spirituality" of God.

So far as it is possible to make language do it, the gentleman teaches that God is "pure being," "most [therefore absolutely] simple--not compound." He is not only infinite, then, but infinity. It follows that he is without quality, other than being--mere existence--"I Am Who Am;" without attributes; not susceptible of division, or of relation; for if he possessed quality or attribute or was susceptible of division or of relation, his absolute simplicity--that tremulously precarious thing on which, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy, his very existence and all his excellence depends--would be destroyed. It was doubtless these considerations that led the Church of England--which, by the way, is at one with the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrine of God--to say of the "one true and living God," that he is _without body, parts or passions_.[A] With which also the Westminster Confession of Faith agrees, by saying: "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, _without body, parts or passions_, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," etc.[B]

[Footnote A: Bk. Com. Prayer, Articles of Religion, Art. 1.]

[Footnote B: Westminster Confession, Art. 2, Sec. 1.]

The German school of philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which ends in inevitable agnosticism, went but one step further than these creeds; a step made inevitable by the creeds themselves. The creeds postulate God as "pure being"--"existence" "the one who could not _not_ exist," Mr. V.'s interpretation of "I Am Who Am." But "existence," says Fichte, "implies origin," and "God is beyond origin"--i. e. beyond "being," "existence." Schelling reached substantially the same conclusion when, by a pathway but little divergent from that followed by Fichte, he was led to regard God as neither "real or ideal;" "neither thought nor being." While Hegel, by similar subtleties, established the identity of "Being and Non-Being." This German philosophy, which but extends the philosophy of the orthodox creeds to its legitimate conclusion, leaves us with the paradox on our hands of regarding God at once as the most real existence, and as the most absolute non-existence. The conclusions from the premise are just; and Mr. V.'s "most simple," "infinite being," he who is "pure existence itself," vanishes amid the metaphysical subtleties of the learned Germans.[A]

[Footnote A: "Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some

## particular manner. Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox

of the German philosopher becomes literally true;--_pure being is pure nothing_. We have no conception of existence which is not existence in some particular manner; and if we abstract from the manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence. Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy, refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human consciousness, are bound in consistency, to deny that God exists; for the conception of existence is as human and as limited as any other" (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 95, 96).]

Let us examine the effect of this Deity-destroying postulate in England. Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Infinite being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," the "unconditioned;" the "first cause," hence the "uncaused." These terms, it is well known, Mr. Herbert Spencer seized upon, in his volume on "First Principles," and ran them down to logical absurdity, showing them to be "unthinkable," and that ultimate religious ideas (arising from the postulates of orthodox creeds) lead to the "Unknown!" In reaching this conclusion he was wonderfully helped by Henry L. Mansel, some time Dean of St. Paul's, who in his celebrated Bampton Lecture arrives at substantially the same conclusion--with an exception to be noted later.[A] Indeed, so nearly at one are the churchman and the philosopher, in their methods of thought, in their deductions, that the latter reaches his conclusions from the data and reasoning of the former, whom he quotes with approval and at great length. I select from these writers a few typical passages tending to show the absurdity of God's "simplicity," or "spirituality," as held by Mr. Van Der Donckt, reminding the reader that Mr. V.'s "Infinite Being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," "unconditioned," the "first cause," the "uncaused" of both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Spencer.

[Footnote A: Page 109.]

Mr. Spencer, after showing that the First Cause cannot be finite, nor dependent, reaches the conclusion that it must be infinite and independent; and then proceeds:

But to think of the First Cause as totally independent is to think of it as that which existed in the absence of all other existence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot be the First Cause. Not only, however, must the First Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of being, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the established word, it must be absolute.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 29, 30; 1896 edition, D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.]

Thus far the philosopher; and even Mr. Van Der Donckt, I think, could not complain that he has not stated the "simplicity" of the First Cause most clearly. But at this point the philosopher, Mr. Spencer, introduces the churchman, Dean Mansel, to abolish the structure of the "First Cause," the "simple" or "spiritual being," or "God," as held by Mr. V. and all orthodox Christians. I quote Mr. Mansel:

But these three conceptions--the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite--all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: _the Absolute cannot as such be a cause_. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. * * Supposing the Absolute to be a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power: and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary, and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation.

The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.

Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative--the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal

## activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute,

whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute--the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *

Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *

To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:

The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.

There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.

It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.

It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 40-44. Limits of Religions Thoughts, lecture II, first American edition, 1875.]

After thus running to absurdity the prevalent conceptions of the "Infinite," the "Absolute," the "Uncaused," Mr. V.'s "Most simple or not compound" "Being," the churchman does what all orthodox Christians do, he commits a violence against all human understanding and good sense--he arbitrarily declares, in the face of his own inexorable logic and its inevitable deductions, that, "_it is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite_;" that is, it is our duty to think of the infinite as at once limited and unlimited; as finite and infinite--"which," to use a phrase dear to Mr. Van Der Donckt, "is absurd," and therefore not to be entertained. At this point, the philosopher and the churchman reach the parting of the ways, and this is the exception, in the conclusion of the two, noted a few pages back.[A]

[Footnote A: Page 105.]

Some do indeed allege [says Mr. Spencer] that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the Absolute cannot, in any manner or degree, be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms! * * * That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe there is eternal war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles, p. 110.]

Yet Mr. Mansel, in the inconsistent and illogical course he pursues, is not more inconsistent, illogical, and unphilosophical than all orthodox Christians. The postulates of their creeds concerning the nature of God leads them to affirm what they call his "Spirituality," "Infinite Being," "Simplicity," etc. (which are but the equivalents of the philosopher's "absolute," "infinite," and the "uncaused"); and yet the necessities of their faith in revelation make it imperative that they regard him as existing in some relation to the universe and to man, which destroys his alleged "simplicity." To ascribe to him attributes is to destroy that simplicity[A] which orthodox creeds affirm, and for which Mr. Van Der Donckt so stoutly argues. Nor does it help matters when it is said that these attributes are existences--the attitude of Mr. V., for he says: "Every perfection [goodness, mercy, justice, etc.--attributes of God] is some existence, something that is." If this be granted, then it follows that God must be the sum of all these existences, therefore a compound, not "simple." And not only does orthodox belief in revelation compel those who follow it to concede the existence of attributes in God, but personality also. But if God be conceived as a personality, his "simplicity" or "spirituality," as held by Mr. V., vanishes, because, when recognized as personality, God is no longer "being"--but _a_ being.

[Footnote A: "The rational conception of God is that _he is_, nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative God. * * * We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter." "_Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs--Christianity_."--(S. Baring-Gould, p. 112.) It was held by well nigh the whole medieval school of theologians that God was unknowable because "the absolute simplicity of the divine essence was incompatible with the existence of distinctions therein." (See art. "Theism," _Ency. Brit._, and the references there given.)]

Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it _is_ [i. e. exists]: but because it is _this or that_; for instance, a stone, a plant, a man"--_or a person_, I suggest. For if God has personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of as _this or that_, as a person, for instance, then of course not infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity" is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are _three persons_--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?

[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts."]

If the three be conceived as one God--yet each with that about him which distinguishes him from the other--how can God be regarded as "simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover, require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons, but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"[A] No wonder the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the one substance," says the _Commentary on the Confession of Faith_, "_must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all analogy_."[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:

[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]

[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p. 58.]

Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal _mysteries_, namely, _the Unity and Trinity of God_, and the incarnation and death of our Savior.

"To think that God _is_, as we _think_ him to be, is blasphemy," is the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.

But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:

First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable, when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as "infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe, a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his "philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.

Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they hold him to be something different from absolute "being"--more than a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to men that it is possible to conceive.

Of the Doctrine of God's "Simplicity" Being of Pagan Rather than of Christian Origin.

The next step in my argument is to prove that this doctrine of God being "most simple," "not compound," "pure being"--without body (i. e., not material), parts or passions--hence, without attributes, is not a doctrine of the Christian scriptures, but comes from the old Pagan philosophies.

Clearly the data for this doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity" did not come from the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to him a human form, and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds of philosophers of Mr. V.'s school, limit him who must be, to their thinking, without any limit whatsoever; and ascribes relativity to him who must not be relative but absolute.

The data for the doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"--contended for by Mr. V.--does not come from the New Testament, for the writers of that volume of scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament respecting God, and even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by representing that the man Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of God, the Father's, person; was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh (I Tim. 3:16); "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5); "God, the Word, who was made flesh, and dwelt among men, who beheld his glory" (St. John 1:1-14). Hence Mr. Van Der Donckt's doctrine of God's "simplicity" cannot claim the warrant of New Testament authority.

Plato, in his _Timaeus_, (Jowett's translation, page 530,) incidentally referring to God, in connection with the creation of the universe, says:

We say indeed that "he was," "he is," "he will be;" but the truth is that "_he is_" alone truly expresses him, and that "was" and "will be" are only to be spoken of generation in time.

Here, then, is Mr. V.'s "pure being," "most simple," "not compound." Again:

We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is granted to intelligence only (Ibid. p. 454).

Here Mr. V. may find his God, "who cannot change with regard to his existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence." Also his God who can only be seen with the "soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God." Dr. Mosheim, in his account of Plato's idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave the supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest wisdom and power, and _totally unconnected with any material substance_."[A]

[Footnote A: Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity, During the First Three Hundred Years", vol. 1. p. 37.]

To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century) generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the sixth book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew, Trypho, Justin remarks:

The Deity, father, is not to be viewed by the organs of sight, like other creatures, but he is to be comprehended by the mind alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato tells us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given Us to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when pure, that _Being_ who is the source of whatever is an object of the mind itself, _who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor anything which the eye can see_, but who is above all essence, who is ineffable, and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing him.

Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra Gentes, ch. 2), almost _verbatim_. Turning again to the _Timaeus_ of Plato, this question is asked:

What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and has never any being? That which is apprehended by reflection and reason [God] always is; and is the same; that on the other hand which is conceived by opinion, with the help of sensation without reason [the material universe], is in a process of becoming and perishing but never really is. * * * Was the world [universe], always in existence and without beginning? or created and having a beginning? Created, I reply.

In this, the orthodox Christians and Mr. V. may find their God of pure "being," that never is "becoming," but _always is_; also the creation of the universe out of nothing. The fact is that orthodox Christian views of God are Pagan rather than Christian.

In his great work on the "History of Christian Doctrine," Mr. William G. T. Shedd says:[A] "The early Fathers, in their defenses of Christianity against their pagan opponents, contend that the better pagan writers themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that their is one Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after quoting the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the better pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he says, 'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that are self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but as he is, _God_; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable world was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the deity, and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"

[Footnote A: Vol 1, p 56.]

It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of God is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able article in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ on Theism, by the Rev. Dr. Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: "The proposition constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity--the propositions in the symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent distinctions and relations in the Godhead--were not drawn directly from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament terms. _They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to faith_--the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer and a Sanctifier--with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, _only elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics_." The same authority says: "The massive defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy, against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was avowedly built on a Platonic foundation."

In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.[A] "Platonism, and Aristotelianism," says the author of the _History of Christian Doctrine_, "exerted more influence upon the intellectual methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind, and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems. They re-appear in Roman philosophy--so far as Rome had any philosophy. We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, exerted more influence than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the Christian Fathers: upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Des Cartes, Leibniz, and Kant, so far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum will find in modern philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science) very little that is true, that may not be, found for substance, and germinally, in the Greek theism."[B]

[Footnote A: Especially compare Plato's methods of arising from the conception of the finite and variable, to the infinite and unchangeable; from the relatively beautiful and good, to the absolutely beautiful and good, in the sixth and seventh books of the "Republic," with St. Augustine's manner of arriving at the conception of "_That which is_"--God.--_Confessions St. Augustine_, book seven.]

[Footnote B: History of Christian Doctrine, by William G. T. Shedd; Vol. I, p. 52.]

It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the conception of God as "pure being," "immaterial," "without form," "or parts or passions," as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation.

Of Jesus Christ Being Both Premise and Argument against Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophical Argument."

And now as to the whole question of God being "existence," "pure being," "most simple," "not compound;" also his "immutability," as set forth in Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophical argument." What of it? This of it: Whatever "simplicity," "immutability," or other quality that is ascribed to God, _must be in harmony with what Jesus Christ is_: I meet Mr. V.'s "philosophical argument" as I meet his scriptural argument. I appeal to the being and nature of Jesus Christ, as a refutation of his philosophical conclusions. Is Jesus Christ God? "Yes," must be my friend's answer. Very well, this is my premise. Jesus is God in his own right and person, and he is a revelation of what God the Father is. He is not only a revelation of the _being_ of God, but of the _kind_ of being God is. And now I test Mr. V.'s argument by the revelation of what God is, as revealed in the person and nature of the Son of God. While I am doing so, let it be remembered that Jesus is now and will ever be what he was at the time of his glorious ascension from the midst of his disciples on Mount Olivet--God, possessed of all power in heaven and in earth, a glorious personage of flesh and bone and spirit. And now, is Jesus Christ without form? No; he is in form like man. Is Jesus Christ illimitable? Not as to his glorious body; that has limitations, dimensions, proportions. Is Jesus Christ without parts? Not as to his person; his body is made up of limbs, trunk, head; and parenthetically I may remark, a whole without parts is inconceivable. Then it follows that God's "infinity," so far as it is spoken of in scripture, does not refer to his person, but evidently to the attributes of his mind--to his intelligence, wisdom, power, patience, mercy, and whatsoever other qualities of mind or spirit he may possess. If it is argued that it is illogical and unphilosophical to regard God in his person as finite, but infinite in faculties, that is finite in one respect and infinite in another, my answer is that it is a conception of God made necessary by what the divine wisdom has revealed concerning himself, and it is becoming in man to accept with humility what God has been pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, being assured that in God's infinite knowledge he knows himself, and that which he reveals concerning himself is to be trusted far beyond man's philosophical conception of him.

But to resume our inquiry: Is Jesus Christ immutable, unchangeable? Is he Plato's "that which always is and has no becoming?" or Mr. Van Der Donckt's "necessary Being * * * that cannot change with regard to his existence, nor can he change with regard to his _mode_ of existence," and therefore could never be anything other than he was from eternity? It is inconceivable how any being can be a son and not have a beginning as such. Whatever of eternity may be ascribed to the existence of the Lord Jesus, he must have had a beginning as a son; that term implies a relation, let it be brought about how it may, and that relation must have had a beginning. While there may never have been a time when Jesus was not in respect of his existence as an Intelligence, there must have been a time when he was not as "Son." So that he doubtless became "Son," hence changed his relation from not Son to Son; hence changed in his relations, in his mode of existence. We know there was a time when he was not man, that is, not man of flesh and bone made of the materials of this world; and he became man; another change. There was a time when he was mortal man, by which I mean, man subject to death; and he became, and is now, immortal man; another change. There was a time when all power in heaven and in earth was "_given_" to him; (Matt. 28:18) hence, there must have been a time when he did not possess it; hence another change, a change from the condition of holding _some_ power to that of possessing _all_ power. These facts attested by Holy Writ are against Mr. V.'s doctrine of God's "immutability," so far at least as relates to the impossibility of changing his mode of existence. And if Mr. V.'s doctrine of the "immutability" of God means that God cannot change in his relations, then I put these facts in the career of the Lord Jesus against his argument, and say that not only did Jesus pass through these changes of conditions and relations, but that God the Father could, and very likely did, pass through similar relations and changes. Else of what significance are the following passages?

The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise (St. John 5:19).

The Prophet Joseph Smith quoting the substance of St. John 5:26, also says:

"As the Father hath power in himself, even so hath the Son power"--to do what? Why, what the Father did. The answer is obvious--in a manner to lay down his body and take it up again. "Jesus, what are you going to do?" "To lay down my body as my Father did, and take it up again." Do you believe it? If you do not believe it, you do not believe the Bible.[A]

[Footnote A: _Millennial Star_, Vol. 23: p. 247.]

It is the accepted doctrine of the orthodox Christian creeds that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is as the Father is--(Creed of St. Athanasius) that is, of the _same_ nature and essence. Very well, then; as God, the Father, begot Jesus, the Son, may not the Son in time also beget a son or sons? Or, after ascribing to the Son the _same_ nature and the _same power_ as is ascribed to the Father, will our orthodox friends insist upon limiting the Son by denying him productive virtue, and contend that Jesus must endure without the exercise of it? If the existence of the Son was essential to the perfection of God, the Father--and it cannot be thought of in any other light--may it not be, since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that the fact of fatherhood is necessary to the perfection of the Son? To deny him the power of attaining it would be to limit his power, which may not be done even according to orthodox Christian doctrine. Is it not likely, nay, would it not be so? that the same cause or impulse, or necessity, or what influence or consideration soever it was that led God, the Father, to beget a Son, create a world, and provide for its redemption, would impel the Son, since he is of the same nature as the Father, to do these same things? And where was the beginning of such proceedings? and where will be the end of them?

But now, to resume again our measuring of Mr. V.'s philosophy by Jesus Christ as God.

Is Jesus Christ without passions? No; his deathless love for his friends, so beautifully manifested by word and deed throughout his mortal life, together with his love for mankind, which led him to give his life for the world, as also his explicitly declared hatred of that which is sin and evil, forbid us thinking of him as without passions.[A] As in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so in him necessarily are gathered all these qualities, attributes and perfections that go to the making of God. Does possession of these qualities, together with Messiah's mode of existence in the form and person of Jesus Christ, come in conflict with the notion of God's "simplicity," "immutability," and "eternity," as conceived by philosophers? So much the worse, then, for the faulty and merely human conceptions of those qualities, as relating to God. Better mistrust the accuracy of metaphysical reasoning; better throw aside Plato and his philosophy as untrustworthy, than to be moved ever so slightly from the great truth of revelation that Jesus, the Messiah, is God; and that such as he is, God is, as to essence, attributes, existence, and the mode of existence. Jesus Christ, then, once accepted as God, and the manifestation of God to men, is a complete answer to Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument for the absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality" or "immutability" of God.

[Footnote A: God is angry with the wicked every day (Ps 7:11.)]

More of Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophy."

I must not neglect Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophy" that forbids us believing that "several finite things" can "produce an infinite, or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last." Also his "finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God." Also, his "many infinite beings are inconceivable; for, if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection." And his "from the moment one would have a perfection, the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts."

Can any one, can Mr. Van Der Donckt himself, be quite sure of all this? Who knows how the infinite is constituted? When men speak of the infinite, are they not treating of that which is beyond the comprehension of the mind of man, at least in his present state of limited intellectual powers; for whatever may be the heights to which the mind of man may rise, when freed from his present earth-bound conditions, here and now he must recognize his intellectual limitations: for, as in Christ's humiliation (i. e. in his earth-life) his judgement was taken away (Acts 8:33), that is, his divine, supreme, intellectual and spiritual powers were veiled--so with man, in this same world of trial and limitations. Whatever his power as an eternal Intelligence may have been, or what it may be hereafter, he is now compelled to admit that he sees but as through a glass darkly, and therefore imperfectly. Men, I hold, though they be philosophers, cannot comprehend the infinite, much less say how it is constituted. But let us reflect a little upon the several propositions Mr. V. submits to us:

1--"_Several finite beings cannot produce the infinite_."

So far as it is possible for the human intellect to conceive the infinite, the material universe is infinite, eternal, without beginning and without end. It is inconceivable that the universe could have had a beginning, could have been produced from nothing. "All the apparent proofs," remarks Herbert Spencer, "that something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in course of a few minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it" (First Prin., p. 177.) Mr. Spencer holds it "impossible to think of _nothing_ becoming _something_," for the reason that "nothing" cannot become an object of consciousness (_Ibid_ pp. 161-2.) In like manner, he holds that matter is indestructible, and hence, that the universe cannot be annihilated. "The doctrine that matter is indestructible has become a common-place," he remarks. "The seeming annihilations of matter turn out, on close observation, to be only changes of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensations to its original shape." The indestructibility of matter, Mr. Spencer holds to be a datum of consciousness, which he thus illustrates:

Conceive the space before you to be cleared of all bodies save one. Now imagine the remaining one not to be removed from its place, but to lapse into nothing while standing in that place. You fail. The place that was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty, save by the transfer of that which made it solid * * * However small the bulk to which we conceive a piece of matter reduced, it is impossible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While we can represent to ourselves the parts the matter as approximated, we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as made less. To do this would be to imagine some of the constituent parts compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than to imagine compression of the whole into nothing. Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on the nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore no thought framed, when one of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence, it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something. (First Prin., p. 181.)

The material universe, then, is eternal, it always existed, and how many changes soever it may pass through, it will never be annihilated. Not one atom can be added to the sum total of its substance, nor one blotted out of existence--it is everywhere existing, and, so far as the mind of man can conceive "infinity," it is infinite. Yet we know that this whole is made up of a great variety of substances and objects which are finite; and our philosophers, for the most part, hold that matter is divisible into ultimate atoms. Not that such a fact has been demonstrated or is demonstrable; but granted the existence of matter, its existence as an aggregation of such ultimate things as atoms seems to be a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, because the mind of man cannot conceive to the contrary, and hence, science assumes matter to be composed of atoms. But atoms are things--material things; and in the mind must necessarily be thought of as having dimensions--an upper and lower part, also a hither and thither side; or if spherical then a circumference and diameter; in other words, atoms are finite, material things, and in the aggregate constitute the material universe, which, so far as the wit of man can conceive, is infinite; and hence, we may say the infinite universe is composed of finite atoms; or, several finite things--Mr. V.'s philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding--produce the infinite.

2--"_Many infinite beings are inconceivable; for if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite_."

That may be true in relation to absolute "infinity." But we have already seen that God cannot be considered as absolutely infinite, because we are taught by the facts of revelation that absolute infinity cannot hold as to God; as a person, God has limitations, and that which has limitations is not absolutely infinite. If God is conceived of as absolutely infinite, in his substance as in his attributes, then all idea of personality respecting him must be given up; for personality implies limitations. If the idea of personality in respect of God be retained, then the idea of absolute infinity regarding him must be abandoned. That "infinite" which does not include all things and all qualities is not absolutely infinite. The only persons who consistently hold to the absolute infinity of God are those who identify God with the universe--regarding God and the universe as one and the same. So long as orthodox Christians regard God as distinct from what they call the "material universe," that long they teach but a modified infinity respecting God. They really mean that God is only infinite "_after his kind_." One of Spinoza's definitions may help us here. He says a thing is _finite_ after its kind "_when it can be limited by another thing or the same nature_," as one body is limited by another (Ethics Def. ii.) is not a thing _infinite_ after its kind, then, when it is _not_ limited by anything of the same nature? Is not this the necessary corollary of Spinoza's definition of the "finite after its kind?" and do not those who regard God as distinct from the universe, and at the same time ascribe infinity to him, mean only that he is infinite "after his kind?" There may be, then, many infinites after their kind; and this view is sustained by the fact that such infinites do exist. Duration or time is infinite after its kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature. Space is infinite after its kind, for the same reason; so, too, are force and matter. If there may be two or four things infinite after their kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature, are many infinites inconceivable? Moreover, when _infinity_ is thus understood--and it can be understood when relating to God in no other way--the difficulty raised by the latter part of Mr. V.'s proposition, __viz__., that, if there were several infinite beings, they would differ from each other by some perfection, and when one would have a perfection that the other lacked, the latter would not be infinite, etc.--disappears; for when beings are infinite after their kind, they are only limited by things of a different nature, and therefore the perfections possessed by those beings of a different nature will constitute no limitation to their infinity.

3--"_If one is infinite nothing can be added to it_."

This maybe true of the absolutely infinite; for that which is absolutely infinite must be the sum total of all existence. To say, therefore, that something existed in addition to this sum total, and could be added to it, would be illogical. But infinity in this conception cannot be ascribed to God; for we have seen that God is only infinite in faculties and power, not in person, hence not absolutely infinite; therefore, this statement in the gentleman's philosophy can have no bearing on the controversy in which we are engaged.

4--"_Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God_."

When the Son of God, Jesus, took on a human body of flesh and bone, was not that which is finite, his body, added to the infinite in Jesus Christ? Did the finite body, taken on by the spirit of Jesus, communicate its limitations to God? And is Jesus, now in his resurrected, immortal body of flesh and bones, less "infinite" than before his spirit was united to his body? If one accepts Mr. V.'s doctrine of the absolute infinity of God, then one must believe that Jesus "the Word," who "was in the beginning with God," who "was God"--was not "made flesh;" that is, did not take on a body of flesh and bone; for the body of Jesus was finite; it had, in fact, all the limitations of a man's body, and Mr. V.'s doctrine tells us that "_if one is infinite, nothing can be added to it_"--therefore the "Word," who "was God," could not have been made flesh. If, on the other hand, one accepts the fact, so well attested by holy scriptures, _viz_., that Jesus, "the Word," "who was God," _was_ made flesh, _did_ take on a body that was flesh and bones, even though that body was finite, then one must reject the philosophy of Mr. V., which says the infinite may not take on finite parts, for the reason that they would communicate their limitations to the infinite, and thus destroy its infinity.

It is not difficult to see that something is wrong with the philosophy of Mr. Van Der Donckt, which thus constantly brings us in conflict with the revelations of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

In what state do these considerations leave the argument? Mr. Van Der Donckt reaches the conclusion, from the premise that _several finite things cannot produce the infinite_, that God cannot be a compound of finite parts. Yet we have seen that what is called the material universe, so far as it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend infinity, answers to his conception of the infinite; and we know that the universe is made up of finite parts; and that in its last analysis, it is but the aggregation of finite atoms.

From the premise that _many infinite beings are inconceivable_, Mr. V. reaches the conclusion that God cannot be a compound of infinite parts. But upon principles of sound reason, we have seen that things are infinite after their kind when not limited by anything of the same nature; and his premise of a number of infinites being inconceivable is destroyed by the actual existence of a number of infinites after their kind, such as duration, space, matter, spirit, and hence the absolute infinite, if existing at all, must be composed of an aggregation of infinities after their kind.

From the premise that _if one is infinite nothing can be added to it_, the gentleman implies the conclusion that God is infinite and therefore nothing can be added to him. Still, since Jesus was the Word, and the Word was and is God, we have seen that something was added to whatever of infinity there was in God, the Word, _viz_., what orthodox Christians call his "humanity"--that is, the pre-existent, divine spirit of Jesus took on a tabernacle of flesh--something finite was added to the infinite of God, the Word, and that, too, let me say, without communicating any limitations to the infinity possessed of God.

On these several premises, Mr. Van Der Donckt bases his general conclusion:--

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore, he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

But since the premises themselves have been shown to be utterly untenable, as relating to God, as revealed in the scriptures, and in the person and nature of Jesus Christ, the conclusions are wrong; and the facts established are that while God in mind, faculties and in power is doubtless infinite, in person he is finite; and as his spirit is united to a body, he is composite, not simple; and as Jesus Christ was God manifested in the flesh, the express image of God the Father's person, the counterpart of his nature, and yet at the same time was a man--it is neither unscriptural, nor unphilosophical to hold that God, even the Father, is also a perfected, exalted man.