CHAPTER XV.

THE PRESS.

Some of the principles for the discovery of truth, professed and acted upon by those who administer the laws of England, and by those who practice in its courts, are certainly repugnant to the first impressions and feelings of honest men, if not also to common sense. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, in order to remove these impressions, to state the ground on which those principles are defended. That ground may be shortly expressed thus—

It has been found by long experience that it is more for the advantage of truth and justice that professional men should be stimulated by fees and the hope of advancement, to put forward or conceal every fact, to advance, withhold, or oppose every inference and argument, _solely_ as it may be of advantage to the party by whom they are employed.

It is also stated that the public are aware of this convention, and, therefore, are not deceived by the speeches of the advocate.

Without asking whether the long experience alluded to has ever been fortified by the trial and the failure of an opposite course, it may be at once stated that this mode of arriving at truth is contrary to the result of long experience in matters of science. In all discussions on those subjects, it is found far more conducive to truth, if either party in discussing a mooted point discover in his own argument a flaw, unobserved by his opponent, that he should immediately point it out, and that they should both apply their minds to repair it, and if unsuccessful, admit it. The same course is pursued with regard to facts; every circumstance, however apparently remote, is contributed by both inquirers to the common stock, without the slightest care as to its bearings on one or the other side of the question. Facts thus conveyed for the first time to the mind of one of the parties, often recall to his memory analogous facts, and thus the materials of reasoning or of induction become largely increased.

§ To this supposed legal principle, it may be fairly objected that it is entirely a theoretical view. To be convinced of this it is enough to appeal to every man who has ever sat on a jury or heard one addressed by counsel. He well knows that the very first effort of the learned advocate is to attempt to persuade the jury that he is no advocate at all. This line is sustained throughout his address, and his great object is to convince them that he himself personally believes both the facts to which his witnesses testify, and the inferences he adduces from their evidence. The more skilful the advocate, the more he endeavours to persuade the jury that he is merely an impartial observer, assisting them in arriving at a just conclusion.

The effects of long habit in thus mystifying less practised reasoners, cannot fail to be injurious to the moral character of the man. Take a case of title to property, on which a barrister is consulted. Suppose the holder has no right whatever to it, yet will the barrister by every means his knowledge and ingenuity can suggest, help his client to rob some other person of his property. It is useless to say that in such circumstances the attorney conceals certain facts of his case, and does not put the facts to the counsel in this plain way. On such occasions the most skilful counsel are always employed, and they are certainly competent, _if they choose it_, to ascertain the real state of the case. In criminal cases such attempts to mislead juries are still more reprehensible.

§ If the principle now discussed is sound, it is capable of application to another subject—the press. But strangely enough, lawyers, more than any other class, abuse the press because it treats its subject commercially, and refuse to admit that rule in the case of editors of newspapers, which they claim as a sanction for themselves. A little examination, however, will show that the conduct of the press is much more defensible than that of the bar.

The public require a daily account of all facts connected with politics and the institutions of the country; it also demands analyses, discussions, and opinions on the bearings of all such facts upon its interests. As opinions amongst the public are often much opposed to, or widely different from each other, it is clear that this demand cannot be satisfied without many newspapers. Now, looking solely to the commercial profit arising from its sale, it is tolerably certain that some one paper supported by greater capital, and conducted with greater skill, will endeavour to represent the opinions of the largest class of those who purchase these sheets of diurnal information. The first place being thus occupied, other journals will arise to represent the opinions of smaller, yet, perhaps, of powerful classes. Thus the opinions of all parties, and, in some measure, their relative strength, become known to each other. This is an end much to be desired.

If the opinions of the public change, those of the leading journal must of course follow, even though they are directly opposed to those advocated by it a few days before. Such a change undoubtedly shocks the feelings of many who remain constant to their own views, and cases often occur in which these latter give up their usual paper. It must, however, be admitted that there are few political or economical questions on which one side is morally right, the other morally wrong. That a given man has or has not got possession of another man’s estate, that a man has or has not committed a murder or other crime, must, in most cases, be well known to his counsel; if in either case the wrong-doer escapes punishment, an injury is done to society. But whether a given line of policy or a given law, is more or less beneficial or even injurious to the State, is generally dependent on so many causes that very few are able to foresee their consequences with tolerable certainty.

The most general and unsophisticated opinion is, that no man is justified in advocating, even when unpaid, doctrines in which he does not himself believe. With respect to the press, it is possible that the writer of the second article may be a different individual from the person who wrote the first article; but even were he the same person, the bar at least have no right to find fault with him.

§ The press then may advantageously be considered as expressing the opinions of classes, not of individuals. It has greatly improved in the last quarter of a century, in consequence of the general improvement of all classes.

There is now also fortunately established a certain professional feeling amongst its members that reports of speeches, or of facts, ought to be _rigidly exact_. Abstracts of speeches will occasionally be coloured not by additions, but by selections or omissions, according to the side of the question advocated by the writer. Yet even here the more popular papers are careful to do justice to all parties. It is the more important that this latter rule should be admitted as a principle, because, from the great length of the debates themselves, they are rarely read by persons much occupied, except when questions of great interest occur.

To such persons an _impartial_ abstract is invaluable.

In the leading articles greater latitude is allowable. These, if the theory which has been explained is admitted, are avowedly the expressions of the opinion of its customers. The power of the press is undoubtedly great, yet it is bound by the strongest ties of interest not to abuse that power. It is clearly its interest to seem consistent, and consequently to employ, at almost any expense, the best means of ascertaining the opinions of the country _before_ they are publicly expressed. Having attained this knowledge, it will get the credit of appearing to lead public opinion.

Its powers of doing good when honestly conducted, are yet larger than its powers of mischief. Yet even here its power is of necessity limited. It cannot advocate even the _best_ course of policy on any important subject unless it is tolerably certain that it will succeed in convincing its customers that it is _really_ the best. It _ought_ not to advocate that best course, because the falling off of its subscribers might then disable it from as effectually assisting the _second best_. It, however, neither ought, nor is it ultimately its interest, to conceal those opinions from its subscribers.

The power it possesses, of exposing knaves and swindlers, by means of its correspondents, and of sending highly intelligent commissioners from time to time to inquire personally into the situation of various classes of the population, are of great value, and could only be exercised by a wealthy as well as by a powerful press.