Part 2

Similar results were obtained by the study of human inventions. It has been observed that apes and monkeys sometimes use stones for defence, and in a way the artificial shelters of animals indicate the beginnings of invention. In this sense we may seek for the origin of implements and utensils among animals. In the earliest times when human remains appear on the surface of the earth, we find man using simple stone implements which are formed by rough chipping, but the multiplicity of forms of implements increases quite rapidly. Since many implements may have been made of perishable materials, we are not able to tell whether at a very early time the implements and utensils used were really confined to the few stone objects that may now be recovered; but certainly the implements were few, and, comparatively speaking, simple. From this time on, the uses of fire, and of tools for cutting and striking, for scraping and perforating, have increased in number and complexity, and a gradual development may be traced from the simple tools of primitive man to the complex machinery of our times. The inventive genius of all races and of unnumbered individuals has contributed to the state of industrial perfection in which we find ourselves. On the whole, inventions, once made, have been kept with great tenacity, and, owing to incessant additions, the available resources of mankind have constantly been increased and multiplied.

Researches on art have led to similar results. Investigators have endeavored to show, that, since the cave-dwellers of France drew the outlines of the reindeer and mammoth on bone and antler, man has tried to reproduce in pictographic design the animals of the region in which he lived. In the artistic productions of many people, designs have been found which are readily associated with pictographic presentations, which, however, have lost their realism of form, and have become more and more conventional; so that in many cases a purely decorative motive has been interpreted as developed from a realistic pictograph, gradually breaking up under the stress of esthetic motives. The islands of the Pacific Ocean, New Guinea, South America, Central America, prehistoric Europe, have furnished examples for this line of development, which therefore was recognized as one of the important tendencies of the evolution of human decorative art, which was described as beginning with realism, and as leading through symbolic conventionalism to purely esthetic motives.

Religion has furnished another example of typical evolution in human thought. At an early time man began to think and ponder about the phenomena of nature. Everything appeared to him in an anthropomorphic form of thought; and thus the first primitive concepts regarding the world came into being, in which the stone, the mountain, the heavenly orbs, were viewed as animate anthropomorphic beings endowed with will-power, and willing to help man or threatening to endanger him. The observation of the activities of man’s own body and of his mind led to the formulation of the idea of a soul independent from the body; and with increasing knowledge and with increasing philosophic thought, religion and science grew out of these simple beginnings.

The sameness of all these phenomena in different parts of the world has been considered as proof not only of the fundamental unity of the mind of all the races of man, but also of the truth of the theory of evolution of civilization; and thus a grand structure has been reared, in which we see our present civilization as the necessary outcome of the activities of all the races of man, that have risen in one grand procession, from the simplest beginnings of culture, through periods of barbarism, to the stage of civilization that they now occupy. The march has not been equally rapid; for some are still lagging behind, while others have forged forward, and occupy the first places in the general advance.

While this evolutionary aspect has occupied the centre of attention for a long time, another view of the field of the phenomena of ethnology was defended by Bastian,--a view which makes its influence felt ever more deeply as time goes on. The sameness of the forms of thought found in regions wide apart appeared to Bastian as a proof of the unity of the human mind, but it also suggested to him that the forms of thought follow certain definite types, no matter in what surroundings man may live, and what may be his social and historical relations. In the varieties of thought found among peoples of distant areas he saw the influence of geographical and social environment upon these fundamental forms of thought, which were called by him elementary ideas. Bastian’s theory of the permanence of forms of thought is related to Dilthey’s conception of the limitation of possible types of philosophy; and the similarity of the line of thoughts of these two men appears also clearly in Bastian’s constant references to the theories of philosophers as compared to the views held by primitive man. From Bastian’s view-point the question of a single or multiple type of evolution of civilization appeared irrelevant. The important phenomenon in his mind was the fundamental sameness of forms of human thought in all forms of culture, no matter whether they were advanced or primitive.

In the views as propounded by him, a certain kind of mysticism may be recognized, in so far as the elementary ideas are to his mind intangible entities. No further thought can possibly unravel their origin, because we ourselves are compelled to think in the forms of these elementary ideas.

In a way the evolutionists and Bastian represent thus, the former the historical point of view, the latter a psychological point of view, in the field of ethnology. More recent discussions have taken up both threads of investigation, and both views are slowly undergoing a number of radical changes.

With increasing knowledge of the data of anthropology, the forms of society, of religion, of art, and the development of invention, do not seem quite so simple as they appeared to earlier investigators. Attempts were made to fit the hypothetical typical evolution of mankind to the historical development of culture in different parts of the world, so far as it had been reconstructed. Thus an opportunity was given to examine the correctness of the accepted theory. As soon as this was done, peculiar difficulties developed, which showed that the theory was hardly ever applicable to specific cases, and that the actual development, as it was traced by historical reconstruction, differed considerably from the theory. From this investigation has developed an entirely new view regarding the relation of different races. We begin to recognize that in prehistoric times transmission of cultural elements has been almost unlimited, and that the distances over which inventions and ideas have been carried cover whole continents. As an instance of the rapidity with which cultural achievements are transmitted, may be mentioned the modern history of some cultivated plants. Tobacco was introduced into Africa after the discovery of America, and it took little time for this plant to spread over the whole continent; so that at the present time it enters so deeply into the whole culture of the Negro that nobody would suspect its foreign origin. We find in the same way that the banana has pervaded almost the whole of South America; and the history of Indian-corn is another example of the incredible rapidity with which a useful cultural acquisition may spread over the whole world. The history of the horse, of cattle, of the European grains, illustrates that similar conditions prevailed in prehistoric times. These animals and plants occur over the whole width of the Old World, from the Atlantic Ocean to the shores of the Pacific. The use of milk was probably disseminated in a similar way at an early time; so that when the people of the world enter into our historic knowledge, we find milk used all over Europe, Africa, and the western part of Asia.

Perhaps the best proof of transmission is contained in the folk-lore of the tribes of the world. Nothing seems to travel as readily as fanciful tales. We know of certain complex tales, which cannot possibly have been invented twice, that are told by the Berber in Morocco, by the Italians, the Irish, the Russians, in the jungles of India, in the highlands of Tibet, on the tundras of Siberia, and on the prairies of North America; so that perhaps the only parts of the world not reached by them are South Africa, Australia, Polynesia, and South America. The examples of such transmission are quite numerous, and we begin to see that the early inter-relation of the races of man was almost worldwide.

It follows from this observation that the culture of any given tribe, no matter how primitive it may be, can be fully explained only when we take into consideration its inner growth as well as its relation to the culture of its near and distant neighbors and the effect that they may have exerted.

The sameness of a number of fundamental ideas and inventions has suggested to some investigators the belief that there are old cultural achievements belonging to a period previous to the general dispersion of the human race,--a theory that has some points in its favor, though its correctness cannot be proved.

An important theoretical consideration has also shaken our faith in the correctness of the evolutionary theory as a whole. It is one of the essential traits of this theory that, in general, civilization has developed from simple forms to complex forms, and that extended fields of human culture have developed under more or less rationalistic impulses. Of late years we are beginning to recognize that human culture does not always develop from the simple to the complex, but that in many aspects two tendencies intercross,--one from the complex to the simple, the other from the simple to the complex. It is obvious that the history of industrial development is almost throughout that of increasing complexity. On the other hand, human activities that do not depend upon reasoning do not show a similar type of evolution.

It is perhaps easiest to make this clear by the example of language, which in many respects is one of the most important evidences of the history of human development. Primitive languages are, on the whole, complex. Minute differences in point of view are given expression by means of grammatical forms; and the grammatical categories of Latin, and still more so those of modern English, seem crude when compared to the complexity of psychological or logical forms which primitive languages recognize, but which in our speech are disregarded entirely. On the whole, the development of languages seems to be such that the nicer distinctions are eliminated, and that it begins with complex and ends with simpler forms, although it must be acknowledged that opposite tendencies are not by any means absent.

Similar observations may be made on the art of primitive man. In music as well as in decorative design we find a complexity of rhythmic structure which is unequalled in the popular art of our day. In music, particularly, this complexity is so great that the art of a skilled virtuoso is taxed in the attempt to imitate it. If once it is recognized that simplicity is not always a proof of antiquity, it will readily be seen that the theory of the evolution of civilization rests to a certain extent on a logical error. The classification of the data of anthropology in accordance with their simplicity has been re-interpreted as an historical sequence, without an adequate attempt to prove that the simpler antedated the more complex.

Notwithstanding this serious criticism, much of the older theory seems plausible; but presumably a thorough revision and a more individualized aspect of the development of civilization in different parts of the world will become necessary.

The psychological aspect of anthropology, which was first emphasized by Bastian, is also undergoing rapid development, particularly in so far as the problem of the origin of elementary ideas is concerned, the investigation of which Bastian considered as impossible. Here, again, the study of language promises to point the way in which many of our problems may find their solution. I have stated before that the languages of primitive tribes are, on the whole, complex, and differentiate nicely between categories of thought. It is very remarkable to find that these categories, which can be discovered only by an analytical study of the languages, and which are unknown to the speakers of these languages, although they are constantly used, coincide with categories of thought which have been discovered by philosophers. It would be possible to find in the languages of primitive people grammatical forms corresponding to a variety of philosophical systems; and in this we may perhaps recognize one of the most brilliant proofs of the correctness of Bastian’s and Dilthey’s theory of the existence of a limited number of types of thought.

We infer from these linguistic facts that the categories of thought, and the forms of action, that we find among a people, do not need to have been developed by conscious thought, but that they have grown up owing to the fundamental organization of the human mind. Linguistic evidence is of such great value, because grammatical categories and forms have never risen into the consciousness of the speaker, while in almost all other ethnological phenomena people have come to observe what they think and what they do. With the moment that activities and thoughts rise into consciousness they become the subject of speculation; and for this reason the peoples of the world, primitive as well as more advanced, are ever ready to give explanations of their customs and beliefs. The importance of the constant occurrence of such secondary explanations cannot be overrated. They are ever present. The investigator who inquires into the history of institutions and of customs will always receive explanations based on such secondary interpretation, which, however, do not represent the history of the custom or belief in question, but only the results of speculation in regard to it.

I will mention one other psychological point that seems of special importance in the discussion of the significance of primitive culture and its relation to more advanced types. In primitive culture certain activities appear closely connected which in more advanced types of civilization have no longer any relation. Thus it is one of the fundamental traits of primitive culture that social organization and religious belief are inextricably related. To a limited extent this tendency persists in our own civilization; but, on the whole, there has been a marked tendency to separate social and political organization, and religion. The same is true of primitive art and religion; and of primitive science, social organization, and religion. So far as we are able to investigate the causes for the peculiar associations between these varied manifestations of ethnic life and the history of their gradual disappearance, we find that in the stream of consciousness of primitive man a sensory stimulus is very liable to release strong emotions, which are in turn connected with certain groups of ideas. Thus the emotions common to both establish associations between groups of ideas that to us appear entirely unrelated. For the same reason it seems impossible for primitive man to establish those purely rationalistic associations between sense-impressions and acts determined by volition which are characteristic of civilized man. A study of primitive life shows that particularly every customary action attains a very strong emotional tone, which increases the stability of the custom. These forces are still acting in our own civilization. In order to make this clear, I only need to remind you of any of those actions which we call good manners, for which no satisfactory reason can be given; which nevertheless have acquired an emotional tone so strong that a breach of good manners is felt as a grave offence. It would, for instance, be impossible to give a reason why a gentleman should not be allowed to keep on his hat indoors, while it is good form for a lady to do so; and the instantaneous judgment by which we characterize an offender against these rules as rude, and the discomfort felt when we unwittingly commit a breach of good manners, show how deep-seated their emotional values are.

There is no doubt that the further pursuit of the psychological investigation, which has hardly been begun, will help us to find a more satisfactory explanation of many anthropological phenomena than those that we have been able to give heretofore.

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You will perceive that anthropology is a science that is only beginning to find its own bearings, that many of the fundamental questions are still open to discussion, and that the promising lines of approach are just opening.

Nevertheless, anthropology has been able to teach certain facts that are of importance in our common every-day life. Owing to the breadth of its outlook, anthropology teaches better than any other science the relativity of the values of civilization. It enables us to free ourselves from the prejudices of our civilization, and to apply standards in measuring our achievements that have a greater absolute truth than those derived from a study of our civilization alone. The differences between our civilization and another type in which perhaps less stress is laid upon the rationalistic side of our mental activities and more upon the emotional side, or in which the outer manifestations of culture, as expressed in manner and dress, differ from ours, appear less as differences in _value_ than as differences in _kind_. This broader outlook may also help us to recognize the possibility of lines of progress which do not happen to be in accord with the dominant ideas of our times.

Anthropology may also teach a better understanding of our own activities. We pride ourselves on following the dictates of reason and carrying out our carefully weighed convictions. The fact which is taught by anthropology,--that man the world over _believes_ that he follows the dictates of reason, no matter how unreasonably he may act,--and the knowledge of the existence of the tendency of the human mind to arrive at a conclusion first and to give the reasons afterwards, will help us to open our eyes; so that we recognize that our philosophic views and our political convictions are to a great extent determined by our emotional inclinations, and that the reasons which we give are not the reasons by which we arrive at our conclusions, but the explanations which we give for our conclusions.

An important lesson is also taught by the course the general development of society has taken. Primitive social units were small, and the members possessed a strong feeling of solidarity among themselves and of hostility against all aliens. The social units have been increasing in size through all ages. Greater individual freedom was allowed to the members of the groups, and the feeling of hostility against strangers weakened. We are still in the middle of this development; and the history of mankind shows that any policy which oversteps the limits of necessary self-protection and seeks advancement of one nation by a policy disregarding the interests of others is bound to lose in the long-run, because it represents an older type of thought that is gradually disappearing.

I cannot leave my subject without saying a word in regard to the help that anthropological methods may render in the investigation of problems of public hygiene, of race-mixture, and of eugenics. The safe methods of biological and psychological anthropometry and anthropology will help us to remove these questions from the sphere of heated political discussion and to make them subjects of calm scientific investigation.

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I have tried to outline in this imperfect picture the methods, aims, and hopes of anthropology. The definite facts that I could lay before you are few, and even the ground-work of the science appears hardly laid. Still I hope that the view of our ultimate aims may have engendered the feeling that we are striving for a goal which is bound to enlighten mankind, and which will be helpful in gaining a right attitude in the solution of the problems of life.

Transcriber’s Note

Words may have inconsistent hyphenation in the text. These have been left unchanged, as were obsolete and alternative spellings. Words and phrases in italics are surrounded by underscores, _like this_.