Part 8

"The French soldier sees in all his officers, from the sub-lieutenant to the marshal, merely his equals; he has the clear and certain conviction that he is inferior to them only in military rank. Neither training nor education nor birth produces an essential difference between them. The sense of equality is so strong that the sense of the ego completely disappears under the absolute domination of the law of discipline. To what enemy could such soldiers be inferior? What human might could successfully resist such soldiers as these, soldiers who stand on an equality with their officers and who are all heroes?"

This is an instance of that thoroughly French notion of the supreme blessing of equality. How little it really signifies, and how far it is from being equivalent to freedom, has been demonstrated by the World War. Instead of a truly liberal State, we see in the French Republic a country enslaved by a plutocracy and governed by the arbitrary will of its English ally. Moreover, every army should esteem itself fortunate in possessing its own particular notion of discipline. We have in any case had sufficient experience of the blessings which our own discipline brings in its train to the welfare of the German Fatherland, and we intend to hold fast to it in the future.

Since the reforms of Scharnhorst, it has been a principle with us that the officer is raised above the men in the ranks both by education and training. Since the standard of education of the mass of the people has been considerably raised during the last hundred years, it is only logical that higher demands should be made from the officers in this respect than was the case at the time of the War of Liberation. Only there must be general recognition of the fact that this education does not by any means consist in the piling up of a mass of learning. The school education of our youth must be such as to furnish them with a sound foundation on which to build up later their knowledge of life. Experience has taught us that the dispute about the superior merit of a humanistic education as a preparation for life is really of very little importance. The former pupils of the various educational establishments do not exhibit any marked differences from one another as the result of their training, and this for the reason that a man begins really to learn only after he has left school. Not till then does he perceive things in their true relations; provided only that his school has furnished him with a basis upon which to build up his further knowledge. The War, which has reduced so many things to their true value, has also revealed clearly the difference between genuine education and mere acquisition of knowledge. Every one among us who has talked with our soldiers, whether at home or in the field, has found reason to rejoice in their sound judgment. Often one could not help feeling that their simple understanding had preserved a higher degree of impartiality and freshness than is commonly to be found in the so-called educated classes. This was, of course, by no means a new experience for any officer who had known how to find the way to the hearts of his men. The modest learning of those who have been educated in elementary schools and have not had a complete secondary education is frequently more thorough as far as it goes, provided that they are endowed with intelligence and the desire for knowledge. They are contented, according to their lights, and frequently give evidence of an astonishingly profound cultivation of the qualities of the heart, and this is in fact the true source of their courage and steadfastness in time of trouble. Those who have had the benefit of an academic training have certainly not the smallest reason to look down upon such men as these.

In the second volume of his _History of Germany during the Nineteenth Century_, Treitschke says, concerning the period following the Wars of Liberation:

"Because they avoided that soul-destroying education which provides a smattering of everything, the classical schools succeeded in kindling in their pupils an enduring delight in classical antiquity and the desire for a liberal and humane culture. Moreover, as yet, that disease of modern universities, the examination-craze, was almost entirely unknown. Those old and famous homes of classical learning, the Fürstenschulen of Saxony and the convent schools of Württemberg, sent on their senior scholars to the university, as soon as it seemed to their teachers that they were ripe for this, and the State made no objections."[19]

Since the year 1882, when Treitschke wrote these words, many improvements have been made in our higher education, and Treitschke himself admits that the system of regular State examinations, which has existed in Prussia since the time of Frederick William I, even if it is more mechanical, is at the same time more equitable, and is, in fact, a necessity in the case of a big State. The meaning of this foremost champion of Germanism is, however, obviously this, that a liberal and humane education is not absolutely bound up with the passing of the leaving examination.

We shall do well in the army if we endeavour, as hitherto, to see to it that as large a number as possible of ensigns and cadets shall pass their leaving examination before they enter the service; on the other hand, in view of the pre-eminently practical nature of their calling, we need not demand this unconditionally of the officers. This should, at any rate, be left to time, especially as the higher schools will have to endeavour to simplify their curriculum by reducing the number of subjects. A consideration of the increased demands which will undoubtedly have to be made upon our young men in respect to physical culture will in itself necessitate this. This applies to the modern schools and to the upper modern schools (especially to the latter) just as much as to the classical schools. The younger seats of learning, in their anxiety to raise themselves to the educational level of the classical schools, have frequently lost sight of the fact that it is they above all who should devote their attention to training with a view to practical life and not with a view to a high standard of scholarship.

These questions may appear to have little to do with the War, and it would be narrow-minded to endeavour to make considerations which have resulted from the War the basis of our educational system. No one, however, will dispute the fact that the World War has given us cause to subject our national life to a thorough examination in all its departments and that it must mark the beginning of all kinds of new developments. Moreover, the training of our youth is more or less closely related to the development of our armed force.

In the case of the education of a future officer, the same demands need not be made as in the case of a young man who intends to devote himself to learned studies, or to the investigation of technical problems. It must, however, be such as not only to qualify him for the training and leadership of his men, but, above all, it must give him that self-assurance in dealing with any situation, which is required of an educated man. In regard to the further education of the officer, intellectual development in all the departments which directly or indirectly concern the soldierly profession is of great importance in relation to his military duties, but first and foremost in importance is the training of character, the cultivation of a distinguished mode of thought. In the time of Napoleon, it was said that every one of his soldiers carried the field-marshal's baton in his knapsack. With us this is true, in a metaphorical and a better sense, of every officer. He can and must strive to attain that "harmonious combination of abilities" which Clausewitz declared to be the characteristic of military genius. Thereby he will guard himself against narrow-mindedness and the danger of that mechanical mode of thought which the predominance of technical science at the present day is apt to induce.

"Technical science and inward culture, or even human happiness, have little connection with one another. In the midst of vast technical achievements, it is possible for humanity to sink back into complete barbarism."

This opinion, which was expressed by Professor Werner Sombart,[20] in spite of his high appreciation of the progress of technical science in other respects, has, unfortunately, been to a large extent confirmed by the World War. The officer must possess a thorough appreciation of technical science, but this must not mislead him into neglecting the study of men. Knowledge of men is the fundamental condition of successful leadership. Hence the study of history--above all of military history--is of the highest value. It is an inexhaustible source of instruction, an unequalled source of consolation in the midst of the monotony which is an inevitable circumstance of service in time of peace, for it keeps the eyes fixed at the same time on the grandeur and sublimity of the soldier's calling, and it encourages that just appreciation of the moral element in war which in the course of a long peace is apt to be lost sight of.

Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen, in the latter years of his life, expressed his regret that he had not been able earlier, before he became Chief of the General Staff, to spare the time for the study of military history which he could now devote to it. "Despise mere reason and abstract science," he said once, placing his hand upon a book which lay before him, while he expressed his opinion of those who imagine that they can do anything merely with the aid of their own experience. And at the Centenary celebrations at the Staff College he uttered the following memorable words:

"Before everyone who wishes to become a commander-in-chief, there lies a book entitled _The History of War_. It is not always, I must admit, very amusing. It involves the toiling through a mass of by no means exciting details. But by their means we arrive at facts, often soul-stirring facts, and at the root of it lies the perception of how everything has happened, how it was bound to happen, and how it will again happen."

The General Staff, which had been educated in the school of this man, has done him no discredit. His training has up to the present triumphantly stood the test to which it has been subjected in this War. Not only have the officers of the General Staff shown themselves capable of filling much higher positions than those for which they were intended in respect of age and length of service; but also for numerous appointments on the General Staff it has been necessary to have recourse to officers who before the War were still at the Staff College, or to those who, in the course of the War, had proved their worth as adjutants attached to the higher staffs. The very substantial augmentations of the large troop-units during the War necessitated this. The fact that these officers have proved themselves equal to their tasks is in itself a convincing argument on behalf of that uniform mental training with a view to war which prevailed in the army before the War, and which extended far beyond the limits of the General Staff. The heritage of Field-Marshal von Moltke was well administered and added to in the hands of Schlieffen. And Schlieffen's successor, Colonel-General von Moltke, not only rendered great service by increasing our armed force; he also rendered the further service that he always realised the importance of training the officers of the General Staff with a view to war, and that he steadily and clearsightedly pursued this end.

Not only at the Front and on the higher staffs have the officers of all arms shown themselves equal to their tasks, but also behind the Front, on the lines of communication, and on home service, where they have filled positions of authority for which they had received no real training. Regular officers, half-pay officers, and officers of the reserve have equally held their own; and the explanation of this lies in the fact that all military efficiency is nothing less than the exercise of sound human intelligence.

A consideration of these facts may well afford us satisfaction and be accounted a proof that we have worked on the right lines in all these departments, but it must not lead us into imagining that we have reached the pinnacle of perfection. Here also it will be necessary later on to build upon the basis of the new experiences we have gained. We must not overlook the fact that the long duration of the War, and, in part also, the stationary conditions which it engendered, furnished all those who took part in it with abundant opportunity for training and study and rendered it easier for them to become familiar with the duties of their positions. On the other hand, the World War has revealed the variety of the tasks which may devolve upon the officer in war, tasks for which, as far as is possible, he must be prepared in time of peace. Therefore a deepening as well as an extending of his professional training is to be aimed at. A training at the Staff College will never be possible for more than a limited number. The War Schools, even if (as is urgently to be desired) their course of training is extended over a longer period and their programme of study somewhat enlarged in scope, none the less cannot furnish more than a foundation for the special knowledge which the officer must possess and which he must afterwards acquire. This after-training was before the War for the most part left completely to the individual. But not everyone is capable of achieving it unaided, especially in the department of military history, which can never be more than skimmed over in the War Schools.

Therefore it seems desirable that an intermediate stage between the War School and the Staff College should be established, in the form, say, of nine-month courses, which it would be obligatory upon all the senior lieutenants to attend. The mere fact that, during the World War, the regular course of training in the War Schools has had to be replaced by an abbreviated course makes such an institution very desirable, since it may prove impossible to arrange that all those who have been promoted to officer's rank during the long War should subsequently go through the training provided in the War Schools. Those who had concluded their intermediate course with the greatest distinction would be sent on to the Staff College, at which in their case a two-years' course would suffice. By this means, the Staff College would be able to confer the benefit of its instruction upon a number of picked officers larger than that customary hitherto by a third as much again. The Staff College will remain, as before, the special nursing-ground for the General Staff, the higher adjutancy, and the military teaching-staff. The other officers, who, after the completion of the above-mentioned nine-months' course, go back to the Front, will in any case have gained the advantage of a more thorough education, both as regards special training for their profession and general culture.

In order to achieve this, it would be advisable that these institutions should be established in university towns, so that the services of the professors who would there be available might be turned to account. This world economic War has revealed the necessity that officers should make themselves so far familiar with political, constitutional, economic, and social questions as to enable them to form an independent judgment about these subjects. The character of the whole modern life of our State makes it desirable that the officer should keep himself in touch with these questions, though he need not for that reason become a politician. Frederick the Great, even in his day, wrote: "I expect above all that a general shall be an honest man and a good citizen of the State; without these qualities, all his ability and all his skill in war will be rather harmful than profitable."[21] By this the King implies that military science and political science are closely related. We must contrive to kindle in the officer, while he is still young, an interest in this relation, so that he may be capable, in the training of his men, of enlightening them from time to time upon questions of civic and economic life. Short, well-written primers might be of great value here.

That "untiring application" which King Frederick demanded from his officers and which has also always been demanded of us, must be insisted on more than ever after the War. Its intellectual side is by no means the least important. The training of the mind by assiduous study is a necessity not only for the officers of the General Staff, but also for those who wish to occupy with advantage any high position in the army. We have no use for officers with a scholastic training, but we do need officers with well-trained minds. Napoleon felt keenly the lack of such, and, even at St. Helena, he placed the Austrian General Staff above his own.[22] As long as theory does not set itself--to use the words of Clausewitz--"in opposition to intelligence," it can only be useful, for it is then no longer theory in the vulgar sense. Even the talent of the most famous representatives of the military art--Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke--had a theoretical foundation, but this foundation consisted only in education of the mind, which had been developed and enlarged as a result of their own experience of life and of war. In any case, the important thing can never be the encouragement of purely theoretical knowledge in the army, but rather the transforming of knowledge into practice. Willisen[23] has said justly: "It is always a long step from knowledge to ability to act, but none the less it is a step from knowledge and not from ignorance."

[1] _Bemerkungen über den Einfluss der verbesserten Feuerwaffen_.

[2] _On War_, i., 187. [_Vom Kriege, III. B._, 6 Kap.]

[3] Reisner v. Lichtenstern. _Die Macht der Vorstellung im Kriege_. Berlin, 1902.

[4] _Echo de Paris_, November 23, 1915.

[5] July 16, 1916.

[6] _La Grande Armée de 1813_. Paris, 1871.

[7] Malachowski. _Scharfe Taktik und Revuetaktik_. Berlin, 1902. E. S. Mittler und Sohn.

[8] _Militärische Schriften Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen_. I., No. 336ff. Bemerkung zu einer Denkschrift Boyens.

[9] _Ueber Verantwortlichkeit im Kriege_.

[10] Wolfgang Foerster. _Prinz Friedrich Karl von Preussen. Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben_. I., p. 170. Stuttgart und Leipzig, 1910. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt.

[11] _Ibidem_, i., p. 219.

[12] Reisner v. Lichtenstern. _Schiessausbildung und Feuer der Infanterie im Gefecht_. Berlin, 1895. E. S. Mittler und Sohn.

[13] See p. 164.

[14] Freytag-Loringhoven. _Die Grundbedingungen kriegerischen Enfolges_. 1914. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. (The War has completely justified this view.)

[15] _Imperial Germany_, pp. 154-6. London, Cassell & Co., Ltd. [_Deutsche Politik_, 1916, pp. 163-4.]

[16] Heinrich v. Treitschke, _Politics_, vol. ii., p. 299-300. London, Constable & Co. Ltd. New York, The Macmillan Company. [_Politik_, II., p. 275.]

[17] Gourgaud. _Ste. Hélène_, i.

[18] Quoted from Jähns, _Das französische Heer von der grossen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart_. Leipzig, 1873.

[19] Heinrich von Treitschke. _Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert_. Vol. ii., p. 10.

[20] _Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19 Jahrhundert_, 3d edn., p. 134. Berlin, Georg Bondi. 1913.

[21] _General-Prinzipien vom Kriege. Von denen Talents, welche ein General haben muss_. Taysen, Friedrich der Grosse. Militärische Schriften, p. 106.

[22] Gourgaud, Ste. Hélène, ii., p. 416.

[23] _Theorie des grossen Krieges_.

VI

STILL READY FOR WAR

The war-readiness of Germany had been very much increased by the votings of the last great Army Bills, together with the carrying out of the programme of naval construction. And yet we have been obliged to organise new formations on a very large scale, and to develop our armaments industry to an extent which had never been anticipated. The levy on capital of a thousand million marks, measured on the scale of the costs of the War, now no longer seems to us the enormous sacrifice which caused doubts as to whether it could be demanded of the German people. The War has, on the one hand, revealed to us the full financial strength of Germany; but, on the other hand, it has proved that additional expenditure on the army at the right time would have been profitable. We should then have saved in this War not only milliards of marks, but in all probability we should have had to offer up a far less considerable sacrifice of men. In view of the central position of the Fatherland, larger expenditure on the land-army, in addition to the necessary expenditure on the fleet, was absolutely essential. The demands which in this connection were put before the Reichstag were but a feeble minimum of what was really desirable, as the World War has proved.

The fact that in peace time the high demands of the Army Estimates encountered all kinds of objections, must certainly not be overlooked, more especially in view of the fact that it is easy, in the case of a war the vast extent and long duration of which could not have been foreseen, to declare after the event that our armaments were not sufficient. The fact, however, still remains, and it is important that we should not lose sight of it, for we have to learn from it the lesson that in future we must disregard every objection, and must see to it that the disproportion between the credits which are asked for and what has to be done in case of war shall in any case never again be so great as it was in the World War. By means of the last Army Bills, which called to the colours a number of men fit for service whom it had not been possible to enlist hitherto, we had already before the War taken steps to restore to compulsory military service the character of universality which belonged to it under law, but which, with the increase of the population, just as formerly in Prussia prior to the army reforms of 1859, threatened more and more to be abandoned. We shall have to continue to pursue this road in future, quite apart from the necessary increase of garrison artillery and technical troops. Moreover, when the number of those who have fought in the Great War has dwindled, we shall have to aim at subjecting at least to a cursory training the men of military age who are at first rejected, but who in the course of the War have turned out to be fit for service, so that, when war breaks out, they may form a generous source of reserves. Only so can we arrive at a real national army, in which everyone has gone through the school of the standing army.