CHAPTER VII

OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY, ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY.

1. That there are three kinds of government only, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy is not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there be certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved. 6. In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be short, or the administration of government during the interval committed to some one. 7. In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man. 8. By what acts aristocracy is constituted. 9. In an aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By what acts monarchy is constituted. 12. Monarchy is by compact obliged to none for the authority it hath received. 13. Monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good government 14. What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. 15. A monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor. 16. Of limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed from subjection.

[Sidenote: There are three kinds of government only; democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.]

1. We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is committed either to _one man_, or _council_, or some _one court_ consisting of many men. Furthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will himself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of government; the one, when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a _democracy_. The other, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only have their suffrages; and we call it an _aristocracy_. The third is that, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled a _monarchy_. In the first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the _people_; in the second, the _nobles_; in the third, the _monarch_.

[Sidenote: Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.]

2. Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three other kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, _anarchy_ or confusion to _democracy_; _oligarchy_, that is, the command of some few, to _aristocracy_, and _tyranny_ to _monarchy_; yet are not these three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeased with that present government or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do usually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens that what one man calls a _democracy_, another calls an _anarchy_; what one counts an _aristocracy_, another esteems an _oligarchy_; and whom one titles a _king_, another styles him a _tyrant_. So as we see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but the _diverse opinions_ of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power. For first, who sees not that _anarchy_ is equally opposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that there is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it possible that _no city_ should be the species of _a city_? Furthermore, what difference is there between an _oligarchy_, which signifies the command of a _few_ or _grandees_, or an _aristocracy_, which is that of the _prime_ or _chief heads_, more than that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to all men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are looked on as the _best_, are by others esteemed to be the _worst_ of all men.

[Sidenote: That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy.]

3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be persuaded that a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse kinds of cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should, by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this pass; that _a king_, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a _king_; if not, they count him a _tyrant_. Wherefore we see a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a _king_ given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a _tyrant_ in way of contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.

[Sidenote: That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.]

4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme command should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in any one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular; which they call a _mixed monarchy_, or _mixed aristocracy_, or _mixed democracy_, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the People, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of state would they call a _mixed monarchy_ forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a state, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree, each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the private sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,[14] hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, art. 6-12.

Footnote 14:

_But that there can be no such kind of government._] Most men grant, that a government ought not to be divided; but they would have it moderated and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not only kings, but all other persons endued with supreme authority, would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and only minding their charges, contain themselves within the limits of the natural and divine laws. But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief power bounded and restrained by others: which, because it cannot be done but they who do set the limits must needs have some part of the power, whereby they may be enabled to do it, the government is properly divided, not moderated.

[Sidenote: That democracy, except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.]

5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part; which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition given in the first article of this chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer δῆμος, _the people_, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, _the people_; the other, which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or _the power_.

[Sidenote: In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening must be short, or the administration of the government committed to some one.]

6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places of meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less distance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by reason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some danger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless this be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it will not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of security, every man’s right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again.

[Sidenote: In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.]

7. Democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with the _people_, but by mutual compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons contracting must be in being before the contract itself. But the _people_ is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any person, but a multitude of single persons; wherefore there could then no contract pass between the people and the subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the people, it is in vain; because the people contains within its will the will of that subject, to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single persons do contract each with other, may be inferred from hence; that in vain sure would the city have been constituted, if the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or omitted. Because, therefore, such kind of compacts must be understood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the subject and the people; it follows, that they must be made between single citizens, namely, that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As if every one should say thus: I give up my right unto the people for your sake, on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine.

[Sidenote: By what acts an aristocracy is framed.]

8. An _aristocracy_ or council of nobles endowed with supreme authority, receives its original from a democracy, which gives up its right unto it. Where we must understand that certain men distinguished from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other character, are propounded to the people, and by plurality of voices are elected; and being elected, the whole right of the people or city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the people might do before, the same by right may this court of elected nobles now do. Which being done, it is clear that the people, considered as one person, its supreme authority being already transferred on these, is no longer now in being.

[Sidenote: In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.]

9. As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the court of nobles is free from all manner of obligation. For seeing subjects not contracting with the people, but by mutual compacts among themselves, were tied to all that the people did; hence also they were tied to that act of the people, in resigning up its right of government into the hands of nobles. Neither could this court, although elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything. For being elected, the people is at once dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a person, utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the _person_, must also vanish, and perish together with it.

[Sidenote: The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.]

10. _Aristocracy_ hath these considerations, together with _democracy_. First, that without an appointment of some certain times and places, at which the court of nobles may meet, it is no longer a court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power. Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme power, unless its administration be transferred to some one man. Now the reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth article.

[Sidenote: By what acts a monarchy is framed.]

11. As an _aristocracy_, so also a _monarchy_ is derived from the power of the _people_, transferring its right, that is, its authority on one man. Here also we must understand, that some _one_ man, either by name or some other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest; and that by a plurality of voices the whole right of the people is conveyed on him; insomuch as whatsoever the people could do before he were elected, the same in every respect may he by right now do, being elected. Which being done, the people is no longer one _person_, but a rude multitude, as being only one before by virtue of the supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this one man.

[Sidenote: That the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the authority he hath received.]

12. And therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himself to any for the command he receives. For he receives it from the people; but as hath been shewed above, the people, as soon as that act is done, ceaseth to be a _person_; but the _person_ vanishing, obligation to the _person_ vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tied to perform obedience to the monarch, by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the people should command them, that is, to obey that _monarch_, if he were made by the _people_.

[Sidenote: A monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing.]

13. But a _monarchy_ differs as well from an _aristocracy_ as a _democracy_, in this chiefly; that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation and consultation of affairs, that is, for the actual exercise of it in all times and places. For the people or the nobles not being _one natural person_, must necessarily have their meetings. The _monarch_, who is one by nature, is always in a present capacity to execute his authority.

[Sidenote: What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office to the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city.]

14. Because we have declared above, (in art. 7, 9, 12), that they who have gotten the _supreme command_, are by no compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily follows, that they can do no _injury_ to the subjects. For _injury_, according to the definition made in chap. III. art. 3, is nothing else but a breach of contract; and therefore where no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the people, the nobles, and the monarch may diverse ways transgress against the other laws of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict and exact notion of _injury_. But if the subject yield not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be _injurious_, as well to his fellow-subjects, because each man hath compacted with the other to obey; as to his _chief ruler_, in resuming that right which he hath given him, without his consent. And in a _democracy_ or _aristocracy_, if anything be decreed against any _law of nature_, the city itself, that is, the civil person sins not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for sin is a consequence of the natural express will, not of the political, which is artificial. For if it were otherwise, they would be guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked. But in a _monarchy_, if the _monarch_ make any decree against the _laws of nature_, he sins himself; because in him the civil will and the natural are all one.

[Sidenote: A monarch made without limitation of time, may elect his successors.]

15. The people who are about to make a _monarch_, may give him the _supremacy_ either simply without limitation of time, or for a certain season and time determined. If simply, we must understand that he who receives it, hath the self-same power which they had who gave it. On the same grounds, therefore, that the _people_ by right could make him a monarch, may he make another monarch. Insomuch as the _monarch_ to whom the command is simply given, receives a right not of _possession_ only, but of _succession_ also; so as he may declare whom he pleaseth for his successor.

[Sidenote: Of limited monarchs.]

16. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have regard to somewhat more than the bare gift only. First, whether the _people_ conveying its authority, left itself any right to meet at certain times and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether it were done so as they might meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet only at the will of that temporary monarch, and not otherwise. Suppose now the _people_ had delivered up its power to some one man for term of life only; which being done, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed from the council without making any order at all concerning the place, where after his death they should meet again to make a new election. In this case, it is manifest by the fifth article of this chapter, that the _people_ ceaseth to be a _person_, and is become a dissolute multitude; every one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engross the supreme power to himself, and settle it on his own head. What monarch soever, therefore, hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the _law of nature_, set down in chap. III. art. 8, _of not returning evil for good_, prudently to provide that by his death the city suffer not a dissolution; either by appointing a certain day and place, in which those subjects of his, who have a mind to it, may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor; whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received his command during life, hath an absolute power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the _people_ departed not from the election of the _temporary monarch_, before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death; then the monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by virtue of the former right. For all the supreme command, as _dominion_, was in the people; but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the right. But if the _people_ after the election of a _temporary monarch_, depart not from the court before they have appointed certain times and places to convene during the time prescribed him; as the dictators in ancient times were made by the people of Rome; such an one is not to be accounted a monarch, but the prime officer of the people. And if it shall seem good, the people may deprive him of his office even before that time; as the people of Rome did, when they conferred an equal power on Minutius, master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made dictator. The reason whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that he, whether man or council, who hath the readiest and most immediate power to act, should hold his command on such terms, as not to be able actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a right of commanding, as oft as nature allows it possible. Lastly, if the _people_ having declared a _temporary monarch_, depart from the court on such terms, as it shall not be lawful for them to meet without the command of the monarch, we must understand the people to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority, who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the city anew, unless he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times; since there remains no _person_ now in being, but at his discretion, to whom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases of a _people_ electing a _temporary monarch_, will be more clearly explained by comparing them with an _absolute monarch_ who hath no heir-apparent. For the people is lord of the subject in such a manner, as there can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects’ meeting, may be fitly compared to those times wherein the monarch sleeps; for in either the _acts_ of commanding cease, the _power_ remains. Furthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet again, is the death of the _people_; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man. As therefore a king who hath no heir, going to his rest so as never to rise again, that is, dying, if he commit the exercise of his regal authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the succession; the _people_ also electing a _temporary monarch_, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole dominion of the country. Furthermore, as a king going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administration of his kingdom to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a _temporary monarch_, and withal retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a king who hath committed the execution of his authority to another, himself in the meanwhile waking, can recal this commission again when he pleaseth; so the _people_, who during the time prescribed to the _temporary monarch_ doth by right convene, may if they please deprive the monarch of his authority. Lastly, the king, who commits his authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake again till he whom he entrusted give consent, loses at once both his power and his life; so the people, who hath given the supreme power to a temporary monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command, is absolutely dissolved, and the power remains with him whom they have chosen.

[Sidenote: A monarch retaining his right of government, cannot, by any promise whatsoever, be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority.]

17. If the monarch _promise_ aught to any one or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that _promise_ or _compact_, whether made by oath or without it, is null. For all _compact_ is a conveyance of right, which by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second chapter, requires meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promised to part with somewhat necessary to the supreme power, and yet retains the power itself, gives sufficient tokens that he no otherwise promised it, than so far forth as the power might be retained without it. Whensoever therefore it shall appear, that what is promised cannot be performed without prejudice to the power, the promise must be valued as not made, that is, of no effect.

[Sidenote: By what means a subject is freed from his subjection.]

18. We have seen how subjects, nature dictating, have obliged themselves by mutual compacts to obey the supreme power. We will see now by what means it comes to pass, that they are released from these bonds of obedience. And first of all, this happens by _rejection_, namely, if a man cast off or forsake, but convey not the _right of his command_ on some other. For what is thus rejected, is openly exposed to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of himself according to his own judgment. In the second place, if the kingdom fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he who before had the supreme authority, hath now lost it: for when the subjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling into the enemy’s hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of obedience which they made each with other; and what, being conquered, they promise afterwards to avoid death, they must with no less endeavour labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monarchy, (for a democracy and aristocracy cannot fail), if there be no successor, all the subjects are discharged from their obligations; for no man is supposed to be tied he knows not to whom; for in such a case it were impossible to perform aught. And by these three ways, all subjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty which all men have to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for the natural state hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man. Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power, namely, if he change his soil; which may be done two ways, either by permission, as he who gets license to dwell in another country; or command, as he who is banished. In both cases, he is free from the laws of his former country; because he is tied to observe those of the latter.

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