Part 11

On account of the fire which they received from the houses, and of which they could not get the mastery, despite all attempts in conjunction with the infantry to clear the houses, they had been obliged to withdraw to the heights.

The village of Les Rivages at first appeared as if deserted. On the opposite bank the houses in Neffe, struck by our artillery fire, burst into flames (Apps. 20, 39, 44).

The crossing began at once. First the 2nd, then the 11th Company of Grenadier Regiment No. 101, gained the left bank and advanced to the attack in extended order against the enemy infantry on the western heights of the river-bank. The 11th Company received about five consecutive discharges of small shot from a house in the narrow alley through which they had passed in Neffe. The barred house was broken open, and the francs-tireurs, a man and two women, were shot.

Directly after this the company, led by the company commander, reached the railway embankment. At this spot a waterway led through the embankment; before the culvert lay a civilian with a sort of carbine, shot dead; in the dark culvert people were seen. From the top of the embankment the officer advancing with another company shouted down that he had been shot at from the culvert. The company commander called out loudly, "Sortez, on ne vous fera rien" ("Come out; nothing will be done to you"). No answer came from the culvert, neither did the people leave it who were concealed there. Thereupon a number of volleys were fired into the culvert. The Grenadiers continued their advance over the railway embankment and up the heights. The detachment left behind for clearing and guarding the culvert brought out about thirty-five to forty civilians, men, half-grown lads, women, and children, and with them about eight to ten rifles, not sporting-guns, but apparently military rifles. A portion of the civilians had been killed or wounded by the fire of the Grenadiers (App. 40). In the meantime everything had still remained quiet in Les Rivages. The first person who showed himself was a lame man. He described himself as the Mayor, and protested that the inhabitants of Les Rivages were peaceable in contrast to those of Neffe. He was therefore sent over to Neffe for the purpose of warning the population in that place to keep the peace, as in that case nothing would happen to them. The commanding officer of Grenadier Regiment No. 101 forcibly collected a large number of persons from the nearest houses in order to hold them as hostages against the hostile action of the populace. It was made clear to them that their lives were guarantee for the safety of the troops. The causes for this measure were the notorious hostility of the population of Dinant, and the report just made by an officer that, close by, to the south of Les Rivages, towards Anseremme, shots had been fired from the houses. The men were placed against a garden wall to the left of the place of crossing, the women and children who came with them out of the houses, somewhat farther down the river.

The bridge-building and crossing were in progress. When the bridge had been built out about 40 metres alike from the houses of Les Rivages and from the rocky slopes close to the south of the "Rocher Bayard," francs-tireurs began to direct a hot fire upon the Grenadiers, who were waiting in close order for crossing, and on the working pioneers. The greatest consternation and confusion ensued. In consequence of this the male hostages assembled by the garden wall were shot.

The shooting of the hostages, evidently visible to the unseen francs-tireurs, resulted in the cessation of the firing and a continuation of the bridge-building (Apps. 46, 48).

## Partly during the night of August 24th and partly on the next day the

troops of the Corps were able to cross the Meuse at Les Rivages and Neffe. On August 25th the rear portions of the Corps also crossed the Meuse.

In no way, however, had the severe measures taken on August 23rd put any final stop to the excesses of the francs-tireurs. On the two following days also, columns passing through and single persons were shot at from the slopes and from the houses, although no longer to the same extent as on August 23rd. This necessarily led again to retaliatory measures, to the shooting of individual inhabitants caught in the act, and to the artillery bombardment of buildings which were occupied by francs-tireurs. The former measures were taken on August 24th in Neffe and St. Médard, and the latter on August 24th and 25th in all parts of the town (Apps. 49, 50). If one reviews the whole of the resistance offered to the German troops by the population of Dinant and its suburbs, the first thing that strikes one is its systematic organisation (Apps. 12, 25, 30).

Already before the 23rd of August it was known to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Dinant that in this place there existed an organisation for treacherous attack on the German troops (Apps. 12, 51).

It was known that the surprise attacks upon the German troops by the local inhabitants, which took place at Sorinnes and other places lying to the east of the Meuse, were partly to be traced to emissaries from Dinant.

This organised effort was distinguished by its careful preparation and by the extent of its activities.

The houses were placed in a state of defence by the barricading of the doors and windows, by the construction of loopholes, and by the accumulation of a large supply of firearms and ammunition in the houses. The existence of large stocks of ammunition was proved in one way by the repeated explosions in the burning houses. In the night operations of August 21st trip-wires were drawn across the street (Apps. 3, 9, 10, 11, 18, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 49, 50, 52, 53, 70, 81).

From the fact that the firearms were not only in part sporting-guns and revolvers, but were partly machine-guns and Belgian military rifles (Apps. 2, 25), one may conclude that the movement had the support of the Belgian Government. The whole of Dinant with its suburbs on the right and left bank of the Meuse was prepared in the same way. Everywhere, in Leffe, in Les Rivages, in Neffe, one found the barricading of the houses, the loopholes, and the presence of weapons. At the same time it is expressly pointed out in the reports of the fighting that the belligerent Belgian civilians did not wear any kind of military badge (Apps. 4-7, 12, 15, 22, 24, 25, 31). The whole population was imbued with the same purpose--to hold up the German advance. If, by taking part in the dangers into which it knowingly ventured, some portion of it perished, it has only itself to blame.

This resistance offered to our troops was extremely obstinate. It was carried on with every kind of weapon, with military rifles and sporting-guns, with bullets and shot, with revolvers, with knives, with stones (Apps. 5, 10, 11, 25-28, 31, 35, 38, 43, 54, 55, 57, 58, 63, 67, 81). All grades, even the clergy (App. 18), took part in it, men and women, old men and children (Apps. 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 18, 28, 29, 35, 41, 44, 54, 56, 59, 63). From the cellars of burning houses firing was still kept up. At the very moment when he was being shot by martial law, a franc-tireur discharged a revolver, which he had kept concealed, at the firing-party (App. 5). With treachery and cunning (Apps. 28, 32, 43, 44, 50, 68), themselves invisible from the outside, they fired from loopholes in the rear of passing detachments and on single officers. They disappeared before the advancing Germans (Apps. 12, 37, 64) through back ways into the caves and subterranean passages, to continue their work of assassination in some other place.

Some male francs-tireurs had put on women's clothing (Apps. 64, 65). The Geneva badge was misused by individuals and in the case of buildings in order, under its protection, to cause injury to the Germans (Apps. 9, 16-18, 32, 56, 66-70).

Even the wounded who were being transported to the rear, as well as hospital orderlies, were shot at from the houses (Apps. 71, 72).

The fanaticism of the population found its most revolting expression in the cruel murder of sleeping men, in the mutilation of the fallen, and in the burning of wounded prisoners who were bound up with wire for this purpose (Apps. 56, 59, 61, 67, 73-78).

In judging of the attitude taken by the troops of the XII. Corps in the face of the action of the civil population, which was hostile to the last degree and employed the most reprehensible methods, we must remember that the tactical aim of the XII. Corps was the rapid passage over the Meuse and the clearing of the enemy from the left bank. The speedy suppression of the resistance of the inhabitants, which was directly opposed to this aim, was a military necessity to be secured by all possible means. From this point of view, the bombardment of the town, which was taking an active part in the fighting, and the burning of the houses occupied by the francs-tireurs, as well as the shooting of inhabitants caught with weapons in their hands, were all justified.

In the same way, the shooting of the hostages in various localities was also justified. The troops fighting in the town found themselves in the direst extremity, inasmuch as they were under the artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire of the regular troops posted on the left bank of the Meuse, and were at the same time being fired at in the rear and on the flanks by the inhabitants. The hostages were taken as security in order to put a stop to the conduct of the francs-tireurs. Despite this, and since the population continued, as before, to inflict losses on the struggling troops, the shooting of the hostages was carried out; otherwise, the holding of the hostages would have only implied an empty threat. Their execution was all the more justified, since, with the general participation of the populace in the fighting, it was hardly a case of innocent victims.

In view of the military objective mentioned above and the serious straits in which the troops found themselves, treacherously attacked as they were from the rear, such action on our part could not be avoided.

The lives of women and children were, on principle, spared, so long as they were not caught in the act, or it was not a case of self-defence against their attacks (Apps. 5, 6, 25, 26, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 79). The fact that, despite this, women and children were killed and wounded is intelligible from the prevailing circumstances.

They were struck partly by shots coming from the enemy on the left bank of the Meuse and partly by stray shots during the house and street fighting (App. 10). In the shooting of the hostages at Les Rivages a few women and children were also hit. This happened in the case of some who, contrary to the arrangements made, had left their station which was apart from the male hostages, and had crowded together with the latter (Apps. 45, 46). That the troops of the XII. Corps did not show themselves harsh or cruel is proved by numerous cases in which they exhibited, under the existing circumstances, a solicitude, deserving special recognition, for women, old men, and children (Apps. 52, 53, 55, 58, 80-86). A number of women confined to their beds on account of child-birth were carried from houses in the danger zone to a sheltered place and laid on mattresses near our wounded (App. 5). Wounded inhabitants--the wounds mostly originated from the enemy's fire--were bandaged and given over to conscientious medical treatment (Apps. 7, 10, 29, 44, 47, 50-52, 68, 86, 87). Little children found alone were handed over to female care (Apps. 47, 51). The large number of women and children from burning Dinant who were in Les Rivages on the night of August 24th were sheltered in a house and provided with food and drink (Apps. 45, 51). In the morning they all received coffee from the field-kitchen of the Guards Regiment.

The account given by the surviving inhabitants of Dinant about the fighting for their town, and the statements thereto appended by the Belgian Commission of Inquiry, as well as those of the hostile Press, are marked by their complete silence as regards the part taken by the populace in the fighting against our troops, and, with intentional exaggeration, solely record what our troops have done to suppress this

## participation in the fighting. In face of what positively occurred, it

is a malicious distortion of the actual facts to maintain that, because orders had been issued to give up all weapons, the inhabitants did not fire.

Without doubt it is deeply regrettable that, in consequence of the events of August 23rd and 24th, the flourishing town of Dinant with its suburbs was burnt and laid in ruins and a great number of human lives were destroyed. The responsibility for this lies not on the German Army, but only on the population. The inhabitants collectively engaged in conflict with the German troops contrary to international law and in a fanatical and treacherous manner, and forced our troops to take those counter-measures required for the purposes of war.

Had the population held aloof from armed resistance and open

## participation in the fighting, scarcely any injury would have been

incurred by them, as regards life or property, despite the hazardous position in which they were placed by reason of military operations.

BERLIN, _April 11th, 1915_.

Military Department of Investigation into the Violation of the Laws of War.

Signed: Major BAUER. Signed: Councillor of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Dr. WAGNER.

C. App. 1.

EXTRACT from the military diary of the General Officer commanding the XII. (1st Royal Saxon) Army Corps.

_August 22nd, 1914._

On August 22nd the Imperial Headquarters remained at the Château of Taviet. The day was occupied in carrying on reconnaissances in the manner directed. Towards 3 o'clock in the forenoon the report came through a General Staff-Officer sent in advance that the 2nd Battalion of Rifle Regiment No. 108 had succeeded by a night attack in throwing the enemy back across the Meuse at Dinant. Here the inhabitants had once more taken part in the fighting, in some cases with shot-guns.

_August 23rd, 1914._

The General's Staff reached the western outlet of Sorinnes at 4 a.m. The 23rd Infantry Division, present at the same point, immediately reported its readiness for opening fire; the 32nd Infantry Division, communication with which was at first lacking, did not report until 5.40 a.m. At 5.55 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief gave the order to fire, which, at first, could not be complied with on account of the thick weather.

In virtue of the command to open fire, the General in command gave the order: "The divisions to occupy the bank on this side of the Meuse with strong lines of riflemen, to enable the slopes on the opposite side to be taken under an effective infantry fire." As the weather, towards 6 a.m., permitted regular artillery fire to be delivered, it was observed that the enemy only replied weakly. For this reason the General in command gave the order at 6.30 a.m. that his reserve troops were to follow their divisions, as he expected a more rapid advance of the divisions towards the Meuse. For the same reason the General Staff proceeded at 8 a.m. to Gemechenne.

The next reports received up to 8.30 a.m., as well as a reconnaissance undertaken by Captain Bahrdt and 1st Lieutenant Count Schall in the district of Dinant, seemed to contradict this assumption. At 8.50 a.m. a report arrived from Colonel Francke, Infantry Regiment No. 180, which seemed to confirm the original opinion of the General in command. A communication by the Oberquartiermeister with reference to the observation of an army airman coincided also with this opinion. At the same time the Commanding General had directed that the order for the crossing of the Meuse should be made out.

In the meantime, the troops had also advanced into new positions in the direction of the Meuse. It seemed to be more and more certain that the enemy had to all intents and purposes withdrawn, and only continued to offer any serious resistance at the presumed crossing-places, especially at Houx.

Although 1st Lieutenant Berckmüller and 1st Lieutenant Count Schall reported at 10.15 a.m. that on a renewed reconnaissance near Dinant they had met with brisk shrapnel-fire, the Army Corps order to cross the Meuse was given at 10.20 a.m.; for this purpose a half of the bridge-building corps was placed at the disposal of each of the two divisions. For the more rapid suppression of the resistance at Houx, the reserve division of the General in command was given back to the 32nd Infantry Division at 10 a.m.

After the issue of this order, 1st Lieutenant Hasse of General Staff No. 3 arrived and reported that the II. Army had crossed the Sambre to the west of Namur on August 22nd, so that a serious resistance on the part of the enemy on the Meuse was not to be expected. It was intended to give the XII. Army Corps the direction on Anthée; the XIX. Army Corps, on the other hand, was to be taken over the Meuse to the south of Givet. The possibility of getting into touch on the western bank of the Meuse with the General Command (left wing, II. Army) was immediately communicated to the 32nd Infantry Division.

The opinion, seemingly confirmed by an air report received in the meantime that the Corps would get across the Meuse without serious difficulties, was destined to prove incorrect. The 32nd Infantry Division met with serious opposition at Houx and Leffe, and a similar experience befell the 46th Infantry Brigade in burning Dinant. It was only at the crossing-place of the 45th Infantry Brigade at Les Rivages that everything, at first, appeared to go smoothly, so that the 23rd Infantry Division reported at 12.40 a.m. through Major v. Zeschau that they were able to commence the crossing.

It was to be inferred from the reports in general that the crossing, even if beset with difficulties, could still be effected in the afternoon. A Corps command was therefore issued at 5.10 p.m., which assigned Sommière as the objective of the 32nd Infantry Division, and Onhaye that of the 23rd Infantry Division.

The General Staff, in view of the shortly expected crossing, proceeded from Gemechenne to the bend in the road 1.5 kilometres to the east of Dinant. At 2 p.m. the XIX. Army Corps reported that the 24th Infantry Division was crossing at Lenne with a brigade.

The troops of the Corps had, however, at the crossing-places some very severe fighting with the enemy posted on the west bank of the Meuse. This fighting, through the participation of the inhabitants, assumed an especiallv severe character. At the moment when the (Guards) Grenadier Regiment No. 100 had lowered the first pontoons into the water, a violent fire was delivered from the adjacent houses. The troops found themselves in the unpleasant position of being fired at by the infantry and artillery of the enemy on the western bank and by the inhabitants in their rear. The most unsatisfactory result of this fight was that a part of the pontoons had been rendered unserviceable by the bombardment.

Subsequently the crossing of the 23rd Infantry Division proved exceedingly difficult. The material to hand was no longer sufficient for the building of a military bridge. The General in command, who towards 7 p.m. had personally ascertained the position of the 32nd Infantry Division in Leffe, proceeded to the crossing-place of the 23rd Infantry Division, which he reached towards 8 p.m. The position of the Corps at this time was more or less as follows:

In Leffe the 32nd Infantry Division was still fighting for the crossing. At Dinant the 46th Infantry Brigade had been obliged to withdraw to the heights on the eastern bank because it was impossible to remain in the burning town. At Les Rivages a part of the bridge was ready, but the material was not sufficient for its completion, consequently a system of ferrying had to be contrived.

The commander of the 23rd Infantry Division accordingly arranged that a mixed force under Colonel Meister (Grenadier Regiment No. 101, Hussar Regiment No. 20, 1st Section, Field Artillery Regiment No. 12) should first be put across. The (Guards) Grenadier Regiment No. 100 was to follow next, while the remainder of the Army Corps was directed to the bridge of the 32nd Infantry Division at Leffe.

According to an Army Order sent at 7.15 p.m. to the east of Dinant, the pursuit was to be taken up with the available troops on the western bank of Meuse; XII. Army Corps; direction, Philippeville.

For correct transcript.

Signed: VON LOEBEN, Captain on the General Staff.

C. App. 2.

EXTRACT from the Report of Rifle (Fusilier) Regiment No. 108 on the fighting in Dinant during the night of the 21st-22nd August 1914.

When the rear of the 2nd Battalion had reached the first houses in Dinant, a signal shot suddenly rang out. The next moment there was a rattle of musketry on all sides. There was firing from all the houses; from all the slopes, which are honeycombed by cellars and vaults, there came flashes. All the houses were firmly barricaded. An attempt was made to penetrate into the houses. If rifle-butts and hatchets were not adequate, there were pioneers at hand to throw in hand-grenades. Machine-guns had been fixed up in a corner house.

C. App. 3.

EXTRACT from the Report of the 1st Field Company of Pioneer Battalion No. 12 on the reconnaissance in force of August 21st, 1914, carried out with the 2nd Battalion, Rifle (Fusilier) Regiment No. 108.

As soon as the first houses in Dinant were reached, the street-lighting was destroyed; the columns marched closely along by the two rows of houses and arrived as far as the first cross-street. Here the head of the infantry column suddenly received from the corner house on the right a very violent fire, which was immediately returned. Instantly there was firing from all the houses. A violent street-fight then ensued. The pioneers forced the fastened doors open with hatchets and axes, threw hand-grenades into the lower rooms, and set others on fire with the torches which had been in the meantime ignited.

Lieutenant Brink turned into the first side-street on the left. This, however, had been obstructed by trip-wires; from the houses came firing, and stones were thrown.

All at once the company was fired at from the rear, and was obliged to return to the corner of the street. Non-commissioned Officer Grosse, who had been struck by several stones and lay unconscious by the trip-wires, was also brought back.

The 1st Company had fifteen slightly wounded and one severely wounded.

C. App. 4.

DRESDEN, _November 6th, 1914_.

Chief Military Court, Dresden.

On citation Paul Kurt Büchner, Reservist, 1st Field Company, Pioneer Battalion No. 12, in Pirna, appeared as witness and made a statement:

On the night of August 21st, 1914, my company was sent on a reconnaissance towards Dinant in Belgium. The 2nd Battalion, Rifle Regiment No. 108, marched with us. When we had arrived in the town we were briskly shot at from the houses, and, indeed, chiefly with small shot. We stormed a number of houses, and saw that the marksmen were civilians without any military uniform or badge. We then withdrew.