CHAPTER XIII

CHILE’S NAVAL POSITION

_Chile and the World War.—Strength of the Chilean Navy.—The Army._

The geographical situation of Chile, giving her a strip of coast twenty-eight hundred miles long, renders her acutely interested in the future of the Pacific. Command of the Strait of Magellan and the possession of an excellent fleet are guarantees of her ability to protect this interest.

In the wide affairs of this ocean, destined apparently to be the scene for the next trials of political if not of physical strength, the nations of the South American west coast have as yet had no voice, for while it is accepted as a matter of course that certain European countries, the United States and Canada, as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, should insist upon having their views heard, neither Mexico nor the countries of Central and South America are generally regarded as parties to the questions involved. With the development of national consciousness and the creation of well-equipped navies, a number of these countries will figure as coadjutors of increasing importance, and in the forefront of them Chile will, I am convinced, be found, ready and able to assume her share in the working out of a common problem.

Chile was physically affected by the great war. Not only was Easter Island used as a naval base by the German fleet, but her ports were used as refuges or supply stations by the ships of several belligerents. German shipping lay in Chilean ports, many German sailors were interned during the war period in Chile, and although her position was a passive one it cannot be doubted that the deep interest with which she watched events in the Pacific and the Magellanic archipelagos was much more than passive. So far as the Allies were concerned, their cause would have been little, if at all, served by the entry of Chile into the conflict against the Central Powers; it was Chile herself, with a possible post-war claim upon some of the steamers of the Kosmos line lying interned during the war in her ports, who stood to gain by a belated entry, and it is to the credit of her scrupulously correct neutrality that she refrained. A distinguished Chilean writer, Dr. Enrique Rocuant, published in 1919 a comprehensive study upon “The Neutrality of Chile: the grounds that prompted and justified it.” I think that no one who understood the situation, or the feeling that Chile sincerely exhibited, needed this explanation, however lucid and kindly, detailing as it does the absence of any such motive as brought Brazil, with her list of torpedoed vessels, to the Allies’ side, and setting forth the equity of Chile’s actions when faced by the acts of the belligerents in her territorial waters. There were, for example, violations of Chilean neutrality by various units of the German fleet at Easter Island and the Port of Papudo as well as in Cumberland Bay (Juan Fernandez); against these violations Chile vigorously protested; when the British _Glasgow_ followed the _Dresden_, escaped from the battle of the Falklands into Cumberland Bay, found that vessel with flags flying and guns pointed and promptly sank her, Chile made similar forcible protests. But she accepted the British regrets and offer of satisfaction with very ready graciousness.

Two years after the close of the great war Chile became, as a direct result of her old and cordial relations with the British navy, in an unprecedentedly strong naval condition.

_Strength of the Chilean Navy_

In August, 1914, two dreadnoughts were building at Elswick for the Chilean Government, the _Almirante Latorre_ and the _Almirante Cochrane_, the price of each vessel being £2,800,000. A number of fast destroyers, also constructed by the Armstrong Whitworth Company, formed part of the Chilean naval developments, two of these, the _Lynch_ and the _Condell_, being already in Pacific waters when hostilities broke out. The dreadnought _Almirante Latorre_ was completed speedily, taken over for British Government service, and did good work under the name of H. M. S. _Canada_ during the four and a half years of the conflict; in April, 1920, she was repurchased by the Chilean Government, which obtained for the comparatively modest sum of £1,400,000 not only this fine vessel but three more destroyers, sister ships of the _Lynch_ (the _Williams Rebolledo_, _Simpson_ and _Uribe_) and a naval tug. About the same time the British Government also presented to Chile six submarines and fifty aircraft, a gift associated with British appreciation of the sympathetic attitude of Chile at the time when the exigencies of war brought about detention of the vessels under construction.

The dreadnought _Latorre_ displaces 28,000 tons, has a length of 125 feet, beam of 92 feet, and draws 28 feet of water. She carries 30 guns of 14 inches, 3 inches and 4 inches, as well as a number of machine-guns and four torpedo tubes. Her speed is 23 knots, and her full crew 1075 men. She burns coal and has a bunker capacity of 1200 tons. The five new destroyers each displace 1850 tons, are 320 feet long, are armed with six 4-inch guns, and have a speed of over 31 knots; bunker capacity, 507 tons of coal; crew, 176. These vessels were laid down in accord with the plans created for the modernisation of the Chilean fleet in 1910, and their incorporation into the navy of Chile renders this country the possessor of an excellent fighting squadron, equipped in consonance with the experiences of the great war.

The possession of good modern vessels of war is one thing; adequate operation of them is quite another, as more than one young nation has discovered to her cost. In Chile, however, a traditional naval feeling has existed for a century, aided by the inheritance of a considerable proportion of blood from British seamen, and the work of a group of British naval instructors who were mainly responsible for efficient development in the service—as the German military instructors moulded at least the exterior of the army in the years before the war.

When I had the pleasure of visiting Chilean naval vessels in Talcahuano in 1920 at the invitation of the genial Admiral Fontaine, it was difficult to realise that the sturdy and well-groomed young officers, many of them bearers of British names, clad in replicas of the British uniform, were going to a foreign country when they set out, a few days later, to fetch back from Britain the new Chilean ships of war.

The Chilean fleet in early 1922 consisted of two battleships, the French-built _Prat_ (acquired 1890), with a war strength of 466 men, and the British-built _Latorre_ (1913–20) carrying about 1100 crew; the two armoured cruisers, the _O’Higgins_ and the _Esmeralda_, were constructed at Elswick in 1897, carrying nearly 600 men each; three cruisers of another type, the _Blanco_, _Chacabuco_ and _Zenteno_, were built in the same yards following the acquisition in 1890 of the French-built _Errazuriz_. In addition to these large vessels, Chile has two torpedo cruisers built by Laird in 1890; the _Tomé_ and _Talcahuano_; five modern destroyers (flotilla leaders) constructed between 1912 and 1914; seven older destroyers (the _Thompson_, _O’Brien_, _Jarpa Gamero_, _Orella_, _Riquelme_ and _Serrano_, carrying 88 men each) built at Laird’s; five torpedo-boats (_Contreras_, _Hyatt_, _Mutilla_, _Rodrigue_ and _Videla_) built in 1896 in the Yarrow yards, carrying 36 men each, war strength; the six new submarines referred to above, built by the Electric Boat Company, Ltd., in 1915, needing a total war strength of 108 men; one training ship, the _General Baquedano_, built at Elswick in 1898, a schooner with auxiliary engines, carrying 253 men; three transports, the _Rancagua_, _Maipo_ and _Angamos_, with a complement of 86 men each; one sailing ship, the _Lautaro_, built in Glasgow in 1896; ten patrol boats, of which six older vessels were built on the Seine between 1890 and 1905, while four boats acquired in 1919 were built in Helsingfors. There is also still upon the list an old ironclad, the ex-_Cochrane_, built at Elswick in 1875, carrying a crew of 132 men.

Chile reckons the peace strength of her navy afloat and ashore at 8377 men, while the naval expenses amount to about 14,000,000 Chilean pesos; in war times the personnel would be increased by 1020 men, costs being brought up to 15,200,000 pesos. Naval reserves are calculated as 35 per cent over the war footing, as regards personnel, while in the event of hostilities aid of great practical value exists in the steamers of the Government-controlled Compañia Sud Americana, transformable into auxiliary cruisers.

A certain number of men are annually recruited compulsorily for one year’s service, but as these conscripts only amount to three or four hundred, the naval forces are chiefly made up of volunteers who enlist for three to ten years; many conscripts after serving their initial year elect to remain under this system. In a maritime country such as Chile seamanship is popular, and the navy never has difficulty in filling the lists with young men who are developed rapidly into smart and well-disciplined sailors. The naval schools of Chile are adequate and well equipped: in Valparaiso is a fine establishment training 200 cadets, of whom 20 to 30 are annually passed as junior naval officers; the Naval Academy, part of the same building, trains twelve higher rank officers. Also in Valparaiso is the Navigation School, passing about six officers yearly, and the School of Mechanics training 120 pupils is supplying yearly 30 to 40 petty officers. Cadets of the Naval School receive a second-class midshipman’s certificate after five years’ instruction, and are then sent to the _Baquedano_ for advanced technical training and a 2000-mile sailing trip, before the first-class certificate is granted. It is significant of Chile’s high repute as a trainer of young sailors that cadets from several other South American countries are to be seen in Chilean naval schools.

Besides the Valparaiso establishments, Talcahuano has a Mechanical School for naval engineers, with 200 cadets in training; here also young officers obtain instruction in torpedo work and radiotelegraphy; this school turns out about 120 seamen, 30 wireless operators, and 20 midshipmen, as well as qualifying an average of 10 officers. On board the ex-_Cochrane_ is a gunnery school, training 120 men every year; on the sailing-ship _Lautaro_ is a school for training pilots of the Chilean merchant marine, as well as for the navy; the corvette _Abtao_ is used as a training school for boys, and here 150 lads are prepared yearly, with the obligation of serving five years in the navy. The _Baquedano_ corvette receives boys from the _Abtao_ and midshipmen qualified from the Valparaiso school for a year’s voyage of instruction before they assume duty in the regular service.

Chile has four naval bases, at Arica, Valparaiso, Talcahuano, and Punta Arenas; the latter has none but mobile defences, since the Treaty made with Argentina at the time when boundary limits were settled stipulates that the Strait of Magellan shall not be fortified, a decision which will probably be modified in view of Chile’s undoubted right to protect the property and lives of her nationals in the rapidly developing district of Punta Arenas and a number of inlets and islands. No belligerent or other vessel would be prevented by Chilean fortifications from passing from Pacific to Atlantic waters or _vice-versa_, since the Cape Horn route offers open waters.

The Hydrographic Bureau attached to the Chilean navy has been responsible since its inception in 1874 for constant exploration and surveying work directed to all parts of the coast, but particularly to the intricate waterways of the south. Over 150 maps and charts have been published by this Bureau, constantly in communication with the equivalent services in the most advanced countries.

The three first-named naval bases possess fixed land defences, as well as movable and submarine defences; at the chief station, Talcahuano, are two dry docks, one of 45,000 tons and the older of 15,000 tons capacity, as well as a floating dock of 1200 tons. Arrangements are also made with private dockowners in Mejillones (Antofagasta) and Valparaiso for repairs when needed, the shipyards of Punta Arenas, Chiloé, Valdivia, and Constitución also offering useful help both as regards construction and repair work. In point of numerical strength, the Chilean navy is second only to that of Brazil, while as a matter of fighting record this service has been conspicuously successful on the three occasions when Chile has been at war during the last hundred years. Her history is firmly bound to her maritime tradition, and her political influence in the future will undoubtedly be considerably affected by her vigorous command of the sea.

The army of Chile is a citizen army; its strength, year by year, is under 20,000 men, of whom about half are newly conscripted; but every healthy man over twenty-one years old is due to receive a year’s training, and is as a matter of fact very rapidly made into good fighting material. I have seen extremely smart soldiers turned out in six months’ time in the training camps of Chile.

There is no doubt that in case of need the country could raise and equip a hundred thousand men at least partly trained to arms in a few weeks’ time. Discipline is good, the uniform neat, weapons of modern pattern and well kept. The cavalry is conspicuous for first-class condition in particular; horses and horsemanship are of a remarkably high quality.

The aircraft branch of Chile’s service is being steadily developed; the daring and skill of the Chilean aviator was displayed when Lieutenant Godoy crossed the Andes into the Argentine—the pioneer to perform this hazardous feat.