Part 26
“My dear Sir,—Permit me to return you my most heartfelt thanks for your unremitting attentions, and for the very gallant support you rendered me during the whole of the action on the 22nd instant. Had the weather been favourable, and we could have seen to have made the necessary signals, to have availed ourselves of some of the mistakes of the enemy, I am fully convinced we should have made the victory much more complete. I was obliged to stand to the northward thus far, in order to cover the _Windsor Castle_, and the two captured ships. I think they are now safe from the combined, as well as the Rochefort squadron, and I am going back to Cape Finisterre, in hopes of seeing Lord Nelson; if I do not, I shall proceed off Ferrol, to see if any favourable opportunity should offer, when I may hope to attack the enemy with advantage. Wishing us all possible success,
“I am, my dear Stirling, “Ever yours most truly and sincerely, “(Signed) ROBERT CALDER.”
Sir Robert Calder produced a letter, and said, is this the answer to that letter?
_A._ It is not the answer, but is written in reply. I sent, by the same conveyance, a letter to the vice-admiral on public service.
_Sir Robert Calder._—You will observe they are not of the same date—one is the 24th, the other the 25th.
The letter from Rear-Admiral Stirling was then read.
“GLORY, _25th July, 1805_.
“My dear Sir,—I thank you much for your letter of yesterday; and can assure you, with great truth, I meant, and do mean to give you all the support in my power.
I hope you made a good tale to please John Bull, for you had a good subject to write on; and I think you have convinced Mons. Bonaparte that he cannot always get to sea and home again with impunity.
Excuse haste, and believe me, Most truly yours, (Signed) CHAS. STIRLING.”
“Sir Robert Calder, Bart.”
_A._ I should not have written so to my commanding officer, on public business: that was a private letter.
A conversation took place about the reading the public letter.
_Sir Robert Calder._—“I have no wish that any paper should be withheld; but, if the rear-admiral has any objection, I do not wish this should be read.”
_Rear-Admiral Stirling._—“I have no objection.”
The letter was then read.
“GLORY,” _24th July, 1805_.
“My dear Sir,—I congratulate you on the capture of the two Spaniards from a force so very superior to that opposed to it, and I think, if the three ships, which at one time showed a disposition to support them, had followed the intention, the consequence might have been decisive.
“The great object I had in view was to obey your orders, by keeping in a compact line, whilst the signal for that purpose remained in force, and therefore, as the _Raisonable_ closed with you, my captain took care that nothing could pass between her and this ship.
“On the surrender of the Spaniards, I directed the _Warrior_ to send and assist in taking possession, and afterwards sent similar orders to the _Thunderer_, as there was no knowing, from the thickness of the weather, what might otherwise be the consequence, if your attention was confined to the van. I likewise ordered the _Egyptienne_, when I got sight of her, to get the prizes on the same tack with us, and to tow them to leeward of our line, which orders will, I hope, meet with your approbation. I know not why there was a separation in the night. Captain Linzee went in pursuance of his instructions, and rejoined me before the morning.
“We had only one man killed, and four wounded; the fore-yard was grazed, which we have fished; and what was otherwise hit, was not of any consequence.
“I have great pleasure of bearing testimony to the zeal of Captain Warren and his officers, and feel much confidence from the good conduct of the crew belonging to the ship where my flag is flying, if our good fortune should again lead us against the foes of our country.
“Believe me, with great esteem, dear Sir, “Your most obedient humble servant, “(Signed) CHARLES STIRLING.”
“Sir Robert Calder, Bart.”
_Rear-Admiral Stirling._—I believe that letter was sent to the admiral on the 25th, and I had the honour to wait upon him in the afternoon, by his permission; and to the best of my recollection that was my reason for not returning an official answer. I do not recollect any other communication with the admiral, from about midnight of the 22nd.
_Q._ Did I not always place the British squadron between the enemy and the _Windsor Castle_ and prizes, when they were in tow?
_A._ The British fleet was always between them.
_Q._ Was not the British squadron always placed by me between that of the enemy and the port of Ferrol, while the enemy remained in sight?
_A._ The British fleet was nearer to Ferrol than the enemy, till they crossed our stern on the 24th.
_Q._ When they crossed our stern could the enemy have fetched Ferrol?
_A._ I do not think they could, as we had the wind.
_Court._—What distance was the British fleet from Rochefort, on the morning after the action?
_A._ I don’t know; the chart will tell. By my master’s reckoning, Cape Finisterre bore S.E. and by E. forty leagues.
Rear-Admiral George Martin, who was captain of the _Barfleur_ in the action, was asked,—
Considering the wind, and the relative situation of the two fleets, during the 23rd of July, could the British fleet have neared the enemy, and renewed the engagement?
_A._ The enemy being rather abaft the beam, the British fleet would have neared the enemy had they tacked. But whether they could have renewed the engagement, I cannot say. That must, in great measure, have depended on the enemy, they being to windward.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral make any signal, or show any disposition to renew the action on that day?
_A._ No.
Sir Robert Calder put in the following paper, which was read:—
“I admit I did not show any such disposition, except by hauling my wind when the enemy bore down, as by doing so I must have separated myself from the crippled ships and prizes.”
Rear-Admiral Martin was further asked,—
Did the vice-admiral, from your remarks and observation, do everything in his power, that he might have done, from the morning of the 23rd, till you lost sight of the enemy, to renew the engagement, and to take and destroy every ship which it was his duty to engage?
_A._ I consider I have answered that question by saying on neither day did he stand towards the enemy.
Sir Robert cross examined Admiral Martin:—
_Q._ Could I have pursued the enemy on the morning of the 24th, without separating the rest of the squadron from the _Windsor Castle_ and prizes, and from the frigates which had them in tow?
_A._ Certainly not, without separating from the prizes; and not under a press of sail, without separating from the _Windsor Castle_.
_Q._ Did I not always place myself between the enemy and the _Windsor Castle_ and crippled ships, while in tow?
_A._ It appeared to me to be the intention of Sir Robert Calder to keep company with them, from the time of the action, till they separated by signal.
_Q._ You understood that for their protection?
_A._ Certainly.
_Q._ Was not the British squadron always placed by me between the enemy and the port of Ferrol, as long as the enemy remained in sight?
_A._ We certainly were between them; but whether the position was taken for that purpose or not, I cannot say.
Captain Philip Charles Durham, of the _Defiance_; Captain Henry Inman, of the _Triumph_, who were also both in the action, were the other two principal witnesses; their testimony did not add much to the weight of the prosecution. After their evidence was given, the court adjourned to Thursday, the 26th of December, 1805, when Sir Robert Calder delivered in his defence, and requested that it might be read by a friend (Mr. Gaselee),[22] and the court intimating their consent, the same was read. It opened thus:—
“MR. PRESIDENT, AND GENTLEMEN OF THE COURT,—I appear before you in a singular, I may almost say an unprecedented, situation. Having served my king and country, not only without reproach, but, I may add, with some degree of reputation, for upwards of forty-six years, during which I have been more than once honoured with marks of approbation from my sovereign; having for the last ten months been employed on a most severe and critical service, without once being in port; and having in the course of it, with a very inferior fleet, forced a superior one of the enemy, who had the advantage of wind and situation, into action, and obtained a decisive victory over them, I felt myself impelled to solicit the present inquiry, for the purpose of vindicating my honour and my character from a variety of injurious and unfounded aspersions which have been cast upon me, in consequence of the not having renewed the engagement during the two days that the enemy afterwards remained in sight. The consciousness of my having done my duty, would, however, have induced me to treat these aspersions with contempt, had they not become so general that I was apprehensive that silence on my part would be construed into an acknowledgment of their truth, and an admission of my own misconduct; I found myself, therefore, under the necessity of applying to the Lords of the Admiralty, to order an inquiry into my conduct, that I might be enabled to state publicly the reasons which actuated it throughout, and to refute the illiberal and unfounded assertions which had been made against me. To this they have been pleased to assent; and although, in a subsequent letter of the 10th of November to that which accompanies the order for your assembling, I requested that the court might be empowered ‘to inquire into the whole of my conduct, even prior to my falling in with the enemy, while in their presence, and subsequent thereto,’ they have thought it right to confine it to _the 23rd of July, and my subsequent conduct and proceedings_, until I finally lost sight of the enemy’s ships, and to direct me to be tried for not having done my utmost to renew the engagement, and to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which the charge asserts it was my duty to engage. I consider this, therefore, as a declaration by their lordships, that this is the only part of my conduct upon which any particle of doubt can by possibility attach, or of which any explanation can be requisite. At the same time, however, I cannot but lament that the inquiry is so limited; as it prevents my giving evidence of the circumstances of the action, which I have no doubt I should have proved to have been such as to add to the reputation of the British navy.
“As to defending myself against this charge, I trust I shall be able to satisfy the court and the public, that the not renewing the engagement, if it was practicable to have done it, was not only justifiable, but the most proper and prudent course, under all the circumstances, to be adopted; and that the attempting to force a renewal of the action, might not only have endangered the safety of my own fleet, but eventually that of the country itself; I shall request the indulgence of the court, to be permitted to enter fully into all the circumstances, and to lay before them the particular situation in which I was placed, the orders I had from time to time received, and the reasons which induced me not to attempt a renewal of the action; confident that when I have done so, all the prejudices that have been hitherto entertained, will be dissipated, and that by your judgment I shall be restored to the good opinion of my country,—that country for which I have bled, and for which I have conquered.
“Before, however, I enter into the particular statement, permit me to make an observation or two on the specific charge, which is the principal object of your inquiry. It does not range itself precisely within any of the Articles of War, though it in part adopts the language of one of them. It assumes as a principle, that it was my duty to renew the engagement, and to endeavour to take or destroy every ship of the enemy.
“I am ready to admit, that it is so much the duty of an officer to engage the enemy wherever he meets with them, that it is incumbent upon him to explain satisfactorily why he does not; but, in making that explanation, it is not necessary for him to prove the physical impossibility of doing so. It may be possible, and yet there may be very many reasons why he should not. Indeed, the absurdity of a contrary position is such, that it would be an idle waste of time to trouble the court with many observations upon it.
“They will, however, permit me to observe, that mine is not the only instance in which a British fleet has laid in sight of that of the enemy without renewing the engagement.
“In proof of this assertion, if it be necessary, I need only recal to your memory, out of many others, the example of two very great and gallant officers, who after obtaining most brilliant victories over the enemy, did not think themselves justified in bringing them a second time to action, although they were in sight of them fully as long as I was. The two meritorious officers to whom I allude are, Earl Howe, in the action of the 1st of June, 1794, and Earl St. Vincent, in that of the 27th of February, 1797. Of the latter, I am competent to speak from my own knowledge, having had the honour to serve under his lordship as captain of the fleet in that engagement.
“Of the propriety of the conduct of these noble lords, in both instances, no doubt has at any moment been entertained by any body. They certainly exercised a sound discretion upon that occasion; but it may not be improper for me to remark, that, although the advantages they had acquired were certainly superior to mine; that mine was a situation in which it was in every respect more necessary to exercise that discretion, which, in every case, must be vested in the commander of a squadron, to judge of the propriety or impropriety of offering battle to a superior fleet. In the instances above-mentioned there was no other force to contend with, no other quarter from which an attack was to be apprehended, than the fleets which had been already engaged. In mine, it behoved me to be particularly on my guard against the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, both which, I had reason to believe, were out, and _one of which appears to have been actually at sea_, and to which the squadron opposed to me might easily have given notice of their situation, as will be hereafter more fully stated.
“With these observations I shall dismiss this part of the case for the present, and proceed to lay before the court a statement of the facts, to which I am to request their serious attention.”
The Vice-Admiral then went into a complete detail of his conduct prior to, at, and after the action. He thus referred to the actual battle:—
“On the 22nd of July, about noon, the combined squadrons came in sight. Their force, consisting of _twenty sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs_, a much greater force than, as I before stated, Admiral Cornwallis supposed them to consist of. And it appears, from Lord Gardner’s letter to me of the 6th of July, that when seen off the Diamond Rock, at Martinique, on the 16th of May, they consisted of sixteen sail of the line, and six frigates.
“My force consisted of _fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, the Frisk cutter, and Nile lugger_.
“Notwithstanding this superiority, and notwithstanding they had the advantage of the wind, I forced them to action. The general result of it you are already acquainted with. As it is not particularly the object of your inquiry, it is unnecessary to take up your time with observations upon it.
“Amidst the numerous prejudices that have assailed me, I have never yet heard the slightest insinuation to my disadvantage, either as to the mode of the fleet being carried into, or conducted in action. The victory certainly was ours, and most decisively so. I have only to lament that the weather did not afford an opportunity of making it more complete. Such was the valour and intrepidity of my second in command, and of every officer and man of my squadron, that, but for the weather, I am satisfied it would have been so. As it was, there are but few instances, and those of modern date, in which _even equal_ numbers have been so successful....”
His defence concluded thus:—
“The question before you is a great and momentous one,—it affects every officer who has been, or at any time may be, in a situation of command. Miserable, indeed, must be their condition if they are to be censured for the fair and honest exercise of the discretion necessarily resulting from such a situation. I have ever felt, that in my case, I have exercised it wisely and beneficially; I still feel so, and were I again placed in the same situation, I should act in the same manner; unless this court, putting themselves in the situation I then was, and considering all the circumstances that at that time presented themselves to my consideration, and the various objects to which my attention was necessarily directed, shall tell me I have acted erroneously. This I trust they will not do.
“If, in the discussion of this question, I may be allowed to look to subsequent events, they, I think, will fully justify the line of conduct I adopted. By it I was enabled, after receiving a reinforcement, to pursue the combined squadrons to Cadiz, and thereby perhaps to have laid the foundation of that glorious victory (Trafalgar) which we have so recently celebrated. Believe me, gentlemen, the circumstance of having, by the various calumnies which have been spread, been put under the necessity of soliciting the present enquiry, and thereby been prevented from being a sharer in the glories of that day, has been no small addition to the various sufferings I have undergone.
“These sufferings, I trust, will now have had their period, and the opinion of this court will, I flatter myself, confirm me in that estimation with the profession and the public, which I have for so many years enjoyed, and to restore me unsullied that fair fame and reputation which has on this occasion been so cruelly and unjustly attacked.”
In support of the defence, the Gazette and several official letters were read, approving his conduct throughout the encounter. Nine officers, the Hon. Captain Gardner, the Hon. Captain Legg, Captain Boyles, Captain Lechmere, Captain Brown, Captain Cuming, Captain Griffiths, Captain Elphinstone-Fleming, and Lieutenant Warrand, and the Rev. John Souter, chaplain of the _Prince of Wales_ (Admiral Calder’s ship), all witnesses of the engagement, spoke strongly in favour of the Vice Admiral, and bore out the view that he could not renew the engagement. The evidence of each is so nearly alike that I need here only give the statement of one or two.
In Captain Lechmere’s examination Sir Robert Calder asked:—
_Q._ Did the enemy ever chase or make any attempt to force me to action on the 23rd of July?
_A._ No.
_Q._ Could I have forced the enemy to action on the 23rd of July, if they had chosen to avoid it?
_A._ No.
_Q._ Did the enemy appear to you to have sustained any considerable damage to their masts and yards?
_A._ None in their masts. They shifted a top-sailyard or two, and that, I believe, was the utmost.
_Q._ Was the British fleet always kept between the enemy and Ferrol as long as they continued in sight?
_A._ Till the afternoon of the 24th we were always nearer Ferrol, than the enemy was.
_Q._ Could they then have fetched Ferrol?
_A._ Certainly not, the wind was then N.E. and by E.
_Q._ If I had gone towards the enemy on the 24th, could I have overtaken them, if they had chosen to avoid me, without approaching so near the shore between Ferrol and Cape Finisterre, as to have enabled them to have communicated by land signals with Ferrol?
_A._ No.
Captain W. Cuming, of the _Prince of Wales_, was asked by Sir Robert Calder:—
_Q._ As you were near my person during the whole time of the action of the 22nd, was any part of my conduct to be attributed to fear, or a want of zeal for his majesty’s service?
_A._ Most certainly not.
_Court._—Captain Cuming, what number of the British ships appeared to you, on the morning of the 24th, incapable of sailing in line-of-battle or order of sailing?
_A._ I imagine the whole, except the _Windsor Castle_, might have been formed in line-of-battle.
_Q._ If the _Windsor Castle_ had been taken in tow, considering the relative situation of the two fleets, could the British squadron have renewed the action on the 24th, the enemy declining so to do?
_A._ Certainly not.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral decline the action, either on the 23rd or 24th, if the enemy had been inclined to renew it?
_A._ He did not.
_Sir R. Calder._—Mr. President, I conceive Captain Cuming to be the only person competent to speak to the question I put to him, or I should have no difficulty in submitting the same to every captain in the fleet.
Notwithstanding this testimony, and to the surprise of most present and the public generally, the court came to an adverse decision. Its judgment was this:—
“The court is of opinion, that the charge of not having done his utmost to renew the said engagement, and to take or destroy every ship of the enemy, has been proved against the said Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, that it appears that his conduct has not been actuated either by cowardice or disaffection, but has risen solely from error in judgment, and is highly censurable, and doth adjudge him to be severely reprimanded; and the said Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly.”
The _Gentleman’s Magazine_ of the time thus records the effect of this judgment upon Calder:
“Upon the sentence being pronounced, Sir Robert Calder appeared deeply affected—he turned round, and retired without a word. He was accompanied by a great number of friends, and, on descending from the deck of the _Prince of Wales_ into his barge, scarcely lifted up his head, which was apparently bowed down by the weight of the sentence upon him. He is in his sixtieth year; forty-six of which he has passed in the service of his country.”