Part 13

“The French ships, however, as has been mentioned before, were generally superior to ours in sailing qualities, so that the chase would in all probability have been entirely fruitless, had not the wind suddenly shifted on the morning of the 27th from south-west to west-south-west; and, though this does not appear a very great change, it was sufficient to prevent the French admiral from any longer having the entire option of engaging in or avoiding a battle. It put in Keppel’s power to force on at least a partial action, and he instantly availed himself of the chance thus unexpectedly afforded him; but he found himself in some difficulty. The eagerness with which he had hitherto pressed on the chase had somewhat scattered his fleet. Harland was four miles off, on the _Victory’s_ weather quarter; Palliser, in the _Formidable_, was three miles or more to leeward, and as the way in which he handled his ship seemed to show a disposition to increase that distance, Keppel, desiring to unite his squadron to his own, signalled to Palliser to chase to windward. Finding an action inevitable, D’Orvilliers, to preserve his line of battle unbroken, caused his fleet to wear; but that and some other evolutions threw them into great disorder, and brought them nearer to the enemy whom their chief object was to avoid. These manœuvres had occupied nearly four hours. At last, a little before noon, Keppel made the signal to attack, and Sir Robert Harland, who commanded the van division, led the fleet gallantly into battle, passing along the French line, receiving their fire without returning it till he came up to their leading ships. Keppel followed with the centre, in like manner reserving his fire till he got alongside the French admiral himself, whom he had marked for his own especial antagonist, and was soon joined by Palliser and his squadron. For nearly two hours both fleets were hotly engaged. The loss of life was lightest in ours; but, from the French practice of aiming chiefly at the rigging, many of our ships were far more crippled than any of theirs. Keppel’s own flag-ship, the _Victory_, had received great damage; and five more of our ships were so much disabled that the admiral was not altogether without apprehension of losing some of them. Palliser’s ship, the _Formidable_, had suffered as severely as any, and Sir Hugh had been the first to quit the line. When the battle had lasted nearly two hours, with a view of enabling him to renew the action, and also of protecting the crippled ships, Keppel made the signal to wear. Harland and his division obeyed; but Palliser took no notice of the signal, making no attempt to renew the action himself, and, as was afterwards alleged, by his example preventing the rest from going to the admiral’s support. Later in the afternoon, Keppel sent a frigate to him with an express order to bear down; but the sun went down, and it was not till daylight the next morning that the _Formidable_ again took up the station assigned for her. But long before daylight all hope of renewing the battle was past. The lights of the enemy had been visible to our men all night; but, when day broke, it was discovered that they proceeded from only three ships. D’Orvilliers had stolen away with his main body, and, to prevent any suspicion of his flight from occurring to the British admiral, he had left three of his fastest sailers to keep up the same lights that were shown by the flag-ship, with instructions to set all sail and rejoin him as soon as daylight should reveal to the English the delusion that had been practised. Once more Keppel chased for an hour or two, and then, finding his efforts to overtake the enemy perfectly fruitless, he returned to Plymouth to repair the damage he had received.

“No ship was taken on either side, the number of our killed and wounded did not amount to above three-fourths of the loss sustained by the French; but the question of who were the victors was most clearly determined by a proof far more incontestable than any such minute calculation. The flight of the French, for their course on the 28th can be called by no other name, acknowledged their defeat in the most forcible manner. But, after having made such efforts to fit out a sufficient fleet, the British nation was not contented with a victory which required arithmetic and logic to prove it to have been one. Murmurs soon began to be heard, which presently assumed the definite shape of complaints that Palliser, by his disobedience to his commander’s signals, had prevented the renewal of the action, and by so doing had enabled the French to escape. In his official despatch Keppel was so far from having complained of Palliser’s behaviour, that he expressly named him as, “by his spirited conduct, having deserved much commendation.””

Before proceeding further, however, it should be here stated in fairness to the Count D’Orvilliers, (whom Keppel himself, in his defence, does not blame,) that Mr. Yonge seems to have taken rather a severe and incorrect view of the Count’s conduct in evading an engagement: D’Orvilliers, on the contrary, had great reasons for avoiding a battle, and his retreat was really a success. Another writer, the author of an excellent “British Naval Biography,” to whom I am much indebted in this article, puts the point very clearly, thus:

“It must not be attributed to any want of spirit in D’Orvilliers that he thus obstinately declined a battle. The motives of both commanders exactly corresponded with the different lines of conduct they pursued. Our East and West India convoys, of immense value, were on their return home, and hourly expected. The position maintained by the French fleet was extremely favourable for intercepting those convoys in the course they were expected to hold; and from the situation of the hostile fleets, and the state of the wind, they might have been captured in the English admiral’s sight, without a possibility of his preventing it. On the other hand, Keppel’s fleet effectually cut off that of his adversary from the port of Brest. It was, therefore, no less the object of Keppel to bring the enemy to an immediate action, than it was that of D’Orvilliers to avoid it.”

It was so, in fact, understood by the British public, who felt, at once, that the French had gained a great advantage, and that this action of July, 1778, had not been of that bold and decisive character which the country was used to expect from the navy.[16] The event gave rise to much animadversion, and at last was discussed by the newspapers and periodicals of the day with furious animosity. Party feeling embittered the question; for though Admiral Keppel was employed on account of his ability and experience, he was hostile to the then administration, so that any attempt to disparage him was attributed to the malevolence of the government.

In the House of Commons, of which both Admirals Keppel and Palliser were members, a motion was made for an inquiry, whereupon Admiral Keppel rose, and gave an account of his conduct from the time he assumed the command of the fleet. He declared, “That if he was again to go over the business of the 27th of July, he would conduct himself in the same manner. He said, everything he could do against the enemy had been done; but observed, at the same time, that the oldest and most experienced officers would discover something in every engagement, with which they were previously unacquainted; and he acknowledged that that day had presented something new to him.” Sir Hugh Palliser defended himself with much warmth, and accused Keppel of inconsistency in having officially commended his conduct, and in now wishing to insinuate that he had neglected to perform his duty. To this the admiral replied, “That the official praise which he had bestowed on all the officers under his command, to obviate discord, did not oblige him to authenticate statements which would impeach himself; but now, when called upon to speak out, he would inform the House, and the public, that the signal for coming into the _Victory’s_ wake, was flying from three o’clock in the afternoon till eight in the evening unobeyed; at the same time he did not charge the vice-admiral with actual disobedience, because he was fully persuaded of his personal bravery, and believed that if any inquiry was considered necessary that he would be able to justify himself.” This altercation led to a great deal of mutual recrimination between the two admirals, until at length Sir Hugh Palliser, on the 9th of December, delivered in an accusation to the Board of Admiralty, of which he was himself one of the lord commissioners. This accusation consisted of five separate charges against Keppel, for misconduct and neglect of duty in the action of the 27th of July; and the Board immediately ordered the admiral to be tried by a court-martial.

On the 7th of January, 1779, the signal was made for all the admirals and captains of His Majesty’s fleet to come on board the _Britannia_ in Portsmouth harbour.

Then the Judge-Advocate General, Sir Charles Gould, LL.D., read the order sent by the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Thomas Pye, admiral of the white, to hold the court-martial, dated the 31st of December, 1778, signed Sandwich, T. Buller, Lisburne: and for adjourning to the Governor of Portsmouth’s house.

The court-martial consisted of the following members:—

President, Sir Thomas Pye, Kt., admiral of the white; Mathew Buckle, vice-admiral of the red; John Montagu, vice-admiral of the red; Mariot Arbuthnot, rear-admiral of the white; Robert Roddam, rear-admiral of the white; Captains Mark Milbank (afterwards an admiral), Francis Samuel Drake (afterwards an admiral and a baronet), Taylor Penny, John Moutray, William Bennet, Adam Duncan (afterwards an admiral and a viscount, the hero of Camperdown), Philip Boteler, and James Cranston.

Pursuant to the Admiralty order, the court adjourned to the house of the Governor of Portsmouth, and there the trial was held.

Keppel appeared before the court attended by a galaxy of friends; among them were some of the most illustrious personages in the kingdom, viz., the Dukes of Cumberland, Richmond, and Bolton; the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earls of Effingham and Albemarle, Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Keppel’s counsel was Erskine—the Hon. Thomas Erskine, the future Lord Chancellor, then in the first year of his call to the bar, and already becoming famous as an advocate.

The proceedings commenced by the President desiring the Judge-Advocate, Sir Charles Gould, to read the charge, which was as follows:

“A charge of Misconduct and Neglect of Duty against the Honourable Admiral Keppel, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1778, in divers instances undermentioned.

“I. That on the morning of the 27th of July, 1778, having a fleet of thirty ships of the line under his command, and being then in the presence of a French fleet of the like number of ships of the line, the said admiral did not make the necessary preparations for fight, did not put his fleet into a line of battle, or into any order proper either for receiving or attacking an enemy of such force; but, on the contrary, although his fleet was already dispersed and in disorder, he, by making the signal for several ships of the vice-admiral of the blue’s division to chase to windward, increased the disorder of that part of the fleet, and the ships were, in consequence, more scattered than they had been before; and whilst in this disorder, he advanced to the enemy, and made the signal for battle.

“That the above conduct was the more unaccountable, as the enemy’s fleet was not then in disorder, nor beaten, nor flying, but formed in a regular line of battle, on that tack which approached the British fleet (all their notions plainly indicating a design to give battle), and they edged down and attacked it whilst in disorder. By this unofficer-like conduct a general engagement was not brought on, but the other flag-officers and captains were left to engage without order or regularity, from whence great confusion ensued; some of his ships were prevented getting into action at all, others were not near enough to the enemy, and some from the confusion, fired into others of the king’s ships, and did them considerable damage; and the vice-admiral of the blue was left alone to engage singly and unsupported. In these instances the said Admiral Keppel negligently performed the duty imposed upon him.

“II. That after the van and centre divisions of the British fleet passed the rear of the enemy, the admiral did not immediately tack and double upon the enemy with those two divisions, and continue the battle; nor did he collect them together at that time, and keep so near the enemy as to be in readiness to renew the battle as soon as it might be proper; but, on the contrary, he stood away beyond the enemy to a great distance, before he wore to stand towards them again, leaving the vice-admiral of the blue engaged with the enemy, and exposed to be cut off.

“III. That after the vice-admiral of the blue had passed the last of the enemy’s ships, and immediately wore and laid his own ship’s head towards the enemy again, being then in their wake, and at a little distance only, and expecting the admiral to advance with all the ships to renew the fight, the admiral did not advance for that purpose, but shortened sail, hauled down the signal for battle; nor did he at that time, or at any other time, whilst standing towards the enemy, call the ships together, in order to renew the attack, as he might have done; particularly the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, which had received the least damage, had been the longest out of action, were ready and fit to renew it, were then to windward, and could have bore down and fetched any part of the French fleet, if the signal for battle had not been hauled down, or if the said Admiral Keppel had availed himself of the signal appointed by the thirty-first article of the fighting instructions, by which he might have ordered those to lead who are to lead with the starboard tacks on board by a wind, which signal was applicable to the occasion for renewing the engagement with advantage after the French fleet had been beaten, their line broken, and in disorder. In these instances he did not do the utmost in his power to tack, sink, burn, or destroy the French fleet that had attacked the British fleet.

“IV. That instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as in the preceding articles is alleged, and as he might and ought to have done, the admiral wore and made sail directly from the enemy, and thus he led the whole British fleet away from them, which gave them the opportunity to rally unmolested, and to form again into a line of battle, and to stand after the British fleet: this was disgraceful to the British flag, for it had the appearance of a flight, and gave the French admiral a pretence to claim the victory, and to publish to the world that the British fleet ran away, and that he pursued it with the fleet of France, and offered it battle.

“V. That on the morning of the 28th of July, 1778, when it was perceived that only three of the French fleet remained near the British, in the situation the whole had been in the night before, and that the rest were to leeward, at a greater distance, not in a line of battle, but in a heap, the admiral did not cause the fleet to pursue the flying enemy, nor even to chase the three ships that fled after the rest; but, on the contrary, he led the British fleet another way, directly from the enemy.

“By these instances of misconduct and neglect a glorious opportunity was lost of doing a most essential service to the State, and the honour of the British navy was tarnished.”

The trial lasted thirty-two days, and the evidence was very extensive and very minute; but, after all was heard, it left the affair much as stated by Mr. Yonge in his account of it. The following incidents from the testimony adduced may be read with interest.

_Captain Marshall_, of the _Arethusa_ frigate, the first witness called, stated in answer to the question, whether Admiral Keppel conducted himself unbecoming a flag-officer; “No, as God is my judge!”

_Captain Sir William Chaloner Burnaby_, Bart., of the _Milford_, in his evidence, informed the court, that when he first perceived the French fleet, the afternoon of the 23rd, they were to eastward of our fleet, nearly a-head, or rather leeward, standing towards us, and appearing to be in great disorder; that, the _Milford_ having received orders from the admiral to reconnoitre the enemy, he made towards them. That at half past four he tacked and stood towards the _Victory_, the French fleet nearly then beginning to form a line a-head, seeming to direct their course to leeward of our fleet, and very little from the wind. About half past eight o’clock the British admiral made signal for the fleet to bring to, and, to the best of his recollection, it continued in that situation all night. Upon further interrogations it appeared from Sir William that the French fleet were all that day forming in line of battle; that on the 25th and 26th the weather was squally, with fresh gales, that occasioned such a northwest swell as is usual with such winds; that they kept the weather-gauge of us all the time, generally observing their line of battle, and rather gained upon our fleet, sometimes carrying a pressing sail, at other times under an easy sail, for the better perfecting their line of battle; and that during all that time, had they been ever so much disposed to attack our fleet, they could not have done it without disadvantage, as they could not, without risk, fight their lee lower-deck guns, whilst we could fight our weather lower-deck guns. Sir William was cross-examined by Admiral Keppel as to the vice-admiral’s situation and conduct after the engagement; when it appeared, that from the natural superiority of the _Victory_ over the _Formidable_ in sailing, and the damage the latter had sustained, Sir Hugh Palliser could not accompany the admiral; but that he did not see him make any signal of his disability.

In the course of the admiral’s questions to Sir William he asked, did I not pursue with a press of sail, conformable to my worst sailing ships, to close and get up, until the moment I brought them to battle, except the two times after the 24th that I made the signal for the line? Sir Hugh objected to this as a leading question.

_Admiral Keppel_: “I desire I may not be interrupted by the accuser. I am trying for my life, and for my honour, which is dearer, and I hope for the protection of the court.” Soon after he said, “I would have fired at the French if they had not fired at me.” Sir William Burnaby concluded by saying, Admiral Keppel always pressed sail, and gave every proof of a great desire of bringing the French to battle.

_Captain Digby_, of the _Ramillies_, was called: Sir Hugh Palliser began to interrogate him with regard to the business of the 23rd, when Admiral Keppel begged the Court to take notice, that, for the purpose of shortening, if possible, the length to which he saw the trial would necessarily extend, if they still went over the same ground, and questions were repeatedly asked which he had admitted, he again told them that he admitted that the French fleet put themselves into order of battle when we discovered them. When Captain Digby mentioned, that from squally weather there was a swelling sea, and was asked whether the ships could then fight their lower-deck guns; he said, he could not have fought all his.

_Admiral Montagu_: In both articles of the charge, Admiral Keppel is charged with running away from the French fleet. Did you that day see him run away from them, instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as he might and ought to have done, which are the words expressed in the charge?

The charge was then read, and an objection started by Sir Hugh Palliser to the question, as contrary to law. Upon which several members of the court-martial said, “We do not care sixpence in this case for the law; we are come here to do justice, and hope, in God’s name, it will be done.”

_Admiral Montagu_: If Admiral Keppel ran away, Captain Digby did so too; and I suppose every part of the fleet followed their leader. Did you that day run away from the French fleet?—No.

_Captain Hood_, of the _Robuste_, was called upon and examined. _Admiral Arbuthnot_ asked him if the admiral had thought fit to have renewed the attack when the French line was broke, could you have obeyed his signal and gone down to the enemy in the condition you were in?—I could not.

_Admiral Montagu_: From their relative situation, as you have described them, do you think the British admiral was running away from the enemy?—At that time there was no appearance of a flight.

Did the admiral run away any other time?—There was nothing in his conduct at any time which indicated, in the most distant manner, a flight. In the morning he pursued them.

_Captain Allen_, of the _Egmont_, was called, and he was finally put these questions. Sir, was it not more proper and prudent in the admiral to lay to, and repair his disabled ships before he renewed the attack, than to have returned to the engagement immediately?—Assuredly it was.

Then, sir, upon the whole did it appear to you, as an old experienced officer, that Admiral Keppel did by his conduct, either on the 27th or 28th of July, tarnish the honour of the British navy?—No; and I should not take upon me to say thus much, if I had not been forty years at sea, and three-and-thirty years an officer. I look upon it, the admiral did much honour to, instead of tarnishing, the British navy.

One circumstance showed very strongly the animus of Sir Hugh Palliser. It was discovered in the course of the trial, that some leaves had been taken out of the log book of the _Formidable_, containing the work of the 26th, 27th and 28th July, and the master of the _Formidable_ was required to attend to explain.

Now such a witness should not be interfered with before coming to court by the prosecutor; yet that Sir Hugh Palliser did so interfere, appears by the following incident. _Vice-admiral Palliser_ to the President: Sir, the cutting leaves out of the _Formidable’s_ log-book, is a fact of which I was totally ignorant, until it was perceived by a member of this court; nor could any person be more astonished at it than myself. It is my most anxious wish to have this matter fully investigated; and, for that purpose, I have ordered the master of the _Formidable_, and the mate who made the entries, to attend here this morning; and, that they may be more strictly interrogated upon the matter, I desire that they may be examined by the court and Admiral Keppel, without any previous question from me.