CHAPTER XXXI

THE _DOMAINE PRIVÉ_

“Our only programme, I am anxious to repeat, is the work of moral and material regeneration.”—Extract from a published letter of his Majesty King LEOPOLD II., King of the Belgians, Sovereign of the Congo Free State.

It is to be regretted that writers who, from time to time, call attention to the terrible maladministration prevailing in the Congo State do not, as a rule, strive to bring its _causa causans_ clearly before the public. The main issue becomes too often imbedded in a mass of surplus detail, and the bewildered individual searching for light gropes about in despair with an eternal query on his lips—“Why?” Why these atrocities which have been attested by dozens of honourable men[262]—atrocities which the Congo State Administration has long ceased to deny, and now merely attempts to minimise; atrocities of which every mail from the Congo brings additional proof?[263] Why this callous ferocity which appears at first sight to have in it naught but incoherence and downright stupidity, which seems so monstrous as to be almost incredible, and yet is vouched for, not only by travellers and missionaries who have witnessed its effects, not only by those who are in a position to guarantee the authenticity of information received from persons unwilling to allow their names to appear through fear of jeopardising their means of livelihood, but by the actual perpetrators, who, not without reason—although this excuse cannot shield them from execration—throw the responsibility upon the system whose servants they have been? Where is the underlying motive of it all? The answer to the query is, the _Domaine Privé_. When you have learnt what the _Domaine Privé_ is, what it means, what it involves, what it necessitates, what it renders inevitable, the story is told and everything is explained.

In the first place, let these main facts be borne well in mind. The vast territories of the _Domaine Privé_ have for eleven years been absolutely closed to legitimate private enterprise. Trade, which in Central Africa means the exchange of European merchandise for raw products, does not exist therein. The native living within these territories has been deprived by Royal Decree of his rights as a land-owner. Property held for centuries by well-defined native laws, vested in particular families and tribes, has been appropriated without consulting the interested parties, let alone compensating them. With the deprivation of his land the native has been dispossessed of the fruits thereof; the rubber growing so luxuriously in his forests he may (by decree) only gather for the State—we will see presently how the “may” becomes “must”; the ivory stacked about his villages is no longer his, but another’s; the elephants which roam about his country and damage his plantations he can incur the physical peril of destroying, but may not reap the reward to which he is thereby entitled, for the tusks of the slain beast do not, according to Royal Decree, belong to him. Since he cannot dispose of his produce, which is his wealth and also his currency; since he has lost his rights in his own land; since he cannot even hunt the wild beast which provides him with the wherewithal to make horns for war and the chase, armlets and anklets for his wives, ornaments for his habitation, he is no longer a free agent, but has become _de facto_ a serf. In theory, then, the decrees of September 1891 and October 1892 made of the native throughout the _Domaine Privé_ a serf. In theory a serf he remained for a little while. But as the grip of Africa’s regenerator tightened upon the _Domaine Privé_, as the drilled and officered army, armed with repeating-rifles, gradually grew and grew until it was larger than the native forces kept up by any of the great Powers of Europe on African soil,[264] as the radius of the rubber taxes was extended, as portions of the country began to be farmed out to so-called “companies,” whose agents were also officials of the king; the native of the _Domaine Privé_ became a serf not in theory only but in fact, ground down, exploited, forced to collect rubber at the bayonet’s point, compelled to pay onerous tribute to men whose salaries depend upon the produce returns from their respective stations—the punishment for disobedience, slothfulness, or inability to comply with demands ever growing in extortion, being anything from mutilation to death, accompanied by the destruction of villages and crops.

The _Domaine Privé_ is “worked” in two ways. The country is vaguely divided into districts, and the business of the _Commissaires_ of districts, and their agents and sub-agents, is to collect _impôts de nature_, the taxes in kind, which the king levies. There is no limit to this taxation. The _Commissaires_ are told to “devote all their energies to the harvesting of rubber,” but at the same time to proceed “_as far as possible_ by persuasion rather than force.” The purport of the instructions maybe briefly summed up thus: “Obtain all the rubber and ivory you can; your future advancement depends upon your energy.”[265] Of course, this _régime_ in a country like Africa, where the native is not obliged to “work” in order to live, would be so much beating of the air, if force were not used to give it practical effect. King Leopold understood that well enough, and, to use the expression of a French Colonial writer of repute—M. Pierre Mille—“the basis of the king’s economic policy has been the formation of an army sufficiently strong to force the natives to pay the rubber and ivory tax.” A large army, chiefly recruited from the Bangalas and Batetlas—both cannibal tribes—was raised, and when not engaged in rebelling against its officers, it has proved only too well its value.

Side by side with the enforcement of the _impôts de nature_, King Leopold bethought him of another scheme whereby to increase his revenue, and, at the same time, to throw dust in the eyes of European public opinion, by professing to sanction private enterprise in the _Domaine Privé_. His Majesty took to farming out portions of his domain to certain financiers with whom it suited him to keep on good terms. “Companies” were formed, in which the State retained a half interest. These companies are supposed to obtain the rubber and ivory they ship home in such large quantities by barter; but as more often than not the king’s officials and the companies’ agents are the same persons, and as the companies have the assistance of the _Force Publique_ (or permission to raise their own forces) to facilitate their commercial operations,[266] we may judge of the amount of legitimate barter trade which is carried on. There are six of these companies[267] in existence. The first group of five consists of the _Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo, the Abir, the Compagnie du Lomami, the Comptoir Commercial Congolais, and the Société Générale Africaine_. The State holds half the shares of the _Abir_ and half the shares of the _Société Anversoise_. It has no shares in the _Comptoir Congolais_, but receives 50 per cent. of the profits. Its arrangement with the _Compagnie du Lomami_ is, I believe, on the same lines as that with the _Comptoir Commercial Congolais_; and with the _Société Générale Africaine_ on the same lines as the _Abir_ and _Anversoise_. The _Société_, or rather _Comité Spécial du Katanga_, is also a _Domaine Privé_ company, but under a somewhat different form. One-third of the profits of the latter institution go to the Thys group of companies and two-thirds to the State. The principal officials of the _Comité Spécial du Katanga_—the sixth _Domaine Privé_ company—are Messrs. Droogmans (president and Secrétaire-Général), Arnold, De Keyser, and Lombard. All these men are highly-placed officials of the State. Droogmans is the Minister of Finance, Arnold is director of the Domaine, director of Agriculture, and of “Central book-keeping”; De Keyser is a director of the Finance Department, and Lombard is a director of the Department of the Interior.

The _Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo_ being a typical representative, we may examine its condition. It was formed in August 1892 under Belgian law, but reconstructed in January 1898 under Congo law—quite a unique jurisprudence, of which it may be said _summum jus summa injuria_—with a capital of 1,700,000 francs divided into 3400 shares of 500 francs each. King Leopold has conferred upon this company some 12,000 square miles situated in the Mongalla district. Within that large area, of course, no one has the right to enter; in that particular, the Mongalla district resembles every other portion of the Congo _Free_ State above Leopoldville, in the sense of being a monopoly within a monopoly. The administrative seat of the _Anversoise_ is 104 Rempart des Béguines, Antwerp; its principal headquarters in Africa are at Mobeka. Its president is M. A. de Browne de Tiège, nominated under the constitution of the company by the king himself. M. de Browne de Tiège is the king’s principal financial adviser in Congo affairs, and has several times lent moneys to the State. He has a seat in the House. The administrators are Baron Goffinet,[268] Ed. Bunge, and C. de Browne de Tiège; the “Commissaire” is Count Emile le Grelle. The original shareholders are: the Congo State, 1700 shares; A. de Browne de Tiège, 1100 shares; Bunge & Co., 100 shares; E. P. Grisar, 130 shares; Deyman & Druart, 100 shares—which accounts for 3130 out of the 3400. No one with even a superficial knowledge of Belgian society need be told of the relations between the king and Baron Goffinet, Count le Grelle and E. P. Grisar. The net profits for the four years 1897-1900 have been: 1897, 120,697 francs; 1898, 3,968,832 francs; 1899, 3,083,976; 1900, 84,333, or say a profit in four years of 7,275,838 francs. The “State’s” holdings being 50 per cent., its share in the profits would be proportionate. At this point it may be well to remark that the inspired utterances which from time to time appear in the British Press, dated from Brussels, to the effect that the Sovereign of the Congo State does not hold a single share in these companies, constitute, of course, a polite fiction. In all matters affecting the _Domaine Privé_ the State is the King. The _Domaine Privé_, let it be reaffirmed once again, is the king’s property and his alone. The shares of the _Société Anversoise_ have stood as high as 13,730 francs (March 1900), which for a 500-franc share is sufficiently alluring. At that figure, which can be easily verified by the sceptical, his Majesty’s 1700 shares were worth over 23,000,000 francs, or say £933,000. During the last two years, outbreaks in the Mongalla district have been so numerous that the profits of the company have fallen somewhat.

The performances of this particular offshoot of King Leopold’s _Domaine Privé_ have been worthy of the regenerating nature of the Congo State rule. In 1900, one or two of its agents confessed to killing, by order, 150 natives, cutting off 60 hands, crucifying women and children, and impaling the sexual remains of slaughtered males on the stockade of the villages whose inhabitants were slow in gathering rubber! “_Les scandales de la Mongalla_” led to stormy debates in the Belgian Chamber on July 16 and 17 of last year. It may not be out of place to recall their nature.

“July 17.—M. VANDERVELDE: We are not anti-colonial in principle.... But we are adversaries of a capitalist colonial policy which entails exploitation, theft, and assassination.... You dare not, in the name of Christian morality, defend the exploitation of the _Domaine Privé_.... Rubber and ivory represent 93 per cent. of the exports.... The _Domaine Privé_ produces much more than the budgetary returns. How are these extraordinary results obtained?... The Congo State has introduced forced labour, tribute, paid in kind, and a twelve years’ military service.... We protest against this disguised form of slavery. (Applause.) The greatest names in England and Germany have condemned this system. The premiums given to Congolese agents have been repudiated by the honest ones amongst them. (M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE interrupts.) M. de Browne de Tiège, who is interested in Congo affairs, must be admirably posted in the Mongalla lawsuit, which revealed acts of cruelty in his very own district.

“M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE: It is false.

“M. MAROILLE: No doubt; like the stories of the severed hands.

“M. LORAND: It is so true that, as a result of what I have stated here, the particular officer whom I challenged to deny the facts has written giving me information, in which he admits that these ‘war trophies’ were brought in. That is Congo civilisation! On all sides war, massacres, crimes continue there. How can you possibly defend these things?

“M. FURNEMONT: On the coat-of-arms of the city of Antwerp figure cut hands. M. de Browne, who inhabits Antwerp, no doubt considers the emblem very appropriate....

“M. DE SMET DE NAEYER (Belgian Premier): The exploitation of the _Domaine Privé_ is conformable with jurisprudence.... People criticise tribute paid in kind (_prestations de nature_). Do they not exist to a certain extent in Belgium? Why suspect the Congo State of cruelty?

“M. LORAND: We are entitled to do so. Remember the 1300 severed hands.

“M. DE SMET DE NAEYER: Faults have certainly been committed, but the State is applying itself to their disappearance. The disinterestedness of the creators of the Congo State will find its reward in the gratitude of the country....

“July 18.—M. LORAND: Your colonial policy is analogous to the crimes mentioned in Article 125 of the Penal Code; it is a policy of devastation, pillage, and assassination. [The speaker (I quote from the Parliamentary report of the Belgian papers of that date) then read some correspondence published in the Antwerp newspaper _La Métropole_, in which a series of executions, murders, and expeditions against the Bundjas are mentioned.] ‘Are we,’ he continues, ‘to have another edition of the severed hands incident?’

“M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE: That is not the question.

“M. LORAND: Indeed. But it happens precisely to be the question. (M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE interrupts.)

“M. VANDERVELDE: Your interest, M. de Browne, is so direct a one in this matter that you might refrain from any participation in this debate.”

The cutting-off of hands item is a constantly recurring charge. I have in my possession at the present moment a photograph from the Upper Congo of three natives, a woman and two boys; the woman and one of the boys have their right hands severed at the wrist, the other boy has both hands severed. The correspondent who sent it me—and whom I know to be an honourable man—saw the victims himself, and was satisfied that soldiers of the State were the culprits. I fully believe him, but the photograph, of course, does not prove it.[269]

[Illustration: THE VICTIM OF A RUBBER RAID

A LIVING ILLUSTRATION OF THE “MAIN COUPÉES” DEBATES IN THE BELGIAN CHAMBER. THE BOY HERE PHOTOGRAPHED IS NOW CARED FOR BY A BRITISH MISSIONARY IN THE UPPER CONGO]

In November last, an American ex-agent of the _Société Anversoise_, Mr. Canisuis, who served for some time under the amiable ex-Major Lothaire, who, as already stated, was appointed Director in Africa of this company _after_ the murder of Stokes, in a Press interview said: “Last year I was on a rubber expedition with Major Lothaire, and during the six weeks it lasted 900 natives were killed and scores of villages were burnt.”

According to this gentleman, the natives receive the equivalent of one penny per pound of rubber, paid in merchandise valued at 100 per cent. above cost price. We knew that before. As things go in the Congo State, that particular rate of pay is even generous. But you cannot get rubber in Africa at even the munificent sum of one penny per pound, and sell it in Europe from 3s. to 4s. per pound, without those gently persuasive methods which find favour in quarters where the “regenerating” instinct is properly developed!

I trust I shall not be unduly troubling my readers if I pass another of King Leopold’s _Domaine Privé_ companies under review. It is not my fault that the whitewash has been laid on so thickly, and the process of scraping is bound to take some little time—and, from the author’s point of view, no little trouble. What company could be better singled out than the _Abir_, the most powerfully equipped of all—the “Queen” of Congo companies as it has been called? Originally the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company, founded in August 1892, and in which Colonel North was at one time largely interested, it was, like the _Anversoise_, reconstructed under “Congo law” in 1898 with a capital of 1,000,000 francs, divided into 2000 shares without designation of value, “giving right of 1/2000 of the _avoir social_.” King Leopold has conferred upon this company the monopoly of exploitation in the Lopori and Maringa districts of the _Domaine Privé_. The administrative seat of the _Abir_ is 48 Rempart Klipdorp, Antwerp; its headquarters in Africa are at Bassankusu. The President is M. A. van den Nest; administrators, A. Mols and Count H. van de Burgh; _Commissaires_, Jules Stappers and F. Reiss; Director, Ch. de Wael; Director in Africa, Ch. Sterckmans. I am under the impression that the British interests in the company ceased when it ceased to be a company in the ordinary acceptation of the term, viz. in 1898, as aforesaid. At any rate, I can find none but Belgian shareholders in the documents I have been able to obtain. First and foremost comes the Congo State with its 50 per cent., viz. 1000 shares, the inevitable M. A. de Browne de Tiège being _mandataire_ for the State; then M. A. de Browne de Tiège has 60 shares in his own name, and M. C. de Browne de Tiège 50, while our old friend the _Société Anversoise_ has 150 shares represented by M. de Browne de Tiège, President, and M. Bunge, Administrator; Bunge & Co. (whom we have seen hold 100 shares in the _Anversoise_) have 50 shares; other shareholders are Alexis Mols, Charles de Wael, F. Reiss, &c.[270] I have used the word _clique_ to describe the handful of persons who are running the Congo State (and as much more of Africa as they can lay hands on) with the king as Managing Director. It is an appropriate term, as the particulars given for these two “Companies” show. I may add that M. A. van den Nest, President of the _Abir_, is the original holder of 120 shares in the _Comptoir Commercial Congolais_, of which company M. Alexis Mols is President, while Messrs. Charles de Wael and F. Reiss are also holders, the one to the extent of 100, the other to the extent of 60 shares.[271] Baron Goffinet’s name crops up again in the _Lomami_,[272] and so it goes on.[273] These men are the king’s bodyguard. I know nothing of them personally. They may in private life be the most blameless of men, but the extraordinary thing is that Europe should be content to allow 1,000,000 square miles of African territory to be run by this _clique_ with its royal head, entirely for their own ends, and to fill their own pockets! Why, in the name of common sense and common decency, should hundreds, if not thousands, of natives of Africa be slain annually on account of this _clique_? It would be grotesque, were it not so horrible; so monstrous as to seem more like a nightmare than a reality.

But to return to the _Abir_. Its net profits in 1897 were 1,247,455 francs; in 1898, 2,482,697 francs; in 1899, 2,692,063 francs. The figures for 1900 I am unable to give, I regret to say. In 1901 the net working profits (_bénéfices nets d’exploitation_) were 2,455,182 francs, and the “profit and loss account” was closed with 2,614,370 to the good. A dividend[274] of 900 francs was declared on each share, and “the State” being the possessor of 1000 shares, it follows that its august Sovereign raked in the nice little sum of 900,000 francs, or say £36,000, for one year’s working of this eminently satisfactory “subsidiary” of the _Domaine Privé_. In four years the _Abir’s_ net profits amounted, therefore, to 8,877,397 francs, nearly nine times as much as its total capital! In June 1899 the shares stood at 17,900 francs per share, and the total value on the Antwerp Stock Exchange of this concern, whose capital is one million, was 35,800,000 francs! But since that date the shares have been up to over 25,000 francs per share! In June of this year they had fallen to a little over 11,000 francs per share. For a considerable time past they have been quoted _in tenths_; that is to say, one-tenth shares are bought and sold, and give rise to a great deal of speculation on the Bourse. Imagine the fortune which a holder of 1000 _full_ shares has had the opportunity of making during the last few years! Those 1000 shares, at 25,000 francs per share, were worth a million sterling! What it is to be a royal rubber merchant in the Congo!

It will have been noticed that the shares of the _Abir_ have dropped. The fact is that there have been “indiscretions,” and several Belgian newspapers published in October of last year some unpleasant details with regard to the circumstances under which these enormous stocks of rubber find their way to Europe. Amongst other revelations published—all of which purported to come from “a most honourable and esteemed agent” of the _Abir_—were the following: (1) In September 1897, the whole of the Upper Bolombo country was devastated (“_mis à feu et à sang_”) by the Dikila factory to compel the natives, with whom contact had not before been established, to make rubber. (2) “On Aug. 24, 1900, I met at Boyela two young women, one of whom was _enceinte_, with their right hands cut off. They told me they belonged to the village of Bossombo, and that the soldiers of the white man of Boyela had cut off their hands, because their master did not produce enough rubber!” These statements appear to have had the effect of depreciating the market value of the shares. But, really, the “bulls” might have been prepared for them. Possibly, they had not read the evidence given a year before by M. de Lamothe, ex-Governor of French Congo, before the Commission of Colonial Concessions held in Paris. M. de Lamothe, who had just returned from five months’ sojourn in the Upper Congo, remarked in the course of his deposition that:

“The Belgians have recently had insurrections in their territory. It is but right to add, however, that they sometimes make use of proceedings towards the natives that Frenchmen would never use.... The _Abir_, for instance, possesses a considerable territory and has even police rights (_sic_) over the natives. From that point of view the rights which its charter confers upon it are exaggerated. _Its agents have applied this so well that they have succeeded in inducing 30,000 natives to leave their territory and take refuge on the French bank of the Congo._”

Is it necessary to plunge yet deeper into this garbage of human villany and greed? The entire system is based upon terrorism. No man in his senses can really believe otherwise. A volume might be filled with misdeeds which since the days of Cortès and Pizarro have never been equalled, much less surpassed. The habitual _modus operandi_ in the Mongalla territory was tersely put by one of the agents of the _Anversoise_:

“When natives bring rubber to a factory they are received by the agent surrounded by soldiers. The baskets are weighed. If they do not contain the 5 kilos. required the native receives 100 blows with a _chicotte_.[275] Those whose baskets attain the correct weight receive a piece of cloth, or some other object. If a certain village contains, say, 100 male inhabitants (a census is always taken of the village before operations begin) and only fifty come to the factory with rubber, they are retained as hostages, and a force is despatched to shoot (_sic_) the fifty recalcitrant natives and burn their village.”

There are some districts which do not produce rubber: such a district, for instance, as the Bangala country proper, where hardly any rubber grows. Let it not be imagined that the people of that district are the gainers thereby. They are not subject, it is true, to either the rubber tribute or the rubber-collecting operations of the _Domaine Privé_ companies. But their lot is little better for all that. The Bangala country is one of the great recruiting centres of the State for its army.[276] The Bangalas are cannibals, and good fighters. It is also a victualling centre for the State posts. A great deal of information has been reaching me from this district of late. It may be usefully epitomised. First, as to the recruiting. The method adopted is this: A general order is sent from Boma to the Commissaires of Districts to the effect that so many recruits must be sent down. Each Commissaire then sets to work to obtain recruits. There is no system in the demands. Towns are dropped on according to the whim of the Commissaire. A particular village is summoned to supply a certain number of young men. The summons is rarely communicated by a white officer: almost invariably by native soldiers. The summons once made, it has to be obeyed, or the usual punishment is meted out. Nevertheless there has, upon occasion, been active opposition to this forced recruiting. There is always passive opposition. Both men and women object and complain very bitterly, but they have to submit. Mothers, wives, and relatives have been seen crying and protesting against their children, husbands, and relatives being sent away as recruits, for very few ever return; which is not astonishing, seeing that they serve twelve years. Secondly, as to the victualling-tax. Every month, and sometimes every fortnight, goats, fowls, palm-oil, eggs, and cassava bread have to be supplied to the State troops. The burden is increasingly heavy, because since it was first assessed the population has very much decreased. When accused of extortion the State replies that it pays for its produce. It does pay, at about one-twentieth of the market value. The natives have not infrequently to purchase produce themselves, in order to meet the demands of the State, which they are compelled to dispose of to the State soldiers at a much lower price than they have paid themselves:

“Every two or three miles a sentry, with a subordinate or two, and two or three servants from the locality, are stationed. It is part of the sentry’s duty to see that the tax is taken up regularly, and if he does not do so he is severely reprimanded by his chief. Now a keen-witted soldier will see to it that he is not reprimanded, and an unprincipled soldier will do anything to the people to wring the tax out of them, rather than run the risk of being a marked man in the Commissaire’s book.”

The oppression and misery which ensue can be imagined. The result of this double pressure for men and foodstuffs has been, naturally, to bring about a great decrease in the population. A correspondent who knows the Bangala country well, tells me that between 1890 and 1895 there was no perceptible decrease in the population. The taxes were first levied in the latter year, and in five years (1895-1900) there has been a reduction of one-half of the population. This appalling ratio of reduction is partly to be accounted for by the fact that sleeping sickness is endemic in the country, and that the withdrawal of the strongest and most virile elements of the population to serve in the army is naturally followed by a decline in the birth-rate. Those that are left have “the heart wrung out of them” by the food-tax. The people along the river are fast dying out, and the State “is forcing the backwood folks to start towns on the river the better to exploit them.” In one relatively small area my correspondent says, “Since 1890, one town half a mile long has disappeared; another, a quarter of a mile long, has also gone; and up a creek where there were 1500 people, there are scarcely 400 now.”

So long as Europe tolerates the _Domaine Privé_, so long will these things be—just as long as the regenerator of Africa and his friends can make money out of their philanthropic undertaking and can count upon dishonest, interested, or infatuated friends in Europe to throw dust in the eyes of the public.

There is one other feature of this unsavoury business which must be gone into before we can close the chapter on the _native_ aspect of Congo State rule. The Congo State invariably attempts to wriggle out of the responsibility for these horrors, by attributing their perpetration to the “excesses” of individual agents; and M. Jules Houdret, the Consul-General of the Congo State for England, had the effrontery the other day to point to the punishment of some of the _Anversoise’s_ people as affording a justification for the State’s claim to be what it professes, viz. solicitous of the welfare of the natives! It is a barefaced attempt to bamboozle public opinion, as impudent as the proposal made by the representatives of the Congo State at the Mansion House meeting last May to “inquire” into specific acts of cruelty brought forward. We know what these “punishments” mean. Occasionally, with a grand flourish of trumpets, the State announces that an agent has been punished. The announcement generally follows each fresh crop of revelations. One or two sub-agents are, for the time being, made scapegoats, and everything goes on as before. How could it be otherwise when the SYSTEM ITSELF is what it has been shown to be? The time has gone by when the public can be deceived by these sophistries, by these perpetual and frivolous excuses and denials.

The edicts of the Congo State administration, coupled with certain material facts as to which there can be no dispute, show the main factors, if one may say so, of the system of African tropical development, which it has instituted, to be these:

(1) Alienation of native ownership in land.

(2) Monopoly over the products of the soil.

(3) Natives forbidden to collect those products for any one but the State, or the subsidiary trusts (_Domaine Privé_ companies, if that appellation be preferred) created by the State, and in whose profits the State shares, generally to the extent of 50 per cent.

(4) Natives compelled to bring in rubber and ivory, and also recruits for the native army (and for labour in the cocoa and coffee plantations), to the State as tribute, and to supply the subsidiary trusts with rubber and ivory.

(5) The existence of a regular army of fifteen thousand[277] men armed with Albini rifles, and an unnamed number of irregulars to enforce the rubber and ivory tribute and to “facilitate the operations” of the subsidiary trusts.

(6) White officials in receipt of instructions to devote all their energies to the exploitation of rubber and ivory; in plain words, to get as much rubber and ivory out of their respective districts as they possibly can.

(7) The financial existence of the State dependent upon the rubber and ivory tribute, and upon the profits it derives from its share in the subsidiary trusts.

When on the one side you have the factors already enumerated, and on the other a primitive and—in the face of coercion backed by rifles of precision—helpless population, common sense asserts that gross oppression, violence, and every form of tyranny and outrage must be the infallible outcome of such a system; and it is that _system_ which the Powers are morally bound to put a stop to, seeing that it is they who are morally responsible for its existence.