Chapter 11 of 21 · 3974 words · ~20 min read

Part 11

Is a kind of divination, or method of arriving at the knowledge of futurity, by means of birds; it was among the Greeks what Augury was among the Romans.

PYROMANCY,

A species of divination performed by means of fire.

The ancients imagined they could foretel futurity by inspecting fire and flame; for this purpose they considered its direction, or which way it turned. Sometimes they added other matters to the fire, _e. g._ a vessel full of urine, with its neck bound round with wool; and narrowly watched the side in which it would burst, and thence took their prognostic. Sometimes they threw pitch in it, and if it took fire instantly, they considered it a favourable omen.

PYSCOMANCY, or SCIOMANCY,

An art among the ancients of raising or calling up the manes or souls of deceased persons, to give intelligence of things to come. The witch who conjured up the soul of Samuel, to foretel Saul the event of the battle he was about to give, did so by Sciomancy.

RHABDOMANCY,

Was an ancient method of divination, performed by means of rods or staves. St. Jerome mentions this kind of divination in his Commentary on Hosea, chap. vi. 12.; where the prophet says, in the name of God: _My people ask counsel at their stocks; and their staff declareth unto them_: which passage that father understands of the Grecian _Rhabdomancy_.

The same is met with again in Ezekiel, xxi. 21, 22. where the prophet says: _For the king of Babylon stood at the parting of the way_, at the head of the two ways, to use divination; he made his arrows bright; or, as St. Jerome renders it, _he mixed his arrows; he consulted with images; he looked in the liver_.

If it be the same kind of divination that is alluded to in these two passages, _Rhabdomancy_ must be the same kind of superstition with Belomancy. These two, in fact, are generally confounded. The Septuagint themselves translate ‏חצים‎ of Ezekiel, by ῥαβδος, a rod; though in strictness it signifies an arrow. So much however is certain, that the instruments of divination mentioned by Hosea are different from those of Ezekiel. In the former it is ‏עצו‎ _etso_, ‏מקלו‎ _maklo_, his wood, his staff: in the latter ‏חצים‎ _hhitism_, arrows. Though it is possible they might use rods or arrows indifferently; or the military men might use arrows and the rest rods.

By the laws of the Frisones, it appears that the ancient inhabitants of Germany practised Rhabdomancy. The Scythians were likewise acquainted with the use of it: and Herodotus observes, _lib._ vi. that the women among the Alani sought and gathered together fine straight wands or rods, and used them for the same superstitious purposes.

Among the various other kinds of divination, not here mentioned, may be enumerated: _Chiromancy_, performed with keys; _Alphitomancy_ or _Aleuromancy_, by flour; _Keraunoscopia_, by the consideration of thunder; _Alectromancy_, by cocks; _Lithomancy_, by stones; _Eychnomancy_, by lamps; _Ooscopy_, by eggs; _Lecanomancy_, by a basin of water; _Palpitatim_, _Salisatio_, παλμος, by the pulsation or motion of some member, &c. &c. &c.

All these kinds of divination have been condemned by the fathers of the Church, and Councils, as supposing some compact with the devil. Fludd has written several treatises on divination, and its different species; and Cicero has two books of the divination of the ancients, in which he confutes the whole system. Cardan also, in his 4th Book de Sapientia, describes every species of them.

ORACLE.

The word oracle admits, under this head, of two significations: first, it is intended to express an answer, usually couched in very dark and ambiguous terms, supposed to be given by demons of old, either by the mouths of their idols, or by those of their priests, to those who consulted them on things to come. The PYTHIAN[36] was always in a rage when she gave oracles.

Ablancourt observes that the study or research of the meaning of _Oracles_ was but a fruitless thing; and they were never understood until they were accomplished. It is related by Historians, that Crœsus was tricked by the ambiguity and equivocation of the oracle.

Κροισος Άλυν διαβας μεγαλην αρχην καταλνσει. rendered thus in Latin:—

_Crœsus Halym superans magnam pervertet opum vim._

Oracle is also used for the Demon who gave the answer, and the place where it was given. (Vide DEMON.)

The principal oracles of antiquity are that of Abæ, mentioned by Herodotus; that of Amphiarus; that of the Branchidæ, at Didymus; that of the Camps, at Lacedemon; that of Dodona; that of Jupiter Ammon; that of Nabarca, in the Country of the Anariaci, near the Caspian sea; that of Trophonius, mentioned by Herodotus; that of Chrysopolis; that of Claros, in Ionia; that of Mallos; that of Patarea; that of Pella, in Macedonia; that of Phaselides, in Cilicia; that of Sinope, in Paphlagonia; that of Orpheus’s head, mentioned by Philostratus in his life of Appolonius, &c. But, of all others, the oracle of _Apollo Pythius_, at Delphi, was the most celebrated; it was, in short, consulted always as a _dernier ressort_, in cases of emergency, by most of the princes of those ages.— Mr. Bayle observes, that at first, it gave its answers in verse; and that at length it fell to prose, in consequence of the people beginning to laugh at the poorness of its versification.

Among the more learned, it is a pretty general opinion that all the oracles were mere cheats and impostures; calculated either to serve the avaricious ends of the heathen priests, or the political views of the princes. Bayle positively asserts, they were mere human artifices, in which the devil had no hand. In this opinion he is strongly supported by Van Dale, a Dutch physician, and M. Fontenelle, who have expressly written on the subject.

There are two points at issue on the subject of _oracles_; viz. whether they were human or diabolical machines; and whether or not they ceased upon the publication and preaching of the Gospel?

Plutarch wrote a treatise on the ceasing of some _oracles_: and Van Dale has a volume to prove that they did not cease at the coming of Christ; but that many of them had ceased long before the coming of that time, and that others held out till the fall of Paganism, under the Empire of Theodosius the Great, and when it was dissipated, these institutions could no longer resist.

Van Dale was answered by a German, one Mœbius, professor of Theology, at Leipsic, in 1685. Fontenelle espoused Van Dale’s system, and improved upon it in his history of oracles; wherein he exposed the weakness of the argument used by many writers in behalf of Christianity, drawn from the ceasing of _oracles_.

Balthus, a learned Jesuit, answered both Van Dale and Fontenelle. He labours to prove, that there were real _oracles_, and such as can never be attributed to any artifices of the Priests or Priestesses; and that several of these became silent in the first ages of the Church, either by the coming of Jesus Christ, or by the prayers of the Saints. This doctrine is confirmed by a letter from Father Bouchet, missionary to Father Balthus; wherein it is declared, that what Father Balthus declares of the ancient oracles, is experimented every day in the Indies.

It appears, according to Bouchet, that the devil still delivers oracles in the Indies; and that, not by idols, which would be liable to imposture, but by the mouths of the priests, and sometimes of the bye-standers; it is added that these oracles, too, cease, and the devil becomes mute in proportion as the Gospel is preached among them.

It was Eusebius who first endeavoured to persuade the christians that the coming of Jesus Christ had struck the oracles dumb; though it appears from the laws of Theodosius, Gratian, and Valentinian, that the oracles were still consulted as far back as the year 358. Cicero says the oracles became dumb, in proportion as people, growing less credulous, began to suspect them for cheats.

Two reasons are alleged by Plutarch for the ceasing of oracles: the one was Apollo’s chagrin, who, it seems, “took it in dudgeon,” to be interrogated about so many trifles. The other was, that in proportion as the genii, or demons, who had the management of the oracles, died and became extinct, the oracles must necessarily cease. He adds a third and more natural cause for the ceasing of _oracles_, viz. the forlorn state of Greece, ruined and desolated by wars. For, in consequence of this calamity, the smallness of the gains suffered the priests to sink into a poverty and contempt too bare to cover the fraud.

Most of the fathers of the church imagined it to be the devil that gave _oracles_, and considered it as a pleasure he took to give dubious and equivocal answers, in order to have a handle to laugh at them. Vossius allows that it was the devil who spoke in oracles; but thinks that the obscurity of his answers was owing to his ignorance as to the precise circumstances of events. That artful and studied obscurity, wherein, says he, answers were couched, shew the embarrassment the devil was under; as those double meanings they usually bore provided for the accomplishment. When the thing foretold did not happen accordingly, the _oracle_, forsooth, was always misunderstood.

Eusebius has preserved some fragments of a Philosopher, called Oenomaus, who, out of resentment for having been so often fooled by the oracles, wrote an ample confutation of all their impertinences, in the following strain: “When we come to consult thee,” says he to Apollo, “if thou seest what is in the womb of futurity, why dost thou use expressions that will not be understood? if thou dost, thou takest pleasure in abusing us: if thou dost not, be informed of us, and learn to speak more clearly. I tell thee, that if thou intendest an equivoque, the Greek word whereby thou affirmedst that Crœsus should overthrow a great Empire, was ill-chosen; and that it could signify nothing but Crœsus’ conquering Cyrus. If things must necessarily come to pass, why dost thou amuse us with thy ambiguities? What dost thou, wretch as thou art, at Delphi; employed in muttering idle prophesies!”

But Oenamaus is still more out of humour with the oracle for the answer which Apollo gave the Athenians, when Xerxes was about to attack Greece with all the strength of Asia. The Pythian declared, that Minerva, the protectress of Athens, had endeavoured in vain to appease the wrath of Jupiter; yet that Jupiter, in complaisance to his daughter, was willing the Athenians should save themselves within wooden walls; and that Salamis should behold the loss of a great many children, dead to their mothers, either when Ceres was spread abroad, or gathered together. At this Oenamaus loses all patience with the Delphian god: “This contest,” says he, “between father and daughter, is very becoming the deities! It is excellent, that there should be contrary inclinations and interests in heaven! Poor wizard, thou art ignorant who the children are that shall see Salamis perish; whether Greeks or Persians. It is certain they must be either one or the other; but thou needest not have told so openly that thou knewest not which. Thou concealest the time of the battle under these fine poetical expressions, _either when Ceres is spread abroad, or gathered together_: and thou wouldst cajole us with such pompous language! who knows not, that if there be a seafight, it must either be in seed-time or harvest? It is certain it cannot be in winter. Let things go how they will, thou wilt secure thyself by this Jupiter, whom Minerva is endeavouring to appease. If the Greeks lose the battle, Jupiter proved inexorable to the last; if they gain it, why then Minerva at length prevailed.”

OURAN, OR URAN, SOANGUS,

The name of an imaginary set of magicians in the island Gromboccanore, in the East Indies.

The word implies _men-devils_; these people, it seems, having the art of rendering themselves invisible, and passing where they please, and, by these means, doing infinite mischief; for which reason the people hate and fear them mortally, and always kill them on the spot when they can take them.

In the Portuguese history, printed 1581, folio, there is mention of a present made by the king of the island to a Portuguese officer, named Brittio, _ourans_, with whom, it is pretended, he made incursions on the people of Tidore, killed great numbers, &c.

To try whether in effect they had the faculty ascribed to them, one of them was tied by the neck with a rope, without any possibility of disengaging himself by natural means; yet in the morning it was found he had slipped his collar. But that the king of Tidore might not complain that Brittio made war on him with devils, it is said he dismissed them at length, in their own island.

DREAMS, &c.

The art of foretelling future events by dreams, is called

_Brizomancy._

Macrobius mentions five sorts of dreams, viz. 1st, vision; 2d, a discovery of something between sleep and waking; 3d, a suggestion cast into our fancy, called by Cicero, _Vesum_; 4th, an ordinary dream; and 5th, a divine apparition or revelation in our sleep; such as were the dreams of the prophets, and of Joseph, as also of the magi of the East.

_Origin of Interpreting Dreams._

The fictitious art of interpreting dreams, had its origin among the Egyptians and Chaldeans; countries fertile in superstitions of all kinds. It was propagated from them to the Romans, who judging some dreams worthy of observation, appointed persons on purpose to interpret them.

The believers in dreams as prognostics of future events, bring forward in confirmation of this opinion, a great variety of dreams, which have been the forerunners of very singular events:—among these are that of Calphurnia, the wife of Julius Cæsar, dreaming the night before his death, that she saw him stabbed in the capitol: that of Artorius, Augustus’s physician, dreaming before the battle of Philippi, that his master’s camp was pillaged; that of the Emperor Vespasian dreaming an old woman told him, that his good fortune would begin when Nero should have a tooth drawn, which happened accordingly.

Cæsar dreaming that he was committing incest with his mother, was crowned Emperor of Rome; and Hippias the Athenian Tyrant, dreaming the same, died shortly after, and was interred in his mother earth. Mauritius the Emperor, who was slain by Phocas, dreamed a short time previous to this event, that an image of Christ that was fixed over the brazen gate of his palace, called him and reproached him with his sins, and at length demanded of him whether he would receive the punishment due to them in this world or the next; and Mauritius answering in this, the image commanded that he should be given, with his wife and children, into the hands of Phocas. Whereupon Mauritius, awakening in great fear, asked Phillipus, his son-in-law, whether he knew any soldier in the army called Phocas, he answered that there was a commissary so called; and Phocas became his successor, having killed his wife and five children. Arlet, during her pregnancy by William the Conqueror, dreamed that a light shone from her womb, that illumined all England. Maca, Virgil’s mother, dreamed that she was delivered of a laurel branch.

The ridiculous infatuation of dreams is still so prominent, even among persons whose education should inform them better, and particularly among the fair sex, that a conversation seldom passes among them, that the subject of some foolish inconsistent dream or other, does not form a leading feature of their gossip. “I dreamed last night,” says one, “that one of my teeth dropped out.”—“That’s a sign,” replies another, “that you will lose a friend or some of your relations.”—“I’m afraid I shall,” returns the dreamer, “for my cousin (brother, or some other person connected with the family or its interests,) is very ill,” &c.

_Opinions on the cause of dreams._

Avicen makes the cause of dreams to be an ultimate intelligence moving the moon in the midst of that light with which the fancies of men are illuminated while they sleep. Aristotle refers the cause of them to common sense, but placed in the fancy. Averroes places it in the imagination. Democritus ascribes it to little images, or representations, separated from the things themselves. Plato, among the specific and concrete notions of the soul. Albertus to the superior influences which continually flow from the sky, through many specific mediums. And some physicians attribute the cause of them to vapours and humours, and the affections and cares of persons predominant when awake; for, say they, by reason of the abundance of vapours, which are exhaled in consequence of immoderate feeding, the brain is so stuffed by it, that monsters and strange chimera are formed, of which the most inordinate eaters and drinkers furnish us with sufficient instances. Some dreams, they assert, are governed partly by the temperature of the body, and partly by the humour which mostly abounds in it; to which may be added, the apprehensions which have preceded the day before; which are often remarked in dogs, and other animals, which bark and make a noise in their sleep. Dreams, they observe, proceeding from the humours and temperature of the body, we see the choleric dreams of fire, combats, yellow colours, &c.; the phlegmatic, of water, baths, of sailing on the sea, &c.; the melancholics, of thick fumes, deserts, fantasies, hideous faces, &c.; the sanguines, of merry feasts, dances, &c. They that have the hinder part of their brain clogged with viscous humours, called by physicians ephialtes incubus, or, as it is termed, night-mare, imagine, in dreaming, that they are suffocated. And those who have the orifice of their stomach loaded with malignant humours, are affrighted with strange visions, by reason of those venemous vapours that mount to the brain and distemper it.

Cicero tells a story of two Arcadians, who, travelling together, came to Megara, a city of Greece, between Athens and Corinth, where one of them lodged in a friend’s house, and the other at an inn. After supper the person who lodged at the private house went to bed, and falling asleep, dreamed that his friend at the inn appeared to him, and begged his assistance, because the innkeeper was going to kill him. The man immediately got out of bed much frightened at the dream but recovering himself and falling asleep again, his friend appeared to him a second time, and desired, that as he would not assist him in time, he would take care at least not to let his death go unpunished; that the innkeeper having murdered him, had thrown his body into a cart and covered it with dung; he therefore begged that he would be at the city gate in the morning, before the cart was out. Struck with this new dream, he went early to the gate, saw the cart, and asked the driver what was in it; the driver immediately fled, the dead body was taken out of the cart, and the innkeeper apprehended and executed.

FATE.

Fate, in a general sense, denotes an inevitable necessity, depending on some superior cause. It is a term much used among the ancient philosophers. It is formed _a fando_, from speaking; and primarily implies the same with _effatum_, _i. e._ a word or decree pronounced by God; or a fixed sentence, whereby the deity has prescribed the order of things, and allotted every person what shall befal him. The Greeks called θμαρμενη, _quasi_, θρμος, _nexus_, a change, or necessary series of things, indissolubly linked together; and the moderns call it PROVIDENCE. But independent of this sense of the word, in which it is used sometimes to denote the causes in nature, and sometimes the divine appointment, the word Fate has a farther meaning, being used to express some kind of necessity or other, or eternal designation of things, whereby all agents, necessary as well as voluntary, are swayed and directed to their ends.

Some authors have divided Fate into Astrological and Stoical.

ASTROLOGICAL FATE, denotes a necessity of things and events, arising, as is supposed, from the influence and positions of the heavenly bodies, which give law to the elements and mixed bodies, as well as to the wills of men.

STOICAL FATE, or FATALITY, or FATALISM, is defined by Cicero, an order or series of causes, in which cause is linked to cause, each producing others; and in this manner all things flow from the one prime cause. Chrysippus defines it a natural invariable succession of all things, _ab eterno_, each involving the other. To this fate they subject the very gods themselves. Thus the poet observes, that the “parent of all things made laws at the beginning, by which he not only binds other things, but himself.” Seneca also remarks, _Eadem necessitas et deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter et humana cursit vehit. Ipse ille omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidam fata, sed sequitur; semel scripsit, semper paret._ This eternal series of causes, the poets call μοιραι, and _parcæ_, or destinies.

By some later authors Fate is divided into _Physical_ and _divine_.

The first, or Physical fate, is an order and series of physical causes, appropriated to their effects. This series is necessary, and the necessity is natural. The principal or foundation of this Fate is nature, or the power and manner of acting which God originally gave to the several bodies, elements, &c. By this Fate it is that fire warms; bodies communicate motion to each other; the rising and falling of the tides, &c. And the effects of this Fate are all the events and phenomena in the universe, except such as arise from the human.

The second, or divine Fate, is what is more commonly called Providence. Plato, in his Phædo, includes both these in one definition; as intimating, that they were one and the same thing, actively and passively considered. Thus, Fatum _Est ratio quædam divina, lexque naturæ comes, quæ transiri nequeat, quippe a causa pendens, quæ superior sit quibusvis impedimentis_. Though that of Bœtius seems the clearer of the two:—_Fatum_, says he, _est inhærens rebus molilibus despositio per quam providentia suis quæque nectet ordinibus_.

PHYSIOGNOMY[37], ΦΥΣΙΟΓΝΩΜΙΑ.

There seems to be something in Physiognomy, and it may perhaps bear a much purer philosophy than these authors (see Note,) were acquainted with. This, at least, we dare say, that of all the fanciful arts of the ancients, fallen into disuse by the moderns, there is none has so much foundation in nature as this. There is an apparent correspondence, or analogy between the countenance and the mind; the features and lineaments of the one are directed by the motions and affections of the other: there is even a peculiar arrangement in the members of the face, and a peculiar disposition of the countenance, to each particular affection; and perhaps to each particular idea of the mind. In fact, the language of the face (_physiognomy_,) is as copious, nay, perhaps, as distinct and intelligible, as that of the tongue, (_speech_.) Thanks to bounteous nature, she has not confined us to one only method of conversing with each other, and of learning each other’s thoughts; we have several:—We do not wholly depend on the tongue, which may happen to be bound; and the ear, which may be deaf:—but in those cases we have another resource, _viz._ the Countenance and the Eye, which afford us this further advantage, that by comparing the reports of the tongue, (a member exceedingly liable to deceive,) with those of the face, the prevarications of the former may be detected.