Part 7

Here as everywhere, the real question is how much importance is to be conceded to formal drill. The important thing to be kept in mind is that drill is to be considered, not as an end in itself, but only as a means to an end. It is inevitable that it should happen from time to time that a few individual pedants, who, moreover, have not kept the prospect of war steadily in view, should go astray. It will be the duty of the superior officers in charge of these matters to see that these deviations do not lead us too far away from the proper goal of all training. It will be their duty to see that it does not happen that--to use a phrase of Scharnhorst--"the mechanical heads triumph," and they must constantly bear in mind that success in war falls only to him who is capable of emancipating himself from the bonds of custom when the occasion demands.

We must not carry too far our cult of tradition. Blind adherence to tradition in the place of a living continuous development is an evil. A great and proud tradition is a wonderfully invigorating thing in an army, and nothing can take the place of it, but it ought not to be nurtured for its own sake, but for the sake of the firmness and stability which it gives to the army as a whole.

The years of exhaustion which followed the great war-period at the beginning of the nineteenth century were not calculated to inspire a warlike spirit in the Prussian army and to shape its training with a view to the needs of war. Hence a pronounced tendency in the direction of review tactics very soon manifested itself. This phenomenon has frequently occurred after wars of long duration, and it is easily understandable. But it is all the more important that we should be on our guard against its reappearance. The ambition of Frederick the Great to see that "admirable discipline" of his troops, which had become relaxed in the course of the Seven Years' War, once more restored allowed him to overlook many an extravagance which the resurgent drill-devil provoked in the army. His own thoughts, as his later writings prove, were always concerned with the needs of actual war and the most glorious side of the soldierly profession, but his generals became more and more immersed in the minor arts of the drilling-ground. The uneventful course of the Bavarian War of Succession was not calculated to diminish the pedantry of peace drill.

The tendency in the direction of review tactics, which again became predominant in the first decades following the War of Liberation, had begun to manifest itself in a peculiar way during the war, even in the Prussian army, and first of all in the Guards. It was our brotherhood in arms with the Russians which resulted in the marked predominance of parade drill (as though it were not a means to an end, but in itself the end of training), and with it a tendency to triviality. The manœuvres in the environments of Berlin were, under Frederick William III., merely spectacles; they degenerated for the most part into mere military sports. The Tsar Alexander and his brothers all took the same unspeakable delight in military pedantry, and it could not but happen that, in view of the intimate ties of blood and friendship which existed between the Courts of Petrograd and Berlin, similar tendencies should have been transmitted to Prussia. Thus that training which had been originally derived from Prussian models, though endowed with greater rigour after the manner of the Tsar Paul, which, moreover, was organised entirely with a view to outward show in a manner quite opposed to the old Prussian models, was reintroduced into Prussia in this distorted form.

Under Scharnhorst's general rules for manœuvres on a large scale, pre-arrangement of the course the manœuvres were to take was declared to be inadmissible; but, after the great war-period, parade manœuvres, the critical moments of which were exactly planned out beforehand, were once again revived. The brief and concise Regulations of 1812 seemed to those in charge of military affairs too simple for peace-time. General Krauseneck, a distinguished collaborator in the drawing-up of the Regulations and afterwards Chief of the General Staff, discovered, when he took over the command of a division in 1821, that quite a number of supplementary orders had been added, and he found himself compelled to protest against them. He writes[7]:

"We had never doubted that time and the experience of war might entail alterations, and that simplifications might be effected, but we never dreamed that the Regulations--in which we had aimed at the greatest possible brevity and clearness, as one of the most essential requirements--would, after a war which had been conducted to a glorious conclusion, be criticised as insufficiently detailed and precise. It is not only useless, it is harmful, to aim at excessive hair-splitting preciseness in the case of every order, and to strive after uniformity with a scrupulousness that borders on pedantry. Such a uniformity can never be attained, and, even if it could be attained, it would not repay the trouble and energy expended upon it."

General Krauseneck was of opinion that uniformity in matters of detail was rather injurious than otherwise, and he insisted that the greatest possible freedom as regards the means for attaining the desired end had the result of infusing spirit and energy into the men.

Fortunately it was not to happen that the "mechanical heads" should triumph once again in the Prussian army, as Scharnhorst had feared. The conditions had been completely altered since 1806. The introduction of universal service entailed on the officer educational duties which had not fallen to him in the old army. Also, although the army did not have an opportunity of gaining new experience of war on a large scale, the dangerous tendencies with which it had become infected were none the less successfully overcome. In this connection valuable service was rendered by the Prince of Prussia. His clear understanding in regard to military matters enabled him to form a very just estimate of the limits within which a rational training by means of drill ought to be confined, and this at a time when a one-sided training, with a view principally to the requirements of parades, seemed still to be completely in the ascendent. In notes which he made in the year 1840,[8] the Prince laid down principles which still hold good at the present day. He wrote: "The sole purpose of the drilling-ground is, in my opinion, to achieve order. If the spirit of order exists in a troop, it is possible to do anything with it; without order nothing is possible." The parade step, and the preparatory practice for it, the Prince held to be indispensable, "if," he says, "we are to have troops and not a mere assembled mob." Thus the Prince assigned to the parade the importance which properly belongs to it, and to which it can justly lay claim even at the present day. A very careful training by means of drill is an indispensable preparation. Therefore, in the same notes, the Prince says further in regard to drill: "Uniformity is indispensable. Why should one be permitted to do his task well, and another to do it badly? ... Either we intend to have a trained troop or else a mob of undisciplined men. That is a point which must be settled." Further he says that the objectionable term "Trillen" is constantly applied to what is really no more than soldierly discipline, as opposed to rustic clownishness. The future Emperor expressed very finely his firm and unshakable confidence in the efficiency of the army for purposes of war when he said that suspicions ought not to be entertained concerning the spirit of the army merely because, in addition to its actual achievements, it presented a handsome outward appearance. "Any one who has had to do with the army for twenty years will have only one opinion on this head, namely, that the spirit and the will of the army are above all praise, and that such an _esprit de corps_ exists in it as never before."

It was not prejudice in favour of what was old and accustomed, nor mere routine, that caused the German army to preserve its "handsome outward appearance," but the recognition, based upon history, that any negligence in this respect constitutes a serious danger. Archduke Albert of Austria, in 1869, drew attention to the existence of such a danger in "the efforts of a subversive Press to turn to ridicule the discipline and strict regulations which are indispensable in every army."[9] In the fifties of last century the stimulating influence of Prince Frederick Charles made itself felt in the Prussian army. It was particularly effective, because here was the case of a royal prince who made it his aim to plan the training and education of the soldier directly with a view to actual warfare. The Prince succeeded in overcoming a far too narrow-minded preference for parade-drill and the affectations of the drilling-ground, although he insisted that a certain stiffness was in harmony both with our traditions and with our national character, and was also a good means of instilling discipline.

"It is the warlike spirit that decides," wrote the Prince in 1858,[10]" not the tactical form. The form must be elastic; it must not exercise compulsion in a certain direction. Every epoch has had its special tactical forms, and these have been connected with the warlike spirit of the age and with the nature of its equipment for war.... The more developed the warlike spirit in the individual soldier, the greater will be the energy of the whole mass, and the less will be the influence of the tactical form."

The importance which Prince Frederick Charles attached to the mutual relations between the leader and the troops is evident from the following words which he wrote in the year 1860. He says[11]:

"The general is the loved and respected chief, not a scolding, punishing task-master. When he addresses his troops (which he should do only seldom) all hearts beat faster. He must know how to touch those chords which produce a fine ring. He is pleasant and friendly with all his subordinates, and the more so according as they are the farther removed from him in rank. He has always a friendly word and a sympathetic greeting for the man in the ranks. Although they seldom see him at his work, and then only accidentally and when he rides past them, they none the less delight in his near presence and they are proud of him. He has rendered both the men and their officers susceptible to the inspiration which his presence, his glance, his words, and his bearing must infuse into them on the day of battle, and which must result in a trebling of their efforts. If then, in the fulness of their enthusiasm, they ask him eagerly, 'Sire, where is it your will that we should die?' then and only then has he succeeded in making the right impression upon them in time of peace."

That this impression was actually produced in our army in the sense which the Prince intended has been proved by the World War, for never was the question which he desired uttered with a more sublime devotion than it has been by our troops during this War.

There has been much talk in Germany of the so-called trench-spirit, and of the fine comradeship between officers and men. But it has been overlooked that this comradeship, based upon the loyal solicitude of the officers for their men, existed also before the War. It was merely expressed in a different way. The officer must make a difference in his behaviour towards the younger troops, who have to be trained and disciplined, and his behaviour towards the fully-trained and, in particular, the older men, whom he has to lead against the enemy. Moreover, it is only natural that, in the face of death, a greater equality should prevail between superiors and subordinates. But the officer stands just as much above his subordinates in the trenches as elsewhere. The lack of officers after the heavy losses in August, 1914, made itself very seriously felt, and even men who had been brave hitherto failed occasionally when the enemy fire suddenly deprived them of their leaders. Good relations between officers and men will and must remain after the War, but they must not be such as to be prejudicial to the authority of the superior officer. Our young men, who have outgrown paternal discipline in the course of the War and have rendered splendid services before their time, will stand in very special need of the rigorous training afforded by the army.

The officer must be "of that ruling race who exert a controlling influence, even if momentarily they are not within sight or hearing."[12] Field-Marshal Count Schwerin once declared that Fear and Love were the two instruments by which the soldier must be governed, and then added--and with manifest justice as applied to his time--that unfortunately Fear had to perform the lion's share. The case has, however, unquestionably been reversed as regards our age. Prince Frederick Charles, even in his day, would have nothing to do with the "scolding and punishing taskmaster."[13] Without dependence on the personality of the superior officer (though, of course, this presupposes a wholesome rigour in the latter), without enthusiasm for the work in hand, the results of military training will be merely superficial. The World War has demonstrated how very important it is that we should preserve all that military discipline which has proved its efficacy, but that at the same time we should enlist the services of the best men for this task.

"It is unjust to depreciate the reserves from the industrial districts and the big towns as compared with those from the rural districts. The latter may perhaps be endowed with greater physical fitness and endurance, but as regards those aptitudes in regard to present-day methods of warfare and the use of modern technical weapons for the purposes of war, which must be possessed even by the man in the ranks, the urban population, in view of their quicker intelligence, will undoubtedly possess certain advantages."[14]

If, before the War, certain prejudices on this head existed in the officers' corps, they have perished as the result of the War, equally with many others. It is our duty to concede full recognition to the human personality in all our troops. Present-day social conditions, no less than the achievements of our national army as a whole in the course of the War, demand this. A national army cannot be other than a democratic organisation. The task of the officers is in high degree a social task--social, that is to say, in an aristocratic sense; for what has rendered our army so efficient has been precisely the thoroughly aristocratic organisation of the officers' corps upon a democratic basis.

Prince Bülow says very justly in reference to Scharnhorst's army reforms:

"Through the material of the national army, an institution of a democratic nature, runs a thread of the modern aristocracy. The happy thought of making entry into the corps of officers contingent upon election by the corps of officers made it possible in the structure of the national army to take account of the structure of the nation. Probably nothing in the past, as in the present, has to such a degree assured the superiority of our army as the fact that the leading position, which is the natural due of those who rank highest in intellect and education, has been retained by them in the army.... The World War has shown that devotion and contempt of death are the common heritage of every German soldier. But it has also been a song of praise of mutual confidence between officers and men, such as the world has never seen.... The spirit of German militarism, as Prussia first developed it and Germany adopted it, is every whit as monarchical as it is aristocratic and democratic, and it would cease to be German and the mighty expression of German imperial military power and military efficiency if it were to change. If our enemies, to whom with God's help our militarism will bring defeat, abuse it, we know that we must preserve it, for to us it means victory and the future of Germany."[15]

The War has brought about an almost complete fusion of the officers' corps of the active army with the officers on the reserve list. We had fully recognised the importance of the tasks which, in case of war, must fall to the officers of the Reserves and the Landwehr, and for more than a decade prior to the War we had devoted special care to their training. This precaution has reached a rich reward. During the War, wherever the conditions made it possible, this training has been continued--especially in the case of the younger officers who had recently obtained their captaincies--by means of numerous courses of instruction organised behind the front. Though very satisfactory results were achieved by this means, it ought none the less to be borne in mind that only in connection with the officers' corps of the active army and under its guidance were the officers of the reserve able to render such valuable services to the Fatherland. The long duration of the War brought it about that the memory of their civilian calling became more and more effaced. They were completely absorbed into the organic entity of the troop; they became professional soldiers equally with the men; they acquired a training which they had lacked in peace-time, when their adoption of the profession of arms had been only an incidental experience. To the professional knowledge, which they gained in an increasing degree, was added all that intelligence and energy which characterise the German whenever he occupies a responsible position in a civilian calling. Thus the officers of the reserve soon exhibited no longer any difference from the officers of the active army. They may have exhibited less familiarity with routine duties, but this was equally the case with the younger officers of the standing army, who lacked for this purpose the necessary experience of active service, brilliant as was the example which they furnished to their troops during battle.

Moreover our regiments were commanded by staff officers who were considerably younger both in years and in experience of military service than was customary before the War in the case of these positions. We shall not see such young commanders in time of peace. This will not be prejudicial to the army, for in time of peace the qualities demanded from the commander of a regiment, in respect to the training of the officers' corps and the inner consolidation of the troop, are somewhat different from those required in time of war. In time of peace we need for this position fully-matured and self-assured personalities. On the other hand, it is just the officers occupying the middle status of regimental and battalion commanders who have been subjected to a severe strain in this War, a fact which should warn us not to allow officers to occupy these positions in peace-time after they have reached a certain age.

It proved advantageous and necessary not only to promote many excellent noncommissioned officers to officers' rank, but also frequently to extend the sphere for the replenishment of the officers' corps, in the case both of the regular army and the reserves, very considerably beyond the limits customary in time of peace. In doing this many prejudices were set aside, often with very beneficial results. At the same time it ought to be borne in mind that, in peace-time, no matter how insistently direct preparation for war is put in the first rank of importance, none the less all kinds of claims are made upon the officers which disappear in time of war, and therefore the choice of persons suitable for the position of officer is necessarily confined within narrower limits. We need not take into account here the question of pecuniary circumstances, but education, intellectual bias, and ambition do not suffice to render every individual fit for the position of officer.

The spirit of German militarism, which has enabled us to stand the test of the World War, and which we must preserve in the future, because with it our world-position stands or falls,--which, moreover is: "every whit as monarchical as it is aristocratic and democratic,"--rests ultimately on the building up of an officers' corps which shall be thoroughly efficient for purposes of war. For this purpose a sound aristocratic tradition is of the highest value. This is in no way connected with so-called Junkerdom and caste-feeling. Even in the case of the army of the young North American Republic, Washington demanded that only "gentlemen" should be given a commission. Aristocratic tradition, in the wider sense, is of the utmost service in the training of personalities. No profession stands in greater need of the latter than that of the officer. The choice of the most suitable man can, however, only be satisfactorily accomplished by means of the gradual replenishment of the officers' corps, and not by the arbitrary placing of all on the same level.

The warlike efficiency of the ruling class in Japan was essentially the result of the tradition which lived in the old Samurai families. Even the army of the first French Empire, in spite of the democratic notions which linked it with the time of the Republic, none the less did not lose all its connection with the army of the _ancien régime_. Napoleon made it his immediate endeavour to develop a new chivalry in his army, and to fill up the ranks of his officers from the families of the old nobility. In spite of the intense revolutionary and national feeling, republican tendencies alone could not have endowed the armies of the Revolution with the necessary stanchness. It was only the development of a military hierarchy and its consolidation in course of time, combined with the leadership of Napoleon and the great aims which he held up before his army, that raised the latter to supreme war-efficiency.

In any case the masses, as such, can never rule. If mob-rule is consequently an absurdity in a State, how much more so is it in an army. The army which Russia now proclaims to be a national army is by no means efficient for purposes of war. The words of Treitschke are significant here:

"A Republic is confronted with still more serious difficulties in the matter of a standing army. All history has shown that such an army, whose commissioned ranks are imbued with definite class feelings, will always be monarchically inclined."[16]

Only under the absolute command of a war lord can an army achieve a really vigorous development. It cannot be emphasised too often what an immense debt the Prussian army--and therewith all Germany--owes to the Prussian Kings.

Napoleon declared, when he was at St. Helena: "Armies are monarchical through and through."[17] This had been clearly exhibited in his own army, above all in the Imperial Guard, and in the spirit which animated the latter. The achievements of the French army under their great Emperor, and, equally so, those of the last world war, rested on a surer foundation than the _Spectateur Militaire_, with its empty phrase-mongering, was willing to admit, when it declared at the beginning of the sixties of last century[18]: