CHAPTER IV

ON GOD

A word or two may here be added on the nature and attributes of God. We have already learnt that Gassendi is in direct opposition to Epicurus on this point. He treats the subject as primarily a question of causality, and discusses it as the first part of the subject of efficient causation. The primary efficient cause is God: this is considered to be proved from the character (as opposed to the nature) of the world. The order of the universe naturally suggests to the mind the being of some Power that can regulate and control the march of events. This action is not really distinct from that of creation, for it was at creation that God gave to matter certain determinations which it preserves.[113] It is not enough, says Gassendi, to say that the atoms were created, we must also allow that they were created in certain kinds. In this point Gassendi is really enlarging the hint given by Lucretius, who had introduced the idea of atoms as ‘semina rerum,’ which implies that certain lines of development were prescribed. The common phrase that one atom unites with another because it is like it, really involves the same introduction of a pre-determination of the possible compositions of atoms. Before Gassendi this argument was used to disprove the necessity of a God. But here the purpose was really extraneous to the argument: it was the previous intention of getting rid of that watchful providence which seemed to Epicurus nothing but a source of fear, that dictated the conclusion. Gassendi, setting out with the opposite purpose, finds these arguments equally useful for the purpose of establishing the being of God, and there is much to be said for his view. He quotes from Lucretius a passage which shows that this opponent of the gods allows all the facts which he himself uses in the defence of the one God. We must remember also that as a believer in the Bible Gassendi would at least be glad to find room for the idea of special creation: in spite of the obvious connection between his views and a theory of development, the times were not yet ripe for any doctrine of the origin of species, and it was tacitly assumed that in some way or other the species found on the earth were fixed and immutable. Now, the idea of semina rerum supplies the required element: if we go right back to the atom as purely indeterminate it should be possible to get any combinations at any time, and this was held to be opposed to the laws of regular production. If we stop at the semina rerum we have our actual elements given with a considerable amount of determination, and Gassendi seems to have been willing to go a step further and say that the atoms were not created at first in their isolation, but in complex masses which were divisible into atomic parts. He is at any rate quite clear that to begin with the atom is a purely abstract and hypothetical result, which could only be asserted to be in harmony with reality if it solved all our problems, which it does not. We are compelled to deduce from the nature of the universe that there is something beside the material cause, some Power which can supply the elements of law and order, which moreover will explain the creation of the atoms themselves. Thus nature brings us to God both as creator and as rector of the universe. The concession which is made to science is that this does not imply perpetual interference: once created with their guiding determinations the world of matter is left to work out its own laws.

The recognition of the reign of law, which was so strongly insisted on by Lucretius, is now turned against the materialist. The one thing that atoms in themselves could not produce would be laws; and as law is, from the subjective point of view, intelligibility, we may say that the atoms are not capable of evolving an intelligible world. But the intelligibility of the world is above all things that which science demonstrates in the observation of laws, and it is thus a means by which the nature of the world as intelligible is unfolded before us. But while it explains what the intelligible is, in reference to its content, it does not explain how the intelligibility itself came to be there; and that is where we require to supplement our science with Faith and Reason.

Having thus established the a priori need for a God, we turn to the question of the ways by which we get our knowledge of God. The first is Faith[114] and the second Reason; but the difference between these is not very great: in both the reaction of our minds is the convincing point. As to faith, it is the belief which arises in our minds when we hear a description of God: we find that the idea has an inner response which compels us to believe. The effect is much the same in the case of reason: there is formed within us an ‘anticipatio’ as a sort of residual impression produced by experience. This is in a sense a priori. It is not derived from the senses, but exhibited on the occasion of the sense-impressions calling it forth. Technically we have to distinguish between an ‘anticipatio’ got directly by comprehension, and those which are got indirectly by comparison. The latter are formed on the basis of sense-impressions, but are rational, requiring an activity that goes beyond the senses, and constructs what is never given to the senses. It is by this latter faculty that we attain the idea of God, which is thus a concept. If we ask whether this is innate, the answer is that the faculty is innate, but its exercise is dependent on the occasion furnished by the senses.

As to the relation of God to man, we are told that Epicurus erred in denying a special providence watching over man. At the same time man is a free agent, his freedom being the gift of God that he may work out his own salvation.[115] Religion, as is natural, produces in Gassendi a cheerful optimism: the good man does indeed suffer evils, and the sinners seem to flourish unduly; but the good man himself acknowledges that his sufferings are profitable, and all things work together for good, which is at least a tribute to the goodness of the good man; but if he was less good perhaps his opinion might have been less in accord with our philosopher’s creed.

With regard to this theology, some have said that it is no part of Gassendi’s real philosophy. This I think is wrong. Apart from the question of religious training and fear of the Church, the principles of Gassendi’s philosophy require that the idea of causality should carry us beyond the physical world of things. If it be necessary to go beyond at all there seems no particular objection to the acceptance of theism, for pantheism is out of the question. It is as a metaphysical requirement that Gassendi introduces God, not as an appendix to his philosophy, but right in the middle, at the heart of the subject, when he is dealing with causation. The idea is for his times considerably refined: it would probably have been hailed at a later time as deism, and unconsciously goes very near to that as it is, for the world manages its own affairs (VI. 155), and even man is only watched from afar with paternal interest and led on to his self-fulfilment indirectly; but in spirit there is certainly no suggestion of such a conclusion, and God is theoretically rector mundi in the fullest sense of the term. The question which usually proves so great a stumbling block, that of personality, is not raised by Gassendi. He seems to have found no difficulty in the idea of human personality, and consequently none in that of God; though he is careful to point out that anthropomorphism is not essential, he does not reconcile that with the converse assertion he frequently makes, that man is created in the likeness of God.

NOTE ON DECLINATION

Gassendi discusses this point of declination very fully. When I say (page 221) there is no trace of it I mean that Gassendi does not build his own theory on it in any way. As this ‘declination’ has been the subject of much dispute, it will be worth while comparing Gassendi’s view of it with later opinions. The most important of these later opinions is that of Guyau in _La Morale d’Epicure_ (2nd edition, Paris, 1881). The whole position taken up by Guyau is criticised by Masson (_The Atomic Theory of Lucretius_), and I shall first state that position and the criticisms made by Masson:

‘M. Guyau’s explanation of the subject is in several respects a novel one, and especially so in regard to one point, viz. his account of Epicurus’ teaching as to Chance and the very important part which M. Guyau supposes it to play in the Epicurean philosophy. According to him Epicurus believed that the element of chance which we see at work in the world every day is the manifestation and outcome of a principle of “Spontaneity” existing in Nature. This “Spontaneity” is the consequence of the power of Declination possessed by the Atoms. Thus Epicurus believed both Free-will in man and the element of Chance in the world around him to be the result of the same power of Atomic Declination in its twofold working. Epicurus, says M. Guyau, after having combated the religious idea of Providence or Divine caprice, found himself confronted with the scientific idea of necessity. Thus his main philosophic aim was to escape from the notion of gods interfering with nature on the one hand and to steer clear of the doctrine of fate on the other. It is well known that Epicurus solved the difficulty in a way satisfactory to himself, by assigning to the atoms the power of declination. But for this power the world could never have come into existence, for otherwise the atoms could never have come into contact and produced the earth or the life upon it. It is the same power of spontaneous movement in the atoms of the soul which alone originates and renders possible the Free-will of man.... It is commonly thought,’ M. Guyau continues, ‘that Contingency, placed by Epicurus at the origin of things, existed, according to him, at the origin alone, and then disappeared in order again to leave room for necessity. The world once made, the machine once constructed, why should it not go on by itself without any need of invoking any other force than Necessity?’ (_Masson_, pp. 210-214).

Further quotation shows that M. Guyau thinks, in opposition to this common view, that Spontaneity is always and everywhere active. The objection that all production would then be of the nature of a miracle is rebutted by saying that the idea of miracles implies an agent outside the natural order; but here the agency is in the things whose sum is nature: moreover the effect produced by this spontaneity would be very slight. (Masson rightly points out that this is wrong: ‘the spontaneous movement of a mass of matter, however slight, might still be able to give the initial impulse required to let loose a mighty force.’)

The result of M. Guyau’s position is then that ‘the Free-will which man possesses will exist everywhere in inferior degrees, but always ready to awake and act.... The atoms which form our bodies must possess a power of Free-will analogous to our own, more or less extensive, more or less conscious, but real.’ The objections Masson makes to this, apart from sundry obvious misinterpretations of Lucretius,[116] are that it destroys the concept of Law in the universe which is so prominent a feature in both Epicurus and Lucretius, and assumes, what could not be proved from Epicurus, that masses of matter would have the same freedom that the atoms have.

The root of M. Guyau’s view is his opinion that ‘in Epicureanism there are no inconsistencies, but only a few false deductions.’ This cannot be allowed if it means that Epicurus consciously recognised both the fundamental difference of mind from matter and the necessity for a final re-unification. The great error which it appears to me that M. Guyau has committed is that he does not recognise the difference of the ancient and modern methods: he looks at the question himself from the standpoint of consciousness as most important, and so inverts the position of Epicurus. To this he was doubtless led by the famous passage[117] of Lucretius. If we now quote the remarks of Gassendi, we shall see how the matter presented itself to one who was less biased by modern points of view, and probably far nearer the truth.

‘Videtur itaque Epicurus ex eo saltem laudandus quod vel auctore ipso Plutarcho, nullum non movit lapidem ut libertatem arbitrii intemeratam tueretur: tametsi adversus Democritum non habuerit aliud paratius effugium quam declinationem illam atomorum, dictam Plutarcho ... _rem adeo exilem, ac tam vilis pretii_. Ecquonam porro modo potuit hocce qualecunque commentum Libertati accomodare? Forte, quatenus cum attenderet esse in animalibus et in hominibus praesertim, triplex genus motus, nempe Naturalem Violentum et Voluntarium seu Liberum, existimavit primariam causam petendam esse ex atomis, a quibus omnis motus principium. Quare et velle potuit radicem motus naturalis esse ipsum motum Primarium atomis ingenitum, eum scilicet qui dicitur gravitatis et ponderis et quo Atomus dicitur ad lineam sive perpendiculum ferri. Violenti vero motum Reflexionis seu illum qui est ex occursione, seu plaga ictuque alterius. Denique Voluntarii ipsum motum declinationis cui nulla regio determinata, nullum tempus praefixum est.... Verumtamen videtur fuisse excepturus Democritus nullatenus posse Epicurum commentatione hac adjuvari. Quoniam, cum hic declinationis motus tam sit naturalis atomisve congeneus, quam qui ad perpendiculum est (quippe quem non extrinsecus, sed a seipsis habeant) ideo tam fient omnia Fato, tametsi ille concedatur, quam si admissus non fuerit: cum pari semper necessitate ea quae eveniunt sint eventura pro varietate motuum, ictuum, repulsuum, clinaminum, etc., aeterna quadam serie et quasi catena sese consequentium: ac speciatim quidem quod ad cognitionem appetitionemque attinet, ad quam referri libertas debet. Etenim ut mens, sive animus eam libertatem explicet, qua appetit, v.c. Pomum, debet primo imago seu species visibilis pomi ex ipso procedere, trajectaque per oculos percellere mentem, ut illud cognoscat. Pomum autem, ut speciem in oculum transmitteret, debuit tali loco reponi ab eo, qui ex arbore ipsum collegisset, collectumve aliunde habuisset. Arbor vero praeter Solis radios, humoremque et terram, unde adolesceret, etiam granum habuit, unde nasceretur. Id granum fuit ex pomo alio, hocque ex alia arbore, huic non alio loco nec alio tempore sata: atque ita retrogrediendo ad usque mundi initium, quo et terra et terrena semina ortum habuere ex concursionibus complexionibusque atomorum, quae ut iis locis iisque modis convenirent, debuerunt exinde non aliunde accedere: et ut accederent, debuerunt aut ex inani aut ex alio sive uno sive multiplici Mundo ita advenire ut per illud sive in illo ac isto non alio modo fuerint: atque ita porro per totam antecedentem aeternitatem. Deinde, si animus quoque coaluit ex atomis, debuere necessario tales atomi contineri in parentum seminibus, debuere eo confluere ex certis cibis, aere, sole. Debuere hi cibi, non alii assumi: debuere ipsorum caeterae causae ex his illisque non aliis esse atque ita rursus ab aeterno tempore quod idem pari modo eveniet, quamcunque ex causis quasi lateralibus, et concomitantibus quae in immensum pene excrescunt, quovis modo assumpseris adeo ut cuicunque illarum ex tota serie te addixeris, deprehensus si retexendo, ipsam ea concatenatione teneri cum aliis ut ex tota serie ad tale usque momentum producta, necessum fuerit consequi huiusmodi appetitionem. Scilicet ex aeterno usque causae causis sic cohaeserunt ut postremae istae denique concurrerint, quibus positis mens non potuit non cognoscere et appetere pomum. Quodque de causis dicitur, idem semper est intelligendum de atomis, ex quibus conflantur et ex quarum motibus variis motiones derivant, propter quas sunt causae. Praetereo autem, quod Cicero videatur eodem respexisse.... Adhaec autem, ut aliquid ex ipsa Epicuri mente probabiliter respondeatur: assumendum est eam esse animorum contexturam ex atomis, ut quae in ea sunt declinantes, eam rigiditatem quae ex aliis est, flectant, naturamque flexibilem in omnem partem faciant: in quo sit radix libertatis. Quare et animum allectum cuiuspiam rei imagine, abripi quidem versus illam: sed non ita tamen quin, si aliunde imago alia occurrerit, allici ea rursus et abripi posset: adeo, ut a priore deflectens, constituatur quasi in bivio et ad utramque partem indifferens sit: quod sane est liberum esse. Quod animus autem, cum sit ita flexilis ac indifferens, sese ad unam potius partem quam ad aliam determinet, id oriri ex impressione unius imaginis vehementiore, quam alterius: sicque electionem sequi ad apprehensionem eius rei quam imago sive bonum sive meliorem exhibuerit. Denique animum, ubi quippiam elegit, aut voluit, esse quasi principem machinam, ex cuius motione, intercedentibusque spiritibus, qui per totum corpus discurrunt, facultates omnes, ac membra exsequendo destinata, excitentur eoque feratur quo tendit ipse animus. Facere huc possunt, quae canit Lucretius,

‘Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo, nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens. Nam dubio procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas principium dat: et heinc motus per membra vagantur.

‘Quo loco declinare est flectere ac dirigere motus: illudque nec tempore certo, etc., notat cum ipsam animi indifferentiam seu libertatem, quatenus animus ex se non ad ista potius quam ad illa fertur: tum varietatem rerum occasionum, imaginum, quae neque semper, neque eaedem neque eodem modo in eum incidunt ipsumque alliciunt.’

This is by no means an easy passage to comprehend, but if the mind of the reader can be cleared of all presuppositions, he will see that the following points are established:

(1) Epicurus is opposed to Democritus.

(2) His answer to Democritus is based on the idea of Declination.

(3) His position would not be overthrown by any objection urged by the supporter of Democritus to the effect that Declination is an original force, and therefore only one more form of determination.

(4) His own doctrine proves that the mind is capable of _any_ motion, and therefore up to the time it moves is wholly undetermined: it moves entirely in accordance with the laws of force, and is therefore free.

This last is the point at which it seems to me that our guides have led us astray. M. Guyau’s spontaneity surely means that the Will can and does act in wholly indeterminate ways, _i.e._ in ways which have no relation at all to the other co-existent forces. Masson argues that this is a breach of law, and therefore would not have been tolerated throughout Nature (M. Guyau having thought it universal), but is none the less valid of the mind: the ‘fatis avolsa potestas’ of Lucretius seems to have made him think Lucretius exempted the Will from determination, though surely Lucretius must have seen that one lawless element makes the whole lawless. Masson’s assumption seems to be that Law holds in Nature only: hence Guyau’s spontaneity in nature must be a fiction. But the animus which we labour to make free is also in Nature; and therefore its spontaneity is a fiction. Although Masson speaks of ‘the volition of the dead atoms,’ I think he has not really succeeded in putting himself entirely on the material side and looking at things in the way Lucretius did. If we can once begin to discuss freedom without reference to consciousness as the agent, if, that is, we can comprehend a freedom revealed to consciousness but not dependent on consciousness, we shall be on the right road.

Lucretius exactly formulates the position in the phrase ‘fatisque avolsa potestas.’ The apparent meaning of that is ‘a power plucked from the grip of Fate,’ _i.e._ saved from the inexorable laws. But that is just what it does _not_ mean: on the contrary, it means ‘saved from the Fates in order to be subject to law.’ The Fates denote here the power which overrules physical laws, which is therefore, from the point of view of Physics, an incommensurable quantity. Plato gives us this idea of Fate in the _Republic_, Bk. X., for there we see that the will of the individual is destined at one fell stroke to follow out the chosen course of a whole life-time. Now, express this in terms of Force. Two forces act on the body _A_: as a result it moves in direction _x_.

[Illustration:

_M_ _x_ ↑ ↗ | / | / _f_ | / | / | / ↓/ --------------> _N_ _A_ _f′_ ]

This is according to law: neither _f_ nor _f′_ produces the direction _x_ by itself—but both together produce a result which, given the factors involved, is always calculable. Now if _A_ moved in the direction _M_ or _N_, or any direction other than _x_, the reason for that movement could only be found in some determinant other than the given forces, _i.e._ in Fate. Fate, then, is the contrary of regular law-abiding action. Hence Gassendi says, ‘Explodenda Democriti sententia est ... illa Epicuri defendi quidem potest quatenus Fatum et Naturam naturaleisve causas res esse synonymas ducit.’ It was then by making Fate the same as Nature that Epicurus defended freedom! This seems paradoxical, but the difference lies just in this, that Democritus said Nature is Fate, and in any case we are bound hand and foot: Epicurus said Fate is nothing unless it is law, and the law is my nature, not something ‘extrinsecus,’ overruling me. So long, says Epicurus, as natural forces alone control action, I am free, for I am a real agent, and when I say, _I_ do this, there is no illusion: I take my place among the forces of the world and am content.

But if this is the opinion of Epicurus, what more do we want? Why does not Gassendi accept it? The answer is, that after all for _us_, as we now look at it, with God and the hereafter to keep in mind, this theory is useless. In it the future counts for nothing: the forces all act a tergo: the what-I-am-now alone counts: the future being, that which is not, cannot have any place in a theory that aims to be purely physical. As soon as Providence is assumed and its implications examined, as they had been in the literature of Christian philosophy, we get the idea of end, and the possibility of the consciousness of ends. Then the doctrine of Epicurus must be relegated to the sphere of the animals, from which it had been taken: the sphere that is of those beings that move and think, but do not move because of the thought.

Such is Gassendi’s view and my conception of its meaning. I add one or two remarks by way of elucidation for which Gassendi is not responsible. It might easily be said that Epicurus admitted the influence of _future_ happiness as determining present choice, and therefore must have gone beyond the sphere of physical action. To this there are two answers: (1) The thought of the future is a present thought, and therefore belongs, as active factor, to the forces which are now and here. This I think Epicurus would not have used. (2) The real answer lies in the point that it is Freedom of the Will we are discussing, not freedom of choice. Locke has put this point very well. ‘This then is evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing: liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. But if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty: so likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would’ (_Essay_, Bk. ii. ch. xxi. § 24). This latter clause exactly expresses the idea which Gassendi attributes to Epicurus. It is not a question of being free to choose, but of being able to do what one does choose. Freedom of choice belongs to Ratio: would any Greek talk of freedom of Reason? Certainly not an Epicurean: for him it is enough that the action begins from the man, the ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, the voluntas principium dat of Lucretius.

At the close of Gassendi’s exposition quoted above, we see that he says ‘the more vehement image or impression determines action, _i.e._ we always follow the better course.’ The words vehementior and melior come so close together that it seems impossible to suppose that Gassendi was not conscious of the transition. On the contrary, I think it is an intentional juxtaposition expressing his opinion that for Epicurus and Lucretius the better must always be the stronger: in which he was probably right. For his own theory this is a difficulty, and perhaps explains why he transfers the liberty from voluntas to Ratio, a procedure which is on the whole retrograde, and theological rather than philosophical. After the Pelagian controversy and the subtleties of posse non peccare and non posse peccare, the moral quality of volitions was a more important question than the efficiency of the will as a factor in a world of motions.

PART IV. GENERAL REVIEW