CHAPTER XI.

NAPOLEON’S CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST

The Appeal of Bonaparte to the Jews of Asia and Africa――Haim Mu’allim Farhi――The Fortress of Acre――Jewish opinion in Palestine――El-Arish――_Gaza_――_Jerusalem_――Moses Mordecai Joseph Meyuchas――“A Letter addressed by a French Jew to his Brethren”――France and England――The real motives of Bonaparte’s Appeal.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769‒1821) issued in 1799 a summons to the Asiatic and African Jews to march under his banner, promising “to give them the Holy Land,” and “to restore ancient _Jerusalem_ to its pristine splendour” (Appendix xl). One hardly knows whether this was to be taken quite seriously. The Jews in _Jerusalem_ appear either not to have put much trust in Bonaparte’s flattering words, or to have been utterly ignorant of the proclamation. The question was so important, and so much confusion prevailed regarding it, that the appeal, being vague in its terms, could not lead to any practical action. Some historians suppose that this proclamation was only a trick which Bonaparte played with the intention of winning over to his cause the Jewish minister of the Pasha of Acre, Haim Mu’allim Farhi (1750?‒1820), the soul of the defence of that important sea-fortress. This supposition, however, is based on no evidence. It is pure speculation, and is highly improbable.

No Jew seriously believed in the success of Bonaparte’s ambitious design or in the possibility of his victory, and no attention was paid to his promises. On the other hand, it would not have been impossible to suppose that Bonaparte’s plan might succeed after he had conquered Syria and carried the war into the heart of Turkey. He would then perhaps have assigned a share in his government to members of the Jewish nation upon whom the French could rely.

Bonaparte’s idea was simple and his intentions were sincere. He regarded the Jews――particularly those living in Asia and Africa――as a nation, and as having indisputable historical claims on the Holy Land and _Jerusalem_. He was sure that they would help him and hail his victory as a happy triumph¹ if they knew that their national ideal was to be realized and “ancient _Jerusalem_” to be restored to its “pristine splendour.” Was this not the same policy which he applied in later years in his relations with the small nationalities in Europe?

¹ In an Order, in which he confirms the prerogatives of the Monks of the Mount _Sinai_ convent, he refers to the Jews.

AU CAIRE, le 29 frimaire au 7 (19 décembre, 1798).

Bonaparte, général en chef, voulant favoriser le convent du mont _Sinai_: ... 2º Par respect pour _Moise_ et le nation juive, dont la cosmogonie nous retrace les âgres les plus reculés; ... Bonaparte.

(_Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte_ ... Egypte. Tome Deuxième. Paris ... M.DCCC.XIX. _p._ 179.)

In another Appeal, Bonaparte ordered his troops to treat the natives with tolerance: “Agissez avec eux comme vous avez agi avec les Juifs, les Italiens; ayez des égards pour leur mufti et leurs imams, comme vous en avez eu pour les rabbins et les evêques; ayez pour les cérémonies que prescrit l’Alcoran, pour les mosquées, la même tolérance que vous avez eu pour les convents, pour les synagogues, pour la religion de _Moise_ et de Jésus Christ” (Proclamation of General Bonaparte of the 22nd June, 1798).

Colonel Sebastiani wrote concerning the Jews in his report on his mission to Constantinople in 1802 in a somewhat anti-Semitic spirit: “Les Juifs sont, comme partout ailleurs, indifférents sur tout changement de gouvernement qui ne leur offre pas la matière à de nouvelles spéculations” (_Bibliothèque Diplomatique――Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane_ ... Par le Baron J. _de_ Testa ... Tome Premier France. Paris ... MDCCCLXIV. _p._ 513).

Jewish opinion in the East was reserved and somewhat pessimistic, not with regard to the purpose, but concerning the opportunity and the means. The Jews were willing to make any sacrifices in order to restore “ancient _Jerusalem_” in a peaceful way, but not to revolt against the rulers of the country. Moreover, they knew that this campaign was bound to be a failure.

The Turks followed the plan of allowing the inadequate forces of Bonaparte to advance as far as possible from their Egyptian base, while they massed heavy forces in Syria. El-Arish and _Gaza_ in the south-west of Palestine fell into the hands of Bonaparte’s army on the 17th and 25th February, 1799. The Jewish community of _Gaza_ had fled. In _Jerusalem_ the news of victories and atrocities created a general panic. It was rumoured that Bonaparte was about to enter the Holy City. At the command of the deputy Governor the inhabitants began to throw up ramparts, the Jews also taking part in the work. One of the _Rabbis_, Moses Mordecai Joseph Meyuchas, encouraged and even assisted them in their operations. After these occurrences the success of Bonaparte in Egypt and Syria was arrested, chiefly by the arms of Great Britain, and his schemes in the East were frustrated.

The appearance of Bonaparte in Palestine was like the passing of a meteor, which, after causing much perturbance, disappears. His dream of becoming Emperor of the East faded away quickly. Still the fact remains that the idea of the Restoration of _Israel_ had occupied the mind of this great conqueror in the prime of his youth, at the very beginning of his unexampled career. He and his adherents seemed, even after this failure, to persist in gazing with a wistful eye towards the same quarter, and their ambitious plans evidently involved the future fortunes of those Eastern countries which have so long been the monotonous scenes of isolation and ignorance.

Whatever judgment we may form as to the practical value of Bonaparte’s scheme in those days, the suggestion of restoring Palestine to the Jews remains highly significant. It is obvious that had there not been Jewish aspirations of this kind in France such a suggestion could not have arisen even as a fantastic plan or as a caprice of military headquarters in a distant country. Bonaparte had too much political foresight even in his younger years to run the risk of engaging himself in an undertaking before he had sounded the competent circles in his own country. As a matter of fact these aspirations were expressed, and, imaginary as they were, seem to have been very popular among French Jews. There is, consequently, reason to conclude that Bonaparte’s scheme was, in reality, more serious than it might have seemed at first sight.

A most curious document, almost entirely overlooked or underestimated by French historians, throws some light on the real tendencies of that time among French Jews. This is a “Letter addressed to his brethren by a Jew” in 1798¹――one year before the Bonaparte Proclamation (Appendix xli). This letter is a sort of Zionist programme. It is a mixture of different elements, partly Jewish, partly pan-French Imperialist, expounded in a manner that only a deep Jewish national feeling could have inspired. The impenetrable political speculations of those days already contain the germs of some ideas which are developed to full consciousness and clearness a hundred years later in modern Zionist speeches, pamphlets and programmes.

¹ Restoration of the Jews ... Second Edition ... By J. Bicheno. 1807. _pp._ 60‒62.

The author of this “Letter” rightly proclaims in the first place the pre-eminent interest of his theme, “the greatest theme of Jewish history.” “It is at last time to shake off this insupportable yoke――it is time to resume our rank among the other nations of the universe.” The nations of the world――he now hopes――will support the Jewish claim that the Jewish nation should be treated on the lines of the national idea. The design of the author, then, is to suggest a solution of no less a problem than the Jewish Tragedy. He begins with a review “of the Jewish situation during many ages under the weight of the cruellest persecutions,” and this review is not less tragic than the Jewish elegies of the Middle Ages, though it was written a few years after the great Revolution. He then addresses himself to his main task, the exposition, based, as far as he is able to base it, on lessons learnt from contemporary events, of that system of Restoration which he regards as the most practical.

This author was, no doubt, the agent and mouthpiece of the people behind him. The fact that this “Letter” was published at the suggestion of those then in power in France shows that the scheme suggested in it was in accordance with the views of the Government. This being the tendency of the Government, the appeal addressed by Bonaparte to the Jews of Asia and Africa one year after the publication of the “Letter,” in 1798, appears to be a logical consequence of prevailing opinions. Moreover, the fact that schemes of this kind had gained great currency in England, and that the Restoration of _Israel_ was a favourite idea of the English, could not be unknown in France. It is scarcely necessary to point out what was the fundamental idea of the Egyptian and Syrian campaign. The idea of the Restoration of _Israel_, as suggested in the “Letter of the French Jew” in 1798 and in Bonaparte’s Appeal of 1799, was merely a link in the same chain.

To sum up, the situation of affairs, in view of the possibility of great changes in the East, seemed to afford an opportunity for the solution of the Jewish problem on national lines. Bonaparte may also have been anxious to avail himself of the services of the Jews of Asia and Africa. But the essential point is that many influential Christians as well as Jews considered the Jewish problem from a national point of view at the end of the eighteenth century.