CHAPTER IX

THE AUDIENCIA AND THE GOVERNOR: THE AD INTERIM RULE

The most extensive non-judicial activity in which the audiencia

## participated at any time was its assumption of the provisional

government of the colony during vacancies in the governorship. Aside from the ten different occasions on which this was done, the audiencia very frequently assumed control of the government when the exigencies of defense and foreign conquest rendered necessary the temporary absence of the governor. This was true at irregular intervals during the administrations of Governors Pedro Bravo de Acuña (1602-1606), Juan de Silva (1609-1616), Juan Niño de Tavora (1626-1632), Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (1635-1644) and Diego Fajardo (1644-1653). The administrations of these several governors were characterized by extensive military operations, largely in a foreign field, and the audiencia not only took over governmental affairs but it assumed the obligations of defense during their absence. On such occasions, of course, the tribunal retained its exercise of judicial functions.

Since the audiencias in Perú and New Spain assumed the government much earlier than did the audiencia in the Philippines, and as the laws authorizing the rule of the audiencia were promulgated first to meet conditions in those viceroyalties, it seems advisable to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the establishment and development of this practice there. Having done this, we shall proceed to a study of the ad interim rule of the Audiencia of Manila, noting particularly the causes of the success or failure of its administration and the effect of this practice upon the subsequent relations of the audiencia and the governor.

The first law in the Recopilación authorizing the assumption of the government by an audiencia was promulgated as early as March 19, 1550. This law provided that in case of a vacancy in the office of Viceroy of Perú, the audiencia there should succeed to the governments of Perú, Charcas, Quito and Tierra Firme, and that the three last-named subordinate audiencias should obey the mandates of the Audiencia of Lima until a permanent successor to the viceroy was named. [579] This law was proclaimed again on November 20, 1606.

Even before the promulgation of the above law the audiencias of Lima and Mexico had assumed control of the government in their respective viceroyalties. Shortly after the death of Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror, an audiencia was sent to Perú, arriving at Lima in January, 1544, in company with Blasco Núñez Vela, the first viceroy. The rigidity and thoroughness with which this new executive enforced the New Laws which were entrusted to him met with the opposition of the residents of the colony, and the audiencia accordingly removed him from his position as viceroy and suspended the operation of the code referred to, assuming charge of affairs itself. [580] Its rule was brief, however, for on October 28, 1544, it invited Gonzalo Pizarro, the brother of the conqueror, into the city and turned the government over to him, proclaiming him Governor and Captain-General of Perú.

During the period from 1544 to 1551, until the arrival in Perú of Viceroy Mendoza, the audiencia exercised control of governmental affairs. It made and unmade captains-general and viceroys, irrespective of royal appointments. It suspended the New Laws of 1542 and its commands were obeyed. From 1550 to 1551 it governed alone. In these incidents we note that the audiencia actually assumed the government ad interim prior to the time of the promulgation of the law of March 19, 1550, exercising administrative as well as judicial powers, thirty-five years before the Audiencia of Manila was created. "To it (the audiencia) were confided in the beginning and later in the absence of the viceroy," writes Moses, "all matters with which governmental authority might properly deal." [581] He further states that "the audiencia in its executive capacity, failed to justify the expectations of the king, and a new order of things was introduced by the appointment of a viceroy" (Mendoza, April 17, 1535) for New Spain. [582]

These powers were not only exercised by the Audiencia of Lima, but also by a second tribunal which was created in 1549 at Santa Fé de Bogotá. The latter body was endowed permanently with both judicial and administrative powers, appealing important cases to the superior government at Lima. This audiencia had the status of a presidency. Its president was often captain-general, visitador, and senior magistrate, and in exercising the functions of these various offices he was in all respects the most powerful official in New Granada, always being able to enforce his will over the other magistrates. At times this official acted with entire independence of the Viceroy of Perú. [583] The exercise of military functions by this president and audiencia is especially to be noticed in the part they played in putting down the Pijáo Indian revolt in 1565. [584] On the whole, however, judging by the strife prevailing in the colony, the various struggles between the oidores and the president, and between the audiencia or president and the archbishop, the government could never have been considered successful. The official corruption which became apparent as a result of the pesquisas and residencias held during the rule of the Audiencia of Santa Fé could scarcely have encouraged the home government to entrust that tribunal with the administration of affairs in the future.

The defects referred to above in connection with the government of the Audiencia of Santa Fé did not deter the Spanish crown from founding the Audiencia of Charcas in 1559. This tribunal, "like the audiencias established elsewhere, exercised not only judicial, but also administrative powers." [585] It had jurisdiction over the neighboring city of Potosí. Again we may note the case of the Audiencia of Santiago de Chile, which was established on August 27, 1565. Its members arrived in 1567 and the audiencia was installed at Concepción "as the supreme court of the colony, and, at the same time, in accordance with the royal decree, it became the administrative head of the government. In this latter capacity it undertook to reorganize the military forces." Later, in 1568, Melchoir Bravo de Saravia assumed the office and functions of the governorship of Chile (1568-1575) and the audiencia became a judicial tribunal, without other attributes. [586]

We may gather from these various citations taken from the early history of the audiencias of South America that these tribunals not only exercised the authority of governing ad interim, but that they had permanent governmental and administrative powers as well. It would seem, as Professor Moses has suggested, that the original purpose of the Spanish government had been to entrust the executive and administrative functions in the dependencies to the audiencia, and that the endowment of the viceroys and captains-general with extensive executive powers was an expedient to which Spain was obliged to turn after the breakdown of the audiencia as an administrative agency. The main fact to be emphasized in this connection is that during the period of the promulgation of the laws which we are now studying, the minor audiencias were exercising regular governmental powers.

The Audiencia of Mexico, which was created in 1527 to check the excesses of Hernán Cortés, had participated in governmental affairs even before the events described above. This tribunal, which was composed of four magistrates, with the notorious Guzmán as president, conducted the residencias of Cortés and his followers, and after obtaining control of the government, administered affairs to suit its own convenience. [587] It was at this time, and as a result of these abuses, Bancroft tells us, that the Spanish government decided to establish a viceroyalty in New Spain, with a semiregal court and regal pretensions. A new tribunal was left in charge of governmental affairs while this reform was being inaugurated. This second audiencia governed with great satisfaction, correcting the abuses of its predecessor and devoting itself to various improvements. [588]

Although the audiencia of 1528-1535 exercised the administrative functions above mentioned, Bancroft brings forth no evidence in support of the theory that it was ever the royal intention to entrust the institution of the audiencia permanently with administrative authority. He states that as early as 1530, three years after the establishment of the first tribunal in Mexico, the sovereigns had already decided to establish a viceroyalty. Although the audiencia was entrusted with the government for a few years, the above facts would seem to indicate that this was only a temporary arrangement. The audiencia's chief attributes were judicial, and we have repeatedly noted that the principal object of its establishment, aside from the administration of justice, was to check the abuses of the captain-general.

Cortés retained his rank as captain-general after the audiencia was established. The conqueror was in reality reduced to a secondary position, and he was compelled repeatedly to acknowledge the supremacy of the audiencia. His commission was recognized by the tribunal on its arrival, but soon after its establishment the oidores exhibited a royal order requiring that "Cortés, in all his operations, should consult the president and oidores and act only on their approval." [589] Even in his field, as commander of the military forces, Cortés was subordinated to the tribunal, and the audiencia and the conqueror quarrelled bitterly over practically all matters which presented themselves for solution. The audiencia had been created to meet extraordinary and unusual conditions. It was the business of the tribunal to correct the abuses which had previously been inflicted on the colony by Cortés, and it did so. On the arrival of Mendoza in 1535, however, the audiencia surrendered the control of administrative affairs, and it did not assume them again, except in the regular way in conjunction with the viceroy, until it next served to administer the ad interim government. [590]

The first legal provision for the succession of the audiencia in Mexico, according to Bancroft, was contained in the royal instructions to Visitor Valderrama, who arrived in Mexico in 1563. These instructions, says Bancroft, provided that in the event of the death or inability of the viceroy to discharge his duties, the audiencia should rule temporarily. [591] This was indeed timely, in view of the death of Viceroy Velasco on July 31, 1564. The audiencia, which was legally authorized to take charge of the government, was under investigation when the death of the viceroy occurred, and the tribunal was dominated during the first half of its rule by the visitor, who, Bancroft tells us, was virtually viceroy. [592] Valderrama dismissed two of the oidores, and sent them to Spain. The audiencia was even less able to administer justice during the early part of its ad interim government than it had been when the viceroy was alive. After the departure of the visitor, however, the audiencia inaugurated a season of proscription and reprisal which bade fair to include every opponent of the oidores in the colony. Matters had reached a very unsatisfactory state, indeed, when the new viceroy, the Marqués de Falcés, arrived at Mexico on October 14, 1566. [593]

In view of the fact that the next important law dealing with the question of the succession was not promulgated until 1600, a continuance of this survey of affairs in New Spain will not be necessary. The audiencia there did not again assume the government until 1612, and then only for a very short period. We have already noticed the conditions under which the Audiencia of Mexico was created, and the various occasions on which it assumed charge of the government. Though entrusted with the government upon its establishment, the example set by three years of its unsatisfactory rule convinced the Spanish monarch of the unwisdom of entrusting such governmental authority to the audiencia permanently. Therefore, a viceroy was sent out in 1535, and it was not until 1563 that the first law was promulgated which provided for the temporary government by the audiencia when there was a vacancy in the office of viceroy. This was thirteen years after such a law had been promulgated for Perú, and fourteen years after an audiencia had been created, with all the functions of government, at Santa Fé de Bogotá.

The cédula of February 12, 1569, following in sequence that of March 5, 1550, provided that the faculty of filling vacancies among the oficiales reales, in case of death or removal from office, should rest with the viceroy, president, or the audiencia, if the latter body were governing. [594] This, of course, was a recognition of the principle of the assumption of the government by the audiencia. This law was not confined in its application to any particular territory, but was general in its scope and applicable wherever an audiencia existed. It was later confirmed by the cédula of August 24, 1619. [595]

The next law dealing with the subject of succession was promulgated on January 3, 1600. It applied especially to New Spain, and it provided that in case of a vacancy in the office of viceroy, either by death or by promotion, the audiencia should assume charge of the government of the provinces there, and it should execute the duties which ordinarily devolved upon the viceroy, performing them "as he could, would and ought to do." It furthermore ordered the subordinate Audiencia of Guadalajara, under such circumstances, to obey and fulfill the orders which the Audiencia of Mexico might give or send, in the same manner as it would do, were those orders issued by the viceroy. [596] Under a separate title on this same date the assumption of the government of the minor dependencies of Perú and New Spain by the respective audiencias was authorized in case of the illness or absence of the viceroy. In other words, this law authorized in New Spain the same procedure in case of the death or absence of the viceroy as had already prevailed in South America for half a century.

The above laws form a precedent for the subsequent authorization of the Audiencia of Manila to assume charge of the government on the death of the governor. This authorization was given on April 12, 1664, but the Audiencia of Manila, like those of Mexico and Lima, had already assumed the functions of the executive on four earlier occasions, and the king, in the cédula of 1664, merely recognized, with some qualifications, a practice which had been followed in the Philippines for half a century. A cédula dated as early as September 13, 1608, had authorized the nomination in advance by the Viceroy of New Spain of a resident of the Islands to assume the governorship on the death of the regular governor. [597] The intention of this law seems to have been to guard against the ills incident to a vacancy in the governorship by an arrangement whereby some person should be appointed in advance and thus be ready to assume the command without delay. Whatever the royal intentions may have been, this law was never effective in bringing about the benefits for which it was designed. In fact, this particular provision met with general dissatisfaction in the Philippines, and the audiencia, acting in accordance with the custom observed in other parts of Spain's dominions, continued to govern on the demise of the governor, ruling two or three years on some occasions, until the arrival of a temporary governor, sent from New Spain. So flagrantly was the prescribed method of procedure violated in the Philippines that in 1630, Visitor Francisco de Rojas y Ornate reminded the Council of the Indies of the existing law (that of 1608) and recommended that henceforth on the death of a governor the audiencia should have nothing to do with administration, but that one of three persons secretly designated by the viceroy should take over the government at once, thus eliminating all possibility of the interference of the tribunal. [598]

The irregularities and inconveniences arising from the inefficacy of the law of 1608 led to the promulgation of the cédulas of January 30, 1635, and of April 2, 1664, and to the enactment of the consulta of September 9, 1669. These regulations applied exclusively to the Philippines, and they legalized the intervention of the audiencia in governmental affairs on the death of the governor. The first of these admitted the right of the audiencia to administer political affairs, but ordered that military defense should be in the hands of a person appointed in advance by the Viceroy of New Spain. The cédula of April 2, 1664, ordered that the audiencia should serve temporarily during vacancies in the governorship until the temporary appointee of the viceroy should arrive. This law further prescribed that the audiencia should assume charge of political affairs while the senior magistrate should take over the military command. He was to see that the forces and defenses of the Islands were adequately kept up, and that the soldiers were disciplined; he was authorized to command them in case of insurrection or invasion. The consulta of September 9, 1669, above referred to, re-enacted the cédula of April 2, 1664, but in addition it specifically ordered that the viceroy should not designate a temporary governor until news of the death of the regular incumbent was received, and then that no resident or native of the Philippines should be appointed. [599]

The Council of the Indies, by the law of September 29, 1623, had already sought to guard against any undue assumption of power on the part of the audiencia by ordering that when the viceroy was absent from the capital city, but within his own district, he should still retain his status as governor, and neither the audiencia nor any of the oidores should interfere in governmental affairs. [600] This law was not applicable to the Philippines alone, but it was of general validity, throughout Spain's dominions. The control of the audiencia in governmental affairs was only to become effective when the governor was absent from the colony, or incapacitated through sickness or death. Otherwise the governor's sphere of authority was to be recognized by the tribunal.

A variety of laws exist in the Recopilación prescribing the duties and conduct of the audiencia when it had charge of governmental affairs, and defining the relationship which should exist between the oidores under such conditions. The magistrates were ordered to proceed harmoniously and moderately both in the execution of governmental affairs and in the administration of justice, not erring either on the side of excessive severity, or of undue moderation. They were to devote special attention to the increase and care of the royal revenue during these times. [601] The right to grant encomiendas, essentially the function of the governing authority, was conceded to the audiencia when it acted in the capacity of governor. All such concessions ultimately had to be confirmed by the king. On these occasions, also, the audiencia filled vacancies and made appointments. However, the oidores were warned against discharging officials and vacating offices in order to fill them with their dependents and friends. [602] All appointments made by the audiencia were to become void after the arrival of a regular governor, unless they had subsequently received the royal confirmation. When a vacancy arose, it was the duty of the senior magistrate to propose a candidate, but the actual filling of the place was to be effected by the acuerdo vote of the entire audiencia. [603]

The laws provided that the audiencia, as a body, should exercise two distinct types or classes of powers when in charge of the government. These were designated as governmental and military. The exercise of these functions was assigned respectively to the audiencia as a body, and to the senior magistrate, individually. While an effort was made to insure the fair and equal participation of all in government in case of a vacancy, the senior magistrate assumed the position and honors of the executive, though not granted all the governor's powers. [604] In the functions and duties of administration all the magistrates were to participate. As noted above, each was to have a share in the exercise of the appointing power, the administration of colonial finances, participation in the acuerdo, and in every other function except defense, which was entrusted to the senior oidor. In this capacity, the oidor was always the most prominent figure in the government. Among those who distinguished themselves through the exercise of this power were Rojas, Morga, Alcaraz, Bónifaz, Coloma, Montemayor, and above all, Anda. Although these men were assisted and supported by their colleagues of the audiencia, and the parts played by the latter were not without importance, the periods of rule of the audiencia are always identified with the names of the senior oidores, while those of the ordinary magistrates are forgotten.

A complete understanding of the governmental functions and authority of the audiencia, and the relation of the latter to the other departments of government under these conditions may best be obtained by a review of the circumstances and conditions of the audiencia's rule during vacancies in the Philippines. The first occasion which in any way approached the temporary rule of an audiencia in the Philippines was in 1593, after the murder of Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas. Pedro de Rojas, who had been a magistrate of the audiencia when it was suppressed in 1589, was at that time sole judge, with the additional rank of lieutenant-governor and asesor, standing next to the governor in authority. [605] After the death of Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, Rojas had occupied the governor's chair less than a year when he was succeeded by the deceased governor's son, Luís Pérez Dasmariñas, who became governor on the authority of a royal order found among the papers of his father, whereby he was given the power to name his successor. [606] His tenure seems to have been only temporary, however, for as soon as news reached the court of the death of the elder Dasmariñas, Francisco Tello de Guzmán was appointed permanent governor and an audiencia was sent to the Islands, arriving at Manila in 1596. [607] Meanwhile Rojas was succeeded as lieutenant-governor and asesor by Antonio de Morga. According to Montero y Vidal, Dasmariñas turned over the government to Morga in 1595, but it is more probable that Morga assumed the temporary governorship when Dasmariñas was in Cambodia and elsewhere fighting against the Dutch. In fact, this conclusion is confirmed by Zúñiga. [608] At any rate, Morga administered both governmental and military affairs on several occasions when the various governors were absent from the Islands, engaged in expeditions of conquest.

On the suppression of the audiencia in 1589, the administration of justice remained entirely in the hands of the lieutenant-governor and asesor. This position was first occupied by Rojas, and later by Morga, who succeeded to the same judicial duties and enjoyed the same prerogatives as had formerly belonged to the audiencia. In the absence of the tribunal, therefore, they assumed functions which elsewhere were carried out by the audiencia on the death of the governor or viceroy, partly because they had taken the place of the audiencia, and

## partly because they were lieutenants-governor. After the audiencia was

re-established in 1598, Morga continued in charge of military affairs when the governor was absent or dead, while the audiencia administered the government, not by virtue of any laws relating especially to the Philippines, but seemingly because this was the general practice in all of Spain's colonies. Morga's defense of Manila against the Dutch in 1600 has been referred to in an earlier chapter.

Not only did the audiencia do much in defense against outside enemies at this time, but it carried on offensive operations against them in the Moluccas after the deaths of Governors Tello and Acuña. The Japanese who were residing in the city also caused trouble, and the audiencia was under the necessity of taking repressive measures against them. [609] In 1606, while Governor Acuña was absent from the colony, the fortification of Cavite, the equipment of a fleet and the defense of the city were undertaken and carried out successfully by Oidor Almansa. [610] Then on the death of Governor Acuña the audiencia succeeded to the government and it managed affairs from June 24, 1606, to June 15, 1608, with Almansa in charge of military affairs.

The various governmental matters with which the audiencia concerned itself during this period are shown in a memorial which it sent to the king on July 6, 1606. After reporting the death of Governor Acuña, and its succession to the government, the audiencia took up questions of finance and commerce. It stated that the money in the treasury was insufficient for the necessary expenses of the colony, owing to the extraordinary outlays which had been necessary to defray the costs of the wars and expeditions which had been undertaken at this time. The audiencia suggested that the galleon returns be increased from 500,000 to 1,000,000 pesos a year. It was pointed out in this connection that the total cost of transporting goods from Manila to Acapulco, including freight and duty, aggregated thirty per cent of their value, leaving to the merchants a profit of only 350,000 pesos. The oidores admitted that this arrangement might have been ample and satisfactory when the colony was small or when there was peace, but at that time, when the inhabitants of the colony had been forced to expend so much of their revenue for defense, a larger return was necessary. [611] Further recommendations were made regarding commerce and the management of the galleons. It was said that their great size encouraged smuggling; in order to avoid this, and at the same time to contribute to the revenues of the colony, it was urged that the ships should carry cargo to the limit of their capacity, instead of being restricted to an insufficient amount. Large reductions of salaries of ships' officers, soldiers, and sailors were urged. The oidores did not think it advisable to forbid the crews and officers of the galleons to trade, however, since their interest in the cargo would encourage them to be obedient and loyal. [612] The audiencia concluded its memorial with an appeal for the reform of the freight and customs charges on the galleon. The abolition of all fixed duties was recommended; instead, it was suggested that these duties be graduated to meet the regular expenses of the colony as they were incurred year by year. This recommendation was made on the basis of the theory that duties should not be levied for the benefit of the king's exchequer, but only for the support and maintenance of the merchants and inhabitants of the colony. [613] This memorial would seem to indicate that the audiencia, when acting in the capacity of governor, exercised considerable authority and assumed entire responsibility for the commercial and financial affairs of the colony.

Zúñiga, after describing the success of Oidor Almansa in putting down an insurrection of the Japanese, characterized the administration of affairs by the audiencia during this period as follows:

The Royal Audience conducted themselves with great approbation in the civil administration, until the year 1608, when Don Rodrigo Vivero of Laredo, who was named by the Viceroy as Governor ad interim, arrived at Manila, and having had great experience in the management of the Indians in New Spain, he availed himself of it on this occasion, giving instructions to that effect to the chief judges, and other ministers of justice. He governed with much satisfaction for one year, when he delivered up the insignia of his office, and returned to Mexico. [614]

Vivero arrived in the colony on June 15, 1608. Vivero was the first of the military governors appointed from New Spain. Under this and succeeding arrangements, these governors exercised absolute control of military affairs, while the audiencia concerned itself solely with matters of government, the senior magistrate, of course, not

## participating in military affairs.

Vivero was relieved in 1609 by Governor Juan de Silva, who had a permanent appointment and served for seven years. Silva's administration was characterized by his military exploits, chief among which was his defense of the colony against the attacks of the Dutch pirate, Wittert, and subsequently of Spielberg. These frequent expeditions gave the audiencia many opportunities to assume charge of affairs, and after Silva's death in the Moluccas the tribunal ruled from April 19, 1616, to June 8, 1619. During a part of this time Andrés de Alcaraz, the senior magistrate, exercised the duties of captain-general, successfully defending the city against the Dutch. On September 30, 1617, the office of military governor devolved on Gerónimo de Silva, who was especially designated for the post by the royal order of March 20, 1616. [615] He was not an oidor, however, but had served as governor of Ternate, having recently returned from the Moluccas. [616]

While the post of captain-general devolved upon Silva, the audiencia retained control of administrative affairs in the colony until Alonso Fajardo y Tenza, the next royal appointee, arrived on June 8, 1618, to enter upon the duties of governor and captain-general. As we have already seen, Alcaraz was relieved of his military responsibilities on September 30, 1617, and was at once obliged to submit to residencia. In this trial he was compelled to answer for his failure to warn the Chinese traders, who usually approached the Islands at that time of the year, of the presence of the Dutch. As a result of his oversight in this matter, a large quantity of merchandise, including provisions for the city, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. He was also held accountable for the disaster which had occurred to a portion of the Spanish fleet in the battle of Playa Honda through the appointment of the son of one of the oidores to its command. [617] Alcaraz, senior oidor, who was legally responsible for defense, was compelled to answer for the failure of this inefficient commander. The choice of a relative of one of the oidores was a violation of the laws of the Indies. [618] Although Oidor Alcaraz seems to have acquitted himself well of his duties as commander of the military forces, seven galleons were lost in an expedition to the Moluccas during the rule of the audiencia, and considerable difficulty was experienced in fixing responsibility for this disaster. Alcaraz claimed that Silva was answerable; the latter maintained that the audiencia was to blame, and the audiencia disclaimed responsibility because, it alleged, "the audiencia was entrusted with government and not war." In an investigation ultimately made in 1625, Silva was deprived of his office and was prevented from leaving the Islands.

Governor Fajardo has left us a number of comments and criticisms of the work of the audiencia as governor. His observations are timely and appropriate, since the tribunal had been in charge of the government for two years preceding his rule, and he was brought intimately in touch with the deeds and mistakes of the previous administration. [619] Fajardo's comments relate to the abuse of the appointing power by the audiencia, and the failure of that body to provide adequately for the defense of the colony. In support of the former charge, Fajardo said that the magistrates had appointed several officials for life, which was forbidden by the laws, since the audiencia was only permitted to fill offices for the period of its rule. [620] The audiencia had also infringed upon the prerogatives of the governor by the permanent bestowal of encomiendas. Fajardo stated that when he arrived in the Islands he found all the offices and encomiendas filled with friends and dependents of the oidores. Thus as a direct consequence the success of his administration was impaired by the presence of officials who regarded him, their chief, with hostility. He cited an instance in which similar infringements upon the rights of the viceroy by the Audiencia of Mexico had been nullified by the royal veto, and he urged that some definite cédula or law should be promulgated relative to these matters in the Philippines. [621]

The difficulty of fixing responsibility for the loss of the galleons in the expedition to the Moluccas led Fajardo to criticise the practice of allowing the audiencia to assume control of affairs during vacancies. He regarded it as a cumbrous proceeding which could only result in chaotic and incompetent government. No better results could be expected when a body of magistrates and lawyers undertook to rule an isolated colony, and especially when one of them assumed responsibility for military affairs, which could not be successfully carried out by any but a military man. He emphasized the necessity of locating responsibility for every department of government in a central authority. He recommended the designation of "two military men of such standing and ability that, when the governor and captain-general is absent, they might succeed to those duties." [622] He considered it advisable that during vacancies, as well as when the regular governor was present, authority should rest with one person and not be scattered or divided among a number of magistrates.

Gerónimo de Silva had been given a commission from the viceroy to assume the post of captain-general, and upon the demise of Fajardo in 1624, he took charge of military affairs, while the audiencia retained the government. Silva's responsibility for the loss of the ships in 1617, already referred to, as well as for other disasters in 1624, caused him to be removed from the command and confined in Fort Santiago where he remained until released by the new temporary governor, Fernando de Silva, who arrived in 1625. The latter commanded the military forces, while the audiencia administered the government. [623]

Of far-reaching importance was the action of the audiencia in 1624, in nullifying the action taken by the former governor, Alonso Fajardo, relative to the construction of a seminary for Japanese priests and students. This edifice had been partially constructed when the audiencia took over the government. It is interesting to note that the oidores, although not collectively responsible for the defense of the colony, took a stand on this occasion in a matter which had to do with the common security. The objections of the oidores were significant. The location of the seminary within three hundred feet of the wall was thought to be unwise in view of the danger of a Japanese revolt. The Japanese emperor had signified his disapproval of Christianity on many occasions by banishing and torturing numerous friars who had gone to Japan from the Islands. He had forbidden the worship and propagation of Christianity in his empire. There were at that time rumors of an impending conquest of China and the Philippines by the Japanese, consequently the audiencia did not wish to invite the emperor's wrath upon the colony by attempting to proselyte his subjects. The audiencia thought best to stop this before the displeasure and enmity of the Japanese were incurred. Fear of the loss of trade with China, dread of an alliance of the Japanese with the Dutch, making probable a concerted attack on the Philippines, and the danger of an outbreak of the Japanese already within the colony in conjunction with an attack by those without, were all considerations which induced the audiencia to take responsibility upon itself in this matter. [624]

The official correspondence of the governor following immediately upon the administration of an audiencia is always valuable as showing the state of affairs under the preceding rule. That of Fernando de Silva coincides closely with the correspondence of Governor Fajardo in charging the audiencia with many misdeeds, chief among which were the abuse of the appointing power and the concession of encomiendas without authorization. Silva, on his accession to the governorship, also found the finances of the colony in a bad condition, great waste having been incurred in their administration. There had been neither peace nor order; the oidores had quarreled among themselves, and residents were leaving the city as a consequence of this turmoil. The oidores had, without cause, dismissed all the officials appointed by Fajardo, filling their places with their friends. [625] The following account of the excesses of the audiencia was given by Silva:

Under pretext of the arrest and removal of Don Geronimo de Silva, Licentiate Legaspi, ... exercised the office of captain-general, carrying the staff of office and making them lower the banners to him, and address him as "your Lordship," and his wife as "my lady." He immediately appointed his elder son to the post of sargento-mayor of this camp, and his younger son to a company, while another company was assigned to a relative of Auditor Matias Flores y Cassila (also an oidor). Others were assigned to brothers of the said Don Matias, the fiscal, and other auditors, except Don Albaro (Messa y Lugo), who refused to have anything given to his household. Upon seeing the illegality of these appointments, I issued an act declaring them vacant and restoring those posts to those who had held them before. [626]

That the king had not entirely lost confidence in the audiencia, notwithstanding the above complaints, is attested by the instruction issued by the Council of the Indies to Francisco de Rojas y Ornate, royal visitor to the Philippines. [627] This communication, which was dated August 17, 1628, approved the stand which the audiencia had taken in insisting that all money obtained from Chinese trading-licenses should be put into the royal treasury and accounted for by the oficiales reales before it was spent. It appears that the governor had hitherto used this money as an extra fund upon which to draw for the expenses of the colony. The king also approved the attitude of the audiencia in denying to persons in New Spain the right of using the Manila galleon for the shipment of their goods, and in refusing to allow money sent by them to the Islands to be invested in the Chinese trade. Silva contended that the audiencia had no right to intervene in either of the above matters, but in this Silva was not sustained, Rojas y Ornate being instructed to see that Governor Tavora respected the action of the audiencia in the two particulars referred to. [628]

The audiencia assumed management of political affairs in 1632, on the death of Governor Juan Niño de Tavora, but neither the audiencia as a body, nor the senior oidor personally were entrusted with the military command. This responsibility devolved on Lorenzo de Olazo, the maestre de campo, who had been designated by the viceroy of New Spain to assume temporary charge of military affairs. He was succeeded the following year by Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, who had been sent from Mexico by the viceroy as soon as the death of Tavora was announced in that city. Cerezo served ad interim for three years, and during his administration the audiencia acted solely as a judicial body, not attempting to interfere in governmental or military affairs. [629] It was under the rule of this governor that important expeditions were undertaken against the Moros in the South, and the first fort and settlement were made at Zamboanga.

It is to be especially noted that in the appointment of Olazo and Cerezo in 1632 and 1633 respectively, the senior oidor was deprived of the control of military affairs. This had been done also in 1617 and in 1624 when Gerónimo de Silva, governor of Ternate, had taken charge of military affairs during vacancies in the regular governorship. Temporary appointments had been made on two different occasions by the Marqués de Cerralbo, Viceroy of New Spain, once in the sending of Fernando de Silva after the death of Governor Fajardo, and on this occasion, when Cerezo de Salamanca took the place of Governor Juan Niño de Tavora, after the audiencia had governed a year. Experience had shown that the assumption of the military command by the senior oidor was not productive of the most satisfactory results. It was not to be expected, of course, that a magistrate would administer military affairs with the skill of a captain-general, and we have seen that various governors recommended that the practice should no longer be continued. So it came about that the law of 1608 was revived, and the viceroy appointed a temporary governor to assume control of military affairs, the audiencia being restricted to judicial and administrative functions. In 1633, on the accession of Cerezo de Salamanca, the audiencia was deprived of the right of intervention in the last mentioned activity, and was confined to its judicial duties alone. This was confirmed by the cédula of January 30, 1635, which relieved the Audiencia of Manila of all jurisdiction over military affairs during vacancies, ordering that they were to be administered by a temporary appointee of the viceroy. [630]

Nevertheless, considerable opposition to this method of filling vacancies in the governorship had developed within the colony. This is shown in various protests which came from the Islands from time to time. These are set forth with great clarity in the correspondence of the governors. Corcuera, in a letter written to Philip IV on June 30, 1636, stated that these temporary governors had allowed persons in Mexico to make large fortunes out of the Philippine trade, and that the governors had devoted most of their time when in Manila to serving as agents of the residents of Mexico. Corcuera, however, seemed to regard the audiencia as incapable of government, for he claimed that in the brief term of a year in which the tribunal had ruled, three years prior to his accession, it had run the colony into debt from 80,000 to 100,000 pesos. He charged the oidores with the same dishonest practice as had been alleged against Governor Fajardo, namely, that they had issued due-bills in payment of debts and had bought them up later at less than their face value, realizing the full amount on them upon their presentation to the treasury later. He stated that these warrants were not only bought by the oidores, but by practically all the officials of the government. During Cerezo's term a sum in excess of 100,000 pesos was said to have been paid out to officials as usury. [631]

Corcuera presented a scheme of reform designed to remedy the evils resulting from the succession either of the audiencia or of an irresponsible military commander to the ad interim governorship. He recommended that the regularly appointed governor should be assisted by five commissioners, who should be military men, holding the respective commands of Fort Santiago, Cavite, the Port of Manila, Formosa, and the Parián. These were to be eligible in the order named in case of a vacancy. This plan, like so many of the schemes of the soldier governors, only took cognizance of the military side of the governor's office. The marked tendency of these commanders was to continually underestimate the administrative and political phases of their positions. The plan of Corcuera was not adopted, however, and the viceroy continued to appoint temporary governors to succeed the audiencia when it assumed the government ad interim.

Governor Diego Fajardo, on July 10, 1651, wrote a letter to the king protesting against the policy of appointment which was then in force. He said:

I should be unfaithful to Your Majesty if I did not advise you of the inconveniences arising from the appointment of governors by the Viceroy of New Spain; the practice of sending money from Mexico for investment in this colony has continued and increased, to the exclusion and deprivation of the merchants of these Islands.... Investments have been made by the viceroys through the agency of others. [632]

Fajardo urged that the audiencia should be permitted to retain the government as it had done formerly. He showed the advantages accruing to the colony from a continuity of policy which would result from the rule of the oidores. He showed that the incursions of the viceroys and residents of Mexico upon the galleon trade would more likely be checked by the oidores than by any other agency, adding moreover that this particular matter should be attended to at once since the life and prosperity of the colony depended on the control of the Acapulco and Chinese commerce by the merchants of Manila. [633] A similar argument was presented by Governor Manrique de Lara in a letter written July 19, 1654. This governor urged that a commission of magistrates, familiar with the needs of the colony through experience and long residence, was better fitted to rule for the common good than a stranger, appointed by a distant viceroy, coming to the Islands as most of the temporary governors had done, with the sole purpose of exploitation. [634]

Probably the sentiments of the residents and officials of the Philippines were best and most effectively expressed on this subject in the letter written by the audiencia to the king on July 19, 1654. [635] The audiencia, on this occasion, described the inconveniences resulting from the appointment of a resident of the Islands by the Viceroy of New Spain. It was alleged that these appointees, being already established in the Islands as merchants, officials, lawyers, and even as soldiers, spent all their time in the service of their own special interests. The commercial abuses of these appointees were said to be notorious. The presence of so many relatives, friends, and business connections made it impossible for these temporary rulers to officiate properly as presidents of the audiencia, or to administer the affairs of the government with diligence and impartiality.

As a result of the general dissatisfaction in the colony, which was reflected in the above letters, and in compliance with the repeated requests previously made for reform, the law of April 2, 1664, was proclaimed, and followed by the consulta of September 9, 1669, which has been already referred to. These laws still recognized the right of the Viceroy of New Spain to appoint governors temporarily, but these were no longer to be designated in advance from the residents of the Islands. While the senior magistrate was to have charge of military affairs, he was to seek the advice of such military officials as were stationed in the colony, "exercising very particular care and vigilance in all that pertains to military affairs, endeavoring to keep the presidios well stocked and provided with all the defenses necessary for whatever occasion may arise." This, then, was a return to the practice which had prevailed prior to September 13, 1608, when the Viceroy of New Spain was first authorized to appoint a temporary governor in advance of the death of the incumbent. Although the audiencia assumed the government with partial legal justification from 1593 onward, the period from 1664 to 1719 may rightly be said to constitute the era of the audiencia's authorized rule.

An occasion for the exercise of the new law occurred in 1668, when Governor Diego de Salcedo was arrested and imprisoned by the commissary of the Inquisition. In accordance with the law of April 2, 1664, just referred to, the audiencia was entitled to assume the government until the arrival of the provisional governor from New Spain. A dispute arose between the two most eligible oidores, Francisco de Coloma and Francisco Montemayor y Mansilla, for the honors of the military command. Coloma had been commissioned as magistrate of the Audiencia of Manila before Montemayor, who maintained his claim to the headship of military affairs on the grounds that he had arrived in the Philippines earlier than Coloma. [636] These two officials were unable to agree as to their respective rights, and Juan Manuel de la Peña Bónifaz, junior magistrate of the audiencia, took advantage of the discord to further his own interests. Put forward by the commissary of the Inquisition and by the ecclesiastical element of the colony as arbiter in the contention between his two colleagues, he solidified his own power until he was able to usurp the entire government. He issued orders to the soldiers, compromised with Coloma, exiled Montemayor, enacted financial and governmental measures, appointed his friends to office, and in general acted the part of a dictator, combining in his own person all the functions of the military, judicial and executive departments. [637] The audiencia, of course, was entirely suppressed. Certain ecclesiastical authorities state that he governed with greater consideration and fairness than many of his predecessors, and that his rule was more just than that of the audiencia had been. [638] The spirit of his administration was

## particularly favorable to the churchmen, by whose favor he gained

office, and by whose aid he was able to retain his position. His successor, Manuel de León, was appointed regular governor as soon as news of the arrest of Salcedo reached Spain. Bónifaz was apprehended and sentenced to pay the customary penalty for treason, but death intervened and defrauded the king's justice. It may be considered, in a sense, that Bónifaz conferred a service upon the colony by forcibly putting an end to the disputes which had been prevalent between the rival oidores whose claims could not have been settled for three years at least--the time necessary for the Council of the Indies to transmit to the distant colony a ruling on the points at issue.

The audiencia next took over the government in April, 1679, on the death of Governor León, and it retained control of affairs until the arrival of Governor Juan de Vargas Hurtado in September, 1678. The rule of the tribunal on this occasion was without sensational features. Oidor Francisco de Coloma, in whose favor the Council of the Indies had declared in the dispute described above, assumed charge of military affairs, serving as captain-general until his death. His seniority was acknowledged by Montemayor, who was called back from exile to a place in the audiencia. [639]

The inefficiency of the audiencia as a governing agency as shown in the episode just described was surpassed by the state of utter impotency to which the tribunal was reduced during the Pardo controversy in 1684. Though at first successful in exiling the archbishop, the audiencia and Governor Vargas were later completely undone by the intriguing of the new governor, Curuzaelegui, with the prelate to discredit the previous administration. The struggle ended in the restoration of the prelate, the residencia of Vargas and the appointment of a new tribunal which was calculated to be more subservient to the commands of the new governor and the prelate. This audiencia assumed the government after the death of Curuzaelegui on April 17, 1689, with Alonzo de Ávila as chief executive. [640]

The events of the Pardo controversy prepared the way for a period of rule by an audiencia in which the entire government was dominated by the ecclesiastics. Archbishop Pardo and his successors were the real governors and the victory of the church over the various officials of civil administration lowered the moral tone of the entire government. Corruption flourished and the vigor of the administration decayed. [641] It is clear that the depravity of the civil government proceeded largely from the weakness of the audiencia and its submission to the governor. The latter was under orders from no less an authority than the king, himself, to put an end to the disputes between church and state in the colony and to bring about peace; it also happened that the situation in the colony at that time caused the governor to lean towards the side of Pardo and his supporters. The audiencia was entirely disregarded both by Governor Curuzaelegui and by the court, which may be attributed in some measure to that policy of the Spanish government previously alluded to--that of sacrificing principle in order to preserve harmony. There is no doubt but that the weakness and inefficiency of the audiencia during these two controversies contributed largely to the subsequent decision of the court to deprive the audiencia of the right of governing ad interim.

The last occasion on which the audiencia regularly assumed the government of the Islands, and one which demonstrated still more conclusively the inefficiency of the audiencia as governor, occurred in 1715, after the death of Governor Lizarraga. His rule had been uncommonly quiet and peaceful, and the period of extortion and strife which succeeded it furnished a marked contrast to that governor's administration. The audiencia ruled from February 4, 1715, to August 9, 1717, with Oidor José Torralba as senior magistrate. The reports sent by Torralba to the court during the two years of his service as military commander show that the audiencia as a body played a very small part in the government. This was again the rule of a dictator. We have seen in a former chapter that Torralba was held accountable in his residencia for a deficit of 700,000 pesos which developed during this period; [642] it is difficult to understand how this could have been possible had the senior magistrate concerned himself solely with military affairs. Concepción states that Torralba, inflated by his position, and ambitious of getting absolute control of the government, drove from office the oidores who dared to oppose him. [643] He refused to honor the royal cédula of April 15, 1713, which ordered the reinstatement of Oidor Pavón to his place as senior oidor since the fulfillment of this order would have deprived Torralba of his command.

Torralba reported great progress in the repair and restoration of royal and municipal warehouses, hospitals, convents, and churches during his administration. The wall of Manila was re-built and new bronze guns were cast and placed thereon. As acting captain-general, Torralba inspected Fort Santiago, and, "noting grave needs both in construction and in the morale of troops," made the necessary repairs, reforms and corrections. [644] He concerned himself also with the promotion and appointment of military officials. These latter acts were vigorously resisted by the maestre de campo, and by other military officials, as encroachments on their authority. They ultimately sought to bring about the nullification of all Torralba's "unjustifiable acts of interference within the military sphere." [645] Whether animated by a sincere desire to see the natives justly treated, or rather by his natural dislike of the friars, Torralba intervened on various occasions for the protection of the Indians against the encroachments and abuses of the churchmen on the encomiendas and in the native towns. These acts were carried out in the name of the audiencia, and in accordance with the law, ultimately meeting with the approval of the Council of the Indies. [646]

A great deal of dissatisfaction, both at the court and in the colony, had resulted from the audiencia's assumption of the government at various times since 1664. We have already noted that the restoration of this authority to the audiencia was attended by the disgraceful quarrel between Coloma and Montemayor and the usurpation of Bónifaz in 1668. The Pardo controversy did not produce a favorable impression of the activities of the audiencia. Torralba's dictatorship in the name of the audiencia from 1715 to 1717, conspicuous for the huge deficit in which it culminated, demonstrated the unfitness of the audiencia to be entrusted with the rule of the Islands.

Indeed, it may be said that the various experiments made by the monarchs during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries for the purpose of perfecting a system whereby the governorship could be satisfactorily filled ad interim had failed to demonstrate or develop any authority capable of maintaining harmony or decent government. Co-operation among the authorities of the colony was practically unknown. The royal disapproval was passed upon practically all the official acts of these interim administrations. The thirst for personal glory, and the desire for private gain invariably induced some official who was stronger than his contemporaries to assume control of affairs; thus the government of the colony was made repeatedly to subserve personal ends, and civil and political life was characterized by its strife and discord. The probabilities that the temporary administration of the audiencia would not be entirely successful had been recognized from the beginning, and in order to guard against its misrule the king had authorized the appointment of a temporary governor by the Viceroy of New Spain. It was unavoidable, however, that the audiencia should govern until the arrival of this official. For a time the alternative was tried of allowing the maestre de campo to assume the military command, but this resulted in such an incompetent rule that the former prerogatives of the audiencia were restored. Whether the audiencia was capable of governing successfully or not, it certainly had the power to make or mar the government of any other person or authority, whether he was regularly appointed by the king, or chosen temporarily by the viceroy.

The church, as represented by a succession of triumphant archbishops, had exercised the preponderance of power and authority throughout the forty years of strife, ending with the death of Governor Bustamante. We need not be concerned here with the various struggles and disagreements with governors and audiencias, but the fact remains that the church was the only institution existing during this period which was able to present a solid and united front to its enemies, or which manifested any symptoms of power, unity or royal approbation. The culmination of ecclesiastical power was virtually reached on October 11, 1719, when Governor Bustamante was murdered by emissaries of the church and Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, Archbishop of Manila, assumed the vacant governorship.

Zúñiga, the Dominican historian, says that the archbishop declined the governorship on this occasion, but was subsequently prevailed upon to accept it. [647] It is certain that the tribunal was in no state or condition to take charge of affairs; its administration had been discredited by the murder of its protector, its senior magistrate had been proved an embezzler in his residencia, and the remaining members of the tribunal were not qualified to remain in office. Oidores Villa and Pavón, removed by Torralba and Bustamante, were restored by the archbishop, and were content to recognize him as president of the audiencia. Each of them had his own claims to the position of

## acting-governor and had Cuesta not occupied the governorship with their

consent, these oidores would either have been languishing in banishment as punishment for having resisted the prelate, or they would have been struggling for the honors of a position occupied by a pretended mediator, as on former occasions. So there can be no doubt that it was best for all concerned that the church was powerful at this time; the colony had had enough of strife and murder and there was urgent need of some authority with sufficient power to bring about peace. It is sufficient to say that the audiencia renounced its claims to the government, and, according to Zúñiga, who devotes an unusual amount of space to this important epoch in the ecclesiastical history of the Islands, the people were very content with the archbishop's rule after the injustice and oppression of Bustamante. [648] It may be noted that the archbishop exercised complete authority over the audiencia, even to the extent of restoring oidores who had been unlawfully dismissed, and of acting as an intermediary between magistrates. He was master of the situation and his interim rule was preferred by the sovereign and by the people to that of the audiencia.

The royal order of September 8, 1720, legalizing the government of the prelates, applied not only to the administration of Cuesta, but it established a precedent for the temporary rule of four prelates. [649] In compliance with this decree, three sealed envelopes (pliegos de providencia) were sent to the audiencia to be placed unopened in the archives of that tribunal, and the seals were to be broken only on the death of the governor. These envelopes were accompanied by an order from the king, directing that the person mentioned in the first envelope should be recognized as temporary governor. In case of his absence or incapacity to serve, the second envelope was to be opened and the directions contained therein were to be followed, and if these could not be complied with, the third envelope was to be opened.

No further necessity for the observance of this law of succession arose until after the death of Governor Gaspar de la Torre, when, on August 15, 1745, the first envelope was opened in the presence of the audiencia. The post of archbishop being vacant at this time it became necessary to follow the directions prescribed by the second envelope. It was found that Fray Juan de Arrechedera, Bishop of Nueva Segovia, had been designated as the governor's successor. The audiencia relinquished the control of affairs into his hands and he governed for a period of five years.

It would seem that the ecclesiastical calling of this governor in no way incapacitated or hindered him in the execution of his duties. His administration was characterized especially by various measures taken for the defense and fortification of the Islands. He suppressed several insurrections in Ilocos and Cagayán, dispatching military forces under the command of alcaldes mayores against the revolting natives. He repelled several Moro raids and made treaties of peace with the Sultan of Sulu. [650] There is no evidence of discord between the governor and the audiencia during this period. Although Archbishop Trinidad arrived and took possession of his see on August 27, 1747, he made no attempt to take charge of political affairs. [651] He permitted Arrechedera to continue as governor for three years, handing over to him

a royal mandate, for the absolute expulsion of the Chinese [which was never] ... carried into execution, the interest of the Governor being too deeply involved in the suspension of it, the Chinese paying him a contribution for his forbearance. The Archbishop found that Arrechedera was strongly attached to this nation, and he became so far a convert to his sentiments on this subject that he did not put the royal order in force.... This seems to have been the only error committed by this illustrious prelate during the time he held the government. In all other respects his conduct reflected the highest honour on him. [652]

The third time the government was taken over by a prelate was in 1759 on the death of Governor Arandía. On this occasion it became necessary to open the third pliego de providencia. The metropolitan see of Manila and the diocese of Nueva Segovia being vacant, Bishop Espeleta of Cebú was the senior prelate of the Islands. Shortly after the accession of Espeleta, Manuel Rojo, the new archbishop, arrived, commanding Espeleta to vacate the governorship at once. Rojo refused, citing the precedent established by Bishop Arrechedera. Espeleta appealed to the audiencia for support, but the oidores were unable to agree on the question, two of them, Calderón and Galbán supporting Rojo, and the other two remaining in favor of the retention of the governorship by Espeleta. The question was left to the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de Viana, who advised that the matter should be carried to the Council of the Indies for final settlement. [653] It transpired, therefore, that Espeleta retained the governorship from 1759 until 1761, and he did very effective work in repelling the raids of the Moros, who had been ravaging the provinces with impunity for some time.

The prosecution of Dr. Santiago Orendaín occupied a large share of Espeleta's attention during his administration. This controversy should be noted here because it illustrates the relations between the audiencia and an ecclesiastical governor. Orendaín had been the advisor (asesor) of Governor Arandía, and was held responsible for the repressive measures taken against the church during the administration of the latter. The rule of an unscrupulous prelate presented an excellent opportunity for revenge and Orendaín's prosecution was unanimously demanded by the ecclesiastical element of the colony. The magistrates also welcomed the opportunity to retaliate upon a hitherto successful, but unpopular, rival. The fiscal brought

## action against Orendaín, who sought refuge in an Augustinian convent,

whereupon the civil authorities forced an entrance into the asylum, seizing Orendaín and imprisoning him in Fort Santiago. The provisor of the ecclesiastical court excommunicated Magistrate Villacorta, who had exculpated Orendaín in his trial, but the ban was disregarded by the audiencia. A division over the question arose in the tribunal, and matters were assuming a threatening aspect, when the authorized appointment of Governor Rojo arrived. Espeleta gave up his office, and the first act of the new governor was to restore Orendaín to full favor as his counsellor. The affair of Dr. Orendaín illustrates a phase of Spanish colonial administration which is too characteristic to be left unnoticed here. Aside from the influence which Orendaín exercised over Governor Arandía, his persecution shows the measure of personal rancour which even a prelate might put into his administration, spending practically two years in the pursuit of revenge. In this he was supported by the audiencia. In this affair neither the church nor the audiencia were animated so much by motives of right and justice as they were influenced by personal feelings.

The rule of Archbishop Rojo from 1761 to 1764 was a notable one in the history of the Philippines. The principal event during his administration was the capture of Manila by the British. This furnished the occasion for the resistance of Oidor Simón de Anda y Salazar, in the name of the audiencia, both to the English and to the archbishop who had ordered his surrender. These events show the complete incapacity of an ecclesiastical governor of Rojo's type and personality to fulfill the military requirements of his position. In the operations of Anda we note how a man of decisive

## action, energy, courage, and loyalty was able to force the issue and

deprive the archbishop-governor of the executive functions which he had assumed legally, but which he was unable to dispense. This episode illustrates, furthermore, the general disregard of the laws which placed the governorship in the hands of a man who was unfit for its exercise, showing again that in the selection of a person to carry out the duties of governor the military side of the situation could not be disregarded.

Anda, at the time of the accession of Rojo, was a junior magistrate in the audiencia, having arrived in Manila on July 21, 1761. [654] The British squadron entered Manila Bay on September 22, 1762. The British subsequently attacked the city, the fall of which seemed imminent on account of the neglectful state into which the defense had fallen. [655] The proposition was made to the archbishop-governor by Fiscal Francisco Leandro de Viana and the audiencia that Oidor Anda should be dispatched to the provinces with the title of Governor and Captain-general of the Islands for the purpose of maintaining and defending them under the sovereignty of the Spanish monarch, [656] and "in order that he might keep the natives quiet in their Christian instruction and in their obedience to the king." [657] The archbishop refused to accede to this proposition on the grounds that "neither he nor the Audiencia had any authority to create a governor and captain-general, which was the proper privilege of his Majesty; and that it was enough to give him the title of visitor of the land ... and ... of lieutenant of the captain-general." [658] This was done, therefore, and Anda left on the night of October 3, 1762, with these titles and powers.

It is important to note that Anda was not given the title of governor and captain-general, but that as oidor he was commissioned visitador de tierras and teniente de gobernador y capitán general. [659] The authority to designate oidores as visitors of the provinces was a function regularly exercised by the president of the audiencia and authorized by the laws of the Indies. [660] It appears from the above that Anda was sent to the provinces to defend them against the English. This was the main object as stated in the original proposition of the audiencia. Zúñiga states the purpose of the departure of Anda to have been "to maintain the islands in obedience to the King of Spain," [661] and this is corroborated by the testimonies of Anda, [662] Viana [663] and of Rojo, [664] himself. In view of these facts, Rojo's failure to co-operate with Anda, his proneness to listen to those who counseled surrender, his complete reversal of tactics in repeatedly summoning Anda to abdicate, and his willingness even to betray Anda into the hands of the British are almost inexplicable. [665]

Anda organized a provisional government in his capacity as lieutenant-governor. He disregarded the repeated summons of the archbishop to return to the city and surrender to the British. In a letter to the archbishop, dated October 21, 1762, Anda justified his position and made clear that he was not acting on the basis of any delegation of power as captain-general, which authority, he acknowledged, still rested with Rojo. He stated that he had been appointed visitor-general of the provinces "with the real mission of protecting them if the English captured Manila;" in case this happened he was to solicit the aid of prelates, religious and alcaldes mayores in defending the Islands. He complained that Rojo had already "endeavored to influence the prelates, religious and natives to submit to the British." [666] He urged that Rojo should desist from his opposition to his efforts, pointing out the great desirability of their co-operation.

When Anda became convinced of the infirmity of Rojo and the uselessness of further attempts at co-operation with him he completely changed his attitude towards his own position and towards the question of the defense and government of the Islands. While he had hitherto recognized Rojo as governor and captain-general, he now assumed the position that the archbishop was a prisoner in the city and he therefore refused to recognize the orders of the latter. Anda issued a call to all loyal inhabitants to defend the honor of Spain. He ordered the alcaldes mayores to pay no heed to the dispatches and commands issued by the archbishop or the British in the city. He set himself up as governor and captain-general of the Islands, subsequently moving his capital to Bacolor, Pampanga. He obtained possession of the funds of the royal treasury, which had been sent to the province of Laguna when the English had appeared, and he turned a deaf ear to the demands of the archbishop that the money should be returned to the city in order that it might be applied on the payment of the four million-peso war indemnity imposed by the victorious British. Anda enlisted a military force aggregating eight thousand men, and he successfully prevented the enemy from doing more than capture Cavite, Pásig, and a few other places of minor importance. Notwithstanding the demands of the British, who had placed a price of four thousand pesos on his head, and the entreaties of the archbishop, Anda resisted until he was assured that peace was definitely arranged between Spain and Great Britain. [667]

The justification which Anda offered for his conduct was as follows: the regular governor and the audiencia (excepting himself) were prisoners in the city of Manila; their positions and places were therefore vacant, and Anda, as the sole oidor who was not incapacitated, should accordingly succeed and had succeeded to the management of political affairs and defense. He was both audiencia and governor. In support of his contention that he himself was the legally constituted audiencia, he cited the law promulgated by Philip III on August 14, 1620, declaring that "in some of the audiencias of the Indies it has happened, and it might happen still that the oidores being absent and ... only one remaining, ... in such cases the audiencia is to be conserved and continued with only one oidor." [668] Anda had been a legally appointed oidor on special delegation to the provinces when the city fell into the hands of the British; the governor and the remaining oidores had become prisoners and were civilly dead; being the only magistrate of the audiencia yet on duty, he was at once audiencia and governor. He stated that he would surrender his office to the archbishop and audiencia when both had regained their liberty, but he warned the archbishop that if he went to the extreme of surrendering the Islands, he (Anda) "would in no wise obey so unjust and absurd a treaty," and furthermore stated that if the British wished to rule the country, they would have to conquer it first. He expressed the conviction that neither the archbishop nor any other authority except the king had the power to surrender the Islands. [669] In these arguments and sentiments Anda was supported by the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de Viana, and by Oidores Galbán and Villacorta, who subsequently escaped from the city and joined him in the provinces, aiding him in his resistance to the invaders.

Although the British had agreed in their terms of capitulation that the audiencia should continue in the exercise of its normal powers in Manila, [670] that tribunal and the archbishop were virtually prisoners; the idea of their recognition therefore appears almost an absurdity. The oidores acted as members of the council of war which considered the proposition made by the British for the surrender of the city, but if we may trust the testimony of Viana, the archbishop, influenced by his favorites, Monroy and Orendaín, forced the magistrates to sign the articles of capitulation. Viana says that in the various matters which came up for solution after the city had surrendered, the oidores were formally consulted, but the archbishop followed his own counsel, or that of his favorites. [671]

The position of Rojo after the escape of the fiscal and the oidores was an exceedingly unpleasant one. The English commander complained that the prelate and the audiencia had failed to keep the agreement which had been made between them; in escaping, the fiscal and the oidores had violated their oaths; the indemnity had not been paid; the provinces had not surrendered and Anda was still continuing his resistance. The sack of the city was threatened. These conditions made Rojo redouble his efforts to betray Anda and to get possession of the treasure which had come on the patache, "Filipino". The British offered remission of tribute to all natives then in insurrection who would surrender. Anda was charged with responsibility for the danger with which the city was threatened. He was said to have prevented the fulfillment of the treaty between Rojo and the British. To this Anda replied that he had not been a party to the treaty. The state of perpetual worry in which Rojo was kept brought about his death on January 30, 1764. Even before this he had practically lost his status as governor and the British were treating with Anda for the surrender of the Islands. [672] This continued until the legitimacy of the position of Anda was recognized by Governor Torre. [673]

A statement of the above facts aids in clarifying our view of Anda's position. It certainly can be said that there was neither an audiencia nor a governor with sovereign powers in Manila; this lack furnished a reasonable basis for Anda's claims. However clearly it was established that a vacancy existed in the governorship, his position would have been sufficiently tenable had it been based solely on the grounds that the archbishop had delegated him as lieutenant of the captain-general, with military powers. The archbishop-governor had granted him that title and those powers for the very purpose for which he had utilized them, namely, for the defense of the Islands against the British. In view of the support which was extended to Anda in his contention that he was governor and captain-general as long as the archbishop and the regularly constituted audiencia were prisoners, it is not easy to understand why it was necessary for him to justify himself by advancing the claim, first, that he was the audiencia, and, second, that he was the governor because he had the authority of the audiencia. The only accountable reason for this was probably the necessity of nullifying the commands of the archbishop which were being issued from the captured city. He may have felt that such measures were imperative in order to gain and retain the respect of the natives and provincial officials who were not under his immediate influence and who were consequently more independent and inclined to be insurrectionary and riotous. Yet, it is hardly possible that the legal arguments advanced in support of his claims were understood by this class.

It does not appear, moreover, that Anda was entirely justified in his argument by the laws. No doubt he was right in regarding himself as the audiencia, on the basis of the laws cited by him. However, the law did not at that time authorize the succession of the audiencia to a vacancy in the governorship. The cédulas of September 8, 1720, and of August 15, 1731, were still in force in the Philippines, and by virtue of these and by the special cédula promulgated in 1761 in favor of Rojo, an ecclesiastic was authorized to act as governor in case of a vacancy. According to law and precedent, the post vacated by the archbishop-governor should have been filled by the bishop of Nueva Segovia, and by the bishop of Cebú, respectively. It is true that neither of these ecclesiastics put forth any effort to maintain their legal rights, probably for the reason that they realized their incapacity to organize and conduct the defense of the Islands as well as Anda had done. The audiencia had not succeeded to the government since 1715; it had been forbidden to do so in 1720 and subsequently. It is therefore difficult to understand how Anda could have seriously advanced the claim that in his capacity as sole oidor he should succeed to the government.

Aside from the opposition of the archbishop, there does not seem to have been any great difference of opinion on the question of whether Anda could rightfully claim the prerogatives of the audiencia and governorship at the same time. Rojo paid no attention to the legal arguments advanced by Anda, but contended that both the governor and the audiencia were still in full possession of their powers and in complete enjoyment of their liberties within the city. No comment is to be found on Anda's contention in the royal dispatches which were sent in answer to his reports. It is important to note, however, that after the death of the archbishop, and after the restoration of peace, the fiscal was of the opinion that the government should go to Fray Ustáriz, bishop of Nueva Segovia. [674] In this opinion he was seconded by Oidor Galbán.

It would seem that Anda was supported in his resistance to Archbishop Rojo and the British largely on grounds of expediency. This is clearly brought out in a letter which Fiscal Viana wrote to the king on October 30, 1762, stating his opinion that:

Since the Audiencia and governor are unable to exercise their duties, Anda, as the only active and unembarrassed minister who is able to retain his place under the authority of Your Majesty, has declared himself governor, royal audiencia and captain-general. It is evident that, being a prisoner, the archbishop cannot be governor and captain-general, and it is equally certain that the government and office of captain-general falls back on the audiencia and the oldest oidor. [675]

This argument savors of expediency and sound practicability rather than of interest in the legal quibble. Had Viana been convinced of the legality of Anda's claims he would not subsequently have supported Ustáriz. Viana contended that neither the archbishop nor the audiencia enjoyed sovereign powers when they were prisoners. Anda, on the other hand, was in such a position that he could utilize his legal powers; he used them to good advantage and effectively, therefore he was entitled to recognition.

Aside from the question of legality, it is important to note that Anda was the only person who was able to exercise sovereign powers during this time. It is certain, moreover, that he prevented the Islands from falling into the hands of the British and that he maintained the continuity of the sovereignty of Spain in the Islands from 1762 to 1764. During his rule in the provinces he exercised practically all the functions of a normal government. Aside from the management of military affairs he administered the finances and levied tribute. As noted above, he contrived to obtain possession of the royal treasure which had been sent to Laguna; he was consequently better equipped financially than he would have been otherwise, and better than his rivals in the city. His finances were also augmented by the favorable circumstance of his capture of the "Filipino" which was returning from Acapulco with the proceeds of the sale of her former cargo. [676]

Other functions of a semi-military and governmental character were exercised by Anda in his capacity as acting governor. In some of these matters he was assisted by the fiscal and audiencia in the latter part of his administration. He regulated the prices of provisions in order to prevent them from attaining prohibitive proportions. He did all that he could to further and encourage interprovincial trade. He issued orders in regulation of wages. In order to discourage drunkenness he forbade the sale of nipa wine except in small quantities. He discouraged the importation of wine from Laguna. He took measures to prevent the Chinese from counterfeiting or chipping coins, and he declared what should be legal tender. He forbade the shipment of provisions to the beleaguered city and refused to permit the natives under his jurisdiction to shelter or otherwise assist an Englishman. He prevented secular priests from communicating with the archbishop. In order to encourage service in the army he exempted natives from the polo, or labor tax, and he also made certain exceptions to the general rule for the payment of tribute to offset the decree of the British who had offered wholesale exemption from the payment of tribute in order to attract the natives. Anda issued very severe orders to prevent looting and extortion on the part of his soldiers. Because of the alliance between the Chinese and the British, Anda was obliged to take repressive measures against the former. He forbade games of dice, cock-fighting and card-playing so as to raise the morale of the natives, to prevent thefts and to encourage law and order. He prescribed the death penalty for theft. Anda's rule was little less than a dictatorship, with all the powers of government centered in himself and in his immediate advisors. [677]

It has already been pointed out that when Anda's resistance gave certain assurances of success, the fiscal, Viana, and the oidores, Galbán and Villacorta, escaped to his capital, attached themselves to his cause and assumed a share in his government. Anda was willing to recognize them as magistrates of the audiencia, and as such they officiated. Villacorta made some trouble for Anda, however, by claiming the right to act as governor on the ground that he was Anda's senior in the audiencia. This was generally recognized, but Anda refused to accede to his demands, and the matter was dropped for a time. [678] Anda found that his colleagues, Viana and Galbán, were of the opinion that Bishop Ustáriz was legally entitled to the office of governor, but there was some doubt in their minds whether he should be invited at that time to act as governor. Anda consulted the Bishop of Camarines and that prelate expressed his willingness to submit to the decision of the audiencia. The Augustinians and Dominicans were of the same opinion, but the Jesuits and Franciscans

told him, that in the then (sic) situation of the islands he alone could preserve the public tranquillity, and on that account he ought to retain the supreme authority. This diversity of opinion was not very gratifying to Señor Anda, and although the troops were in his favour, he was by no means desirous of having recourse to violence. [679]

Shortly after the death of Archbishop Rojo, Anda received dispatches informing him that peace had been restored between Spain and England; [680] at the same time the British received orders to evacuate the city. Now that Anda's presence in the field as military commander was no longer absolutely required, a three-cornered fight arose among the supporters of Villacorta, Ustáriz and Anda. Each of these contenders was able to advance a reasonable claim. Villacorta was certainly the senior magistrate, and thus he had a better right legally to the office than Anda. Ustáriz was bishop of Nueva Segovia and as such, was entitled to the governorship according to the most recent law. "Anda had in his favor the circumstance of having defended the islands, and of having prevented the English from advancing to the northern provinces; and, above all, he commanded the troops, who were attached to him, and this served to check the pretensions of the others." [681]

The arrival of the interim governor, Francisco Xavier de la Torre, put an end to these disputes. He had been dispatched to the Islands by the Viceroy of New Spain with the title of teniente del rey (king's lieutenant), and in accordance with his instructions he assumed the temporary government on March 17, 1764, which he retained until the arrival of Governor Raón in July, 1765. Anda's residencia was taken by his successor, and it was found that the finances of the colony had been faithfully and honestly administered during his administration. He was able to account for all of the money taken from the "Filipino", turning over two million pesos of these funds to the new governor, accounting for the balance. Anda was recalled to Spain, where he was presented at court, receiving the personal thanks of the sovereign. [682]

Torre's accession to the governorship marks the discontinuance in the Philippines of the practice of allowing the archbishop to take charge of the government during vacancies. On no subsequent occasion in the history of the Islands did an ecclesiastic take over the rule of the Islands. [683] It would seem that this plan of succession was abandoned quite generally throughout Spain's dominions, though there is no instance in which the rule of a prelate ever resulted quite so disastrously as in the Philippines from 1762 to 1764. Torre's accession marks the return to the practice introduced in 1608 and followed from time to time throughout the history of the Islands.

The audiencia, as a tribunal, concerned itself no further with the temporary government of the Islands. On September 30, 1762, a new cédula authorized the appointment of a teniente del rey by the viceroy of New Spain, and the succession of this official was ordered in case of a vacancy. This law was repromulgated on two subsequent occasions, the first time on November 23, 1774, and again on July 2, 1779. [684] The plan of succession which it authorized was followed quite generally in the subsequent history of the Islands, until the separation of New Spain in 1821 rendered impossible the appointment of a teniente by the viceroy. Anda's government was the last occasion on which the audiencia, in reality or in theory, ever attempted to rule by its own right, except by association with the teniente del rey, with whom it acted in the usual advisory capacity, as authorized in the above-mentioned laws.

By the Royal Instruction of Regents of 1776, the regent was authorized to act as president of the audiencia during the absence of the governor, and in case there were no regent, the senior magistrate of the audiencia was to take his place. [685] This law was confirmed by the cédula of August 2, 1789, which ordered that viceroys and presidents, on going outside of their capitals, "should assign to the regents the faculties for the dispatch of the most important and immediate affairs." [686] A subsequent law, dated July 30, 1779, stated that "these important and immediate affairs" did not include "the duties and functions of the captain-general." Again, the royal order of October 23, 1806, [687] commanded that the audiencia should in no case take control of the government when there was a vacancy, but that the name of the temporary governor should be contained in an envelope which was to be opened on the death of the governor, or on his absence from the district. In case provision had not been made in this way, it was ordered that the government should be taken over by the ranking military officer of the colony, if he were higher than the grade of colonel; if not, the regent or decano should be temporary president, governor and captain-general, without ceding the exercise of any of the functions of this office to the audiencia. [688] This law was suspended by the royal order of July 12, 1812, and by the decree of November 2, 1834, which ordered that the segundo cabo, or lieutenant-commander of the king's forces should succeed the governor and captain-general. [689] It is important to note that these laws were applicable throughout the Spanish colonial empire. Subsequent vacancies in the Philippines were filled by military men, and the audiencia refrained from interference with the government.

Considering the question in its broadest phases, it cannot be said that the audiencia administered the ad interim rule with a great degree of success. This method of filling vacancies in the governorship failed for a number of reasons. Owing to the divided composition of the tribunal, the rivalry and personal jealousy of the magistrates and the perpetual quarrels and struggles which arose as a consequence, the periods of its rule became wild scrambles for power in which the strongest survived and reaped all the benefits of office. By their example, the oidores stimulated others to wrong-doing, and in their efforts to secure advantages for themselves they oppressed the residents, Spanish and native, with the burden of their misrule. They did not scruple to indulge in dishonest practices whenever occasion offered; indeed, they went out of their way to seek such opportunities.

Perhaps the gravest defect of the rule of the audiencia lay in its failure as an executive, owing to the divided character of its composition. There was much jealousy, but neither unity nor centralized responsibility. In their governmental capacity the oidores frequently enacted measures and made recommendations of a statesmanlike character, although they did not always succeed in enforcing them. The magistrates were neither experienced legislators nor trained soldiers, and the latter defect seems to have been a cause of considerable dissatisfaction, especially among the military classes. These were naturally jealous of an assumption of military power by lawyers, whose commands they refused to obey. Nevertheless it must be conceded that such individual oidores as Morga, Alcaraz, Almansa and Anda acquitted themselves of their military duties with great credit when called upon.

The reform which gave the government to the churchmen was designed to obviate the defects expressed above. It was believed that a prelate would not be open to so many ventures of a questionable and mainly commercial character. Moreover, the archbishops in Mexico and elsewhere had fulfilled the duties of the executive on former occasions with a fair degree of success. The church was the most powerful, highly centralized and unified institution in the Philippines at the time when both the audiencia and the governorship were weakest. The ecclesiastical authority had repeatedly triumphed over the civil government, and the former gave promise of being able to control matters more effectively in the future than the audiencia had done in the past. The rule of the churchmen did not remedy matters, however, except that it produced harmony through the exercise of force. During the rule of the archbishops, with the exception of that of Rojo, the audiencia was so completely dominated by the ecclesiastical power that the tribunal could scarcely be considered a factor in the government.

There were various defects in the rule of the ecclesiastics. Of these, perhaps the most prominent was their failure to meet the military requirements of the position. Because of the natural incongruity existing between ecclesiastical and military duties, they were obliged to delegate the command of the troops to military leaders, who thus exercised an influence never realized by them during the rule of the audiencia. Archbishop Rojo was unwilling to trust the problem of defense to any other person, though unable to cope with the situation himself. Hence Anda forced his way to the front because he was fitted to command and Rojo was not. As administrators and executives the prelates were as efficient as any others, but they were never able to reconcile successfully the opposition of the civil, political, and commercial elements, who were displeased with the rule of an ecclesiastic. Surprising as it may seem, the government of a prelate was usually most unsatisfactory to the churchmen and religious authorities. If the prelate-governor were a friar, his rule was resented by the members of all the rival orders. If he were a secular priest, he was opposed by the friars of all the orders.

The failure of Rojo was enough to condemn the practice of permitting ecclesiastics to assume the government, but aside from that, there was a more significant and fundamental reason. The increasing political authority of the church at that time, both in the colonies and in the mother country, its widespread and almost irresistible dominance over temporal affairs, demanded a radical change of policy whereby this dangerous ecclesiastical power could be checked. The rule of Anda, though technically based on that law which gave the succession to the tribunal, was not a typical instance of the government of the audiencia, nor did that period present all the features of such a rule. The influence of the audiencia as a body was practically nil. Anda governed because he was a strong man, not because he was sole oidor or because he was lieutenant-governor. His government was virtually a dictatorship, based on military power, but, nevertheless, just and benevolent. His extra-judicial actions met with the king's approval, because they were efficient.

History will show that the Audiencia of Manila assumed temporary charge of the government because the distance and isolation of the colony rendered such a course necessary and because it was thought that the audiencia was best fitted to assume control. The government by the audiencia in the Philippines was not an isolated incident, but was typical of the entire Spanish colonial empire. Owing to the conditions which we have noted, and judged by the standards which constitute good government, the rule of the audiencia was neither successful nor satisfactory. Its most far-reaching defect, as far as the relations of the audiencia and the governor were concerned, lay in the wholesale exercise of administrative and military functions by the magistrates of the audiencia. This impaired the quality of their services as impartial magistrates and contributed in most cases to an insatiable thirst for power. The magistrates were loath to surrender the exercise of these governmental activities on the accession of the succeeding governor, the audiencia displaying a marked tendency to continue in the exercise of administrative control. This, then, was a decided cause of strife and dissension between the audiencia and the governor.

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