CHAPTER VII
THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
“The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds.”--GEORGE WASHINGTON.
It is the fashion to say that the world is growing smaller. This figure of speech is deep with significance for the United States. No people know the fact of world shrinkage so well as our own, because of the characteristic passion of Americans for foreign travel. As a corollary, there is one subject that will always hold the interest of the United States citizen, whether the subject be looked at in the light of pleasure or profit, and that is transportation.
Step by step, the American republic has advanced in prosperity and prominence in stride with the progress of freight and passenger carriage. Present wealth in the United States is built upon the railroads. At the same time, the American people envy other nations their great sea tonnage.
While the citizens of the United States have studied the transportation problem extensively from the business point of view, few have examined its bearing upon the strategic position of the country. At the present stage of world development, no subject is more worthy of hard thought than the probable contraction of globe-encircling lines of communication.
It is a curious circumstance that the paths of war follow the paths of commerce. Still, if we go into the reasons for this phenomenon, they are seen to be consistently logical. The conflicts of commerce are often the precursors of warfare, so it is but natural the two conditions run along the same channels.
Thus, every point where the lines of transportation impinge upon the coast of the United States holds a danger--intimate or remote--to this country. In other words, the United States is open to attack at every point on the coast, except where local defenses protect individual cities. The coast of the United States includes not only the seaboard line of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the Gulf of Mexico, but the shores of Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and our Achilles heel, the Panama Canal Zone. The most remote possessions must be carefully considered in all plans of defense.
While more frequent and more rapid transportation will tend to bring outlying American dependencies into closer relations with the mother country, yet by their positions they will always be under the menace of potential enemies. Such menace increases in direct ratio to the lack of transports and shipping units in the United States.
In the exposition that follows bear constantly in mind the fact that the figures given for the time required to transport troops from point to point, is the maximum. Remember that each year shows an improvement in tonnage and speed in ocean-going ships. As a gauge of such advancement, compare the speed and displacement of the Mauretania with any ship considered an ocean leviathan twenty years ago. The comparison will give you an insight into the rate of world shrinkage.
The safeguard of isolation no longer exists. The oceans, instead of being barriers to possible enemies, are now convenient carriers of striking power. The number, speed and carrying capacity of ocean-going vessels make the sea lanes of peace easy avenues of attack in time of hostilities. The most conclusive demonstration of this fact was the British Expedition to the Dardanelles. Incident to this campaign, it was shown that sea transport was the safest and most convenient method of moving troops and material between distant points.
And as a supplement to ocean transport we must consider the aeroplane, the submarine and wireless telegraphy, with the increased radii of action of these elements and the possibilities of their further development. From my own experience, I expect to see improved Zeppelins sailing between Europe and the United States within ten years. If you want to arrive at a parallel which gives a hint of future aerial advancement, compare the “Claremont” of Fulton’s voyage down the Hudson in 1807 with the superdreadnaught “Pennsylvania.” The first successful steam vessel would not be fit for dingy work on the battleship. The improvement that has taken place within the last one hundred years in ocean-going transportation puts a very different complexion upon the American political status from that which inspired the actions of the fathers of the nation.
As the years pass, both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States will become more and more within the sphere of hostile activities of over-seas nations. So in planning for national defense let us not build only for today.
All American citizens know enough of the geographical circle of American influence to realize the many points of weakness it presents. On one side we offer the whole Atlantic seaboard, the coast line of the Gulf of Mexico, and the Colon entrance to the Panama Canal. Also Puerto Rico and the islands of the Caribbean Sea may be regarded as in the sphere of hostile activities, and readily assailable.
Because of the Monroe Doctrine, it can be accurately stated that the United States is liable to attack at any part of the Atlantic side of the Western Hemisphere, from Portland, Maine, to Punta Arenas, Patagonia.
The Pacific sphere of American influence is the open door to all enemies. It is conceded by military students that the island possessions of the United States could not be defended in case of attack, under the present army program. It is not necessary to enlarge upon this situation. What more nearly concerns the integrity of the Union is the undefended condition of Alaska. Finally, the entire western area of the country is exposed to aggression.
Here also the entrance to the Panama Canal is a strategic objective sure to receive prompt attention from any enemy. Again, on the Pacific side of the American continent, the prohibition of the Monroe Doctrine can be challenged. One sword-prick and this paper rampart will be breached. In order to get the strategic outline of the United States in your mind, try to imagine all possessions girdled by a fortress wall. Remember, we have no troops to man more than an infinitesimal section of this imaginary bulwark, and guns are placed only at rare and immense intervals along it. That it lacks the first essential of a fortress, positions of mutual support, is immediately observed. Again it is at once evident that the lines of communication, another basic element of defense, are from every angle, outside immediate boundaries, assailable. The measure of defense to be expected at points of probable assault can be approximately estimated by the number of troops present at the points. It is assumed the forces have the requisite amount of ammunition and artillery to meet initial operations of an enemy. Figures obtained from the War Department give the usual peace time distribution of the fighting forces of the army as follows:
In the United States (including Coast Artillery) 51,000 In the Philippines: Regular troops 13,500 Native scouts 6,000 In Puerto Rico 700 In Alaska 800 In Hawaii 9,600 In Panama 6,200 ------ 87,800
From this table it is possible to estimate what effectives can be placed in the field at the immediate outbreak of hostilities. No allowance is made for “war strength,” which, under the system prevailing in the United States army, is largely a myth. To add a thousand untrained men to an infantry unit does not double the fighting ability of that unit, although it doubles its numerical strength. Such a proceeding is more likely to demoralize a dependable force. The worst feature of the whole American plan is the war-expansion idea. Stop a moment to analyze what the scheme means.
In peace, regiments are homogeneous aggregations of disciplined, equipped and trained soldiers. They are fighting teams. Think what will happen when the team is suddenly doubled in size, by adding undisciplined and unarmed, untrained elements. Admitting that it were possible to absorb these troops into the original regiment (a result in itself impossible, because the rifles for the supplementary troops are not made), how would the fighting value of the force be affected? Any army officer, and there are many who have approximated the experience outlined during the Spanish-American war, will tell you that the original efficiency of the unit suffers a distinct loss. The theory that it is possible to strengthen armies with undigested recruits added to veteran forces is a fallacy often proved on the battlefield.
As our subject is preparedness against war, defenses must be considered in the light of deterrents from attack. Let us see what forces could be mobilized to meet a foe on the East.
Officers of the General Staff have agreed that, in case of war with a first-class power on the Atlantic, the portion of the country lying between and including Maine and Virginia would undoubtedly be the primary objective of an invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on our land frontiers would undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the Atlantic states named. Roughly, any one of the first-class powers could transport 150,000 to 350,000 soldiers to American shores within fifteen days. This result is worked out from what is known of the troops available and the serviceable transport at the disposition of the great European powers and the time needed to load the assumed expeditionary army and cross the ocean. The factor of naval interference is not considered.
It must be taken for granted that the enemy would not be able to gain a foothold in any of the coastal fortified areas by direct naval attack, and in consequence, would be forced to choose some suitable place on the Atlantic seaboard from which land operations could be conducted against both the important coast cities and the rich commercial centers in the interior. Between the fortified positions on the coast, long stretches lie open to the enemy. The only cure for this weakness is a mobile land force sufficient to deter a potential aggressor from making the attempt at landing.
There is a simple test to determine how rapidly units can be moved and how many troops can be concentrated at some designated point on the periphery of the United States. Such a maneuver--which would be a splendid object lesson--could be planned to follow closely probable political and military sequences.
The War Department would assume that diplomatic relations with a certain first-class European power were at the breaking point.
A confidential order is then issued to the Chief of Staff. It is supposed, in stating the problem, that cabinet conferences and congressional agitation have no material bearing on the course of events. Hardly has the head of the army received his admonitory order, when a special agent in the certain hostile European power reports mobilization activities in the vicinity of a named port. This information, confirmed from other sources, is assumed to come to hand on June 1st. However, diplomatic negotiations continue, so the American government, ever hopeful of avoiding war, does not act upon the information received until the 4th of June. On this day the American ambassador in the certain first-class European power is handed his passports. War against the United States is declared at midnight.
Before the last echoes of the striking hour have died away over the waters of the named port, a fleet of fifty transports carrying the first hostile expedition puts to sea. The enemy fleet is already in position on the Atlantic.
In our maneuver, news of the sailing of the transports is supposed to arrive in Washington the morning of June 5th. Immediately the War Department issues the necessary orders for mobilizing the regular army. National Guard and militia forces are also called upon. At this time it is unknown at which point the enemy may choose to attempt a landing. Therefore the available forces can only be moved to positions in rear of salient points.
It is assumed the American and enemy fleet meet, and, owing to superior organization on the part of the invader, the American ships are sunk or scattered. The naval battle takes place June 12th. Now the hostile transports are half way across the Atlantic Ocean. News of the naval defeat reaches the United States on June 13th. From the course and position of the transports, as reported by an American destroyer, the enemy is seen to be moving to strike at either New York or Washington. Orders from the War Department and the General Staff follow fast. On June 18th the enemy squadron is sighted steaming directly towards New York. On the night of June 20th (the time calculated for the sea-crossing having elapsed) the enemy is supposed to begin disembarking at Fort Pond, Long Island. Here our experiment ends.
To furnish the answer to the question of preparedness all that is now necessary to reckon is the aggregate number of American troops, regulars, National Guard and militia, in position to oppose the assumed landing. Granting that the enemy has 150,000 troops on the transports--a moderate estimate in view of the forces available in the first-class powers of Europe--how many American soldiers will be fighting the invader and what are our chances of driving him back to his ships?
Could the War Department be allowed the money necessary for carrying out the experiment outlined above, the result would be a stunning object lesson for the citizens of the United States.
Without putting the maneuver into actual practice, we can deduce certain facts. From the table furnished by the War Department we know that there are in the United States (when not diverted to follow a Mexican bandit) a few over 50,000 regular troops. In our problem, however, we must subtract 15,000 coast defense soldiers from this total, as these are not mobile. So we are left with 35,000 soldiers to defend 3,000,616 square miles of territory and 20,000 miles of continental coast. We know that these troops are scattered over the United States from Maine to California, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. The time necessary to transport them from their posts to the Atlantic seaboard can be approximately computated. But what cannot be ascertained is the help the railroads will be able to give in meeting an unexampled situation. How long it will take to mobilize the rolling stock necessary for the movement of the troops is a time factor we must allow for with a large margin.
The records of the past performances of the army in time of war are available, and they contain nothing calculated to inspire the hope that more than half the total forces posted in the United States could be mobilized on the Atlantic coast within fifteen days. Allowing a little grace, the greatest number of regular troops that could be thrown against the landing invader is 20,000. It needs no extraordinary military knowledge to estimate how long such a force could stand against 150,000. The regulars will be supplemented by a large force of militia, as the attack is supposed to take place in New York, where the National Guard organization is strongest. But anyone in the smallest degree familiar with the limitations of the citizen regiments, as at present organized, equipped and trained, knows that they will only be available as a supporting line of doubtful value. To throw the state troops into action against the soldiers of any first-class European power, under the conditions that now hold, would be murder.
Ammunition, the vital necessity of fighting units, is not considered, but from the lessons learned in Europe it is known that the rate of expenditure far surpasses the measure of supply. It would be interesting to discover how much and what class of ammunition could be supplied the artillery of the United States defensive force. Calculated according to the expenditure of artillery ammunition during daily battles along the Buzra River in Russia, the American army could rely for support from its batteries for half a day.
Transferring the scene of activities to the Pacific coast, the same general conditions will prevail. Only, from the peculiar geographical outline of the country and the difficulty of transportation, this part of the United States is far weaker, strategically, than the eastern seaboard. This is the fact, in spite of the distance separating the Pacific coast from the ports of a possible enemy. To load 150,000 troops and cross the Pacific Ocean would require not less than twenty-two days. But once a hostile force was landed on the west sector of the Union, the utmost difficulty would be experienced in dislodging it.
Washington State offers a particularly inviting objective to an enemy in the Puget Sound district. This corner of the United States is completely cut off from the rest of the country by great natural obstacles. At the same time, it presents a long stretch of coast open to attack. It would be no difficult matter for a first-class Pacific power to strike at Puget Sound, enter western Washington, seize and destroy the important bridges and tunnels linking the state with the rest of the country, and establish an army so securely that a great force and a long time would be necessary to dislodge it. The natural resources, as well as the industrial condition, of this region are calculated to maintain an invading army of 150,000 men for an indefinite period.
The situation in California is even more perilous. There are so many points along the extended coast of this state an enemy would be in a quandary as to the best for his purposes. While the transportation facilities are somewhat better than in Washington State, this advantage is offset by the enormous area of California. To mobilize enough troops to meet invasion at the many possible landing places would be a task beyond the power of an army numbering less than 250,000 men. The peril of California is increased because of its border adjoining Mexico. Nothing at present stops hostile forces from entering the state over the southern border. The little strip of Lower California offers an enemy a suitable position upon which to establish an advanced base of operations. Once admit a hostile army into this great western commonwealth, and all the resources of the nation, in men and money, would be needed to drive him out. His expulsion would only be accomplished after years of effort and the loss of thousands of lives. It follows that the military preparation of the West must be such as to forbid any potential enemy the thought of invasion.
Passing to the oversea possessions of the United States, it is discovered that each distant territory presents a special military problem. The forces that would garrison the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, not to mention Guantanamo and Puerto Rico, in case of war, would perform a distinct tactical and strategic mission. Dependent upon long sea communication for aid from the home country, they would have to be in all ways self-supporting and able to maintain themselves for long periods of isolation. It is impossible to maintain a force strong enough to hold the entire island territory of the United States. All that can be hoped for is to keep some point that is a key position, while allowing the enemy to have his way over the undefended area. The Hawaiian Islands and Panama present a strategic problem that cannot be treated in this manner. The former would offer a convenient base for an enemy operating against the Pacific coast, and tend to nullify the advantages accruing from the possession of the Panama Canal. The question of their defense is largely technical and does not depend so much on the size of the force assigned as the organization of defenses and the co-operation of the navy.
The Panama Canal is the most important strategic position within the domain of the United States. The whole foundation of American military and naval strength is based upon the control of this highway connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans. It follows that no effort is too great to secure this point from capture. The complicated machinery of the locks, spillways and basins of the canal call for extraordinary precautions in safeguarding them, and demand an organization large enough and efficient enough to protect these easily destroyed mechanisms, under all circumstances. A resolute commander with a picked force could land at a point outside the range of the sea-coast guns and with skill find his way to some vulnerable sector of the canal and destroy its usefulness for an indefinite period. The most pressing problem confronting the American nation is to provide immediately for the safety of the canal.
The strategic problems of the United States are so many and so intricate that they lead us far into the domain of the technical soldier. But omitting the highly specialized quality of knowledge needed, when the last professional soldier has had his say, the problem of defense depends upon the number of troops available in time of attack.
The officers of the American general staff have compiled a plan of preparedness. In all probability, this plan would insure the United States against war. Surely the well-considered conclusions of our professional soldiers merit the respectful consideration of the non-military population. In passing, let me correct a wrong impression prevalent among people unacquainted with the army officers. American officers are not hungering for war. They know the consequences of conflict better than the civilian. To suggest that the leaders of the United States army desire war in order to exercise knowledge, is a scandalous indictment based upon ignorance or thoughtlessness. The majority of army officers are family men who work hard at their vocation, and have as much to lose through warfare as other citizens.
To return to the strategic problems, it is next to impossible to arouse all of the inhabitants of the United States to the serious consideration of the problem of preparedness against war. While the coast states are keenly interested in the discussion, citizens living in the interior scoff at talk of danger. All of which operates against the evolution of a sound military policy. Another factor militating in opposition to the plans of defense is the wrong conclusion drawn from the past experiences of the United States in war. Providence has been kind to the American republic. We have emerged from many conflicts successfully. But when the military student analyzes the reasons for our success, he is amazed. The fact that the United States exists today is due in the first instance to the timely aid of the French at a critical stage of the Revolutionary War, and to a wonderful sequence of events, classified only under the head of luck. Is it good policy to depend upon luck to save us in the future?