CHAPTER XV [p314]

THE MORALIST IN AN UNBELIEVING WORLD

1. _The Declaration of Ideals_

Of all the bewilderments of the present age none is greater than that of the conscientious and candid moralist himself. The very name of moralist seems to have become a term of disparagement and to suggest a somewhat pretentious and a somewhat stupid, perhaps even a somewhat hypocritical, meddler in other men’s lives. In the minds of very many in the modern generation moralists are set down as persons who, in the words of Dean Inge, fancy themselves attracted by God when they are really only repelled by man.

The disesteem into which moralists have fallen is an historical accident. It so happens that those who administered the affairs of the established churches have, by and large, failed utterly to comprehend how deep and how inexorable was the dissolution of the ancestral order. They imagined either that this change in human affairs was a kind of temporary corruption, or that, like the eighty propositions listed in the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, it could be regarded as due to “errors” of the human mind. There were, of course, churchmen who knew better, but on the whole those who prevailed in the great ecclesiastical [p315] establishments could not believe that the skepticism of mind and the freedom of action which modern men exercise were due to inexorable historic causes. They declined to acknowledge that modern freedom was not merely a wilful iconoclasm, but the liquidation of an older order of human life.

Because they could not comprehend the magnitude of the revolution in which they were involved, they set themselves the task of impeding its progress by chastising the rebels and refuting their rationalizations. This was described as a vindication of morals. The effect was to associate morality with the vindication of the habits and dispositions of those who were most thoroughly out of sympathy with the genuine needs of modern men.

The difficulties of the new age were much more urgent than those which the orthodox moralists were concerned with. The moralists insisted that conduct must conform to the established code; what really worried men was how to adjust their conduct to the novel circumstances which confronted them. When they discovered that those who professed to be moralists were continuing to deny that the novelty of modern things had any bearing upon human conduct, and that morality was a word signifying a return to usages which it was impossible to follow, even if it were desirable, there was a kind of tacit agreement to let the moralists be moral and to find other language in which to describe the difference between good and bad, right and wrong. Mr. Joad is not unrepresentative of this reaction into contempt when he speaks of “the dowagers, the aunts, the old maids, the parsons, the town councillors, the clerks, the members of vigilance committees and purity [p316] leagues, all those who are themselves too old to enjoy sex, too unattractive to obtain what they would wish to enjoy, or too respectable to prefer enjoyment to respectability.” Thus for many the name of moralist came to be very nearly synonymous with antipathy to the genius and the vitality of the modern age.

But it is idle for moralists to ascribe the decline of their influence to the perversity of their fellow creatures. The phenomenon is world-wide. Moreover, it is most intensely present at precisely those points where the effect of science and the machine technology have been most thoroughly manifested. The moralists are not confronted with a scandal but with history. They have to come to terms with a process in the life of mankind which is working upon the inner springs of being and altering inevitably the premises of conduct. They need not suppose that their pews are empty and that their exhortations are ignored because modern men are really as wilful as the manners of the younger generation lead them to conclude. Much of what appears to be a tough self-sufficiency is protective: it is a brittle crust covering depths of uncertainty. If the advice of moralists is ignored, it is not because this generation is too proud to listen, or unaware that it has anything to learn. On the contrary there is such curiosity and questioning as never before engaged so large a number of men. The audience to which a genuine moralist might speak is there. If it is inattentive when the orthodox moralist speaks, it is because he seems to speak irrelevantly.

The trouble with the moralists is in the moralists themselves: they have failed to understand their times. They [p317] think they are dealing with a generation that refuses to believe in ancient authority. They are, in fact, dealing with a generation that cannot believe in it. They think they are confronted with men who have an irrational preference for immorality, whereas the men and women about them are ridden by doubts because they do not know what they prefer, nor why. The moralists fancy that they are standing upon the rock of eternal truth, surveying the chaos about them. They are greatly mistaken. Nothing in the modern world is more chaotic—not its politics, its business, or its sexual relations—than the minds of orthodox moralists who suppose that the problem of morals is somehow to find a way of reinforcing the sanctions which are dissolving. How can we, they say in effect, find formulas and rhetoric potent enough to make men behave? How can we revive in them that love and fear of God, that sense of the creature’s dependence upon his creator, that obedience to the commands of a heavenly king, which once gave force and effect to the moral code?

They have misconceived the moral problem, and therefore they misconceive the function of the moralist. An authoritative code of morals has force and effect when it expresses the settled customs of a stable society: the pharisee can impose upon the minority only such conventions as the majority find appropriate and necessary. But when customs are unsettled, as they are in the modern world, by continual change in the circumstances of life, the pharisee is helpless. He cannot command with authority because his commands no longer imply the usages of the community: they express the prejudices of the moralist rather than the practices of men. When that [p318] happens, it is presumptuous to issue moral commandments, for in fact nobody has authority to command. It is useless to command when nobody has the disposition to obey. It is futile when nobody really knows exactly what to command. In such societies, wherever they have appeared among civilized men, the moralist has ceased to be an administrator of usages and has had to become an interpreter of human needs. For ages when custom is unsettled are necessarily ages of prophecy. The moralist cannot teach what is revealed; he must reveal what can be taught. He has to seek insight rather than to preach.

The disesteem into which moralists have fallen is due at bottom to their failure to see that in an age like this one the function of the moralist is not to exhort men to be good but to elucidate what the good is. The problem of sanctions is secondary. For sanctions cannot be artificially constructed: they are a product of agreement and usage. Where no agreement exists, where no usages are established, where ideals are not clarified and where conventions are not followed comfortably by the mass of men, there are not, and cannot be, sanctions. It is possible to command where most men are already obedient. But even the greatest general cannot discipline a whole army at once. It is only when the greater part of his army is with him that he can quell the mutiny of a faction.

The acids of modernity are dissolving the usages and the sanctions to which men once habitually conformed. It is therefore impossible for the moralist to command. He can only persuade. To persuade he must show that the course of conduct he advocates is not an arbitrary pattern [p319] to which vitality must submit, but that which vitality itself would choose if it were clearly understood. He must be able to show that goodness is victorious vitality and badness defeated vitality; that sin is the denial and virtue the fulfilment of the promise inherent in the purposes of men. The good, said the Greek moralist, is “that which all things aim at”; we may perhaps take this to mean that the good is that which men would wish to do if they knew what they were doing.

If the morality of the naive hedonist who blindly seeks the gratification of his instincts is irrational in that he trusts immature desire, disregards intelligence and damns the consequences, the morality of the pharisee is no less irrational. It reduces itself to the wholly arbitrary proposition that the best life for man would be some other kind of life than that which satisfies his nature. The true function of the moralist in an age when usage is unsettled is what Aristotle who lived in such an age described it to be: to promote good conduct by discovering and explaining the mark at which things aim. The moralist is irrelevant, if not meddlesome and dangerous, unless in his teaching he strives to give a true account, imaginatively conceived, of that which experience would show is desirable among the choices that are possible and necessary. If he is to be listened to, and if he is to deserve a hearing among his fellows, he must set himself this task which is so much humbler than to command and so much more difficult than to exhort: he must seek to anticipate and to supplement the insight of his fellow men into the problems of their adjustment to reality. He must find ways to make clear and ordered and expressive those concerns [p320] which are latent but overlaid and confused by their preoccupations and misunderstandings.

Could he do that with perfect lucidity he would not need to summon the police nor evoke the fear of hell: hell would be what it really is, and what in all inspired moralities it has always been understood to be, the very quality of evil itself. Nor would he find himself in the absurd predicament of seeming to argue that virtue is highly desirable but intensely unpleasant. It would not be necessary to praise goodness, for it would be that which men most ardently desired. Were the nature of good and evil really made plain by moralists, their teachings would appear to the modern listener not like exhortations from without, but as Keats said of poetry: “a wording of his own highest thoughts and ... almost a remembrance.”

2. _The Choice of a Way_

What modernity requires of the moralist is that he should see with an innocent eye how men must reform their wants in a world which is not concerned to make them happy. The problem, as I have tried to show, is not a new one. It has been faced and solved by the masters of wisdom. What is new is the scale on which the problem is presented—in that so many must face it now—and its radical character in that the organic bonds of custom and belief are dissolving. There ensues a continual necessity of adjusting their lives to complex novelty. In such a world simple customs are unsuitable and authoritative commandments incredible. No prescription can now be written which men can naively and obediently follow. They have, therefore, to reeducate their [p321] wants by an understanding of their own relation to a world which is unconcerned with their hopes and fears. From the moralists they can get only hypotheses—distillations of experience carefully examined—probabilities, that is to say, upon which they may begin to act, but which they themselves must constantly correct by their own insight.

It is difficult for the orthodox moralists to believe that amidst the ruins of authority men will ever learn to do this. They can point to the urban crowds and ask whether anyone supposes that such persons are capable of ordering their lives by so subtle an instrument as the human understanding. They can insist with unanswerable force that this is absurd: that the great mass of men must be guided by rules and moved by the symbols of hope and fear. And they can ask what there is in the conception of the moralist as I have outlined it which takes the character of the populace into account.

What I take into account first of all is the fact, which it seems to me is indisputable, that for the modern populace the old rules are becoming progressively unsuitable and the old symbols of hope and fear progressively unreal. I ascribe that to the inherent character of the modern ways of living. I conclude from this that if the populace must be led, if it must have easily comprehended rules, if it must have common symbols of hope and fear, the question is how are its leaders to be developed, rules to be worked out, symbols created. The ultimate question is not how the populace is to be ruled, but what the teachers are to think. That is the question that has to be settled first: it is the preface to everything else.

For while moralists are at sixes and sevens in their own [p322] souls, not much can be done about morality, however high or low may be our estimates of the popular intelligence and character. If it were necessary to assume that ideals are relevant only if they are universally attainable, it would be a waste of time to discuss them. For it is evident enough that many, if not most men, must fail to comprehend what modern morality implies. But to recognize this is not to prophesy that the world is doomed unless men perform the miracle of reverting to their ancestral tradition. This is not the first time in the history of mankind when a revolution in the affairs of men has produced chaos in the human spirit. The world can endure a good deal of chaos. It always has. The ideal inherent in any age is never realized completely: Greece, which we like to idealize as an oasis of rationality, was only in some respects Hellenic; the Ages of Faith were only somewhat Christian. The processes of nature and of society go on somehow none the less. Men are born and they live and die with some happiness and some sorrow though they neither envisage wholly nor nearly approximate the ideals they pursue.

But if civilization is to be coherent and confident it must be _known_ in that civilization what its ideals are. There must exist in the form of clearly available ideas an understanding of what the fulfilment of the promise of that civilization might mean, an imaginative conception of the good at which it might, and, if it is to flourish, at which it must aim. That knowledge, though no one has it perfectly, and though relatively few have it at all, is the principle of all order and certainty in the life of that people. By it they can clarify the practical conduct [p323] of life in some measure, and add immeasurably to its dignity.

To elucidate the ideals with which the modern world is pregnant is the original business of the moralist. Insofar as he succeeds in disentangling that which men think they believe from that which it is appropriate for them to believe, he is opening his mind to a true vision of the good life. The vision itself we can discern, only faintly, for we have as yet only the occasional and fragmentary testimony of sages and saints and heroes, dim anticipations here and there, a most imperfect science of human behavior, and our own obscure endeavor to make explicit and rational the stresses of the modern world within our own souls. But we can begin to see, I think, that the evidence converges upon the theory that what the sages have prophesied as high religion, what psychologists delineate as matured personality, and the disinterestedness which the Great Society requires for its practical fulfilment, are all of a piece, and are the basic elements of a modern morality. I think the truth lies in this theory.

If it does, experience will enrich and refine it, and what is now an abstract principle arrived at by intuition and dialectic will engender ideas that marshal, illuminate, and anticipate the subtle and intricate detail of our actual experience. That at least can be our belief. In the meantime, the modern moralist cannot expect soon to construct a systematic and harmonious moral edifice like that which St. Thomas Aquinas and Dante constructed to house the aspirations of the mediæval world. He is in a much earlier phase in the evolution of his world, in the phase of inquiry and prophecy rather than of ordering and harmonizing, [p324] and he is under the necessity of remaining close to the elements of experience in order to apprehend them freshly. He cannot, therefore, permit the old symbols of faith and the old formulations of right and wrong to prejudice his insight. Insofar as they contain wisdom for him or can become its vehicles, he will return to them. But he cannot return to them with honor or with sincerity until he has himself gone and drunk deeply at the sources of experience from which they originated.

Only when he has done that can he again in any honest sense take possession of the wisdom which he inherits. It requires wisdom to understand wisdom; the music is nothing if the audience is deaf. In the great moral systems and the great religions of mankind are embedded the record of how men have dealt with destiny, and only the thoughtless will argue that that record is obsolete and insignificant. But it is overlaid with much that is obsolete and for that reason it is undeciphered and inexpressive. The wisdom it contains has to be discovered anew before the old symbols will yield up their meaning. That is the only way in which Bacon’s aphorism can be fulfilled, that “a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion.” The depth in philosophy which can bring them about is a much deeper and more poignant experience than complacent churchmen suppose.

It can be no mere settling back into that from which men in the ardor of their youth escaped. This man and that may settle back, to be sure; he may cease to inquire though his questions are unanswered. But such conformity is sterile, and due to mere weariness of mind and [p325] body. The inquiry goes on because it has to go on, and while the vitality of our race is unimpaired, there will be men who feel with Mr. Whitehead that “to acquiesce in discrepancy is destructive of candor and of moral cleanliness,” and that “it belongs to the self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final unravelment.” The crisis in the religious loyalties of mankind cannot be resolved by weariness and good nature, or by the invention of little intellectual devices for straightening out the dilemmas of biology and Genesis, history and the Gospels with which so many churchmen busy themselves. Beneath these little conflicts there is a real dilemma which modern men cannot successfully evade. “Where is the way where light dwelleth?” They are compelled to choose consciously, clearly, and with full realization of what the choice implies, between religion as a system of cosmic government and religion as insight into a cleansed and matured personality: between God conceived as the master of that fate, creator, providence, and king, and God conceived as the highest good at which they might aim. For God is the supreme symbol in which man expresses his destiny, and if that symbol is confused, his life is confused.

Men have not, hitherto, had to make that choice, for the historic churches have sheltered both kinds of religious experience, and the same mysteries have been the symbols of both. That confusion is no longer benign because men are no longer unconscious of it. They are aware that it is a confusion, and they are stultified by it. Because the popular religion of supernatural governments is undermined, the symbols of religion do not provide clear channels [p326] for religious experience. They are choked with the debris of dead notions in which men are unable to believe and unwilling to disbelieve. The result is a frustration in the inner life which will persist as long as the leaders of thought speak of God in more senses than one, and thus render all faith invalid, insincere, and faltering.

3. _The Religion of the Spirit_

The choice is at last a personal one. The decision is rendered not by argument but by feeling. Those who believe that their salvation lies in obedience to, and communion with, the King of Creation can know how whole-hearted their faith is by the confidence of their own hearts. If they are at peace, they need inquire no further. There are, however, those who do not find a principle of order in the belief that they are related to a supernatural power. They cannot be argued into the ancient belief, for it has been dissolved by the circumstances of their lives. They are deeply perplexed. They have learned that the absence of belief is vacancy; they know, from disillusionment and anxiety, that there is no freedom in mere freedom. They must find, then, some other principle which will give coherence and direction to their lives.

If the argument in these pages is sound, they need not look for and, in fact, cannot hope for, some new and unexpected revelation. Since they are unable to find a principle of order in the authority of a will outside themselves, there is no place they can find it except in an ideal of the human personality. But they do not have to invent such an ideal out of hand. The ideal way of life for men who must make their own terms with experience and find [p327] their own happiness has been stated again and again. It is that only the regenerate, the disinterested, the mature, can make use of freedom. This is the central insight of the teachers of wisdom. We can see now, I think, that it is also the mark at which the modern study of human nature points. We can see, too, that it is the pattern of successful conduct in the most advanced phases of the development of modern civilization. The ideal, then, is an old one, but its confirmation and its practical pertinence are new. The world is able at last to take seriously what its greatest teachers have said. And since all things need a name, if they are to be talked about, devotion to this ideal may properly be called by the name which these greatest teachers gave it; it may be called the religion of the spirit. At the heart of it is the knowledge that the goal of human effort is to be able, in the words I have so often quoted from Confucius, to follow what the heart desires without transgressing what is right.

In an age when custom is dissolved and authority is broken, the religion of the spirit is not merely a possible way of life. In principle it is the only way which transcends the difficulties. It alone is perfectly neutral about the constitution of the universe, in that it has no expectation that the universe will justify naive desire. Therefore, the progress of science cannot upset it. Its indifference to what the facts may be is indeed the very spirit of scientific inquiry. A religion which rests upon particular conclusions in astronomy, biology, and history may be fatally injured by the discovery of new truths. But the religion of the spirit does not depend upon creeds and cosmologies; it has no vested interest in any particular truth. It is [p328] concerned not with the organization of matter, but with the quality of human desire.

It alone can endure the variety and complexity of things, for the religion of the spirit has no thesis to defend. It seeks excellence wherever it may appear, and finds it in anything which is inwardly understood; its motive is not acquisition but sympathy. Whatever is completely understood with sympathy for its own logic and purposes ceases to be external and stubborn and is wholly tamed. To understand is not only to pardon, but in the end to love. There is no itch in the religion of the spirit to make men good by bearing down upon them with righteousness and making them conform to a pattern. Its social principle is to live and let live. It has the only tolerable code of manners for a society in which men and women have become freely-moving individuals, no longer held in the grooves of custom by their ancestral ways. It is the only disposition of the soul which meets the moral difficulties of an anarchical age, for its principle is to civilize the passions, not by regulating them imperiously, but by transforming them with a mature understanding of their place in an adult environment. It is the only possible hygiene of the soul for men whose selves have become disjointed by the loss of their central certainties, because it counsels them to draw the sting of possessiveness out of their passions, and thus by removing anxiety to render them harmonious and serene.

The philosophy of the spirit is an almost exact reversal of the worldling’s philosophy. The ordinary man believes that he will be blessed if he is virtuous, and therefore virtue seems to him a price he pays now for a blessedness he [p329] will some day enjoy. While he is waiting for his reward, therefore, virtue seems to him drab, arbitrary, and meaningless. For the reward is deferred, and there is really no instant proof that virtue really leads to the happiness he has been promised. Because the reward is deferred, it too becomes vague and dubious, for that which we never experience, we cannot truly understand. In the realm of the spirit, blessedness is not deferred: there is no future which is more auspicious than the present; there are no compensations later for evils now. Evil is to be overcome now and happiness is to be achieved now, for the kingdom of God is within you. The life of the spirit is not a commercial transaction in which the profit has to be anticipated; it is a kind of experience which is inherently profitable.

And so the mature man would take the world as it comes, and within himself remain quite unperturbed. When he acted, he would know that he was only testing an hypothesis, and if he failed, he would know that he had made a mistake. He would be quite prepared for the discovery that he might make mistakes, for his intelligence would be disentangled from his hopes. The failure of his experiment could not, therefore, involve the failure of his life. For the aspect of life which implicated his soul would be his understanding of life, and, to the understanding, defeat is no less interesting than victory. It would be no effort, therefore, for him to be tolerant, and no annoyance to be skeptical. He would face pain with fortitude, for he would have put it away from the inner chambers of his soul. Fear would not haunt him, for he would be without compulsion to seize anything and without anxiety [p330] as to its fate. He would be strong, not with the strength of hard resolves, but because he was free of that tension which vain expectations beget. Would his life be uninteresting because he was disinterested? He would have the whole universe, rather than the prison of his own hopes and fears, for his habitation, and in imagination all possible forms of being. How could that be dull unless he brought the dullness with him? He might dwell with all beauty and all knowledge, and they are inexhaustible. Would he, then, dream idle dreams? Only if he chose to. For he might go quite simply about the business of the world, a good deal more effectively perhaps than the worldling, in that he did not place an absolute value upon it, and deceive himself. Would he be hopeful? Not if to be hopeful was to expect the world to submit rather soon to his vanity. Would he be hopeless? Hope is an expectation of favors to come, and he would take his delights here and now. Since nothing gnawed at his vitals, neither doubt nor ambition, nor frustration, nor fear, he would move easily through life. And so whether he saw the thing as comedy, or high tragedy, or plain farce, he would affirm that it is what it is, and that the wise man can enjoy it.

APPENDIX [p331]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At the suggestion of the publishers, the references which follow have been segregated in an appendix instead of being scattered as footnotes through the text. They felt, rightly enough, I think, that in a book of this character the purpose of the notes was to acknowledge indebtedness for the material cited rather than to support the argument, and that the reader would prefer not to have the text encumbered by the apparatus of a kind of scholarship to which the author makes no pretensions.

While these notes, except in a few instances, refer only to matter actually used in the text, they are also an approximate bibliography of the works which I have consulted. I wish I could adequately acknowledge the obligation I owe to my teachers, William James, George Santayana, and Graham Wallas, though that perhaps is self-evident. I should like to thank Miss Jane Mather and Miss Orrie Lashin for help in the preparation of the manuscript. I am under special obligation to my wife, Faye Lippmann, without whose assistance I could not have completed the book.

W. L.

New York City, January, 1929.

NOTES [p332]

[Transcriber’s note: a standard page of this book had 31 or 32 lines.]

PAGE LINE

4 32 Quoted in Irving Babbitt, _Rousseau and Romanticism_, p. 181.

5 4 John Herman Randall Jr., _The Making of the Modern Mind_, p. 118.

5 21 From _The City of Dreadful Night_, cited, Babbitt, op. cit., p. 332.

5 24 For discussion of this theme, cf. Babbitt, op. cit. passim.

5 29 Shelley, _Prometheus Unbound_, Act III, Scene IV.

6 12 From Byron, _The Island_, cited, Babbitt, op. cit., p. 186.

6 16 From T. H. Huxley, _Address on University Education_, delivered, 1876, at the formal opening of Johns Hopkins University. I am indebted to Mr. Henry Hazlitt for the quotation.

7 11 Cited, Babbitt, op. cit., p. 341.

7 20 Nietzsche, _Thus Spake Zarathustra_, LXIX, cited, Babbitt, op. cit., p. 261.

11 12 Cf. W. R. Inge, _The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought_.

11 19 W. C. Greene, Introduction to Selection from the _Dialogues of Plato_, p. xxiv.

13 27 Calvin, _Institutes_, Book IV, Chapter X, Paragraph 7, cited A. C. M’Giffert, _Protestant Thought Before Kant_, p. 90.

21 32 Harry Emerson Fosdick, _Adventurous Religion_, p. 59.

24 8 W. C. Brownell, Scribner’s Magazine, Vol. XXX, p. 112, cited in footnote, William James, _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 115.

24 25 William James, _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 518.

25 12 James, op. cit., p. 519.

26 7 Alfred North Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_, pp. 249–250.

27 12 Bertrand Russell, _A Free Man’s Worship_, in _Mysticism and Logic_, p. 54.

27 27 Kirsopp Lake, _The Religion of Yesterday and Tomorrow_.

30 2 W. R. Inge, _Science, Religion and Reality_, p. 388. [p333]

31 3 Cf. W. B. Riley, _The Faith of the Fundamentalists_, Times Current History, June, 1927.

34 18 _Fundamentalism and the Faith_, Commonweal, Aug. 19, 1925.

35 25 George Santayana, _Reason in Religion_, p. 97.

37 22 The material in this section is taken from Harry Emerson Fosdick, _The Modern Use of the Bible_.

40 2 Fosdick, op. cit., p. 83.

42 5 Fosdick, _The Desire for Immortality_, in _Adventurous Religion_.

44 10 W. R. Inge, _The Philosophy of Plotinus_, Vol. II, p. 166.

44 23 W. R. Inge, _The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought_.

47 30 Fosdick, _The Modern Use of the Bible_.

51 22 Cf. Rudolf Otto, _Chrysostom on the Inconceivable in God_, in _The Idea of the Holy_. Appendix I; cf. also the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, p. 452; cf. also William James, _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, Lecture III.

56 21 Lord Acton, inaugural _Lecture on the Study of History_, in _Lectures on Modern History_.

70 29 Otto Gierke, _Political Theories of the Middle Ages_— Translated by F. W. Maitland, p. 7.

71 14 From the Song of Roland, cited, Henry Adams, _Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres_, p. 29.

72 18 For an analysis of the texts on which this claim was based, cf. James T. Shotwell and Louise Ropes Loomis, _The See of Peter_.

73 18 Cited in A. C. M’Giffert, _Protestant Thought Before Kant_, p. 44.

74 7 For a comprehensive condemnation by the Holy See of modern opinions which undermine the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, see the Syllabus of Pius IX (1864) and the Syllabus of Pius X (1907). The Syllabus of 1864 lists and condemns eighty principal errors of our time, and is described by the Catholic Encyclopedia (Vol. XIV, p. 369) as opposition “to the high tide of that intellectual movement of the Nineteenth Century which strove to sweep away the foundations of all human and Divine order.” The Syllabus of 1907 condemns sixty-five propositions of the Modernists which would “destroy the foundations of all natural and supernatural knowledge.” (Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, [p334] p. 370.) It should be noted that there is difference of opinion among Catholic scholars as to the binding power of these two pronouncements, and also that their meaning is open to elaborate interpretation.

75 2 _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XIV, p. 766.

76 20 J. N. Figgis, _Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century_, Cambridge Modern History, Vol. III, p. 743.

79 4 Cf. J. N. Figgis, op. cit., p. 742.

80 20 For an able recent exposition by an American of this theory of absolutism, cf. Charles C. Marshall, _The Roman Catholic Church in the Modern State_.

85 24 Cited R. H. Tawney, _Religion and the Rise of Capitalism_, p. 44.

86 13 Cited Tawney, op. cit., p. 243.

98 6 The facts cited in this section are from: E. Mâle, _L’Art Religieux du XIIIeme Siècle en France_, and _L’Art Religieux de la Fin du Moyen-Age en France_. But cf. G. G. Coulton, _Art and the Reformation_.

102 28 _Prometheus Unbound_, cited A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_, p. 119.

104 23 R. H. Wilenski, _The Modern Movement in Art_, p. 5.

109 10 Cf. Diego Rivera, _The Revolution in Painting_, in Creative Art, Vol. IV, No. 1. “And there is absolutely no reason to be frightened because the subject is so essential. On the contrary, precisely because the subject is admitted as a prime necessity, the artist is absolutely free to create a thoroughly plastic form of art. The subject is to the painter what the rails are to a locomotive. He cannot do without it. In fact, when he refuses to seek or accept a subject, his own plastic methods and his own esthetic theories become his subject instead. And even if he escapes them, he himself becomes the subject of his work. He becomes nothing but an illustrator of his own state of mind, and in trying to liberate himself he falls into the worst form of slavery. That is the cause of all the boredom which emanates from so many of the large expositions of modern art, a fact testified to again and again by the most different temperaments.”

109 18 Bernard Berenson, _The Florentine Painters of the Renaissance_, p. 19.

111 4 Cf. R. H. Wilenski, _The Modern Movement in Art_, p. 119.

116 4 Cf. George Santayana, _Reason in Religion_, pp. 92 et seq. [p335]

119 28 Cf. _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. X, p. 342.

123 17 Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_, p. 257.

127 2 A. S. Eddington, _Stars and Atoms_, p. 121.

128 1 John Herman Randall Jr., _The Making of the Modern Mind_, p. 100.

128 9 _Epist. ad Can Grand_, cited in footnote to _Paradiso_ in the Temple Classics.

129 3 Cf. P. W. Bridgman, _The Logic of Modern Physics_, p. 45.

129 23 C. S. Peirce, _How to Make Our Ideas Clear in Chance, Love and Logic_, edited by Morris R. Cohen.

130 4 Bridgman, op. cit., p. 38.

135 2 Cited L. R. Farnell, _The Attributes of God_, p. 275.

137 31 Cf. M. C. Otto, _Natural Laws and Human Hopes_, pp. 32 et seq.

146 29 The _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XII, p. 345.

147 29 Cf. B. L. Manning, _The People’s Faith in the Time of Wyclif_.

148 3 Fosdick, _Adventurous Religion_, p. 85 et seq.

148 9 Santayana, _Reason in Religion_, p. 43.

148 17 L. R. Farnell, _The Attributes of God_, p. 15.

149 14 Manning, op. cit.

159 2 Herbert Asbury, _A Methodist Saint, The Life of Bishop Asbury_, p. 265.

160 20 Cf. _Encyclopedia Britannica_, “Asceticism.”

161 17 Cf. _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. I, p. 768.

162 5 Quoted in Irving Babbitt, _Rousseau and Romanticism_, p. 45.

162 19 _Rabelais_, Book II, Chapter 34.

163 6 Cited Henry Osborn Taylor, _Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century_, Vol. I, p. 330.

163 25 Babbitt, op. cit., p. 161.

163 28 Cf. Dora Russell, _The Right to be Happy_.

164 5 Cf. Bertrand Russell, _Political Ideals_.

165 17 T. W. Rhys Davids, _Buddhism_, p. 111.

166 22 _Ethics_, Book II, Chapter 9.

177 3 S. Freud, _Formulierung über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens_, 1911, Jahrb, Bd., I, s. 411.

177 10 S. Ferenczi, _Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality_, 1913. In _Contributions to Psychoanalysis_, translated by Dr. Ernest Jones.

192 13 Spinoza, _Ethics_, Part V, Prop. XLII.

192 23 Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, _Buddhism_, p. 110.

192 31 _Confucian Analects_, Book II, Chapter 4.

195 25 A. N. Whitehead, _Religion in the Making_, pp. 15–16. [p336]

196 20 _Analects_ VII, XX.

197 24 _Ethics_, Part V, Prop. XLII.

199 19 Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, _Buddhism_, p. 84.

199 30 C. Snouck Hurgronje, _Mohammedanism_, p. 82.

200 18 _Republic_, VI, 495, 504.

205 5 Cf. J. Burnet, _Philosophy_ in _The Legacy of Greece_, edited by R. W. Livingstone, p. 67.

218 9 Lucretius, _On the Nature of Things_, Book Third, Translation by H. A. J. Munro.

220 1 Spinoza, _Ethics_, Part V, Prop. III.

220 4 Id., Part V, Prop. VI.

224 28 Aristotle, _Ethics_, Book IV, Chapter III.

232 18 Oswald Spengler, _The Decline of the West_.

233 25 C. A. Beard, _Is Western Civilization in Peril?_ Harper’s Magazine, August, 1928.

234 17 H. G. Wells, _The Outline of History_, Vol. II, pp. 394–5.

235 30 A. N. Whitehead, _Science and the Modern World_, p. 4.

236 10 W. T. Sedgwick and H. W. Tyler, _A Short History of Science_, p. 269. Cf. Martha Ornstein, _The Role of Scientific Societies in the Seventeenth Century_.

237 7 J. B. Bury, _The Idea of Progress_, p. 330.

238 16 For a most illuminating description of the behavior of a great scientific investigator, cf. Claude Bernard, _An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine_.

238 26 Bertrand Russell, _Mysticism and Logic_, p. 42.

240 19 Cf. Graham Wallas, _Our Social Heritage_, Chapter I.

241 12 John Herman Randall Jr., _The Making of the Modern Mind_, p. 279.

242 24 Adam Smith, _The Wealth of Nations_, Book IV, Chapter 9.

245 4 Cited in R. H. Tawney, _Religion and the Rise of Capitalism_, p. 286.

265 19 Otto Gierke, _Political Theories of the Middle Age_, Translated by F. W. Maitland, p. 23.

266 9 Id., p. 88.

266 12 Cf. J. W. Garner, _Introduction to Political Science_, p. 92.

267 7 For a discussion of the concept of sovereignty in the modern world, cf. Otto Gierke, _Political Theories of the Middle Ages_; J. N. Figgis, _Churches in the Modern State_; Lord Acton, _History of Freedom and Other Essays_; H. J. Laski, _A Grammar of Politics_; Kung Chuan Hsiao, _Political Pluralism_.

274 11 William Hard, _Who’s Hoover?_ p. 193.

280 31 _Reflections on the French Revolution_, cf. Garner, op. cit., p. 112. [p337]

288 6 Genesis XXXVIII; cf. Harold Cox, _The Problem of Population_, pp. 208–211, for an interpretation of the story of Onan in the light of Deut. XXV, which shows that the crime of Onan was not the spilling of his seed, but a breach of Jewish tribal law in refusing “to perform the duty of a husband’s brother” with his brother’s widow.

289 1 Psalm 127, cf. Cox, op. cit.

289 9 The historical data are from A. M. Carr-Saunders, _The Population Problem_, Chapter I.

295 6 Havelock Ellis, _Love as an Art_, in Count Hermann Keyserling’s _The Book of Marriage_, p. 388.

295 21 Santayana, _The Life of Reason_, Vol. II, p. 10.

297 3 C. E. M. Joad, _Thrasymachus_, or _The Future of Morals_, pp. 54–55.

297 15 Havelock Ellis, _The Family_, in _Whither Mankind_, p. 216.

299 4 Quoted in Judge Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, _The Companionate Marriage_, p. 210.

302 18 Cf. Alfred Weber, _History of Philosophy_, p. 72.

304 24 _Love—Or the Life and Death of a Value_, Atlantic Monthly, August, 1928.

310 14 _Reason in Society_, p. 22.

313 6 W. R. Inge, _The Philosophy of Plotinus_, Vol. II, p. 161.

320 15 John Keats, Letters to John Taylor, Feb. 27, 1818—in _Oxford Book of English Prose_, No. 379.

INDEX [p339]

Absolute state, 80

Absolutism, 266

_Accademia dei Lincei_, 236

“Acids of modernity.” _See_ Modernity.

Acquisitive instinct, 250

Acton, Lord, 56

Adams, Henry, 71

Adeimantus, 160

Adultery, 89

“Agnostic,” 28, 77

Agnostics, 29, 54

Agnosticism, 34

Allegiance, 263, 265, 267, 268–269

Allegory, 37, 38–40

American farmer, 85, 276

Americanism, 61, 63, 274

American Philosophical Association, 236

Anabaptists, 15

Analysis, scientific, 107

Ananias, 95

Anarchy, moral, 209

Anne, St., 149

Anthropomorphism, 28, 148

Anti-evolution laws, 31

Antioch, 51, 52

Apostles, 58, 99, 120, 200

Aquinas, St. Thomas, 11, 68, 71, 100, 218, 323

Arcadia, 148, 162

Arians, 52

Aristocracy, 15

Aristophanes, 4

Aristotle, 26, 48, 127, 156, 157, 161, 166–167, 194, 224, 244, 319

Art, 112; Christian, 101; for art’s sake, 101, 104–105, 107

Artist, modern, 108–109

Artists and the Catholic Church, 98–101, 104

Asbury, Bishop, 158

Asbury, Herbert, 158

Asceticism, 155, 156–161, 191, 192, 204, 205

Astronomers, Newtonian, 123

Atheism, 28, 324

“Atheist,” 28, 29

Atheists, 6, 54, 194

Augsburg, Peace of, 79

Augustine, St., 37, 38, 69, 71, 73, 113, 196

Authority, 13, 14, 166, 202, 262, 272, 317, 326; divine, 135; ecclesiastical, 14–15, 35, 76, 93, 133, 236; moral, 9

Bacon, 324

Baxter, 86

Beard, Charles A., 233, 235

Beauty, religion of, 18

Beauvais, Vincent de, 99

Behavior, 171–172, 186

Behaviorism, 174, 177

Belief, childish, 185, 189, 190

Berenson, 109

Bergson, 107

Berlin Academy, 236

Besant, Mrs., 290

Betelguese, 169

Bible, 13, 23, 27, 34–35, 37, 38–39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47–48, 60, 78, 121, 131, 132, 162, 214, 288; epic of, 116, 117

Biblical world, 40

Bigotry, 190

Bill of Rights, 114

Biologists, 150–151, 325

Birth control, 93, 285, 287, 289–291, 292–293, 296–297, 298–299, 301, 305–306, 307

Bishop of Rome, 71

Bodin, Jean, 262

Bolshevism, 251–253, 254–255 [p340]

Bradlaugh, 290

Breuer, 220

Bridgman, Prof., 129

Broadway Temple, 88

Brownell, W. C., 24

Bryan, 77

Buddha, 46, 155, 156, 161, 165, 193, 194, 199, 200

Buffon, 241

Bunyan, John, 86

Bureaucracy, 249–250

Burke, Edmund, 280

Bury, Prof. John B., 236

Business, 231, 284; and the Catholic Church, 84–88; organized, 244; stabilization of, 256

Byron, 5, 6

Calles, 264, 265

Calvin, 13, 39, 73, 74, 135

Calvinism, 13

Canby, Henry Seidel, 17

Capitalism, 16, 85, 245, 247–248, 250–251; primitive, 251–252; rise of, 232, 245–246

Capitalists, 242; abolition of, 249–250; coercion of, 248–249

Capitalistic credo, 244–245

Caste, 199

Catholic Church, 7, 15, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 49, 58, 72, 73, 77, 81, 84–85, 86, 94, 98, 117, 120, 161, 205–206, 291

_Catholic Encyclopedia_, 51, 74

Catholicism, 11, 15, 35, 58, 78, 81, 86, 109

Catholics, 74, 76–77

Cause and effect, 181

Cecilia, St., 98–99

Certainty, feeling of, 19, 21, 322

Certainty, moral. _See_ Moral certainty.

Chateaubriand, 5

Chesterton, G. K., 56–57

Children and the churches, 91, 93

Christ, 13, 14, 23, 29–30, 33, 58, 74, 99, 205; _See also_ Jesus.

“Christ, athletes of,” 160

Christian capitalism, 87

_Christian Directory_, 86

Christian doctrine, 152, 163

Christian Fathers, 207

Christianity, 8–9, 11, 29–30, 32, 34, 55, 58, 205–206, 250; foundations of, 51

_Christianity and Liberalism_, 32

Christian socialism, 87

Chrysostom, St., 51–54

Church and state, 75, 79–80, 112

Church attendance, 48

Church councils, 58

Church of England, 266

Church of St. Urban, 98

_City of God_, 69, 71; _See also “Civitas Dei.”_

Civilization, cycle of, 232; modern, 4, 9, 62, 230, 233–234, 237, 240, 241, 265, 267, 271, 273, 300, 327; Roman, 233–234; technological, 233, 238, 240

Civil service, 271–272

Civil War, 66

_Civitas Dei_, 70; _See also “City of God.”_

Commercial enterprise, 86

Commonsense, religion of, 44, 45

_Commonweal_, 34

Communities, homogeneous, 270–271

Competition, 247; free, 244

Compulsions, old and new, 9–10

Comstock, Anthony, 156

Conceptions of God, 51; Eighteenth-Century, 55; Luther’s, 53; mediæval, 55, 71–72; Modernist, 55; Oriental, 55; St. Chrysostom’s, 52–53

Concepts, fixed, 171

_Conclusions to The Renaissance_, 106

Conduct, human, 145, 230, 284, 323

Conformity, 12, 324–325, 328

Confucius, 193, 196, 258, 327

Conventions, new, 12

Conversion, 192, 198

Council of Vienna, 87

Counter-Reformation, 94, 96

Courage, 222–223

Cox, Harold, 288 [p341]

Creation, 99; theory of, 11

Creative evolution, 18, 117, 131

Creator, dependence on, 69

Credulity, modern, 8–9

Creeds, profusion of, 110

_Critique of Pure Reason_, 136

Cults, modern, 9, 14, 125–126

Culture, theocratic, 164, 175, 221

Curia, 81

Curiosity, 129–130

Custom, 166, 167, 241, 327

Dante, 11, 68, 69, 128, 323

Darwin, 210

Darwinism, 125, 132, 174

Darrow, Clarence, 13

Davids, Rhys, 165

Decoding the Bible, 41, 47

Della Porta, 236

Democracy, 15, 264, 278

Desire, reform of, 201, 202, 282, 320–321

Desires, human, 145, 146, 165, 167–170, 172, 180, 182, 186, 190, 193, 206, 216, 310–311, 319

Destiny, human, 133, 184, 218, 324

Development, concept of, 171–172, 174, 191; industrial, 245–246, 252, 253–254, 255, 257, 258

_Dialogue of Dives and Pauper_, 147

Dictatorship, military, 253, 264

Disciplines, 202, 203, 205

Disillusionment, 17, 326

Disinterestedness, 204, 206, 209, 210, 221, 225, 230–231, 237, 238–239, 243, 258, 272, 281, 283, 311, 313, 323, 327, 330

Disorders, social, 191–192, 206

Disposition to believe, 143

_Divine Comedy_, 69, 128

Divine government, sense of, 72, 95, 194; theory of, 71–72, 82, 175

Divine right of kings, 79, 265

Divorce, 299, 308

Doge, 81

Dogma, 13, 96, 125, 133, 176, 244

Domain of religion, 82

Donne, John, 40

Doubt, freedom from, 16

Ecclesiastical establishments, 196, 201, 314–315

Eckhart, 196

Economic order, new, 86, 246–248

Eddington, Dr., 127

Eden, 37

Education, 175, 184, 191, 192, 198, 230

Eighteenth Century, 154, 174, 266, 289

_Élan vital_, 55

Eliot, T. S., 303

Ellis, Havelock, 293, 295–296, 297, 301, 305

Emancipation, 19; of women, 91–92

Emotions, 220

_Encyclopedia Britannica_, 289

England, 253–254, 272, 273

Environment, 145, 172, 180, 181, 184, 189, 190, 247, 250

Epistles of St. Paul, 44

Erasmus, 196

_Essay on Population_, 289

Estheticism, 105, 107

Ethical codes, 49, 165

_Ethics_, 166

Evil, problem of, 145, 156, 213, 214, 216–217, 218, 329; sense of, 188, 189, 218–219

Evils, social, 243

Evolution, 60, 117, 122, 125, 132, 171, 210, 231; _See also_ Creative evolution.

Excommunication, 76

Executives, modern business, 256–257

Exhibition of London, 236–237

Existence, 108, 117, 123

Exodus, 27, 118

Experience, Christian, 33; esthetic, 106; lessons of, 181, 182, 183, 186, 188, 189, 192, 195, 227; scientific, 220

Faith, age of, 83, 322; questions of, 77 [p342]

Fallacy, 167, 168

Family, 88, 91–92, 93

Fanaticism, 271

Faraday, 240

Fascism, 251–253, 254

_Faust_, 116

Federal Council of Churches of Christ, 87

Ferenczi, Dr. S., 177–179

Fetich worship, 160

Feudal system, 85–86, 242, 252, 253, 263, 266–267

Figgis, Dr., 76, 81

Fildes, Mrs., 289–290

Flaubert, 7

Ford, Henry, 64

Fornication, 89

Fosdick, Rev. Harry Emerson, 21–22, 40, 41, 42, 45–46, 47, 97, 147–148

Fourth Gospel, 11, 44, 194

Francis, St., 69, 113

Franklin, Benjamin, 236

Freedom, 17, 136, 242, 262, 315, 326, 327; religious, 75

French Academy of Sciences, 236

Freud, 107, 157, 176, 177, 179, 220

_Fruits of Philosophy_, 290

Fundamentalism, 30–31, 34–35, 64

Fundamentalists, 31, 33–34, 51, 60, 77

Galileo, 123–124, 236

Gargantua, 162–163

Genesis, 27, 38, 131, 132, 325

Geneva, 74

Genteel, cult of, 155

Gentleman, ideal of, 167

Germany, 254, 272

_Gestalt-theorie_, 174, 177

Gierke, 70

Giotto, 109

Gnostics, 52

God, attributes of, 213–214, 215–216

Gods, Greek, 10, 302

Godlessness, 194

Gods, popular. _See_ Theology, popular.

Golden Age, 151

Golden mean, 166–167, 180

Good and evil, 135, 137, 153, 168, 170, 172, 214–215, 320

“Good life,” 156, 172, 191, 202, 319, 323

Good Samaritan, 37

Gospels, 37, 44, 206, 325

Government, 231, 275–276, 278–279

Grace, meaning of, 58; religion of, 12

Greek Church, 51

Hammurabi, code of, 136

Happiness, pursuit of, 4, 153, 166, 198, 328–329

Heaven, Christian, 146

Hedonism, 301–302, 304, 319

Hegesias, 302

Hellenism, 322

Hemingway, Ernest, 303

Hera, 148

_Heretics_, 56

Heroism, 156

Hertz, 240

Heterodoxy, 12, 62

Hierarchies, 92, 263, 265, 268

Higher Criticism, 40

“Higher sense,” 11

High religion, 193, 203–204, 207, 208, 230, 239; function of, 193; insight of, 207–208, 209, 230, 239, 251

Hildebrand, 58

Historians, philosophic, 232

Historical scholarship, 157

History, 143, 157

Hobbes, 266

Holy Land, 149

Holy See, 73, 74

Homer, 10, 43

Hooker, Richard, 266

Hoover, 273–274

Hope and fear, 321, 330

Hosea, 12

Human development, 177, 234

Humanism, 137–139, 143–144, 164, 166, 167, 172, 175, 196, 221

Humanity, religion of, 18 [p343]

Human nature, 157, 161, 164, 165, 169, 171–172, 173, 175–176, 183–184, 207, 227, 306, 327

Huss, 73

Huxley, Aldous, 303

Huxley, Thomas Henry, 6

Iconoclasm, 17, 96, 315

Iconoclasts, 15, 302

Idealism, debacle of, 17

Ideals, foundation of, 133, 224, 323; succession of, 111

Ideas, crystallization of, 20

Idols, smashing of, 15, 16

Illusions, 8, 189, 232

Immortality, 11, 41–43, 45, 122, 180, 188

Impersonal, worship of the, 44

Impulses, 165–166, 168, 169, 192, 222, 224, 227, 306

Industry, ideals of, 258–259; modern, 248, 251, 255–256, 260, 273–274, 288

Inertia, human, 208, 227

Infallibility, 81

Infantilism, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189–190, 191

Inferno, 146

Inge, Dean, 28, 29–30, 42, 44, 46, 196, 313, 314

Inquiry, disinterested, 132; freedom of, 126

Inquisition, 123–124, 161

Inspiration, 13, 46

Intelligence, 186; machinery of, 64

Interests, diversification of, 267–268, 269–270, 274, 328

Internal life, 152, 195, 196

Invention of invention, 235

Inventions, mechanical, 234–235

Irreligion, modern, 12, 53–54

Isaiah, 12

Italy, 251–253, 272

James I, 79

James, William, 18, 24–26

Jefferson, 15

Jehovah, 12, 214, 288; _See also_ Yahveh.

Jerome, St., 161

Jesus, 12, 46, 99, 119, 155, 193, 199, 200; _See also_ Christ.

Jews, 52

Joad, C. E. M., 296, 297, 315–316

Job, 213–216

Job, Book of, 214, 216

John, Gospel of. _See_ Fourth Gospel.

John, St., 99

Joyce, James, 303

Judaism, 12

Judgment, private, 15, 34

Kant, Immanuel, 136–137

Keats, 320

Kelvin, Lord, 129

Keynes, Maynard, 245, 258

Knowledge, limitations of, 202

Knowlton, 290

Knox, 73

Krutch, Joseph Wood, 302–303, 304

Ku Klux Klan, 31

Labor, organized, 244

_Laissez-faire_, 242, 244, 250, 252

Lake, Kirsopp, 27–29

Lamarckism, 125

“Land of heart’s desire,” 151–152

Last Judgment, 99

Law enforcement, 277–278

Law, international, 265–266

Lawrence, D. H., 303

Leadership, mass, 274–275

Legislation, modern, 275–276, 279

Lent, 1492, 38

Leviticus, 37

Lewis, Sinclair, 16

Liberalism, 6, 152

Liberals, Protestant, 34; religious, 21, 33

Liberty, natural, 243, 244–246, 258

Life, art of, 175, 326–327; mediæval view of, 154, 323; wisdom of, 156, 330

Lindbergh, Col. Charles A., 222–223 [p344]

Lindsey, Judge, 298, 307

Locke, 266

Love, art of, 293, 295, 301, 303, 305, 308–309; value of, 302–304, 306, 310

Lowell Lectures, 25

Loyalty, 261–263, 268–269, 272, 325

Lucretius, 218

Luther, 13, 14–15, 39, 53–54, 73–74, 79, 196

Lutheran Church, 13

Lutherans, 77

Machen, Prof. J. Gresham, 32, 33–34

Machine process, 246, 253–254, 274

Machine technology, 242–243, 247, 251, 252, 254, 257, 258–259, 274, 284, 316

Mâle, 100, 101

Malthus, 289

Manichæans, 52

Man, nature of, 152, 243

Manner of life, 235

Markets, 246–247

Marriage, 89, 286, 288, 289, 291, 309, 310–311, 312; companionate, 298, 307

Marxianism, 16

Mary, St. _See_ Virgin Mary.

Masses, 148–149, 278

Matriarchal societies, 91

Maturity, 174–175, 176–177, 179–180, 183–184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191–192, 204, 209, 225, 230, 237, 239, 313, 323, 325, 327, 328–329

Maxwell, 240

Mazzini, 18

Meaning of things, 183

Mechanism, 125, 128, 130–131

Medical progress, 218

Melanchthon, 79

Mencken, H. L., 13, 16

Mendel’s law, 231

Messianic Kingdom, 11

Methodism, 6; American, 158

Mexico, 253, 265

Middle Ages, 70–72, 73, 94, 129, 131, 161, 265, 266

Mill, James, 289

Milton, 74, 266

Minority, recalcitrant, 279

Miracles, 118, 119–120

Mississippi flood, 273–274

Modernism, 18, 32, 33, 59, 77, 117, 217

Modernists, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 42, 51

Modernity, 5, 8, 14, 15, 19, 56, 68, 96, 105, 110, 112, 143, 158, 196–197, 208, 229, 251, 284, 316, 318, 320, 321

Modern man, 4, 8–10, 12, 19, 21, 24, 40, 41, 51, 54, 57, 59, 94, 111, 112, 113, 114, 152, 153, 158, 161, 194, 203, 227–228, 315, 316

Modern men. _See_ Modern man.

_Modern Movement in Art, The_, 104

Modern spirit, 36, 110, 143

Modern state, 260, 262–263, 267, 272–273, 275, 279, 311

Modern world, 14, 19, 20, 268–269, 270, 300, 311, 322–324

Mohammed, 145

Mohammedanism, 199

Monasticism, 204–206

Montaigne, 48, 175, 196

Moral certainty, 9–10, 15, 115

Moral codes, 3, 49, 135, 167, 170, 171, 201, 208–209, 226, 228, 272, 317, 319

Moral confusion, 155, 228, 230

Moral effect, 179–180

Moral effort, 175

Moral guidance, 14, 205

Moral insight, 227–228, 229

Moralists, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173, 208–209, 225, 244, 300, 314–315, 316–319, 320–321, 323

Morality, 114–115, 117, 136, 137–139, 145; divine, 49–50; sanctions of, 78, 166, 176, 228; theistic, 138; _See also_ Morals.

Moral law, 46, 48, 191, 233 [p345]

Moral philosophies, 156

Moral problem, 134, 166, 168, 192, 229, 312, 317

Morals, 17, 112, 151, 157, 192, 208, 210, 227–228, 229, 241, 322; _See also_ Morality.

Moral values, 106

Morris, William, 5, 244

Mortality, 188, 191

Mosaic law, 136

Moses, 49

Moving pictures, 6

Music, 182

Musset, Alfred de, 163

Mystics, 147, 196

Nain, 119

Naples, 236

Nationalism, 63–64, 232

Natural goodness, 163

Natural man, 19, 162, 163, 241

Natural selection, 18, 150

Nature and science, 241

Nature, laws of, 117, 122, 125, 150, 165, 195; religion of, 18

Necessity, experience of, 187

Need to believe, 125, 203

Neo-Malthusianism, 289–290

Neo-Platonism, Christian, 28

Neo-Platonists, modern, 11

New Jerusalem, 115, 116

Newspapers, popular, 6, 64–65

New York, 66, 271, 273

Nicæa, Second Council of, 98, 100, 101

Nietzsche, 7, 157

Nietzscheanism, 16

Nineteenth Century, 5, 16, 18, 174, 288, 309

Nirvana, 145, 165, 199

Noah’s Ark, 38

Noguchi, 223

Non-sectarianism, 77–78

Novels, autobiographical, 113

Objectivity, 132

Obregon, Gen., 264

Old Testament, 55, 214

Onan, 288

Order, ancestral, 68, 153, 207, 208, 228, 267, 314, 322; cosmic, 8, 195, 202, 216; industrial, 242

Origen, 11, 28, 29, 37, 39, 196

Original sin, 198

“Orthodox,” 57, 122

Orthodoxy, 10, 11, 12, 19–20, 32, 35, 194, 216

“Overbeliefs,” 24

Pach, Walter, 95

Pagans, 52

Painting, religious, 94–96, 97–98

Pantagruelists, 162

Pantheism, 117–118

Paradise, 128, 145, 146

_Paradise Lost_, 116

Parenthood, 292–294, 301, 305

Paris, 111, 223

Passions, harmony of, 198, 206, 208

_Pater_, 149

Pater, Walter, 106–107

Patriotism, 18, 78, 82

Paul, St., 12–13, 50, 52, 58, 90, 99, 155, 161

Peace of mind, 7–8

Peirce, Charles S., 129

Periclean Age, 11, 232

Personality, persistence of, 42

Peter, St., 72, 74, 99, 146

Petrarch, 5

_Phædo_, 159

Pharisees, 12, 317, 319

Philistines, 104

Philosophers, Greek, 10, 159, 233, 235–236

Philosophy, 324; industrial, 243, 260; modern, 157, 158; political, 260

Physicists, 102, 124, 129

Physics, 143, 157, 174, 241

_Pilgrim’s Progress, The_, 200

Place, Francis, 289

Plato, 10, 48, 156, 159, 161, 200, 289

Platonic tradition, 28

Platonism, 43

Platonists, 42–43, 196

Pleasure and pain, 177, 179, 302 [p346]

Plot, John, 149

Plotinus, 155

Political conduct, 264–265, 284

Political machine, 264

Politician, the, 279–282

Pope, the, 13, 15, 72, 79, 81, 85, 265, 270–271

Pope Innocent IV, 85

Pope Paul V, 81

Pope Pius IX, 75

Population, growth of, 289–291

Post-Darwinians, 18

Pragmatism, 119

Prayer, 146–149

Pre-machine age, 253

Presbyterians, 79

Priesthood, 73

Primitive peoples, 159

Procreation, 166

Progress, religion of, 18

Prohibition, 31, 277

Propaganda, 281

Prophet, artist as, 101–102, 103, 104

Prophets, 12

Protestantism, 15, 30, 32, 34, 52, 77, 86

Protestants, 34–35

Pseudo-religions, 125

Psychiatry, 158, 159

Psychoanalysis, 6, 125, 174, 177, 179, 220

Psychology, 143, 171, 172, 173, 174, 220; abnormal, 171; folk, 171; popular, 114; scientific, 173, 176

Public interest, 257–258

Public opinion, 167

Public schools, 76–77

Public utilities, regulation of, 254–255

Purgatory, 146

Puritanism, 154, 302

Purpose, cosmic, 9

Pythagoras, 204–205

Rabelais, 161, 162–163

Randall, Dr., 127–128

Rationalists, 24–25

Rationalization, 39

Reality, 177, 179, 180, 193, 216, 272, 312, 319

Reason and faith, 51, 121

Rebellion, 16–17, 19, 190

Rebels, 15–18, 19

Reconstruction, essays in, 14

Redemption, 11, 115

Reformation, 13, 72–73, 94, 154

Reformers, Eighteenth-Century, 15; Protestant, 34, 39, 40, 73, 96

Relative motion, 124

Religion, 8, 10, 17, 18–19, 23, 112, 123, 131, 284, 324; aristocracy in, 197, 200, 202, 203; need of, 123; of the spirit, 44, 46, 196–197, 203, 205–206, 327–328; popular, 14, 32–33, 47, 50, 69, 91, 94, 127, 131–132, 143, 145, 176, 194, 195–196, 201, 202, 208, 216, 227, 232, 244, 325 (_See also_ Theology, popular); traditional, 122, 124, 203

Religious experience, 33, 90–91, 125, 325–326

Religious synthesis, 111, 124

Religious thought, 96

Religious wars, 74

Religious writing, 97

Renaissance, 94–95, 161; High, 154

Renan, 7

Renunciation, 45, 156, 157, 191, 192, 206

_Republic_, 159–160

Revelation, 124, 126, 127, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143, 318, 326; logic of, 121; sense of, 13

Revivals, 14

Revolution, French, 289; industrial, 210, 248; mechanical, 19, 234, 236, 241, 248, 289; Russian, 250–251; spiritual, 133–134

Rewards and punishments, 201, 202, 213

Riggs, Father, 34

Righteousness, sense of, 16

Right of revolution, 82

Right to believe, 25

Rights of men, 242, 267

Roland, 71 [p347]

Roman Catholic Church. _See_ Catholic Church.

Roman Empire, 58, 205

Romantics, 18, 26, 154

Rome, 149, 236

Rousseau, 154, 266

Royal Society of London, 236

Ruskin, 244

Russell, Bertrand, 27, 114, 157, 238, 298–299, 308

Russell, Dora, 163

Russia, 250–253, 272, 273

Sages, teaching of, 198, 200, 210, 239

Saintliness, 156

Salvation, 75, 88, 147, 195–197, 198, 201, 313

Santayana, George, 19, 35, 36, 43, 68, 145, 148, 182, 310, 311

Sargent, John, 95

Savonarola, 37

Schoolmen, 127, 129

Science, 10, 18, 19, 112, 120, 123, 153, 176, 205; and religion, 123–124, 132–133; concepts in, 102–103, 107, 122; Greek, 210; logic of, 121; mediæval, 128; method of, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 157, 239; modern, 127, 128, 236–237, 239, 316; popular, 127; pure, 237–238, 239

_Science and the Modern World_, 123

Scientific discipline, 239–240, 241

Scientific explanation, 130, 131

Scientific hypotheses, 125, 126–127

Scientific inquiry, 35, 123, 236

Scientific materialism, 131

Scientific method. _See_ Science, method of.

Scientific research, 236–237, 238

Scientific spirit, 240, 327

Scientific theory, 133, 209

Scribes, 12

Scriptures. _See_ Bible.

Self-discipline, 45, 196–197, 198

Serenity, 7–8

Sex, 284–285, 288, 299–300, 306, 308; and religion, 89–90

Sexual conventions, 299–300, 301, 307–308

Sexual ideal, 93–94, 293, 301, 305–306, 307

Sexuality, 150, 165–166, 303–304

Sexual relations, 231, 284–287, 288–289, 291–292, 295–296, 297, 299, 308, 312

Shaw, George Bernard, 18, 48, 156

Shelley, 5–6, 102

Simeon Stylites, St., 158

Sinai, 136, 227

Smith, Adam, 242, 243, 245

“Social compact,” 266–267

Socialism, 249–250, 258

Socialists, 249, 250, 252

Social system, American, 65–67, 273–274

Society, 19, 190, 206, 207, 241, 250, 266, 276, 284, 322; opinion of, 134

Socrates, 10, 11, 155, 159, 160, 161, 219, 220

Song of Solomon, 38

Sophists, 219, 220

Sophisticated violence, 64

Soul, 114, 196

Sovereignty, conception of, 265, 267

Space, sense of, 180

Species, propagation of, 150

Speculation, philosophic, 233

Spengler, 62, 232

Spinoza, 155, 156, 161, 192, 193, 194, 197, 216, 219, 220, 266

Spirituality, 154, 197, 204, 329–330

Staël, Madame de, 162

Statesman, the, 279–283

Steele, Richard, 86

Stimuli, 182

Stoddard, Lothrop, 64

Suffering, irrational, 213

_Summa_, 100

Supernatural kingdom, 143, 325–326

Superstition, 218

Survival of the fittest, 150

Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, 314

Symbolism, 34, 45, 68, 100, 325 [p348]

Tabu, 160

Tamar, 288

Tariff, 276–277

Ten Commandments, 78

Tennessee, 77

Theism, 136, 137

Theocracy, 194, 195, 197, 203, 227, 228

Theodorus of Cyrene, 301–302

Theology, Catholic, 51, 119; popular, 10–11, 23 (_see also_ Religion, popular)

Thirteenth Century, 11

Thomas à Kempis, 113

Thomson, James, 5

Thought, contemporary, 194; scientific, 125, 235

Time, sense of, 181

Toleration, 74–77, 123

Totemism, 160

Towns, rise of, 19, 232

_Tradesman’s Calling, The_, 86

Traditions, religious, 61–62, 96, 97

Transubstantiation, 58

Trent, Council of, 14, 100–101

Trinity, 70

_True Law of Free Monarchy_, 79

“Truth, the,” 129

_Unam sanctam_, 81

Unbelief, 3–20, 28, 228, 229, 326

Understanding, 181–183, 191, 206, 321, 329

Uneasiness, modern, 14

United States, 253–254, 272, 274, 276, 277–278

Universe, 8, 128, 129, 145

Usury, 84, 85, 86, 87

Utopia, 151

Valerian, 98–99

Values, transvaluation of, 16, 181

Versailles, Court of, 95

Vicegerent of God, 72

Victoria, Queen, 155, 302

View of life, traditional, 109

Villers, 162

Virgin Mary, 96, 99, 115, 149

Virtue, 166, 192, 221–225, 226–227, 228–229, 320, 329; conception of, 226, 318, 319, 324

Voltaire, 16, 197

Wallas, Graham, 240

Walter Reed Hospital, 223

Walwayn, Thomas, 149

War, abolition of, 232

Watt, James, 234, 236

_Wealth of Nations_, 242

Wells, H. G., 233–234

West, Lady Alice, 148–149

Whitehead, Alfred North, 25–27, 123–124, 195, 236, 325

Wilenski, R. H., 104, 111

Will, human, 195

Will of God, 10, 195

Will to believe, 25, 53

Wisdom, 185–186, 198–199, 201, 226–228, 229, 244, 320, 324

Woman, economic independence of, 93

Women, chastity of, 286–288, 291

Wordsworth, 5, 18, 180

World, character of, 186

World’s Christian Fundamentalist Association, 30, 31

World War, 17, 253, 272–273

Wyclif, 37, 73

Wynne, Father, 146

Yahveh, 55, 214. _See also_ Jehovah.