CHAPTER XXI

GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR

The balance of power in European diplomacy led inevitably to a _rapprochement_ between France and Russia and Great Britain to offset the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The Triple Alliance, however, while purely _defensive_, was still an alliance. It had endured or over thirty years, and the three Powers generally sustained each other in diplomatic moves. Their military and naval strategists were in constant communication, and ready at any time to bring all their forces into play in a European war.

France and Russia had also entered into a defensive alliance. This had not been accomplished without great difficulty. Were it not for the constant menace to France from Germany, the French Parliament would not have ratified the alliance in the first place, nor would it have stood the strain of increasing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last decade. While there is much intellectual and temperamental affinity between Gaul and Slav, there is no political affinity between democratic France and autocratic Russia.

The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and {400} Germany led to a rivalry of armaments. The struggle of German industry for the control of the world markets is the real cause of the creation and rapid development of the German navy to threaten the British mastery of the seas. It is possible that the statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal policy in regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and Asia and in regard to German ambitions in Asiatic Turkey, might have diverted German energy from bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce. It is possible that such a policy might have enabled the German democracy to gain the power to prevent Prussian militarism from dominating the Confederation. But that would have been expecting too much of human nature. Nations are like individuals. There never has been any exception to this rule. What we have we want to keep. We want more than we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from our neighbour. Thus the world is in constant struggle. Until we have the millennium, and by the millennium I mean the change of human nature from selfishness to altruism, we shall have war. Then, too, the British have seen in themselves so striking an illustration of the proverb that the appetite grows with eating that they could hardly expect anything else of the Germans, were they to allow them voluntarily "a place in the sun."

The rapid growth of Germany along the lines similar to the development of Great Britain has made the two nations rivals. As a result of this rivalry, Great Britain has been forced to prepare for the eventuality of a conflict between herself and {401} Germany by giving up the policy of "splendid isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly relationship with those European Powers that were the enemies of her rival. The first decade of the twentieth century saw British diplomacy compounding colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with Russia in Asia. The African accord of 1904 and the Asiatic accord of 1907 marked a new era in British foreign relations. Since their conclusion, Great Britain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia.

But British statesmen have had to reckon with the development of Radical tendencies in the British electorate. These tendencies have become more and more marked during the very period in which British foreign policy found that its interests coincided with those of Russia and France. British democracy had the same antipathy to a Russian alliance as had French democracy. But the menace of Germany, which threw France into the arms of Russia, has not seemed as real to the British electorate. There was also the sentiment against militarism, which has made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure from Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance of an adequate naval establishment, and has blocked every effort to provide even a modified form of compulsory military service and military training in Great Britain and Ireland.

When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has had to contend with during the years that he has held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet admiration for his achievements knows no limits. It is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments {402} in the appreciation of contemporary figures in history. But I cannot refrain from stating my belief that British foreign policy has never passed through a more trying and critical period, and British interests have never been more ably served, than during the years since the conference of Algeciras.

The menace of a war between Great Britain and Germany has disturbed Europe several times during the past decade. There has not been, however, a direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or even probable. But, although British public sentiment might have been slow in supporting the intervention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had Germany attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911, to have stayed out of the war would have been suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have awakened to this fact.

The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Servia became acute after the terms of the ultimatum were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded by as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever represented British interests on the continent of Europe, honestly tried to prevent the outbreak of war. It was not to the interests of Great Britain that this war should be fought. All sentimental considerations to one side, the moment was peculiarly unfavourable on purely material grounds. The British Parliament was facing one of the most serious problems of its history. The confidence of the country in the wisdom of the measures in Ireland {403} that the Government seemed determined to carry out was severely shaken. The interest of the British public in the troubles between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not great enough to make the war popular. The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to improve the relationship between Great Britain and Germany. Sympathy with Russia had been alienated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the Czar's government towards the Poles, the Finns, and the Jews. The British press was disgusted by the overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the revelations of the Caillaux trial.

As there was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France, and no understanding of any nature whatever with Russia, French public opinion was far from being certain that British aid would be given in the approaching war, _and British public opinion was far from being certain as to whether it would be necessary to give this aid, or whether it wanted to do so_. I am speaking here of the feeling among the electorate, which, accurately represented by Parliament, is the final court of appeal in Great Britain. There was no doubt about the opinion of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the Opposition. There was, however, very serious doubt as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it sustain France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a time when there was so serious a division in the nation concerning the Home Rule Bill--even the open menace of civil war?

When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, {404} and it was seen that France would be drawn into the struggle, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg declared to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain once guaranteed, every assurance would be given to the Cabinet at London that the Imperial Government did not have in view territorial acquisitions at the expense of France." Sir Edward questioned the Chancellor about the French colonies, "the portions of territories and possessions of France situated outside of the continent of Europe." Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within his power to make any promise on that subject.

There was no hesitation or equivocation in the response of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to this proposition. He said that neutrality under such conditions was impossible, and that Great Britain could not stand by and see France crushed, even if she were left her European territory intact, for she would be reduced to the position of a satellite of Germany. To make a bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which Great Britain would never recover. It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the only means of maintaining good relations between Great Britain and Germany would be for the two Powers to continue to work together to safeguard the peace of Europe. Sir Edward Grey promised that all his personal efforts would be directed towards guaranteeing Germany and her Allies against any aggression on the part of Russia and France, and hoped that, if Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis, {405} more friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany would ensue than had been the case up to that moment.

This dignified and manly response could have left no doubt in the minds of German statesmen as to the stand which the British Cabinet intended to take. Did they believe that Parliament and the people would not support Sir Edward Grey?

The position of Great Britain was explicitly put before the House of Commons on the evening of August 3d. Because of her naval agreement with France, by which the French navy was concentrated in the Mediterranean in order that the British Admiralty might keep its full forces in home waters, Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of France. If Germany were to make such an attack, Great Britain would be drawn into the war without any further question. There had also been since November, 1912, an understanding between the British and French military and naval authorities concerning common action on land and sea "against an enemy." But, at the time this understanding was made, it was put in writing that it was merely a measure of prudence, and did not bind Great Britain in any way whatever to act with France either in a defensive or offensive war.

Great Britain was drawn into the war by the German violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock, Germany gave the following ultimatum to Belgium:

"The German Government has received sure news, {406} according to which the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its very good will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a forward march of French troops which promises so large a development.

"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a threat directed against Germany; it is an imperious duty for self-preservation for Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

"The German Government would regret exceedingly should Belgium regard as an act of hostility against it the fact that the enemies of Germany oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. In order to dissipate every misunderstanding, the German Government declares as follows:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium, if Belgium consents, in the war which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany. The German Government, on its side, promises, at the moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their entire extent. 2. Germany promises to evacuate Belgian territory, under the condition above pronounced, immediately peace is concluded. 3. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all that would be necessary for her troops, and to indemnify the losses caused to Belgium. 4. If Belgium conducts herself in a hostile manner against the German troops and makes in particular difficulties for their forward march by an opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of {407} roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Germany will be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this case, Germany will make no promise in regard to the kingdom, but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the relations of the two states one toward the other to the decision of arms.

"The German Government has the hope with reason that this eventuality will not take place, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures suitable for preventing it from taking place.

"In this case, the relations of friendship which unite the two neighbouring states will become narrower and more lasting."

Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as follows:

"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to sure news the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of her very good will, would not be able to repulse without help the forward march of the French troops.

"The German Government would believe itself under the obligation of forestalling this attack and of violating the Belgian territory. In these conditions, Germany proposes to the Government of the King to adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude, and she promises at the moment of the peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of its possessions in their entire extent.

"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty for the forward march of the German troops, Germany will be obliged to consider her as an enemy but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the {408} relations of the two states one towards the other by the decision of arms.

"This note has aroused in the Government of the King a deep and grievous astonishment. The intentions that it attributes to France are in contradiction with the formal declarations which have been made to us on August 1st, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

"However, if in opposition to our expectation a violation of the Belgian neutrality is going to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all her international duties, and her army would oppose itself to the invader with the most vigorous resistance. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has accomplished her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain and to make respected her neutrality. The attack upon her independence with which the German Government menaces her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law.

"No strategic interest justifies the violation of international law. The Belgian Government in accepting the propositions of which it has received notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same time as it would betray its duties toward Europe. Conscious of the rôle that Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is deceived, the Belgian Government is firmly decided to repulse by every means in its power every attack upon its rights."

[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1914]

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As I record these two statements, there is before me a cartoon from a recent issue of _Punch_. The Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is leaning over the shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country, and the long defile of refugees. The Kaiser says, "See, you have lost all." King Albert answers, "Not my soul."

To be just to Germany, is necessary for us to quote the explanation of this action made by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the _Reichstag_, on August 4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into execution her threat:

"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and necessity knows no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already put their foot upon Belgium territory.

"It is against the law of nations. The French Government has, it is true, declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that France was ready for the aggression. France could wait; we, no. A French attack upon our flank in the Lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. So we have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Government. We shall recompense them for the wrong that we have thus caused them as soon as we shall have attained our military end.

"When one is as threatened as we are and when one fights for that which is most sacred to him, one can think only of one thing, that is, to attain his end, cost what it may."

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"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with pure conscience that Germany goes to the combat.'"

On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey was leaving for Parliament to make his _exposé_ of Great Britain's position in the European crisis, he received from the King a telegram that had just arrived from King Albert of Belgium:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship of Your Majesty and of Your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870, as well as of the new gage of friendship that she has just given me, I address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, and explained that the diplomatic intervention asked for had already been made both at Paris and Berlin, for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the questions of the British Ambassadors concerning their intentions towards Belgium, _to respect and maintain the neutrality of which each of these Powers was equally bound with Great Britain by the treaty of 1839_, France responded by telegraph received August 1st:

"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise."

Germany answered the same day through Sir E. Goschen;

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"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer."

When Sir Edward Goschen expressed the hope that the answer would not be delayed, Herr von Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he doubted whether he could respond, "for any response on his part would not fail, in case of war, to have the regrettable effect of divulging a part of the German plan of campaign!"

There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parliament. The Cabinet saw that party lines had been obliterated, and that the country was behind them. The following day, August 4th, Great Britain presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding an assurance that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected. Germany gave no answer. Her army had already invaded Belgium. A few hours after the reception of the British ultimatum, the advance on Liège was ordered. After waiting until evening, Great Britain declared war on Germany.

It is probable that Germany counted the cost before she invaded Belgium. Whatever may have been said at Berlin, the intervention of Great Britain was not the surprise that it has been represented to be. In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in spite of the British ultimatum, the German argument was: It is morally certain that Great Britain will intervene if we enter Belgium. But what will this intervention mean? She has no army worth the name. Her navy can do practically nothing to harm {412} us while we are crushing France and Russia. The participation of Great Britain in the war is a certainty a few weeks later. By precipitating her intervention, we are less harmed than we would be by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of attacking France through Belgium.

In believing that the eventual participation of Great Britain was certain, even if there were no Belgian question, Germany was right. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but the occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war. It was, however, a most fortunate opportunity for the British Cabinet to secure popular sympathy and support in declaring war upon Germany. For it is certain that Great Britain ought not to have delayed entering the war. The nation might have awakened too late to the fact that the triumph of Germany in Europe would menace her national existence. There is no room in the world for the amicable dwelling side by side of Anglo-Saxon idealism and German militarism. One or the other must perish.

In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the catastrophe of a general European war would have been to allow Germany to make, according to her own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe.

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INDEX

Abdul-Hamid deposed as Sultan, 185

Adana massacres, 190

Adrianople, invested by Bulgarians in Balkan War, 292; captured by combined Servian and Bulgarian armies, 313; Turks reoccupy, 349

Agadir expedition reopens the Moroccan question in 1911, 78; terms of the two treaties signed by France and Germany, 81

Agram and the Serbo-Croat movement, 147-8

Albania: hotbed of rebellions, but partial to Moslem rule, 210; a thorn in the flesh to the chancelleries of Europe, 351; her political status before and during the Balkan War, 353; put in the hands of the Powers by the Treaty of London, 1913, 360; Prince William of Wied made ruler of new kingdom, 364; his abdication, 366; now under the provisional government of Essad pasha, 366

Algeciras, Conference of European Powers on the Moroccan question at, 73; provisions of the Convention, signed April 7, 1906, 74

Alsace-Lorraine, annexed to Germany in 1871, 1; political status in the Empire, 6; new Constitution granted in 1911, 11; autonomy demanded, 12; persecutions suffered from Prussian military arrogance, 15-20

Analogy between German Socialists of to-day and the Jacobins of 1793, 32

Anglo-French agreement of 1904 published, 81

Arabs in Ottoman Empire oppose Young Turk hegemony, 214-218

Armenia, Turkish and Moslem oppression in, 187; horrors of the Adana massacres, 190

Austria-Hungary, and her south Slavs, 142-160; the Dual Monarchy's Balkan policy and problems, 144-160; acts the bully against Servia, 156

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, 368-385; the direct sequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908-1909, 368-371; exciting cause: the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, 374; Austria's note to Servia and demands for reparation, 376; the Servian reply, 381; declared not satisfactory by Austro-Hungarian Minister, 384; war declared on Servia, July 28, 1914, 384

_Bagdadbahn_, The, 58-70, 216; the Pan-Germanist conception of it, 62; concession granted in 1899, and company constituted in 1903, 65; British oppose successfully German schemes in Asiatic Turkey, 66

Balbo, Cesare, on the "Hope of Italy," 125

Balkan States: Alliance of Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro against Turkey, 263; Russian and Austro-Hungarian joint note to the States, 268; war declared by Montenegro, October 8, 1912, 270; causes of Turkish disasters, 279; story of the Thracian campaign, 283-293; capture of Kirk Kilissé and battle of Lulé Burgas, 285-289; Bulgarians halt at Tchatalja, 290; Servian and Greek successes, 293-300; conditions of armistice, signed December 3d, 302; failure of first peace conference, 308; mediation of the Great Powers accepted, 316; terms of the Treaty of London, which ended war, 316; rupture between the Balkan allies, 319-329; disputes over division of the spoil bring on second Balkan War, 321-327; treachery of the Bulgarians at Salonika, 330-334; Servian and Greek successes, 333-337; Rumania intervenes against Bulgaria, 338; Montenegro supports Servia, 341; Bulgaria humiliated, and new map for the Balkan peninsula made by the Treaty of Bukarest, 343-350

Banca di Roma in Tripoli, 243

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, August 3, 1914, 397

Belgium, Germany's ultimatum to, 405; the reply, 407

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German Chancellor, 10; his arbitrary ruling forbidding discussion of the Polish lands question in the _Reichstag_, rebuked, 114; his disregard for parliamentary opinion in the German Confederation, 115; his notes to London, Paris, and Petrograd on the Servian ultimatum, 391; tries to bargain for Great Britain's neutrality at the expense of France, but fails, 404; his explanation in the _Reichstag_ for Germany's violation of neutrality, 409

Bismarck, in the Congress of Berlin, 26; indifferent to the Eastern Question, 27; concerned chiefly with internal problems, 28; inaugurates new German colonial policy by annexations in Africa, 41; purchases Russian neutrality in 1870, 137-8

Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, 148-155; how their annexation was effected despite the protests of England, Russia, Turkey, and Servia, 368-371

Bülow, von, German Chancellor, on the Moroccan situation in 1906, 74

Bulgaria, aspirations in Macedonia, 168-173, 176-8, 207; alliance with Greece, 231, 237-8, 265; in the Balkan War, 275-293; attitude towards Servia and Greece after the Treaty of London, 321-7; fights her former allies, 328-40; loses Adrianople again to Turks, 349

_Bundesrath_, composition of, 7, 11

Burney, British Admiral, on the future of Albania, 363

Carol, King of Rumania, loyalty to Hohenzollerns, 134

Colonization policy of the German Government, 44; opposition against it in Germany, 44-45

Congress of Berlin, 161; its provisions disregarded by the contracting Powers and the Balkan States, 162, 240; its action on the Cretan question, 222

Congress of Vienna, 97, 119

Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, 144, 166

_Coup d'état_ of January 23, 1913, in Turkey, 307

Crete: Assembly decrees the island indissolubly united to Greece, 202; Turkey enforces the Greek commercial boycott, 203; put back under Ottoman rule by Congress of Berlin, 222; granted autonomy by the Powers in 1898, 224; Young Turks attempt to re-establish their authority, 228; rise of M. Venizelos from a Cretan revolutionary to become Prime Minister of Greece, 231; insincere and procrastinating diplomacy of the Powers on the Cretan question leads to the first Balkan War, 230-240, 264

Danube and the Dardanelles, 131-141; how the former is subordinated to the latter, 133; Russia's struggles for ocean waterways, 135-141

Dellbrück, Herr, Secretary of State for the Interior, sent to confer with Alsatians concerning the new Constitution, 10

_Deutschland über Alles!_ 36

Duma, Poles in, 105-8

Durazzo, Servia forced to evacuate, 157

_Drang nach Osten_, according to Professors Haeckel and Wirth, 151; Austro-Hungarian attitude towards, 144; birth of, 165-6

Enver bey, in training at Berlin, 67; and the _coup d'état_ of January 23, 1913, 307; attempts an offensive movement on the Gallipoli peninsula, 310

Essad pasha, in control of northern Albania, 361; put at head of new provisional government by Albanian Senate, 366

France: opposes German intervention in Morocco, 72; sends expeditionary force and captures Fez, 77; patches peace with Germany by mutual concessions, 81

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassinated, with his wife, at Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, 374; assassinations preceding this, 153

German, connotation of word, 33

German citizenship law of 1914, 34-6

German Empire, how constituted in 1872, 6

German _White Book_, 382, 392

Germans quoted on the superiority of their race, 29-31

Germany: in Alsace and Lorraine, 1-20; annexed the land but not the people, 2; her industrial prosperity since 1870 necessitated entering the colonial field, 40; annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 41; how her campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on, 49; historical _résumé_ of the attempts to obtain concessions in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, 62-70; intervenes in Morocco in 1905 and 1910, 72-83; fails to obtain a foothold in Persia, 89-95: her treatment of the Poles, 111; forces war upon Russia and France, 386-398; backs Austria-Hungary in her demands upon Servia, 388; diplomatic exchanges day by day preceding the declaration of war, 392-398; violates the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 397; sends ultimatum to Belgium, 405

Great Britain enters the war, 399-412; commercial rivalry with Germany one of the causes, 399; Sir Edward Grey's efforts to prevent the outbreak, 402; refuses to make a bargain with Germany at the expense of France, 404; violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany the occasion for declaring war, 405, 411

Greece: her impotence in the war of 1897, 223; drawn into the Balkan alliance, 264; her rôle in the Balkan War, 276, 295, 299, 331, 333, 336

Greek Church, 170, 171, 196, 197

Grey, Sir Edward, supports France in resisting German claims in Morocco, 81; makes strenuous efforts to prevent war, 393, 402, 404

Hakki pasha predicts European War, 247

Haldane, Lord, his mission to Germany in 1912, 54

_Hamidieh_, Turkish cruiser, raids the Ægean, 304 note

Herreros against Germany, 20, 44

Holepa, Pact of, 222

Hussein Hilmi pasha, characterization of Macedonians, 237

Italia Irredenta, 119-130; meaning of the term "Irredentism," 120; Cesare Balbo on the "Hope of Italy," 125; the struggle to gain control of the Adriatic, 128

Italy: sends ultimatum to Turkey to consent to the occupation of Tripoli, 247; war begins September 30, 1911, 248; decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey approved by Italian Parliament, November 5th, 250; peace secured by Treaty of Lausanne, October 15, 1912, 260, 273

Janina, surrendered to the Greeks, 311

Jews, development of business sense, 49; oppressed in Poland and Russia, 107, 117

Kholm separated from the Kingdom of Poland in 1912, 106

Kiau-Chau, China, leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, 43; increase of commerce of, 46

Kirk-Kilissé captured by the Bulgarians, 286

Koweit, British seize, 66

Lausanne, Treaty of, 260

Lodz, a German outpost in Poland, 97

London, Treaty of, 316

Lulé Burgas, battle of, 287

Luxemburg neutrality violated by Germany, August 2, 1914, 397

Macedonia, racial rivalries in, 161-179; fomented by Austro-Turkish policy, 167; complicated by Russian intrigues in the Balkan States, 171; Armenian massacres of 1893-96, 174; failure of the international "pacification" policy, 176; how the Young Turks decided to solve the Macedonian problem, 207

Mesopotamia, British and German rivalry in, 67

Montenegro, opens first Balkan War by a memorable declaration, 270; enters war against Bulgaria, 341

Morocco, German intervention in 1905 in, 72; Convention of Algeciras in 1906 decides the international status of, 73; question reopened by the Agadir incident in 1911, 78; French protectorate over, agreed to by Germany, 81-82

Mürszteg, Program of, 176

_Narodna Obrana_, Servian patriotic society organized in support of the national aspirations for a "Greater Servia," 155, 373; its dissolution demanded by Austria-Hungary, 378; and agreed to by Servia, 383

Nazim pasha assassinated, 308

New citizenship law enacted in Germany, January 1, 1914, 34

Nicholas, Czar, proclamation to Poles, Aug. 16, 1914, 116

Novi Bazar, Sandjak of, 144, 368, 341

Osmanlis, contrast of civilization to Roman and Byzantine, 60

Pan-Germanic movement in Germany, 55

Pan-Islamic movement, failure of, 64, 70

Paris, Congress of (1856), forbids the Black Sea to Russia, 137

Persia, Passing of, 84-95; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 87; terms of the Russo-German Accord of 1911, 92

Persian Constitutionalists, weakness of, 87

Poland, and its partitioners, 96-118; its redistribution by the Congress of Vienna, 97; the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863, 98; harsh treatment of the Poles since 1864 in Russia, 99; separation of Kholm in 1912, 106; condition of the Poles in Austria-Hungary since 1867, 108; how the Poles have fared in Germany since 1870, 111; international aspect of the Polish question, 115-118

"Program of Mürszteg," proposed as a solution of the Macedonian problem, 176

Radetzky, on the attitude of Russia to the Ottoman Empire, 136

_Reichsland_, Alsace-Lorraine constituted a, 6

Reichstadt, Convention of, 144

Ribot Ministry, fall of, 389, 403

Rumania: her neutrality discussed, 134; her rôle in the second Balkan War, 338-340; and the Treaty of Bukarest, 346

Ruthenians in Galicia, 109-111

Russia: ends Asiatic rivalry with Great Britain by convention of August 31, 1907, 87; sends troops to northern Persia in 1909, 90; comes to accord with Germany in Persia, 92; her despotic rule in Poland, 99; her strivings after ocean waterways, 135; promises to support Servia against Austrian aggression, 381, 394

Salonika, Austro-Hungarian dream of possessing, 144, 166; surrendered to the Greeks, 297, 321

Sandansky, the capturer of Miss Stone, an American missionary, 328

Sarajevo, Archduke Ferdinand and his wife assassinated at, 374

Saverne, affair of, 17-18

Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, 315

Serbo-Croatian national aspirations repressed in southern Hungary, 146

Servia: her national aspirations for a strong independent state held in check by Austria-Hungary, 143-149, 155-158; her rôle in the Balkan alliance, against Turkey, 276, 293; capture of Monastir, 294; her rupture with Bulgaria precipitates second Balkan War, 323; protests against annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, 368; forced into submission, 371; receives ultimatum from Austria for the Sarajevo assassination, 376; her answer conciliatory but not satisfactory, 381-384; war declared against her, 384

Shuster mission in Persia a failure, 91

Tchatalja, Bulgarian attack halted at, 291

Thracian campaign in the Balkan War, 276-292

Treaty of Bukarest, 343-350: terms of the protocols signed by the allies and new map of the Balkan peninsula, 345-350

Treaty of Frankfort, 6, 21, 22

Treaty of Lausanne ends war between Italy and Turkey, 260

Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, 316; its terms, 318, 360

Treitschke's opinion of the British, 30

Triple Alliance, 24, 28, 122

Triple Entente, 26

Tripoli annexed by Italy, 250

Turkey, the bloodless revolution of 1908, 180; Young Turks' constitutional _régime_, 182-219; why it failed, 185, 218; treatment of Armenians before and after the Adana massacres, 186; the attempt to suppress the liberties of the Orthodox Church, 194; the Cretan question and the Greek boycott, 201; the Young Turks and the Macedonian problem, 206, the Albanian uprisings, 210; treatment of the Arabs in Asiatic Turkey, 214; war with Italy over the occupation of Tripoli, 247, 262; war with the Balkan States, 263-300

Venizelos, Eleutherios, Prime Minister of Crete, urges Powers to place the island under Greek protection, 228; the diplomats temporize, 230; becomes Prime Minister of Greece and inaugurates constitutional reforms, 232

_Weltpolitik_ of Germany, 22-57; the factors which have given birth to it, 29; its scope as announced by the Kaiser, 31; supported by new citizenship law, 34; "once a German always a German," 35; led to colonial annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 41; its development creates a strong navy and merchant marine, 52; leads to railway concessions in Asia Minor and formation of the Bagdad Railway Company, 64; German intrigues in the Ottoman Empire, 66

Wilhelm, Emperor, makes tactless speech at Strasbourg, 14; attacked by Socialists in the _Reichstag_, 14-15; announces scope of the _Weltpolitik_, 31; historic speech in Tangier, March 31, 1905, 72; Venizelos interviews, 236

William of Wied, Prince, made Mpret of Albania, 364; abdicates after a short reign, 366

Wolff, Herr, leader of the German Liberal party, on the attitude of the anti-Prussian parties in the _Reichsland_, 19

Young Turks, _see under_ Albania, Crete, Italy, Macedonia, and Turkey