CHAPTER VI

RHETORIC AND LOGIC IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARP Baldwin (C. S.), _Ancient rhetoric and poetic_, New York, 1924.

Clerval Clerval (l’Abbé A.), _Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, du Ve au XVIe siècle_, Chartres, 1895 (Mémoires de la Société Archéologique d’Eure-et-Loir, XI).

Haskins Haskins (C. H.), _The renaissance of the twelfth century_, Harvard University Press, 1927.

Manacorda Manacorda (G.), _Storia della scuola in Italia_, vol. I, _Il medio evo_, Milan, 1913 (2 parts in separate volumes).

Mignon Mignon (l’Abbé A.), _Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor_, Paris, 1895, 2 vols.

PL _Patrologia latina_, Migne (cited by volume and column).

Poole Poole (Reginald Lane), _Illustrations of the history of medieval thought_, London, 2d ed., 1920. See also his important biography of John of Salisbury in Dict. Nat. Biog., his article in Eng. Histor. Rev., July, 1923, and his communication, March 27, 1924, to the British Academy (Proceedings, xl) on the early correspondence.

A. THE TRIVIUM AT CHARTRES, ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES

At the fall of Rome the Trivium was dominated by _rhetorica_; in the Carolingian period, by _grammatica_; in the high middle age, by _dialectica_. The shift of emphasis to logic probably began in the eleventh century. Even Chartres, renowned for its teaching of _grammatica_, shows hints of this under Fulbert.[1] In the next century the theory of logic was fortified by commanding in Latin translation those parts of Aristotle’s _Organon_ which had not been available; and its practise became more urgent through the historic debates as to universals. By offering thus the most active training in composition, logic confirmed the restriction of rhetoric to style. John of Salisbury, after giving full scope to _grammatica_, focuses his great book on _dialectica_. _Rhetorica_ he merely mentions; it claims none of his thought. Nor does any other leader of the high middle age treat rhetoric as active in the intellectual processes of composing. Rhetoric has no educational vitality. The vital study that taxes and develops men’s minds is logic.

In detail, _grammatica_ at Chartres[2] during the great century of the school (about 1050-1150), shows a full development of _prælectio_ and distinct cultivation of rhythmic.[3] _Rhetorica_, except in _dictamen_ and in some application of the larger ancient precepts of composition to preaching, is at a standstill.[4] The more significance therefore attaches to a short poem of Fulbert summing up the differences between rhetoric and logic: the one concrete, current, reasoning in enthymemes, aiming at persuasion; the other abstract, syllogistic, aiming at conviction.[5] This giving of the full ancient scope to rhetoric in theory may be a reminder, may be even a protest. At any rate the practise had no such scope. The Chartres manuscript[6] containing these verses is an eleventh-century collection of traditional materials for the study of logic. The study was advanced by Gilbert de la Porrée.[7] Thierry’s collection[8] of the traditional writers on the seven arts, _Bibliotheca septem artium_, or _Heptateuchon_, gives 190 leaves to _grammatica_,[9] 88 to _rhetorica_,[10] 154 to _dialectica_.[11] The remaining 160 leaves of the two large volumes are devoted to the Quadrivium. Thierry’s prologue,[12] summarizing the functions of the several arts _viâ_ Martianus Capella, distributes those of the Trivium as follows: through _grammatica_, elegance; through _dialectica_, logical coherence; through _rhetorica_, ornament. Oral composition, as distinct from revision for style, seems to have no pedagogy except through logic.

B. THE TRIVIUM IN HUGH OF ST. VICTOR

Hugh of St. Victor’s[13] _Lore of teaching_ (_Eruditio didascalica_, or _Didascalicon_) is neither a compend nor a program; it is a concise philosophical survey of education. Though his primary concern is with what is to be studied, and to what ends, he sometimes gives also acute hints of method. Book I (_De studio legendi_), a preliminary survey of typical directions of study, ends (xii) with _logica_, Hugh’s general term for the Trivium as a group, i.e., for all language studies. Considering language as expression (_logica sermocinalis_), these are indeed the usual three; but considering language as thought (_logica rationalis_), they are only two, _dialectica_ and _rhetorica_. Book II (_De discretione artium_) expands the exposition to determine the places of all seven arts in a scheme of philosophy. First the Quadrivium, then the manual arts, are classified under the traditional threefold division:[14] theory (1) of thought, (2) of morals, or conduct, (3) of technical skill. Outside this division remains the Trivium, Hugh’s _logica_, as a fourth and final group. Though _logica_ may be divided simply, as in Book I, Hugh now offers a more philosophical division by function in composing. By the latter we have (a) _grammatica_ by itself as having no such function, and (b) _rhetorica_ and _dialectica_ together as both involving investigation (_inventio_) and the processes of arrangement, and revision (_iudicium_). These two composition studies are thus seen to belong, as probable proof (_probabilis_), between absolute, or abstract proof (_demonstratio_) and plausible, or illegitimate proof (_sophistica_).

PHILOSOPHIA

_theorica_ { theologia (the Boethian intellectibilis) { arithmetica (_speculativa_){ mathematica ( ” ” intelligibilis) { musica { physica ( ” ” naturalis) { geometria { astronomia

_practica_ (_activa_, _ethica_)

_mechanica_: the seven manual arts, e.g., lanificium, agricultura

{ dialectica { rationalis { rhetorica _logica_ { I { { grammatica (scientia loquendi sine vitio) { sermocinalis { dialectica (disputatio acuta, verum a falso { distinguens) { rhetorica (disciplina ad persuadendum quæque { idonea)

{ grammatica _logica_ { { demonstratio II { ratio disserendi { probabilis (involving { dialectica { inventio and iudicium) { rhetorica { sophistica

From these classifications Hugh proceeds in Book III to practical considerations: of studies as training (_disciplina_), of the interrelations of the seven arts, of a scheme of reading (_ordo legendi_), of meditation, etc. The three remaining books deal with sacred studies.

Hugh’s term _logica_ expresses a conception of the Trivium as an integrated group. Less obvious, but hardly less significant, is the importance given implicitly to logic (_dialectica_). Though rhetoric is recognized as having theoretically a function in composing, it receives otherwise but little more attention than in the cardinal treatise of medieval pedagogy, the _Metalogicus_.

C. THE _METALOGICUS_ OF JOHN OF SALISBURY

The most extensive reasoned medieval survey of the Trivium is the _Metalogicus_[15] of John of Salisbury. Though this devotes most space to logic and to the logical aspects of other language study, it is a unified and carefully coherent presentation of all teaching that deals with words. Statesman as well as scholar, more widely known, perhaps, than any other man of his time, and more widely conversant with its movements in church and state, secretary to two archbishops of Canterbury, rounding out his life as Bishop of Chartres, he devoted his best thought to the _Metalogicus_. The classification underlying its first two books is that of Hugh of St. Victor.[16]

{ scientia recte loquendi scribendique { grammatica { { { poetica logica { { { demonstrativa { { { dialectica { ratio disserendi { probabilis { { { rhetorica { sophistica

By the conception of the Trivium as twofold, _rhetorica_ is theoretically subordinated; and in John’s working out of the scheme it is ignored. Barely mentioned,[17] it appears to have no distinctive composing function. Part of its ancient function seems to be implied now and then under _grammatica_; more is certainly transferred to _dialectica_, with which John connects most of what he discerns of composition as a study. His scheme can be comprehended only as a whole and in sequence. The survey of _logica_ in Books I and II is not primarily an analysis. Rather it develops the functions of language studies in progressive stages. This procedure, too, as well as some of its important details, may have been suggested by Quintilian.[18] John is concerned less with division than with order. His own order is so significant and so carefully marked[19] that it should be followed step by step.

DIGEST OF _METALOGICUS_

BOOK I. _GRAMMATICA_

i-vi. The opening takes occasion from certain opponents of the Trivium.[20] “When _logica_ was derided, and its envious opponent provoked me, in spite of my indignation and protests, by almost daily disputes, at length I accepted trial, and have studied to reply to his calumnies” (824 A) ... “Since I have undertaken the defense of _logica_, the book is entitled Metalogicon.”

vii-ix. Eloquence is natural, not in the perverted sense that the full exercise of speech is instinctive, but only to the extent that speech is the peculiar opportunity of mankind.

x (837 B). “_Logica_, then, to show the widest meaning of the word, is the theory of speaking or of discoursing. Sometimes it is contracted to the extent of limiting the force of the word to theories of discourse. Whether, therefore, it teaches the ways of reasoning or offers a rule for all speech, they are evidently unwise who call it useless; for either [the narrower or the wider scope] is taught by most famous theory as necessary. The twofold meaning of the word comes from its origin in Greek; for there λόγος means now speech (sermo), now theory (ratio). But that its meaning may be extended most widely, let us assign to it at present the control of all speech, so that nowhere it may be proved useless, and so that in its more general sense it may appear as a whole very useful and necessary.”

xi. The idea of any art is to further nature by theory.

xii (839 C). “But since _artes_ are of many kinds, the first of all for a mind bent on wisdom are the _artes liberales_. All these are included in the theory either of the Trivium or of the Quadrivium; and so great efficacy they are said to have achieved among the ancients, who taught them assiduously, that they opened all reading, roused the mind to everything, and sufficed to resolve the difficulties of all questions which can be settled. They to whom the theory of the Trivium expounded the secrets of all speech, the law of the Quadrivium the secrets of all nature, needed no teachers to explain their books or resolve their questions.”

xiii (840 A). “Of all these the first is _logica_, in that part of it which deals with the first teaching of speech.... This is _grammatica_, the lore of speaking and writing correctly, the origin of all liberal disciplines ... the cradle of all philosophy ... the first nurse of all literary study.”

xiv-xvi. _Grammatica_ imitates nature by keeping congruity of thought.[21] For instance, it does not tolerate adjectives of secondary application with nouns of primary application.

xvii (847 A). “In other things, too, _grammatica_ imitates nature; for the precepts of _poetica_ set forth the habits of nature and exact of the craftsman in this art that he follow nature—to that degree, indeed, that the poet shall not depart from the footprints of nature, but apply himself to stick to them in manner, gesture, even word. Moreover the theory is to be kept not only in feet or tenses, but in ages, places, seasons,[22] and other details beyond our present purpose; for all these come from the workshop of nature. Indeed, _poetica_ stays so close to the things of nature that many have refused to include it in _grammatica_, asserting that it is an art in itself, pertaining no more to _grammatica_ than to _rhetorica_,[23] though so far related to both as to have precepts in common. Let them snarl about this who will. I will not keep up the dispute; but under favor of them all I think that _poetica_ is to be assigned to _grammatica_ as to the mother and nurse of its study.... Either _grammatica_ will hold on to _poetica_, or _poetica_ will be turned out from the number of the liberal disciplines.”

xviii-xx. _Grammatica_ deals both with precision and with imagery, both with denotation and with connotation. It includes letters, syllables, phrase, sentence-form, punctuation, figures, metric—everything that can be taught verbally.

xxi-xxiii. It has occupied persons no less eminent than Cæsar and Cicero. It is a practical guide to utterance and to learning. The objection derived from Seneca is insufficient. For the practise of philosophy and of virtue the important approaches are reading, teaching, meditation. Of these the root and foundation is _grammatica_.

xxiv. Actually the _prælectio_ is vindicated by such a _grammaticus_ as Bernard of Chartres.[24]

(853 C) “He, then, who aspires to philosophy, let him lay hold of reading, teaching, and meditation, with the practise of good works, lest God be angry and what he seemeth to have be taken from him. But since _lectio_ is equivocal, applicable both to the practise of teacher and learner and to the absorption of one studying writings for himself, let the one, the interchange of teacher and learner, be called, to use Quintilian’s word, _prælectio_, the other, applied to the scrutiny of meditation, simply _lectio_. On the authority, then, of Quintilian, the _grammaticus_ in his _prælectio_ ought to attend to such details as to ask to have the verse analyzed into the parts of speech and the appropriate feet, which ought to be known in poems. He should take exception to barbarisms, improprieties, or other transgressions of the law of speaking—not, however, that he should find fault with poets for metrical necessities which, though faults in prose, are called virtues in verse, since force of necessity commonly wins the praise of virtue for what cannot be denied without sacrifice. Metaplasm, sentence variation, figures of speech and such various iterations as may be present, the theory underlying this way of speaking or that—all these the _prælectio_ should point out and impress upon the hearer’s memory by frequent warnings.

(854 A) “The _prælectio_ should make authors yield, without holding them up to ridicule, the feathers with which, crow-fashion, they have decked their works from various disciplines, to make the style more becoming. The more disciplines the teacher is imbued with, and the more abundantly, the more fully he will discern the elegance of authors, the more clearly he will bring it out in teaching. For they by the _diacrisis_ which we may call illustration[25] or visualization, when they had undertaken in bare outline story, plot, fable, or whatever else it might be, would develop it with such abundance of disciplines and such charm of sentence and style that the work when completed seemed the image of all the arts.

(854 B) “_Grammatica_ and _poetica_, indeed, are entirely fused and control the whole surface of what is expounded. _Campologica_, as it is called, contributing descriptive amplification of proof,[26] looses its theory in a blaze of gold; and _rhetorica_ with store of persuasions and brilliance of style rivals the brightness of silver. Mathematics is borne on the wheels of its Quadrivium and, hard on the heels of the others, has woven its own figures and charms in manifold variety. Science, having searched the counsels of nature, brings from its own storehouse manifold charm of figures. Moreover that which rises above the other parts of philosophy—I mean ethics—without which not even the name of philosopher abides, surpasses all the others in the gift of ornament that it brings. Sound Vergil or Lucan, and there, whatever philosophy you profess, you will find its making. In proportion, therefore, to the capacity of the pupil, or to the industry and diligence of the teacher, the fruit of the _prælectio auctorum_ is constant.

(854 C) “This used to be the habit of Bernard of Chartres, in our modern times the most overflowing spring of literature in Gaul. In his reading he would show first what was simple and regular. Grammatical forms, rhetorical figures, quibbles of sophistry, relations of the passage to other disciplines, he used to bring out clearly—not, however, by teaching everything at every point, but by adjusting to the capacity of his pupils and to the time of the instruction. Since appeal of discourse is either in precision, that is in the nice adjustment of adjective or verb to noun, or in imagery, that is in passing by comparison from one sense to another, he used to inculcate these in the minds of his hearers whenever he found occasion. Since memory is strengthened and talent is sharpened by practise, he would spur some by exhortation, others by punishments, to imitate what they had heard. Each of them was required to account on the following day for what he had heard on the preceding, some more, some less. For with them the preceding day always taught the following.[27]

(855 A) “The evening exercise, which was called _declinatio_,[28] carried such abundance of grammar that any one keeping at it for a whole year, provided he were not too stupid, would control the principles of speaking and writing and could not remain ignorant of the meaning of expressions in common use. But since no school, nor any day, should be without religion, such a subject was proposed as would upbuild faith and morals and animate the group, as by common discussion, toward good. The final item, moreover, of this _declinatio_, or rather of this philosophical discussion, exhibited the footsteps of pious remembrance. The souls of the departed, by devout offering of the sixth penitential psalm [_De profundis_] and the Lord’s Prayer, were commended to their Redeemer.

(855 B) “For those whose assignments were elementary exercises in imitating prose or poetry he set poets or orators and prescribed close imitation after showing the art of connection and of sentence close.[29] If a boy had brightened his work by sewing on a piece from some one else, he would show that the theft was detected, but very often would inflict no punishment. But if the borrowing was misplaced, with modest kindliness he bade the boy come down to express his author’s likeness; and his own practise was such that in imitating his predecessors he became a model for his successors. He also taught among the elements and fixed in mind the force of composition,[30] the achievement of thought and of phrase, the character of the style, whether thinness or plausible abundance, extravagance or just measure.

(855 C) “Stories and poems, he used to say, were to be read carefully, not on the run; and of each pupil he required as a daily task something memorized with careful attention. But superfluous reading, he would add, should be shunned, famous authors are enough. To follow what every one, however unimportant, has ever said is to regard oneself either too meanly or too boastfully. It holds back and obstructs minds which would otherwise make better use of their leisure; and what displaces something better is so far unavailing that it cannot even be called good. To explore all papers and ponder all writings, even those not worth reading, is no more to the purpose than to attend to old wives’ tales. For, as Augustine says in his _De ordine_: ‘Who shall call that man uncultured who has not heard of the flight of Dædalus, or a liar for asserting it, or impudent for questioning it? I always feel deep pity for those of our friends who are accused of ignorance if they have not answered what was the name of the mother of Euryalus, and who dare not call the people who ask such questions shallow, impertinent, and curious.’ So says Augustine both neatly and truly. Therefore it was rightly reckoned by the ancients among the virtues of a _grammaticus_ that there should be some things which he did not know.

(856 A) “Since in all the preliminary exercises nothing is more useful than to accustom oneself to what ought to be done expertly, Bernard’s students would daily write prose and verse and practise themselves by exchange of criticism. Nothing is more useful than this exercise for expression, nothing more promotive of learning; and its greatest contribution is to the conduct of life, provided this insistence be controlled by charity, and progress in literature contribute to humility.”

The last chapter (xxv) quotes at length the _laus grammaticæ_ of Quintilian I. iv. 5-6.[31]

BOOK II. _DEMONSTRATIVA_ AND _DIALECTICA_

_Proem._ “The course of the former book has sufficiently, I think, disengaged the truth that _grammatica_ is not useless, and that without it not only eloquence falls short, but the way toward the other expressions of philosophy is not open.”

i. _Logica_, being the theory of discourse, embraces both investigation and judgment.[32]

ii. Knowledge of truth being for them the highest good, the Peripatetics divided philosophy into two parts: natural, or physical, and moral, or ethical.[33] But the difficulties arising from insufficient control of discourse “demonstrated the need of determining and publishing a lore which should distinguish words and concepts[34] and dissipate the mists of fallacies. Here, indeed, as Boethius asserts in his second commentary on Porphyry, is the origin of the _logica disciplina_. For there had to be a lore which should distinguish the true from the false and teach which reasoning holds the path of [absolute] truth, which of probable, which of assumed,[35] and which should be distrusted. Otherwise truth cannot be found by reasoning (858 C).... The rules of the art were seized and handed down finally by Aristotle.”

iii. (859 C) “Later in time than the other disciplines of philosophy, this is first in place. For beginners in philosophy it is a prerequisite, as the interpreter of words and concepts, without which no item of philosophy comes precisely to light. He who thinks that philosophy is taught without _logica_, i.e., by [direct] cultivation of wisdom, may as well do away with theory in everything, since this is the domain of _logica_.... The very name comes from its being an aid and a test of theory. Plato divided it into _dialectica_ and _rhetorica_; but those who estimate its efficacy higher give it more, i.e., _demonstrativa_, _probabilis_, _sophistica_. _Demonstrativa_ begins in the first stages of training, and passes on into the next. It is satisfied only by necessity; provided a thing ought to be so, it pays little attention to whether or not it appears to be so. This becomes the philosophical majesty of those who are teaching precisely, a majesty grounded, quite apart from the assent of an audience, on its own will. _Probabilis_, on the other hand, is occupied with what appears to be so to all, or to many, or to intelligent observers, with what is best known and most probable to them, or with what follows therefrom. This includes _dialectica_ and _rhetorica_, since logician and orator alike striving to persuade, the one an opponent, the other a judge, think the [abstract] truth of their arguments makes little difference, provided they keep what seems to be true. But _sophistica_, which is apparent and not serviceable wisdom, assumes the likeness either of probability or of necessity, little caring what this or that may be, while it involves whatever is discussed in fanciful images and deceptive shadows. _Dialectica_, that member of the Trivium which all approach from this side and from that, but few, in my judgment, really pursue, neither aspires to dogma, nor is drowned in the waves of politics, but analyzes truth by prompt and reasonable probability.”

iv. _Dialectica_, moreover, is the art of effective debate.

v-viii. _Logica_ has for its distinctive function to serve as effective instrument. It is not an end in itself. So perverted, it becomes the absurd and deplorable occupation of senility.

ix-xi. (866 C) “_Dialectica_, which among the servants of eloquence is most alert and prompt, avails each man according to the measure of his knowledge.... Deprived of the strength of the other disciplines, it is maimed and almost useless; thriving with their vigor, it is strong to overthrow all falsehood, and always suffices at least to reach a probable conclusion.” From my own teachers, to whom I returned years after they had schooled me, I conclude that “as _dialectica_ advances other disciplines, so if it remain alone, it lies bloodless and sterile, and does not engender the fruit of philosophy in a soul not impregnated from other sources.” Of itself it can only despatch issues, not rise to others.

xii. _Dialectica_ operates in all disciplines wherever the issue is abstract.[36] It leaves to _rhetorica_ whatever is hypothesis, i.e., whatever involves concrete circumstances: who, what, when, why, how. It makes no address to the public, expects no legal decision.

xiii-xv. Though each division of philosophy has its own field of inquiry and its own principles, yet _logica_ supplies methods common to all, as it were theory in a nutshell. A problem in _dialectica_ considers choice and avoidance, truth and knowledge, whether for itself or as aiding inquiry where opinion divides.

xvi-xvii. Review of the value and place of Aristotle, of the right use of Porphyry’s Introduction, and of other typical cases in teaching. Bernard (875 D) of Chartres and his followers took great pains to heal the breach between Plato and Aristotle; “but in my opinion they came late and labored in vain to reconcile in death those who differed as long as they lived.”

xviii-xix. Certain errors of those who profess Aristotle can hardly be overlooked: the burdening of tender shoulders, the making of Porphyry cover the whole ground, the misinterpretation that simplifies Aristotle by substituting Plato or something remote from both.

xx. The last chapter, much the longest, presents Aristotle on genus and species.

BOOK III. _TOPICA_

i-iv. A survey of the teaching of categoriæ, prædicamenta, and interpretatio as preliminary begins with general advice (890 D). “The exposition of every book should be such as to furnish most readily the knowledge of what is written. No occasion should be sought of introducing difficulty; everywhere the way should be opened. That was the practise, I remember, of Abelard ... (891 A). Thus Porphyry should be read so that the significance of the expressions in question may be retained and the sense of the words got from the surface. He will be sufficiently introductory so, and conspicuous for being quickly intelligible ... (891 D). For the text is to be searched mannerly, not bitterly racked, as if it were a prisoner, until it gives up what it has not taken.” This preliminary closes with a reminiscence (900 C). “Bernard of Chartres used to say that we, like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, can see more and farther not because we are keener and taller, but because of the greatness by which we are carried and exalted.”

v-x. Forecasting the rest of the program, John wonders why Aristotle’s _Topica_ should have been so long neglected (903 A). “Single words of it, in both rules and examples, are valuable not only for _dialectica_, but for almost all the disciplines. It comprises eight books, each more potent than the last.” The following digest, book by book, iterates (910 C) the general value. “The precepts of all eloquence seem to be derived originally from it as from the primary source. For it is indubitably true, as Cicero and Quintilian say, that rhetors and rhetoricians have found in it not only an aid, but a source.”

BOOK IV. _ANALYTICA_

In contrast to the ten long chapters of III, IV is divided into forty-two short ones: i-v, _analytica_ in general; vi-viii, _demonstrativa_; ix-xx, the progress of knowledge: sensus, imaginatio, prudentia, ratio, intellectus; xxi-xxiii, _hypothetica_, _sophistica_; xxiv-xlii, critical review: objectors to Aristotle the place of _logica_ in teaching, typical conceptions of ratio, and of truth and error, the relation of ratio to veritas.

This last book iterates the importance of correlation (xxviii. 982 B). “But though _logica_ is useful generally, he who is ignorant of other arts[37] is not so much helped by it toward philosophy as he is hindered by a habit of verbosity and presumption. For _logica_ is almost useless if it be alone. It stands out when it shines by the power of correlated studies.”

John’s slighting of rhetoric cannot be explained merely by his preoccupation with logic. Why was he thus preoccupied in a consistent and progressive scheme of the whole Trivium? He begins with a _logica_ embracing all studies of words; he devotes a whole book to _grammatica_; in his last pages he is speaking of an _organon_ that shall be a minister to _eloquentia_. Yet _rhetorica_ he merely mentions when he must. That he was aware of its ancient importance in such a scheme as his is evident from his large use of Quintilian’s _Teaching of Rhetoric_. No other medieval writer gave this work more attention. The much-quoted chapter (I. xxiv) on _prælectio_ uses not only Quintilian’s ideas, but his very words;[38] and other correspondences are no less significant. The following list, though not complete, is typical.

QUINTILIAN, _INST. ORAT._ _METALOGICUS_

I. iii. 3-5 II. viii. 865 B-C

Illud ingeniorum ... decrescit. Hoc est quod ... decrescit.

I. viii. 13-14 I. xxiv. 853 D-854 A

In prælegendo grammaticus ... In prælegendo grammaticus ... memoriam agitet. memoriam auditorum.

17-21 855 B-D

Præcipue vero illa ... Id quoque inter prima ... aliqua nescire. aliqua ignorare [with substitution of Augustine for Didymus, who is relegated to 864 C].

The correspondences above, verbatim for considerable stretches, involve here and there transpositions or other variations. The following are quotations or adaptations.

I. iv. 5-6 I. xxv. 856 D

Quo minus sunt ferendi ... in libro _De institutione oratoris quam ostentationis. Ne quis ..._ Ait ergo: “Ne quis igitur ... scientiam possit. [and the two sentences are quoted in reverse order].”

II. iii. 3 II. vii. 864 D

Propter quod Timotheum ... Refert Quintilianus [quotation with slight verbal variation].

II. iv. 5-7 IV. xxviii. 932 B

Nec unquam ... quod exculpi. Teneræ tamen ætati ... improbitas conquiescat [correspondence evident in idea, occasionally in word].

X. i. 83 II. ii. 859 A

Quid Aristotelem?... quid de eo dicat Quintilianus: clariorem putem. “Quid Aristotelem?... [exact quotation].”

X. i. 125-131 I. xxii. 852 B

Ex industria Senecam ... [Discusses Quintilian’s view (“ut quod voluit efficit. pace Quintiliani loquar”) with occasional reminiscence of his words.]

Even if these correspondences were confined to Quintilian’s first and second books, there would still be no sufficient ground for the inference that John, consulting him primarily for _grammatica_ and further for his general ideas on education, did not think of him as a rhetorician. For Quintilian not only presents rhetoric from the beginning; he frequently in these first books cites and quotes Aristotle as a rhetorician. But the matter seems to be put beyond doubt by the use of Book X. It is only fair to assume of so careful a scholar reading the first books and one of the last, and occupied with Quintilian’s idea of educational sequence, that he read the whole work.[39]

Having read and admired one of the chief ancient works on rhetoric, why did he leave rhetoric out of his own scheme? The answer is probably in the contemporary conditions to which the _Metalogicus_ is adjusted, and especially in the contemporary state of rhetoric. It seems not to have been in the twelfth century worth more than mention from a John of Salisbury seeking a vital sequence of studies. It lacked what he sought above all, vital relations. If he had known Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_, he might conceivably have sought to recall the ancient study to its better ancient aim. What he found vital in Quintilian’s rhetoric he transferred to _grammatica_ or to _dialectica_, partly, no doubt, because the transfer was actually going on, partly, one may think, because he saw in these other studies the real opportunities of his time for composition. The current lore of ornament which passed for rhetoric could hardly detain his consideration.

What he discerns in _grammatica_, and had found in the teaching of Bernard, is of course training in precision. But though he makes much of this, he does not slight the value of concreteness for presentation; he sees the importance of studying style by imitation; and he adopts from Quintilian a word not common in medieval treatises, _œconomia_. All these point to composition; and composition seems to have been one of the essential applications of the master’s analysis. The _prælectio_ as John describes it is tinged with Quintilian because it realizes fully the ancient function of _grammatica_ with the poets.

In the rapidly expanding teaching of _dialectica_ also he sees opportunity for composition. To this end, very likely, he urges repeatedly that the debates of the schools keep touch with reality by insisting on subject matter through correlation with other studies. Above all he desires that language studies be unified and progressive, that they call for expanding correlation of _inventio_ and _iudicium_. The study that in his time actually demanded and exercised these was not _rhetorica_, which was by way of ignoring both; it was _dialectica_.

D. THIRTEENTH CENTURY SURVEYS

1. The _Anticlaudianus_ of Alain de Lille

The allegorical survey entitled by Alain[40] _Anticlaudianus_ has but superficial likeness to the _De nuptiis philologiæ et Mercurii_[41] of Martianus Capella. Each presents the seven liberal arts in allegory; each is in nine books; but there is no real resemblance, nor any indication of Alain’s having used Martianus except as a stock source. The allegory of Martianus is confined to his first two books, and is purely decorative; the allegory of Alain pervades his whole work as a controlling idea. That idea is the function of education in the redemption of mankind. The sub-title “de officio viri boni et perfecti” is akin to Hugh’s[42] “animæ perfectio.” The consistent, elaborate theological symbolism shows some force of conception and, in spite of occasional excursions into style, some ardor and elevation. The four thousand hexameters are usually above the medieval fatal fluency in this verse. The survey, though it has not Hugh’s originality and does not attempt John’s unification, is equally serious.

The seven arts are summoned to provide _Prudentia_ with a chariot for her quest on behalf of man. _Grammatica_ supplies the pole; _Logica_, the axle, which _Rhetorica_ adorns with gems and gold; the Quadrivium, the four wheels. The horses, the five senses, are then harnessed by _Ratio_. When the upward journey has reached the term of human powers, _Prudentia_, leaving her chariot, is conducted by _Theologia_ into the empyrean, to the saints, to Mary, to God himself. Obtaining of God the formation of the new man, _Prudentia_ returns to seek gifts for the _anima creata_. _Natura_ gives it a body. _Concordia_ and _Pudicitia_, _Ratio_ and _Honestas_, coöperate in gifts with the seven arts. The dubious gifts of _Fortuna_ are assisted by _Ratio_. Thereupon the vices declare war, which is concluded by the victory of the opposed virtues.

Alain incidentally defines the character of each of the seven arts, and summarizes its scope. Each has its function—except _rhetorica_. The other members of the Trivium[43] provide the car of Prudentia with essential pole and axle; the Quadrivium supplies essential wheels; but all that _Rhetorica_ has to offer is quite unessential adornment. Though Alain rehearses the traditional parts of her ancient lore,[44] he sums up her actual occupation in two lines of cardinal significance.

Supremasque manus apponit, opusque sororum Perficit, atque semel factum perfectius ornat.

III. ii. 511 D.

In other words, rhetoric is not operative as composition, but only as style after the fact. Her gifts to the soul are only _colores_, _decor_, _clausula_.

Adsunt rhetoricæ cultus floresque colorum, Verba quibus stellata nitent; et sermo decorem Induit, et multa splendescit clausula luce.

VII. vi. 554 D.

Alain’s own use of rhetoric is consistent with this point of view. Each of his allegorical figures is introduced with the conventional descriptive ecphrasis; and his diffuseness arises from the idea that _poetica_ involves decorative dilation by those _colores_ of which Cicero and Vergil are equally patterns.

Verbi pauperiem redimit splendore _colorum_ Tullius, et dictis ornatus fulgura donat. Virgilii musa mendacia multa _colorat_, Et facie veri contexit pallia falso.

I. iv. 491 C.

2. The _Speculum Doctrinale_ of Vincent of Beauvais

The vast _Speculum_ of Vincent of Beauvais[45] is a compend of all knowledge. Its second part, _Speculum doctrinale_, Mirror of Teaching, devotes two books to the Trivium. _Grammatica_,[46] including metric, follows Isidore. The following book[47] devotes ninety-eight chapters to logic (_logica_), ten to rhetoric, twenty-three to poetic. The proportion is significant; and _poetica_, taken from under the ægis of _grammatica_, appears as a separate, coördinate section. For rhetoric Vincent, still following Isidore,[48] repeats the classical definition and division. The following chapters (101-108) deal briefly with the elements of a speech, the ideals of oratory, the types of cases, status, syllogisms, _loci rhetorici_, style.

Vincent then goes on to _poetica_,

which Alphorabius[49] in his book on the division of the _scientiæ_ puts last among the parts of _logica_, and which in his book on the origin of the _scientiæ_ he describes thus: “_Poetica_ is the lore of ordering meters according to the proportion of words (dictiones) and the times of feet and of their rhythms (numeri).” Again he says in the former book: “It belongs to _poetica_ to make the hearer through its locutions image something as fair or foul which is not so,[50] that he may believe and shun or desire it. Although certainly it is not so in truth, nevertheless, the minds of hearers are roused to shun or desire what they image.” Moreover poetry has seven species: _comedia_, _tragedia_, _invectio_, _satyra_, _fabula_, _historia_, _argumentum_.[51] _Comedia_ is poetry reversing a sad beginning by a glad end; but _tragedia_ is poetry lapsing from a glad beginning to a sad end (109). The function, then, of the poet is in this, that with a certain beauty he converts actual events into other species by his slanting figures (end of 110).

Except meter, which belongs under _grammatica_, and the two forms of drama, which are not thought of as forms of composition, there is nothing to distinguish this poetic from rhetoric.

3. St. Bonaventure _de Reductione Artium ad Theologiam_

St. Bonaventure[52] distinguishes four “lights”: (1) the exterior light of a manual art, illuminating with regard to artistic form; (2) the inferior light of knowledge through the senses, illuminating with regard to the patterns of nature; (3) the interior light of philosophical knowledge, illuminating with regard to truth comprehended intellectually; (4) the superior light of grace and revelation, illuminating with regard to truth as a means of salvation.[53] For (3), the “interior light,” his division is stated first in its commonest form. _Philosophia_ is: (a) _rationalis_ (i.e., _sermonum_), (b) _naturalis_ (i.e., _rerum_), (c) _moralis_ (i.e., _morum_). This division[54] he then repeats in another form and order:

(a) _physica_, for knowing the causes of being;

(b) _logica_, for knowing the theory of understanding;

(c) _practica_, for knowing the conduct of living.

Finally he considers it in a third aspect. The domain of _moralis_ is motive; of _physica_ is self-limited and self-sufficient; of _sermocinalis_ is interpretation. The last item he subdivides into:

_grammatica_, for expression, regarding reason as apprehension, seeking the appropriate;

_logica_, for instruction, regarding reason as judgment, seeking the true;

_rhetorica_, for persuasion, regarding reason as motive, seeking the ornate.[55]

Bonaventure does not use the word _dialectica_. His word for this, not for the whole Trivium,[56] is _logica_. Though his _movendum_ and _motivam_ suggest association of rhetoric with morals, and remind one of Aristotle’s conception, and Cicero’s, and Quintilian’s, he is content to give rhetoric the narrow and barren field of _ornatus_, assigning _docendum_ and _verum_ to logic.

4. The _Trésor_ of Brunetto Latini

The Old French _Trésor_ of Brunetto Latini[57] devotes a far larger proportion of space than Vincent’s _Speculum_ to rhetoric. Book I, surveying the seven arts,[58] includes history, geography, and the zoölogy of the bestiaries. Book II adds to Aristotelian ethics a collection of moral apothegms.[59] Book III opens politics with rhetoric.

Here begins the third book of the _Treasure_, which speaks of the teachings of good speech and of the government of towns and cities.... Cicero says that the highest lore for governing a city is rhetoric.[60] 467.

They are mistaken who think that to tell fables or old stories ... is matter of rhetoric.... [Rather rhetoric is concerned with] what is said by word of mouth or sent by letter to induce belief, to praise or blame, to advise ... in something that demands decision. 471.

The following chapters present the ancient division into five parts and the lore of _status_ and _quæstio_.[61] But at this point the distinctive ancient function of rhetoric begins to fade. After saying that the main division of all expression is into prose and rime, he adds that “the teachings of rhetoric are common to both,” save for the restrictions of meter.[62] The section on _dispositio_, the ordering of a speech, takes from Martianus Capella not his sober survey, but a single passage which Brunetto perverts by subdivision and by transfer to narrative.

To exploration of the material [of a speech], with discernment of its value for persuasion, is to be joined the ordering of the points, which is the part commonly called _dispositio_.... The scheme may be either the natural order or devised by the orator’s artifice; natural, when after the beginning comes the statement of facts, then the division, proposition, proof, conclusion and epilogue; by the orator’s artifice, when the things that must be said have been distributed through the parts of the speech.[63]

Here Martianus is apparently extending to the whole plan of a speech the commonplace of ancient rhetoric that the _narratio_ (statement of facts) might be either continuous as a single, distinct part, or distributed for the sake of giving salience to its separate items. Brunetto’s further extension is not his own; it is common stock of the contemporary _artes poeticæ_.[64] These manuals make much of “natural” and “artificial” order, subdivide each, and apply both to narrative. Brunetto is typical.

“Order [means] everything in its place; but this order is in two manners, one which is natural and another artificial.... The artificial order is divided into eight manners”:

(1) to say at the beginning what was at the end, (2) to begin with what was in the middle, (3) to base your story on the beginning of a proverb, (4) to base it on the middle of the proverb, (5) to base it on the end of the proverb, (6) (7) (8) so for three uses of an example. 482.

The mechanical division reflects a wide abeyance in theory, not only of poetic shaping and movement, but even of the _dispositio_ of ancient rhetoric; for its real concern is not with composition at all, whether in prose or in verse, but with the phrasing of certain patterns.

Brunetto’s preoccupation with style, and with style mainly as decorative dilation, soon appears in “how to dilate one’s tale in eight ways ... which are called colors of rhetoric.”[65] Among these _colores_, under _demonstrance_ (_demonstratio_), is his celebrated, but entirely conventional, ecphrasis on Yseult.

The traditional parts of a speech (exordium, etc.) are used[66] as an approach to _dictamen_, of which Brunetto appears to be thinking through much of what follows. The concluding chapters on statecraft are far from a discussion of politics. Rather they set forth the conduct of a seigneur. Thus they fail to carry out the relations of rhetoric to government which in his opening he borrows from Cicero. Book III, then, of the _Trésor_ lapses further and further from the ancient conception of rhetoric with which it begins. The rhetoric which it actually presents, and which it applies to poetry as well as to _dictamen_,[67] is a meager, though pleasant, review of style.[68]

What rhetoric appears in these surveys to lack most is distinct function. Writers as different as John of Salisbury and Brunetto Latini seem to think of it as polishing, decorating, especially dilating, what has been already expressed. It comes in after the real job is done; it has lost its ancient function of composing. The ancient lore of _inventio_ kept rhetoric in contact with subject matter and with actual presentation. This had so much less scope in feudal society that the lore easily lapsed, or was perverted. The only large field for its exercise was preaching. Education, therefore, naturally threw its weight on _grammatica_ for boys, on _dialectica_ for men. Between the two rhetoric was crowded into narrow room. Whether it would still have vindicated itself if it had been the rhetoric of Aristotle, or oftener the rhetoric of Quintilian, can be only conjectured. Actually it was the rhetoric of _De inventione_ and _ad Herennium_, and inculcated the sophistic of Sidonius. That may explain why there was no medieval rhetorician who really advanced the study.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Fulbert, c. 960-1028. His distinguished successor Ives, who ruled Chartres 1090-1115, had been, with Anselm, a pupil of Lanfranc at Bec, and had himself taught there (Clerval, 146).

That Chartres had the whole _Organon_ even before Gilbert de la Porrée, Richard l’Evêque, and John of Salisbury is shown by Clerval, 244 seq.

Haskins notes in the twelfth century the primacy of the cathedral schools (Laon, Tours, Chartres, Orléans, Paris) over the monastic.

(_The Normans in European History_, 177; _The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century_, 49.)

[2] The traditional manuals and authors continue: Donatus, Priscian, Martianus Capella (not much used), Bede, _De arte metrica_; Livy, Valerius Maximus, Orosius, Gregory of Tours; Vergil, Ovid, Horace, Terence, Statius; Fortunatus, Sedulius, Arator, Prudentius, Boethius. _Prælectio_ appears at its best in John of Salisbury’s account of the teaching of Bernard of Chartres (below pages 160-164). See the admirable summaries, period by period, in Clerval.

The library at Bec in the twelfth century had Priscian, Isidore, Martianus Capella (with Remi’s commentary), Anselm _De grammatica_, and Claudian (PL 150: 775-782).

[3] Clerval, 111-113, suggests an influence on the earlier forms of liturgical sequences.

[4] Colson (ed. of Book I, Cambridge, 1924) finds no clear indication of Quintilian in the eleventh century; and the large use of him by John of Salisbury in the twelfth (below, page 169) is not specifically related to rhetoric. Cicero is limited to _De inventione_ and the commentary of Victorinus (Clerval, 115). The _Rhetorica ad Herennium_ is the source of the _Colores_ of Onulf, who taught at Speier c. 1050. The Bec library had in the twelfth century “utraque rhetorica” (i.e., _De inv._ and _Ad Herenn._), Cicero, _De partit. orat._, Suetonius, and the letters of Sidonius. At Chartres Thierry cites Quintilian and, according to Clerval, 233, Cicero, _De oratore_. The latter, with Quintilian, appears in _A list of textbooks from the close of the twelfth century_, Haskins in Harvard Stud. Class. Phil. 20:92.

[5] Clerval, 115-116.

[6] *100 as described in Clerval, 117. Besides Fulbert’s verses, it has (*10) two short treatises: _De rhetoricæ cognatione_, and _Locorum rhetoricorum distinctio_. The _Topica_, of course, are common ground between rhetoric and logic.

[7] Gilbertus Porretanus, c. 1075-1154, Chancellor at Chartres 1126, teacher at Paris 1141, Bishop of Poitiers 1142; _Liber sex principiorum_, _Comment. IV libr. Boeth._, _Liber de causis_. See Clerval, 163-168, and Poole. Clerval suggests that Gilbert, as well as Thierry and Bernard Silvester, had relations with the Toulouse translators of Arabic books into Latin.

[8] Terricus Carnotensis, Breton, _scolarum magister_ at Chartres 1121, taught rhetoric at Paris c. 1140, died c. 1150; _Comment. De invent._ and _Rhet. ad Herenn._; _Heptateuchon_ c. 1141 (Chartres MSS. *497, 498) described in Clerval, 220 seq., with a synoptic table of contents.

[9] Donatus and Priscian.

[10] Cic. _De invent._ and _Partit. Orat._, _Rhet. ad Herenn._, the summary of Severianus, and Martianus Capella.

[11] The usual Boethian items.

[12] Translated in Clerval, 221.

[13] Hugh of St. Victor, Saxon, c. 1096-1141, entered the Abbey of St. Victor at Paris c. 1116 and taught there; works PL 175-177. See especially Mignon, whose second chapter is a good summary of studies before Hugh. A critical study of the MSS. by Hauréau (B.), _Les œuvres de H. de St. V._, Paris, 1886 (a revision of a study published in 1859), shows that _Eruditio didascalica_ has only six parts, the seventh added in PL being a separate work. See also Fourier Bonnard, _Histoire de l’abbaye royale et de l’ordre des chanoines réguliers de St. Victor de Paris_, Paris (n. d.); and the index to Manacorda. John of Salisbury refers to Hugh, and uses part of his classification.

[14] The division, which is common in the middle age (e.g., John of Salisbury, _Metalogicus_, II. ii), is in Quintilian, _Inst. Or._ XII. 2. 10.

[15] About 1159. For John see Poole, the index to Clerval, and the antiquated, but still suggestive study of Schaarschmidt, _J. S. nach Leben und Studien ..._, Leipzig, 1862. Webb (C. C. I.) has edited the _Policraticus_, Oxford, 1909, with an introduction especially valuable for John’s reading, and announced an edition of the _Metalogicus_, for which meantime the only available text is in PL 199, referred to in this section by column. The letters, also in PL 199, were printed with Gerbert’s and Stephen of Tournai’s in 1611 (Paris, Ruette). The _Historia pontificalis_, printed in MGH as anonymous, has been edited by Poole, Oxford University Press, 1927. _Policraticus_ IV, V, VI, with selections from VII and VIII, are translated, with an introduction, by Dickinson (J.) as _The statesman’s yearbook of J. of S._, New York, 1927.

[16] See the preceding section. John mentions Hugh at 833 A, 924 B. The word _disserere_ Hugh and John may have taken, as John took other things at the opening of Book II, from Isidore (see above, page 97); but the ultimate source of the phrase _ratio disserendi_ is probably Cicero’s _Topica_: “omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habet partes, unum inveniendi alteram iudicandi.” _Top._ 2. Cf. _Fin._ 1. 7. 22; _Fat._ 1. 1. _Disserere_ seems limited to _dialectica_ in _De orat._ I. 9 (see Wilkins’s note); but using the same word in II. 157, Cicero points out that the proper function of _dialectica_ is analysis (_iudicium_, not _inventio_). In _Orator_ 113, discussing the common ground of rhetoric and logic, he says “utrumque in disserendo est,” and goes on to distinguish logic as _ratio disputandi_ from rhetoric as _ratio dicendi_. _Dicere_ is generally his word for rhetoric. Quintilian, whom John uses largely, probably has in mind the same distinction in X. 1. 81, though in other places he uses _disserere_ more generally.

[17] I. xvii (847 C), xxiv (854 B), II. x (868 B).

[18] For John’s use of Quintilian, see below, page 169.

[19] In this respect _Metalogicus_ is conspicuously different from _Policraticus_.

[20] These “Cornificians” are mentioned 825 C, 827 A, 852 B, 857 A. See Clerval 182, 211, 227.

[21] Quadam proportione rationis, 841 B.

[22] This poetic is none the less rhetoric for being confirmed by quotations from Horace (_Ars poetica_, 102-105, 108-111; see ARP 245). The general doctrine of appropriateness was the basis of the specific recipes for _encomium_ (above, page 31).

[23] Cf. Vincent of Beauvais below, section D. 2.

[24] The following translation renders entire the most specific extant account of _prælectio_ in the middle age. Long selections from it in French translation will be found in Clerval, 225-227; a shorter selection, with the corresponding Latin text, in Faral, _Les arts poétiques du xiie et du xiiie siècle_, Paris, 1924, 99-101. Haskins, 135, has a short selection in English translation.

For _prælectio_, see the index to ARP and to this volume.

[25] _Illustratio_ is Quintilian’s word (and Cicero’s, he says) in VI. ii. 32, where he is exhibiting the same sort of development as is here indicated by John. For _historia_, _argumentum_, _fabula_ see the index. That these were elementary school exercises suggests that the subject of this sentence (_Illi_) refers not to authors, but to schoolboys engaged in developing a _materia_; but the reference can hardly be determined in PL, in which the whole sentence seems to me dubious.

[26] _Probandi colores._ The word _colores_ in this sense, unusual at this time, is characteristic of Seneca Rhetor, to whom John refers in II. viii. But the solution of a passage apparently corrupt may well await a better text.

[27] Cf. III. vi (904 C). Et sicut juxta ethicum: discipulus prioris est posterior dies.

[28] _Declinatio_ is the eighth item, under Priscian, in the list from Thierry’s _Heptateuchon_ cited above, page 153.

[29] For _clausula_ see the indexes to ARP and to this volume; for John’s own cadences, below, Chapter VIII.

[30] Œconomia.

[31] See below, page 170.

[32] For _inventio_ and _iudicium_ see Hugh above, page 154, and note 16. Quintilian III. iii. 5 objects to the application of this to rhetoric.

[33] See Hugh’s division above, page 155.

[34] Vocum et intellectuum.

[35] Ficta, hypothetical? Sophistica seems to be intended in the following clause.

[36] Thesis.

[37] Reading _aliarum_.

[38] This is pointed out by Colson in his edition of Quintilian’s first book, Cambridge, 1924, page 1, note 2. It is the stranger that the quotations should not have been noticed before since John himself calls attention to them: “ut verbo utamur Quintiliani,” “ab auctoritate ejusdem Quintiliani” (I. xxiv. 853 D).

[39] _Illustratio_ in I. xxiv (854 A/B) is probably a reminiscence of Quintilian VI. ii. 32, to judge not only from the word, but from the context in both passages. Cf. 844 A, 851 C, 860 C, 910 D.

[40] Alanus de Insulis (about 1128-1202), Cistercian at Citeaux, sometimes called “doctor universalis,” wrote mainly on theology. _Anticlaudianus_ was edited by Wright in the second volume of his _Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century_, London, (Rolls Series), which contains also _De planctu naturæ_. The latter has been translated by D. M. Moffat in Yale Studies in English, New York, 1908.

The citations in this section are by column from PL 210. For the _Summa de arte predicatoria_ see below, Chapter IX. C.

[41] See above, Chapter III. B. 1.

[42] For Hugh, see above, page 153.

[43] Alain’s order is the usual (1) _grammatica_, (2) _dialectica_, (3) _rhetorica_. His _logica_ is _dialectica_, not the inclusive term of Hugh and John. Its _auctores_ (III. ii. 510 A) are Porphyry, Aristotle, Zeno, Boethius.

[44] III. ii. 512-513.

[45] About 1190-1264. The _Speculum_ was printed at Strasburg in 1473, and by the Benedictines at Douai in 1624.

[46] Book III (II in the Benedictine edition).

[47] Book IV (III in the Benedictine edition).

[48] Vincent refers in Chapter 100 to Quintilian. “Tullius in libro de oratore” (100 and 127) is probably not a reference to _De oratore_. In 101 “Tullius in rhetorica prima,” and in 127 “idem in rhetorica secunda,” are the usual references to _De inventione_ and _ad Herennium_. For the references to Quintilian see Bassi, _Giornale storico_, XXIII, 186, and Colson’s introduction to his edition of Quintilian’s first book, page lii.

[49] Farabi. For translations from Arabic see above, page 153, and Haskins, Chapter IX.

[50] Compare Alain above in the quotation on page 174.

[51] For the three school exercises that conclude this list see the indexes to ARP and to this volume; for the rest of the classification, Bede, above, Chapter V. B. 1.

[52] 1221-1274. The _Opusculum de reductione artium ad theologiam_ is number 4 (pages 317-325) in volume 5 of the Works edited by the College of St. Bonaventure, Quaracchi (Florence), 1891.

[53] (1) Lumen exterius artis mechanicæ illuminat respectu figuræ artificialis;

(2) lumen inferius cognitionis sensitivæ illuminat respectu formæ naturalis;

(3) lumen interius cognitionis philosophicæ illuminat respectu veritatis intellectualis;

(4) lumen superius gratiæ et sacræ Scripturæ illuminat respectu veritatis salutaris.

[54] For the classifications of Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury see above, sections B and C.

[55]

(a) moralis regit motivam; (b) naturalis regit se ipsam; (c) sermocinalis regit interpretativam: (1) grammatica ad exprimendum respicit rationem ut apprehensivam ... congruum; (2) logica ad docendum respicit rationem ut iudicativam ... verum; (3) rhetorica ad movendum respicit rationem ut motivam ... ornatum.

[56] That he does not intend _logica_ in the larger sense of Hugh and John will be clear from comparative study of the three forms of his division, and also from _Collationes in hexaëmeron_ (in the same volume), IV. 18-25. This briefly sums up _rhetorica_ according to its ancient topics, including the three fields and the five parts. Here again _dialectica_ is not used, and _logica_ merely supersedes it.

[57] 1230-1294. The _Trésor_ is edited, with an introduction, by Chabaille in the Collection des documents inédits sur l’histoire de France, Paris, 1863. References in this section are to the pages of this edition. The Italian version, also widely current, is edited by L. Gaiter, Bologna, 1878. See also F. Maggini, _La rettorica italiana di B. L._ (Pub. del R. Istituto di studi superiori), Florence, 1913.

[58] The proem, beginning with theology as the highest lore of _theorica_, makes the usual enumeration under _mathematica_, divides _practica_, “la seconde science de philosophie,” into “éthique . économique . politique,” and so arrives at rhetoric, but with some confusion as to logic.

[59] See Chabaille, xv.

[60] Villani may be merely repeating this when he says: “Egli fu cominciatore e maestro in digrossare i Fiorentini, e farli scorti in bene parlare et in sapere guidare e reggere la nostra repubblica secondo la politica.” VIII. x.

[61] Brunetto’s main source is Cicero _De invent._

[62] La grans partisons de touz parleors ... en prose ... en rime; mais li enseignement de rectorique sont commun andui, sauf ce que la voie de prose est large et pleniere, si comme est ore la commune parleure des gens; mais li sentiers de rime est plus estroiz et plus fors. 481.

[63] His igitur ad fidem faciendam prudenter inuentis ordo rerum est sociandus, quæ pars _dispositio_ uocitatur ... duplex igitur huius partis est ratio; aut enim naturalis est ordo aut oratoris artificio comparatur: naturalis, cum post principium narratio, partitio, propositio, argumentatio, conclusio epilogusque consequitur; artificio oratoris, cum per membra orationis quæ dicenda sunt digerimus. V. 506 (Teubner, ed. Dick, 248).

[64] See below, Chapter VII. B.

[65] “Comment l’om puet acroistre son conte en viij manieres ... qui sont apelees color de rectorique.” The first of these, _aornement_, is defined so bluntly that the humorous implication may be intentional: “tout ce que l’om porroit en iij moz ou en iiij, ou a mult po de paroles dire, il les acroist par autres paroles plus longues et plus avenans qui dient ce meisme.” 486.

[66] 490.

[67] For _dictamen_, see below, Chapter VIII.

[68] Jean d’Antioche in his introduction to the translation of _De inventione_ and _Rhetorica ad Herennium_ (end of XIIIth century) has two divisions of _Philosophye_: (A) into _ethique morale_, _rationele_, and _naturele_; (B) as follows:—

Philosophye

Practique Teorique Civile Dispensative Morale Naturele Devine Matematique | | | | | | { Mecanique { Prudence | { Droit { Justize | { Sermocinale { Force | | { Temprance { Geometrie | { Arismetique { Gramaire { Muzique { Logique { Astronomie { Retorique | | | | | +-------------------Les vii ars------------------+

Delisle in _Notices et Extraits_, 36:216.

Neither _Le mariage des sept arts_ nor Henri d’Andeli’s _Bataille des sept arts_ contains any information about teaching.