Part 18
It is still more singular that Dr. Beattie with all his professions of christianity, should not have been aware of the atheistical complexion of the following passage in his “Hermit.”
Nor yet for the ravage of winter I mourn, Kind nature the embryo blossom shall save; But when shall spring visit the mouldering urn! Oh, when shall it dawn on the night of the grave!
Indeed, the natural evidences of a future state were never conceived by any reasonable defender of the doctrine, to be of themselves satisfactory and conclusive.[70] They were never deemed of more value than to produce a _probable expectation_ of a state of future rewards and punishments, and they are certainly contradicted by the known facts relating to the origin, the growth, and decline of the human faculties. Bishop Porteus has collected these arguments, and stated them with as much force as his moderate abilities would permit; but by far the best summary of what has been urged on this as well as on almost every important question of morals and metaphysics, will be found in Mr. Belsham’s Elements of the Philosophy of Mind. An excellent compendium, by a gentleman, to whom next to Mr. Lindsey, Dr. Priestley appears to have been more attached than to any other.
[70] Dr. Priestley in his observations on the increase of infidelity published at Northumberland, has a passage which would seem to intimate that a future state might be clearly made out by the light of nature (p. 59, 60) but this is certainly inadvertency, and by no means conformable to his constant, deliberate, sentiments on that subject as expressed particularly in his Institutes.
The SECOND part of the Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, contains a discussion of the long contested and confused question of Liberty and Necessity.
Dr. Priestley is right in his opinion that this question was not understood by the ancients, nor perhaps before the time of Hobbes: Long ago it appeared to me, that the only writer among the schoolmen who had touched upon it, was Bradwardine in his Book De causà Dei, which I regret that I have no opportunity of consulting here. Many of his observations are extracted by Toplady in his treatise on Liberty and Necessity, and in his life of Zanchius; but Toplady like Edwards, did not completely understand the question; they connected the doctrine of necessity with all the bigotry of Calvinism.
Hobbes in his Leviathan, and in his reply to Bramhall on liberty and necessity in his Tripos, first truly stated the subject, and shewed that the question was, not whether we can do what we will, but whether the will itself, (i. e. choice, preference, inclination, desire, aversion,) is not inevitably determined by motives not in the power or controul of the agent.
Hartley’s book, however, shews, or rather leads to the conclusion, that these motives are twofold, _ab extra_ and _ab intra_. The action depending on the compound force of the motives ab extra, and the physical state of the animal organs at the moment. For the latter is frequently of itself an immediate cause of voluntary action.
But previous to Dr. Hartley’s great work, the question of liberty and necessity had been discussed between Collins and Clark, and Clark and Leibnitz.[71] Collins’s Philosophical inquiry into human liberty, first published in 1715 was the only book on the subject worth reading between the times of Hobbes and Hartley, and a masterly and decisive work it is. This appears to have been translated and repeatedly printed on the continent; Dr. Priestley, who republished it in London, mentioning a second edition in 1756 at Paris, and a third edition when he was there in 1774. The controversy was kept alive in Collins’s life time by Leibnitz; but he like Dr. Edwards who afterwards wrote in defence of the same side of the question in his treatise on Free will, was too much given to expand his ideas, and obscure the sense by the multiplicity of words which he used to express it. The letters of Theodicèe contain many passages well conceived, but the book is insupportably tedious. Hobbes could condense more argument and information in a page, than would serve Leibnitz for a volume.
[71] I do not find that the controversy about the Soul occasioned by the publications of Blount, Coward, Dodwell, &c. involved the question of Liberty and Necessity, though they touch so nearly. It escaped me a few pages back, that Dr. Coward, was also the author of “Second Thoughts concerning the human Soul.” (Estibius Psycalethes) as well as of the Grand Essay.
To this treatise of Collins, plainly and popularly written, no sufficient answer was or could be given. It must have satisfied the mind of every reader capable of understanding the question, though it omitted to notice many objections which were afterwards taken up and fully answered by Dr. Priestley. Collins in his preface takes pains to have it understood that he writes in defence of _moral_ necessity only, and not of _physical_ necessity. A distinction without a difference, though taken by all who have succeeded him.
I do not dwell on the controversy between Jackson on the one side in defence of human liberty, and Gordon and Trenchard in Cato’s letters, because little was added to the sum of knowledge, on either side. Jackson had learning and industry, but he did not understand the question, and had no pretensions to that species of distinguishing acuteness, so necessary to a good metaphysician.
Dr. Priestley, following the enlarged and cheering views of the future happiness of all mankind, first connected by Hartley with this question, shews completely that the doctrine under consideration has nothing to do with the strict calvinistic hypothesis. That it is sufficiently conformable to popular opinion. That it is the only practical doctrine which in fact is, or indeed can be acted upon with respect to the application of reasoning and argument, reward and punishment. That the formation of character and disposition, the actual inferences we make from, and the dependence we place upon them, rest entirely on the truth of this opinion. That from the nature of cause and effect, every volition must be the necessary result of previous circumstances. That the _scientia contingentium_, the great and insuperable difficulty of God’s pretended foreknowledge of uncertain events, can on no other hypothesis be avoided, and that the doctrine of necessity is perfectly consistent with the great plan of divine benevolence, in the present state, and future destination, of the human race.
These subjects called forth remarks by Dr. Price, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Bryant, Dr. Kenrick, Mr. Whitehead, Dr. Horsely and others; to all of whom, answers were given by Dr. Priestley.
The controversy with Dr. Price is a pleasing specimen of the manner in which an important subject can be amicably discussed between two friends, and made interesting too, by the manner as well as the matter, without any thing of that “seasoning of controversy” which Dr. Horsely afterward thought so necessary to keep alive the public attention, and which he strews over his polemics with so unsparing a hand. The Bishop had not yet however adopted that stile of arrogance by which he has since been so disgracefully distinguished; and it is to be regretted for the sake of his own character as a gentleman and as a writer, that he adopted it at all. Dr. Horsely should recollect, that those who emulate the insolence of Warburton ought at least to give proofs of equal learning and acuteness; and that bigotry and intolerance in defence of opinions which, though a man may profess to believe, he can hardly profess to understand, will do no credit to his religious, his moral, or his literary character in the present state of knowledge. But character as a writer, may be a secondary consideration, to one who is determined to verify the saying, that godliness is great gain.[72]
[72] Dr. Horseley’s polemic strictures on Dr. Priestley’s writings, exhibit a singular compound of insolence and absurdity. But he is contented, I presume, if he rises in the church, as he sinks in reputation. Some of his opinions are truly diverting. His theory of divine generation by the Father contemplating his own perfections, and his grave suggestion of the three persons of the Godhead meeting together in consultation, stand a fair chance of being noticed by some wicked wit, who may wish to expose the infirmities of orthodoxy real or pretended.
It has been a misfortune to this question, that it has seldom been treated by persons who knew any thing of the organization or physiology of the human frame; and that it has been complicated with all the prejudice arising from the theological tenets of those who opposed the doctrine of necessity. Every physician knows, though metaphysicians know little about it, that the laws which govern the animal machine, are as certain and invariable as those which guide the planetary system, and are as little within the controul of the human being who is subject to them. Every sensation therefore, and every idea dependent on, or resulting from the state of the sensory, is the necessary effect of the laws of organization by which that state was produced. But we neither have nor can have any sensation or any idea, but what is so dependent, or but what thus results; for we can neither feel nor think without the brain. The words we use for the Phenomena termed mental, are mere terms of classification and arrangement of the sensations and ideas thus produced, and their combinations. Hence it follows, that all these phenomena depend on the laws which regulate the animal system, and are the necessary, inevitable result of those laws. The obscurity which has enveloped this question, has arisen from want of due attention to that state of mind (or rather of body) which we call, the will; and from the power that animals seem to have over the voluntary muscles. But every Physiologist knows that the state of the system which calls into action the voluntary muscles, that is, a state of want, desire or inclination, whether to act or to abstain, is the result of previous circumstances to which the animal is exposed; and the action of the voluntary muscles, is equally the result of necessary laws, as those of the involuntary.
The great object of terror to the Divines in this question about Necessity, was the consequence resulting, that God is the author of Sin. Many and subtile were the distinctions made upon this subject by the necessarian theologists among the schoolmen, and down to the middle of the seventeenth century. Richard Baxter the peace-maker, in his Christian Directory, his Catholic Theologie and some other works, has briefly reviewed them all, and as usual distinguished upon them so acutely, that what was not quite clear before, he has most effectually obscured. The prevailing opinion, however, seems to have been, not that God permitted the sinful act (for the reply was unanswerable, that God must be considered, as willing that which he does not prevent when he can,) but that God, in the common course of nature as pre-ordained by him, permitted the action itself to come to pass, but not the intention or quo animo of the actor, in which the sin consists; or as Gale expresses it in the quaint language of the time, it is “God’s pre-determinate concurse to the entitative act.”
Indeed, I do not see with the orthodox notions then prevalent, how it was possible on the hypothesis of God’s foreknowing and pre-ordaining all that comes to pass, to avoid considering God Almighty as the author of Sin; and to feel repugnance toward a system, which makes the deity inflict eternal punishment on a creature, whose actions he might have controuled, and whose existence he could have prevented. Such manifest injustice might be viewed without horror, by the brutal bigotry of Calvin, but the tenets that drew after them such a consequence, could not be adopted without hesitation and regret, by any, but the most thorough going, unfeeling zealot.
_Origen’s_ doctrine of Universal Restitution, was first advanced in England (so far as I know) by Rust, Bishop of Dromore, and Jeremy White, who I believe had been Chaplain to Cromwell. Since that, the labours of Stonehouse, Petitpierre, Newton, Winchester, Chauncey and Simpson, have furnished ground enough for us to adopt it as the doctrine of scripture as well as of common sense. By connecting this doctrine with that of necessity, Dr. Hartley and Dr. Priestley have been enabled to give a full and satisfactory reply to all the objections that can be drawn from the theory of necessity, making God the author of Sin. Indeed, unless God’s foreknowledge be denied, the same difficulty must occur on either scheme: for he has knowingly and voluntarily adopted a system, in which the existence of evil if not necessary, is at least undeniable.
Granting the goodness of God, it follows according to Dr. Priestley, that he has adopted that system which is most conducive to general, and individual happiness upon the whole; and that the moral evil of which for the best purposes he has permitted human creatures to be guilty, and the physical evil, which here or hereafter will be the inevitable consequence of that conduct, are necessary to produce the greatest sum of good to the system at large, and to each human being individually, considering the situation in which he has been necessarily placed in respect to the whole system. Indeed, moral evil is of no farther consequence than as it produces physical evil to the agent, or to others. And as we see in the system of inanimate nature, that general good is the result of partial and temporary evil, and that though the one follows necessarily from general laws as the result of the other, the good manifestly predominates, so in the moral system, we have a right from analogy to predict, that good will be the ultimate result of the apparent evil we observe in it: that we shall be the wiser for knowing what is to be avoided; the better for corrected dispositions; and that the power, and the wish to receive and communicate happiness, will be enlarged through each successive stage of our existence, by the experience of those that have preceded. So at least thought Dr. Priestley.
Leibnitz states some of these ideas with great force in the following passage, which I am tempted to transcribe entire from his _Essais de Theodicèe; sur la Bontè de Dieu, la libertè de l’homme, et l’origine du mal_, first published in 1710. (Prem. partie Sec. 7, 8, 9.)[73]
[73] _Dieu_ est _la premiere Raison des choses_: car celles qui sont bornèes, comme tout ce que nous voyons et experimentons, sont contingentes, & n’ont rien en elles qui rende leur existence necessaire; ètant manifeste que le tems, l’espace & la matière unies & uniformes en elles-mèmes, & indifferentes à tout, pouvoient recevoir de tout autres mouvemens & figures, & dans un autre ordre. Il faut donc chercher _la raison de l’existence du monde_, qui est l’assemblage entier des choses _contingentes_; & il faut la chercher dans _la substance qui porte la raison de son existence avec elle_, & laquelle par consequent est _necessaire_ & éternelle. Il faut aussi que cette cause soit _intelligente_; car ce Monde qui existe étant contingent, & une infinitè d’autres Mondes étant également possibles & également prétendans à l’existence, pour ainsi dire, aussi bien que lui, il faut que la cause du monde ait eu égard ou relation à tous ces Mondes possibles pour en déterminer un. Et cet égard on rapport d’une substance existante à de simples possibilités, ne peut etre autre chose que _l’entendement_ qui en a les idées; & en déterminer une, ne peut etre autre chose que l’acte de _la volonté_ qui choisit. Et c’est _la puissance_ de cette substance qui en rend la volonté efficace. La puissance va à l’_etre_, la sagesse ou l’entendement _au vrai_, & la volonté _au bien_. Et cette cause intelligente doit etre infinie de toutes les manieres, & absolument parfaite _en puissance_, en _sagesse_ & en _bonté_, puisqu’elle va à tout ce qui est possible. Et comme tout est lié, il n’y a pas lieu d’en admettre plus d’_une_. Son entendement est la source des _essences_, & sa volonté est l’origine des _existances_. Voilà en peu de mots la preuve d’un Dieu unique avec ses perfections, & par lui l’origine des choses.
8. Or cette suprême sagesse jointe à une bonté qui n’est pas moins infinie qu’elle, n’a pu manquer de choisir le meilleur. Car comme un moindre mal est une espece de bien; de même un moindre bien est une espece de mal, s’il fait obstacle à un bien plus grand: & il y auroit quelque chose à corriger dans les actions de Dieu, s’il y avoit moyen de mieux faire. Et comme dans les Mathématiques, quand il n’y a point de _maximum_ ni de _minimum_, rien enfin de distingué, tout se fait également; ou quand cela ne se peut, il ne se fait rien du tout; on peut dire de même en matière de parfaite sagesse, qui n’est pas moins reglée que les Mathématiques, que s’il n’y avoit pas le meilleur (_optimum_) parmi tous les Mondes possibles, Dieu n’en auroit produit aucun. J’appelle _Monde_ toute la suite & toute la collection de toutes les choses existantes, afin qu’on ne dire point que plusieurs Mondes pouvoient exister en differens temps & differens lieux. Car il faudroit les compter tous ensemble pour un Monde, ou si vous voulez pour un _Univers_. Et quand on rempliroit tous les tems & tous les lieux; il demeure toujours vrai qu’on les auroit pu remplir d’une infinité de manières, & qu’il y a une infinité de Mondes possibles, dont il faut que Dieu ait choisi le meilleur; puisqu’il ne fait rien sans agir suivant la suprême Raison.
9. Quelque adversaire ne pouvant répondre à cet argument, répondra peut-être à la conclusion par un argument contraire, en disant que le Monde auroit pu être sans le péché & sans les souffrances: mais je nie qu’alors il auroit été _meilleur_. Car il faut savoir que tout est _lié_ dans chacun des mondes possibles: l’Univers, quel qu’il puisse être, est tout d’une pièce, comme un Océan; le moindre mouvement y étend son effet à quelque distance que ce soit, quoique cet effet devienne moins sensible à proportion de la distance, de sorte que Dieu y a tout réglé par avance une fois pour toutes, ayant prévu les prières, les bonnes & les mauvaises actions, & tout le reste; & chaque chose a contribué _idéalement_ avant son existence a la resolution qui a été prise sur l’existence de toutes les choses. De sorte que rien ne peut être changé dans l’Univers (non plus que dans un nombre) sauf son essence, ou si vous voulez, sauf son _individualité numérique_. Ainsi, si le moindre mal qui arrive dans le Monde y manquoit, ce ne seroit plus ce Monde; qui tout compteé, tout rabattu, a été trouvé le meilleur par le Créateur qui l’a choisi.
According to this opinion of Leibnitz, the operative motive in the choice of the present system being the attribute of Benevolence in the Almighty, the existence of all that we term _evil_, is with respect to him, and his preordination of it, _good_; for the whole intention and motive of its permission is founded in perfect goodness guided by perfect wisdom. With respect to the finite beings, by whom evil is permitted to take place, there can be no doubt on this scheme, but the balance of existence will be happiness even to them, whenever by proper discipline they are fitted to enjoy it. Perhaps it may be doubted without infringing on the reverence due to the supreme disposer of all events, whether it would be consistent with his justice, knowingly and voluntarily to bring into existence, a sentient being, destined to be permanently miserable.
The question of Materialism, has been discussed since the disquisition of Dr. Priestley, by Mr. Cooper, who adopts the same side. Dr. Ferriar of Manchester, has rendered it dubious how far the sentient principle ought to be confined to the brain, though the facts he adduces, apply with equal force against the common hypothesis of a separate soul, acting by means of the body. The doctrine of Necessity has been opposed by Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh, but with a weakness of argument, and a petulance of language, that places his work in the lowest rank among the writers who have adopted the same side of the question. It hardly deserved the notice of so good an advocate as Dr. Crombie, who has been the latest author on the subject.
Indeed, the question must now be considered as settled; for those who can resist Collins’s philosophical enquiry, the section of Dr. Hartley on the Mechanism of the mind, and the review of the subject taken by Dr. Priestley and his opponents, are not to be reasoned with. _Interest reipublicæ ut denique sit finis litium_, is a maxim of technical law. It will apply equally to the republic of letters; and the time seems to have arrived, when the separate existence of the human soul, the freedom of the will, and the eternal duration of future punishment, like the doctrines of the Trinity, and Transubstantiation, may be regarded as no longer entitled to public discussion.
It is for this reason that I have paid no attention to the hypothesis of the Scotch Doctors, Reid, Beattie and Oswald, and have given no detailed account of Dr. Priestley’s examination of their writings. Indeed the perfect oblivion into which these writers have fallen, and the utter insufficiency of such young gentlemen and lady’s philosophy as they have adopted, has secured them from further animadversion. The facility with which ignorance can refer all difficulties relating to the phenomena of mind, to instinctive principles and common sense, might answer the purpose of popular declamation for a while, but it could not last; and these writers have fallen into merited obscurity, notwithstanding the national prejudice in favour of each other, so prevalent among the Literati of North Britain.
Some passages in Dr. Reid, however ought to exempt him from the contempt which is due to the common system advanced by him and his coadjutors: and his last book on the Active powers of man, is a work of undeniable merit on a very important subject, which has not yet been discussed with half the labour it so eminently deserves. The Synthesis and Analysis of our ideas, the history and process of their formation, and the detail of facts attending and connected with their rise and progress, is comparatively a new subject. Des Cartes, Buffier and Condillac among the French, Locke, Berkeley and Hartley among the English, and Hume, Reid, and Adam Smith among the Scotch, are almost the only authors worth notice who have treated it expressly, and most of them only partially.[74] Something may be found to the purpose in Hobbes, and in the first part of Dr. Priestley’s examination of Reid, Oswald and Beattie, and more in the first volume of Zoonomia, § 14 and 15.[75] The common sense of Dr. Reid and Co. seems to have been employed as the _clavis universalis on_ this subject by Buffier, in his “First Truths.” Hutcheson’s theory of the Moral Sense hardly merits notice, nor does that of Dr. Price promise to add much to the stock of real knowledge. We have had enough (_sat superque_) of occult principles, innate principles, and instinctive principles, which illustrate nothing, but the ignorance of those who employ them.