CHAPTER XVI

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

On Sunday, December 29, 1895, an armed force commanded by Dr. Jameson and Captain Willoughby invaded the territory of the Republic of the Transvaal. The object of the Jameson Raid was to combine with a body of disaffected Englishmen, living at Johannesburg, in order to upset the Government of the Transvaal, and, thereby, to provoke the intervention of the neighbouring British Commissioner, and so lead to the remission of the grievances of the Uitlander population. Such intervention, in the opinion of those responsible for the Raid, was not intended to result in the absorption of the South African Republic by the British Empire, though this point has never been made altogether clear. The English in Johannesburg, the Uitlanders as they were called in Dutch, failed, however, to meet the invaders, and Jameson and his men were captured without difficulty by the troops of the Republic, and were handed over to the Imperial Government to be tried and punished. Subsequently, a select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to investigate the causes of the Raid. The Committee, which numbered amongst its members Mr. Labouchere, met for the first time on February 5, 1897. The directors of the British South Africa Company, Messrs. C. J. Rhodes, Jameson, Alfred Beit, Lionel Phillips, and Rutherford Harris, were represented by Counsel. Mr. Labouchere frequently told me that he had never felt altogether {427} satisfied with the composition of the Committee. There were not enough stalwart Radicals on it. It was composed as follows: Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Chamberlain, the Attorney-General, Mr. Cripps, Sir W. Hart Dyke, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Wharton, Mr. George Wyndham, Sir William Harcourt, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, Messrs. John Ellis, Sidney Buxton, Blake, Labouchere, and Bigham (now Lord Mersey). Mr. Labouchere found his chief support in Mr. Blake, but even he fell off towards the end, and the member for Northampton registered his solitary vote for the second reading of the alternative report with which he wished to replace that of the chairman. The chairman's report finally adopted by the Committee may be summarised as follows:

"(1) Great discontent had for some time previous to the incursion existed in Johannesburg, arising from the grievances of the Uitlanders.

"(2) Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he was Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and, beyond all other persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a course as that which he adopted. As Managing Director of the British South Africa Company, as director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of interests: he used his position and those interests to promote and assist his policy. Whatever justification there may have been for action, on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position, in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed insurrection against the Government of the South African Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a state which was in friendly relations with Her Majesty, in breach of the obligation to {428} respect the right to self-government of the South African Republic under the conventions between Her Majesty and that state. Although Dr. Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always part of the plan that these forces should be used in the Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

"(3) Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr. Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his colleagues in the Colonial Ministry and from the Board of the British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

"(4) Your Committee have heard the evidence of all the directors of the British South Africa Company, with the exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined Mr. Beit and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr. Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Reform Union; he contributed large sums of money to the revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for the consequences.

"(5) There is not the slightest evidence that the late Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all information on the subject away from him. The Committee must, however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in not communicating to the High Commissioner the information which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty in a like manner.

"(6) Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor {429} any of the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which made them, or should have made them or any of them, aware of the plot during its development.

"(7) Finally, your Committee desire to put on record an absolute and unqualified condemnation of the Raid and of the plans which made it possible. The result caused for the time being grave injury to British influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with neighbouring states."[1]

It is impossible to quote even such a summary as I have just given of Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report. He began by indicating the difficulties under which the Committee laboured:

"(1) Your Committee decided, in the first instance, to limit its inquiries into that portion of the matters submitted to it for investigation having relation to the Jameson Raid.

"(2) A considerable amount of oral and documentary evidence has been placed before it. But its task was rendered difficult. Some of the witnesses, who were either cognisant of the Jameson plan, or who took part in the Jameson Raid, displayed an unwillingness to make a clean breast of all that they knew, and in many instances witnesses refused to answer questions that the Committee considered might properly be put to them. Lord Rosmead could not be called as a witness on account of ill health, although Mr. Rhodes had referred to him in his evidence as able to answer questions, to which that gentleman was not willing to reply. Documents of the greatest importance, in possession of one of the witnesses, were not forthcoming,[2] nor was an opportunity given to all the members of your Committee to examine him as to the statement that he had made in evidence in connection with them, nor was he reported to your House for contumacy, with a view to your House taking action to {430} overcome it. It seemed probable from the evidence that much in regard to the document had been stated to the War Office, as a ground for its taking certain action with respect to the officers concerned in the Raid. But witnesses from that office were not examined as to these communications. Although these documents were in the hands of his solicitor, who informed your Committee that Mr. Rhodes claimed them as his property, and would not allow him to produce them, no direct application was made to Mr. Rhodes by your Committee to allow them to be produced. Other documents of a similar character were secured by your Committee only after Mr. Rhodes had left the country. He was not, consequently, examined in regard to their or as tenor, to his action in respect to them.

"(3) Owing to these causes your Committee cannot pretend to have become possessed of a perfect and full knowledge of everything connected with the Jameson plan and the Jameson Raid. It has consequently only been able to weigh evidence against evidence, and to deduce from what has been submitted to it the inferences that seem to flow therefrom."[3]

He proceeded to stigmatise, even more severely than the Report adopted by the Committee, the political conduct of Mr. Rhodes, for whom, in private, he had conceived considerable personal admiration. In paragraph 25 of Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report was this statement: "Your Committee is, however, of the opinion that they (Messrs. Rhodes and Beit) merit severe punishment. Mr. Rhodes is a Privy Councillor, he was a Cape Premier, and he was the autocrat of Rhodesia when the conspiracy that your Committee has investigated was in preparation, and when it was sought to carry it out. He deceived his Sovereign, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner of South Africa, the Governor of the Cape Colony, his colleagues in the Cape Cabinet, the Board of the Chartered {431} Company, and the very persons whom he used as his instruments in his nefarious designs; and he abused the high positions which he held by engaging in a conspiracy, in a success of which his own pecuniary interests were largely involved, thus inflicting a slur on the hitherto unblemished honour of our public men at home and in our colonies. Mr. Beit is a German subject. In conjunction with Mr. Rhodes he fomented a revolution in a state in amity with us, and promoted an invasion of that state from British territory. These two men, the one a British statesman, the other a financier of German nationality, disgraced the good name of England, which it ought to be the object of all Englishmen to maintain pure and undefiled."

The only other important point in Mr. Labouchere's Draft Report was that referring to the alleged complicity of the Colonial Office in the Raid. While Mr. Labouchere admitted that the evidence in no way showed that any such complicity had existed, he regretted that the question had not been probed to the bottom, "because the slightest appearance of any indisposition to do this by your Committee may lead some persons erroneously to suppose that there may be some truth in the statements of witnesses connected with the Jameson plan that the secret aims of Mr. Rhodes were more or less clearly revealed to Mr. Chamberlain and to Mr. Fairfield."

He expressed himself very strongly in the following article on the Chartered Company in _Truth_:

If the events of the past week have not opened the eyes of Englishmen at large to the character of the patriots and heroes who have too long ruled the roost in South Africa, our boasted national common sense must indeed be a pitiful sham. What is the position? The South African Republic is a state originally brought into existence by the Boers treking from Cape Colony into the wilderness, and establishing themselves beyond what were then the limits of British colonisation. We tricked them once into surrendering their independence, merely reserving a suzerainty as against their right to conclude treaties with foreign {432} states without our consent. But since that was done, gold was discovered within their territory, and this has led to the migration of a vast number of English and men of other nationalities into the region where the Boer imagined that he was safe from pursuit. On the whole, these settlers, considering how unwelcome their presence must have been, have not been badly treated. The taxation is not excessive, and the condition of the mining industry is infinitely better than it is ever likely to be under the Chartered Company. Out of all those who have dabbled in Transvaal mining shares during the last year I wonder how many know the facts respecting the relation of the companies to the Government of the country. The Government charges on every mining claim a ground rent or royalty of 10s. a month. To a company owning fifty claims this means a ground rent of £300 a year--a very reasonable charge, when from thirty to sixty per cent. can be earned on the capital of the Company. As against this what do the Chartered Company charge? One half the net profits of all mines worked under their jurisdiction. This alone should teach shareholders of the Transvaal mines how little they have to gain from the overthrow of Boer Government by the Rhodes gang, and how thankful they may be for the course of events last week.

The non-Boer population, however, at Johannesburg and elsewhere have a genuine grievance on the question of the franchise and other rights of citizenship. In order to maintain their exclusive sovereignty in the land the Boers insist upon a fifteen years' residence for full naturalisation.... The period is too long, and it would be prudent on the part of the Boers to reduce it. There is no reason to suppose that they would refuse to do so, were the demands of the Uitlanders advanced in a regular manner.... But even were the Boers ever so deaf to justice and so blind to their own interests as to meet the Uitlander case with an obstinate _non possumus_, what pretext does this afford for armed intervention by the Chartered Company? A pretence it is true has been made that, before commencing their Raid, Jameson and his men resigned their positions under the Company; but even if such a form were gone through, it is obviously only a colourable pretence. The invading force was drilled, armed, and maintained by the Company. At its {433} head was the administrator of the Company. On his staff was the Company's generalissimo. It took with it the ammunition, equipment, and horses of the Company.... Neither in the political aims of the Uitlanders, nor the position of the Johannesburgers was there a shadow of justification for Jameson's Raid..... The proceedings bear their character on their face and are of a piece with all that has gone before in the history of the Company. The design was to play the Matabele coup again on a bigger field. What was the origin of the Raid on Lobengula? The Company had obtained Lobengula's permission to occupy Mashonaland and dig there for gold, and had no further right beyond this. When occupied, Mashonaland was found to have no paying gold. The shares of the Company were unsalable rubbish. A pretext was therefore found for making war on Lobengula and seizing Matabeleland--a pretext as transparently dishonest as the pretext for the invasion of the Transvaal. All the circumstances showed in that case as in this, that the coup had been carefully prepared long beforehand. When the train had been laid, a quarrel was picked with the Matabele, who had entered Mashonaland at the Company's request, and they were attacked and shot down by this same Jameson while doing their best to retire in obedience to his orders. Instantly the whole of the Company's forces, all held in readiness, entered Matabeleland under the pretence that the Matabele and not the Company were the aggressors. Lobengula's savages were mowed down by thousands with Maxims. Those who were taken prisoners were killed off to save trouble. The envoys sent by the King to try and make terms were barbarously murdered. The King himself fled and died before he could be captured. His territory and the flocks and herds of his people were parcelled out among the Company and the band of freebooters who had been collected by promises of loot. One million new shares were created by Jameson's principals and colleagues, and, in the subsequent boom, shares were unloaded on the British public at prices ranging up to £8 per share. Matabeleland, however, has proved no richer in paying gold than Mashonaland. The shares have been going down again. What were the Chartered gang to do next? In the Transvaal there are extensive paying gold mines, and money which the gang would like to pocket is going elsewhere. Forthwith {434} the Chartered Company's forces are marshalled again. A sudden and obviously factitious agitation springs up at Johannesburg. Rumours of deadly peril to the alien population are put in circulation, goodness knows whence. The women and children are packed off--so it is said, but no one knows why or at whose instigation. Simultaneously a message imploring aid from the quaking citizens reaches Jameson, no one knows how, and in a moment the fighting doctor and his bold buccaneers are once more over the border. There, however, all resemblance between the two coups ends. The Chartered heroes have not to deal this time with naked half-armed savages, but with white men as well armed as themselves, and as well able to use their arms. There are Maxim guns on the other side this time and Krupp guns as well. Result: after a few hours' fighting, the conquerors of Matabeleland are killed or taken prisoners, and the doughty Jameson and his staff are lodged in Pretoria Gaol. I have no desire to exult over their fate. It is a shameful and abominable business all round, out of which no Englishman can extract a grain of satisfaction. But if ever men died with their blood on their own heads, they are the men who fell in this raid, and if ever prisoners of war deserved scant mercy, Jameson and his comrades are those prisoners. They may thank their stars that they have fallen into the hands of men who are not likely to treat them as they themselves treated the Matabele wounded and prisoners.[4]

He continued his attack in a series of articles. The burden of his argument was always the impurity of motive arising from the financial interest involved. "What a comment on our morality," he writes on April 2, "has been our action during the last few months! We quarrelled with the Americans about Venezuela about a bog in which we fancied there might be gold; we remain in Egypt because we are looking after the interest on Egyptian bonds, and finding salaries for a herd of English employees; we are engaged in a Soudan Expedition because Dongola is fertile, and its possession will afford a plea to us to violate our pledges to leave {435} Egypt; we are disputing with President Kruger because he has fallen out with a crew of company mongers; we are backing up a company in Rhodesia because its shares have been put up to a high premium on the Stock Exchange. But, pledged as we are to see that there is good government in Armenia, we are supinely looking on whilst Armenian men are being slaughtered, Armenian women ravished, and Armenian villages burnt. Why? Because there is no money to be made in protecting Armenians, and our financiers have no interests in Armenia."[5]

Mr. Labouchere thought, rightly or wrongly, that the Imperialism of Mr. Rhodes was little more than a mask to cover the desire for financial expansion. Not that he thought badly of Mr. Rhodes personally. He thought that he deceived himself in perfectly good faith. While he detested his aims, he could not help admiring the energy and skill with which they were promoted, and something simple and direct in the character of the man himself.

The estimate I had formed of Mr. Labouchere's opinion of Mr. Rhodes as a private individual was recently confirmed by the following extract from a letter which I received from Mr. Charles Boyd containing a reminiscence of an interview he had with Mr. Labouchere in 1897:

That was the year [he wrote] of the British South Africa Commission of which he (Mr. Labouchere) was a member, and which, as George Wyndham's Secretary, I regularly attended; he was, of course, very much "over the way," in Mr. Jaggers's sense, to what one may call the Imperialist view of the South African question. It was, I think, in May, or, at all events, near the end of the sitting of the Commission, that I conceived the spirited notion of offering myself for the post of Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner for South Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, then recently appointed; though without official experience, I had some good backers on the strength of some little {436} study of the South African problem. Among these was one of the kindest of men, the late Mr. Moberley Bell, manager of the _Times_, with whom one morning I sat in his house in Portland Place considering that forlorn hope, as it most properly proved to be of my ambition. "The only thing is," said Mr. Bell, "what are you going to do with Labby? You know you are a child of the opposite camp." I agreed with gloom that, if I had any chance, and Mr. Labouchere "took notice," my antecedents might not be a recommendation. The imperial South African Association was then about a year old, and active and formidable enough to have caught the eye of _Truth_. Mr. Bell, leaning his big head on his big hand, had a benevolent inspiration. "If I were you," he said, "I'd jump into the nearest hansom and drive straight to 5 Old Palace Yard. It's a sort of move he may quite well love. You will be 'squaring Labby,'" and Mr. Bell dismissed me with his blessing. Yet a little and somewhat nervous-like I stood in the presence of your Uncle, in that wonderful room which you will so well remember giving on the green turf of the Abbey precincts. I stated my case, and displayed one or two testimonials, including that of his friend Sir Charles Dilke. "And now," said I indignantly, "if I do have any chance, I am told that I am in danger of _Truth_." "Nothing of the kind," said Mr. Labouchere. "I have, to begin with, a considerable admiration for George Wyndham, and, as for yourself, your having the nerve to come straight to me is sufficient proof of your fitness for the Imperial Secretaryship or for anything else," and with a graceful movement of his wrist he disengaged some cigarettes from a sort of gilded network basket of the same, which depended from the wall, and bade me sit down and smoke. He talked of the Commission, and asked me what I thought of the evidence of Mr. Rhodes, with whom, of course, he had considerably crossed swords, not to say whom he had bated. I expressed, possibly with an air of defiance, an extreme sense of Mr. Rhodes' candour. "But bless you," said Mr. Labouchere, "I know all that as well as you. I like Rhodes, I like his porter and sandwiches. An entirely honest, heavy person. On the other hand, did you ever see anything so fatuous as the performance of H----?"

Presently he returned to my candidature, and said, "I'd better write you a testimonial myself, and that will allay your fears..."

{437}

As is well known, the troubles of South Africa did not come to an end with the settlement of the Jameson Raid. The aggrieved Uitlanders had not availed themselves, when it came to the point, of Dr. Jameson's action, and their unredressed grievances--that they suffered from serious grievances was admitted even by Mr. Labouchere--festered in their minds and produced, as time went on, deeper and more widespread dissatisfaction. Nor was the appointment in 1897 of Sir Alfred (now Lord) Milner as British Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa by Mr. Chamberlain, who had taken office under Lord Salisbury as Colonial Secretary, calculated to allay the resentment of the Boers, his Imperialist sympathies being well known. Towards the end of 1898, Sir Alfred Milner left South Africa for England. He was away for three months, and during his absence several things occurred to hasten the unfortunate crisis--the outbreak of war. General Sir William Butler had been selected to fill the chief military command in South Africa, left vacant by the sudden death of Sir William Goodenough. Sir William Butler, immediately on his arrival in South Africa, allowed his sympathy with the Afrikander party to be very apparent. He was convinced that the English population of the Transvaal had no real grievances, and were only striving to make mischief. When Sir Alfred Milner returned to the Cape, on February 14, 1899, he was faced by a very different situation to the one he had left. In almost all the towns of Cape Colony and Natal meetings had been held by the Colonists protesting against the continuation of the existing state of affairs in the Transvaal, and demanding the intervention of the Imperial Government. Dutch feeling was no less agitated. Among the extreme section of Afrikanders everywhere a movement was on foot for the formation of a National League which should bind together all Afrikanders in strenuous opposition to any attempt of the Imperial power to intervene in South African affairs.[6]

{438}

In England, the first indication of what was coming was revealed to the discerning public who read Parliamentary reports by the publication of the army estimates, in which a sum not exceeding £1,211,900 was asked for to cover the military expenses (March, 1899-March, 1900). Mr. Dillon asked why it was considered necessary to increase so enormously our forces in South Africa. The Colonial Secretary (Mr. Chamberlain) replied to the effect that the Transvaal Republic, which borders on the colony of Natal and Cape Colony, had enormously in creased their offensive or defensive forces within the last few years. They had spent large sums in forts, artillery, and rifles, and millions of cartridges had been imported. Therefore, as long as the British Government was responsible for the peace in South Africa, a like increase of warlike preparation was necessary on our part. Mr. Labouchere replied aptly that the increased defensive measures adopted by the Boers had only followed upon the scandalous and outrageous raid which had been made upon their country by the minions of the Chartered Company. Then a paragraph appeared in the _Times_ to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief had been engaged in completing the organisation and composition of the "larger force which it will be necessary to dispatch to South Africa in the event of the negotiations at present in progress with the Government of the Transvaal proving unsuccessful." Mr. Labouchere asked, on July 7, whether the officers mentioned in this communique as going to South Africa to organise the forces, were to go into Cape Colony and into Natal to organise them, and, if so, whether it was with the consent of the Ministers of those Colonies? To which question Mr. Balfour replied "I do not know."[7]

On October 17, Mr. Dillon moved an amendment to the Address in answer to the Queen's Speech, praying for arbitration to settle the difficulties between the two Governments, so that "an ignominious war may be avoided between the {439} overwhelming forces of your Majesty's Empire and those of two small nations numbering in all less than 200,000 souls." Mr. Labouchere seconded the amendment, and pleaded eloquently for arbitration, suggesting President McKinley as the best arbitrator possible. The peroration of his speech was excellent, but, alas, it fell at the time upon ears already eagerly alert for no other sounds than the music of triumphant victory and glorious marches home after a course of deeds of valour, which the mere fact of British nationality was to render as easy of achievement as an afternoon's football. It reads now with a different ring, and testifies to the spirit of justice and temperance which were so characteristic of all his policy in those crises when the English nation gets stirred up, as it sometimes does, to a spirit of hysterical enthusiasm, in comparison with which the excitability and nervous agitation of the "foreigner" is a mere joke. "I confess that I feel very sorry for the end of these unfortunate Boers," he said. "They are fathers of families, they are farmers, honest and ignorant if you like. They are fighting for that which they believe to be the holiest and most noble of causes--their homesteads and their country. We must all regret that their country is not only turned into a battlefield, but that a number of these men, the breadwinners of families, will be slain. For my part, I cannot accept the responsibility of contenting myself with merely washing my hands of an injustice like this. It might be a very politic thing to say: 'There is a feeling in favour of war; I protest against it, but I wash my hands of it, and shall criticise hereafter the conduct of the Colonial Secretary.' I have not criticised the conduct of the right hon. gentleman in this matter except indirectly, because that is not the question of the moment. The question is to do the best we can to put an end to this war, and that is why I have seconded, and why I would venture to urge the House to agree to the amendment which has been moved, because then the war would cease in a very few days."[8]

{440}

On October 20, Mr. Labouchere pointed out that, although the total cost of our army is £22,000,000, we are "positively spending £10,000,000 in sending troops to South Africa." He added, with some truth, that, as the Government had a majority, to ask the House to vote against these proceedings was useless. But he declared that, in his opinion, before the war was over, it would cost the country a hundred millions. A burst of laughter and ironical cheering from the Ministerialists greeted the statement of the member for Northampton. They all imagined that Buller would be in Pretoria before Christmas, and that there would even be some change out of the ten millions voted. What a chill would have fallen over that light-hearted assembly if some hand had written on the wall at that moment the real sum which the South African enterprise so gaily entered upon would cost the nation! Something well over two hundred millions did not cover it.[9]

In March 1900, the War Loan Bill raising a sum of thirty-five millions was passed through both Houses of Parliament. The events of the war which had taken place by this time were, briefly, these: The British dispatch which led up to the Boer ultimatum was presented in Pretoria on September 25, and the mobilisation of the Boers commenced on the 27th. The Transvaal ultimatum was presented to the British agent on October 9, and the war began upon the 11th. At the end of the first fortnight the English claimed the victories of Talana and Elandslaagte, whilst the Boers could boast that they had swept the whole of Natal down to Ladysmith. At Pretoria there was great jubilation, and the highest expectations of success for the farmers' arms were entertained. Before Christmas the defeats of Nicholson's Nek, Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso had plunged England into depths of gloom. The investment of Ladysmith had been completed, and the first stage of the war marked by the advance of the Boers into British territory was over. {441} On the 22nd of December, Lord Roberts had set sail from Southampton to the Cape. To him the British Government had turned in its hour of need to restore the shaken prestige of the British army and to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Their confidence was justified, though the conclusion of the war was still far distant. The horrible disaster of Spion Kop occurred in January, but the middle of March saw Lord Roberts in Bloemfontein. Ladysmith and Kimberley had been relieved, and the whole vast territory south of these points was in uncontested occupation of the British troops.

In Mr. Labouchere's speech of March 13, on the occasion of the second reading of the War Loan Bill, he had pleaded eloquently for a cessation of hostilities in South Africa. The Boers, he said, had now been driven out of British territory, but the only terms upon which the British Government would make peace were degrading to a brave and honest people, namely the surrendering of their independence, and the blotting of their nationality out of existence. "Can you tell me of any war," he asked, "in which the vanquished side asked for terms and were told that the victors would grant terms only in the capital of the defeated country, and on condition of their surrendering their independence? I call this thing an iniquity, and a disgrace to this country to propose such terms. Perhaps the question of iniquity does not appeal to hon. gentlemen opposite. It is not only a crime--it is a blunder. I do not believe this is a way to establish peace and harmony and good feeling in South Africa.... You are at present appealing to the lowest passions outside of this House. I do not believe you will succeed in the long run; it may be that the people will be carried away by the feeling which at present exists among Englishmen, but they will soon see that they have been fooled into this war by the vilest body of financiers that ever existed in this world, and that the opportunity had been taken to lay hold of the territory and gold, which Lord Salisbury himself boasted we did not wish for."[10]

{442}

There is no doubt that Mr. Labouchere was extremely unpopular in England during 1900. It was difficult for the man in the street to separate his political attitude, with regard to the war, from that of the Irish Nationalists, with whose policy he had been so long identified, and who welcomed the war as supplying fresh food for their campaign of denunciation against the British Government, and who openly expressed their exultation at the Boer successes. Mr. Labouchere did not rejoice at the British humiliation. The point that he always had in view was the prevention of more bloodshed, and the injustice of the annexation of new territory by the force of numerical superiority. Further, he considered that the negotiations which took place in the summer and autumn of 1899, before the outbreak of war, had not been carried on with fairness towards the Boers. After the President of the Transvaal Republic had agreed to a seven years' Franchise Law, retrospective in its action, for the colonists, Mr. Chamberlain took exception to a provision of the new Bill, which required that the alien desirous of burghership should produce a certificate of continuous registration during the period for naturalisation. He suggested further that the details of the scheme should be discussed by delegates appointed by Sir Alfred Milner and the Transvaal Government (July 27). The Transvaal Government, as it had a perfect right to do, instead of immediately accepting Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion, submitted alternative proposals to the British Government, which gave most liberal concessions to the Uitlanders, the details of which were to be discussed with the British agent at Pretoria. To these proposals were attached certain conditions, one of which was that "Her Majesty's Government will not insist further upon the assertion of suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being tacitly allowed to drop" (August 19). Mr. Conynghame Greene, the British agent at Pretoria, wired the Boer proposals and conditions to Sir Alfred Milner. Sir Alfred Milner wired to Mr. Conynghame Greene in reply: "If {443} the South African Republic should reply to the invitation to a joint enquiry put forward by Her Majesty's Government by formally making the proposals described in your telegram, such a course would not be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a refusal of their offer, but they would be prepared to consider the reply of the South African Republic on its merits."

In Mr. Labouchere's opinion, it was at this point of the negotiations that the disingenuousness of Mr. Chamberlain's action was most apparent. The formal reply of Her Majesty's Government to the Boer proposals was delivered on August 30. It declared that the Boer proposals were accepted, but that the British Government utterly refused to consider the conditions attached to them. It was obvious now that the Boers had no other course open to them but to fall back upon the Commission proposed by Mr. Chamberlain on July 27, and to which their proposals and conditions were the alternative, and, according to Sir Alfred Milner's wire to Mr. Conynghame Greene, understood by both Governments as such. On September 2, therefore, they asked for further information as to the Joint Committee which they were now _par force majeure_ and _faute de mieux_ prepared to accept. The reply they received on September 12 was that "H.M. Government have been compelled to regard the last proposal of the Government of the South African Republic as unacceptable in the form in which it was presented"; that they "cannot now consent to go back to the proposal for which those in the note of the Government of the Republic of August 19 are intended as a substitute"; and that, if those proposals of the Transvaal Government, taken by themselves and without the conditions attached by that Government, are not agreed to, "H.M. Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation _de novo_ and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement." On September 15, the Secretary of State of the Transvaal Republic replied that he learned with deep {444} regret of the withdrawal of the invitation to a joint enquiry. The proposal of August 19, made by him in the name of his Government, involved the danger of affecting the independence of the Republic, but his Government had set against this danger the advantage of obtaining the assurances mentioned in the conditions. He protested against the injustice of being asked to grant the original proposals without the conditions annexed, and he could not understand Mr. Chamberlain's present refusal to accept the Commission which was his own alternative. The reply of the Republic consequently was that it could not grant the first half of the August 19 offer without the second, but would accept the Joint Commission which had been proposed by Mr. Chamberlain; that it welcomed the introduction of a Court of Arbitration, and was willing to help in its formation, but that it was not clear what were the subjects mentioned as outside the Court of Arbitration, and it deprecated the foreshadowing of new proposals without specification. Mr. Reitz finally implored the acceptance of the Joint Commission, as "if H.M.'s Government are willing and able to make this decision it will put an end to the present state of tension, race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and welfare of the South African Republic and of the whole of South Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between the different nationalities would increase." On September 25 Mr. Chamberlain replied that no conditions less comprehensive than the final offer of H.M. Government could be relied upon to effect the object for which they had been striving. The dispatch concluded with these words: "H.M. Government will communicate to the High Commissioner the result of their deliberations in a later dispatch." On September 30 the British agent at Pretoria telegraphed by request of the Secretary of State of the Republic to ask what decision had been taken by the British Government. Mr. Chamberlain replied on October 2 that "the dispatch of H.M. Government is being prepared {445} but will not be ready for some days." In the meantime Parliament had been summoned to grant supplies, the Reserves were called out, and ships were chartered to convey all available troops to South Africa. From September 27 to October 8 the President of the Orange Free State telegraphed frequently to Sir Alfred Milner. He complained of the concentration of troops on the frontiers of his State and of the Transvaal, again and again preferred his good offices to avoid all possibility of war, and in almost every telegram urged that Her Majesty's Government should at once make known the "precise nature and scope of the concessions or measures, the adoption whereof Her Majesty's Government consider themselves entitled to claim, or which they suggest as being necessary or sufficient to secure a satisfactory and permanent solution of existing differences between them and the South African Republic, whilst at the same time providing a means for settling any others that may arise in the future." To this request Sir Alfred Milner made no reply.[11] On October 9 the famous Ultimatum was presented to the British agent at Pretoria. Amongst other plain statements it contained words to the effect that the Transvaal felt obliged to regard the military force in the neighbourhood of its frontiers as a threat against the Republic, and that it became necessary to ask Her Majesty's Government to give an assurance that no further troops should be landed in South Africa, that troops on the borders of the Republic should be withdrawn either by friendly arbitration or some other amicable way. In the event of a refusal the Secretary of State of the Transvaal must regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war. War broke out, as has been said, on October 11.

When Lord Roberts marched triumphantly into Pretoria on the 9th of June, some important letters were found in the capital of the Transvaal out of which great political interest was made against the group of Englishmen, of {446} whom Labouchere was one of the most important, who were known as the "little Englanders" in contradistinction to the ever growing numbers of "Imperialists." These letters were sent to Mr. Chamberlain, and a correspondence on the subject ensued between him and Mr. Labouchere. Mr. Labouchere published the whole of it in _Truth_, prefacing the letters with the following remarks:[12]

"The correspondence which I print below speaks for itself. I had not supposed that I was one of the three M.P.'s whose letters had fallen into the hands of Mr. Chamberlain, as I do not think that I ever wrote to any one in Pretoria. But I did, before the war, both write and talk to Mr. Montagu White, the Transvaal representative in London, and it would seem that he sent some of my letters to Pretoria. What there is requiring explanation in either my conversations or correspondence I do not know. The advice which I gave to Mr. White was that his Government should make reasonable concessions, and should gain time, in order to tide over the false impression created by Mr. Chamberlain's appeal to the passions which had been excited by statements in regard to Boer rule derived from the 'kept' Rhodesian press in South Africa and the correspondents of the English newspapers, who were nearly all connected with that 'kept press' and with the Rhodes gang. Had my advice been followed, there would have been no war. The difficulty which stood in the way of its being adopted was that President Kruger and other leading Boers were fully convinced that Mr. Chamberlain had been in the counsels of the Jameson-Rhodes conspirators of 1895, and that--no matter what concessions the Transvaal might make--he was determined to have his revenge for President Kruger having got the better of him on that occasion."

Here is the correspondence:

_Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Labouchere_

COLONIAL OFFICE, Aug. 6, 1900.

SIR,--I beg to call your attention to the enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Montagu White, with copies of two letters {447} purporting to have been written by you, and to inquire if you desire to offer any explanations or observations with regard to them.--I am, Sir, Your obedient,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Montagu White to Dr. Reitz_[13]

58 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON,

Aug. 4, 1899

DEAR DR. REITZ,--I feel tired and done for to-night. It is past six o'clock and I still have forty miles to go before I get home. My inclination is to wire to you, asking you to tell the British Government to go to the devil and to do their "darnedest." It is perfectly sickening the way one is kept in a continual state of suspense and nervous excitement. Everything is as quiet as possible on the surface, and there has been a tremendous decrease in press cuttings which is a sure sign that matters are relapsing into a normal condition. But I have been able to judge of the effect upon our friends of hints that we may not be able to accept the proposed Commission. Without exception, they are one and all dead against our refusing it, and all agree that we shall have to face a very serious crisis if we refuse the proposal, and that without the friendly support of the majority of the newspapers which have hitherto been on our side. Spender of the _Chronicle_, who has fought consistently and well for us, tells me that none of them can understand in what way we shall be worse off for accepting the Commission, for (if) your people disagree about the finding of the report what can Mr. Chamberlain do further? Even our best friends say that by rejecting the report of the Industrial Commission two years ago, we have allowed things to go so far that it is unwise to talk of intermeddling in our home affairs as a refusal to entertain what public opinion here endorses as a fair proposal. The essence of friendly advice is: Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc., and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the Commission. In other words: gain as much time as you can, and give the public time here to get out of the dangerous frame of mind which Chamberlain's {448} speeches have created. Spender is of opinion that after two months' delay all danger will have vanished. I cannot say I share his optimistic views, for this sort of thing has been going on for three years. Labouchere said to me this morning: "Don't for goodness sake, let Mr. Kruger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little skilful management, and he will give Master Joe another fall." He further said: "You are such past masters in the art of gaining time, here is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right hands lose their cunning, and you ought to spin out the negotiations for quite two or three months." I must leave off now. Please remember one thing: I do not send you my advice. I send you the opinions of friends and the tendency of public feeling here.

Some one sent me some lines parodying R. Kipling's _Lest We Forget_. I got it published in _Truth_.--Yours very truly,

MONTAGU WHITE.

(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Montagu White_

5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Aug. 2, 1899.

DEAR MR. MONTAGU WHITE,--You will see the lines in _Truth_. I have altered one or two words to make the grammar all right. I do hope that President Kruger will manage to accept in some form or another the reference (proposed conference). Bannerman and all our Front Bench believe that it is only a way devised by the Cabinet to let Joe climb down. The new Franchise Act stands. The _onus probandi_ of showing that it does not give substantial representation to the Uitlanders and yet leave the Boers masters is with Chamberlain. The difference between five and seven years is not a ground for proof. The details for registration do not prove it. Let President Kruger quote our Registration Laws, which you had better send him, and do not forget that a lodger has to register every year; he is not automatically on the Franchise list. In connection with this, Milner suggested in his dispatch six years. He afterwards said that six was a mistake for five. But Chamberlain in his reply approved of six. It is impossible to calculate the effect without knowing how many Outlanders there are, and how long each has been in the country. To discover the basis of inquiry would take a long time. As the {449} decision would go by the majority, the question would be on the Chairman, who would have a casting vote. Surely it could be arranged with Natal; the Cape and the Orange Free State, as well as the Transvaal, should be represented, with the Chairman an Englishman who has not yet expressed an opinion.

My own impression is that comparatively few will ever become Boers amongst the English; they will not like to give up their nationality. The President has a great opportunity to give Joe another fall. If at the same time the Dynamite Concession is abrogated there will be a rise in many shares, and this will be regarded as a barometer that everything is going on well and satisfactorily. The great thing is to gain time. In a few months we shall be howling about something in another part of the world.--Yours truly,

H. LABOUCHERE.

(_Enclosure_) _Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Montagu White_

5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Aug. 4, 1899.

DEAR MR. WHITE,--It is the general opinion that Chamberlain "climbed down." As Bannerman put it to me: "His speech was a little bluster of his own with the main parts arranged by his colleagues, and they sat by like policemen to see that he read them." As a matter of fact he did read all the important parts.

If the President agrees to the Committee it will, under clever tactics, take months to settle conditions, and then it will take further months to come to a decision. If the basis is established that there shall be a substantial representation of the Uitlanders, yet not such as can endanger the majority of the Boers, no harm can well come of the Commission. The only difficulty is that it is a sort of recognition of our right to meddle. But this might be avoided in two ways: (1) By getting Schreiner into it and making it a sort of South African affair; (2) by making a bargain and agreeing only on the understanding that there should be arbitration on all matters affecting the true reading of the Convention. But if the latter is proposed then the President should put in some proposal for the Chief Justices and one Imperial Judge or Governor to be the tribunal.

The universal opinion is that the Cabinet has forced all this {450} upon Chamberlain, and that they are determined not to have war and to do something to let him down easily. Salisbury's speech was conceived on these lines, and a little vague bluster but nothing more. I accentuated Bannerman's declaration about hostilities; this pledges the Liberal party against war.--Yours truly,

H. LABOUCHERE.

_Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Chamberlain_

HOTEL AND PENSION WALDHAUS, VULPERA TARASP, ENGADIN SCHWEIZ, Aug. 18, 1900.

SIR,--I beg to acknowledge your letter of Aug. 6, enclosing copy of a letter of Mr. Montagu White, with copies of two letters "purporting to have been written by me," and inquiring if I desire to offer any explanation or observations with regard to them.

For what I may have written or said to Mr. Montagu White I am responsible to the House of Commons, of which I am a member; to my constituents who have done me the honour to send me there; and to the law. To you I owe no sort of explanation. I ascribe, therefore, your invitation to furnish you with one in respect to the enclosed letters to the singular illusion that no matter what course you may see fit to adopt, whether as a Conservative or a Liberal Minister, all owe you a personal explanation who take the liberty to disapprove of it, and to do their best to prevent its bringing us into unnecessary hostilities with some foreign power. Whilst not recognising this pretension on your part, I will, however, offer you some observations in regard to these letters, as you apparently desire that I should do so.

The letters of mine enclosed were, I do not doubt, written by me. The only exception that I have to take to the copies is that a few of the words in them are, I should fancy, erroneously copied, as they do not make sense. The advice tendered in them seems to me to be excellent, and I know of no reason why I should not have addressed it to Mr. White, who was then the representative of a country with which we were at peace. Many letters passed before the War between that gentleman and myself. He was most desirous that all possibility of war should be removed, and {451} that harmony and good feeling should be established on a firm basis between Great Britain and the Transvaal. This we both thought could only be effected by a full recognition of the Convention of 1884, as explained by Lord Derby, who signed it for Great Britain, and by reasonable concessions on the part of the Transvaal Government in regard to the naturalisation and electoral franchise of the Uitlanders domiciled in the Republic. I therefore suggested that the Transvaal Government should grant to such domiciled aliens naturalisation and electoral franchise of the Uitlanders on precisely the same terms as they are granted to aliens in Great Britain. A law thus framed would, I thought, not be open to objection on your part, and would put an end to all the carping criticisms raised by you in respect to small and unimportant details in the concessions that you were forcing on the Transvaal in regard to these matters, and which seemed to me hardly calculated to bring about a peaceful solution of the situation. If I remember rightly the last letters exchanged between Mr. White and myself were just before the close of the normal session of Parliament last year. Mr. White in his letter informed me that he had received a communication from Mr. Reitz, the Transvaal Sec. of State, in which that gentleman told him that, although he had always been a strong advocate for all reasonable reforms in respect of the Uitlanders, and although he had used all his influence to promote a peaceful solution of the pending issues between the two countries, your despatches were so persistently insulting in their tone, and all concessions made by his Government were so invariably met by you with fresh demands, that even the most moderate of the Transvaal Burghers were becoming convinced that you were determined to oblige them either to surrender at discretion to all that you might demand, or to defend by arms the position secured to the Transvaal by the Convention of 1884. He therefore suggested that the negotiations should be taken in hand by Lord Salisbury, in which case he was convinced that a settlement satisfactory to both sides would be easily come to. As I entirely agreed with this opinion of Mr. Reitz, and believed that you were the chief impediment to such a settlement, I replied to Mr. White that the tenor of Mr. Reitz's communication should be conveyed to a leading member of the Cabinet, and that {452} I hoped--although I did not expect--that the suggestion would bear fruit.

As I gathered from your observations in the House of Commons that you had not made up your mind whether you would publish the letters of Members of Parliament to Transvaal authorities that had fallen into your hands, I will--so far as my letters are concerned--relieve you of further consideration by publishing them myself, together with this correspondence. I have often urged that the public should have the advantage of a full knowledge of all documents which are likely to enable them to form a sound judgment in respect to the issues that have arisen in South Africa. Might I, with all respect, venture to suggest to you that you should follow my example? The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (whoever he may be) and Her Majesty's representatives in foreign capitals correspond not only by despatches, but by what they are pleased to term "private letters," which are to all intents and purposes despatches. I presume that the same course is usual between Secretaries of State for the Colonies and Her Majesty's Colonial Governors. You have announced that you are in favour of a "new diplomacy" in which nothing is kept back from the public. Would it be too much to ask you to inaugurate the "new diplomacy" by publishing all the so-called private letters that have been exchanged between you and the Governors of Natal and the Cape Colony; and all the letters and despatches exchanged between these Governors and our military commanders in South Africa, of which you may have copies? Without these documents it is impossible that either the House of Commons or the electors of the United Kingdom can form a true conclusion in regard to the "diplomacy" that led to the war, or be able to affix the responsibility on the right shoulders in respect to our lack of preparation for hostilities in South Africa and our initial reverses. If it is too much to hope that you will act on this suggestion, I would venture to urge that at least you should publish the correspondence between yourself and Mr. Hawksley in regard to your alleged knowledge of the contemplated Rhodes-Jameson conspiracy of 1894. Mr. Hawksley is still, and then was, the solicitor of the Chartered Company of South Africa, and is a close friend and confidant of Mr. Rhodes. When the Parliamentary Committee {453} of Inquiry into all connected with the conspiracy was sitting, Mr. Hawksley was a witness. He alluded to this correspondence. But when I wished to examine him about it--which was my right as a member of the Committee according to Parliamentary usage--this was not permitted by the Committee. After the Report of the Committee was published Mr. Hawksley made public his conviction that, if this correspondence saw the light, a guilty knowledge of the conspiracy would be brought home to you. When the debate on the Report took place in the House of Commons, he placed the correspondence in the hands of a member with instructions to read it if you made any attack upon Mr. Rhodes. Far, however, from doing this, you went out of your way to assert that Mr. Rhodes had done nothing to invalidate his rights to be considered an honourable man, although only a few days before you had agreed to a report in which he was branded as having been guilty of dishonourable conduct. Since then, again and again, you have been asked to produce the correspondence. But this you have persistently refused to do, although no public interest could suffer by the production. Yet, if Mr. Hawksley is wrong in the inference he deduces from the correspondence, it is obvious that its publication would go far to allay the suspicion which led President Kruger to doubt your desire for a peaceful solution of the strained relations that existed between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Transvaal Republic, and which even now militates against all good feeling between the colonists of South Africa of British and Dutch origin.

I trust that you will excuse my venturing to make these suggestions. I do so because I heartily agree with you as to the desirability of the "new diplomacy." It is the only way in which that popular control can be established over the Executive which is essential in a self-governing community, if it is to escape from falling under the domination of some purely unscrupulous adventurer gifted with a ready tongue.

I believe with my leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, that the war might and ought to have been avoided, and I cannot help hoping that my letters which have fallen into your hands will show you that I laboured to the best of my ability in order that it should be avoided. Unfortunately these efforts were not {454} successful. The war was commenced under a lamentable ignorance on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers of the resistance which the two Dutch Republics would oppose to our arms. Reverses followed owing to the meddling of civilians in military matters. Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein are in our hands. The Orange River Free State has been annexed. The Transvaal Republic has been annexed. Under these circumstances peace and prosperity can only be restored in South Africa when all suspicion is removed that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was actuated by his previous relations with the Rhodes-Jameson conspiracy in forcing a war. I am sure, too, that you will agree with me that it will not be right for the electors of the United Kingdom to be called upon to pronounce an opinion on the policy of a war which has cost us thousands of valuable lives and tens of millions of money, as well as on the mode in which the war has been conducted, until all that can enable them to arrive at a conclusion has seen the light.--I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

H. LABOUCHERE.

_P.S._--If you desire to offer any explanations or observations with regard to your action in respect to South Africa, they will receive due consideration.

The Rt. Hon. J. Chamberlain, etc., etc.

Mr. Labouchere wisely remarked at about this period of the South African War: "War is war. The old Greek line holds good that in war the great ones go mad, and the people where it takes place weep. This must inevitably always be the case." With equal force, but less elegance, he also remarked: "I do not waste my time in answering abuse. I am accustomed to it and I thrive under it like a field that benefits by the manure that is carted on to it." He must have thriven exceedingly during the summer of 1900, for the amount of abuse collected and thrown over him was phenomenal. Most of it was extracted from the most shadowy appearances of fact possible. The Conference, or Commission, referred to in the Pretoria correspondence, was {455} understood by papers of quite high standing, such even as the _Birmingham Post_, to be the Bloemfontein Conference, the abortive proceedings of which had come to an end early in June, 1899. Nevertheless, Mr. Labouchere was accused by the press of having, in his letters to Mr. Montagu White, elaborated a scheme, to make the conference at Bloemfontein not only a failure, but a deliberately planned sham. With regard to the cry of treason which was raised against him indiscriminately, the dates on the letters--even had his communications been of a treasonable nature--rendered such a charge childish in the extreme.

As soon as Mr. Labouchere received Mr. Chamberlain's letter with its enclosures, which followed him to the retired Swiss Valley where he was spending his holiday, he wrote at once to the leader of his party telling him of what had occurred. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was spending August at Marienbad, and wrote him the following letter in reply:

MARIENBAD, Aug. 22, 1900.

MY DEAR LABOUCHERE,--I am much interested in your story, and shall look forward to my _Truth_ with extra avidity. All you describe was perfectly proper and legitimate this time last year, or indeed at any time: and where high treason comes in I cannot see. My little facetiousness will do the great man no harm if it is published. I remember the fact perfectly. All the while the statesman was speaking, Aaron-Balfour and Hur-Hicks Beach were not holding up his hands, but watching, with anxious faces, his every word.

Mark Lockwood, who is here, told me that you were one culprit, and that the other was no other than the ingenuous John Ellis, who was guilty of writing to some lady asking whether the stories of strange doings under martial law were authentic! If this is all one may exclaim _tantæne animis cælestibus iræ_? Can our Sec. of State be so small-minded!

What a gorgeous palace you are living in! It quite eclipses anything here, even in your favourite St. John's Wood quarter. {456} They are all there: at least a fair representation, ready for Him. But alas He does not come. Weather superb here, but not much company to amuse or interest.--Yours,

H.C.B.

The war dragged on until the May of 1902, when the Boers were obliged to make peace, not so much on account of the military situation as because the burghers were weary of fighting and wanted to lay down their arms. And what else could be expected of them? Half the national army were prisoners of war, nearly four thousand had been killed, the rest were weakening and dwindling hourly, twenty thousand women and children had died in the concentration camps, thousands more were perishing on the veld. There was no help from Cape Colony, no help from Europe, no help from the sympathetic minority in England itself.[14] The national representatives of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State were given three days in which to consider the conditions of peace which were put before them by Sir Alfred Milner, and which they were told were absolutely final. Their answer was given on the 31st, at five minutes past eleven, only an hour before the expiry of the term of grace. The last few moments of their conference were occupied by President Schalk Burger, who closed the melancholy meeting with these words:

"We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do it in the official capacities which we have formerly occupied. Let us not draw our hands back from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide us, and to show us how we shall be able to keep our nation together. We must be ready to forgive and forget whenever we meet our brethren. That part of our nation which has proved unfaithful we must not reject."

In considering the part Mr. Labouchere played in the {457} discussions that took place in Parliament and in the press, during the pitiful struggle, no attitude but one of admiration for his consistency and envy of his courage can be maintained for a moment. This chapter cannot be better closed than with a repetition of his own words, expressed valiantly at the moment when he was of all men in England perhaps, the most unpopular: "The best settlement that can be made now will be worse for all parties than the settlement which could have been effected by tact and self-restraint had the Boers never been goaded into war. I adhere to everything that I have ever said as to the causes that brought on this war, with all its disastrous results. I retract not one word that I have published in _Truth_, or spoken in Parliament, or written in any letter, or uttered in any shape or form about the Chamberlain diplomacy and the Chamberlain war."[15]

[1] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. i.

[2] The Hawkesley telegrams. These were subsequently published in the _Independence Belge_.

[3] _Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa_, 1897.

[4] _Truth_, Jan. 9, 1896.

[5] _Truth_, April 2, 1896.

[6] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. ii.

[7] _Hansard_, vol. 74, July 7, 1899.

[8] _Hansard_, vol. 77, Oct. 17, 1899.

[9] Henry W. Lucy, _The Balfourian Parliament_.

[10] _Hansard_, vol. 80, March 13, 1900.

[11] _Truth_, Sept. 13, 1899.

[12] _Truth_, Aug. 23, 1900.

[13] Secretary of State of the Transvaal Republic.

[14] _Times' History of the War in South Africa_, vol. v.

[15] _Truth_, Sept. 6, 1900.

{458}