Part 2

Let us examine separately these different motives; and first, attentively considering the union of private with public interest, let us see if this union is real, and if we can deduce from such a principle any moral instruction truly efficacious.

Society is very far from being a perfect work; we ought not to consider as an harmonious composition the different relations of which we are witnesses, and particularly the habitual contrast of power and weakness, of slavery and authority, riches and poverty, of luxury and misery; so much inequality; such a motly piece could not form an edifice respectable for the justness of its proportions.

Civil and political order is not then excellent by its nature, and we cannot perceive its agreement, till we have deeply studied, and formed to ourselves those reflections which legislators had to make, and the difficulties that they had to surmount. It is then only, with the assistance of the most attentive meditation, that we discover how those particular relations, which are established by social laws, form, nevertheless, that system of equilibrium, which is most proper to bind together an immense diversity of interests; but a great obstacle to the influence of political morality is, the necessity of giving, for the basis of the love of order, an abstract and complicated idea. What effect on vulgar minds would the scientific harmony of the whole have, opposed daily to the sentiment of injustice and inequality, which arises from the aspect of every part of the social constitution, when we acquire the knowledge of it, in a manner solitary and circumscribed; and how limited is the number of those, who can continually draw together all the scattered links of this vast chain!

It could not be avoided, in the best regulated societies, that some should enjoy, without labour or difficulty, all the conveniencies of life; and that others, and far the greater number, should be obliged to earn, by the sweat of their brow, a subsistence the most scanty, and a recompense the most confined. It is not to be prevented, that some will find, when oppressed by sickness, all the assistance which officious tenderness and skill can afford; whilst others are reduced to partake, in public hospitals, the bare relief that humanity has provided for the indigent. We cannot prevent some from being in a situation to lavish on their families all the advantages of a complete education; whilst others, impatient to free themselves from a charge so heavy, are constrained to watch eagerly for the first appearance of natural strength, to make their children apply to some profitable labour. In short, we cannot avoid perpetually contrasting the splendour of magnificence with the tatters which misery displays. Such are the effects, inseparable from the laws, respecting property. These are truths, the principles of which I have had occasion to discuss in the work which I composed on administration and political œconomy; but I ought to repeat them here, since they are found closely connected with other general views. The eminent power of property is one of the social institutions, the influence of which has the greatest extent; this consideration was applicable to the commerce of grain; it ought to be present to the mind, in disquisitions on the duties of administration; and it is still more important, when the question is to be examined, what kind of moral instruction may be proper for mankind?

In effect, if it appertains to the essence of the laws of right, constantly to introduce and maintain an immense disparity in the distribution of property; were it an essential part of these laws, to reduce the most numerous class of citizens, to that which is simply the most necessary; the inevitable result of such a constitution would be, to nourish, amongst men, a sentiment of habitual envy and jealousy. Vainly would you demonstrate, that these laws are the only ones capable of exciting labour, animating industry, preventing disorder, and opposing obstacles to arbitrary acts of authority; all these considerations sufficient, we grant, to fix the opinion and the will of the legislator, would not strike in the same manner the man thrown on the earth, without property, without resources, and without hopes; and he will never render free homage to the beauty of the whole, when there is nothing for him but deformity, abjectness, and contempt.

Men, in most of their political reasonings, are deceived by resemblances and analogies: the interest of society is certainly composed of the interests of all its members; but it does not follow from this explication, that there is an immediate and constant correspondence between the general and private interest; such an approximation, could only be applicable to an imaginary social state; and which we might represent as divided into many parts, of which the rich would be the head, and the poor the feet and hands: but political society is not one and the same body, except under certain relations, whilst, relatively to other interests, it partakes in as many ramifications of them as there are individuals.

Those considerations, to which we annex an idea of general interest, would be very often susceptible of numberless observations; but the principles, we are accustomed to receive and transmit, in their most common acceptation; and we discover not the mixt ideas which compose them, but at the moment when we analyze the principles, in order to draw consequences from them, in like manner as we perceive not the variety of colours in a ray of light, till the moment we divide them by means of a prism.

The formation of social laws, with reason, ought to appear one of our most admirable conceptions; but this system is not so united in all its parts, that a striking disorder would always be the necessary effect of some irregular movement: thus the man, who violates the laws, does not quickly discover the relation of his actions with the interest of society; but at the instant enjoys, or thinks to joy, the fruit of his usurpations.

Should a theatre be on fire, it is certainly the interest of the assembly that every one go out with order; but if the people, most distant from the entrance, believed they should be able to escape sooner from the danger, by forcing their way through the crowd which surrounds them, they would assuredly determine on this violence, unless a coercive power prevented them; yet the common utility of restricting ourselves to order in such circumstances, would appear an idea more simple, and more distinct, than is the universal importance of maintaining civil order in society.

The only natural defence of this order, is government; its function obliges it ever to consider the whole; but the need which it has of power to carry its decrees into execution, proves evidently, that it is the adversary of many, even when acting in the name of all.

We are then under a great illusion, if we hope to be able to found morality on the connection of private interest with that of the public; and if we imagine, that the empire of social laws can be separated from the support of religion. The authority of these laws has nothing decisive for those who have not assisted to establish them; and were we to give to the hereditary distinctions of property an origin the most remote, it is no less true, on this account that the poor succeeding inhabitants of the earth, struck with the unequal division of its rich domains, and not perceiving the limits and lines of separation traced by nature, would have some right to say; these compacts, these partitions, this diversity of lots, which procures to some abundance and repose; to others, poverty and labour; all this legislation, in short, is only advantageous to a small number of privileged men; and we will not subscribe to it, unless compelled by the fear of personal danger. What are then, they would add, these ideas of right and wrong, with which we are entertained? What are these dissertations on the necessity of adopting some order in society, and of observing rules? Our mind bends not to those principles, which, general in theory, become particular in practice. We find some satisfaction and compensation, when the idea of virtue, of submission, and of sacrifice, are united to religious sentiments; when we believe we shall render an account of our actions to a Supreme Being, whose laws and will we adore, and from whom we have received every thing, and whose approbation presents itself to our eyes, as a motive of emulation, and an object of recompense: but if the contracted bounds of life limit the narrow circle in which all our interest ought to confine itself, where all our speculations and our hopes terminate, what respect owe we then to those whom nature has formed our equals? To those men sprung from lifeless clay, to return to it again with us, and to be lost for ever in the same dust? They have only invented these laws of justice, to be more tranquil usurpers. Let them descend from their exalted rank, that they may be put on our level, or, at least, present us with a partition less unequal, and we shall then be able to conceive, that the observance of the laws of right is of importance to us; till then, we shall have just motives for being the enemies of civil order, which we find so disadvantageous; and we do not comprehend how, in the midst of so many gratifications which excite our envy, it is, in the name of our own interest, that we ought to renounce them.

Such is the secret language which men, overwhelmed with the distress of their situation, would not fail to use; or those who, merely in a state of habitual inferiority, found themselves continually hurt by the splendid sight of luxury and magnificence.

It would not be an easy task to combat these sentiments, by endeavouring to paint forcibly the vanity of pleasure in general, and the illusion of most of those objects which captivate our ambition, and the apathy which follows in their train. These reflections, without doubt, have their weight and efficacy; but if we attentively consider the subject, every thing that deserves the name of consolation in this world, cannot be addressed with any advantage; but to minds prepared for mild sentiments, by an idea of religion and of piety, more or less distinct; we cannot, in the same manner, relieve the barren and ferocious despondency of an unhappy and envious man, who has thrown far behind him all hope. Concentred in the bare interests of a life, which is for him eternity, and the universe itself; it is the passion of the moment which enslaves him, and nothing can disengage him from it; he has not the means to catch any vague idea, nor of being content; and as even reason has need, every instant, of the aid of the imagination, he cannot be encouraged, either by the discourse of his friends, or his own reflections.

Besides, if we can maintain, in general, that the allotments of happiness and misery are more equal than we imagine; if we can reasonably advance, that labour is preferable to idleness; if we can say, with truth, that embarrassments and inquietudes often accompany wealth, and that contentment of mind appears to be the portion of the middle state of life; we ought to acknowledge, at the same time, that these axioms are only perfectly just in the eyes of the moralist, who considers man in a comprehensive point of view, and who makes his calculation upon a whole life: but, in the recurrence of our daily desires and hopes, it is impossible to excite to labour by the expectation of fortune, and detract, at the same time, this fortune, in decrying the pleasures and conveniences that it procures. These subtle ideas, without excepting those which may be defended, can never be applicable to real circumstances; and if we sometimes use with success such kind of reflections to alleviate unavailing sorrow and regret, it is when we have only shadows to cope with.

In short, when we have reduced to precept, all the well known reflections, on the apparent, but delusive advantages of rank and fortune, we cannot prevent uncultivated minds from being continually struck with the extreme inequality of the different contracts which the rich make with the poor; it might be said, in those moments, that one portion of mankind was formed only for the convenience of another; the poor man sacrifices his time and his strength to multiply round the rich gratifications of every kind; and he, when he gives in exchange the most scanty subsistence, does not deprive himself of any thing; since the extent of his physical wants is bounded by the laws of nature: equality then is only re-established by the lassitude and apathy which the enjoyment even of pleasure produces. But these disgusts compose the back ground in the picture of life; the people perceive them not; and as they have only been acquainted with want, they cannot form any idea of the langour attendant on satiety.

Will any one imprudently say, that if the distinctions of property are an obstacle to the establishment of a political system of morality, we ought, therefore, to labour to destroy them? But if in past ages, when the different degrees of talents and knowledge were not so unequal, men were not able to preserve a community of possessions, can you imagine, that these primitive relations could be re-established at a time when the superiority of rank and power is enforced by the immoveable strength of disciplined armies?

Besides, when even in the composition of an ideal world, we should have introduced the most exact division of the various possessions esteemed by men, it would still be necessary, to preserve a system of real equality, that every one should execute faithfully the duties imposed on him by universal morality; since this is incumbent on every individual, for the sacrifice that all the members of society have made; which society ought to recompense every citizen in particular, for the restriction to which he submits himself.

It is essential to observe still further, that it is not only personal interest, when clearly understood, which ought to be annexed to the idea of public order; it is the same interest when led astray by the passions, then a mere guide is no longer sufficient; a yoke must be imposed; a check always acting, which must be used absolutely. Nothing can be more chimerical than to pretend to restrain a man, hurried on by an impetuous imagination, by endeavouring to recal to his remembrance some principles and instructions, which, in the terms of an academic thesis[1], ought to be the _result of analysis, of methodizing, of the art of dividing, of developing, and circumscribing ideas_.

It would be, at present, a hardy enterprize, to attempt to conduct men by reason alone, since the first thing that reason discovers is its own weakness; but when we want to rest on maxims which admit of controversy; when we wish to oppose to the strong motive of personal interest, a moral consideration which cannot act but with the concurrence of profound reflection; we recollect the doctrine of the first œconomists, who, in establishing the extravagant principles respecting an exclusive right of exporting or monopolizing grain, put off the care of preventing popular commotions till they should happen.

It appears to me, that false reasoning, on the union of private with public interest, arises from applying to the present state of society, the principles which have served as the base for their formation; this very natural confusion is one grand source of error. Let us try to render clear a proposition, which, at first, appears difficult to comprehend; and in this light we will suppose, for a moment the future generation assembled in idea, in an imaginary world, and ignorant before they inhabit the earth, who those individuals are that shall be born of parents loaded with the gifts of fortune, and those who are beset with misery from their cradle. They are instructed in the principles of civil rights, and the convenience of the laws of order, has been represented to them, and a sketch is drawn of the disorder, which would be the inevitable consequence of a continual variation in the division of property; then all those who are to compose the new generation, equally uncertain of the lot that the chance of birth reserves for them, subscribe unanimously to those events which await them; and at the very moment in which the relations of society exist only in speculation, it might be truly said, that the personal interest is lost in the public; but this identity ceases, when each, arrived on the earth, has taken possession of his lot; it is then no longer possible, that the various personal interests should concur to the maintenance of these prodigious gradations of rank and fortune, which are derived from the chance of birth; and those to whom cares and wants have fallen, will not be resigned to the inferiority of their condition, but by a grand religious principle alone, which can make them perceive an eternal justice, and place them in imagination before time, and before the laws.

There is nothing so easy, as the establishment of conventions, and making rules to be observed, till the moment of the drawing of a lottery; every one then, at the same point of view, finds all good, all just, and well contrived, and peace reigns by common agreement; but as soon as the blanks and prizes are known, the mind changes, the temper grows sour; and without the check of authority, it would become unmanageable, envious, quarrelsome, and sometimes unjust and violent.

We see, however, the consequence to be drawn from the preceding reflections; that political societies in contemplation, and in reality, present to our observation two different periods; and as these periods are not separated by any apparent limits, they are almost always confounded in the mind of the political moralist. He who believes in the union of private interest with that of the public, and who celebrates this harmony, has only considered society in its general and primitive plan; he who thinks, on the contrary, that the whole is wrong and discordant, because there is a great difference of power and fortune, has considered it only under its actual vicissitudes. Both these mistakes have received a sanction from celebrated writers. The man hurried away by a lively imagination, and strongly impressed by present objects, has been struck by the inequality of conditions; and the philosopher, who, transported by his abstractions beyond the circle of human society, has only perceived those relations and principles which led men to form the first institution of civil laws. Thus, every where we see, that most disputes relate to mere difference of positions, and to the various points of view in which the same subject is considered; there are so many stations in the moral world, that, according to that which we choose, the picture changes entirely.

Hitherto we have endeavoured to understand the effect which we might expect from a system of morality, by applying this kind of instruction only to private interest, when most clearly ascertained. It remains now to show, that every species of education, which demands time and reflection, cannot belong, in any manner, to the class of men most numerous; and to be sensible of this truth, it is sufficient to turn our attention on the social state of those who are destitute of property, and talents which might supply its place; obliged to have recourse to hard labour, where nothing is required but to employ their bodily strength, their concurrence, and the power of riches reduce the wages of this numerous class to what is absolutely necessary; they cannot without difficulty support their children, and they may well be impatient of qualifying them for useful occupations to relieve themselves; and this prevents their being sent to public schools, except during their infancy: thus, ignorance and poverty are in the midst of our societies, and the hereditary lot of the greater part of the citizens; there is only to be found an alleviation of this general law, in those countries where the constitution of the government encourages the high price of labour, and gives the poor some means of resisting the despotism of fortune. However, if such is the inevitable effect of our civil and political legislation, how shall we be able to bind men without distinction, to the maintenance of public order, by any instruction, I do not say complicated, but to which the exercise of long reasoning forms only a necessary introduction? It would not be sufficient to endow institutions; it would be still more necessary to pay the scholars for their time; since, for the lower class, time is, even very early in life, their only means of subsistence.

Nevertheless, morality is not, like other human sciences, a knowledge, that we may be at liberty to acquire at our leisure; the quickest instruction is still too slow, since man has a natural power of doing evil before his mind is in a state to apply to reflection, and connect the most simple ideas.

It is not then a political catechism which would be proper for the instruction of the people; it is not a course of precepts founded on the union of public and private interest, which can suit with the measure of their understanding; when a doctrine of that kind would appear as just as it seems to me liable to be disputed, they will never be able to render the principles of it distinct enough, to apply them to the purposes of instructing those whose education continues for so short a time. Morality, founded on religion, by its active influence, is precisely adapted to the particular situation of the greater number of men; and this agreement is so perfect, that it seems one of the remarkable features of universal harmony. Religion alone has power to persuade with celerity, because it excites passion, whilst it informs the understanding, because it alone has the means of rendering obvious what it recommends; because it speaks in the name of God, and it is easy to inspire respect for him, whose power is every where evident to the eyes of the simple and skilful, to the eyes of children, and men advanced to maturity.