CHAPTER XII.

The North Sea Outrage--Seizures of Neutrals--The Case of the "Malacca"--The Baltic Fleet--Departure at Last--Russian Alarms--In the North Sea--Bringing Home the News--Russian Allegations--Naval Preparations--Supplementary Information--The Baltic Fleet Proceeds to Madagascar.

[Sidenote: The North Sea Outrage]

No sooner had the echoes of the terrific battle of the Sha-ho begun to subside than the attention of the civilized world, which had so long been concentrated on the vicissitudes of the Titanic struggle in the Far East, was suddenly focussed on a spot separated from the theatre of war by more than half the circumference of the globe, and on an incident fraught, as it seemed, with more direful and tremendous consequences even than the momentous rupture between Russia and Japan. On the 15th of October, Russia's Baltic Fleet--which for many months had been preparing as a reinforcement to the Pacific Squadron--at last left port on its voyage to the Far East; and within six days of its departure it had so effectually asserted itself as a factor in the naval situation that Europe, shocked and startled, woke up one morning to find itself hanging on the perilous brink of that Armageddon which has been the nightmare of statesmen for the last twenty years. In passing through the North Sea, the Russian fleet--for causes which have yet to be fully elicited--fired on a flotilla of British fishing-boats engaged in trawling on the Dogger Bank; killed and wounded several of the fishermen; sunk one of the trawlers, and more or less grievously injured others. When the news of this amazing outrage was published a storm of indignation and resentment swept over England such as has not been known for more than a generation; and feeling was embittered and intensified to a truly dangerous pitch, first by the callous indifference displayed by the perpetrators of the outrage, and next by the indisposition of the Russian Government to offer those immediate apologies and amends which alone could palliate so wanton a breach of the comity of nations. It seemed for the moment that Russia had deliberately designed to provoke England to hostilities, in the hope of redeeming her own desperate position by extending the area of the conflict and by dragging into it first the ally of Japan, and by consequence her own ally, France. The prospect, though almost too terrible to contemplate, did not for a moment quench the resolution of the people of England, where men of all parties were found standing shoulder to shoulder in the demand for ample reparation. What made the situation especially dangerous was that public patience had at last been well-nigh exhausted by the repeated provocations of Russia--provocations which the North Sea outrage was only the crown and culmination. To understand this fact, it is necessary to go back a little.

[Sidenote: Seizures of Neutrals]

When Russia found that she could not hope successfully to contest the supremacy of the sea with Japan, she turned her attention to the subsidiary enterprise of commerce-raiding. In this task the Vladivostock Squadron were particularly active, and, unsated by the destruction of such Japanese transports and trading vessels as they encountered, seized or sunk many vessels flying neutral flags. On the 16th of June the Vladivostock cruisers seized the _Allanton_, a British steamer, carrying coal from Hokkaido Island to Singapore. There was nothing contraband in the cargo or destination of this vessel, as the subsequent decision of the St. Petersburg Prize Court proved, yet the _Allanton_ was confiscated, and her crew held prisoners at Vladivostock for months. The real reason for this high-handed conduct was that the _Allanton_ had previously carried a cargo of coal from Cardiff to Japan--but she had been chartered for that voyage before the outbreak of war. On the 16th of July the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company's steamer, the _Hispang_, was wantonly sunk in Pigeon Bay by a Russian torpedo-boat. The _Hispang_ was engaged in a lawful trade; there was no suggestion that she carried contraband; and indeed no examination of her cargo was even attempted. She was flying the British flag, and she stopped directly she was ordered to do so. But in spite of these facts, a Russian torpedo-boat came straight out to her and sunk her--the captain, officers, and passengers being rescued with difficulty. It was afterwards confessed by the Russian officer that did this deed that his orders were given under the impression that the _Hispang_ was the steamer _Haimum_, which was being employed by the London _Times_' correspondent. On the 26th of July an equally gross outrage was perpetrated by the Vladivostock Squadron, who, besides unjustifiably seizing the _Chalcas_, deliberately sunk on the 23rd of July the British steamer _Knight Commander_. This vessel was carrying rails for Japan; and even if such a cargo could be regarded as contraband, there was no excuse for sinking the vessel. Such an act, in the words of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, constituted "a grave breach of international law"; and it was aggravated by the circumstances in which it was committed. The captain and crew were ordered to get clear of the vessel in ten minutes, and such was the haste with which they were compelled to leave the boats in order to save their lives, that nearly all the personal effects had to be sacrificed. The growing irritation with these acts was brought to a head in England by the famous case of the _Malacca_--a P. and O. mail steamship which was seized by Russian cruisers in the Red Sea on the 19th July. At the beginning of June two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet in the Black Sea--the _Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_--were "designated for Government service outside the Black Sea." Even their commanders were kept in the dark as to their destination and the nature of the service that they were to perform. The two vessels, which, as warships, would not by international treaty have been able to leave the Black Sea, passed through the Dardanelles under the commercial flag, and then steered straight to the Suez Canal, where the non-belligerent character was still maintained. But it seems that on reaching Constantinople the commanders had been informed that their ships had been raised to the rank of second-class cruisers in the Russian fleet; and no sooner had the Red Sea been reached than the _Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_ put off their commercial disguise and put on the character of ships of war. They flew the naval flag, and mounted the armament of 5in. quick-firers, which had been up to that moment securely stowed away. The Government service for which they had been designated was that of searching for contraband on neutral vessels, and the _soi-disant_ cruisers lost no time in demonstrating their zeal. All this time, by the way, the Russian Admiralty was strenuously denying that the _Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_ had left the Black Sea at all. On the 15th July the commerce-raiders began operations, rather tactlessly, by stopping and seizing the German mail steamer, _Prinz Heinrich_, and by confiscating the Japanese mails. The indignation and astonishment of the German public had only begun to make itself heard, when it was distracted by the intelligence that the P. and O. steamer _Malacca_ had also been stopped, and had been actually brought back to Suez in charge of a Russian prize crew. The vessel, flying the Russian flag, reached Suez on the 19th July, and on the 20th the English Government, moved thereto by the clamor which began to be heard both in Parliament and in the press, addressed to the Government of the Czar a strongly-worded protest against the seizure and a demand that the _Malacca_ should be instantly released. The demand was based on the irregular position of the _Petersburg_--a vessel which, if a ship of war, ought not to have passed the Dardanelles, and which, if not a ship of war, had no right to stop and search neutral vessels. This contention was unanswerable; for it is evident that if a ship could be permitted to change its character at will, it could perform all the functions of a ship of war and still enjoy all the privileges of a non-belligerent at neutral ports.

[Sidenote: Case of the "Malacca"]

Incidentally it was pointed out in Lord Lansdowne's dispatch that the ammunition found on board the _Malacca_ belonged to the British Government, and was intended for the China Squadron. It subsequently came to light that the seizure of the _Malacca_ was no mere accident; but that the vessel had been waited for by the Russian cruisers acting on secret information from Russian agents at Antwerp. For several days no reply was vouchsafed by the Russian Government, and feeling in this country rose to such a height that the situation became dangerous. While the whole British nation was chafing under the indignity and affront, the _Malacca_ was being navigated by her prize crew, with almost deliberate insolence, through the Suez Canal on the way to the Baltic port of Libau. A British liner, in the eyes of the whole world, was made an ignominious captive, and, like a pickpocket in the clutch of a police-constable, was dragged away to judgment. The humiliation of the situation was aggravated by the fact that at Suez--a port of the English Protectorate of Egypt--the Russian officer in charge of the _Malacca_ demanded to be supplied with coal, water, and provisions. In spite of the strong representations which had been made by the British Government, nothing was done at St. Petersburg to alleviate the situation. The _Malacca_ reached Suez on the 19th of July and Port Said on the 20th, and on the 21st she sailed unconcernedly for her destination, which was ostentatiously announced to be Libau. Then at last the Russian Government broke the silence. Having inflicted the greatest possible humiliation on this country, they were pleased to accept the assurances of the British Government that the prize had no contraband on board, and to consent that the _Malacca_ should not be brought before a Prize Court. A claim for damages for detention was to be admitted, and the vessel was to be handed over to the British authorities at "some Mediterranean port," after formal examination in the presence of the British Consul. On the 27th July the terms of this agreement--so extravagantly indulgent to Russia--were carried out, and the incident of the _Malacca_ closed; but there remained still unsettled the fundamental question of the status of the volunteer cruisers, _Smolensk_ and _Petersburg_. Meanwhile, for the German liner _Scandia_, which had been seized on the 23rd July, very different treatment was reserved--she was released on the following day. The only public recognition of the protests of the British Government which was given by the Government of the Czar was the publication on the 3rd August of an official communication declaring that "the special commission" of the cruisers _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ had "expired;" and these vessels promptly disappeared from the Red Sea. But their mischievous career was not yet at an end. Although the Russian Government had specifically promised that they should not be employed in searching neutral shipping any longer, the world was startled at the end of August to learn that the British steamer _Comedian_ had been stopped 80 miles from East London and 10 miles only from the coast of British territory by a mysterious Russian cruiser. The unpleasant impression in England was deepened when it was discovered that this strange cruiser was no other than the _Smolensk_ of Red Sea fame. Well might Mr. Balfour, who received at this moment a deputation of British shipowners, declare that the incident had produced "a painful impression" in the minds of the English Government. Representations to the Russian Government produced the characteristic excuse that the messages sent to the _Smolensk_ and _Petersburg_ had not reached their destination. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that the Russian Admiralty, which had done its best to thwart the Russian Foreign Office, had taken particularly good care that the messages should be delayed until the _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ were out of reach. But realizing the gravity of the situation, and protesting their own helplessness, the Russian Government now invited the British Government itself to communicate to the raiders a cypher message of recall. Accordingly the cruisers on the Cape Station were sent out to find the delinquents; and on the 5th September they were discovered coaling in the territorial waters of Zanzibar with German colliers in attendance. Their whereabout was at any rate sufficiently well known for them to command the means to replenish their bunkers, and as soon as they saw a British warship, they prepared for instant flight. But H.M.S. _Forte_ managed to communicate to them the orders of their own Government, and as these were too unequivocal to be disregarded, the raiding career of the _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ forthwith came to an end. But they had done enough, in conjunction with the Vladivostock Squadron, to rouse feeling in England to a high pitch of irritation; and to make it ill-prepared to endure with patience or forbearance the greater and still more wanton outrage with which the Baltic Fleet was to inaugurate its voyage to the Far East.

[Sidenote: The Baltic Fleet]

The dispatch of this fleet had been the feverish pre-occupation of the Russian Admiralty from the moment that the first disasters befell the Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur. Naval reinforcements were on the way, it will be remembered, at the outbreak of war, and had reached the Red Sea; but they were recalled when the news of the successful torpedo attack on the Port Arthur Fleet reached Europe. It was realized how vital must be the command of the sea to the achievement of victory; and Russia at once set about preparing an Armada which should restore to her the naval preponderance so suddenly lost. At first the intention, which was so loudly proclaimed, was not taken quite seriously; but it was decidedly encouraged as the weeks went on and as the resisting power of Port Arthur to assault gave hopes that the new fleet might still find a warm-water port to receive it. At first the departure of the Baltic Fleet was announced for June; though everyone knew the design, only formed perhaps to reassure public opinion in Russia, was incapable of fulfilment. Then June came, and the date of departure was again postponed; and in July the world was informed that there was "no hurry;" and that it had been thought advisable to "test thoroughly" the new ships and to familiarize the officers and crews with their work. All through the summer the game of fixing the day of departure and then postponing it went merrily on; but on the 15th August Admiral Rozhestvensky, on whom supreme command of the fleet had been bestowed, went on board the flagship with his staff; and received from the Port Admiral at Kronstadt by signal a formal message of farewell. But nothing more happened, except that on the 20th August it was announced that the Baltic Fleet would not leave before the 28th September.

[Illustration: HUGE SIEGE GUNS BEFORE PORT ARTHUR.]

[Sidenote: Departure at Last]

On the 26th August the fleet went for a trial trip with the most discouraging results, for several of the new ships broke down and the battleship _Orel_ ran aground, inflicting structural injuries on herself. Early in September there was another false alarm. Danish pilots had been procured, and on the 11th September the fleet again put to sea; but it only got as far as the port of Libau, and the next news was that it would remain there "some weeks longer" for firing practice and manoeuvres. The next definite date fixed was the 7th October; but two days later than that the fleet had only got as far as Reval, where it was inspected and blessed by the Czar in person. On the 15th October, however, the long delay at last came to an end, and the fleet, consisting of thirty-six vessels, actually left Russian waters.

It is necessary now to describe the fleet in which Russia had placed so many of her hopes. The class and character of the principal vessels is best realized from a table:--

Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun W'ght of ment in horse- speed in Protec'n b'side fire BATTLESHIPS. tons. power. knots. in inches. in lbs.

Kniaz Suvaroff (flagship) 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 Alexander III 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 Borodino 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 Orel 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426 Ossliabia 12,674 14,500 18 10.5 2,672 Sissoi Veliky (flagship) 8,880 10,400 16 12.5 3,186 Navarin 9,476 18,206 16 12.5 3,404

Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun W'ght of ment in horse- speed in Protec'n b'side fire tons. power. knots. in inches. in lbs.

ARMORED CRUISERS.

Admiral Nakhimoff 8,500 9,000 16.7 6 944 Dmitri Donskoi 5,893 7,000 16 6.2 444

PROTECTED

Oleg 6,675 19,500 23 4 872 Aurora 6,630 11,600 20 4.5 632 Svietlana 3,828 8,500 20 4 476 Almaz 3,285 7,500 19 -- 184 Jemtchug 3,200 7,000 24 -- 184 Izumrud 3,200 7,000 24 -- 184

[Sidenote: Strength of Baltic Fleet]

In addition to these ships there was a torpedo flotilla of 7 destroyers of 28 knots speed, and 8 torpedo-boats; the following vessels of the Volunteer Fleet: _Kiev_, _Vladimir_, _Voronej_ (each of 10,500 tons and with a speed of 12 knots), _Tambov_, and _Yawslar_ (each of 8,640 tons and with a speed of 12 knots); 13 transports armed with light guns; and a hospital ship, the _Orel_--not to be confused with the battleship of the same name. On paper, at least, this was a very formidable fleet; but its fighting efficiency appears much reduced on analysis. There were four modern battleships of a powerful type and of homogeneous design; but their value is much discounted by the fact that some of their consorts are distinctly less powerful; and in naval warfare the manoeuvring power of a fleet becomes that of its weakest item. This was proved very signally on the occasion of the engagement between Admiral Kamimura and the Vladivostock Squadron, when the Russian cruisers _Gromoboi_ and _Rossia_ suffered most severely from having to stand by the _Rurik_, the lame duck of the squadron. The _Ossliabia_, it is true was not much inferior to the battleships of the _Kniaz Suvaroff_ class. She was a sister ship to the _Peresviet_ and _Pobieda_, sunk in the harbor of Port Arthur, and was launched in 1898. But the _Sissoi Veliky_ and the _Navarin_ both dated from 1891, and were distinctly inferior in the all-important matter of speed, even their nominal speed never having been attained. The only armored cruisers with the Baltic Fleet--the _Admiral Nakhimoff_ and the _Dmiti Donskoi_--were barely entitled to their description, as they have a low speed, light armor, and comparatively small gun power. Certainly they were not fit, like the best armored cruisers of to-day, to lie in the line of battle. Some of the other cruisers were little more than armed merchantmen, and none of them were formidable warships. Another circumstance that detracted from the fighting value of this fleet was the character of the officers and crews. All Russia's best and most highly-trained sailors and marine engineers were sent out before the war to the Pacific Squadron; and she had no adequate reserve to draw on. The modern man-of-war's-man--whether he is in the engine-room or on the gun-deck--is a highly specialized product, and he cannot be turned out at a moment's notice. Stokers, artificers, engineers, as well as torpedo lieutenants, gunners, and even admirals, have to be carefully trained for years before they become efficient, and the inefficiency and inexperience of the scratch crews and raw officers put on board the Baltic Fleet was the main cause of the long delay in that fleet's departure and of the disaster that occurred immediately after the start had been made, and that nearly brought the voyage to a tragic and ignominious conclusion. When all these circumstances were taken into consideration, it became obvious that the Baltic Fleet was hopelessly inferior to the fleet which, on reaching Far Eastern waters, it would have to encounter in order to wrest from the Japanese their command of the sea. But one question, even more urgent than that of the fate which would befall the fleet on arrival, was how it was to overcome the difficulties of the voyage. Russia had no coaling stations; and coaling at sea from attendant colliers has not yet become a feasible operation for a great fleet. The larger vessels would require from 5,000 to 6,000 tons of coal each, and the smaller cruisers from 2,000 to 3,000 tons in the course of a voyage of nearly 13,000 miles, occupying at least 100 days, and very possibly 30 days more. But the coaling difficulty proved less insuperable than it had appeared, and Russia's energy and ingenuity in overcoming it were the first symptoms that she meant the Baltic Fleet to be taken seriously. Negotiations for the supply of coal were opened with English firms; but our Foreign Office ruled that such contracts would be an infringement of neutrality. The Germans, however, were much more complaisant; and their attitude of "benevolent neutrality," as Count Von Bulow called it, enabled them to meet all demands of Russia. Large orders for English coal to be delivered to German consignees at neutral ports were received at Cardiff; and this coal was then transferred to the ports at which the Baltic Fleet was to call. According to the strict interpretation of international law these facilities for coaling in port ought not to have been extended to the fleet of a belligerent. But Russia was a close neighbor of the Powers concerned, and the ally of one of them, while her enemy was a long way off; and so it happened that Admiral Rozhdestvensky suffered no more inconvenience than if he had been engaged on a yachting cruise. He and his fleet put into any port that they fancied, and stayed, practically, as long as they had a mind to!

[Sidenote: Russian Alarms]

The Baltic Fleet was divided into three divisions, and on the 16th-18th October the first division left Libau. The daring surprise attacks of the Japanese torpedo-boats at Port Arthur had filled the minds of the Russian naval authorities with every kind of misgiving; and by some means not yet disclosed, they had become possessed of the idea that the Japanese meditated an attempt on the Baltic Fleet during its passage through the narrow waters of the Danish Straits and the North Sea. Rumors of mysterious Japanese agents, endeavoring to charter vessels in obscure Danish and Norwegian ports filled the Russian newspapers. On the 14th October Admiral Wirenius, the Chief of the Russian Admiralty, solemnly declared to an interviewer that the narrow waters of the Belt and the Sound were particularly favorable for a surprise attack; that officers of the Japanese Navy were known to have left for Europe; and that there was reason to apprehend an attempt to throw mines in the track of the Russian Squadron in the Danish Straits. The state of "nerves" to which the Russian naval officers had been reduced by these apprehensions was shown when, as the Russian fleet passed through the Kattegat, an attempt was made to deliver to the Russian Admiral a cypher dispatch that had arrived from St. Petersburg. Two fishermen were sent out with the dispatch in a motor-launch, but when their vessel approached the flagship the searchlights were turned on, and blank charges fired to forbid a nearer approach. The dispatch was taken in by a boat launched by the battleship for the purpose.

[Sidenote: In the North Sea]

On the 19th of October the first division of the fleet passed through the Kattegat; and by the 21st of October all the ships had left Danish waters and entered on their course down the North Sea. Immediately followed an occurrence almost without parallel in naval history--an occurrence that was only saved from inextinguishable ridicule and contempt by the tragic consequences which it unhappily involved. On this memorable night of Friday, the 21st of October, some fifty vessels of the Hull fishing fleet were engaged in trawling on the Dogger Bank--one of the places in the North Sea most frequented by the fishermen not only of Great Britain, but of Germany, Denmark, Holland and Norway. It is a prominent figure in all charts of the North Sea, and to every sailor and seafaring man its situation and character are perfectly familiar. The Hull fishermen, of the Gamecock and Great Northern Fleets, had their trawls down and were thus deprived of the possibility of rapid movement, when about midnight they sighted a number of warships steaming from the northeast. At first they did not suspect that it was the Russian Baltic Fleet that had come their way, because in that event the fleet must have been navigating some 40 miles out of the true course; but very soon their ignorance was enlightened. While the men were watching the passing warships, searchlights were suddenly flashed on the trawlers, and then, to the horror and amazement of these innocent fishermen engaged peaceably in their lawful occupations, a sudden storm of shot and shell broke upon them from unknown men-of-war. The steam-trawler _Crane_ was sunk and its skipper and mate were decapitated by a shell, and all but one of the crew were injured; while the trawlers _Moulmein_ and _Mino_ were seriously damaged, the latter vessel having no fewer than sixteen holes in her. From the evidence given at the subsequent inquiries the following facts were elicited: