CHAPTER II.
OF NAMES.
1. The necessity of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory: a Mark defined.—2. The necessity of Marks for the signification of the conceptions of the Mind.—3. Names supply both those necessities.—4. The Definition of a Name.—5. Names are Signs not of Things, but of our Cogitations.—6. What it is we give Names to.—7. Names Positive and Negative.—8. Contradictory Names.—9. A Common Name.—10. Names of the First and Second Intention.—11. Universal, Particular, Individual, and Indefinite Names.—12. Names Univocal and Equivocal.—13. Absolute and Relative Names.—14. Simple and Compounded Names.—15. A Predicament described.—16. Some things to be noted concerning Predicaments.
[Sidenote: Necessity of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory.]
1. How unconstant and fading men's thoughts are, and how much the recovery of them depends upon chance, there is none but knows by infallible experience in himself. For no man is able to remember quantities without sensible and present measures, nor colours without sensible and present patterns, nor number without the names of numbers disposed in order and learned by heart. So that whatsoever a man has put together in his mind by ratiocination without such helps, will presently slip from him, and not be revocable but by beginning his ratiocination anew. From which it follows, that, for the acquiring of philosophy, some sensible moniments are necessary, by which our past thoughts may be not only reduced, but also registered every one in its own order.[Sidenote: A Mark defined] These moniments I call MARKS, namely, sensible things taken at pleasure, that, by the sense of them, such thoughts may be recalled to our mind as are like those thoughts for which we took them.
[Sidenote: Necessity of Marks for the signification of the conceptions of the Mind.]
2. Again, though some one man, of how excellent a wit soever, should spend all his time partly in reasoning, and partly in inventing marks for the help of his memory, and advancing himself in learning; who sees not that the benefit he reaps to himself will not be much, and to others none at all? For unless he communicate his notes with others, his science will perish with him. But if the same notes be made common to many, and so one man's inventions be taught to others, sciences will thereby be increased to the general good of mankind. It is therefore necessary, for the acquiring of philosophy, that there be certain signs, by which what one man finds out may be manifested and made known to others. Now, those things we call SIGNS are the _antecedents of their consequents, and the consequents of their antecedents, as often as we observe them to go before or follow after in the same manner_. For example, a thick cloud is a sign of rain to follow, and rain a sign that a cloud has gone before, for this reason only, that we seldom see clouds without the consequence of rain, nor rain at any time but when a cloud has gone before. And of signs, some are _natural_, whereof I have already given an example, others are _arbitrary_, namely, those we make choice of at our own pleasure, as a bush hung up, signifies that wine is to be sold there; a stone set in the ground signifies the bound of a field; and words so and so connected, signify the cogitations and motions of our mind. The difference, therefore, betwixt marks and signs is this, that we make those for our own use, but these for the use of others.
[Sidenote: Names supply both those necessities.]
3. Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts, are called SPEECH, of which every part is a _name_. But seeing (as is said) both marks and signs are necessary for the acquiring of philosophy, (marks by which we may remember our own thoughts, and signs by which we may make our thoughts known to others), names do both these offices; but they serve for marks before they be used as signs. For though a man were alone in the world, they would be useful to him in helping him to remember; but to teach others, (unless there were some others to be taught) of no use at all. Again, names, though standing singly by themselves, are marks, because they serve to recal our own thoughts to mind; but they cannot be signs, otherwise than by being disposed and ordered in speech as parts of the same. For example, a man may begin with a word, whereby the hearer may frame an idea of something in his mind, which, nevertheless, he cannot conceive to be the idea which was in the mind of him that spake, but that he would say something which began with that word, though perhaps not as by itself, but as part of another word. So that the nature of a name consists principally in this, that it is a mark taken for memory's sake; but it serves also by accident to signify and make known to others what we remember ourselves, and, therefore, I will define it thus:
[Sidenote: Definition of a Name.]
4. _A_ NAME _is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not before in his mind_. And it is for brevity's sake that I suppose the original of names to be arbitrary, judging it a thing that may be assumed as unquestionable. For considering that new names are daily made, and old ones laid aside; that diverse nations use different names, and how impossible it is either to observe similitude, or make any comparison betwixt a name and a thing, how can any man imagine that the names of things were imposed from their natures? For though some names of living creatures and other things, which our first parents used, were taught by God himself; yet they were by him arbitrarily imposed, and afterwards, both at the Tower of Babel, and since, in process of time, growing everywhere out of use, are quite forgotten, and in their room have succeeded others, invented and received by men at pleasure. Moreover, whatsoever the common use of words be, yet philosophers, who were to teach their knowledge to others, had always the liberty, and sometimes they both had and will have a necessity, of taking to themselves such names as they please for the signifying of their meaning, if they would have it understood. Nor had mathematicians need to ask leave of any but themselves to name the figures they invented, _parabolas_, _hyperboles_, _cissoeides_, _quadratices_, &c. or to call one magnitude A, another B.
[Sidenote: Names are signs not of things, but of our cogitations.]
5. But seeing names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound of this word _stone_ should be the sign of a stone, cannot be understood in any sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks of a stone. And, therefore, that disputation, whether names signify the matter or form, or something compounded of both, and other like subtleties of the _metaphysics_, is kept up by erring men, and such as understand not the words they dispute about.
[Sidenote: What it is we give names to.]
6. Nor, indeed, is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as these, a _man_, a _tree_, a _stone_, are the names of the things themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, and of a stone, which are represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can remember these; and, therefore, it is no less necessary that they have names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this word _future_ is a name, but no future thing has yet any being, nor do we know whether that which we call future, shall ever have a being or no. Nevertheless, seeing we use in our mind to knit together things past with those that are present, the name _future_ serves to signify such knitting together. Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall, or ever can be, has a name, namely, _that which neither is nor has been_, &c.; or more briefly this, _impossible_. To conclude; this word _nothing_ is a name, which yet cannot be the name of any thing: for when, for example, we substract 2 and 3 from 5, and so nothing remaining, we would call that substraction to mind, this speech _nothing remains_, and in it the word _nothing_ is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say truly, _less than nothing_ remains, when we substract more from less; for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake, and desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature, yet it is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word _thing_ to whatsoever we name; as if it were all one whether that thing be truly existent, or be only feigned.
[Sidenote: Names Positive and Negative.]
7. The first distinction of names is, that some are _positive_, or _affirmative_, others _negative_, which are also called _privative_ and _indefinite_. _Positive_ are such as we impose for the likeness, equality, or identity of the things we consider; _negative_, for the diversity, unlikeness, or inequality of the same. Examples of the former are, _a man_, _a philosopher_; for a _man_ denotes any one of a multitude of men, and _a philosopher_, any one of many philosophers, by reason of their similitude; also, _Socrates_ is a positive name, because it signifies always one and the same man. Examples of _negatives_ are such positives as have the negative particle _not_ added to them, as _not-man_, _not-philosopher_. But positives were before negatives; for otherwise there could have been no use at all of these. For when the name of _white_ was imposed upon certain things, and afterwards upon other things, the names of _black_, _blue_, _transparent_, _&c._ the infinite dissimilitudes of these with _white_ could not be comprehended in any one name, save that which had in it the negation of white, that is to say, the name _not-white_, or some other equivalent to it, in which the word _white_ is repeated, such as _unlike to white_, _&c._ And by these _negative names_, we take notice ourselves, and signify to others what we have not thought of.
[Sidenote: Contradictory names.]
8. Positive and negative names are _contradictory_ to one another, so that they cannot both be the name of the same thing. Besides, of contradictory names, one is the name of anything whatsoever; for whatsoever is, is either man, or not-man, white or not-white, and so of the rest. And this is so manifest, that it needs no farther proof or explication; for they that say _the same thing cannot both be, and not be_, speak obscurely; but they that say, _whatsoever is, either is, or is not_, speak also absurdly and ridiculously. The certainty of this axiom, viz. _of two contradictory names, one is the name of anything whatsoever, the other not_, is the original and foundation of all ratiocination, that is, of all philosophy; and therefore it ought to be so exactly propounded, that it may be of itself clear and perspicuous to all men; as indeed it is, saving to such, as reading the long discourses made upon this subject by the writers of _metaphysics_ (which they believe to be some egregious learning) think they understand not, when they do.
[Sidenote: A common name.]
9. Secondly, of names, some are _common_ to many things, as a _man_, _a tree_; others _proper_ to one thing, as _he that writ the Iliad_, _Homer_, _this man_, _that man_. And a common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively of all together (as man is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally) is therefore called an _universal name_; and therefore this word _universal_ is never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when _a living creature_, _a stone_, _a spirit_, or any other thing, is said to be _universal_, it is not to be understood, that any man, stone, &c. ever was or can be universal, but only that these words, _living creature_, _stone_, _&c._ are _universal names_, that is, names common to many things; and the conceptions answering them in our mind, are the images and phantasms of several living creatures, or other things. And therefore, for the understanding of the extent of an universal name, we need no other faculty but that of our imagination, by which we remember that such names bring sometimes one thing, sometimes another, into our mind. Also of common names, some are more, some less common. _More common_, is that which is the name of more things; _less common_, the name of fewer things; as _living creature_ is more common than _man_, or _horse_, or _lion_, because it comprehends them all: and therefore a more common name, in respect of a less common, is called the _genus_, or a _general name_; and this in respect of that, the _species_, or a _special name_.
[Sidenote: Names of the first and second intention.]
10. And from hence proceeds the third distinction of names, which is, that some are called names of the _first_, others of the _second intention_. Of the _first intention_ are the names of things, a _man_, _stone_, _&c._: of the _second_ are the names of names and speeches, as _universal_, _particular_, _genus_, _species_, _syllogism_, and the like. But it is hard to say why those are called names of the _first_, and these of the _second intention_, unless perhaps it was first intended by us to give names to those things which are of daily use in this life, and afterwards to such things as appertain to science, that is, that our second intention was to give names to names. But whatsoever the cause hereof may be, yet this is manifest, that _genus_, _species_, _definition_, _&c._ are names of words and names only; and therefore to put _genus_ and _species_ for things, and _definition_ for the nature of any thing, as the writers of _metaphysics_ have done, is not right, seeing they be only significations of what we think of the nature of things.
[Sidenote: Universal, particular, individual, and indefinite names.]
11. Fourthly, some names are of _certain_ and _determined_, others of _uncertain_ and _undetermined_ signification. Of _determined_ and _certain_ signification is, first, that name which is given to any one thing by itself, and is called an _individual name_; as _Homer_, _this tree_, _that living creature_, &c. Secondly that which has any of these words, _all_, _every_, _both_, _either_, or the like added to it; and it is therefore called an universal name, because it signifies every one of those things to which it is common; and of _certain_ signification for this reason, that he which hears, conceives in his mind the same thing that he which speaks would have him conceive. Of _indefinite_ signification is, first, that name which has the word _some_, or the like added to it, and is called a _particular name_; secondly, a common name set by itself without any note either of universality or particularity, as _man_, _stone_, and is called an _indefinite name_; but both _particular_ and _indefinite_ names are of uncertain signification, because the hearer knows not what thing it is the speaker would have him conceive; and therefore in speech, particular and indefinite names are to be esteemed equivalent to one another. But these words, _all_, _every_, _some_, _&c._ which denote universality and particularity, are not names, but parts only of names; so that _every man_, and _that man which the hearer conceives in his mind_, are all one; and _some man_, and _that man which the speaker thought of_, signify the same. From whence it is evident, that the use of signs of this kind, is not for a man's own sake, or for his getting of knowledge by his own private meditation (for every man has his own thoughts sufficiently determined without such helps as these) but for the sake of others; that is, for the teaching and signifying of our conceptions to others; nor were they invented only to make us remember, but to make us able to discourse with others.
[Sidenote: Names univocal and equivocal.]
12. Fifthly, names are usually distinguished into _univocal_ and _equivocal_. _Univocal_ are those which in the same train of discourse signify always the same thing; but _equivocal_ those which mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another. Thus, the name _triangle_ is said to be _univocal_, because it is always taken in the same sense; and _parabola_ to be _equivocal_, for the signification it has sometimes of allegory or similitude, and sometimes of a certain geometrical figure. Also every _metaphor_ is by profession _equivocal_. But this distinction belongs not so much to names, as to those that use names, for some use them properly and accurately for the finding out of truth; others draw them from their proper sense, for ornament or deceit.
[Sidenote: Absolute and relative names.]
13. Sixthly, of names, some are _absolute_, others _relative_. _Relative_ are such as are imposed for some comparison, as _father_, _son_, _cause_, _effect_, _like_, _unlike_, _equal_, _unequal_, _master_, _servant_, _&c._ And those that signify no comparison at all are _absolute names_. But, as it was noted above, that universality is to be attributed to words and names only, and not to things, so the same is to be said of other distinctions of names; for no things are either _univocal_ or _equivocal_, or _relative_ or _absolute_. There is also another distinction of names into _concrete_ and _abstract_; but because abstract names proceed from proposition, and can have no place where there is no affirmation, I shall speak of them hereafter.
[Sidenote: Simple and compounded names.]
14. Lastly, there are _simple_ and _compounded names_. But here it is to be noted, that a name is not taken in philosophy, as in grammar, for one single word, but for any number of words put together to signify one thing; for among philosophers _sentient animated body_ passes but for one name, being the name of every living creature, which yet, among grammarians, is accounted three names. Also a _simple name_ is not here distinguished from a _compounded name_ by a preposition, as in grammar. But I call a _simple name_, that which in every kind is the most common or most universal; and that a _compounded name_, which by the joining of another name to it, is made less universal, and signifies that more conceptions than one were in the mind, for which that latter name was added. For example, in the conception of _man_ (as is shown in the former chapter.) First, he is conceived to be something that has extension, which is marked by the word _body_. _Body_, therefore, is a _simple name_, being put for that first single conception; afterwards, upon the sight of such and such motion, another conception arises, for which he is called an _animated body_; and this I here call a _compounded name_, as I do also the name _animal_, which is equivalent to an _animated body_. And, in the same manner, an _animated rational body_, as also a _man_, which is equivalent to it, is a more compounded name. And by this we see how the composition of conceptions in the mind is answerable to the composition of names; for, as in the mind one idea or phantasm succeeds to another, and to this a third; so to one name is added another and another successively, and of them all is made one _compounded_ name. Nevertheless we must not think bodies which are without the mind, are compounded in the same manner, namely, that there is in nature a body, or any other imaginable thing existent, which at the first has no magnitude, and then, by the addition of magnitude, comes to have quantity, and by more or less quantity to have density or rarity; and again, by the addition of figure, to be figurate, and after this, by the injection of light or colour, to become lucid or coloured; though such has been the philosophy of many.
[Sidenote: A predicament described.]
15. The writers of _logic_ have endeavoured to digest the names of all the kinds of things into certain _scales_ or degrees, by the continual subordination of names less common, to names more common. In the scale of _bodies_ they put in the first and highest place _body_ simply, and in the next place under it less common names, by which it may be more limited and determined, namely _animated_ and _inanimated_, and so on till they come to _individuals_. In like manner, in the scale of _quantities_, they assign the first place to _quantity_, and the next to _line_, _superficies_, and _solid_, which are names of less latitude; and these orders or scales of names they usually call _predicaments_ and _categories_. And of this ordination not only positive, but negative names also are capable; which may be exemplified by such forms of the _predicaments_ as follow:
THE FORM OF THE PREDICAMENT OF BODY.
Not-Body, or Accident. { Not animated. Body { { Not living Creature. { Animated { { Living { Not Man. { Creature { { Not Peter. { Man { { Peter.
{ { Quantity, or so much. Both Accident and Body { Absolutely, as { are considered { or { Quality, or such. { Comparatively, which is called their Relation.
THE FORM OF THE PREDICAMENT OF QUANTITY.
{ Not continual, { as Number. { Line. Quantity. { { Of itself, as { Superficies. { { { Solid. { Continual { { { Time, by Line. { { Motion, by Line and { By accident, as { Time. { Force, by Motion and { Solid.
Where, it is to be noted, that _line_, _superficies_, and _solid_, may be said to be of such and such quantity, that is, to be originally and of their own nature capable of equality and inequality; but we cannot say there is either majority or minority, or equality, or indeed any quantity at all, in _time_, without the help of _line_ and _motion_; nor in _motion_, without _line_ and _time_; nor in _force_, otherwise than by _motion_ and _solid_.
THE FORM OF THE PREDICAMENT OF QUALITY.
{ Seeing. { Hearing. { Primary { Smelling. { { Tasting. { Perception { { Touching. { by Sense { { { { Imagination. { { Secondary { Affection { pleasant. Quality { { { unpleasant. { { By Seeing, as Light and Colour. { { By Hearing, as Sound. { Sensible { By Smelling, as Odours. { Quality { By Tasting, as Savours. { By Touching, as Hardness, Heat, { Cold, &c.
THE FORM OF THE PREDICAMENT OF RELATION.
{ Magnitudes, as Equality and Inequality. { Qualities, as Likeness and Unlikeness. Relation of { { Together { In Place. { { { In Time. { Order { { { In Place { Former. { Not together { { Later { In Time { Former. { Later
[Sidenote: Some things to be noted concerning predicaments.]
16. Concerning which predicaments it is to be noted, in the first place, that as the division is made in the first predicament into contradictory names, so it might have been done in the rest. For, as there, _body_ is divided into _animated_ and _not-animated_, so, in the second predicament, _continual quantity_ may be divided into _line_ and _not-line_, and again, _not-line_ into _superficies_ and _not-superficies_, and so in the rest; but it was not necessary.
Secondly, it is to be observed, that of _positive_ names the former comprehends the latter; but of _negatives_ the former is comprehended by the latter. For example, _living-creature_ is the name of every man, and therefore it comprehends the name _man_; but, on the contrary, _not-man_ is the name of everything which is not-living-creature, and therefore the name _not-living-creature_, which is put first, is comprehended by the latter name, _not-man_.
Thirdly, we must take heed that we do not think, that as names, so the diversities of things themselves may be searched out and determined by such distinctions as these; or that arguments may be taken from hence (as some have done ridiculously) to prove that the kinds of things are not infinite.
Fourthly, I would not have any man think I deliver the forms above for a true and exact ordination of names; for this cannot be performed as long as philosophy remains imperfect; nor that by placing (for example) _light_ in the predicament of _qualities_, while another places the same in the predicament of bodies, I pretend that either of us ought for this to be drawn from his opinion; for this is to be done only by arguments and ratiocination, and not by disposing of words into _classes_.
Lastly, I confess I have not yet seen any great use of the predicaments in philosophy. I believe _Aristotle_ when he saw he could not digest the things themselves into such orders, might nevertheless desire out of his own authority to reduce words to such forms, as I have done; but I do it only for this end, that it may be understood what this ordination of words is, and not to have it received for true, till it be demonstrated by good reason to be so.
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