Part ii

., Bersch and Krueger, _Geodaetische Linien, Parallelbogen, und Lothabweichungen zwischen Feaghmain und Warschau_ (Berlin, 1896); J.G. Kohl, _Die geographische Lage der Hauptstaedte Europas_ (Leipzig, 1874); Paul Meuriot, _Des agglomerations urbaines dans l'Europe contemporaine_ (Paris, 1898); Scharff, _The History of the European Fauna_ (London, 1899). (G. G. C.)

2. POLITICAL HISTORY

The origin of the name of Europe has been dealt with above, and the difficulty of any exact definition of the geographical limits covered by this term has been pointed out. A similar difficulty meets us when we come to deal with European history. We know what we mean when we speak of European civilization, though in its origins, as in its modern developments, this was not confined to Europe. In one sense the history of Europe is the history of this civilization and of the forces by which it was produced, preserved and developed; for a separate history of Europe could never have been written but for the alien powers by which this civilization was for centuries confined within the geographical limits of the European continent. Moreover, within these geographical limits the tradition of the Roman empire, and above all the organization of the Catholic Church, gave to the European nations, and the states based upon them, a homogeneity which without them could not have survived. The name of Europe, indeed, remained until modern times no more than "a geographical expression"; its diplomatic use, in the sense of a group of states having common interests and duties, is, indeed, no older than the 19th century; in the middle ages its place was taken by the conceptions of the Church and the Empire, which, though theoretically universal, were practically European. Yet the history of the states system of Europe, though enormously influenced by outside forces, possesses from the first a character of its own, which enables it to be treated as a separate unit. This historical Europe, however, has never been exactly commensurate with Europe considered as a geographical division. Russia, though part of Europe geographically--even if we set the limits of Asia at the Don with certain old geographers--had but slight influence on European history until the time of Peter the Great. The Ottoman empire, though its influence on the affairs of Europe was from the first profound, was essentially an Asiatic power, and was not formally introduced into the European system until the treaty of Paris of 1856. It still remains outside European civilization.

Europe, then, as we now conceive the term in its application to the political system and the type of culture established in this part of the world, may, broadly speaking, be traced to four principal origins: (1) The Aegean civilization (Hellenic and pre-Hellenic); (2) the Roman empire; (3) Christianity; (4) the break-up of the Roman empire by the Teutonic invasions. All these forces helped in the development of Europe as we now know it. To the Aegean civilization, whether transformed by contact with Rome, and again transformed by the influence of Christianity and the religious genius of the middle ages--or rediscovered during the classical Renaissance--Europe owes the characteristic qualities of its thought and of its expression in literature and art. From republican Rome it largely draws its conceptions of law and of administrative order. From the Roman empire it inherited a tradition of political unity which survived, in visible form, though but as a shadowy symbol, until the last Holy Roman emperor abdicated in 1806; survived also, more fruitfully, in the rules of the Roman lawyers which developed into modern international law. Yet more does Europe owe to Christianity, an Asiatic religion, but modified by contact with Greek thought and powerfully organized on the lines of the Roman administrative system. The Roman Church remained a reality when the Roman empire had become little more than a name, and was throughout the period of chaos and transformation that followed the collapse of the Roman empire the most powerful instrument for giving to the heterogeneous races of Europe a common culture and a certain sense of common interests.

The history of Europe, then, might well begin with the origins of Greece and Rome, and trace the rise of the Roman empire and the successive influence upon it of Hellenism and Christianity. These subjects are, however, very fully dealt with elsewhere (see AEGEAN CIVILIZATION; GREECE; ROME; CHURCH HISTORY); and it will, therefore, be more convenient to begin this account with the Teutonic invasions and the break-up of the Roman empire, events which mark the definite beginning of the modern European states system.

In a sense the Roman empire had been already "barbarized" before the invasions of the barbarians _en masse_. Land left vacant by the dwindling of the population was colonized by immigrants, Teutonic and other, from beyond the frontiers; the Roman legions were largely recruited from Germans and other non-Romans, some of whom even rose to the imperial purple. Thus, in the end, the Roman emperor, with his guard and his household, ruling over an empire mercilessly exploited to fill his treasury, was essentially indistinguishable from those barbarian chiefs, with their _antrustions_ and their primitive fiscal methods, who entered into portions of his inheritance and carried on the traditions of his rule.

The history of the Teutonic peoples prior to their organized invasions of the empire is dealt with elsewhere (see TEUTONIC PEOPLES). It was in the 4th century that the pressure of their advance was first felt on the frontiers, and this led to a change in the government of the empire which was to have notable consequences. In A.D. 330 Constantine had transferred the capital from Rome to Byzantium (Constantinople), but the empire, from the Forth to the Tigris, continued to be administered successfully from a single centre. Not, however, for long: the increasing perils from without made a closer supervision essential, and after the death of Theodosius I. (395) the empire was divided between emperors of the East and West. It was the beginning not only of the break-up of the empire, but of that increasing divergence between the eastern and western types of European religion and culture which has continued to this day.

[Illustration: Europe in the VI century.]

The pressure of the Teutonic invasions became increasingly strong during the reigns of the emperor Valens and his successors. These invasions were of two types, (1) migrations of whole peoples with their old German patriarchal organization complete, (2) bands, larger or smaller, of emigrants in search of land to settle on, without tribal cohesion, but organized under the leadership of military chiefs. The earlier invaders, Goths and Vandals, and later the Burgundians and Lombards were of the first type; to the second belonged the Franks, "free" men from the Saxon plain, and the Saxon invaders of Britain. The distinction was a vital one; for the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and Lombards never took root in the soil, and succumbed in turn, while the Frankish and Saxon immigrants, each man lord in his own estate, not only maintained themselves, but set up at the cost of the Roman organization and of the power of their own kings a wholly new polity, based on the independence of the territorial unit, which later on was to develop into feudalism.

The Teutonic Invasions.

It was owing to the pressure of Turanian invaders from the East that the Teutonic peoples were first forced to take refuge within the empire. In 378 the Goths defeated and slew the emperor Valens in a battle near Adrianople; in 410 Alaric, king of the West Goths, sacked Rome; and shortly after his death the Goths passed into Gaul and Spain. In 429 Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, at the invitation, it is said, of the governor Bonifacius, passed over from Spain to Roman Africa, which became the centre of another Teutonic kingdom, soon established as a great naval power which for a while commanded the Mediterranean and devastated the coasts of Italy and Sicily with its piracies.

Meanwhile the Franks and Burgundians were pressing into Germany and Gaul, while from 449 onwards the Saxons, the Angles and the Jutes invaded and occupied Britain. For a moment it was doubtful if the Aryan or Turanian races would be supreme, but in 451 Attila, king of the Huns, was decisively beaten in the battle of Chalons by a combination of Franks, Goths and Romans, under the Roman general Aetius and Theodosius, king of the Goths. This battle decided that Europe was to be Christian and independent of Asia and Africa. In 476 the succession of Western emperors came to an end with Odoacer's occupation of Rome, and with the decision of the Roman senate that one emperor was enough, and that the Eastern emperor, Zeno, should rule the whole empire. For a time Theodoric, king of the East Goths, ruled Italy, Gaul and Spain; but after his death in 526 the empire of the East Goths was shattered, and changes took place which led to the rise of independent Teutonic kingdoms in Gaul and Spain. In Gaul Clovis (d. 511), the king of the Franks, had already established his power, and in Spain, the West Gothic kingdom, with its capital at Toledo, now asserted its Teutonic independence. Under the emperor Justinian (527-565), indeed, the Roman empire seemed in a fair way to recover its supremacy; the Vandal kingdom in Africa was destroyed; in 555 the Byzantine general Narses finally shattered the power of the East Goths in Italy, and the exarchate of Ravenna was established in dependence on the Eastern emperor; the West Goths were forced to give up the south of Spain; and the Persians were checked. But with the death of Justinian troubles began. In 568 the Lombards, under Alboin, appeared in Italy, which they overran as far south as the Tiber, establishing their kingdom on the ruins of the exarchate. Though in Asia the emperor Heraclius, in a series of victorious campaigns, broke the Persian power and succeeded even in extending the Roman dominion, Italy, save for a while Ravenna itself and a few scattered sea-coast towns, was thenceforth lost to the empire of which in theory it still formed a part.

This catastrophe produced one result the importance of which it is impossible to exaggerate; the development of the political power of the papacy. At the beginning of the 6th century Rome, under Theodoric the Goth, was still the city of the Caesars; the tradition of its ancient life was yet unbroken; at the end of the century Rome, under Pope Gregory the Great (590-604), had become the city of the popes. And with the city the popes entered into some of the inheritance of the Caesars; in the world-wide activity of Gregory we already have a foreshadowing of universal claims, often effectively asserted, which made the great medieval popes, in a truer sense than the medieval emperors, the representatives of the idea of Roman imperial unity (see ROME, sec. ii. _Middle Ages_; PAPACY).

The Hegira, A.D. 622. Rise of Mahommedanism.

The next event that profoundly affected the history of Europe was the rise of Mahommedanism. In A.D. 622, sixteen years after Gregory's death, occurred the flight (_Hijra_) of Mahomet from Mecca to Medina, which fixed the memorable era of the Hegira. The full force of the militant religion founded by the Arab prophet was not felt till after his death (632). The emperor Heraclius, the vigour of his manhood passed, was unable to meet this new peril; the Arabs, strong in their hardy simplicity, and new-born religious fanaticism, and aided by the treason and cowardice of the decadent Roman governing classes, overran Asia Minor, conquered Egypt and the whole of northern Africa, overwhelmed the Gothic kingdom in Spain, and even penetrated beyond the Pyrenees to the conquest of the province of Narbonne. One of the chief effects of these Arab conquests was that Christian civilization became gradually confined to Europe, another was that the trade routes to the East were closed to the Western nations. The conquest of Narbonne marked the limit of the advance of Islam in western Europe, for in 732 the Arabs were overthrown by Charles Martel in the battle of Tours, and a few years later were driven out of Gaul. In Spain, however, they succeeded in maintaining themselves throughout the middle ages; developing a high type of civilization which had a considerable influence on the intellectual life of medieval Europe; and it was not till 1494 that Granada, their last possession in the peninsula, was conquered by the Christian monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella.

The Carolingians.

The battle of Tours emphasized and increased the power and reputation of Charles Martel. As a mayor of the palace to the decadent Merovingian successors of Clovis, he was virtually ruler of the Franks, and, after his death, the last of the _rois faineants_ of the house of Merovech was deposed, and Pippin, Charles's son, was elected king of the Franks. The prestige of the Carolingian house (to give it the name it was later known by) was increased when, at the urgent entreaty of Pope Stephen III., Pippin marched into Italy and saved Rome from the Lombards, who were endeavouring to extend their power southwards. Pippin's son Charles (Charlemagne) finally conquered the Lombards in 774 and thus added part of northern Italy to his dominions.

[Illustration: Charlemagne's Empire at its greatest extent.]

The coronation of Charles the Great as emperor. 800.

In 797 an event of the highest importance to the European world took place. The emperor Constantine VI. was deposed by his mother Irene, who seized the throne. Thereupon Pope Leo and the Roman people definitely threw off the authority of the emperors of Constantinople, on the ground that a woman could not hold the position of Caesar. In 800 Leo crowned Charlemagne emperor at Rome, and henceforth till 1453, when Constantinople was conquered by the Turks, there was an Eastern and a Western empire. Till his death in 814 Charlemagne was king of the Franks as well as emperor. His kingdom embraced not only all German and modern France, but included a large part of Italy and Spain as far as the Ebro. Under his rule western Europe was united in a powerful empire, in the organization of which the principles of Roman and Teutonic administration were blended; and, after his death, he left to his successors, the Frankish and German kings, the tradition of a centralized government which survived the chaos of the period that followed, and the prescriptive right to the title and prestige of Roman emperors--a tradition and a claim that were to exercise a notable effect on the development of European history for centuries to come. (See FRANCE: _History_ and CHARLEMAGNE.)

Europe after the death of Charlemagne.

The period from the death of Charlemagne (814) to the 12th century is characterized in western Europe by the general weakening of the idea of central government and by the rise of feudalism. During the same period the East Roman or Byzantine empire escaped disruption and, preserving the traditions of Roman civil and military administration, formed an effective barrier for Europe and Christendom against the advancing tide of Islam. At the same time, however, the growing divergence between the Eastern and Western Churches, which had been accentuated by the iconoclastic controversy (see ICONOCLASTS), and was destined in 1053 to culminate in a definite schism, was gradually widening the breach between the two types of European civilization, which came into violent conflict at the beginning of the 13th century, when crusaders from western Europe captured Constantinople and set up a Latin empire in the East (see ROMAN EMPIRE, LATER; CHURCH HISTORY; CRUSADES). In western Europe, meanwhile, the unity of the empire did not long survive Charlemagne. Its definite break-up dates from the treaty of Verdun (843), by which Charles the Bald received Neustria, Aquitaine and western Burgundy, Louis the German Bavaria, Swabia, Saxony and Thuringia, and the emperor Lothair the middle kingdom known by his name, the _regnum Lotharii_ or Lotharingia (see LORRAINE). By the partition of Mersen (870) Lotharingia itself was divided between the West and East Frankish realms--France and Germany, terms which from this time begin to represent true national divisions. With the treaties of Verdun and Mersen the history of the European state system may be said to begin.

[Illustration: The Western Empire after the Partition of Mersen 870.]

[Illustration: Europe in 1810.]

[Illustration: Europe in 1815.]

Rise of feudalism.

At first, indeed, it seemed as though the nascent states were about to be dissolved by disruption from within and attacks from without. All alike were subject to the attacks of the Norse sea-rovers, hardy pirates who not only scourged all the coasts of Europe but penetrated, burning and harrying, far inland up the great waterways. Meanwhile, the weakening of central government due to dynastic struggles had led to the growth of independent or semi-independent powers within the states themselves. The Frank landowners had successfully asserted their independence of the jurisdiction of the king (or emperor) and his officials; the imperial officials themselves, dukes or counts, had received grants of lands with similar immunities (_beneficia_), and these had become hereditary. Thus sprang up a class of great territorial nobles to whom, amid the growing anarchy, men looked for protection rather than to the weak and remote central power; and so, out of the chaos that followed the break-up of the empire of Charlemagne, was born the feudal system of the middle ages (see FEUDALISM). This organization was admirable for defence; and with its aid, before the close of the first decade of the 10th century, the frontiers of France and Germany had been made safe against the northern barbarians, who had either been driven off and barriers erected against their return--e.g. the marks established by Henry the Fowler along the middle Elbe--or, as in the case of the Normans, absorbed into a system well adapted for such a process. By the treaty of St Claire-sur-Epte (911) between Charles the Simple and Rollo, chief of the Norsemen, the Normans were established in the country since known as Normandy (q.v.), as feudatories of the French crown. In England, by the treaty of Wedmore (878) between Alfred and the Danish king Guthrum, the Danes had already been established in a large part of England.

Royalty and feudalism.

Feudalism, by the time the Northmen had been subdued by its aid, was quite firmly established in the western part of Europe. During the 11th century it was carried by the Normans into England, into Sicily and southern Italy, and by the nobles of the first crusade into the newly established kingdom of Jerusalem (1099). By the kings of France, England and Germany, however, who saw themselves in danger of being stripped of all but the semblance of power by its delegation to their more or less nominal vassals, the feudal organization was early recognized as impossible as a form of state government, if the state was to be preserved; and the history of the three great European powers during the succeeding centuries is mainly that of the struggle of the sovereigns against the disruptive ambitions of the great feudal nobles. In England the problem was, from the outset, simplified; for though William the Conqueror introduced the system of feudal land tenure into England in 1066 he refused to set it up as his system of government, retaining alongside of it the old English national policy. In France, on the other hand, feudalism as a system of government had become firmly established; and it was not till the days of Philip Augustus (1180-1223) and Louis IX. (1226-1270) that the monarchy began to get the upper hand. From this time until the 17th century the power of the French monarchy, in spite of occasional lapses, grew steadily stronger. The reverse was the case with the German kingship. Its association with the undefined claims involved in the title of Roman emperor, traditionally attached to it, and notably those to authority in Italy, necessitated concession after concession to the feudal nobles, in order to purchase their support for their assertion. The kingship, moreover, became elective; the imperial title was obtainable only at Rome at the hands of the pope; and the German kings thus became entangled in contests, not only with their own vassals, but with the tremendous spiritual force of the medieval papacy by which, for its own ends, the spirit of feudal insubordination was from time to time fomented. Thus in Germany the feudal nobles gradually acquired a sovereign status which, in some cases, has survived the territorial rearrangements of the 19th century and left its mark on the federal constitution of modern Germany; while the kingship and the imperial title grew more and more shadowy till in 1806 it vanished altogether. (See ENGLISH HISTORY; FRANCE: _History_, GERMANY: _History_.)

The rise of the house of Capet.

In France the process by which a strong hereditary monarchy was established was a slow one. During the greater part of the 10th century the Carolingians, stripped of the vast domains which had been the basis of the power of Pippin, owed their continued existence to the forbearance of Hugh the Great, count of Paris. In 987, however, the last Carolingian king died, and Hugh Capet, son of Hugh the Great, the most powerful of the territorial magnates, was chosen king of France. With his election dates the real beginning of the French monarchy, and under him and his successors Paris became the capital of France. Hugh's election, however, was the work of the great feudatories, and France remained divided among a number of great fiefs, of which the chief were Brittany, Anjou, Flanders, Vermandois, Champagne, Burgundy, Aquitaine, Poitou, Gascony, Toulouse and Normandy.

The royal power in Germany.

While the central power in France advanced slowly but steadily, the development of the royal authority in Germany was in the 10th and 11th centuries more rapid. In 911 the German magnates had elected Conrad the Franconian to reign over them, and in 919 Henry "the Fowler" of Saxony, "whose reign forms one of the great turning-points in the history of the German nation." He defeated the Hungarians, the Slavs and the Danes, and by encouraging the growth and development of towns he contributed greatly to the formation of the German kingdom. His immediate successors, Otto the Great and Otto II., continued his work, which was only interrupted for a short time during the reign of the idealist Otto III., whose "cosmopolitan imperialism" brought him into collision with the German Church and to some extent with the German nobles. Henry II. (1002-1025) asserted with success his authority over Germany, and his successor Conrad II., who belonged to the Salian or Franconian line, did much to secure unity and prosperity to the Empire. His son and successor Henry III. (1039-1056) governed Germany wisely, and his reign witnessed the culminating point of the Holy Roman Empire. At the time of his death it seemed probable that Germany, like England and France, would gradually escape from the thraldom of the great feudatories. The future of the German monarchy depended upon the ability of future kings to suppress the forces of feudal disintegration in Germany, and to withstand the temptation of struggling to establish their influence over Italy. Unfortunately for German kingship Henry IV. (1056-1106) was only six years old on his accession, and when he became a man he found that the papacy under Hildebrand's influence was practically independent of the emperor. Had Henry confined his efforts to coercing the German barons he might, like the Normans and Angevins in England, and like the Capetians in France, have proved successful. Unfortunately for Germany Henry entered upon the famous contest with the papacy under Gregory VII. (1073-1080), which ended in the 13th century in the defeat of the Empire in the person of Frederick II. The struggle began in 1073 over the question of investiture (q.v.), and widened into a duel between the spiritual and temporal powers. During the early years of the contest the influence of the papacy reached a high pitch and made itself felt in the crusading movement, which received its first impetus from Pope Urban II., who appealed to Europe at the council of Clermont in 1095 to recover the Holy Places from the Turks.

The eastern Empire and the Crusades.

During the 11th century the Eastern Empire was attacked by the Russians, the Normans and the Seljuks. The emperor Alexius Comnenus found himself on his accession in 1081 threatened by the Seljuks (the victors in the decisive battle of Manzikert in 1071) and by the Sicilian Normans who in 1081 besieged Durazzo. In 1083 he defeated the Normans in the battle of Durazzo, and with the death of Robert Guiscard in 1085 all danger from a fresh Norman invasion passed away. But the first crusade brought new anxieties to Alexius, for he feared that the crusaders might attack Constantinople. That fear removed, he took advantage of the increased connexion between eastern and western Europe by bestowing commercial privileges upon the Italian trading republics, who thus gained access to the ports of the Empire on easy terms.

The Crusades and the Hildebrandine reformation.

With the era of the Crusades, which lasted till the middle of the 13th century, Europe entered upon a period of change, the importance of which is realized by contrasting the condition of western Christendom in the 11th with its condition in the 13th century. Between the opening and close of the crusading movement Europe underwent a complete revolution. While the Crusades tended to enhance the prestige and authority of the papacy and the power of European monarchs, they also led to increased knowledge of the East, to the rapid development of commerce, to the introduction of new industries, to the rapid decline of the influence of the feudal nobility, and to the rapid development of town life (see COMMUNE). At the same time the Hildebrandine reformation was having an immense influence upon the intellectual condition of Europe. The 12th century saw the establishment of many new monastic orders (see MONASTICISM), and at the same time a remarkable speculative and literary revival (see SCHOLASTICISM). This movement owed not a little of its success to the influence of the Crusades, which stirred up intellectual as well as commercial activity. This intellectual activity, as well as the fruits of commercial expansion, were--since learning was still a monopoly of the clerical order--weapons in the hands of the papacy, which in the 12th century attained the height of its power, if not of its pretensions. It is, indeed, impossible to exaggerate the influence of the Roman Church upon the development of Europe at this period. The popes, in fact, represented Europe in a sense that could not be predicated of the emperors; the terror of their spiritual power, their vast wealth derived from the tribute of all the West, their unique experience of international affairs, and--in the case of the great popes of this epoch--the superiority of their minds and characters, made them not only the spiritual rulers of Europe, but the effective centres of whatever political unity it possessed. As a Byzantine observer was to observe of Innocent III., they had become the successors of the Caesars rather than of Peter (see PAPACY).

Growth of the royal power in France.

Nowhere were the beneficial effects of the Crusades seen more clearly than in France. The smaller fiefs were steadily absorbed by the greater lordships, which in their turn fell victims to the royal power. It might almost be said that "modern France is a creation of the Crusades." The effects of the crusading movement were felt in France as early as the reign of Louis VI. (1108-1137). Aided by his able minister Suger, Louis managed before his death to add to the possessions of his house the Ile de France and a prospective claim to Poitou and Aquitaine. Under his successor Louis VII. (1137-1180) the consolidation movement was checked owing to the marriage of Eleanor of Aquitaine (after her divorce from Louis VII.) to Henry II of England. By the addition of his wife's lands (Gascony and Guienne) to those which he had already inherited from his father and mother (Normandy, Anjou, Touraine and Maine) Henry was enabled to form the powerful though short-lived Angevin empire. But the lost ground was rapidly recovered by Philip Augustus (1180-1223), who took advantage of the weakness and folly of John of England, and before 1215 had united firmly to France Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Touraine. Louis VIII. and Louis IX. adhered firmly to the policy of Philip IV., and in 1258, by the treaty of Paris, Henry III. of England recognized the loss of Poitou. There thus remained to England out of the vast continental domains of Henry II. only Gascony and Guienne.

General results of the Crusades.

The rest of Europe was also in various degrees affected by the Crusades. While Spain was occupied in a crusade of her own against the Moors and gradually driving them into Granada, Germany, Italy, and to some extent England, were interested in, and influenced by, the Crusades against the Turks. During the absence of many of the nobles in the East the growth of towns and the development of the mercantile class proceeded without interruption. The trading classes demanded strong governments and equal justice, and vigorously supported the monarchs in their suppression of feudalism.

During the 12th and 13th centuries the Crusades thus proved a large factor in the commercial prosperity of the Italian maritime states, an "open door" between East and West was secured, and reinforcements from Europe were poured into Syria as long as the peoples of the West regarded the stability of the Latin kingdom of Syria as a matter of prime importance. During the crusading period a check was placed to the tide of Mahommedan conquest, while to the caliphate the Crusades proved a perpetual drain upon its material resources. To the Mahommedans the possession of the Holy Places by the Christians was as great a humiliation as their desecration by the Mahommedans was to the crusaders. Unfortunately the Crusades led to a disastrous schism between the Byzantine empire and western Christendom, which had calamitous results. The decay of the crusading spirit was a necessary result of the growth of the consolidation of the European nations, but the price paid was the fall of Constantinople and the establishment of the Turks in eastern Europe. The Crusades thus not only postponed the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks for some two hundred years, but led, as had already been said, to a vast expansion of commerce, as seen in the rapid growth and development of the Italian cities, and to a striking development of town life.

The struggle between the Empire and the papacy.

The Crusades had enormously strengthened the power and prestige of the papacy, and indirectly contributed to its victory over the Empire in the person of Frederick II. From the reign of the emperor Henry IV. to the death of Frederick II. in 1250 the struggle between the Empire and the papacy continued, and is coincident in point of time with the Crusades. The reign of Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190) saw that struggle at its height, and during that reign it became apparent that the emperor's efforts to unite Italy and Germany under one crown were doomed to failure. The rise and success of the alliance of Italian republics known as the Lombard League no doubt contributed to the success of the papacy, but in their contest with the popes the emperors never had any chance of gaining a permanent victory. Frederick II continued with great energy to attempt the hopeless task of dominating the papacy, but his possession of Sicily only made the popes more determined than ever to establish their predominance in Italy. Frederick's death in 1250 marked not only the triumph of the papacy in Italy, but also that of feudalism in Germany. He has been called the "most dazzling of the long line of imperial failures," and with him ends the Empire as it was originally conceived. Henceforward the Holy Roman Empire, which implied the unity of Italy and Germany, and the close alliance of pope and emperor, no longer exists save in name, and its place is taken by a glorified German kingship presiding over a confederation of turbulent German nobles.

Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries.

Thus with the later years of the 13th century Europe had arrived at the definite close of one epoch and the beginning of another. The period of the Crusades was over, the theory of the Holy Roman Empire had broken down. The period from the beginning of the 14th to the close of the 15th century might well be styled the latter days of medieval Europe.

During the 14th and 15th centuries the idea of regarding Europe as one state in which emperor and pope presided over a number of subordinate kings gave way before the spirit of nationalism and particularism. England, France and Spain were rapidly becoming strong centralized monarchies which stood in striking contrast to the weakened Empire.

## Partly no doubt owing to the failure of the Empire and papacy to work

together, a great impetus had been given to the formation of national monarchies. While Frederick II. had failed, Louis IX. and Philip IV. of France, Ferdinand III. of Castile (1217-1252), James the Conqueror, king of Aragon (1213-1276) and Edward I. of England (1239-1307) succeeded in laying the foundations of strong monarchies which after two centuries of struggles with the dying efforts of feudalism were established on a firm basis. In spite of the intellectual activity and political developments which characterized the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries it remains true that the later middle ages were marked by the decay of those remarkable social and political forces which had been such striking characteristics of the earlier period (see MIDDLE AGES).

Summary of the characteristics of the 14th and 15th centuries.

Thus the 14th and 15th centuries have characteristics which differentiate them from all preceding and succeeding centuries, The triumph of the papacy over the Empire had been short-lived. Owing to the disturbed state of Italy, Clement V. was in 1305 compelled to take refuge at Avignon, and till 1377--a period known as the Babylonish captivity--the popes remained in France. While the Empire and papacy steadily decline, while the Byzantine empire falls before the Turks, strong monarchies are gradually formed in England, France, Spain, and Portugal, and in Italy the Renaissance movement covers the later years of the 15th century with glory (see RENAISSANCE). During these centuries there is common to Europe no one principle which is to be found in all kingdoms. But while the old system, founded on belief in the unity of Europe under the Empire and papacy, declines amid chaos and turbulence, there is much intellectual and political activity which portends the appearance of an entirely new state of things. The 14th and 15th centuries may truly be styled a period of transition.

The decline of the Empire, 1254-1519.

From the death of Conrad IV., the son of Frederick II., in 1254 to 1273, when Rudolph of Habsburg became king, chaos reigned in Germany, and the period is known as the Great Interregnum. The forces of decentralization strengthened themselves, and the emperors found that the formation of a strong and united German kingdom was an impossibility. Rudolph of Habsburg (1273-1291), realizing what were the limits of his power in Germany and the futility of attempting to establish his hold upon Italy, began that policy of family aggrandizement which was continued so notably by successive members of his house. His reign witnessed the firm establishment of the house of Anjou in Naples, and, after the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, the supremacy of the house of Aragon in Sicily. Refusing to follow the example of Frederick II. and to take part in distant expeditions, Rudolph conquered Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, Vienna became the capital of the Habsburg dominions in Germany, and his son Albert of Austria, who was king from 1298 to 1308, was careful to continue the policy of his father. Though no Habsburg was again elected to the imperial throne till 1438, when the long succession of emperors began which continued unbroken till 1742, the establishment of the Habsburgs in Austria by Rudolph proved an event of European importance. From that time the leading members of the Habsburg family never lost an opportunity of aggrandizement. In 1335 they received Carinthia, in 1363 the Tirol. While, however, the Habsburgs, the Wittelsbachs and later the house of Brandenburg were strengthening themselves, the Empire was steadily declining in power and influence. The 14th century saw Switzerland shake itself free from the Austrian house and establish its independence, which was, however, not formally acknowledged till the treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

During the 14th century the weakness of the Empire became more and more accentuated under the weak rule of Louis IV. On his death in 1346 his successor Charles of Luxemburg, known as the emperor Charles IV., made a celebrated attempt to form a strong centralized German monarchy. With that object he issued in 1356 the Golden Bull, by which it was hoped that all matters connected with the imperial election would be settled. The number of imperial electors was settled, and henceforth they were to consist of the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz and Trier, and of the king of Bohemia, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg and the count palatine of the Rhine. Charles hoped to concentrate gradually in his house all the chief German provinces, and having by the Golden Bull endeavoured to check the growth of the towns, he expected to establish firmly the imperial influence in Germany. But the towns were too strong to be coerced, and during his reign the Swabian cities formed a union; and though the marriage of his son Sigismund to the heiress of the king of Hungary and Poland, and the possession of Brandenburg, which fell to him in 1373, seemed steps towards the realization of his hopes, his death in 1378 left his work unfinished. Moreover, his son and successor Wenceslaus (1378-1400) proved, like Richard II. of England and Charles VI. of France, unequal to the task of checking the growing independence of the nobles and the cities. The Hanseatic League (q.v.) was at the height of its power, and in 1381 the Rhenish towns formed a confederation. Wenceslaus, like Richard II., had fallen upon evil times. The advance westwards by the Turks occupied the attention of his brother Sigismund, now king of Hungary; he was himself unpopular in Bohemia, and at the same time was exposed to the intrigues of his cousin Jobst of Moravia, who had secured Brandenburg. In 1400 Wenceslaus was formally deposed by the electors, and spent the rest of his life in Bohemia, where he died in 1419. His successor Rupert of the palatinate reigned from 1400 to 1410, and during his reign the council of Pisa endeavoured to bring to an end the great schism which had followed upon the return of Pope Urban VI. from Avignon to Rome in 1377. Two popes had been elected, one living at Rome, the other at Avignon, and Christian Europe was scandalized at the sight of two rival pontiffs. On Rupert's death the electors chose Sigismund the brother of Wenceslaus, and he ruled as emperor from 1411 to 1437.

Decline of the papacy.

Sigismund, emperor, 1411-1437.

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks.

Thus at the beginning of the 15th century the papacy was seen to have fallen from the high position which it occupied at the time of the death of Frederick II. The Avignon captivity followed by the great schism weakened its temporal as well as its spiritual power and prestige, while national developments and dynastic ambitions, such as led to the Hundred Years' War, diverted men's minds from religious to purely temporal concerns. The work of Wycliffe and Hus illustrated not only the decline of papal prestige but also the general opinion that reform in the papacy was necessary. Sigismund's reign as emperor was rendered noteworthy by the part which he took in the council of Constance (q.v.), and by his successful efforts to suppress the Hussite movement in Bohemia (see HUSSITES). That country on the death of Wenceslaus in 1419 fell to Sigismund, but it was not till 1431, after a long and sanguinary war, that the opposition to the union of Bohemia with the Empire was suppressed. Led by Zizka and other able chiefs, the Bohemians who were Slavs utilized the Hussite movement in a vigorous attempt to secure their independence. In 1436 Sigismund was formally acknowledged king of Bohemia. In 1431, the year of the final overthrow of the Bohemians and the Hussites, he opened the council of Basel (q.v.), being resolved to establish a religious peace in Europe and to prevent the Hussite doctrines from spreading into Germany. In 1438 Sigismund died, leaving Germany involved in a quarrel with the papacy, but having successfully withstood the efforts of the Bohemians to acquire independence. Sigismund's death marks an epoch in the history of the Empire, for his successor Albert of Austria proved to be the first of a long line of Habsburg emperors. Albert himself reigned only from 1438 to 1440, but on his death the imperial dignity was conferred upon another member of the Habsburg house, Frederick, duke of Styria and Carinthia, known as the emperor Frederick III. With his accession the imperial throne became practically hereditary in the Habsburg family. Frederick's long reign, which lasted from 1440 to 1493, was of little benefit to Germany; for he showed no administrative skill and proved a weak and incapable ruler. Undoubtedly his lot fell upon evil days, for not only were the Turks at the height of their power, but both Bohemia and Hungary gave him much anxiety. The imminent fall of Constantinople, the last barrier of Christendom against Islam in the East, was a threat not only to the Empire, but to all Christian Europe. But western Europe was too much occupied with internecine feuds to unite effectively against the common enemy. In vain the emperor John VI. had gone in person to solicit aid at the various courts of the West; in vain he had humbled himself to pay the price asked, by subscribing to the abnegation of the distinctive tenets of the Orthodox Church, which secured the ephemeral reunion of Christendom at the council of Florence (1438). The crusading spirit was dead; the European powers stirred no finger to save the imperial city; and in 1453 Sultan Mahommed II. rode through the breach over the body of the last of the Eastern Caesars, and planted the crescent on the dome of the metropolitan church, of Eastern Christendom (see TURKEY, and ROMAN EMPIRE, LATER).

The fall of Constantinople marked the definite establishment on European soil of a power alien and hostile to all that was characteristic of European civilization. It was a power, moreover, which could live only by expanding; and for over two hundred years to come the dread of Ottoman aggression was a dominant factor in the politics of eastern Europe. The tide of Turkish advance could have been arrested by a union of Europe; but the appeals of Pope Nicholas V. fell unheeded upon a sceptical age, intent only on its dynastic and particularist ambitions. To the emperor the ousting of the Ottomans from the Balkan peninsula seemed of less importance than the consolidation of the Habsburg power in Germany, and its extension over the neighbouring kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. France was exhausted by the long agony of the Hundred Years' War, which came to an end the very year of the fall of Constantinople, and the French kings--especially Louis XI. (1461-1483)--were busy for the rest of the century crushing out the remnants of feudalism and consolidating the power of the monarchy. As for Italy, with its petty tyrants and its _condottieri_, there was no hope of uniting it for any purpose whatever, least of all a religious purpose, and Spain was busy with her own crusades against the Moors. The exploits of John Hunyadi, king of Hungary, against the Turks, therefore, remained isolated and unsupported. In 1456 he checked their advance northwards by a brilliant victory which led to the relief of Belgrade; but he died the same year, and his death was followed by a struggle for the succession between Hungarians and Bohemians. The racial and religious quarrels of the Balkan peoples had made it possible for the Turks to obtain a foothold in Europe; the jealousies and internecine struggles of the Christian states made possible the vast expansion of the Ottoman power, which in the 17th century was to advance the frontiers of Islam to those of Germany and to reduce the emperors, in their relations with the Porte, to the status of tributary princes.

The victory of Ladislaus, son of Casimir, king of Poland, who succeeded in uniting in his own person the crowns of Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, threatened to result in the permanent independence of those countries of the house of Habsburg. But in 1490 Ladislaus was compelled by Maximilian, son of Frederick III., to sign the treaty of Pressburg, providing for the eventual succession of the Habsburgs to Hungary and Bohemia.

Consolidation of the Habsburg power.

In other ways the reign of Frederick III. laid the foundations of the greatness of his family. In 1477 Maximilian married Mary, duchess of Burgundy and heiress of Charles the Bold, and through her the Habsburgs obtained Franche Comte and the Netherlands. The line, _Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube_, well described the method by which the house of Habsburg increased its possessions and established its fortunes. A.E.I.O.U. (_Austriae est imperare orbi universo_), was the device invented for his house at that time by Frederick III. and it proved no idle boast. Maximilian I, the son of Frederick III., reigned from 1493 to 1519, and during his reign Europe passed from medieval to modern times. Some reforms in the Empire were carried out, but the events of his reign made it apparent that it was impossible to set up a centralized monarchy in Germany (see MAXIMILIAN I.; GERMANY and AUSTRIA: _History_).

France in the 13th and 14th centuries.

Far different developments were taking place during the 14th and 15th centuries in France, Spain, the Scandinavian north and in England. During the greater part of the 14th century France was engaged in foreign wars and in internal complications, and it seemed doubtful if a strong centralized monarchy would be firmly established. The failure of Philip VI. (1328-1350) and John (1350-1364) in their contest with England weakened the central power in France, and, though Charles V. (1364-1389), owing to his own sagacity and the weakness of the English government, managed to regain for France many of her lost provinces, the French power both at home and abroad again declined under the rule of the incapable Charles VII. (1380-1422). In fact the year 1422 may be said to mark the lowest stage in the history of the French monarchy. From that year an improvement gradually set in. A national sentiment, as exemplified in the career of Joan of Arc (q.v.), was developed; an alliance, essential for the successful expulsion of the English from France, was made in 1435 between the king of France and the duke of Burgundy; and in 1439 the famous ordinance empowering the king to maintain a standing army and to raise money for its maintenance was passed at Orleans by the states-general. These measures proved successful; in 1453 the Hundred Years' War came to an end, and Louis XI. managed between 1461 and 1483 to establish an absolutism in France on sure foundations. Under his successor Charles VIII. (1483-1498), Brittany was annexed, and France, secure from all danger of a feudal reaction, entered with the invasion of Italy in 1494 by Charles VIII. upon modern times. A similar process is observable in England and Spain. In England the Wars of the Roses were followed by the establishment of a strong monarchy under Henry VII., while in Spain Ferdinand and Isabella established in place of anarchy the royal authority, and during their reign suppressed all attempts at provincial independence. In 1491 the consolidation of Spain was completed by the conquest of Granada. In 1397, by the union of Calmar, the three kingdoms of Norway, Sweden and Denmark were united under Eric XIII. This union was, however, short-lived, and in the early years of the 16th century came definitely to an end (see NORWAY; SWEDEN; DENMARK).

The close of the middle ages.

The close of the middle ages and the beginning of modern times was marked by several noteworthy events. The invention of printing, the discovery of America and the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. all occurred before the end of the 15th century, while in the early years of the 16th century the ideal of civil and ecclesiastical unity was finally shattered by the Reformation and by the development of the modern states system, accompanied by the prominence henceforward attached to the question of the balance of power.

The Renaissance.

During the whole of the 15th century Europe had been affected by what is known as the Renaissance movement, which marked the transition from the medieval to the modern order. This movement, caused by the growth of learning, had its first home in Italy, which had witnessed a marvellous revival of interest in classical antiquity, in painting and in sculpture, accompanied by a keen intellectual activity in religious and political, no less than in literary matters. Criticism of existing beliefs was developed, knowledge became widely diffused, and, while the way was prepared for the substitution of individualism for the old ecclesiastical system, the development of commerce coincident with the discovery of America and the establishment of monarchical systems destroyed feudalism (see RENAISSANCE). The later years of the 15th, and the early years of the 16th, centuries may be described as the transition from medievalism to modern times, from feudalism to individualism, from the idea of a world church and a world empire to one in which national consolidation was the chief feature and monarchical government a necessity.

Summary of European history from 1500.

From the beginning of the 16th century Europe entered upon modern times. Many events marked the close of the middle ages. The discovery of America, the decay of Venice, the development of the European states system, the rise of diplomacy as a permanent international system (see DIPLOMACY), the wars of religion--all these are the general characteristics of the new period upon which Europe now enters. With the growth of monarchies arises the belief in the divine right of kings, the development of territorial sovereignty, and wars of ambition like those waged by Louis XIV.

With the 18th century democratic ideas first begin to appear side by side with the rule of the enlightened despots such as Frederick the Great, Catherine II. and Joseph II. The outbreak of the French Revolution brings to an end the old European system, upsets the ideas on which it was founded, and leads to important territorial changes.

[Illustration: Map of Europe 1815-1910.]

The balance of power and the beginning of modern times.

The advent of the Reformation, as has already been pointed out, finally shattered that ideal of civil and religious unity which had been the main characteristic of the middle ages. Thus from the beginning of the 16th century Europe sees the development of the modern states system and becomes the scene of national wars in which the idea of the balance of power was the leading principle (see BALANCE OF POWER). That principle did not allow of the recognition of the rights of nationalities, and till the wars of the French Revolution the interests of the various European states were usually subordinated to the dynastic aims of their rulers. During the ensuing centuries the balance of power in Europe was seriously threatened; during the first half of the 16th century by Charles V., during the latter half of the same century by Philip II., in the first half of the 17th century by the house of Habsburg, and in the latter half by Louis XIV.

The close of the Seven Years' War seemed to prelude a period of British ascendancy on the continent, but that danger passed away with the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and her American colonies. For a time the balance of power in Europe was completely shattered by Napoleon's brilliant conquests, but his fall, while to a great extent restoring the political equilibrium, gave an opportunity to Alexander of Russia to dominate Europe. Thus the 16th century definitely marked the beginning of modern times both from a political as well as from a religious point of view.

The Reformation and the rivalry of Charles V. and Francis I.

With the accession of Francis I. to the French and Charles V. to the imperial throne began the long rivalry between France and the house of Habsburg, which continued with few interruptions till 1756. In the struggle between Charles V. and Francis I., which began in 1521, the former had the advantage, and the battle of Pavia (1525) seemed likely to lead to the permanent pre-eminence of the imperial cause. But unexpected allies were found by Francis in the German reformers and in the Turks. The nailing by Luther of his ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittenberg church, followed by the decisions of the diet of Worms in 1521, led to a rapid development of Lutheran opinions among the princes of the north of Germany. Charles V.'s victory over France in 1525 and his reconciliation with the papacy in 1529 seemed, however, to prelude the suppression of the Protestant opinions. But Francis I. again took up arms, while the invasions of Suleiman the Magnificent, during whose reign the Turkish influence was not only felt in Hungary and Germany but extended to the west basin of the Mediterranean, forced Charles to temporize. When in 1544 the conclusion of the peace of Crepy with Francis I. enabled Charles to turn his attention to the rapid growth of Protestantism, it was too late to adopt with any chance of success a policy of suppression. In 1552 he found himself compelled to agree to the treaty of Passau which implied the adoption of a policy of compromise, and which in 1555 was followed by a definite arrangement at Augsburg, which admitted the principle of _cujus regio, ejus religio_. Till the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618, the settlement of Augsburg tended to keep peace between the Catholics and the Protestants. Equally unsuccessful were Charles's later efforts against France; in 1553 he lost Metz, Toul and Verdun, and in 1556 he retired to Spain, leaving the Empire to his brother Ferdinand, and Spain, the Netherlands and his Italian possessions to his son Philip. The latter, after winning the battle of St Quentin in 1557, made peace with Henry II. of France by the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559.

The Counter-Reformation.

By this peace a term was put to the struggle between France on the one hand and the Empire and Spain on the other, and the kings of France and Spain were enabled to turn their attention to the issues raised by the immense growth of Protestantism since 1521. While Charles V. had been engaged in his struggles with the Turks and the French, Protestantism had rapidly developed. In Sweden, in Denmark, in England, in various parts of Germany, and in France Protestant principles had been largely adopted (see REFORMATION).

Though the forces of Roman Catholicism had for a time been vanquished they had still to be counted with. From the middle of the 16th century the growth of Protestantism began to be checked, and a period of reaction against the Reformation set in. For a time it seemed that the efforts of Roman Catholicism would be successful and that the cause of Protestantism would be permanently weakened. The papacy since the beginning of the 16th century had reformed itself, the council of Trent (q.v.), which closed its sittings in 1564, had given Roman Catholicism a "clearly and sharply defined body of doctrine," and the Catholic Church had become "more united, less worldly; and more dependent on herself." In this work of reorganization the Jesuits had played a great part, and the success of the Counter-Reformation was largely due to their efforts (see JESUITS). Paul III., Pius IV. and V., Gregory XIII. and Sixtus V. are all good examples of the reforming popes of the 16th century. Under them the Jesuits worked; they restored Catholicism in Poland, Bohemia and south Germany; and supported by them the Inquisition crushed Protestantism out of Spain and Italy.

The aims of Philip II.

The interest of the Counter-Reformation movement from 1559 to 1618 centres round Philip II. of Spain. While Pius V. (1566-1572) is the best example of the Counter-Reformation popes, Philip II. took the lead among European Catholic monarchs in working for the extinction of Protestantism. His recovery of the southern Netherlands for the Catholic cause, his attempt to conquer England, his intention of subjugating France, were all parts of a scheme to advance simultaneously his own power and that of the Counter-Reformation.

Circumstances combined to aid Philip, and while he was endeavouring to carry out his political aims, the Jesuits were busily occupied in winning back large portions of Europe to allegiance to the papacy. But failure attended most of Philip's projects. Though he succeeded in recovering the southern or Walloon provinces of the Netherlands, he was unable to conquer the northern provinces, which under William of Orange formed themselves into the Dutch republic (see HOLLAND: _History_). His scheme for the conquest of England failed, and the Spanish Armada was totally defeated in 1588. Nor was his plan for the subjection of France more successful. After a tedious civil war between the Catholics and Huguenots, Henry of Navarre appeared as a national leader, who, having overcome the armies of the League with which Philip was allied, concluded the peace of Vervins in 1598. In consenting to this treaty Philip acknowledged that his schemes for the establishment of his influence over France had failed. Thus, when the 16th century closed, England's independence was assured, the Dutch republic was established, the French monarchy was rapidly recovering from the effects of the religious wars and the decadence of the Spanish monarchy had set in. But the religious question was still unsettled, religious passions ran high, and no satisfactory agreement between Catholicism and Protestantism had been, or seemed likely to be arrived at. The successes of the Counter-Reformation under the Jesuits and such men as Ferdinand of Styria (afterwards the emperor Ferdinand II.) and Maximilian of Bavaria only roused strenuous opposition on the part of Calvinist princes such as Frederick IV., the elector palatine.

The approach of the Thirty Years' War.

Various events had indicated the approach of a final struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism during the early years of the 17th century. The seizure of Donauwoerth, a town with Protestant sympathies, by Maximilian of Bavaria in 1607, the formation of the Protestant Union in 1608 and of the Catholic League in 1609, the questions raised in 1609 by the Cleves-Juelich affair, the preparations of Henry IV. of France for an anti-Habsburg campaign--all these showed that the political atmosphere was charged with electricity. Till 1618, however, an open conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany was averted; in that year the acceptance, by the Calvinist Frederick, the elector palatine, of the crown of Bohemia, proved the starting-point of the Thirty Years' War.

The Thirty Years' War.

Till the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632 that war preserved a religious or semi-religious character. The emperor Ferdinand II., Philip III. of Spain and Maximilian of Bavaria undoubtedly hoped to suppress Protestantism in Germany, while Wallenstein, the great imperial general, was prepared to conquer Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and to convert the Baltic into an Austrian lake. Though the resistance of Christian IV. of Denmark was vain, the jealousy felt by the Catholic princes of Wallenstein and the skill of Gustavus Adolphus caused the total failure of these ambitious schemes. All hope of seeing the imperial flag waving over the Baltic was dispelled by the victory of Breitenfeld, and that of Luetzen in 1632, and though Gustavus Adolphus fell in the last-named battle, he had saved north Germany from falling into the hands of the Jesuits.

Entry of France into the war.

With his death the Thirty Years' War became in the main a political struggle between France and the Habsburgs--a continuation of the wars of Francis I. and Henry II. against Charles V., and of the war between Henry IV. and Philip II. Ferdinand II. had attempted to carry back the religious history of the Empire more than seventy years, and had failed. He had endeavoured to make the Empire a reality and to revive and carry out the designs of Charles V. His failure was now complete. The edict of Restitution issued in 1629 remained a dead letter, and from 1632 to 1648 he and his successor Ferdinand III. had to employ all their energies in defending their possessions from the attacks of the French and Swedes.

The death of Gustavus Adolphus followed in 1634 by the assassination of Wallenstein proved an admirable opportunity for the entry of France into the Thirty Years' War. And till 1648, in spite of occasional reverses, the French and their allies gradually wore down their adversaries. After the death of Henry IV. in 1610 France had temporarily retired from a foremost place in the politics of Europe, and for some thirty years her ministers were busy in coercing the Huguenots and establishing the supremacy of the crown which was threatened by the nobles. Once united at home France was ready and eager to seize the opportunity for inflicting a severe blow upon the Habsburgs in Spain and Austria. The time for such action was well chosen. Austria was weakened by the war which had been waged since 1618, while Spain, exhausted by her efforts in the preceding century, had entered upon a long period of decay, and was about to see Portugal regain its independence. The Protestant princes in the north of Germany were ready to ally with France and Sweden against the emperor, even the Catholic Bavarian duke was to prove a doubtful ally of the Habsburg house. In 1642 Richelieu and in 1643 Louis XIII. died, but though Louis XIV. was an infant, and the French nobles by their cabals hindered the work of the regency, Mazarin successfully carried out the anti-Habsburg policy of his predecessors and brought the war against Austria to a successful conclusion. (See further THIRTY YEARS' WAR.)

The peace of Westphalia, 1648.

The peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the virtual close of religious conflicts in Europe. It also marked the end of the attempts of the Habsburgs to establish a monarchical system throughout all Germany. By that peace the practical independence of the German princes was assured. Henceforward each prince could decide what form of religion was to be observed in his dominions. Thus Lutheranism, Calvinism and Catholicism were alike tolerated, and this recognition of the principle of compromise prepared the way for a wider toleration. Moreover, the petty principalities of the Empire, which numbered over 300, were allowed the right of concluding alliances with any foreign power, of making their own laws, and of carrying on war. Thus, in consequence of this most important concession of the emperor, the Empire lost all cohesion and became little more than a confederation. The states had firmly established their "liberties," the princes were now emancipated from imperial control, and it was evident that, unless by some means the house of Austria could re-establish its ascendancy, the eventual dissolution of the Empire must sooner or later follow. The peace of Westphalia thus marks for Europe, and in a special sense for Germany, the end of an important epoch. For Germany the changes introduced into its political life amounted to nothing less than a revolution, for there "the mainspring of the national life was broken." For Europe the Thirty Years' War brought to a close "the mighty impulses which the great movements of the Renaissance and Reformation had imparted to the aspirations" of men in all parts of the western world.

The treaties of the Pyrenees and Oliva.

It was not, however, till the treaties of the Pyrenees (1659) and Oliva (1660) were signed that the echoes of the Thirty Years' War died away, and Europe entered upon a period in which the political ambitions of Louis XIV. threatened the interests of Europe and absorbed the attention of all European statesmen. During the intervening years from 1648 to 1659 Spain and France continued the struggle, while Charles X. of Sweden in 1654 entered upon a career of aggression and conquest in the north of Europe, which was only ended with his death on the 23rd of February 1660. Upon the balance of power in the north of Europe the wars of Charles X. had little permanent effect, and the peace of Oliva to a great extent merely marked the restoration of the _status quo_. But the peace of the Pyrenees was far more important. During its struggle with France, Spain found itself also involved in hostilities with England, and the real rottenness of the Spanish monarchy became rapidly apparent. Any assistance which might have been hoped for from the emperor was prevented by the formation of leagues of German princes--lay and ecclesiastical--in 1657 and 1658, which had the full support of France. The effect of the formation of the second league was at once apparent: all hope of assistance to Spain from the emperor was seen to have disappeared, and the conclusion of a pacific settlement between France and Spain was at once arrived at. The peace of the Pyrenees was a triumph for the _Rheinbund_, no less than for France.

The age of Louis XIV.

With the beginning of the personal rule of Louis XIV. in 1661, and the return of Charles II. to England in 1660, a new period in the history of personal monarchy in Europe began. At the time of the peace of Westphalia the monarchy in Europe was under a cloud. In England the cause of Charles I. was lost; in France the Fronde was holding its own against Mazarin; in Germany the princes had triumphed over the emperor; even in Russia the nobles were aiming at the curtailment of the power of the crown. But from 1660 it became evident that these attempts to secure the curtailment of the monarchical power were, with few exceptions, not destined to be successful. Though all chance of the establishment of a strong central authority in Germany had disappeared, the various states composing the Empire now entered upon a new period in their history and speedily formed miniature despotisms. Of these Brandenburg, Saxony and Bavaria were the most important. In Denmark Frederick III. made his crown hereditary, and his establishment of an absolutism was imitated by Charles XI. of Sweden a few years later.

Thus when Louis XIV. took into his own hands the government of France, the absolutist principle was triumphant all over Europe. The period of his personal rule lasted from 1661 to his death in 1715, and is known as "the age of Louis XIV." During that period France was the leading monarchy in Europe, and the most conspicuous not only in arms but also in all the arts of civilization. While Turenne, Luxemburg, Villars and many others exemplified, till the rise of Marlborough, the pre-eminence of French generals, Pascal, Racine, Corneille, Moliere and Fenelon testified to the commanding position taken by France in the world of literature. The building of Versailles and the establishment of the French court there was an event of importance not only in the history of France, but also in the history of Europe. The history of Europe may without exaggeration be said during the reign of Louis XIV. to centre round Versailles.

The political condition of Europe, 1661-1688.

During his reign France took the lead in European politics, and established her supremacy all the more easily, owing partly to the weakness of most of the European countries, partly to the aggressions of the Turks, whose invasions of eastern Europe occupied from 1683 to 1699 the attention of the Poles and of the Austrians. The weakness or neutrality of the various European states was due to various causes. England was prevented till 1689 from taking a part in opposing the ambitious schemes of Louis XIV. owing to the personal aims of Charles II. and James II. Philip IV. and Charles II. of Spain could do nothing to resist the growing ascendancy of France, owing to the increasing weakness and rapid decadence of Spain, whose disappearance from the rank of great powers was one of the most striking features in the history of Europe during the second half of the 17th century. The weakness of Germany from the peace of Westphalia to the end of the century, due

## partly to the establishment of the independence of the princes of the

Empire, partly to the unrest in Hungary, partly to the aggressions of the Turks, was obviously an immense gain to Louis XIV.

Louis' aggressions.

Realizing the strength of his own position and the weakness of that of most of the European states, he entered in 1667 into the Devolution war and secured several fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands. From 1672 to 1678 he was again at war with Holland, and from 1673 with the emperor, Spain and Brandenburg as well. At the same time the Turks invaded Poland, but were successfully resisted by John Sobieski. In 1676, however, they made the favourable treaty of Zurawna, securing Kamenets and portions of Podolia and the Ukraine. Thus, while the Turks were threatening the independence of eastern Europe, Louis XIV. was attacking the independence of western Europe. In 1678 he made the treaty of Nijmwegen, securing great advantages for France. Till the end of the century Europe was faced with two serious problems: Could she successfully cope with the Turks on her eastern frontier? And could she resist the continued aggressions of France on her western frontier? Consequently the years from 1678 to the end of the century were of vital importance to the European world. For during that period the French and Turks made unceasing efforts to extend their frontiers at the expense of Germany. Encouraged by the weakness of the chief European states, Louis set up the Chambers of Reunion, seized Strassburg in time of peace and attempted to annex Luxemburg. At the same time it seemed that an independent Gallican Church would be set up, and that Louis, like Henry VIII., would sever all connexion with Rome. The persecution of the Jansenists and the revocation of the edict of Nantes in 1685 established something akin to religious uniformity in France. Buoyed up by his successes abroad and at home, and conscious that he had nothing to fear from England or from Spain, Louis prepared to carry out his schemes, with regard to the extension of his territory eastwards, at the expense of Germany. Simultaneously with Louis' aggressions in western Europe, the Turks had made an attempt to capture Vienna in 1683. Fortunately the efforts of the emperor Leopold, aided by John Sobieski, king of Poland, were successful, and the Turkish tide of conquest was gradually but successfully checked. It was not, however, till the accession of William III. to the English throne that the tide of French conquest in western Europe was in like manner successfully resisted, and it was not till the treaty of Ryswick in 1697 that Louis realized that Europe had set a limit to his conquests. That treaty inflicted a blow on the prestige of France, just as the treaty of Karlowitz, concluded in 1699, was an important step in the decline of the Ottoman power. By that treaty, which marks a definite beginning in the history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the hands of the emperor were freed, and he was able to devote his attention to the Spanish succession question, which already engrossed the attention of all Europe.

The Spanish Succession War.

The decadence of Spain had been obvious to all Europe since the middle of the century, and in anticipation of the death of the Spanish king Charles II., Louis XIV. and William III. had made a partition treaty in October 1698, which was superseded in March 1700 by a second partition treaty. However, on the death of King Charles on the 1st of November 1700 Louis repudiated the partition treaties and accepted the crown of Spain for his grandson Philip, who became Philip V. of Spain. Not content with this success Louis committed a number of aggressive acts which led to the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702. That war continued till 1713, when the treaty of Utrecht, followed in 1714 by the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, ended a struggle which had many results of vital importance to Europe. Great Britain, strengthened by the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca, by her establishment in Canada, and by trading rights in South America, henceforward stood forth as a rising colonial power to whom the command of the sea was essential. Austria obtained not only Belgium, which she held till the French Revolution, but also a firm foothold in Italy, which she maintained till 1859. To Spain the war indirectly brought unexpected benefits. Freed from her expensive possessions in Belgium and Italy, and now ruled by a new dynasty, Spain, so far from meeting with the fate which later attended Poland, entered upon a new period in her career, and throughout the 18th century showed considerable power of resistance to the colonial policy of Great Britain.

The 18th century.

With all its defects the treaty of Utrecht proved in many ways an excellent settlement. Till 1740, although a few short wars took place, Europe as a whole enjoyed peace. But with the settlement of Utrecht Europe seemed to have lost all touch with the high ideals which occasionally, as in the career of Gustavus Adolphus, or in the English great rebellion, or in the defence of Vienna by John Sobieski, were met with. The 18th century was marked by the dominance of a perverted system of the balance of power, which regarded such acts as the Prussian seizure of Silesia and the partition of Poland as justifiable on the ground that might is right.

European politics--1715-1740.

Before many years had passed after the treaty of Utrecht it became evident that two new nations were forcing themselves into the front rank of European powers. These were Russia and Prussia. The treaty of Nystaed in 1721 was to the north of Europe what the treaty of Utrecht was to the western and southern nations. It marked the decline of Sweden and the rise of Russia, which henceforth played an important part in European politics. Nevertheless till 1740 with the exception of the short Polish Succession War 1733-35 and the equally short war of 1737-39, in which Russia and Austria fought against Turkey, no general European struggle took place. That this was so was due in great measure to the alliance of 1717 between Great Britain and France, to the subsequent peace policy upheld by Walpole, Fleury, Patino and Horn (the English, French, Spanish and Swedish ministers), to the hostility between the courts of Vienna and Madrid--only momentarily healed by the treaty of Vienna in 1725--and to the uncertain character of Russian politics.

During those years from 1713 to 1740 the great powers were slowly forming themselves into groups, bound together by motives of interest. Thus Spain and France after 1729 began to realize that both countries were interested in checking Great Britain's colonial developments, while Spain was also ready to seize every opportunity of increasing her possessions in Italy at the expense of Austria.

1740 a new epoch.

With the year 1740 Europe entered upon a new epoch. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia for the leadership of Germany definitely began, and the struggle between Great Britain and France for supremacy in India, Canada and the West Indies entered upon an acute phase. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) holds therefore an important place in the history of Europe, and proved with the Seven Years' War, which was practically a continuation of it, of very real interest to Europe.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.

In April 1748 Great Britain, France and Holland signed preliminaries of peace, which on the 18th of October became the definitive treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The other powers concerned agreed to the treaty with reluctance, Spain on the 20th of October, Austria on the 8th of November, and Sardinia on the 20th of November. By the terms of the peace France and Great Britain restored the conquests in America, India and Europe which each had made from the other. As regards the other powers, the peace left serious heart-burnings. Sardinia, though gaining territory in the Milanese, was compelled to relinquish her hold on Piacenza and its territory, and to restore Finale to Genoa; Austria had to yield Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip, and to recognize the loss of Silesia to Prussia; Spain was compelled to forgo all hope of regaining Gibraltar. The importance of the terms of this treaty lies in the fact that they indicate not only the lines followed by later European settlements, but also the tendency of later European developments. To Great Britain the treaty was only a pause in her expansion in Canada and in her advance to the establishment of her influence over all India. To France the treaty was equally a presage of future disasters in India and Canada. The retention of Silesia by Prussia was a pronouncement to all Europe that a new power had arisen which was destined in 1866 to oust Austria from her dominant position in Germany. The gains won by Sardinia, too, indicated that the real danger to Austria's position in Italy would come from the house of Savoy.

The Seven Years' War.

The Seven Years' War (1756-63) opened with a diplomatic revolution as important as that of 1717, when France and Great Britain made an alliance. In May 1756, as a reply to the treaty of Westminster the Second, made in January between Great Britain and Prussia, France and Austria, united in the treaty of Versailles. This unexpected union, which lasted till the French Revolution, between two powers which had been hostile to each other from the beginning of the 16th century, amazed all Europe. However, it had not the results expected, for although Russia, which was allied with Austria, sent large armies headed by capable generals to the war, Frederick the Great remained unconquered. This result was partly due to the English alliance, partly to the incapable French generals, and partly to the state of internal politics in Russia. The treaties of Paris (February 10, 1763) and Hubertsburg (February 15) marked an important stage in the history of Europe. By the first Great Britain emerged from the war an imperial power with possessions all over the world, by the second Prussia was recognized as the equal of Austria in Europe.

Close of the Seven Years' War to the French Revolution.

The period from the close of the Seven Years' War to the French Revolution saw all the special characteristics and tendencies of the 18th century in an accentuated form. Benevolent despotism found representatives not only in Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, but also in Joseph II., Catherine II., Charles III. of Spain, and Leopold of Tuscany. Reforming ministers, too, flourished in the persons of Tanucci, Turgot, Squillaci, Florida Blanca, D'Aranda and many others. Instances, too, of the low state of political morality are to be found. The indefensible seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great was followed in 1772 by the equally immoral partition of Poland, and it was clearly apparent that monarchs, though ostensibly actuated by a desire for the welfare of their subjects, were resolved that reforms should come from above and not from below. The chief European events during these years were (1) the partition of Poland; (2) the war of the Bavarian Succession; (3) the alliance of Russia with Prussia in 1764 and with Austria in 1781; (4) the entry of France and Spain into war between Great Britain and her American colonies; (5) the combined attack of Russia and Austria against Turkey (1787-92); (6) the Triple Alliance of 1788.

No sooner was the Seven Years' War ended than France and Spain, having made the third family compact in 1761 (the other two were signed in 1733 and 1743), prepared to take revenge upon Great Britain at the first favourable opportunity. The result of this determination, and of Great Britain's absorption in internal politics, was that Russia, Prussia and Austria were enabled to carry out the first partition of Poland in 1772. The entry of France into the American war of independence rendered it impossible for Joseph II., single-handed, to carry out his project of exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria, and he was compelled, after a short war, to give up for the time his project and to agree to the treaty of Teschen (1779). The continuance of the American War proved of great value to Russia and enhanced her position in Europe. Not only had she, together with France, brought about the treaty of Teschen, but in 1780 she headed the league of armed neutrality, and between 1780 and 1784 annexed the Crimea. The conclusion of the war of American Independence enabled Great Britain to regain her influence in Europe, and when Russia and Austria combined to attack Turkey, and when France threatened to re-establish her influence in Holland, Pitt formed with the Prussian king and the stadtholder the famous Triple Alliance of 1788. During the ensuing four years the influence of that alliance made itself felt in an unmistakable way. All hope of the establishment of French influence in Holland was destroyed; Denmark was forced to relinquish an attack on Sweden, then at war with Russia; and after Leopold of Tuscany had succeeded Joseph II. as emperor in 1790, the revolution in the Netherlands was brought to an end. Moreover, through the influence of Leopold the hostility of Prussia to Austria was removed, and the two powers in July 1790 made the treaty of Reichenbach. Great Britain, the chief member of the Triple Alliance, had supported the pacific solution of all these questions so menacing to European peace, and Pitt was aided in his policy by the emperor Leopold, who in 1791 made the treaty of Sistova with the Turks. Danger to the peace of Europe was, however, caused by the attempt of the Spaniards to annex Nootka Sound, and by the continuance of the war between Russia and Turkey. The former difficulty was, however, removed in November 1790 by an agreement between Great Britain and Spain, and in January 1792 Russia made the treaty of Jassy with Turkey.

French Revolution, 1789.

Opening of the war between France and Great Britain, 1793.

The treaties of Luneville and Amiens.

Instead of Europe remaining at peace the year 1792 saw the beginning of a series of wars which did not come to a final conclusion till the battle of Waterloo. While the east of Europe was engaged in war, and while the Triple Alliance was busy attempting to restore peace to Europe, the French Revolution had broken out in 1789. The assistance given by France to the American colonists had brought the country to bankruptcy, and no course was left to Louis XVI. except to summon the states-general in May 1789. In that year a revolution against the reforms of Joseph II. had taken place in the Netherlands, and a revolution was being prepared in Poland for the overthrow of the aristocratic constitution and for the establishment of an hereditary monarchy. At first the revolution in France was entirely occupied with internal reforms, but after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in September 1791 the Girondists, whose influence became paramount, determined by the advice of Brissot to insist upon a policy of menace towards the Empire which would inevitably lead to war. War would, they hoped, result in the downfall of monarchy in France. On the other hand, Lafayette and his party advocated war on the ground that it would strengthen the cause of monarchy. In April 1792 war was accordingly declared upon Austria, then in alliance with Prussia. After a short period of failure the French in September won the battle of Valmy, and in November the battle of Jemappes. French armies advanced to the Rhine, Belgium was occupied, the Scheldt was declared open, and Holland was threatened. In consequence of the danger to Holland, Pitt adopted a warlike tone, and in February 1793 France declared war upon Great Britain. In that war Spain, Sardinia and Tuscany joined, so that France was practically fighting all Europe. Nevertheless, owing to the want of union among the allies, to the Polish questions which distracted Prussia and Austria, and to the determination and patriotism of all classes in France, the allies were discomfited and the league of powers broken up in 1795, when the treaties of Basel were made. Only Great Britain, Austria and Sardinia remained in arms against France, which was till 1799 ruled by the Directory. The next few years witnessed a series of most startling events. The successes of Napoleon Bonaparte in the Italian campaigns of 1797 and 1798 led to the peace of Cherasco with Sardinia, and the peace of Campo Formio with Austria. Only Great Britain remained at war with France. In 1799, taking advantage of the absence of Napoleon in Egypt, the Second Coalition was formed by Russia, Great Britain and Austria. Though the French were driven from Italy, Massena defeated the Russians in Switzerland, and the English were forced to retire from Holland. The return of Napoleon from Egypt was followed by the establishment of the Consulate in November 1799, by the overthrow of the Austrians at Marengo and Hohenlinden, by the treaty of Luneville with the emperor, and by the treaty of Amiens in 1802 with the English government. (See FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS.)

The German Revolution.

Up to this point the Revolution may be said to have benefited Europe and to have shaken to its base the 18th-century ideas of government. During the years succeeding the peace of Campo Formio a revolution was effected in Germany. The Holy Roman Empire had become an anachronism, and as soon as France became possessed of the left bank of the Rhine it was obvious that the imperial constitution required revision. The jealousies existing among the German princes and the overthrow of Austria at Austerlitz enabled Napoleon to carry out a revolution in Germany according to his own ideas. At first, in 1804, new arrangements were made with regard to the character and formation of the diet. The constitution of that assembly was so altered that a Protestant majority free from Austrian influence was now assured. The middle states, such as Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, Wuerttemberg and Hanover, received additions of territory, taken either from the ecclesiastical states or from the lands belonging to the imperial knights. After Austerlitz Napoleon in 1806 established the Confederation of the Rhine, and the Holy Roman Empire came finally to an end. A great European revolution had now been effected, but much remained to be done before a feeling of nationality could be aroused among the people of central Europe.

The causes of Napoleon's success.

Napoleon aims at the destruction of Great Britain.

Already before the peace of Amiens Pitt had tried to stir up national feeling in Austria and Prussia, the means which he suggested for opposing Napoleon being in great measure those which were adopted in 1813 and 1814. But during Pitt's lifetime central Europe was not moved by any feeling of nationality or of patriotism. During the war of the Second Coalition in 1799 Austria had acted without any regard for her allies, while Prussia, from motives of jealousy of and from want of confidence in Austria, had refused to move. It was not till the small states which hitherto had formed independent units had been destroyed and Austria and Prussia trampled under foot by Napoleon that a strong national spirit in Germany was evoked. Until the treaty of Tilsit had been signed in 1807 there was no visible growth of a national uprising in any part of Europe. During the intervening years Prussia had been crushed at Jena and her kingdom cut short (1806), while Alexander I. of Russia, after a fierce campaign against Napoleon, had agreed in 1807 to the treaty of Tilsit, which apparently placed Europe at the feet of France and Russia. Napoleon was, as he thought, now in a position to bring about the humiliation of Great Britain. Already in November 1806, realizing that he could not ruin England by direct invasion, he had issued the first Berlin Decree, which ordered the exclusion of British goods from the continent. The Continental System necessitated by the victory of Trafalgar was thus definitely set up. After Tilsit he proposed to become supreme in the Baltic, and, by securing the dependence of Spain and Portugal, to dominate the Mediterranean, and to resume his plans for conquests in the East, and for the destruction of the British power in India. Thus the effects of the British naval victories of the Nile and Trafalgar would be completely nullified, the Mediterranean would be closed to British ships, Great Britain's Indian possessions would be lost, and Great Britain herself would be forced by starvation into surrender. Fortunately for Europe various circumstances hindered the realization of these ambitious schemes. Alexander, who feared that the French emperor, desired Constantinople, never proved a very helpful ally, the measures taken by Great Britain seriously interfered with Napoleon's schemes, and, before he had subjugated Spain, first Austria in 1809 and then Russia in 1812 offered an active resistance to his projects. The first note of opposition to Napoleon's plans was struck by Canning, when in 1807 he carried off the Danish fleet to England. Then the British fleet conveyed to Brazil in safety the Portuguese royal family when Portugal was invaded by Junot, while the surrender of 30,000 French troops at Baylen in July 1808, which was followed in August by the convention of Cintra, indicated that Spanish patriotism was, when roused, as effective as in the days of the Spanish Succession War. Austria was the first country to follow the example of Spain, and though she was defeated at Wagram and forced to accept Napoleon's hard terms, the national feeling aroused in Germany in 1809 rapidly developed. But Napoleon was apparently unconscious of the growth and importance of a national sentiment in any of the subject countries. In 1810 he had married Marie Louise of Austria, on the 20th of March 1811 a son was born to him, and he now seems to have resolved upon the establishment of a strictly hereditary empire with Paris its capital and Rome its second city. In extent, his empire would be vaster than that of Charlemagne, and the pope was to be completely subordinate to the emperor. This conception of the establishment of a reformed Holy Roman Empire with its centre at Paris did not appear unrealizable in 1811 when everything seemed to favour the new Charlemagne. Napoleon's power was apparently securely established, and during the years 1810 and 1811 he was again returning to his vast oriental designs. A sudden check, however, was about to be placed upon his ambitious schemes.

The triumph of "nationality."

The establishment of French influence in Italy and Germany had stirred up in both countries a national feeling, the growth of which was encouraged by the example of Spain. No greater mistake was ever made by Napoleon than when, ignoring the strength of the Spanish resistance, and the development of a national movement in Germany, he resolved to enter upon the Russian campaign and to march to Moscow. Unconsciously Napoleon "had called into vigorous life the forces of Democracy and Nationality in Germany and Italy." The failure of the Moscow campaign led at once to a national rising in Prussia, and as soon as Austria had united her forces with those of Prussia and Russia, the overthrow of Napoleon at Leipzig in October 1813 was the result, and "the imperial yoke was shaken from the neck of the German people." Napoleon's wars had roused feelings of patriotism in Italy, Germany, Russia and Spain. It was at least realized by the nations of continental Europe, what had long been apparent to Englishmen, that a nation to be strong must be united. To "the subversive cosmopolitanism" of the French Revolution was now opposed the modern idea of nationality, against which the Napoleonic legions hurled themselves in vain. (See NAPOLEON I.; NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS; FRENCH REVOLUTION; ALEXANDER I, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA; METTERNICH.) (A. Hl.)

Reconstruction of Europe.

Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815.

The downfall of Napoleon involved that of the political system of Europe which he had constructed. The changes wrought by the revolutionary period in the old states system were, however, too profound to admit of any attempt at a complete restoration, even had the interests of the allied powers been consistent with such a course. The object of the four great powers in whose hands the settlement of Europe now lay, was rather, after taking precautions to confine France within her "legitimate boundaries," to arrange such a "just equilibrium" in Europe that no individual state should for the future be in a position to overset the balance of power. The first object was to be attained by the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty in France, as a guarantee to Europe against a renewal of the revolutionary propaganda; the second was the work of the congress of Vienna, by which, between September 1814 and June 1815, the reconstruction of Europe was taken in hand. The opening of the congress, in which for the first time all Europe seemed to be united for the friendly settlement of common interests, was hailed as the dawn of a new era. In a sense it was so; but hardly in the manner nor to the degree that some had hoped. In its councils the arts of the old diplomacy, still inspired by the traditional principles or lack of principles, were directed to the old ends; and the world, as though the popular upheaval of the Revolution had never been, was treated as real estate to be parcelled out by the executors of Napoleon's empire among sovereigns by divine right, regardless of the wishes of the populations, which figured in the protocols merely as numbers to be balanced and bartered one against the other.

This process of "dividing the spoils," as Gentz called it, was naturally pregnant with possibilities of quarrels. Of these the most dangerous was that provoked by the resolution of the emperor Alexander I. at all costs to keep the former grand-duchy of Warsaw for himself, while compensating Prussia for the loss of some of her Polish territories by the annexation to her of all Saxony. The deadlock caused by the stubborn insistence on this plan, which the other great powers were equally determined to frustrate, all but led to war, and by a secret treaty signed on the 3rd of January 1815, Great Britain, France, and Austria agreed to make common cause in that event against Russia and Prussia. It needed Napoleon's return from Elba (March 1815) to remind the powers that their

## particular interests must still be subordinated to those of Europe. The

common peril restored the broken harmony; and while the armies of the Alliance were closing in for the final struggle with the French emperor, the congress hurried on its deliberations, and on the 9th of June 1815, a few days before the battle of Waterloo, by which Napoleon's power was finally shattered, the Final Act, embodying the treaties of Vienna, was signed.

Territorial adjustments of the Vienna treaties.

The territorial arrangements thus effected were for half a century the basis of the states system of Europe, and the treaties in which they were defined the charter of international relations. It was in central Europe, where Napoleon's policy had most profoundly affected the pre-revolutionary system, that the greatest changes were made. No attempt, indeed, was made to restore the Holy Roman Empire, in spite of the protest of the pope against the failure to re-establish "the centre of political unity"; but the Confederation of the Rhine having come to an end, Germany was reconstituted as a confederation of sovereign states, in which all the former members of the Empire which had survived the revolutionary epoch found a place (see GERMANY). Austria, in virtue of the imperial tradition of the house of Habsburg, received the presidency of the federal diet; but the bulk of her territories lay outside the frontiers of the Confederation, and the non-German character of the Habsburg monarchy was accentuated by the other arrangements at the congress. In Italy Lombardo-Venetia was erected into a kingdom under the Austrian crown; while the dynastic settlements in the other Italian states tended to make Austrian influence supreme in the peninsula (see ITALY). In return for this, Austria surrendered her claim to her former possessions in the Low Countries, which were annexed to the crown of Holland, so as to form, under the title of the United Netherlands, an efficient barrier to French aggression northwards. The function of defender of Germany on the Rhine frontier which Austria thus abandoned was assigned to Prussia, an arrangement pregnant with momentous issues. In compensation for her disappointment in the matter of Saxony, half of which was ultimately restored to the dynasty of Wettin, she received a large accession of territory in the Rhine provinces, carved partly out of the suppressed kingdom of Westphalia, partly out of the former ecclesiastical states, and comprising the imperial city of Aix-la-Chapelle and the former electorate of Cologne. To Prussia also was conceded the right to garrison the federal fortress of Luxemburg.

Of the other German states, Bavaria, which alone was sufficiently powerful to be of any great importance in the general affairs of Europe, reaped the reward of her timely defection from the cause of her protector Napoleon. She had, indeed, to restore to Austria the territories annexed to her at the expense of the Habsburg monarchy by the French emperor: Tirol, the Quarters of the Inn and of the Hausruck, and part of Salzburg. But she received ample compensation elsewhere, notably the former Bavarian Palatinate with a strip of territory to connect it with Bavaria proper. The right to garrison the federal fortress of Mainz was also ultimately conceded to her. Bavaria was thus placed in a position to continue her traditional policy of aiming at the position of a European great power and holding the balance between Austria and Prussia (see BAVARIA: _History_). The two other German states whose elevation to kingdoms had symbolized a similar ambition, Saxony and Wuerttemberg, were henceforth relegated to a position of third-rate importance; Saxony depended for her very existence on the rivalry of her more powerful neighbours: Wuerttemberg protested in vain against the dictatorship of the great powers to which she was forced to submit. Finally, the electorate of Hanover, partly out of compliment to the king of Great Britain, partly because with the abolition of the Holy Empire the title elector had fallen obsolete, was elevated to a kingdom. The request of the elector of Hesse for a similar concession in his case was refused by the powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.

Of great importance were the changes effected in the north and east of Europe. The affairs of the Ottoman empire, which the treaty of Bucharest (1812) between Russia and Turkey had left in a very unsatisfactory condition, were not dealt with by the congress, in spite of the efforts of Great Britain to bring them into discussion. But the concessions made to the emperor Alexander elsewhere represented a notable advance in the European position of Russia. The possession of Finland, conquered from the Swedes in 1808, was confirmed to her; and, above all, the erection of the former grand-duchy of Warsaw into a constitutional kingdom of Poland under the Russian crown not only thrust the Muscovite power like a wedge into the heart of Germany, but seemed to threaten the Polish possessions of Austria and Prussia by setting up a quasi-independent Poland as a centre of attraction to the scattered elements of the Polish nation; though in the sequel the establishment of the city of Cracow and its territory as an independent republic, to avoid the difficult question of its assignment elsewhere, proved a more fruitful source of nationalist unrest. In the north the settlement confirmed by the congress marked the definite withdrawal of the Scandinavian Powers from any active influence on the affairs of the continent. Alone of the _parvenu_ monarchs of the Napoleonic age Bernadotte retained the crown of Sweden, to which, by the treaty of Kiel, that of Norway had been added. On the other hand, by the cession of Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, Sweden finally withdrew from the southern shores of the Baltic. The Scandinavian states ceased henceforth to play any determining part in European politics. In the south, on the other hand, the restoration of Savoy and Piedmont to Victor Emmanuel I., king of Sardinia, and the incorporation in his dominions of the territories of the former republic of Genoa, were factors pregnant with mighty issues. The object of this increase of the power of the house of Savoy was but to erect a barrier against any possible renewal of French aggression in Italy; in effect it established the nucleus of the power which was to struggle successfully with Austria for the hegemony of Italy.

The gains of Great Britain in Europe were comparatively small, though by no means unimportant. By the retention of Malta she secured her power in the Mediterranean, and this was further increased by the treaty of Paris (November 5, 1815), by which the powers recognized her protectorate over the Ionian Islands. (See VIENNA, CONGRESS OF.)

The powers and France.

But for the episode of the Hundred Days, France would have emerged from the congress with recovered prestige and mistress of at least some of the territorial gains of the revolutionary wars; though Napoleon had thrown away, during the negotiations at Chatillon, the chance of preserving for her her "natural frontiers" of the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. After Napoleon's second downfall she was in serious danger of dismemberment, for which the German powers clamoured as essential to their safety. That Louis XVIII. continued to rule over the territories "handed down to him by his ancestors" was due to the magnanimity, or policy, of the emperor Alexander I. (q.v.), and the commonsense of Castlereagh and Wellington, who saw well that the "just equilibrium," which it was their object to establish, could not be secured if France were unduly weakened, and that peace could never be preserved if the French people were left to smart under a sense of permanent injury. By the second peace of Paris, signed on the 20th of November 1815, France retained her traditional boundaries. The unsatisfied ambition to secure her "national frontiers" was to bear troublesome fruit later.

That the treaties embodied in the Final Act of Vienna represented a settlement of all outstanding questions was believed by nobody. They had been negotiated for weary months in an atmosphere of diplomatic and feminine intrigue; they had been concluded in a hurry, under the influence of the panic caused by Napoleon's return from Elba. To Friedrich von Gentz they were at best but "partial arrangements," useful as forming an authoritative basis for the establishment of a more complete and satisfactory system. The history of the international politics of Europe for the years immediately succeeding the congress of Vienna is that of the attempt to establish such a system.

Treaty of Nov. 20, 1815, and the Concert of Europe.

The Holy Alliance.

England and the Concert.

After a quarter of a century of almost ceaseless wars, what Europe needed above all things was peace and time to recuperate. This conviction was common to all the powers who had inherited Napoleon's dictatorship in Europe; but on the question of the method by which peace should be secured, and the principles which should guide their action, a fateful divergence of view soon became apparent within their councils. All were agreed that France still represented the storm centre of Europe; and a second treaty, signed on the 20th of November 1815, renewed the provisions of the treaty of Chaumont, in view of any fresh outburst of the French revolutionary spirit. But the new treaty went further. By its 6th article it was declared that "in order to consolidate the intimate tie that unites the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals ... meetings consecrated to great common objects and to the examination of such measures as at each of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." This was the formal charter of the concert of the great powers by which for the next seven years Europe was governed, a concert to which the name "Holy Alliance" has been commonly but erroneously applied. The Holy Alliance, drawn up by the emperor Alexander I., and signed by him, the emperor Francis, and King Frederick William III. of Prussia on the 26th of September 1815, represented a different and conflicting ideal. Actually it was not a treaty at all, but at best a declaration of principles to which any Christian could subscribe, at worst--to quote Castlereagh--"a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense" from the political point of view (see HOLY ALLIANCE). It gained its sole political importance from the persistent efforts of the tsar and his ministers to replace the committee of the great powers, established by the treaty of the 20th of November, by a "Universal Union" of all the powers, great and small, who had signed the Holy Alliance, and thus to establish that "Confederation of Europe" of which the autocratic idealist had borrowed the conception from the theorists of the 18th century (see ALEXANDER I., emperor of Russia). It was clear from the first that any attempt to set up such a central government of Europe under a "universal guarantee" would imperil the independence of the sovereign states; and from the first Great Britain, represented by Castlereagh, protested against it. She would consent to take common action on the basis of the treaties she had actually signed, consulting with her allies on each case as it arose; but to vague and general engagements she refused to commit herself. The attitude of Austria and Prussia was from the outset less clear. Metternich was torn between dread of revolution and dread of Russia; the Holy Alliance, though essentially "verbiage," might be useful in holding the imperial Jacobin in check; the "universal guarantee" could not but be discouraging to the "sects"; on the other hand, the extreme willingness of the tsar to march 200,000 Russians for any "European" purpose in any direction convenient or inconvenient to Austria, was--to say the least--disconcerting. Frederick William III., on the other hand, though he too had signed the Holy Alliance with reluctance, in moments of panic saw in the "universal guarantee" his best defence against the renewed attack by France which was his nightmare. In effect, owing to the firm attitude of Castlereagh at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, "the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance" never received a body, though attempts were subsequently made at the congresses of Troppau, Laibach and Verona to apply some of its supposed principles--attempts that led to the definitive breach of Great Britain with the Alliance.

Congress of Aix-la-Chappell, 1818

The highwater-mark of the activity of the Allies as a central government for Europe was reached at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (q.v.) in 1818. France was now admitted to the Alliance, the objects of which were reaffirmed by a public declaration to which she adhered; but at the same time a secret treaty renewed the compact of Chaumont between the four other powers. Certain questions outstanding from the congress of Vienna were referred for settlement to a ministerial conference to meet at Frankfort in the following year. The treaty which was the result of this conference was signed on the 20th of July 1819. The bulk of it was concerned with territorial settlements in Germany: between Austria and Bavaria, and Bavaria and Baden; but some of the articles arranged for the cession of the border fortresses Philippeville and Mariembourg to the Netherlands, defined the frontiers of Savoy, and settled the reversion of the Italian duchies held by the empress Marie Louise.

Alexander I. of Russia and Metternich.

Congress and protocol of Troppau, 1820.

Meanwhile the balance of forces within the European concert had shown a tendency to shift. At the outset the restless activity of the emperor Alexander, his incalculable idealism, and his hardly veiled ambitions had drawn Austria and Great Britain together in common suspicion of an influence that threatened to be little less disturbing to the world's peace than that of Napoleon. But at Aix Metternich had begun to realize that, in the long-run, the system of repression which he held to be essential to the stability of the European, and above all of the Austrian, polity would receive little effective aid from Great Britain, fettered as she was by constitutional forms; while Alexander, alarmed at the discovery of revolutionary plots against his person, had already shown gratifying signs of repentance. The "Jacobin" propaganda of the tsar's agents continued, it is true, especially in Italy; and, in spite of the murder of the dramatist Kotzebue, as a Russian emissary, by the fanatical "Bursche" Karl Sand, Alexander joined with Castlereagh in protesting against the reactionary policy embodied in the Carlsbad Decrees of October 1819. But the murder of the duke of Berri on the 13th of February 1820 completed the Russian autocrat's "conversion." At the congress of Troppau, which met in the autumn of the same year, he was a "changed man," committed henceforth heart and soul to Metternich and his policy. The outcome of this new understanding was the famous Troppau Protocol, published to the world on the 19th of November 1820, and signed by Austria, Prussia and Russia. The immediate occasion of this manifesto was the military insurrection, under General Pepe, at Naples, by which the Spanish constitution of 1812 had been forced on the king (see NAPLES: _History_). But the protocol embodied a general principle involving issues infinitely more important than any arising out of this

## particular question. "States which have undergone a change of government

due to revolution," it declared, "the results of which threaten other states, _ipso facto_ cease to be members of the European alliance, and remain excluded from it till their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

This was, in effect, an attempt to apply the principle of the Carlsbad Decrees to all the world; and, had the attempt succeeded, all Europe would have been turned into a confederation on the model of that of Germany; for a political alliance, charged with the safeguarding of the territorial settlement defined by treaty, would have been substituted a central diet of the great powers, armed with undefined authority; and the sovereign independence of the nations would have been at an end. To any such principle, and therefore to the protocol in which it was embodied, Great Britain offered an uncompromising opposition. In vain Metternich urged upon Castlereagh that the protocol was but the logical conclusion drawn from premises to which he was already committed; for, if the alliance was to be effective in maintaining peace, it must interfere wherever and whenever peace should be threatened, and therefore to crush internal revolutions which could not but have an external result. The logic was perfect; the proposition that on which every "project of peace" must eventually break. Castlereagh's reply was, in brief, that Great Britain could never admit a principle which she would not in any circumstances allow to be applied in her own case.

First rift in the alliance.

Congress of Laibach, 1821.

The absence of the signatures of Great Britain and France from the Troppau protocol marked the first rift in the alliance, a rift that was soon to develop into a breach. For the time, indeed, the crack was "papered over." Castlereagh was prepared to leave Austria a free hand to deal with the risings in Naples and Piedmont, since she had treaty rights in the former case and her interests, as an Italian power, were threatened in both. Great Britain was even represented at the congress which reassembled at Laibach in January 1821, though Lord Stewart, the ambassador at Vienna, was not armed with full powers. Castlereagh had approved of the invitation sent to the king of Naples to attend the congress, as implying "negotiation," an improvement on the dictatorial attitude of the protocol. But everything in the conferences tended still further to shatter the unstable foundations of the alliance. Capo d'Istria, as though the debates of Aix-la-Chapelle had never been, raised once more the spectre of the "Universal Union" which Castlereagh believed he had laid for ever. Metternich, anxious to prove to the Italian Liberals that the tsar was no longer their friend, welcomed the demonstration, and Prussia followed obediently in Austria's wake. "It is clear," wrote Lord Stewart, "that a Triple Understanding has been created which binds the parties to carry forward their own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between them and the two great constitutional governments." (See TROPPAU and LAIBACH.)

Effect of revolution in Spain.

Congress of Verona, 1822.

But the narrower "Holy Alliance" of the three autocratic monarchies, as opposed to the two western constitutional monarchies, was not in fact destined to take shape till after the Paris revolution of 1830. Several factors delayed the process, notably the revolt of the Greeks against the Ottoman rule, and the Spanish question, which latter formed the main subject of discussion at the congress of Verona in 1822. In the Eastern Question the interests of Austria and Great Britain were identical; both desired to maintain the integrity of Turkey; both saw that this integrity was in the greatest peril owing to the possible intervention of the Orthodox tsar in favour of his co-religionists in revolt; and both agreed that the best means of preventing such intervention was to bind the Russian emperor to the European concert by using his devotion to the principles of the Holy Alliance. At Verona, however, the Eastern question was entirely overshadowed by that of Spain, and in this matter the views of Great Britain were diametrically opposed to those of the other powers of the alliance. She shared indeed with France and Austria the strenuous objection to the emperor Alexander's proposal to march 150,000 Russians into Piedmont in order to deal with Jacobinism whether in France or Spain; but she protested equally strenuously against the counter-proposal of France, which was ultimately adopted, that a French army should march into Spain to liberate the king from his constitutional fetters in the name of Europe. George Canning, carrying on the tradition of Castlereagh, once more protested, through Wellington, as British plenipotentiary at the congress, against the whole principle of intervention; and when, in spite of the British protest, the other powers persisted, the breach of Great Britain with the continental alliance was proclaimed to all the world. When, on the 7th of April 1823, the French army under the duke of Angouleme crossed the Bidassoa, the great experiment of governing Europe through a central committee of the great powers was at an end. (See VERONA, CONGRESS OF; ALEXANDER I.; LONDONDERRY, ROBERT STEWART, 2ND MARQUESS OF; CANNING, GEORGE.)

End of the "Confederation of Europe."

Principle of nationality.

Henceforth, though the treaties survived, and with them the principle of the concert on which they were based, "Europe" as a diplomatic conception tends to sink into the background and to be replaced by the old international anarchy of the 18th century. To Canning this development seemed wholly welcome. He applied to the rivalry of states the Liberal principle of free competition as the sole condition of healthy growth. "Villele is a minister of thirty years ago," he wrote to Bagot on the 3rd of January 1823, "no revolutionary scoundrel: but constitutionally hating England, as Choiseul and Vergennes used to hate us, and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all." But the essential difference between the rivalries of the 18th and 19th centuries was in the conception of the "nation." To Canning, as to the diplomatists of the congress of Vienna, "nation" was synonymous with "state," and national boundaries were those defined by the treaties, which Canning was as bent on preserving as any of his reactionary contemporaries. The conception of the divine right of every nationality to readjust political frontiers to suit its own ideals was as foreign to him as to Metternich. Yet this principle of nationality, which was destined during the 19th century to wreck the political structure consecrated at Vienna, and to leave to the succeeding age a host of unsolved and insoluble problems, found in Canning its earliest champion in the higher councils of Europe. The recognition of the independence of the South American republics and of the belligerent rights of the Greek insurgents were both in the first instance motived by the particular interests of Great Britain; but they were none the less hailed as concessions to the principles of nationality, to which they gave an impetus which was destined to continue till the face of Europe had been transformed.

Europe and the revolt of Greece.

Economic progress; rise of the middle classes.

Revolutions of 1830.

This in fact constitutes the main significance for Europe of the War of Greek Independence, which lasted from the first rising of the Greeks in the Morea in 1821 till the signature of the treaty of London on the 7th of May 1832 (see GREEK INDEPENDENCE, WAR OF; TURKEY: _History_). Its actual outcome, so far as the political structure of Europe was concerned, was but to add an insignificant kingdom to the European states system. But its moral effect was immense. The sacrosanctity of the _status quo_ had been violated, and violated with the active aid of three of the powers of the continental alliance: Russia, France and Great Britain. Metternich was right when he said that, in principle, there was no difference between the Greek insurgents and any other "rebels against legitimate authority," and the Liberals of all Europe, forced into inactivity by the Austrian police system, hailed in the Greeks the champions of their own cause. Philhellenism, beyond its proper enthusiasm, served as a convenient veil for agitations that had little concern with Greece. Other forces making for political change were simultaneously at work. The peace secured by the concert of the powers had given free play to the mechanical and industrial innovations that heralded the marvellous economic revolution of the coming age; wealth increased rapidly, and with it the influence and the ambition of the middle classes. The revolution of July 1830, which established the _bourgeois_ monarchy in France, marked their first triumph. In countries less economically advanced, e.g. Germany and Italy, the attempt to follow French example ended in failure; but the revolt of the Belgians, for reasons partly economic and partly national, against the domination of the Dutch, resulted in the establishment of the independent kingdom of Belgium--the first actual breach in the territorial settlement of 1815. In Great Britain the agitation of the disfranchised middle classes, which seemed to threaten a violent revolution, ended in 1832 in the passing of the Reform Bill and their admission to political power. (See FRANCE; GERMANY; ITALY; BELGIUM; ENGLISH HISTORY.)

The easy success of the revolutions in the west of Europe had been due, not to any reluctance of the reactionary powers to interfere on the basis of the old agreements, but to their preoccupation with the national revolt in Poland (q.v.). In view of this, and of the attitude of Great Britain, they had to recognize the title of Louis Philippe as king of the French, merely stipulating that he should guarantee to maintain the treaties. In spite of the overthrow of the legitimate dynasty in France, and of the partition of the kingdom of the Netherlands, the territorial settlement of Vienna remained, after the revolution of 1830, substantially intact. Outside the limits of the treaties, however, fateful changes were in progress. These were determined, broadly speaking, by the two main questions that dominated international politics between the years 1831 and 1841: (1) the antagonism between the western constitutional powers, France and Great Britain, and the eastern autocratic powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia; and (2) the crisis in the Eastern question resulting from the revolt of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt, against the Porte.

Anglo-French "entente."

The strained relations between Great Britain and France, resulting from the French policy of aggression in the Spanish peninsula, which had more than once brought the two powers to the verge of war, had been eased before the fall of the government of Charles X. The peril of a French hegemony over the vast colonial empire of Spain had been forestalled by Canning's recognition of the independence of the South American republics; the intrigues of France in favour of the partisans of Dom Miguel in Portugal had been checkmated by a politic breach, on behalf of the Portuguese Liberals, of the British principle of non-intervention, and finally the chief cause of offence had been removed, in 1827, by the withdrawal of the French army of occupation from Spain. In the Greek question the two powers had acted cordially in concert; and this good understanding even the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, which laid the foundations of the French empire in Africa, had not availed to shatter; for the eyes of the Tory ministry were still fixed on France as the potential focus of revolutionary propaganda, and any over-sea possessions she might acquire were, in Wellington's opinion, so many hostages for her good behaviour given to British sea-power. The results of the July revolution in Paris were accepted by Great Britain so soon as it became clear that Louis Philippe stood for peace and not for revolutionary aggression; the armed intervention of France in favour of the Belgians in August 1831 was stopped by the firm language of Palmerston; the French occupation of Ancona, as a countermove to Austrian aggressions in Italy, was accepted as "an incident of the balance of power"; and the intention of the king of the French to abide by the treaties, which became clearer with the consolidation of his power at home, paved the way for that _entente_ between the two Liberal powers which lasted until 1840.

The constitutional v. the autocratic powers.

The Eastern question, Mehemet Ali.

Conventions of Muenchengraetz and Berlin, 1833.

The cleavage between the fundamental principles of the two groups of autocratic and constitutional powers was not only apparent in their general attitude towards constitutional and national movements, but affected also the position taken up by them during the crisis of the Eastern question evoked by the revolt of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt, a crisis by which between 1839 and 1841 all other diplomatic issues were overshadowed. (See MEHEMET ALI.) During the Greek revolt the efforts of Austria had been directed to preventing a Russian attack upon Turkey; these efforts had failed, and Metternich's worst fears seemed to be realized when the Russo-Turkish campaigns of 1828-29 issued in the treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) and the apparently complete vassalage of the sultan to the tsar. But when, in 1832, Sultan Mahmud appealed in his despair to the emperor Nicholas to save him from ruin at the hands of the Egyptian rebels, and, as the result, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833) seemed to place definitely in the hands of Russia the keys of the Black Sea, it was left to France and Great Britain to give voice to the protest of Europe. Austria, alarmed by the revolutionary movements of 1830, accepted the fact of Russian preponderance at Constantinople, rather than risk a breach with the autocrat who was now the main pillar of the Holy Alliance. The emperor Nicholas, for his part, was equally prepared to surrender some of his ambitions in the East for the sake of the common cause, the more so since to Russian statesmen the maintenance of Turkey in a condition of weakness and dependence now seemed preferable to any attempt to break it up. The result of these dispositions was the convention of Muenchengraetz (September 18, 1833) between Russia, Austria and Prussia, by which the three powers undertook to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire. In the following month a secret convention was signed at Berlin between the same powers (October 15), reaffirming the right of the powers to intervene in the internal affairs of a friendly state at the request of its legitimate sovereign, a right with which no third power would be allowed to interfere, such interference to be regarded by the three powers as an act of hostility directed against all of them.

The Tsar Nicholas I. and Palmerston.

Affairs of Spain and Portugal. Quadruple Alliance of 1834.

This reconstitution of the "Holy Alliance" on a narrower basis was the work of the emperor Nicholas, whose masterful personality had by this time quite overshadowed the influence of Metternich in the councils of the autocratic powers. There was no formal breach of the Grand Alliance; the "treaties" remained in force; but the French revolution of 1830 had produced a practical disruption which was every day accentuated by the attitude of the British government under the influence of Palmerston. For Palmerston had now become "the firebrand of Europe," openly proclaiming his contempt for international law and equally openly posing as the protector of "oppressed nationalities." "If these two powers (France and England)," wrote the tsar to King Frederick William of Prussia, "have the courage to profess loudly rebellion and the overturn of all stability, we ought to have the right and the courage to support Divine right." This deep cleavage of principles was immediately exhibited in the attitude of the powers towards the troubles in the Spanish peninsula. In September 1833 Ferdinand VII. of Spain died, and, under the Pragmatic Sanction, his daughter Isabella succeeded under the regency of Queen Christina; in July, Dom Miguel, the absolutist pretender to the throne of Portugal, had made himself master of Lisbon. In Spain Don Carlos, Ferdinand's brother, claimed the crown as the legitimate heir, and began the long agony of the Carlist wars; in Portugal the constitutionalists upheld in arms the rights of Queen Maria da Gloria (see SPAIN and PORTUGAL). Carlists and Miguelists, making common cause, had the moral support of the allies of Muenchengraetz; while France and Great Britain took the side of the Liberals. A formal alliance between the two western powers, proposed by Talleyrand, was indeed refused by Palmerston, who had no wish to commit Great Britain to an irrevocable breach with Austria and Russia, and was suspicious of the ambitions of France in Spain; but ultimately a triple alliance between Great Britain, Spain and Portugal---with the object of restoring order in the peninsula--was converted, under pressure from the French government, into the Quadruple Alliance of the 22nd of April 1834.

Nicholas I. and Great Britain.

Breach of Anglo-French "entente" 1840.

The _entente_ implied by this formal instrument was, however, more apparent than real. When, in the spring of 1835, Queen Christina applied to the Allies for help against a renewed Carlist rising, Palmerston's suspicions were again aroused by the somewhat naive suggestion of Thiers that France should once more intervene as in 1823, a suggestion that was firmly rejected. Palmerston's counter-proposal of an English expedition met with as little favour in Paris. The Anglo-French _entente_ was proving but a "cardboard alliance," as Wellington called it; and the emperor Nicholas, to whom the existence of Louis Philippe as king of the French was at once a sacrilege and a menace, began with a good hope to work for its destruction. The fears roused by the Reform Act of 1832 had been belied by its results; the conservative temper of the British electorate had restored to Great Britain the prestige of a legitimate power; and the pledge of the tsar's renewed confidence and goodwill was the visit of the cesarevich (afterwards the emperor Alexander II.) to the English court in 1839. This was not without its effect on the public sentiment; but the triumph of the tsar's diplomacy was due to fresh complications in the Eastern question, due to the renewed effort of Sultan Mahmud to crush the hated viceroy of Egypt. These events will be found outlined in the article MEHEMET ALI. Here it will suffice to say that the convention of London of the 15th of July 1840, signed by Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia without calling France into counsel, marked the definite breach of the Anglo-French _entente_, a breach which was but imperfectly healed by the Straits' Convention signed by all the powers on the 13th of July 1841.

Great Britain and France.

The Straits' Convention was hailed by Count Nesselrode, the Russian foreign secretary, as having re-established "the federative system of the European states on its old basis." This was true, in so far as it created yet another precedent for the concerted action of the European powers, and once more consecrated the right of "Europe" to decide in common on questions of first-rate international importance. But the divergence of interests and principles within the concert were too great to be healed by the settlement of a single issue, however important, and this divergence increased as events moved towards the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848. When, in 1846, the independent republic of Cracow was suppressed by agreement of the three autocratic powers, on the ground that it had become a dangerous centre of revolutionary agitation, it was Great Britain and France that protested against an arbitrary infraction of the treaties by the very governments which had laid the greatest stress upon their sanctity. The _entente_ between the two Liberal powers had been patched up after the closure of the Egyptian Question; it was cemented by visits of Queen Victoria and the prince consort to the Chateau d'Eu (1843 and 1845), and of King Louis Philippe to Windsor (1844); and it survived, in spite of several causes of friction, notably the crisis in Morocco (q.v.), until 1846, when the affair of the Spanish Marriages brought it to a somewhat dramatic conclusion.

The "Spanish Marriages."

The "February Revolution," 1848.

The attempt to secure the succession to the Spanish throne for his descendants by pressing on the marriage of the duke of Montpensier with the infanta Luisa, before that of the young queen Isabella had been proved to be fruitful in children, was on the part of Louis Philippe more than a breach of faith with Great Britain (how deeply it was resented may be learnt from Queen Victoria's letters); it was a breach of faith with the revolution that had made him king. Since 1840, indeed, the whole tendency of the king's policy had been to revert to the traditional standpoint of the Bourbons; internally, "resistance" to the growing claims of the democracy; externally, dynastic ambition. But in endeavouring to win the goodwill of the reactionary powers he only succeeded in losing that of the classes of his own people on which his authority was based. In 1847 he joined with the three autocratic powers in supporting the clerical and reactionary _Sonderbund_ in Switzerland, in defiance of the protests of Great Britain and the attitude of the majority of Frenchmen. When, in February 1848, the revolution broke out in Paris, the _bourgeois_ monarchy, utterly discredited, fell without a struggle (see FRANCE and LOUIS PHILIPPE).

Revolution of 1848 outside France.

The revolution in Paris was not the cause of the political upheaval which in the year 1848 convulsed Europe from Ireland to the banks of the Danube; it had indeed been preceded by the triumph of Liberalism in Switzerland, by successful revolutions in Naples and Palermo, and by the grant of a constitution in Piedmont; but flaming up as it were in the revolutionary centre of Europe, it acted as the beacon signal for the simultaneous outbreak of movements which, though long prepared, might but for this have been detached and spasmodic. It was this simultaneity which gave to the revolutions of 1848 their European character and their formidable force. They were the outcome of various, dissimilar and sometimes contradictory impulses--political, social, racial. In France the issue resolved itself into a struggle between the new working-class ideal of Socialism and the _bourgeois_ ideal of the great Revolution; in England the Chartist movement presented, in a less degree, the same character; in Germany, in the Austrian empire, in Italy, on the other hand, the dominant motives were constitutional and nationalist, and of these two the latter became in the end the determining factor. The events of the different revolutions are described elsewhere (see FRANCE; AUSTRIA; GERMANY; HUNGARY; ITALY). From the point of view of Europe such unity as they possessed was due to their being, so far as Central Europe was concerned, directed against the system of "stability" associated with the name Metternich. In hatred of this system German, Czech, Magyar, and Italian were united; Kossuth's great speech of the 3rd of March echoed far beyond the frontiers of Hungary; the fall of Metternich (March 13) was a victory, not only for the populace of Vienna, but for all the peoples and races which had worn the Austrian fetters. It was the signal for revolutions in Hungary (the passing of the "March Laws"), in Bohemia, in Prussia (March 15), in Milan; on the 23rd of March, Charles Albert of Sardinia, placing himself at the head of the Italian national movement, declared war against Austria. Against a movement so widespread and apparently inspired by a common purpose the governments were powerless. The collapse of the Austrian administration, of which the inherent rottenness was now revealed, involved that of those reactionary powers which had leaned upon it. One by one they accepted what seemed to be the inevitable; even Pope Pius IX. sent troops to fight under the banner of St Peter for the Italian cause; while in Berlin Frederick William IV., wrapped in the gold and black colours of imperial Germany, posed as the leader of "the glorious German revolution." When, on the 18th of May, the parliament of United Germany was opened at Frankfort, it seemed as though pan-German dreams were on the threshold of realization; while in Italy, early in the same month, Lombardy, Modena, Parma and Piacenza declared by plebiscites for incorporation in the north Italian kingdom, Venice following suit on the 4th of June. A profound modification of the European states system seemed inevitable.

Causes of the failure of the revolutionary movements.

That, in the event, the revolutions of 1848 left the territorial settlement of Vienna intact, was due in the main to the marvellous resisting power of the Habsburg monarchy, the strength of which lay in the traditional loyalty of the army and the traditional policy of balancing race against race within the empire. The triumph of democracy in Germany was made possible only by the temporary collapse of the Habsburg power, a collapse due to the universality and apparent unanimity of the onslaught upon it. But it was soon clear that the unanimity was more apparent than real. The victory of the democratic forces had been too easy, too seemingly overwhelming; the establishment of the constitutional principle in the main centres of autocracy seemed to make common action against the powers of reaction of secondary importance, and free play was allowed to the racial and national antagonisms that had been present from the first. The battle of German, as well as of Italian, liberty was being fought out on the plains of Lombardy; yet the German democrats, whether in Vienna or Frankfort, hailed the victories of the veteran Radetzky as triumphs of Germanism. In Bohemia the revolution was wrecked on the rivalry of German and Czech; and when the Hungarians drew the sword against Austria, the imperial government was reinforced by the hatred of the southern Slavs for their Magyar task-masters.

Victory of the conservative forces.

Thus, from the chaos of warring races, the old order began slowly to reappear. So early as the 15th of June 1848 Prince Windischgraetz had restored order in Prague and received the thanks of the Frankfort parliament; on the 25th of July Radetzky's victory at Custozza set free the imperialist army in Italy; on the 4th of September Jellachich, ban of Croatia, invaded Hungary in the name of the united empire; on the 1st of November Windischgraetz entered democratic Vienna. The alliance of the army and the Slav races had won the victory over German democracy. The combating of Hungarian nationalism proved a longer and a harder task; but the Austrian victory of Kapolna (February 26-27, 1849) encouraged Schwarzenberg to dissolve the rump of the _Reichsrath_ at Kremsier and proclaim a new constitution for the whole empire, including Hungary. The Magyar victories that followed issued in the proclamation, on the 14th of April, of the independence of Hungary. But though the Austrian arms had not been strong enough to crush the Hungarian revolt, they had proved at least the vitality of the conservative principle. The emperor Nicholas I. of Russia had watched in disgusted silence the weak spirit of concession with which the revolutions had been everywhere met; so long as the sovereigns seemed to forget their divine mission he had held rigorously aloof, and had only broken silence to congratulate Windischgraetz on his capture of Vienna and Schwarzenberg on his reassertion of vigorous principles. Now, however, that Divine Right was in arms against the forces of disorder, he was prepared to listen to the prayer of the emperor Francis Joseph for assistance against the Hungarian rebels. The engagements of 1833 were remembered; and in the brotherly spirit of the Holy Alliance, Hungary was subdued by Russian armies and handed over, without _quid pro quo_, to her legitimate king.

Prussia and Austria. Convention of Olmuetz, 1850.

Goergei's capitulation of Vilagos (August 14, 1849) cleared the ground for the complete restoration of the system destroyed by the March revolutions of the year before. The refusal of Frederick William IV. of Prussia to accept the imperial crown (April 21,1849) had already advertised the failure of the constitutional and unionist movement in Germany; and Prussia, her military prestige restored, stood once more face to face with Austria in rivalry for the hegemony of Germany. In the diplomatic contest that followed Prussia was worsted, her claims to an independent supremacy in the north were defeated, and the convention of Olmuetz (November 29, 1850) restored the _status quo_ of the Confederation as established in 1815.

Napoleon III. and Europe.

Rise of socialism.

"The Napoleonic Idea."

Within three years of the great upheaval of 1848 the forces of revolution seemed everywhere to have been subdued, the states system of Europe to have been re-established on the basis of the treaties of Vienna. In reality, however, this restoration was only on the surface; the cracks in the structure of the European system had--to use Bismarck's phrase applied to another occasion--only been "papered over"; and soon ominous rents revealed the fact that the forces that had threatened it with sudden ruin were still at work. One fateful breach in the treaties had, indeed, been accepted as beyond repair; when the dust of the revolutionary turmoil was at length laid a Bonaparte was once more firmly seated on the throne of France. The emperor Nicholas, watching from the calm of Russia, had realized all that the recognition of this fact would involve; he had proposed to set in motion the somewhat rusty machinery of the Grand Alliance, but the other autocratic powers were in no case to support a legitimist crusade, and when Napoleon in 1852 assumed the title of emperor, all Europe recognized his right to do so, even Nicholas being fain to content himself with refusing to treat the _parvenu_ monarch as his "brother," and to admit his style of "third" Napoleon, which seemed to imply a dynastic claim. Napoleon, indeed, was accepted by the powers, as he was welcomed by the French people, as the "saviour of society" from the newly revealed perils of the social revolution. For new and ominous forces had made their appearance since the revolution of 1830 had established the middle classes in power. The industrial development had proceeded in the west of Europe with astonishing rapidity, with its resulting concentration of vast populations in factories and factory cities; and this "proletariat," excluded from any voice in the government, and exposed in accordance with the prevailing economic theories of doctrinaire Liberalism to the horrors of unrestricted competition, had begun to organize itself in a movement, of which the catchword was "the right to work" and the banner the red flag of the socialist commune. The reign of Charles X. had been the _reductio ad absurdum_ of the principle of legitimacy; that of Louis Philippe had discredited for ever government based solely on the _bourgeoisie_; the socialistic experiments of 1848 in Paris had collapsed amid the anarchy and bloodshed of the June days. At this opportune moment Louis Napoleon Bonaparte proclaimed to the French people the "Napoleonic Idea" as conceived by himself. The great Napoleon had been the incarnation of the Revolution, had "sprung armed from the Revolution, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter"; he had ruled because to him the people, by whom the Revolution had been made, had delegated the duty of representing, protecting and guiding it. Of this idea Louis Napoleon conceived himself to be the heir; and when by a double plebiscite the French nation had established him in supreme power, first as president for life (1851), then as emperor (1852), he was able to claim that he represented the people in a far more immediate sense than could be asserted of the chance majority of any representative assembly.

Economic revolution in Europe.

It was clear that, sooner or later, Napoleon III. would prove a disturbing force in Europe. His title to rule was that he represented France; it followed therefore that he must be hostile to "the treaties," by which the traditional aspirations of France, e.g. for her "natural boundaries" of Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, were restrained. He reigned as "emperor of the French"; it followed that he represented that principle of nationality which the treaties ignored. He could not afford--as Metternich had said of Ferdinand of Naples--"to treat his throne as an arm-chair"; and any activity he might display would be almost certainly at the expense of the established order. At the outset, indeed, it was his policy to pose as its custodian. To conciliate the French clericals he supported the pope against the Italian Liberals; but otherwise he proclaimed aloud his devotion to the arts of peace. A period of rapid material expansion succeeded the unrest of the revolutionary years; engineers and men of science were quickly producing a change in all the material conditions of life, greater than could have been effected by any political revolution; especially the face of Europe was gradually being covered with a network of railways, which it was hoped would draw the European nations not only materially but morally closer together. The first universal exhibition, opened under the auspices of the prince consort at London in 1851, was intended to advertise and consecrate the dawn of a new era of international peace and goodwill. The Crystal Palace at Sydenham, once hailed as the "bright Koh-i-nur of the West," remains the dismal monument of a hope so soon to be belied by the hard logic of events. For no period since 1815 has been so occupied with wars and the rumours of war as the twenty years that followed the opening of this great temple of peace.

The Crimean War.

Congress of Paris, 1856.

One question, that of the ultimate destination of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which threatened the tranquillity of the West, was temporarily settled by the conference of London in 1852 (see SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION). But about the same time anxious watchers noticed on the political horizon in the East a cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, that threatened a serious storm. At first this was no more than a quarrel between Greek and Latin monks about the custody of certain holy places and things in Palestine. It soon, however, became clear that behind these insignificant combatants loomed the figures of the emperors of Russia and France. The motives that induced Napoleon to take up the cause of the rights of the Latin church in this matter were

## partly political, partly personal. He resented the tsar's attitude

towards himself; he wished to gain the firm support of the clergy for his throne; he desired to win prestige for himself and his dynasty by reasserting the traditional influence of France in the Ottoman empire. The events that led up to the Crimean War, and those of the war itself, are told elsewhere (see CRIMEAN WAR). Great Britain had been drawn into the war by her traditional policy of preserving the Ottoman empire as a barrier against the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean and the consequent danger to the British empire in India. It is now generally conceded that, so far as these objects were concerned, the war was a tragic mistake. The hopes that were built on the capacity of Turkey to reform itself were disappointed; the restrictions imposed upon Russia were repudiated at the first opportunity, during the Franco-German War in 1870; and the results of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876 have shown that a far more effective barrier against Russia than the weakened Ottoman empire has been furnished by the young and vigorous national states of the Balkan Peninsula. None the less, the treaty of Paris (1856), by which the war was closed, marks an important epoch in the diplomatic history of Europe; and it is impossible to say that the blood spilled in the Crimea was wholly wasted. At the time the main success of the allied powers seemed to be in the thrusting back of Russia from the Danube by the cession of Bessarabia, the extinction of Russian sea-power in the Black Sea, the formal repudiation of the tsar's claim to a special right of interference in Turkey. But the true significance of the work of the congress of Paris lies in the impetus given by it to the development of an effective international law. The concert of Europe was consecrated anew by the solemn admission of the Ottoman empire to an equality of _status_ with the European powers and the declaration of the collective obligations of Europe towards it. The congress, moreover, acted in some sort as the legislative body of Europe; it established the principle of the free navigation of the Danube and of the right of all nations to carry their commerce into the Black Sea; by a declaration, signed by all the powers present, it abolished the practice of granting letters of marque to privateers in war time. The question was even discussed of establishing some sanction by which the rules of international law agreed upon should be enforced upon recalcitrant states; and, though nothing was settled, a _voeu_ to this effect was entered upon the protocol. The congress of Paris thus set a precedent more hopeful than those of the congresses held earlier in the century, because the issues were not confused by the supposed necessity for upholding "legitimacy" at all costs; it was a stage in the progress from the ideals of the Grand Alliance to those of the Hague Conference.

Preponderance of France.

Napoleon and Italy. War of 1859.

Napoleon and Germany

The conclusion of the Crimean War left the emperor Napoleon the most influential personage in Europe; and Paris, the seat of the congress, became also the centre of the diplomatic world. Russia had been bled almost to death by the war; Austria was discredited and isolated owing to the dubious part she had played in it; Prussia had not recovered from the humiliation of Olmuetz; Great Britain was soon plunged into the critical struggle of the Indian Mutiny. The time was obviously opportune for the realization of some of the aspirations implied in the Napoleonic idea. The opportunity came from the side of Italy. By sending Sardinian troops to fight in a quarrel not their own, alongside the Allies in the Crimea, Cavour had purchased for Piedmont the right to be heard in the councils of the powers--a right of which he had made use at the Paris congress to denounce before all Europe the Austrian misrule in Italy. The Italian unionists were at one with Napoleon in desiring to overset "the treaties"; and the Franco-Italian alliance which, in 1859, drove the Austrians out of Lombardy and established the nucleus of the Italian kingdom was the beginning of a process which, within twelve years, was to change the balance of Europe. It was ominous of the future that it was largely the menace of Prussian intervention that persuaded Napoleon to conclude the armistice of Villafranca (July 11, 1859), which, contrary to his agreement with Victor Emmanuel, left Venice to the Austrians. In spite of the peace of Zuerich (November 10), indeed, the union of Italy continued during the succeeding years, and Savoy and Nice were the reward of the French emperor's connivance (see ITALY). France thus once more gained her "natural frontier" of the Alps; the question was whether she would be able to regain her other natural frontier on the Rhine. The times were not unpropitious for an enterprise which was undoubtedly one of the main objects of Napoleon's policy. The European concert had ceased to exist as an effective force; the treaties had been violated with impunity; in Germany, where the tension between the two great powers had not been eased by Prussia's dubious attitude during the war, there was little prospect of a united opposition to French aggression, and the conditions seemed highly favourable for reviving the traditional policy of exploiting German disunion for the aggrandizement of France. Prussia was arming, but her armaments were directed not against Napoleon but against Austria, and the beginning of the reign of William I., who had become regent in 1858 and king in 1861, pointed to the development of a situation in which the French emperor would once again become the arbiter of Germany. On the 29th of March 1862 Prussia signed a commercial treaty with France on a basis that involved the exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein, and replied to the protests of the court of Vienna by recognizing the new kingdom of Italy. In September of the same year King William placed the supreme direction of Prussian policy in the hands of Otto von Bismarck, whose views on the exclusion of Austria from Germany were known to all the world.

Decline of Napoleon's influence.

The outcome of the Polish insurrection of 1863, however, again altered the aspect of things, and in a direction unfavourable to France (see POLAND: _History_). Napoleon had been forced by French public opinion to come forward as the protector of the Poles; but the spectacle of a Bonaparte posing as the champion of "the treaties" was not impressive; his brave words were not translated into action; and he only succeeded in offending Russia by his protests and alienating Great Britain by his tergiversations. The proffered intervention of Austria, France and Great Britain was rejected in a note of Prince Gorchakov to Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador in London (July 1, 1863); no action followed; and the last effort to put forward the treaties of Vienna as the common law of Europe ended in a fiasco. British ministers, who had been made to look somewhat ridiculous, henceforth began to be chary of active intervention in continental affairs; Austria and France were alike discredited and isolated. Prussia which, under Bismarck's auspices, had aided Russia in suppressing the Poles (convention of February 8, 1863) alone emerged from the crisis with increased prestige. Bismarck, indeed, was too wary to accept the tsar's suggestion of an offensive alliance and an immediate combined attack on Austria and France; but in the coming struggle for the hegemony of Germany he was assured at least of Russia's neutrality.

Rivalry of Prussia and Austria. Schleswig-Holstein question.

Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Prussia supreme in Germany.

The final act in this long rivalry began with the opening up of the Schleswig-Holstein question on the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark and the accession of the "protocol-king" Christian IX. (November 15, 1863). The German claim to the Elbe duchies, the Danish claim to at least Schleswig as an integral part of the northern kingdom, were but subordinate issues of questions far more fateful, the developments of which once more illustrated the hopeless enfeeblement of the idea of the European concert. In the struggle for the possession of the duchies the general sentiment of Germany was on one side, that of Europe on the other. By the protocol of 1852 the duchies had been treated as an integral part of Denmark, and France and Great Britain, as signatory powers, alike protested against the action of Austria and Prussia in asserting the German claim by force of arms. But, as in the case of Poland, protests were not followed by action; Napoleon in the end contented himself with proposing his favourite "Napoleonic idea" of a plebiscite, to discover the wishes of the populations concerned; Palmerston, who realized some of the important issues involved, allowed his warlike attitude, under exalted influences, to evaporate in words. Thus Great Britain earned the lasting resentment of Germans, without succeeding in preventing the establishment of German sea-power in the Baltic. For the Prussian war-harbour of Kiel and the Kiel Canal were in Bismarck's mind from the outset. Throughout he intended to make the duchies a part of Prussia and to use the whole question as a means for the solution of that of Germany. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 grew inevitably out of the Dano-German War of 1864; and the treaty of Prague (Aug. 23, 1866), which excluded Austria from Germany and established the North German Confederation under the headship of Prussia, not only absorbed into Prussia the North German states which had sided with Austria, but by the annexation to her of Schleswig and Holstein laid the foundations of German power in the North Sea, and of German rivalry with England in the future.

Napoleon and Prussia.

More immediate were the effects of the campaign of Koeniggraetz on France. The rapid and overwhelming victory of Prussia overthrew all the calculations of Napoleon, who had looked to intervening as arbiter between exhausted combatants. The sudden menace of the new German power alarmed him, and he sought to secure the Rhine frontier for France, by negotiations with Prussia, in the form of "compensations" at the expense of the South German states. He succeeded only in placing a fresh weapon in Bismarck's hands. The communication of the French overtures to the South German courts was enough to throw them into the arms of Prussia; and treaties of offensive and defensive alliance were signed in August 1866 between Prussia and Wuerttemberg (3rd), Baden (17th), and Bavaria (22nd), by which the king of Prussia was to receive the supreme command of the allied armies in time of war. In vain Napoleon tried to retrieve his damaged prestige by securing compensation elsewhere. His proposal that the grand-duchy of Luxemburg, which had not been included in the new German Confederation, should fall to France by agreement with Prussia was no more successful than his other demands for "compensation." Luxemburg was declared a neutral state by the convention of London in 1867 (see LUXEMBURG), and the French proposal, published by Bismarck in _The Times_ at the outset of the war of 1870, only damaged the French emperor's cause in the eyes of Europe.

Meanwhile public feeling in France had become seriously excited by this sudden menace of a hostile power on her eastern frontier, and this excitement was raised to fever heat when it became known that the vacant throne of Spain had been offered to and accepted by a prince of the house of Hohenzollern. Napoleon's policy had become hopelessly discredited by the successive fiascos in Poland, Mexico and Germany, and even the establishment of a liberal constitution in 1869 could not avail to restore confidence in him. He knew the risk he ran in challenging a conflict with a power whose military efficiency had been so strikingly displayed; but by refusing to do so, in the excited state of public feeling, he would have risked his throne. He reckoned on the traditional jealously of the South German states for Prussia and their traditional friendship with France; he was assured, too, of the support of Austria, in the event of a victorious opening of the campaign. On the other hand Bismarck was bent on war, which, in accordance with his policy of "blood and iron," he believed to be the sole effective means of binding the heterogeneous elements of Germany into a coherent whole. The device of the "Ems telegrams" (see BISMARCK) was sufficient to end the hesitations of Napoleon by giving an irresistible volume to the cry of the war party in France; and on the 19th of July the French emperor's declaration of war was handed in at Berlin.

The Franco-German War, 1870-1871.

The new German Empire.

The story of the struggle that followed is told elsewhere (see FRANCO-GERMAN WAR). The hopes that Napoleon had based on the action of the South German courts was belied; and the first crushing German victories (Weissenburg, August 4, and Woerth, August 6) not only removed all chance of Austrian co-operation but brought down with a crash the imposing facade of the Second Empire. On the 2nd of September Napoleon surrendered, with his army, at Sedan; and two days later the Empire was overthrown and a provisional republican government set up at Paris. On the 19th Paris itself was invested and, after a heroic defence, capitulated on the 28th of January 1871. On the 18th of January, at the palace of Versailles, William I., king of Prussia, was proclaimed German emperor. On the 26th of February were signed the preliminaries of peace, by which France agreed to cede to the German empire Alsace (except Belfort and its territory) and German Lorraine, with Metz and Thionville (Diedenhofen), and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs (L200,000,000) in three years, to be secured by the occupation of French territory. The definitive treaty was signed at Frankfort-on-Main on the 10th of May 1871.

Dual system in Austria-Hungary.

Union of Italy.

The most important outcome of the events which culminated in the Franco-German War and its result was the establishment of a powerful German empire, which was destined to dominate the continent for years to come, and the expansive ambitions of which remain pregnant with menace for the future. So great an overturn, however, involved other changes in the territorial system, which may be briefly summarized. The most notable of these was the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy as a result of the war of 1866. By the treaty of Vienna (October 3, 1866) between Austria and Italy, Austria recognized the Italian kingdom and ceded to it the city and territory of Venice, thus surrendering the traditional claim of the Habsburgs to domination in Italy. This was followed in 1867 by the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in the Habsburg dominions under the auspices of Bismarck's rival, Count Beust,--Francis Joseph being crowned king of Hungary, and a separate constitution being established for Hungary and the _Cis-Leithan_ dominions of the Austrian emperor (see AUSTRIA: _History_). In Italy, meanwhile, the unification of the kingdom had continued after the conclusion of the war of 1859 by the treaty of Zuerich. In 1860 Tuscany, Parma and Modena were united to the monarchy of Victor Emmanuel, at the cost of the cession of Nice and Savoy to Napoleon. In May of the same year Garibaldi and his "Thousand" landed in Sicily, which he reduced by the end of June; in August he crossed to the mainland, and the capitulation of Francis II. of the Two Sicilies at Gaeta on the 13th of February 1861 ended the Bourbon kingdom in southern Italy. On the 17th of March Victor Emmanuel II. was proclaimed king of United Italy. This title, as mentioned above, was recognized by Austria in 1866, when Italy was increased by the cession of Venice. Finally, Rome, which had been preserved to the papacy by Napoleon's troops, was on their withdrawal occupied by the Italians on the 20th of September 1870. Thus the temporal power of the popes came to an end; and the unification of Italy was completed (see ITALY: History).

Another significant outcome of the collapse of France was the denunciation by Russia of the "Black Sea" clauses of the treaty of Paris of 1856, an action rendered possible by the _entente_ between the governments of Berlin and St Petersburg. In the note addressed to the signatory powers announcing that Russia no longer felt herself bound by the clauses of the treaty limiting her sovereign rights in the Black Sea, Prince Gorchakov wrote: "It would be difficult to affirm that the written law founded on the respect for treaties, as the basis of public right and rule of the relations of states, has preserved the same moral sanction as in former times." The action of Russia was, in fact, a practical illustration of Bismarck's _dicta_ that "_rebus sic stantibus_ is involved in all treaties that require performance" (_Mem_. ii. 280), and that "_ultro posse nemo obligatur_ holds good in spite of all treaty obligations whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text" (ib. ii. 270). Great Britain did her best to counteract a doctrine so subversive of international confidence. For a moment at least a diplomatic breach with Russia seemed inevitable. At Bismarck's suggestion, however, a conference was held at London to arrange the affair. There was, in the circumstances, no chance of forcing Russia to recede from her position; but in order "to reconcile facts with principles" the conference on the 17th of January 1871 agreed on a formula announcing that "contracting powers can only rid themselves of their treaty engagements by an understanding with their co-signatories." Thus the principle of the European concert was saved. But, for the time at least, it seemed that the triumph of Bismarck's diplomacy had re-established

... the simple plan That they should take who have the power And they should keep who can.

Beust was not far wrong when he exclaimed, "Je ne vois plus de l'Europe!" (W. A. P.)

By the Franco-German War of 1870-71 and the creation of the German empire the political condition of Europe was profoundly changed. Germany became for a time the leading power on the continent of Europe, and German statesmanship had to devise means for preventing, until the new edifice was thoroughly consolidated, the formation of a hostile coalition of jealous rivals. The first thing to be done in this direction was to secure the support of Russia and Austria to the new order of things.

Russian policy towards Germany.

With regard to Russia there was little cause for apprehension. She had aided Bismarck to carry out his audacious schemes in the past, and there was no reason to suppose that she would change her policy in the immediate future. The _rapprochement_ dated from the Polish insurrection of 1863, when the governments of France and England, yielding to popular excitement, made strong diplomatic representations to Russia in favour of the Poles, whereas Bismarck not only refused to join in the diplomatic campaign, but made a convention with the cabinet of St Petersburg by which the Russian and German military authorities on the frontiers should aid each other in suppressing the disturbances. From that time the friendship ripened steadily. The relations between the two powers were not, it is true, always without a cloud. More than once the bold designs of Bismarck caused uneasiness and dissatisfaction in St Petersburg, especially during the Schleswig-Holstein complications of 1864 and the Austro-Prussian conflict of 1866; but the wily statesman of Berlin, partly by argument and partly by dexterously manipulating the mutual trust and affection between the two sovereigns, always succeeded in having his own way without producing a rupture, so that during the Franco-German War of 1870-71 Russia maintained an extremely benevolent neutrality, and prevented Austria and Italy from taking part in the struggle. So benevolent was the neutrality that the emperor William at the end of the campaign felt constrained to write to the tsar that he owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the campaign and would never forget the fact. Having thus helped to create the German empire, Alexander II. was not likely to take an active part in destroying it, and Bismarck could look forward confidently to a long continuance of the cordial relations between the two courts.

Austrian relations with Germany.

The second part of the German chancellor's programme, the permanent conciliation of Austria, was not so easily carried out. Austria had been the great sufferer, more perhaps even than France, from Bismarck's aggressive policy. For generations she had resisted strenuously and successfully the efforts of the Hohenzollerns to play the leading part in Germany, and she had always considered her own influence in Germany as essential to the maintenance of her position as a first-class power. By the disastrous campaign of 1866 and the consequent treaty of Prague, Austria had been formally excluded from all direct influence in German affairs. With these events still fresh in his recollection, the emperor Francis Joseph could hardly be expected to support the new empire created by his rival at Austria's expense, and it was known that on the eve of the Franco-German War he had been negotiating with the French government for a combined attack on Prussia. To an ordinary statesman the task of permanently conciliating such a power might well have seemed hopeless, but Bismarck did not shrink from it, and even before the signature of the treaty of Prague he had prepared the way for attaining his object. "With regard to Austria," he himself explained on one occasion, "I had two courses open to me after her defeat, either to destroy her entirely or to respect her integrity and prepare for our future reconciliation when the fire of revenge had died out. I chose the latter course, because the former would have been the greatest possible act of folly. Supposing that Austria had disappeared, consider the consequences." He then described very graphically those probable consequences, and drew the conclusion: "for the sake of our own life Austria must live. I had no hesitation, therefore, and ever since 1866 my constant effort has been to stitch up the great torn texture and to re-establish amicable relations with our ancient associate of the Confederation." For this purpose he tried to soothe Austrian susceptibilities, and suggested confidentially that compensation for the losses of territory, influence and prestige in Italy and Germany might be found in south-eastern Europe, especially by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but so long as his rival Count Beust was minister for foreign affairs in Vienna, and Austria had the prospect of being able to recover her lost position by the assistance of Russia and France, these efforts had no success. It was only when Prince Gorchakov had declined Count Beust's advances, which took the form of suggesting the abolition of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris, and when France had been paralysed for some years by her war with Germany, that a _rapprochement_ between the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin became possible. Bismarck lost no time in making advances. From the German headquarters at Versailles he sent a despatch to Vienna suggesting the establishing of more cordial relations between the two countries, and Count Beust replied in an equally amicable tone. The emperor Francis Joseph, finding himself isolated, had evidently accepted the inevitable with his customary resignation, and abandoned his dreams of again playing the leading part in Germany. As a further proof of the change in his disposition and aims he replaced Count Beust by Count Andrassy, who was a personal friend of Bismarck, and who wished, as a Hungarian, to see Austria liberated from her German entanglement, and he consented to pay a visit to Berlin for the purpose of drawing still closer the relations between the two governments.

The Dreikaiserbund.

Bismarck was delighted at this turn of affairs, but he advanced with his usual caution. He gave it to be clearly understood that improvement in his relations with Vienna must not disturb the long-established friendship with St Petersburg. The tsar, on hearing privately of the intended meeting, gave a hint to Prince Reuss, the German ambassador, that he expected an invitation, and was invited accordingly. The meeting of the three sovereigns took place at Berlin at the end of August 1872. The three ministers, Prince Bismarck, Prince Gorchakov and Count Andrassy, held daily conferences, on the basis that the chief aim in view should be the maintenance of peace in Europe, and that in all important international affairs the three powers should consult with each other and act in concert. As a result of three days' consultation the Three Emperor's League was founded, without any formal treaty being signed. In this way the danger of a powerful coalition being formed against the young German empire was averted, for in the event of a conflict with France, Germany could count on at least the benevolent neutrality of Russia and Austria, and from the other powers she had nothing to fear. What ulterior designs Bismarck may have had in forming the league, or "Alliance" as it is often called, must be to some extent a matter of conjecture, but we shall probably not be far wrong in adopting the view of a competent Russian authority, who defines the policy of the German chancellor thus: "To make Austria accept definitively her deposition as a Germanic power, to put her in perpetual conflict with Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and to found on that irreconcilable rivalry the hegemony of Germany."

For more than two years there was an outward appearance of extreme cordiality between the three powers. They acted together diplomatically, and on all suitable occasions the three allied monarchs exchanged visits and sent each other congratulations and good wishes. There was, however, from the beginning very little genuine confidence between them. Before the breaking up of the conferences at Berlin, Alexander II. and his chancellor had conversations with the French ambassador, in which they not only showed that they had suspicions of future aggressive designs on the part of Germany, but also gave an assurance that so long as France fulfilled her engagements to Germany she had nothing to fear. A few months later, when the emperor William paid his return visit to the tsar in St Petersburg, a defensive convention was concluded by the two monarchs behind the back of their Austrian ally. Without knowing anything about the existence of this convention, the Austrian ally did not feel comfortable in his new position. In Vienna the old anti-Prussian feeling was still strong. The so-called party of the archdukes and the military resisted the policy of Andrassy, and sought to establish closer relations with Russia, so that German support might be unnecessary, but as Bismarck has himself testified, "Russia did not yet respond. The wound caused by the conduct of Austria during the Crimean War was not yet healed. Andrassy made himself very popular in the court society of St Petersburg during his visit there with his imperial master, but the traditional suspicion of Austrian policy remained." Altogether, the new league was not a happy family. So long as all the members of it were content to accept the _status quo_, the latent germs of dissension remained hidden from the outside world, but as soon as the temporary state of political quietude was replaced by a certain amount of activity and initiative, they forced their way to the surface. No one of the three powers regarded the _status quo_ as a satisfactory permanent arrangement. In Berlin much anxiety was caused by the rapid financial and military recovery of France, and voices were heard suggesting that a new campaign and a bigger war indemnity might be necessary before the recuperation was complete. In St Petersburg there was a determination to take advantage of any good opportunity for recovering the portion of Bessarabia ceded by the treaty of Paris, and thereby removing the last tangible results of the Crimean War. In Vienna there was a desire to obtain in the Balkan Peninsula, in accordance with the suggestion of Bismarck, compensation for the losses in Italy and Germany. Thus each of the members of the league was hatching secretly a little aggressive scheme for its own benefit, and the danger for the rest of Europe lay in the possibility of their reconciling their schemes so far as to admit of an agreement for action in common. Fortunately for the onlookers there were important conflicting interests, and the task of reconciling them was extremely difficult, as the subsequent course of events proved.

The storm-cloud of 1875.

Russia and Germany divided.

The first of the three powers to move was Germany. In February 1875 M. de Radowitz was despatched to St Petersburg on a secret mission in order to discover whether, in the event of hostilities between Germany and France, Russia would undertake to maintain a neutral attitude as she had done in 1870-1871; in that case Germany might be relied on to co-operate with her in her great designs in the East. Prince Gorchakov did not take the bait with the alacrity that was expected. Having overcome in some measure his hatred of Austria, which had distorted for so many years his political vision, he had come to understand that it was not for the interests of his own country to have as neighbour a powerful united Germany instead of a weak confederation of small states, and he now perceived that it would be a grave error of policy to allow Germany to destroy still more to her own advantage the balance of power in Europe by permanently weakening France. No doubt he desired to recover the lost portion of Bessarabia and to raise Russian prestige in the East, but he did not wish to run the risk of exciting a great European war, and he believed that what he desired might be effected without war by the diplomatic skill which had warded off European intervention during the Polish troubles of 1863, and had recovered for Russia her freedom of

## action in the Black Sea during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In

reply, therefore, to M. de Radowitz's inquiries and suggestions, he declared that the Russian court fostered no ambitious designs in the East or in the West, and desired only peace and the maintenance of the _status quo_, with possibly an amelioration in the miserable condition of the Christian subjects of the sultan. This rebuff did not suffice to dispel the gathering storm. The warlike agitation in the German inspired press continued, and the French government became thoroughly alarmed. General Leflo, the French ambassador in St Petersburg, was instructed to sound the Russian government on the subject. Prince Gorchakov willingly assured him that Russia would do all in her power to incline the Berlin cabinet to moderation and peace, and that the emperor would take advantage of his forthcoming visit to Berlin to influence the emperor William in this sense. A few days later General Leflo received similar assurances from the emperor himself, and about the same time the British government volunteered to work likewise in the cause of peace. Representations were accordingly made by both governments during the tsar's visit to Berlin, and both the emperor William and his chancellor declared that there was no intention of attacking France. The danger of war, which the well-informed German press believed to be "in sight," was thus averted, but the incident sowed the seeds of future troubles, by awakening in Bismarck a bitter personal resentment against his Russian colleague. By certain incautious remarks to those around him, and still more by a circular to the representatives of Russia abroad, dated Berlin and beginning with the words _maintenant la paix est assuree_, Gorchakov seemed to take to himself the credit of having checkmated Bismarck and saved Europe from a great war. Bismarck resented bitterly this conduct on the part of his old friend, and told him frankly that he would have reason to regret it. In the Russian official world it is generally believed that he took his revenge in the Russo-Turkish War and the congress of Berlin. However this may be, he has himself explained that "the first cause of coldness" was the above incident, "when Gorchakov, aided by Decazes, wanted to play at my expense the part of a saviour of France, to represent me as the enemy of European peace, and to procure for himself a triumphant _quos ego_ to arrest by a word and shatter my dark designs!" In any case the incident marks the beginning of a new phase in the relations of the three powers; henceforth Bismarck can no longer count on the unqualified support of Russia, and in controlling the Russo-Austrian rivalry in south-eastern Europe, while professing to be impartial, he will lean to the side of Count Andrassy rather than to that of Prince Gorchakov. He is careful, however, not to carry this tendency so far as to produce a _rapprochement_ between Russia and France. The danger of a Franco-Russian alliance hostile to Germany is already appearing on the political horizon, but it is only a little cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

Austro-Russian agreement, 1876.

The next move in the aggressive game was made by Austria, with the connivance of Russia. During the summer of 1875 an insurrection of the Christian Slavs in Herzegovina, which received support from the neighbouring principalities of Montenegro and Servia, was fostered by the Austrian authorities and encouraged by the Russian consuls on the Adriatic coast. A European concert was formed for the purpose of settling the disturbance by means of local administrative reforms, but the efforts of the powers failed, because the insurgents hoped to obtain complete liberation from Turkish rule; and in the beginning of July, with a view to promoting this solution, Servia and Montenegro declared war against the Porte. Thereupon Russia began to show her hand more openly. The government allowed volunteers to be recruited in Moscow and St Petersburg, and the Russian general Chernayev, who had distinguished himself in Central Asia, was appointed to the command of the Servian army. When the ball had thus been set rolling, the two powers chiefly concerned considered that the time had come for embodying the result of their informal confidential pourparlers in a secret agreement, which is known as the convention of Reichstadt, because it was signed at a meeting of the two emperors in the little Bohemian town of that name. It bore the date of the 8th of July 1876--exactly a week after Servia and Montenegro had declared war--and it contained the following stipulations: (1) That so long as the struggle which had just begun remained undecided, the two sovereigns should refrain from interference, and that in the event of the principalities being defeated, any modification of the territorial or political _status quo ante_ to their detriment should be prevented; (2) that in the event of the principalities proving victorious, and territorial changes taking place, Austria should claim compensation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia should demand the restitution of the portion of Bessarabia which she had lost by the Crimean War; (3) that in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the two powers should act together to create autonomous principalities in European Turkey, to unite Thessaly and Crete to Greece, and to proclaim Constantinople a free town. The contracting

## parties evidently expected that the two principalities would be

victorious in their struggle with the Porte, and that the compensations mentioned would be secured without a great European war. Their expectations were disappointed. Montenegro made a brave stand against superior forces, but before five months had passed Servia was at the mercy of the Turkish army, and Russia had to come to the assistance of her protege. A Russian ultimatum stopped the advance of the Turks on Belgrade, and an armistice, subsequently transformed into a peace, was signed.

Bulgarian Question.

Russia and Austria had now to choose between abandoning their schemes and adopting some other course of action, and unforeseen incidents contributed towards making them select the latter alternative. In June 1876 an attempt at insurrection in Bulgaria had been repressed with savage brutality by the Turks, and the details, as they became known some weeks later, produced much indignation all over Europe. In England the excitement, fanned by the eloquence of Gladstone, became intense, and compelled the Disraeli cabinet to take part, very reluctantly, in a diplomatic campaign, with the object of imposing radical reforms on Turkey. In Russia the excitement and indignation were equally great, and the tsar gradually formed the resolution that if the powers would not

## act collectively and energetically, so as to compel the Porte to yield,

he would undertake the work single-handed. This resolution he announced publicly in a speech delivered at Moscow on the 10th of November 1876. The powers did not like the idea of separate Russian action, and in order to prevent it they agreed to hold a conference in Constantinople for the purpose of inducing the Porte to introduce the requisite reforms. The Porte was at that moment under the influence of popular patriotic excitement which made it indisposed to accept orders, or even well-meant advice, from governments more or less hostile to it, and the inconsiderate mode of procedure suggested by General Ignatiev, and adopted by the other delegates, made it still more unconciliatory. At the first plenary sitting of the conference the proceedings were disturbed by the sound of artillery, and the Turkish representative explained that the salvo was in honour of the new Ottoman constitution, which was being promulgated by the sultan. The inference suggested was that as Turkey had spontaneously entered on the path of liberal and constitutional reform for all Ottoman subjects, it became superfluous and absurd to talk of small reforms for particular provinces, such as the conference was about to propose. The deliberations continued, but finally the Porte refused to accept what the plenipotentiaries considered an irreducible minimum, and the conference broke up without obtaining any practical result. The tsar's Moscow declaration about employing single-handed the requisite coercive measures now came to be fulfilled.

San Stefano.

In order to make a successful aggressive move on Turkey, Russia had first of all to secure her rear and flank by an arrangement with her two allies. In Berlin she encountered no difficulties. Bismarck had no objection to seeing Russia weaken herself in a struggle with Turkey, provided she did not upset the balance of power in south-eastern Europe, and he felt confident that he could prevent by diplomatic means any such catastrophe. He was inclined, therefore, to encourage rather than restrain the bellicose tendencies of St Petersburg. In Vienna the task of coming to a definite arrangement was much more difficult, and it was only after protracted and laborious negotiations that a convention was concluded on the 15th of January 1877, and formally signed three months later. It was a development of the agreement of Reichstadt, modified according to the changes in the situation, but retaining the essential principle that in the event of the territorial status quo being altered, Russia should recover the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria should get Bosnia and a part of Herzegovina. Having made these preliminary arrangements, Russia began the campaign simultaneously in Europe and Asia Minor, and after many reverses and enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure, she succeeded in imposing on the Turks the "preliminary peace" of San Stefano (3rd March 1878). That peace was negotiated with very little consideration for the interests of the other powers, and as soon as the terms of it became known in Vienna and London there was an outburst of indignation. In negotiating the treaty General Ignatiev had ignored the wishes of Austria, and had even, according to the contention of Andrassy, infringed the convention signed at the beginning of the war. However this may be, the peace of San Stefano brought to the surface the latent conflict of interests between the two empires. Russia's aim was to create a big Bulgaria under the influence of St Petersburg, and to emancipate Servia and Montenegro as far as possible from Austrian influence, whereas Austria objected to the creation of any large Slav state in the Balkan Peninsula, and insisted on maintaining her influence at Belgrade and Tsetigne (Cetinje). In vain Prince Gorchakov endeavoured to conciliate Austria and to extract from Count Andrassy a clear statement of the terms he would accept. Count Andrassy was in no hurry to extricate Russia from her difficulties, and suggested that the whole question should be submitted to a European congress. The suggestion was endorsed by Great Britain, which likewise objected to the San Stefano arrangements, and Bismarck declined to bring any pressure to bear on the cabinet of Vienna.

Berlin Congress.

Cyprus Convention.

Deceived in her expectations of active support from her two allies, Russia found herself in an awkward position. From a military point of view it was absolutely necessary for her to come to an arrangement either with Austria or with England, because the communications of her army before Constantinople with its base could be cut by these two powers acting in concert--the land route being dominated by Austria, and the Black Sea route by the British fleet, which was at that time anchored in the Sea of Marmora. As soon, therefore, as the efforts to obtain the support of her two allies against the demands of England had failed, negotiations were opened in London, and on the 30th of May a secret convention was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Schuvalov. By that agreement the obstacles to the assembling of the congress were removed. The congress met in Berlin on the 13th of June, and after many prolonged sittings and much secret negotiation the treaty of Berlin was signed on the 13th of July. By that treaty the preliminary peace of San Stefano was considerably modified. The big Bulgaria defined by General Ignatiev was divided into three portions, the part between the Danube and the Balkans being transformed into a vassal principality, the part between the Balkans and the Rhodope being made into an autonomous province, called Eastern Rumelia, under a Christian governor named by the sultan with the assent of the powers, and the remainder being placed again under the direct rule of the Porte. The independence of Montenegro, Servia and Rumania was formally recognized, and each of these principalities received a considerable accession of territory. Rumania, however. in return for the Dobrudja, which it professed not to desire, was obliged to give back to Russia the portion of Bessarabia ceded after the Crimean War. In Asia Minor Russia agreed to confine her annexations to the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, and to restore to Turkey the remainder of the occupied territory. As a set-off against the large acquisitions of the Slav races, the powers recommended that the sultan should cede to the kingdom of Greece the greater part of Thessaly and Epirus, under the form of a rectification of frontiers. At first the sultan refused to act on this recommendation, but in March 1881 a compromise was effected by which Greece obtained Thessaly without Epirus. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, and the Austrian authorities were to have the right of making roads and keeping garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, which lies between Servia and Montenegro. In all the provinces of European Turkey for which special arrangements were not made in the treaty, the Porte undertook (Art. 23) to introduce organic statutes similar to that of Crete, adapted to the local conditions. This article, like many of the subordinate stipulations of the treaty, remained a dead letter. We may mention specially Art. 61, in which the Sublime Porte undertook to realize without delay the ameliorations and reforms required in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their safety against the Circassians and Kurds. Equally unreliable proved the scheme of Lord Beaconsfield to secure good administration throughout the whole of Asia Minor by the introduction of reforms under British control, and to prevent the further expansion of Russia in that direction by a defensive alliance with the Porte. A convention to that effect was duly signed at Constantinople a few days before the meeting of the congress (4th June 1878), but the only part of it which was actually realized was the occupation and administration of Cyprus by the British government. The new frontiers stipulated in the treaty of San Stefano, and subsequently rectified by the treaty of Berlin, are shown in the accompanying sketch-map.

Russian resentment against Bismarck.

The secret schemes of Russia and Austria, in so far as they were defined in the agreement of Reichstadt and the subsequent Austro-Russian treaty of Vienna, had thus been realized. Russia had recovered the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria had practically annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the nominal suzerainty of the sultan over the two provinces was maintained. But Russia was far from satisfied with the results, which seemed to her not at all commensurate with the sacrifices imposed on her by the war, and her dissatisfaction led to a new grouping of the powers. Before the opening of the Berlin congress Bismarck had announced publicly that he would refrain from taking sides with any of the contending parties, and would confine himself to playing the part of an honest broker. The announcement was received by the Russians with astonishment and indignation. What they expected was not an impartial arbiter, but a cordial and useful friend in need. In 1871 the emperor William, as we have seen, had spontaneously declared to the tsar that Germany owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the war, and that she would never forget it, and we may add that on that occasion he signed himself "Your ever grateful Friend." Now, in 1878, when the moment had come for paying at least an instalment of this debt, and when Russia was being compelled to make concessions which she described as incompatible with her dignity, Bismarck had nothing better to offer than honest brokerage. The indignation in all classes was intense, and the views commonly held regarding Bismarck's "duplicity" and "treachery" were supposed to receive ample confirmation during the sittings of the congress and the following six months. On the 4th of February 1879 Prince Gorchakov wrote to the ambassador in Vienna: "Needless to say, that in our eyes the Three Emperors' Alliance is practically torn in pieces by the conduct of our two allies. At present it remains for us merely to terminate the liquidation of the past, and to seek henceforth support in ourselves alone." The same view of the situation was taken in Berlin and Vienna, though the result was attributed, of course, to different causes, and the danger of serious complications became so great that Bismarck concluded with Andrassy in the following October (1879) a formal defensive alliance, which was avowedly directed against Russia, and which subsequently developed into the Triple Alliance, directed against Russia and France.

[Illustration: Map to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin (1878).]

The causes of the rupture are variously described by the different

## parties interested. According to Bismarck the Russian government began a

venomous campaign against Germany in the press, and collected, with apparently hostile intentions, enormous masses of troops near the German and Austrian frontiers, whilst the tsar adopted in his correspondence with the emperor William an arrogant and menacing tone which could not be tolerated. On the other hand, the Russians declare that the so-called Press-Campaign was merely the spontaneous public expression of the prevailing disappointment among all classes in Russia, that the military preparations had a purely defensive character, and that the tsar's remarks, which roused Bismarck's ire, did not transgress the limits of friendly expostulation such as sovereigns in close friendly relations might naturally employ. Subsequent revelations tend rather to confirm the Russian view. After an exhausting war and without a single powerful ally, Russia was not likely to provoke wantonly a great war with Germany and Austria. The press attacks were not more violent than those which frequently appear in newspapers which draw their inspiration from the German foreign office, and the accusations about the arrogant attitude and menacing tone of Alexander II. are not at all in harmony with his known character, and are refuted by the documents since published by Dr Busch. The truth seems to be that the self-willed chancellor was actuated by nervous irritation and personal feeling more than by considerations of statecraft. His imperial master was not convinced by his arguments, and showed great reluctance to permit the conclusion of a separate treaty with Austria. Finally, with much searching of heart, he yielded to the importunity of his minister; but in thus committing an unfriendly act towards his old ally, he so softened the blow that the personal good relations between the two sovereigns suffered merely a momentary interruption. Bismarck himself soon recognized that the permanent estrangement of Russia would be a grave mistake of policy, and the very next year (1880), negotiations for a treaty of defensive alliance between the two cabinets were begun. Nor did the accession to the throne of Russia of Alexander III., who had long enjoyed the reputation of being systematically hostile to Germans, produce a rupture, as was expected. Six months after his father's death, the young tsar met the old kaiser at Danzig (September 1881), and some progress was made towards a complete renewal of the traditional friendship. Immediately afterwards a further step was taken towards re-establishing the old state of things with regard also to Austria. On his return to St Petersburg, Alexander III. remembered that he had received some time previously a telegram of congratulation from the emperor Francis Joseph, and he now replied to it very cordially, referring to the meeting at Danzig, and describing the emperor William as "that venerable friend with whom we are united in the common bonds of a profound affection." The words foreshadowed a revival of the Three Emperors' League, which actually took place three years later.

Growth of the Triple Alliance.

The removal of all immediate danger of a Franco-Russian alliance did not prevent Bismarck from strengthening in other ways the diplomatic position of Germany, and the result of his efforts soon became apparent in the alliance of Italy with the two central powers. Ever since the Franco-German War of 1870-71, and more especially since the congress of Berlin in 1878, the Italian government had shown itself restless and undecided in its foreign policy. As it was to France that Italy owed her emancipation from Austrian rule, it seemed natural that the two countries should remain allies, but anything like cordial co-operation was prevented by conflicting interests and hostile feeling. The French did not consider the acquisition of Savoy and Nice a sufficient compensation for the assistance they had given to the cause of Italian unity, and they did not know, or did not care to remember, that their own government was greatly to blame for the passive attitude of Italy in the hour of their great national misfortunes. On the other hand, a considerable amount of bitterness against France had been gradually accumulating in the hearts of the Italians. As far back as the end of the war of 1859, popular opinion had been freely expressed against Napoleon III., because he had failed to keep his promise of liberating Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic." The feeling was revived and intensified when it became known that he was opposing the annexation of central and southern Italy, and that he obtained Savoy and Nice as the price of partly withdrawing his opposition. Subsequently, in the war of 1866, he was supposed to have insulted Italy by making her conclude peace with Austria, on the basis of the cession of Venetia, before she could wipe out the humiliation of her defeats at Custozza and Lissa. Then came the French protection of the pope's temporal power as a constant source of irritation, producing occasional explosions of violent hostility, as when the new Chassepot rifles were announced to have "worked wonders" among the Garibaldians at Mentana. When the Second Empire was replaced by the Republic, the relations did not improve. French statesmen of the Thiers school had always condemned the imperial policy of permitting and even encouraging the creation of large, powerful states on the French frontiers, and Thiers himself publicly attributed to this policy the misfortunes of his country. With regard to Italy, he said openly that he regretted what had been done, though he had no intention of undoing it. The first part of this statement was carefully noted in Italy, and the latter part was accepted with scepticism. In any case his hand might perhaps be forced, for in the first republican chamber the monarchical and clerical element was very strong, and it persistently attempted to get something done in favour of the temporal power. Even when the party of the Left undertook the direction of affairs in 1876, the government did not become anti-clerical in its foreign policy, and Italian statesmen resigned themselves to a position of political isolation. The position had its advantages. Events in the Balkan Peninsula foreshadowed a great European war, and it seemed that in the event of Europe's being divided into two hostile camps, Italy might have the honour and the advantage of regulating the balance of power. By maintaining good relations with all her neighbours and carefully avoiding all inconvenient entanglements, she might come forward at the critical moment and dictate her own terms to either of the contending parties, or offer her services to the highest bidder. This Machiavellian policy did not give the expected results. Being friends with everybody in a general way may be the best course for an old, conservative country which desires merely the maintenance of the _status quo_, but it does not secure the energetic diplomatic support required by a young enterprising state which wishes to increase its territory and influence. At the congress of Berlin, when several of the powers got territorial acquisitions, Italy got nothing. The Italians, who were in the habit of assuming, almost as a matter of principle, that from all European complications they had a right to obtain some tangible advantage, were naturally disappointed, and they attributed their misfortune to their political isolation. The policy of the free hand consequently fell into disrepute, and the desire for a close, efficient alliance revived. But with what power or powers should an alliance be made? The remnants of the old party of action, who still carried the _Italia Irredenta_ banner, had an answer ready. They recommended that alliances should be concluded with a view to wresting from Austria the Trentino and Trieste, with Dalmatia, perhaps, into the bargain. On the other hand, the Conservatives and the Moderates considered that the question of the Trentino and Trieste was much less important than that of political influence in the Mediterranean. A strong Austria was required, it was said, to bar the way of Russia to the Adriatic, and France must not be allowed to pursue unchecked her policy of transforming the Mediterranean into a French lake. Considerations of this kind led naturally to the conclusion that Italy should draw closer to the powers of central Europe. So the question appeared from the standpoint of "la haute politique." From the less elevated standpoint of immediate political interests, it presented conflicting considerations. A _rapprochement_ with the central powers might prevent the conclusion of a commercial treaty with France, and thereby increase the financial and economic difficulties with which the young kingdom was struggling, whereas a _rapprochement_ with France would certainly excite the hostility of Bismarck, who was retiring from the _Kulturkampf_ and journeying towards Canossa, and who might possibly conciliate the pope by helping him to recover his temporal sovereignty at the expense of Italy. Altogether the problem was a very complicated one. The conflicting currents so nearly balanced each other, that the question as to which way the ship would drift might be decided by a little squall of popular sentiment. A very big squall was brewing.

France and Tunis.

During the congress of Berlin the French government was very indignant when it discovered that Lord Beaconsfield had recently made a secret convention with the sultan for the British occupation of Cyprus, and in order to calm its resentment Lord Salisbury gave M. Waddington to understand that, so far as England was concerned, France would be allowed a free hand in the Regency of Tunis, which she had long coveted. Though the conversations on the subject and a subsequent exchange of notes were kept strictly secret, the Italian government soon got wind of the affair, and it was at first much alarmed. It considered, in common with Italians generally, that Tunis, on the ground of historic right and of national interests, should be reserved for Italy, and that an extension of French territory in that direction would destroy, to the detriment of Italy, the balance of power in the Mediterranean. These apprehensions were calmed for a time by assurances given to the Italian ambassador in Paris. M. Gambetta assured General Cialdini that he had no intention of making Italy an irreconcilable enemy of France, and M. Waddington declared, on his word of honour, that so long as he remained minister of foreign affairs nothing of the sort would be done by France without a previous understanding with the cabinet of Rome. M. Waddington honourably kept his word, but his successor did not consider himself bound by the assurance; and when it was found that the Italians were trying systematically to establish their influence in the Regency at the expense of France, the French authorities, on the ground that a Tunisian tribe called the Kroumirs had committed depredations in Algeria, sent an armed force into the Regency, and imposed on the bey the Bardo treaty, which transformed Tunis into a French protectorate.

Triple Alliance signed 1882.

The establishment of a French protectorate over a country which the Italians had marked out for themselves as necessary for the defence and colonial expansion of the kingdom had the effect which Gambetta had foreseen--it made Italy, for a time at least, the irreconcilable enemy of France. Whilst the French were giving free expression to their patriotic exultation, and even Gambetta himself, in defiance of what he had said to Cialdini, was congratulating Jules Ferry on having restored France to her place among the nations, the Italians were trying to smother their indignation and to discover some means of retrieving what they had lost. The only remedy seemed to be to secure foreign alliances, and there was now no hesitation as to where they should be sought. Simple people in Italy imagined that if an alliance had been concluded sooner with Germany and Austria, these powers would have prevented France from trampling on the sacred interests of Italy. This idea was entirely erroneous, because Austria had little or no interest in the Tunisian Question, and Bismarck was not at all sorry to see France embark on an enterprise which distracted her attention from Alsace-Lorraine and removed all danger of a Franco-Italian alliance. The illusion, however, had a powerful influence on Italian public opinion. The government was now urged to conclude without further delay an alliance with the central powers, and the recommendation was not unwelcome to the king, because most of the Italian Gallophils had anti-dynastic and republican tendencies, and he was naturally disposed to draw nearer to governments which proclaimed themselves the defenders of monarchical institutions and the opponents of revolutionary agitation. After protracted negotiations, in which Italy tried in vain to secure protection for her own separate interests in the Mediterranean, defensive treaties of alliance were concluded with the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin in May 1882. Though the Italian statesmen did not secure by these treaties all they wanted, they felt that the kingdom was protected against any aggressive designs which might be entertained by France or the Vatican, and when the treaties were renewed in 1887 they succeeded in getting somewhat more favourable conditions.

Dreikaiserbund revived 1884.

By the creation of this Triple Alliance, which still subsists, the diplomatic position of Germany was greatly strengthened, but Bismarck was still haunted by the apprehension of a Franco-Russian alliance, and he made repeated attempts to renew the old cordial relations with the court of St Petersburg. He was bold enough to hope that, notwithstanding the Austro-German treaty of October 1879, avowedly directed against Russia, and the new Triple Alliance, by which the Austro-German Alliance was strengthened, he might resuscitate the Three Emperors' League in such a form as to ensure, even more effectually than he had done on the former occasion, the preponderance of Germany in the arrangement. With this object he threw out a hint to the Russian ambassador, M. Sabourof, in the summer of 1883, that the evil results of the congress of Berlin might be counteracted by a formal agreement between the three emperors. The suggestion was transmitted privately by M. Sabourof to the tsar, and was favourably received. Alexander III. was disquieted by the continuance of the Nihilist agitation, and was not averse from drawing closer to the conservative powers; and as he desired tranquillity for some time in the Balkan Peninsula, he was glad to have security that his rival would do nothing in that part of the world without a previous understanding. M. de Giers, who had now succeeded Prince Gorchakov in the direction of foreign affairs, was accordingly despatched to Friedrichsruh to discuss the subject with Bismarck. The practical result of the meeting was that negotiations between the two governments were begun, and on the 21st of March 1884 a formal document was signed in Berlin. About six months later, in the month of September, the three emperors met at Skiernevice and ratified the agreement. Thus, without any modification of the Triple Alliance, which was directed against Russia, the old Three Emperors' League, which included Russia, was revived. Germany and Austria, being members of both, were doubly protected, for in the event of being attacked they could count on at least the benevolent neutrality of both Russia and Italy. France was thereby completely isolated.

In drawing up the secret treaty of Skiernevice, which may be regarded as the _chef-d'oeuvre_ of Bismarckian diplomacy, the German chancellor's chief aims evidently were to paralyse Russia by yoking her to Germany and Austria, to isolate France, and to realize his old scheme of holding the balance between Russia and Austria in the Balkan Peninsula. With a view to attaining the first two objects it was stipulated that if any one of the three powers were forced to make war on a fourth power, the two other contracting parties should observe a benevolent neutrality towards their ally. If we may believe a well-informed Russian authority, Bismarck wished it to be understood that in the event of _two_ of the powers being at war with a fourth, the stipulation about benevolent neutrality should still hold good, but Alexander III. objected, on the ground that he could not remain a passive spectator of a duel in which France would be confronted by two antagonists. In his third object Bismarck was successful, for it was expressly laid down that in all cases of a disagreement between two of the parties in the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, the third power should decide between them. This meant, of course, that in all discussions between Russia and Austria, the two great rivals in the Eastern Question, Bismarck should always have a casting vote. In return for all this, Russia obtained two small concessions: firstly, that Germany and Austria should seek to restrain the sultan from permitting the passage of the Dardanelles to an English fleet, as he had done in 1878, when the Russian army was before Constantinople; and, secondly, that they should not oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, if it was accomplished by the force of things and within the limits traced by the congress of Berlin.

Bulgarian crisis.

This new form of the Three Emperors' League had all the organic defects of its predecessor, and was destined to be still more short-lived. The claims of Russia and Austria might be reconcilable in theory, but in practice they were sure to conflict; and however much Bismarck might try to play the part of an honest broker, he was certain to be suspected of opposing Russia and favouring Austria. It was therefore only during a period of political stagnation in south-eastern Europe that the arrangement could work smoothly. The political stagnation did not last long. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria had for some time been fretting under the high-handed interference of the Russian agents in the principality, and had begun to oppose systematically what the Russians considered their legitimate influence. Relations between Sofia and St Petersburg had consequently become strained, when a crisis was suddenly brought about by the revolution of Philippopolis in September 1885. The conspirators arrested and expelled the governor-general, who had been appointed by the sultan with the assent of the powers, and at the same time proclaimed the union of the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia with the principality of Bulgaria, in defiance of the stipulations of the treaty of Berlin. The revolution had been effected with the connivance and approval of the regularly accredited Russian agents in Philippopolis, but it had not received the sanction of the Russian government, and was resented as a new act of insubordination on the part of Prince Alexander. When he arrived in Philippopolis and accepted the declaration of union, the cabinet of St Petersburg protested against any such infraction of the Berlin treaty, and the Porte prepared to send an army into the province. It was restrained from taking this step by the ambassadors in Constantinople, so that an armed conflict between Turks and Bulgarians was prevented; but no sooner had the Bulgarians been relieved from this danger on their eastern frontier, than they were attacked from the west by the Servians, who were determined to get ample compensation for any advantage which the Bulgarians might obtain. The Bulgarian army defeated the Servians at Slivnitza (November 19-20, 1885), and was marching on Belgrade when its advance was stopped and an armistice arranged by the energetic intervention of the Austrian government. Following the example of the Servians, the Greeks were preparing to exact territorial compensation likewise; but as their mobilization was a slow process, the powers had time to restrain them from entering on active hostilities, first by an ultimatum (April 26, 1886), and afterwards by a blockade of their ports (May 1886). By that time, thanks to the intervention of the powers, a peace between Bulgaria and Servia had been signed at Bucharest (March 3); and with regard to Eastern Rumelia a compromise had been effected by which the formal union with the principality was rejected, and the prince was appointed governor-general of the province for a term of five years. This was in reality union in disguise.

The diplomatic solution of the problem averted the danger of a European war, but it left a great deal of dissatisfaction, which soon produced new troubles. Not only had Prince Alexander escaped punishment for his insubordination to Russia, but he and the anti-Russian party among the Bulgarians had obtained a decided success. This could not well be tolerated. Before six months had passed (August 21, 1886) Prince Alexander was kidnapped by conspirators in his palace at Sofia and conveyed secretly to Russian Bessarabia. As soon as the incident was reported to the tsar, the prince was released, and he at once returned to Sofia, where a counter-revolution had been effected in his favour; but he considered his position untenable, and formally abdicated. A fortnight after his departure General Kaulbars arrived from St Petersburg with instructions from the tsar to restore order in accordance with Russian interests. In St Petersburg it was supposed that the Bulgarian people were still devoted to Russia, and that they were ready to rise against and expel the politicians of the Nationalist party led by Stambolof. General Kaulbars accordingly made a tour in the country and delivered speeches to the assembled multitudes, but Stambolof's political organization counteracted all his efforts, and on the 20th of November he left Bulgaria and took the Russian consuls with him. Stambolof maintained his position, suppressed energetically several insurrectionary movements, and succeeded in getting Prince Ferdinand of Coburg elected prince (July 7, 1887), in spite of the opposition of Russia, who put forward as candidate a Russian subject, Prince Nicholas of Mingrelia. Prince Ferdinand was not officially recognized by the sultan and the powers, but he continued to reign under the direction of Stambolof, and the Russian government, passively accepting the accomplished facts, awaited patiently a more convenient moment for

## action.

Russian hostility to Germany.

These events in the Balkan Peninsula necessarily affected the mutual relations of the powers composing the Three Emperors' League. Austria could not remain a passive and disinterested spectator of the action of Russia in Bulgaria. Her agents had given a certain amount of support to Prince Alexander in his efforts to emancipate himself from Russian domination; and when the prince was kidnapped and induced to abdicate, Count Kalnoky had not concealed his intention of opposing further aggression. Bismarck resisted the pressure brought to bear on him from several quarters in favour of the anti-Russian party in Bulgaria, but he was suspected by the Russians of siding with Austria and secretly encouraging the opposition to Russian influence. This revived the hatred against him which had been created by his pro-Austrian leanings after the Russo-Turkish War. The feeling was assiduously fomented by the Russian press, especially by M. Katkoff, the editor of the _Moscow Gazette_, who exercised great influence on public opinion and had personal relations with Alexander III. On the 31st of July 1886, three weeks before the kidnapping of Prince Alexander, he had begun a regular journalistic campaign against Germany, and advocated strongly a new orientation of Russian policy. M. de Giers, minister of foreign affairs, was openly attacked as a partisan of the German alliance, and his "pilgrimages to Friedrichsruh and Berlin" were compared to the humiliating journeys of the old Russian grand-princes to the Golden Horde in the time of the Tatar domination. The moment had come, it was said, for Russia to emancipate herself from German diplomatic thraldom, and for this purpose a _rapprochement_ with France was suggested. The idea was well received by the public, and it seemed to be not unpalatable to the tsar, for the _Moscow Gazette_ was allowed to continue its attacks on M. de Giers's policy of maintaining the German alliance. In Berlin such significant facts could not fail to produce uneasiness, because one of the chief aims of Bismarck's policy had always been to prevent a Russo-French _entente cordiale_. The German press were instructed to refute the arguments of their Russian colleagues, and to prove that if Russia had really lost her influence in the Balkan Peninsula, the fact was due to the blunders of her own diplomacy. The controversy did not produce at once a serious estrangement between the two cabinets, but it marked the beginning of a period of vacillation on the part of Alexander III. When the treaty of Skiernevice was about to expire in 1887, he positively refused to renew the Three Emperors' League, but he consented to make, without the cognizance of Austria, a secret treaty of alliance with Germany for three years. Not satisfied with this guarantee against the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance, Bismarck caused attacks to be made in the press on Russian credit, which was rapidly gaining a footing on the Paris bourse, and he imprudently showed his hand by prohibiting the Reichsbank from accepting Russian securities as guarantees. From that moment the tsar's attitude changed. All his dormant suspicions of German policy revived. When he passed through Berlin in November 1887, Bismarck had a long audience, in which he defended himself with his customary ability, but Alexander remained unmoved in his conviction that the German government had systematically opposed Russian interests, and had paralysed Russian action in the Balkan Peninsula for the benefit of Austria; and he failed to understand the ingenious theory put forward by the German chancellor, that two powers might have a severe economic struggle without affecting their political relations. Bismarck had to recognize that, for the moment at least, the Three Emperors' League, which had served his purposes so well, could not be resuscitated, but he had still a certain security against the hostility of Russia in the secret treaty. Soon, however, this link was also to be broken. When the treaty expired in 1890 it was not renewed. By that time Bismarck had been dismissed, and he subsequently reproached his successor, Count Caprivi, with not having renewed it, but in reality Count Caprivi was not to blame. Alexander III. was determined not to renew the alliance, and was already gravitating slowly towards an understanding with France.

Franco-Russian entente.

No treaty or formal defensive engagement of any kind existed between Russia and France, but it was already tolerably certain that in the event of a great war the two nations would be found fighting on the same side, and the military authorities in both countries felt that if no arrangements were made beforehand for concerted action,--such arrangements having been long ago completed by the powers composing the Triple Alliance--they would begin the campaign at a great disadvantage. This was perfectly understood by both governments; and after some hesitation on both sides. Generals Vannovski and Obruchev, on the one side, and Generals Saussier, Miribel and Boisdeffre on the other, were permitted to discuss plans of co-operation. At the same time a large quantity of Lebel rifles were manufactured in France for the Russian army, and the secret of making smokeless powder was communicated to the Russian military authorities. The French government wished to go further and conclude a defensive alliance, but the tsar was reluctant to bind himself with a government which had so little stability, and which might be induced to provoke a war with Germany by the prospect of Russian support. Even the military convention was not formally ratified until 1894. The enthusiastic partisans of the alliance flattered themselves that the tsar's reluctance had been overcome, when he received very graciously Admiral Gervais and his officers during the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt in the summer of 1891, but their joy was premature. The formal _rapprochement_ between the two governments was much slower than the unofficial _rapprochement_ between the two nations. More than two years passed before the Cronstadt visit was returned by the Russian fleet, under Admiral Avelan. The enthusiastic ovations which the admiral and his subordinates received in Toulon and Paris (October 1893) showed how eager and anxious the French people were for an alliance with Russia, but the Russian government was in no hurry to gratify their wishes. Of the official action all we know with certainty is, that immediately after the Cronstadt visit in 1891 a diplomatic protocol about a defensive alliance was signed; that during the special mission of General Boisdeffre to St Petersburg in 1892 negotiations took place about a military convention; that in 1894 the military convention was ratified; that in the summer of 1895 M. Ribot, when prime minister, first spoke publicly of an alliance; and that during the visit of the president of the French Republic to St Petersburg, in August 1897, France and Russia were referred to as allies in the complimentary speeches of the tsar and of M. Felix Faure. Though we are still in the dark as to the precise terms of the arrangement, there is no doubt that close friendly relations were established between the two powers, and that in all important international affairs they sought to act in accord with each other. It is equally certain that for some years Russia was the predominant partner, and that, in accordance with the pacific tendencies of the tsar, she systematically exercised a restraining influence on France.

The Triple entente and the Triple Alliance.

The great expectations excited among the French people by the _entente cordiale_ were consequently not realized, and there appeared gradually premonitory symptoms of a reaction in public opinion, but the alliance between the two governments was maintained, and though the Triple Alliance was weakened by the internal troubles of Austria-Hungary and by a tendency on the part of Italy to gravitate towards France, the grouping of the great powers was not radically changed till the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. By that war the balance of power in Europe was seriously disturbed. Russia inadvertently provoked a struggle with Japan which made such a drain on her energies and material resources that her political influence in Europe necessarily suffered a partial eclipse. Thus the Triple Alliance outweighed its rival, and there was a danger of the German emperor's taking advantage of the situation to secure for himself a diplomatic predominance in Europe. France at once perceived that there was a grave danger for herself, and naturally looked about for some diplomatic support to replace that of Russia, which had lost much of its value. From her uncomfortable isolation there were only two possible exits--a _rapprochement_ with Germany or a _rapprochement_ with England. Both of these demanded sacrifices. The former required a formal abandonment of all ideas of recovering Alsace and Lorraine; the latter a formal recognition of British predominance in Egypt. Under the influence of M. Delcasse the French government chose what seemed the lesser of two evils, and concluded with the English foreign office in April 1904 a general agreement, of which the most important stipulation was that France should leave England a free hand in Egypt, and that England in return should allow France, within certain limits, a free hand in Morocco. On that basis was effected a _rapprochement_ between the two governments which soon developed into an _entente cordiale_ between the two nations. The efforts of the German emperor to undermine the _entente_ by insisting on the convocation of a conference to consider the Morocco question caused M. Delcasse to resign, and produced considerable anxiety throughout Europe, but the desired result was not attained. On the contrary, the conference in question, which met at Algeciras in January 1906, ended in strengthening the _entente_ and in accentuating the partial isolation of Germany.

The grouping of the great continental states into two opposite but not necessarily hostile camps helped to preserve the balance of power and the peace of Europe. The result was that the causes of conflict which arose from time to time up to the end of the 19th century were localized. Some of the principal questions involved may be more

## particularly mentioned.

Armenia.

The Armenian Question was brought prominently before Europe by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin the Sublime Porte undertook "to carry out without delay the ameliorations and reforms required by local needs in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds." This stipulation remained a dead letter, and the relations between the Armenians and the Mussulmans became worse than before, because the protection of the powers encouraged in the oppressed nationality far-reaching political aspirations, and the sultan regarded the political aspirations and the intervention of the powers as dangerous for the integrity and independence of his empire. For some fifteen years the Armenians continued to hope for the efficacious intervention of their protectors, but when their patience became exhausted and the question seemed in danger of being forgotten, they determined to bring it again to the front. Some of them confined themselves to agitating abroad, especially in England, in favour of the cause, whilst others made preparations for exciting an insurrectionary movement in Constantinople and Asia Minor. These latter knew very well that an insurrection could be suppressed by the Turkish government without much difficulty, but they hoped that the savage measures of repression which the Turks were sure to employ might lead to the active intervention of Europe and ensure their liberation from Turkish rule, as the famous "atrocities" of 1876 had led to the political emancipation of Bulgaria. In due course--1895-1896--the expected atrocities took place, in the form of wholesale massacres in Constantinople and various towns of Asia Minor. The sultan was subjected to diplomatic pressure and threatened with more efficient means of coercion. In the diplomatic campaign England took the lead, and was warmly supported by Italy, but Germany, Austria and France showed themselves lukewarm, not to say indifferent, and Russia, departing from her traditional policy of protecting the Christians of Turkey, vetoed the employment of force for extracting concessions from the sultan. In these circumstances the Porte naturally confined itself to making a few reforms on paper, which were never carried out. Thus the last state of the Armenians was worse than the first, but the so-called European concert was maintained, and the danger of a great European war was averted.

Crete.

The next attempt to raise the Eastern Question was made by the Greeks. In 1896 a semi-secret society called the Ethnike Hetairia began a Panhellenic agitation, and took advantage of one of the periodical insurrections in Crete to further its projects. In February 1897 the Cretan revolutionary committee proclaimed the annexation of the island to the Hellenic kingdom, and a contingent of Greek regular troops landed near Canea under the command of Colonel Vassos to take possession of the island in the name of King George. The powers, objecting to this arbitrary proceeding, immediately occupied Canea with a mixed force from the ships of war which were there at the time, and summoned the Greek government to withdraw its troops. The summons was disregarded, and the whole of the Greek army was mobilized on the frontier of Thessaly and Epirus. In consequence of a raid into Turkish territory the Porte declared war on the 17th of April, and the short campaign ended in the defeat of the Greeks. The powers intervened to put an end to the hostilities, and after prolonged negotiations a peace was concluded by which Greece had to consent to a strategical rectification of frontier and to pay a war indemnity of L4,000,000. Thus a second time the European concert acted effectually in the interests of peace, but it did not stand the strain of the subsequent efforts to solve the Cretan Question. Finding the Turks less conciliatory after their military success, and being anxious to remain in cordial relations with the Porte, Germany withdrew from further co-operation with the powers, and Austria followed her example. They did not, however, offer any active opposition, and the question received a temporary solution by the appointment of Prince George, second son of the king of Greece, as high commissioner and governor-general of the island. (See CRETE.)

Africa.

The conflicting desires of several of the powers to obtain colonial possessions in various parts of the world, and to forestall their competitors in the act of taking possession, were bound to introduce complications in which England, as the greatest of colonial powers, would generally be involved; and as the unappropriated portions of the earth's surface at the beginning of the period under discussion were to be found chiefly in Africa, it was in the Dark Continent that the conflicts of interests mostly took place. England's chief competitors were France and Germany. Her traditional policy, except in the south of the continent, where the conditions of soil and climate were favourable to European colonists, had been purely commercial. She had refrained from annexation of territory, as involving too much expenditure and responsibility, and confined her protection to the trading stations on the coast. When France came into the field this policy had to be abandoned. The policy of France was also commercial in a certain sense, but the methods she adopted were very different. She endeavoured to bring under her authority, by annexation or the establishment of protectorates, the largest possible extent of territory, in order to increase her trade by a system of differential tariffs; she encroached on the hinterland of British settlements, and endeavoured to direct artificially the native inland trade towards her own ports. A glance at the map of the African West Coast will suffice to show the success with which this policy was carried out. When the British government awoke to the danger, all that could be done was to prevent further encroachments by likewise annexing territory. The result is shown in the article AFRICA: Sec. 5. In her dealings with France about the partition of Africa, England was generally conciliatory, but she was always inflexible in guarding carefully the two entrances to the Mediterranean. There was, therefore, a permanent danger of conflict in Egypt and Morocco. When England in 1882 considered it necessary to suppress the Arabi insurrection, she invited France to co-operate, but the French government declined, and left the work to be done by England alone. England had no intention of occupying the country permanently, but she had to take precautions against the danger of French occupation after her withdrawal, and these precautions were embodied in an Anglo-Turkish convention signed at Constantinople in May 1887. France prevented the ratification of the convention by the sultan, with the result that the British occupation has been indefinitely prolonged. She still clung persistently, however, to the hope of obtaining a predominant position in the valley of the Nile, and she tried to effect her purpose by gaining a firm foothold on the upper course of the river. The effort which she made in 1898 to attain this end, by simultaneously despatching the Marchand mission from her Congo possessions and inciting the emperor Menelek of Abyssinia to send a force from the east to join hands with Major Marchand at Fashoda, was defeated by the overthrow of the Khalifa and the British occupation of Khartum. For a few days the two nations seemed on the brink of war, but the French government, receiving no encouragement from St Petersburg, consented to withdraw the Marchand mission, and a convention was signed defining the respective spheres of influence of the two countries.

In Morocco the rivalry between the two powers was less acute but not less persistent and troublesome. France aspired to incorporate the sultanate with her north African possessions, whilst England had commercial interests to defend and was firmly resolved to prevent France from getting unfettered possession of the southern coast of the Straits of Gibraltar. As in Egypt, so in Morocco the dangers of conflict were averted, in 1904, by a general agreement, which enabled France to carry out in Morocco, as far as England was concerned, her policy of pacific penetration, but debarred her from erecting fortifications in the vicinity of the straits. Germany thereafter strongly opposed French claims in Morocco, but after a period of great tension, and the holding of an ineffectual conference at Algeciras in 1906, an understanding was come to in 1909 (see MOROCCO: _History_).

With Germany likewise, from 1880 onwards, England had some diplomatic difficulties regarding the partition of Africa, but they never reached a very acute phase, and were ultimately settled by mutual concessions. By the arrangement of 1890, in which several of the outstanding questions were solved, Heligoland was ceded to Germany in return for concessions in East Africa. A conflict of interests in the southern Pacific was amicably arranged by the Anglo-German convention of April 1886, in which a line of demarcation was drawn between the respective spheres of influence in the islands to the north and east of the Australian continent, and by the convention of 1899, in virtue of which Germany gained possession of Samoa and renounced in favour of England all pretensions to the Tonga Archipelago.

Asia.

In Asia the tendencies of the European powers to territorial expansion, and their desire to secure new markets for their trade and industry, have affected from time to time their mutual relations. More than once England and Russia have had disputes about the limits of their respective spheres of influence in central Asia, but the causes of friction have steadily diminished as the work of frontier delimitation has advanced. The important agreement of 1872-1873 was supplemented by the protocol of the 22nd of July 1887 and the Pamir delimitation of 1895, so that the Russo-Afghan frontier, which is the dividing line between the Russian and British spheres of influence, has now been carried right up to the frontier of the Chinese empire. The delimitation of the English and French spheres of influence in Asia has also progressed. In 1885 France endeavoured to get a footing on the Upper Irrawaddy, the hinterland of British Burma, and England replied in the following year by annexing the dominions of King Thebaw, including the Shan States as far east as the Mekong. Thereupon France pushed her Indo-Chinese frontier westwards, and in 1893 made an attack on the kingdom of Siam, which very nearly brought about a conflict with England. After prolonged negotiations an arrangement was reached and embodied in a formal treaty (January 1896), which clearly foreshadows a future partition between the two powers, but guarantees the independence of the central portion of the kingdom, the Valley of the Menam, as a buffer-state. Farther north, in eastern China, the aggressive tendencies and mutual rivalries of the European powers have produced a problem of a much more complicated kind. Firstly Germany, then Russia, next England, and finally France took portions of Chinese territory, under the thin disguise of long leases. They thereby excited in the Chinese population and government an intense anti-foreign feeling, which produced the Boxer movement and culminated in the attack on the foreign legations at Pekin in the summer of 1900. (See CHINA: _History_.)

In 1899-1901 the relations of the European powers were disturbed by the Boer War in South Africa. In nearly every country of Europe popular feeling was much excited against England, and in certain influential quarters the idea was entertained of utilizing this feeling for the formation of a coalition against the British empire; but in view of the decided attitude assumed by the British government, and the loyal enthusiasm displayed by the colonies, no foreign government ventured to take the initiative of intervention, and it came gradually to be recognized that no European state had any tangible interest in prolonging the independence and maladministration of the Boer republics.

One permanent factor in the history of Europe after the war of 1870-71 was the constant increase of armaments by all the great powers, and the proportionate increase of taxation. The fact made such an impression on the young emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., that he invited the powers to consider whether the further increase of the burdens thereby imposed on the nations might not be arrested by mutual agreement; and a conference for this purpose was convened at the Hague (May 18-July 29, 1899), but the desirable object in view was not attained. (See ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL.) (D. M. W.)

Progress of the Peace movement.

Though neither the first Hague Conference nor the second, which met in 1907, did much to fulfil the expectations of those who hoped for the establishment of a system which should guarantee the world against the disasters of war, they undoubtedly tended to create a strong public opinion in favour of peaceful methods in the solution of international problems which has not been without its effect. Any attempt to organize the concert of the powers must always fail, as it failed in the early part of the 19th century, so long as the spirit of national and racial rivalry is stronger than the consciousness of common interests; and the early years of the 20th century showed no diminution, but rather an accentuation of this rivalry. The court of arbitration established at the Hague early in 1901 may deal effectively with questions as to which both parties desire a _modus vivendi_, and the pacific efforts of King Edward VII., which did so much to prevent misunderstandings likely to lead to war, resulted from 1903 onwards in a series of arbitration treaties between Great Britain and other powers which guaranteed the Hague court an effective activity in such matters. But more perilous issues, involving deep-seated antagonisms, have continued to be dealt with by the methods of the old diplomacy backed by the armed force of the powers. How far the final solution of such problems has been helped or hindered by the general reluctance to draw the sword must for some time to come remain an open question. Certainly, during the early years of the 20th century, many causes of difference which a hundred years earlier would assuredly have led to war, were settled, or at least shelved, by diplomacy. Of these the questions of Crete, of Armenia, and of contested claims in Africa have already been mentioned. Other questions of general interest which might have led to war, but which found a peaceful solution, were those of the separation of Norway and Sweden, and the rivalry of the powers in the northern seas. In October 1905 Sweden formally recognized the separate existence of Norway (see NORWAY: _History_ and SWEDEN: _History_). On the 23rd of April 1908 were signed the "Declarations"; the one, signed by the four Baltic littoral powers, recognized "in principle" the maintenance of the territorial _status quo_ in that sea; the other--to which Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Holland were the parties--sanctioned a similar principle in regard to the North Sea. These were followed, in June of the same year, by two agreements intended to apply the same principles to the southern European waters, signed by France and Spain and Great Britain and Spain respectively. Another agreement, that signed between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 for the delimitation of their spheres of influence in Persia and the northern borders of the Indian empire, though having no direct relation to European affairs, exercised considerable influence upon them by helping to restore the international prestige of Russia, damaged by the disasters of the war with Japan and the internal disturbances that followed. The new cordial understanding between the British and Russian governments was cemented by the meeting of King Edward VII. and the emperor Nicholas II. at Reval in June 1908.

Revival of the Eastern Question.

More perilous to European peace, however, than any of these issues was the perennial unrest in Macedonia, which threatened sooner or later to open up the whole Eastern Question once more in its acutest form. The situation was due to the internecine struggle of the rival Balkan races--Greek, Bulgarian, Servian--to secure the right to the reversion of territories not yet derelict. But behind these lesser issues loomed the great secular rivalries of the powers, and beyond these again the vast unknown forces of the Mahommedan world, ominously stirring. The very vastness of the perils involved in any attempt at a definitive settlement compelled the powers to accept a compromise which, it was hoped, would restore tolerable conditions in the wretched country. But the "Muerzsteg programme," concerted between the Austrian and Russian emperors in 1903, and imposed upon the Porte by the diplomatic pressure of the great powers, did not produce the effects hoped for. The hideous tale of massacres of helpless villagers by organized Greek bands, and of equally hideous, if less wholesale, reprisals by Bulgarian bands, grew rather than diminished, and reached its climax in the early months of 1908. The usefulness of the new _gendarmerie_, under European officers, which was to have co-operated with the Ottoman authorities in the restoration of order, was from the outset crippled by the passive obstruction of the Turkish government. The sultan, indeed, could hardly be blamed for watching with a certain cynical indifference the mutual slaughter of those "Christians" whose avowed ideal was the overthrow of Mahommedan rule, nor could he be expected to desire the smooth working of a system against which he had protested as a violation of his sovereign rights. In 1908 the powers were still united in bringing pressure to bear on the Porte to make the reforms effective; but the proposal of Great Britain to follow the precedent of the Lebanon and commit the administration of Macedonia to a Mussulman governor appointed by the sultan, but removable only by consent of the powers, met with little favour either at Constantinople or among the powers whose ulterior aims might have been hampered by such an arrangement.

Young Turkish revolution, 1908.

European results.

European crisis provoked by Austria.

Such was the condition of affairs when in October 1908 the revolution in Turkey altered the whole situation. The easy and apparently complete victory of the Young Turks, and the re-establishment without a struggle of the constitution which had been in abeyance since 1876, took the whole world by surprise, and not least those who believed themselves to be most intimately acquainted with the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman empire. The question of the Near East seemed in fair way of settlement by the action of conflicting races themselves, who in the enthusiasm of new-found freedom appeared ready to forget their ancient internecine feuds and to fraternize on the common ground of constitutional liberty (see TURKEY: _History_). By the European powers the proclamation of the constitution was received, at least outwardly, with unanimous approval, general admiration being expressed for the singular moderation and self-restraint shown by the Turkish leaders and people. Whatever views, however, may have been openly expressed, or secretly held, as to the revolution so far as it affected the Ottoman empire itself, there could be no doubt that its effects on the general situation in Europe would be profound. These effects were not slow in revealing themselves. On the 5th of October Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself king (_tsar_) of the Bulgarians; and two days later the emperor Francis Joseph issued a rescript announcing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg monarchy (see BULGARIA: _History_ and BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: _History_). Whatever cogent reasons there may have been for altering the status of these countries in view of the changed conditions in Turkey, there could be no doubt that the method employed was a violation of the public law of Europe. By the declaration of London of 1871, to which Austria-Hungary herself had been a principal party, it had been laid down that "contracting powers could only rid themselves of their treaty engagements by an understanding with their co-signatories." This solemn reaffirmation of a principle on which the whole imposing structure of international law had, during the 19th century, been laboriously built up was now cynically violated. The other powers, confronted with the _fait accompli_, protested; but the astute statesman who had staked his reputation as foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy on the success of this _coup_ had well gauged the character and force of the opposition he would have to meet. Baron von Aehrenthal, himself more Slav than German, in spite of his name, had served a long apprenticeship in diplomacy at Belgrade and St Petersburg; he knew how fully he could rely upon the weakness of Russia, and that if Russian Pan-Slav sentiment could be cowed, he need fear nothing from the resentment of the Servians. He was strong, too, in the moral and--in case of need--the material support of Germany. With Germany behind her, Austria-Hungary had little to fear from the opposition of the powers of the triple _entente_, Great Britain, France and Russia. This diagnosis of the situation was justified by the event. For months, indeed, Europe seemed on the verge of a general war. During the autumn the nationalist excitement in Servia and Montenegro rose to fever-heat, and Austria responded by mobilizing her forces on the frontiers and arming the Catholic Bosnians as a precaution against a rising of their Orthodox countrymen. Only the winter seemed to stand between Europe and a war bound to become general, and men looked forward with apprehension to the melting of the snows. It is too early as yet to write the history of the diplomatic activities by which this disaster was avoided. Their general outline, however, is clear enough. The protests of Turkey at a violation of treaty rights, doubly resented as likely to damage the prestige of the new constitutional regime, were sympathetically received by the powers of the triple _entente_. An international conference was at once suggested as the only proper authority for carrying out any modifications of the treaty of Berlin necessitated by the new conditions in Turkey; the right of Austria-Hungary to act on her own initiative was strenuously denied; Bulgarian independence and Prince Ferdinand's title of king were meantime refused recognition. In the assertion of these principles Great Britain, Russia and France were united. Germany, on the other hand, maintained an attitude of reserve, though diplomatically "correct"; she accepted the principle of a conference, but made her consent to its convocation conditional on that of her ally Austria-Hungary. But the latter refused to agree to any conference in which the questions at issue should be reopened; the most that she would accept was a conference summoned merely to register the _fait accompli_ and to arrange "compensations" not territorial but financial.

The German-Austrian victory.

For a while it seemed as though Baron Aehrenthal's ambition had o'erleaped itself. The reluctance of the Russian government, conscious of its military and political weakness, to take extreme measures seemed likely to be overborne by the Pan-Slav enthusiasm of the Russian people, and the Austrian statesman's policy to have placed him in an _impasse_ from which it would be difficult to extricate himself, save at an expense greater than that on which he had calculated. At this point Germany, conscious throughout of holding the key to the situation, intervened with effect. Towards the end of March 1909 the German ambassador at St Petersburg, armed with an autograph letter from the emperor William II., had an interview with the tsar. What were the arguments he used is not known; but the most powerful are supposed to have been the German forces which had been mobilized on the Polish frontier. In any case, the result was immediate and startling. Russia, without previous discussion with her allies, dissociated herself from the views she had hitherto held in common with them, and accepted the German-Austrian standpoint. All question of a conference was now at an end; and all that the powers most friendly to Turkey could do was to persuade her to make the best of a bad bargain. The Ottoman government, preoccupied with the internal questions which were to issue in the abortive attempt at counter-revolution in April, was in no condition to resist friendly or unfriendly pressure. The principle of a money payment in compensation for the shadowy rights of the sultan over the lost provinces was accepted,[79] and Bulgarian independence under King Ferdinand was recognized on the very eve of the new victory of the Young Turks which led to the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid II. and the proclamation of Sultan Mahommed V. (see TURKEY: _History_).

Its moral.

The change made by these events in the territorial system of Europe was of little moment. A subject principality, long practically independent, became a sovereign state; the _Almanach de Gotha_ was enriched with a new royal title; the sentiment of the Bulgarian people was gratified by the restoration of their historic tsardom. Two provinces long annexed to the Habsburg monarchy _de facto_ became so _de jure_, and the vision of a Serb empire with a free outlet to the sea, never very practicable, was finally dissolved. Of vastly greater importance were the moral and international issues involved. The whole conception of an effective concert of Europe, or of the World, based on the supposed sacred obligation of treaties and the validity of international law, was revealed, suddenly and brutally, as the baseless fabric of a dream. The most momentous outcome of the international debates caused by Austria's high-handed action was the complete triumph of Bismarck's principle that treaties cease to be valid "when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text." Henceforth, it was felt, no reaffirmation of a principle of international comity and law, so successfully violated, could serve to disguise the brutal truth that in questions between nations, in the long-run, might is right--that there is no middle term between the naked submission preached by Tolstoy and his disciples and Napoleon's _dictum_ that "Providence is with the big battalions." In Great Britain, especially, public opinion was quick to grasp this truth. It was realized that it was the immense armed power of Germany that had made her the arbiter in a question vitally affecting the interests of all Europe. Germany alone emerged from the crisis with prestige enormously enhanced; for without her intervention Austria could not have resisted the pressure of the powers. The cry for disarmament, encouraged by the action of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's government, suddenly died down in England; and the agitation in favour of an increased ship-building programme, that followed the revelation by the first lord of the admiralty (April 1909) of Germany's accelerated

## activity in naval construction, showed that public opinion had been

thoroughly awakened to the necessity of maintaining for Great Britain her maritime supremacy, on which not only her position in Europe but the existence of her over-sea empire depended.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.--(1) _Bibliographies_.--Lists of the principal works on the history of the various European countries, and of their main sources, are given in the bibliographies attached to the separate articles (see also those appended to the articles PAPACY; CHURCH HISTORY; DIPLOMACY; CRUSADES; FEUDALISM, &c.). For the sources of the medieval history of Europe see Ulysse Chevalier's monumental _Repertoire des sources historiques du moyen age; Bio-Bibliography_ (Paris, 1877, &c.), which with certain limitations (notably as regards the Slav, Hungarian and Scandinavian countries) gives references to published documents for all names of people, however obscure, occurring in medieval history. In 1894 M. Chevalier began the publication of a second series of his _Repertoire_, under the somewhat misleading title of _Topo-Bibliographie_, intended as a compendious guide to the places, institutions, &c., of the middle ages; though very useful, this is by no means so complete as the _Bio-Bibliographie_. August Potthast's _Bibliotheca historica medii aevi_ (2nd ed., Berlin, 1895-1896) gives a complete catalogue of all the annals, chronicles and other historical works which appeared in Europe between the years 375 and 1500 and have since been printed, with short notes on their value and significance, and references to critical works upon them. See also the article RECORD. For authorities on the history of Europe from the end of the 15th to the 19th centuries inclusive the excellent bibliographies appended to the volumes of the _Cambridge Modern History_ are invaluable.

(2) _Works_.--Of general works the most important are the _Histoire generale du IV^me siecle a nos jours_, published under the direction of E. Lavisse and A. Rambaud (Paris, 1894, &c.), in 12 vols., covering the period from the 4th to the end of the 19th century: Leopold von Ranke's _Weltgeschichte_ (Leipzig, 1881, &c.), in 9 vols., covering (i.) the oldest group of nations and the Greeks; (ii.) the Roman Republic; (iii.) the ancient Roman Empire; (iv.) the East Roman empire and the origin of the Romano-German kingdoms; (v.) the Arab world-power and the empire of Charlemagne; (vi.) dissolution of the Carolingian and foundation of the German empire; (vii.) zenith and decay of the German empire; the hierarchy under Gregory VII.; (viii.) crusades and papal world-power (12th and 13th centuries); (ix.) period of transition to the modern world (14th and 15th centuries). To this may be added Ranke's works on special periods: e.g. _Die Fuersten und Voelker von Sued-Europa im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert_ (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1837-1839); _Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Voelker_, 1494-1514 (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1874, Eng. trans. 1887). In English the most important general work is the _Cambridge Modern History_ (1903, &c.), produced by the collaboration of English and foreign scholars, and covering the ground from the end of the 15th to the 19th century inclusive. The _Historians' History of the World_, edited by Dr H. Smith Williams (1908), is a compilation from the works of eminent historians of all ages, and the value of its various parts is therefore that of the historians responsible for them. Its chief merit is that it makes accessible to English readers many foreign or obscure sources which would otherwise have remained closed to the general reader. It also contains essays by notable modern scholars on the principal epochs and tendencies of the world's history, the texts of a certain number of treaties, &c., not included as yet in other collections, and comprehensive bibliographies. On a less ambitious scale are the volumes of the "Periods of European History" series (London, 1893, &c.): Per. I. _The Dark Ages, 476-918_, by C.W.C. Oman (1893); Per. II. _The Empire and the Papacy, 918-1273_, by T.F. Tout (1898); Per. III. _The Close of the Middle Ages, 1273-1494_, by R. Lodge (1901); _Europe in the 16th Century, 1494-1598_, by A.H. Johnson (1897); _The Ascendancy of France_, by H.O. Wakeman (1894); _The Balance of Power_, by A. Hassal (1896); _Revolutionary Europe_, by H. Morse Stephens (1893); _Modern Europe_, by W. Alison Phillips (1901, 5th ed., 1908). See also T.H. Dyer, _History of Modern Europe from the fall of Constantinople_, revised and continued to the end of the 19th century by A. Hassal (6 vols., London, 1901). Besides the above may be mentioned, for European history since the outbreak of the French Revolution, A. Sorel, _l'Europe et la Revolution Francaise_ (7 vols., Paris, 1885, &c.), a work of first-class importance; A. Stern, _Geschichte Europas seit den Wiener Vertraegen von 1815_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1894, &c.), based on the study of much new material, still in progress (1908); C. Seignobos, _Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine_ (Paris, 1897), a valuable text-book with copious bibliography (Eng. trans., London, 1901); C.M. Andrews, _Historical development of Europe_, 2 vols. (New York, 1896-1898).

(3) _Published Documents_.--For the vast mass of published sources reference must be made to the bibliographies mentioned above. It must be borne in mind, however, that these represent but a fraction of the unpublished material, and that the great development of original research is constantly revealing fresh sources, throwing new light on old problems, and not seldom upsetting conclusions long established as final. For these latest developments of scholarship the numerous historical and archaeological reviews published in various countries should be consulted: e.g. _The English Historical Review_ (London); _The Scottish Hist. Rev._ (Glasgow); _The American Hist. Rev._ (London and New York); the _Revue historique_ (Paris); the _Historische Zeitschrift_ (Munich). The most notable collections of treaties are J. Dumont's _Corps diplomatique_, covering the period from A.D. 800 to 1731 (Amsterdam and the Hague, 1726-1731); F.G. de Martens and his continuators, _Recueil des traites_, &c. (1791, &c.), covering with its supplements the period from 1494 to 1874; F. (T.T.) de Martens, _Recueil des traites conclus par la Russie_, &c. (14 vols., St Petersburg, 1874, &c.); A. and J. de Clercq, _Recueil des traites de la France_ (Paris, 1864; new ed., 1880, &c.); L. Neumann, _Recueil des traites conclus par l'Autriche_ (from 1763), (6 vols., Leipzig, 1855); new series, by. L. Neumann and A. de Plason (16 vols., Vienna, 1877-1903); _Oesterreichische Staatsvertraege_ (vol. i. _England_, 1526-1748), published by the Commission for the modern history of Austria (Innsbruck, 1907), with valuable introductory notes; _British and Foreign State Papers_ (from the termination of the war in 1814), compiled at the Foreign Office by the Librarian and Keeper of the Papers (London, 1819, &c.); Sir E. Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_ (from 1814), (4 vols., London, 1875-1891). See the article TREATIES. (W. A. P.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] H. Wagner's edition of Guthe's _Lehrbuch der Geographie_ (5th ed., Hanover 1882).

[2] At the summit of each of the Trans-Ural railways (Perm-Tyumen and Ufa-Chelyabinsk) and that of the road across the Caucasus from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis, sign-posts, with the name Europe on one side, Asia on the other, mark this boundary.

[3] Fifth edition, vol. ii. pp. 24-25.

[4] Pt. i. pp. 11-12.

[5] Griesbach, on the strength of Middendorff's observations, remarks that, in addition to European fruit trees, oak, maples, elms, ashes and the black alder do not cross the Urals, while the lime tree is reduced to the size of a shrub (_La Vegetation du globe_, translated by Tchihatchef, i. p. 181).

[6] On the history of the boundary between Asia and Europe see F.G. Hahn in the _Mitteilungen des Vereins fuer Erdkunde zu Leipzig_ (1881), pp. 83-104. Hahn, on the ground that true mountain systems must be regarded as forming geographical units, pronounces against the practice of making "natural boundaries" run along mountain crests, and assigns the whole of the Caucasus region to Europe as all belonging to such a system, but orographically quite different from the Armenian plateau (p. 103). But surely it is no less different from the European plain.

[7] _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1890), p. 91.

[8] See Supan's _Physische Erdkunde_, 4th ed., pp. 376-377, and the authorities there quoted.

[9] "Kustenveranderungen im Mittelmeergebiet," in _Ztschr. der Ges. fuer Erdkunde zu Berlin_ (1878).

[10] See _Mitteil der Wiener Geog. Gesellschaft_ (1890), p. 333.

[11] See R.T. Gunther, _Contributions to the Study of Earth-Movements in the Bay of Naples_ (Oxford, 1903), and "Earth-Movements in the Bay of Naples," in the _Geog. Journ._ vol. xxii. pp. 121-149, 269-285.

[12] See _Petermanns Mitteil._ (1891), Pl. 8.

[13] _Ib._ (1893), Pl. 12.

[14] See Ed. Suess, _The Face of the Earth_, translated by H.B.C. Sollas, vol. i. (Oxford, 1904); J. Milne, _Seismology_ (London, 1886); R. Hoernes, _Erdbebenkunde_ (Leipzig, 1893).

[15] _Die mittlere Hoehe Europas_ (Plauen, 1874).

[16] _Traite de geologie_ (Paris, 1883).

[17] _Scot. Geog. Mag._ (1888), p. 23.

[18] _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1889), p. 17.

[19] _Trans. (Izvestiya) Imp. Rus. Geog. Soc._ (1889), p. 113.

[20] _Die mittleren Erhebungsverhaltnisse der Erdoberflaeche_, pt. i., in Penck's _Geographische Abhandlungen_, vol. v. (Vienna, 1891).

[21] _Morphologie der Erdoberflaeche_, vol. i.

[22] The equivalent of the figures given in _Superficie de l'Europe_. A later measurement by Strelbitsky yielded a result equal to 2215 English miles.

[23] General von Tillo, in _Transactions (Izvestiya) Imp. Rus. Geog. Soc._ vol. xix. (1883), pp. 160-161.

[24] Dr Al. Bludau in _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1898), pp. 185-187, has given new calculations of the areas of the basins of certain European rivers, namely, the Tagus, 31,250 sq. m.; Ebro, 32,810 sq. m.; Guadalquivir, 21,620 sq. m.; Po, 28,800 sq. m.; Guadiana, 25,810 sq. m.; and Jucar, 8245 sq. m.

[25] St Martin, _Dict. de geog. univ._

[26] In other parts of this work areas of river-basins and lakes, and other measurements, may be observed to conflict in some degree with those given here. Various authorities naturally differ, both in methods of estimating and in standards of precision.

[27] Penck's _Geographische Abhandlungen_, vol. v. pt. iv. (Vienna, 1894); noticed in _Geog. Journ._ vol. vi. p. 264.

[28] Including L. Pskov as well as the connecting arm known as Teploye.

[29] _Sweden, its People and its Industry_ (Stockholm, 1904).

[30] See Ascherson, "Die Austrocknung des Neusiedler Sees," in _Z. der Ges. fuer Erdkunde zu Berlin_ (1865).

[31] See Suess, _The Face of the Earth_; M. Bertrand, "Sur la distribution geographique des roches eruptives en Europe," _Bull. Soc. Geol. France_, ser. 3, vol. xvi. (1887-1888), pp. 573-617. A translation of a lecture by Suess, giving a short summary of his views on the structure of Europe, will be found in the _Canadian Record of Science_, vol. vii. pp. 235-246.

[32] Vesselovski, as quoted by Voeikov, _Die atmosphaerische Circulation_.

[33] Plate 1 in _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1903).

[34] See a paper on "Das regenreichste Gebiet Europas," by Prof. Kassner, Berlin, in _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1904), p. 281.

[35] London, 1901 (one of the publications of the Royal Geog. Society).

[36] Plate 21 in _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1900).

[37] _Nova Acta Leop. Karol. d. deutschen Akad. d. Naturforscher_, vol. lxvii. No. 3 (Halle, 1896).

[38] _Petermanns Mitteilungen_ (1890), pl. 11 (text pp. 137-145).

[39] _Ib._ (1887), pl. 10 (text pp. 165-172).

[40] Berlin, 3 vols. (one made up of maps), 1898-1899.

[41] By this term (_Getreideflaeche_) Engelbrecht designates the area occupied by wheat and other varieties of triticum, rye, oats and barley.

[42] Based on Scherzer, _Das wirtschaftliche Leben der Voelker_, p. 12.

[43] From the _Fifth Report of the United States Department of Agriculture_, Division of Statistics, Miscellaneous Series, p. 13.

[44] Based on the _Corn Trade Year-book_ (1904), p. 284.

[45] Exclusive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the average production in 1894-1903 was about 21/2 million bushels.

[46] The estimates for Bulgaria, Rumania, Servia and Turkey in Europe for 1872-1876 are not comparable with those of the two later periods on account of the territorial changes since that date. Those for Bulgaria in the period 1881-1890 include Eastern Rumelia.

[47] Including Poland.

[48] Spanish statistics very imperfect.

[49] Based on the same authorities as the wheat table. In the original, however, the figures for 1894-1903 are given in "quarters of 480 lb.," while the figures given above are calculated on an average quarter of 462 lb.

[50] Including Poland, but not Finland, in which the average production of rye is estimated at about 11,000,000 bushels.

[51] Mainly from or based on the Agricultural Returns for Great Britain, 1905.

[52] Single years.

[53] Period 1883-1887.

[54] Based on _Mines and Quarries: General Report and Statistics for 1906_, pt. iv. (Cd. 4145), 1908.

[55] Production in the Ural districts only.

[56] See note 11.

[57] A considerable quantity of quicksilver is produced in the government of Ekaterinoslav.

[58] Dressed.

[59] Cupreous pyrites and cupreous iron pyrites, besides which a considerable quantity of copper precipitate is produced.

[60] A small quantity of copper ore is produced in Finland, but the bulk of the Russian production is in the Asiatic provinces.

[61] Mainly cupreous iron pyrites.

[62] Argentiferous.

[63] In 1906 Greece produced 12,308 m.t. of argentiferous pig lead.

[64] Of which 158,424 m.t. argentiferous.

[65] A considerable quantity of manganese ore is produced in the government of Ekaterinoslav, but the main seat of Russian production is the Caucasus.

[66] Zinc and lead ore.

[67] In addition to 28,891 m.t. of calcined zinc ore.

[68] Probably the most complete synopsis of the evidence on this point is to be found in Prince Kropotkin's _Fields, Factories and Workshops_ (London, 1899).

[69] The total horse-power used in mechanical industries is obtained by adding 650,000, the estimated total of horse-power in hydraulic installations given in an article in the _Annales de geographie_ for January 1904, to the total steam-power in fixed engines officially given for 1903, and accordingly excludes gas and other engines not driven by steam- or water-power.

[70] The proportion estimated in the official publication entitled _Sweden: its People and its Industry_, edited by G. Sundbaerg (Stockholm, 1904).

[71] Including the installations returned in the Swiss industrial censuses as electric, most if not all of which are probably driven by water-power.

[72] See bibliography at the end of the article.

[73] See on the whole subject Hovelacque's _Science of Language_, Latham's _Nationalities of Europe_, and the same author's _Philology_.

[74] Taken from a paper by Professor Voeikov on "Verteilung der Bevoelkerung auf der Erde unter dem Einfluss der Naturverhaeltnisse und der menschlichen Tatigkeit," in _Petermanns Mitteil._ (1906), p. 249, where corresponding figures are given for other parts of the world.

[75] Kaluga, Smolensk, Tver, Moscow, Yaroslav, Kostromer and Vladimir.

[76] Kursk, Orel, Tula, Ryazan, Tambov, Voronezh and Penza.

[77] Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan, Simbirsk, Samara, Saratov and Astrakhan.

[78] Bessarabia, Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav and Don Province.

[79] The Austro-Turkish protocol had been signed at Constantinople on the 5th of March; it was now ratified by the Turkish parliament on the 5th of April.

EUROPIUM, a metallic chemical element, symbol Eu, atomic weight 152.0 (O = 16). The oxide Eu2O3 occurs in very small quantity in the minerals of the rare earths, and was first obtained in 1896 by E, A. Demarcay from Lecoq de Boisbaudran's samarium; G. Urbain and H. Lacombe in 1904 obtained the pure salts by fractional crystallization of the nitric acid solution with magnesium nitrate in the presence of bismuth nitrate. The salts have a faint pink colour, and show a faint absorption spectrum; the spark spectrum is brilliant and well characterized.

EURYDICE ([Greek: Eurudike]), in Greek mythology, the wife of Orpheus (q.v.). She was the daughter of Nereus and Doris, and died from the bite of a serpent when fleeing from Aristaeus, who wished to offer her violence (Virgil, _Georgics_, iv. 454-527; Ovid, _Metam_. x. 1 ff.).

EURYMEDON, one of the Athenian generals during the Peloponnesian War. In 428 B.C. he was sent by the Athenians to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet which was on the way to attack Corcyra. On his arrival, finding that Nicostratus with a small squadron from Naupactus had already placed the island in security, he took the command of the combined fleet, which, owing to the absence of the enemy, had no chance of distinguishing itself. In the following summer, in joint command of the land forces, he ravaged the district of Tanagra; and in 425 he was appointed, with Sophocles, the son of Sostratides, to the command of an expedition destined for Sicily. Having touched at Corcyra on the way, in order to assist the democratic party against the oligarchical exiles, but without taking any steps to prevent the massacre of the latter, Eurymedon proceeded to Sicily. Immediately after his arrival a pacification was concluded by Hermocrates, to which Eurymedon and Sophocles were induced to agree. The terms of the pacification did not, however, satisfy the Athenians, who attributed its conclusion to bribery; two of the chief agents in the negotiations were banished, while Eurymedon was sentenced to pay a heavy fine. In 414 Eurymedon, who had been sent with Demosthenes to reinforce the Athenians at the siege of Syracuse, was defeated and slain before reaching land (Thucydides iii., iv., vii.; Diod. Sic. xiii. 8, 11, 13).

EUSDEN, LAURENCE (1688-1730), English poet, son of the Rev. Laurence Eusden, rector of Spofforth, Yorkshire, was baptized on the 6th of September 1688. He was educated at St Peter's school, York, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He became a minor fellow of his college in 1711, and in the next year was admitted to a full fellowship. He was made poet laureate in 1718 by the lord chancellor, the duke of Newcastle, as a reward for a flattering poem on his marriage. He was rector of Coningsby, Lincolnshire, where he died on the 27th of September 1730. His name is less remembered by his translations and gratulatory poems than by the numerous satirical allusions of Pope, e.g.

"Know, Eusden thirsts no more for sack or praise; He sleeps among the dull of ancient days."

_Dunciad_, bk. i. 11. 293-294.

EUSEBIUS (Gr. [Greek: Eusebios], from [Greek: eusebes], pious, cf. the Latin name Pius), a name borne by a large number of bishops and others in the early ages of the Christian Church. Of these the most important are separately noticed below. No less than 25 saints of this name (sometimes corrupted into Eusoge, Euruge, Usoge, Usuge, Uruge and St Sebis) are venerated in the Roman Catholic Church, of whom 23 are included in the Bollandist _Acta Sanctorum_; many are obscure martyrs, monks or anchorites, but two deserve at least a passing notice.

EUSEBIUS, bishop of Vercelli (d. 371), is notable not only as a stout opponent of Arianism, but also as having been, with St Augustine, the first Western bishop to unite with his clergy in adopting a strict monastic life after the Eastern model (see Ambrose, _Ep. 63 ad Vercellenses_, Sec. 66). The legend that he was stoned to death by the Arians was probably invented for the edification of the Orthodox.

EUSEBIUS, bishop of Samosata (d. 380), played a considerable part in the later stages of the Arian controversy in the East. He is first mentioned among the Homoean and Homoeusian bishops who in 363 accepted the Homousian formula at the synod of Antioch presided over by Meletius, with whose views he seems to have identified himself (see MELETIUS OF ANTIOCH). According to Theodoret (5, 4, 8) he was killed at Doliche in Syria, where he had gone to consecrate a bishop, by a stone cast by an Arian woman. He thus became a martyr, and found a place in the Catholic calendar (see the article by Loofs in Herzog-Hauck, _Realencykl._, ed. 1898, v. p. 620).

EUSEBIUS OF LAODICEA, though not included among the saints, was noted for his saintly life. He was an Alexandrian by birth, and gained so great a reputation for his self-denial and charity that when in 262 the city was besieged by the troops of the emperor Gallienus he obtained permission, together with Anatolius, from their commander Theodotus, to lead out the non-combatants, whom he tended "like a father and physician." He went with Anatolius to Syria, and took part in the controversy against Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch. He became bishop of Laodicea, probably in the following year (263), and died some time before 268. His friend Anatolius succeeded him as bishop in the latter year (see the article by E. Hennecke in Herzog-Hauck, v. 619).

EUSEBIUS, bishop of Rome for four months under the emperor Maxentius, in 309 or 310. The Christians in Rome, divided on the question of the reconciliation of apostates, on which Eusebius held the milder view, brought forward a competitor, Heraclius. Both competitors were expelled by the emperor, Eusebius dying in exile in Sicily. He was buried in the cemetery of St Calixtus at Rome; and the extant epitaph, in eight hexameter lines, set up here by his successor Damasus, contains all the information there is about his life.

EUSEBIUS [OF CAESAREA] (c. 260-c. 340), ecclesiastical historian, who called himself Eusebius Pamphili, because of his devotion to his friend and teacher Pamphilus, was born probably in Palestine between A.D. 260 and 265, and died as bishop of Caesarea in the year 339 or 340. We know little of his youth beyond the fact that he became associated at an early day with Pamphilus, presbyter of the Church of Caesarea, and founder of a theological school there (see _Hist. Eccl._ vii. 32). Pamphilus gathered about him a circle of earnest students who devoted themselves especially to the study of the Bible and the transcription of Biblical codices, and also to the defence and spread of the writings of Origen, whom they regarded as their master. Pamphilus had a magnificent library, which Eusebius made diligent use of, and a catalogue of which he published in his lost _Life_ of Pamphilus (_Hist. Eccl._ vi. 32). In the course of the Diocletian persecution, which broke out in 303, Pamphilus was imprisoned for two years, and finally suffered martyrdom. During the time of his imprisonment (307-309) Eusebius distinguished himself by assiduous devotion to his friend, and assisted him in the preparation of an apology for Origen's teaching (_Hist. Eccl._ vi. 33), the first book of which survives in the Latin of Rufinus (printed in Routh's _Reliquiae sacrae_, iv. 339 sq., and in Lommatzsch's edition of Origen's Works, xxiv. p. 293 sq.). After the death of Pamphilus Eusebius withdrew to Tyre, and later, while the Diocletian persecution was still raging, went to Egypt, where he seems to have been imprisoned, but soon released. He became bishop of Caesarea between 313 and 315, and remained such until his death. The patriarchate of Antioch was offered him in 331, but declined (_Vita Constantini_, iii. 59 sq.).

Eusebius was a very important figure in the church of his day. He was not a great theologian nor a profound thinker, but he was the most learned man of his age, and stood high in favour with the emperor Constantine. At the council of Nicaea in 325 he took a prominent part, occupying a seat at the emperor's right hand, and being appointed to deliver the panegyrical oration in his honour. He was the leader of the large middle party of Moderates at the council, and submitted the first draft of the creed which was afterwards adopted with important changes and additions. In the beginning he was the most influential man present, but was finally forced to yield to the Alexandrian party, and to vote for a creed which completely repudiated the position of the Arians, with whom he had himself been hitherto more in sympathy than with the Alexandrians. He was placed in a difficult predicament by the action of the council, and his letter to the Caesarean church explaining his conduct is exceedingly interesting and instructive (see Socrates, _Hist. Eccl._ i. 8, and cf. McGiffert's translation of Eusebius' _Church History_, p. 15 sq.). To understand his conduct, it is necessary to look briefly at his theological position. By many he has been called an Arian, by many his orthodoxy has been defended. The truth is, three stages are to be distinguished in his theological development. The first preceded the outbreak of the Arian controversy, when, as might be expected in a follower of Origen, his interest was anti-Sabellian and his emphasis chiefly upon the subordination of the Son of God. In his works written during this period (for instance, the _Praeparatio evangelica_ and _Demonstratio evangelica_), as in the works of Origen himself and other ante-Nicene fathers, expressions occur looking in the direction of Arianism, and others looking in the opposite direction. The second stage began with the outbreak of the controversy in 318, and continued until the Nicene Council. During this period he took the side of Arius in the dispute with Alexander of Alexandria, and accepted what he understood to be the position of Arius and his supporters, who, as he supposed, taught both the divinity and subordination of the Son. It was natural that he should take this side, for in his traditional fear of Sabellianism, in which he was one with the followers of Origen in general, he found it difficult to approve the position of Alexander, who seemed to be doing away altogether with the subordination of the Son. And, moreover, he believed that Alexander was misrepresenting the teaching of Arius and doing him great injustice (cf. his letters to Alexander and Euphration preserved in the proceedings of the second council of Nicaea, Act. vi. tom. 5: see Mansi's _Concilia_, xiii. 316 sq.; English translation in McGiffert, _op. cit._ p. 70). Meanwhile at the council of Nicaea he seems to have discovered that the Alexandrians were right in claiming that Arius was carrying his subordinationism so far as to deny all real divinity to Christ. To this length Eusebius himself was unwilling to go, and so, convinced that he had misunderstood Arius, and that the teaching of the latter was imperilling the historic belief in the divinity of Christ, he gave his support to the opposition, and voted for the Nicene Creed, in which the teachings of the Arians were repudiated. From this time on he was a supporter of Nicene orthodoxy over against Arianism (cf., e.g., his _Contra Marcellum, De ecclesiastica theologia_, and _Theophania_). But he never felt in sympathy with the extreme views of the Athanasian party, for they seemed to him to savour of Sabellianism, which always remained his chief dread (cf. his two works against Marcellus of Ancyra). His personal friends, moreover, were principally among the Arians, and he was more closely identified with them than with the supporters of Athanasius. But he was always a man of peace, and while commonly counted one of the opponents of Athanasius, he did not take a place of leadership among them as his position and standing would have justified him in doing, and Athanasius never spoke of him with bitterness as he did of other prominent men in the party. (For a fuller description of the development of Eusebius' Christology and of his attitude throughout the Arian controversy, see McGiffert, _op. cit._ p. 11 sq.)

Eusebius was one of the most voluminous writers of antiquity, and his labours covered almost every field of theological learning. If we look in his works for brilliancy and originality we shall be disappointed. He was not a creative genius like Origen or Augustine. His claim to greatness rests upon his vast erudition and his sound judgment. Nearly all his works possess genuine and solid merits which raise them above the commonplace, and many of them still remain valuable. His exegesis is superior to that of most of his contemporaries, and his apologetic is marked by fairness of statement, breadth of treatment, and an instinctive appreciation of the difference between important and unimportant points. His style, it is true, is involved and obscure, often rambling and incoherent. This quality is due in large part to the desultory character of his thinking. He did not always clearly define his theme before beginning to write, and he failed to subject what he produced to a careful revision. Ideas of all sorts poured in upon him while he was writing, and he was not always able to resist the temptation to insert them whether pertinent or not. His great learning is evident everywhere, but he is often its slave rather than its master. It is as an historian that he is best known, and to his _History of the Christian Church_ he owes his fame and his familiar title "The Father of Church History." This work, which was published in its final form in ten books in 324 or early in 325, is the most important ecclesiastical history produced in ancient times. The reasons leading to the great undertaking, in which Eusebius had no predecessors, were in part historical, in part apologetic. He believed that he was living at the beginning of a new age, and he felt that it was a fitting time, when the old order of things was passing away, to put on record for the benefit of posterity the great events which had occurred during the generations that were past. He thus wrote, as any historian might, for the information and instruction of his readers, and yet he had all the time an apologetic purpose, to exhibit to the world the history of Christianity as a proof of its divine origin and efficacy. His plan is stated at the very beginning of the work:--

"It is my purpose to write an account of the successions of the holy Apostles as well as of the times which have elapsed from the day of our Saviour to our own; to relate how many and important events are said to have occurred in the history of the church; and to mention those who have governed and presided over the church in the most prominent parishes, and those who in each generation have proclaimed the divine word either orally or in writing. It is my purpose also to give the names and number and times of those who through love of innovation have run into the greatest errors, and proclaiming themselves discoverers of knowledge, falsely so called, have like fierce wolves unmercifully devastated the flock of Christ. It is my intention, moreover, to recount the misfortunes which immediately came on the whole Jewish nation in consequence of their plots against our Saviour, and to record the ways and times in which the divine word has been attacked by the Gentiles, and to describe the character of those who at various periods have contended for it in the face of blood and tortures, as well as the confessions which have been made in our own day, and the gracious and kindly succour which our Saviour has accorded them all."

The value of the work does not lie in its literary merit, but in the wealth of the materials which it furnishes for a knowledge of the early church. Many prominent figures of the first three centuries are known to us only from its pages. Many fragments, priceless on account of the light which they shed upon movements of far-reaching consequence, have been preserved in it alone. Eusebius often fails to appreciate the significance of the events which he records; in many cases he draws unwarranted conclusions from the given premises; he sometimes misinterprets his documents and misunderstands men and movements; but usually he presents us with the material upon which to form our own judgment, and if we differ with him we must at the same time thank him for the data that enable us independently to reach other results. But the work is not merely a thesaurus, it is a history in a true sense, and it has an intrinsic value of its own, independent of its quotations from other works. Eusebius possessed extensive sources of knowledge no longer accessible to us. The number of books referred to as read is enormous. He also had access to the archives of state, and gathered from them information beyond the reach of most. But the value of his work is due, not simply to the sources employed, but also to the use made of them. Upon this matter there has been, it is true, some diversity of opinion among modern scholars, but it is now generally admitted, and can be abundantly shown, that he was not only diligent in gathering material, but also far more thorough-going than most writers of antiquity in discriminating between trustworthy and untrustworthy reports, frank in acknowledging his ignorance, scrupulous in indicating his authorities in doubtful cases, less credulous than most of his contemporaries, and unfailingly honest. His principal faults are his carelessness and inaccuracy in matters of chronology, his lack of artistic skill in the presentation of his material, his desultory method of treatment, and his failure to look below the surface and grasp the real significance and vital connexion of events. He commonly regards an occurrence as sufficiently accounted for when it is ascribed to the activity of God or of Satan. But in spite of its defects the _Church History_ is a monumental work, which need only be compared with its continuations by Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Rufinus and others, to be appreciated at its true worth.

In addition to the _Church History_ we have from Eusebius' pen a _Chronicle_ in two books (c. 303; later continued down to 325), the first containing an epitome of universal history, the second chronological tables exhibiting in parallel columns the royal succession in different nations, and accompanied by notes marking the dates of historical events. A revised edition of the second book with a continuation down to his own day was published in Latin by St Jerome, and this, together with some fragments of the original Greek, was our only source for a knowledge of the Chronicle until the discovery of an Armenian version of the whole work, which was published by Aucher in 1818 (Latin translation in Schoene's edition), and of two Syriac versions published in Latin translation respectively in 1866 (by Roediger in Schoene's edition) and in 1884 (by Siegfried and Gelzer). Other historical works still extant are the _Martyrs of Palestine_ and the _Life of Constantine_. The former is an account of martyrdoms occurring in Palestine during the years 303 to 310, of most of which Eusebius himself was an eye-witness. The work exists in a longer and a shorter recension, the former in a Syriac version (published with English translation by Cureton, 1861), the latter in the original Greek attached to the _Church History_ in most MSS. (printed with the History in the various editions). _The Life of Constantine_, in four books, published after the death of the emperor, which occurred in 337, is a panegyric rather than a sober history, but contains much valuable material. Of Eusebius' apologetic works we still have the _Contra Hieroclem_, _Praeparatio evangelica_, _Demonstratio evangelica_, and _Theophania_. The first is a reply to a lost work against the Christians written by Hierocles, a Roman governor and contemporary of Eusebius. The second and third, taken together, are the most elaborate and important apologetic work of the early church. The former, in fifteen books, aims to show that the Christians are justified in accepting the sacred writings of the Hebrews, and in rejecting the religion and philosophy of the Greeks. The latter, in twenty books, of which only the first ten and fragments of the fifteenth are extant, endeavours to prove from the Hebrew Scriptures themselves that the Christians are right in going beyond the Jews and adopting new principles and practices. The former is thus a preparation for the latter, and the two together constitute a defence of Christianity against all the world, heathen as well as Jews. In grandeur of conception, comprehensiveness of treatment, and breadth of learning, this apology surpasses all other similar works of antiquity. The _Praeparatio_ is also valuable because of its large number of quotations from classical literature, many of them otherwise unknown to us. The _Theophania_, though we have many fragments of the original Greek, is extant as a whole only in a Syriac version first published by Lee in 1842. Its subject is the manifestation of God in the incarnation of the Word, and it aims to give with an apologetic purpose a brief exposition of the divine authority and influence of Christianity. Of Eusebius' dogmatic and polemic writings, we still have two works against his contemporary, Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra, the one known as _Contra Marcellum_, the other as _De theologia ecclesiastica_. The former and briefer aims simply to expose the errors of Marcellus, whom Eusebius accuses of Sabellianism, the latter to refute them. We also have parts of a General Introduction ([Greek: He katholon stoicheiodes eisagoge]), which consisted of ten-books (the sixth to the ninth books and a few other fragments still extant), under the title of _Prophetical Extracts_ ([Greek: Prophetikai eklogai]). Although this formed part of a larger work it was complete in itself and circulated separately. It contains prophetical passages from the Old Testament relating to the person and work of Christ, accompanied by explanatory notes. Of Biblical and exegetical works we have a considerable part of Eusebius' Commentaries on the Psalms and on Isaiah, which are monuments of learning, industry and critical acumen, though marred by the use of the allegorical method characteristic of the school of Origen; also a work on the names of places mentioned in Scripture, or the _Onomasticon_, the only one extant of a number of writings on Old Testament topography; and an epitome and some fragments of a work in two parts on Gospel Questions and Solutions, the first part dealing with the genealogies of Christ given in Matthew and Luke, the second with the apparent discrepancies between the various gospel accounts of the resurrection. Other important works which have perished wholly or in large part, and some orations and minor writings still extant, it is not necessary to refer to more particularly. (See Preuschen's list in Harnack's _Alt-christliche Litteraturgeschichte_, i. 2, p. 55 sq. Preuschen gives thirty-eight titles, besides orations and letters, but it is doubtful whether all of the Commentaries mentioned really existed.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The only edition of Eusebius' extant works which can lay claim even to relative completeness is that of Migne (_Patrologia graeca_, tom, xix.-xxiv.). The publication of a new critical edition was begun in 1902 in the Berlin Academy's _Greek Fathers_ (_Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte_, Leipzig). Many of Eusebius' works have been published separately. Thus the _Church History_, first by Stephanus (Paris, 1554); by Valesius with copious notes, together with the _Life of Constantine_, the _Oration in Praise of Constantine_, and the Histories of Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, &c. (best edition that of Reading (Cambridge, 1720), in three volumes, folio); by Heinichen (1827, second edition 1868-1870 in three volumes, a very useful edition, containing also the _Life of Constantine_ and the _Oration in Praise of Constantine_, with elaborate notes); by Burton (1838; a handy reprint in a single volume by Bright, 1881), and by many others. The most recent and best edition is that of Schwartz in the Berlin Academy's _Greek Fathers_, of which the first half has appeared, accompanied by the Latin version of Rufinus edited by Mommsen. The history was early put into Syriac (edited by Bedjan, Leipzig, 1897; also by Wright, McLean and Merx, London, 1898), Armenian (edited by Djarian, Venice, 1877), and Latin, and has been translated into many modern languages, the latest English version being that of McGiffert, in the _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, second series, volume i. (New York, 1890). Of the _Chronicle_, the best edition is by Schoene in two volumes (Berlin, 1866-1875). The _Life of Constantine_ and the _Oration in Praise of Constantine_ are published by Valesius, Heinichen and others in their editions of the _Church History_, also in the first volume of the Berlin Academy's edition (ed. by Heikel), and an English translation by Richardson in the volume containing McGiffert's translation of the _Church History_. Gaisford published the _Prophetical Extracts_ (Oxford, 1842), the _Praeparatio evangelica_ (1843), the _Demonstratio evangelica_ (1852), and the works against Hierocles and Marcellus (1852); and the works against Marcellus have appeared in the edition of the Berlin Academy (vol. iv.). The _Onomasticon_ has been published frequently, among others by Lagarde (Goettingen, 1870; 2nd ed., 1887), and is contained in the edition of the Berlin Academy (vol. iii.). The _Theophania_ was first published by Lee (Syriac version, 1842; English translation, 1843). A German translation of the Syriac version, with the extant fragments of the original Greek, is given in the edition of the Berlin Academy (vol. iii.).

Acacius, the pupil of Eusebius and his successor in the see of Caesarea, wrote a life of him which is unfortunately lost. His own writings contain little biographical material, but we get information from Athanasius, Philostorgius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Jerome's _De vir. ill._, and Photius. Among the many modern accounts in church histories, histories of Christian literature, encyclopaedias, &c., may be mentioned a monograph by Stein, _Eusebius Bischof von Caesarea_ (Wuerzburg, 1859), meagre but useful as far as it goes; the magnificent article by Lightfoot in the _Dictionary of Christian Biography_; the account by McGiffert in his translation of the _Church History_; Erwin Preuschen's article in Herzog-Hauck, _Realencyklop_. (3rd ed., 1898); the treatment of the Chronology of Eusebius writings in Harnack's _Alt-christliche Litteraturgeschichte_, ii. 2, p. 106 sq.; and Bardenhewer's _Patrologie_, p. 2260 f. The many special discussions of Eusebius' separate works, particularly of his _Church History_, and of his character as an historian, cannot be referred to here. Elaborate bibliographies will be found in McGiffert's translation, and in Preuschen's article in Herzog-Hauck. (A. C. McG.)

EUSEBIUS [OF EMESA] (d. c. 360), a learned ecclesiastic of the Greek church, was born at Edessa about the beginning of the 4th century. After receiving his early education in his native town, he studied theology at Caesarea and Antioch and philosophy and science at Alexandria. Among his teachers were Eusebius of Caesarea and Patrophilus of Scythopolis. The reputation he acquired for learning and eloquence led to his being offered the see of Alexandria in succession to the deposed Athanasius at the beginning of 339, but he declined, and the council (of Antioch) chose Gregory of Cappadocia, "a fitter agent for the rough work to be done." Eusebius accepted the small bishopric of Emesa (the modern Horns) in Phoenicia, but his powers as mathematician and astronomer led his flock to accuse him of practising sorcery, and he had to flee to Laodicea. A reconciliation was effected by the patriarch of Antioch, but tradition says that Eusebius finally resigned his charge and lived a studious life in Antioch. His fame as an astrologer commended him to the notice of the emperor Constantius II., with whom he became a great favourite, accompanying him on many of his expeditions. The theological sympathies of Eusebius were with the semi-Arian party, but his interest in the controversy was not strong. His life was written by his friend George of Laodicea. He was a man of extraordinary learning, great eloquence and considerable intellectual power, but of his numerous writings only a few fragments are now in existence.

See Migne, _Patrol. Graec._ vol. lxxxvi.

EUSEBIUS [OF MYNDUS], Greek philosopher, a distinguished Neoplatonist and pupil of Aedesius who lived in the time of Julian, and who is described by Eunapius as one of the "Golden Chain" of Neoplatonism. He ventured to criticize the magical and theurgic side of the doctrine, and exasperated the emperor, who preferred the mysticism of Maximus and Chrysanthius. He devoted himself principally to logic. Stobaeus in the _Sermones_ collected a number of ethical dicta of one Eusebius, who may perhaps be identical with the Neoplatonist.

The fragments have been collected by Mullach in his Fragmenta _Phil. Graec._, and by Orelli, in _Opuscula veter. graec. sentent. et moral_.

EUSEBIUS [OF NICOMEDIA] (d. 341?), Greek bishop and theologian, was the defender of Arius in a still more avowed manner than his namesake of Caesarea, and from him the Eusebian or middle party specially derived its name, giving him in return the epithet of Great. He was a contemporary of the bishop of Caesarea, and united with him in the enjoyment of the friendship and favour of the imperial family. He is said to have been connected by his mother with the emperor Julian, whose early tutor he was. His first bishopric was Berytus (Beirut) in Phoenicia, but his name is especially identified with the see of Nicomedia, which, from the time of Diocletian till Constantine established his court at Byzantium, was regarded as the capital of the eastern part of the empire. He warmly espoused the cause of Arius in his quarrel with his bishop Alexander, and wrote a letter in his defence to Paulinus, bishop of Tyre, which is preserved in the _Church History_ of Theodoret. Trained in the school of Lucian of Antioch, his views appear to have been identical with those of Eusebius of Caesarea in placing Christ above all created beings, the only begotten of the Father, but in refusing to recognize him to be "of the same substance" with the Father, who is alone in essence and absolute being.

At the council of Nicaea Eusebius of Nicomedia earnestly opposed, along with his namesake of Caesarea, the insertion of the Homousian clause, but after being defeated in his object he also signed the creed in his own sense of [Greek: omoios kat ouoian]. He refused, however, to sign the anathema directed against the Arians, not, as he afterwards explained, because of his variance from the Athanasian theology, but "because he doubted whether Arius really held what the anathema imputed to him" (Sozom. ii. 15). After the council he continued vigorously to espouse the Arian cause, and was so far carried away in his zeal against the Athanasians that he was temporarily banished from his see as a disturber of the peace of the church. But his alienation from the court was of short duration. He retained the confidence of the emperor's sister Constantia, through whose influence he was promoted to the see of Nicomedia, and by her favour he was restored to his position, and speedily acquired an equal ascendancy over the emperor. He was selected to administer baptism to him in his last illness. There seems no doubt that Eusebius of Nicomedia was more of a politician than a theologian. He was certainly a partisan in the great controversy of his time, and is even credited (although on insufficient evidence) with having used unworthy means to procure the deposition of Eustathius, the "orthodox" bishop of Antioch (Theodoret i. 21). His restless ambition and love of power are not to be denied. To the last he defended Arius, and at the time of the latter's sudden death, 336, it was chiefly through his menace, as representing the emperor, that the church of Constantinople was thrown into anxiety as to whether the leader should be readmitted to the bosom of the church. The death of Constantine followed hard upon that of Arius; and Eusebius, who was promoted in 339 to the see of Constantinople, became the leader of the anti-Nicene party till his own death in (probably) 341. The real activity of Eusebius and his party must be studied in connexion with the Arian controversy (see ARIUS).

EUSKIRCHEN, a town of Germany, in the Prussian Rhine province, on a plateau lying to the E. of the Eifel range, at the junction of railways from Cologne and Bonn and 10 m. W. of the latter. Pop. (1905) 10,285. It has an Evangelical and a Roman Catholic church, and its industries include cloth, sugar and stocking manufactures, besides breweries and tanneries.

EUSTACE, the name of four counts of Boulogne.

EUSTACE I., a son of Count Baldwin II., held the county from 1046 until his death in 1049.

His son, EUSTACE II. (d. 1093), count of Boulogne, was the husband of Goda, daughter of the English king AEthelred the Unready, and aunt of Edward the Confessor. Eustace paid a visit to England in 1051, and was honourably received at the Confessor's court. A brawl in which he and his servants became involved with the citizens of Dover led to a serious quarrel between the king and Earl Godwine. The latter, to whose jurisdiction the men of Dover were subject, refused to punish them. His contumacy was made the excuse for the outlawry of himself and his family. In 1066 Eustace came to England with Duke William, and fought at the battle of Hastings. In the following year, probably because he was dissatisfied with his share of the spoil, he assisted the Kentishmen in an attempt to seize Dover Castle. The conspiracy failed, and Eustace was sentenced to forfeit his English fiefs. Subsequently he was reconciled to the Conqueror, who restored a portion of the confiscated lands.

Eustace died in 1093, and was succeeded by his son, EUSTACE III., who went on crusade in 1096, and died about 1125. On his death the county of Boulogne came to his daughter, Matilda, and her husband Stephen, count of Blois, afterwards king of England, and in 1150 it was given to their son, Eustace IV.

EUSTACE IV. (d. 1153) became the heir-apparent to his father's possessions by the death of an elder brother before 1135. In 1137 he did homage for Normandy to Louis VII. of France, whose sister, Constance, he subsequently married. Eustace was knighted in 1147, at which date he was probably from sixteen to eighteen years of age; and in 1151 he joined Louis in an abortive raid upon Normandy, which had accepted the title of the empress Matilda, and was now defended by her husband, Geoffrey of Anjou. At a council held in London on the 6th of April 1152 Stephen induced a small number of barons to do homage to Eustace as their future king; but the primate, Theobald, and the other bishops declined to perform the coronation ceremony on the ground that the Roman curia had declared against the claim of Eustace. The death of Eustace, which occurred during the next year, was hailed with general satisfaction as opening the possibility of a peaceful settlement between Stephen and his rival, the young Henry of Anjou. The _Peterborough Chronicle_, not content with voicing this sentiment, gives Eustace a bad character. "He was an evil man and did more harm than good wherever he went; he spoiled the lands and laid thereon heavy taxes." He had used threats against the recalcitrant bishops, and in the war against the Angevin party had demanded contributions from religious houses; these facts perhaps suffice to account for the verdict of the chronicler.

See Sir James Ramsay, _Foundations of England_, vol. ii. (London, 1898); J.M. Lappenberg, _History of England under the Norman Kings_ (trans. B. Thorpe, Oxford, 1857); and E.A. Freeman, _History of the Norman Conquest_ (Oxford, 1867-1879).

EUSTATHIUS, of Antioch, sometimes styled "the Great" (fl. 325), was a native of Side in Pamphylia. About 320 he was bishop of Beroea, and he was patriarch of Antioch before the council of Nicaea in 325. In that assembly he distinguished himself by his zeal against the Arians, though the _Allocutio ad Imperatorem_ with which he has been credited is hardly genuine. His anti-Arian polemic against Eusebius of Caesarea made him unpopular among his fellow-bishops in the East, and a synod convened at Antioch in 330 passed a sentence of deposition, which was confirmed by the emperor. He was banished to Trajanopolis in Thrace, where he died, probably about 337, though possibly not till 360.

The only complete work by Eustathius now extant is the _De Engastrimytho contra Origenem_ (ed. by A. Jahn in _Texte und Untersuchungen_, ii. 4). Other fragments are enumerated by F. Loofs in Herzog-Hauck's _Realencyklopaedie_.

EUSTATHIUS, or EUMATHIUS, surnamed Macrembolites ("living near the long bazaar"), the last of the Greek romance writers, flourished in the second half of the 12th century A.D. His title _Protonobilissimus_ shows him to have been a person of distinction, and if he is also correctly described in the MSS. as [Greek: megas chartophulax] (chief keeper of the ecclesiastical archives), he must have been a Christian. He was the author of _The Story of Hysmine and Hysminias_, in eleven books, a tedious and inferior imitation of the _Cleitophon and Leucippe_ of Achilles Tatius. There is nothing original in the plot, and the work is tasteless and often coarse. Although the author borrowed from Homer and other Attic poets, the chief source of his phraseology was the rhetorician Choricius of Gaza. The style is remarkable for the absence of hiatus and an extremely laboured use of antithesis. The digressions on works of art, apparently the result of personal observation, are the best part of the work. A collection of eleven _Riddles_, of which solutions were written by the grammarian Manuel Holobolos, is also attributed to Eustathius.

The best edition of both romance and riddles is by I. Hilberg (1876, who fixes the date of Eustathius between 850 and 988), with critical apparatus and prolegomena, including the solutions; of the _Riddles_ alone by M. Treu (1893). On Eustathius generally, see J.C. Dunlop, _History of Fiction_ (1888, new ed. in Bohn's _Standard Library_); E. Rohde, _Der griechische Roman_ (1900); K. Krumbacher, _Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur_ (1897). There are many translations in modern languages, of which that by P. le Bas (1825) may be recommended; there is an English version from the French by L.H. le Moine (London and Paris, 1788).

EUSTATHIUS, archbishop of Thessalonica, Byzantine scholar and author (probably a native of Constantinople), flourished during the second half of the 12th century. He was at first a monk, and afterwards deacon of St Sophia and teacher of rhetoric in his native city. In 1174 he was chosen bishop of Myra in Lycia, but in 1175 was transferred to Thessalonica. He was outspoken and independent, and did not hesitate to oppose the emperor Manuel, when the latter desired an alteration in the formula of abjuration necessary for converts from Mahommedanism. In 1185, when Thessalonica was captured by the Normans under William II. of Sicily, Eustathius secured religious toleration for the conquered. He died about 1193. His best known work is his _Commentary on the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer_ ([Greek: parekbolai], critical compilations), valuable as containing numerous extracts from the scholia of other critics, whose works have now perished. He also wrote a commentary on the geographical epic of Dionysius Periegetes, in which much of Stephanus of Byzantium and the lost writings of Arrian is preserved. A commentary on Pindar has been lost, with the exception of the preface, which contains an essay on lyric poetry, a life of Pindar, and an account of the Olympic games. A history of the conquest of Thessalonica by the Normans, a congratulatory address to the emperor Manuel, a plea for an improved water-supply for Constantinople, and an extensive correspondence with clerical and lay dignitaries, are evidence of his versatility. He is also the author of various religious works, chiefly directed against the prevailing abuses of his time, which almost anticipate, though in a milder form, the denunciations of Luther; the most important of these is _The Reform of Monastic Life_. A commentary on the pentecostal hymn of John of Damascus may also be mentioned.

Editions: Homer Commentary, by G. Stallbaum (1825-1830); preface to Pindar Commentary, by F.W. Schneidewin (1837); Dionysius Commentary in C.W. Mueller, _Geographici Graeci minores_, ii.; pentecostal hymn, in A. Mai. _Spicilegium Romanum_, v. 2 (1841). The smaller works have been edited (1832) and the _De Thessalonica_ (1839) by L.F. Tafel; many will be found in J.P. Migne, _Patrologia Graeca_, cxxxv., cxxxvi. Five new speeches have been edited by W. Regel, _Fontes rerum Byzantinarum_, i. (1892).

EUSTYLE (from Gr. [Greek: eu,] well, and [Greek: stulos], column), the architectural term for the intercolumniation defined by Vitruvius (iii. 3) as being of the best proportion, i.e. two and a half diameters (see INTERCOLUMNIATION).

EUTAWVILLE, a town of Berkeley county, South Carolina, U.S.A., about 55 m. N.N.W. of Charleston. Pop. (1900) 305; (1910) 405. It is served by the Atlantic Coast Line railway. The town lies on high ground near the Santee river, in a region abounding in swamps, limestone cliffs and pine forests. At present its chief interest is in lumber, but in colonial days it was a settlement of aristocratic rice planters. The neighbouring Eutaw Springs issue first from the foot of a hill and form a large stream of clear, cool water, but this, only a few yards away, again rushes underground to reappear about 1/8 m. farther on. At Eutaw Springs, on the 8th of September 1781, was fought the last battle in the field in the Southern States during the War of American Independence. About 2300 Americans under General Nathanael Greene here attacked a slightly inferior force under Colonel Alexander Stewart; at first the Americans drove the British before them, but later in the day the latter took a position in a brick house and behind palisades, and from this position the Americans were unable to drive them. On the night of the 9th, however, Colonel Stewart retreated toward Charleston, abandoning 1000 stand of arms. The battle has been classed as a tactical victory for the British and a strategical victory for the Americans, terminating a campaign which left General Greene in virtual possession of the Carolinas, the British thereafter confining themselves to Charleston. The Americans lost in killed and wounded 408 men (including Colonel William Washington, wounded and captured); the British, 693.

EUTHYDEMUS, a native of Magnesia, who overturned the dynasty of Diodotus of Bactria, and became king of Bactria about 230 B.C. (Polyb. xi. 34; Strabo xi. 515 wrongly makes him the first king). In 208 he was attacked by Antiochus the Great, whom he tried in vain to resist on the shores of the river Arius, the modern Herirud (Polyb. x. 49). The war lasted three years, and was on the whole fortunate for Antiochus. But he saw that he was not able to subdue Bactria and Sogdiana, and so in 206 concluded a peace with Euthydemus, through the mediation of his son Demetrius, in which he recognized him as king (Polyb. xi. 34). Soon afterwards Demetrius (q.v.) began the conquest of India. There exist many coins of Euthydemus; those on which he is called god are struck by the later king Agathocles. Other coins with the name Euthydemus, which show a youthful face, are presumably those of Euthydemus II., who cannot have ruled long and was probably a son of Demetrius. (Ed. M.)

EUTIN, a town of Germany, capital of the principality oi Luebeck, which is an enclave in the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein and belongs to the grand-duchy of Oldenburg, picturesquely situated on the Lake Eutin, 20 m. N. from Luebeck by the railway to Kiel. Pop. (1905) 5204. It possesses a Roman Catholic and two Protestant churches, a palace with a fine park, and a monument to Weber, the composer, who was born here. Towards the end of the 18th century Eutin acquired some fame as the residence of a group of poets and writers, of whom the best-known were Johann Heinrich Voss, the brothers Stolberg, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. In the neighbourhood is a beautiful tract of country, rich in beech forests and fjords, known as "the Holstein Switzerland," largely frequented in summer by the Hamburgers.

Eutin was, according to tradition, founded by Count Adolf II. of Holstein. In 1155 it fell to the bishopric of Luebeck and was often the residence of the prelates of that see. After some vicissitudes of fortune during the middle ages and the Thirty Years' War, it came into the possession of the house of Holstein, and hence to Prussia in 1866.

EUTROPIUS, Roman historian, flourished in the latter half of the 4th century A.D. He held the office of secretary (_magister memoriae_) at Constantinople, accompanied Julian on his expedition against the Persians (363), and was alive during the reign of Valens (364-378), to whom he dedicates his history. This work (_Breviarium historiae Romanae_) is a complete compendium, in ten books, of Roman history from the foundation of the city to the accession of Valens. It was compiled with considerable care from the best accessible authorities, and is written generally with impartiality, and in a clear and simple style. Although the Latin in some instances differs from that of the purest models, the work was for a long time a favourite elementary school-book. Its independent value is small, but it sometimes fills a gap left by the more authoritative records. The _Breviarium_ was enlarged and continued down to the time of Justinian by Paulus Diaconus (q.v.); the work of the latter was in turn enlarged by Landolfus Sagax (c. 1000), and taken down to the time of the emperor Leo the Armenian (813-820) in the _Historia Miscella_.

Of the Greek translations by Capito Lycius and Paeanius, the version of the latter is extant in an almost complete state. The best edition of Eutropius is by H. Droysen (1879), containing the Greek version and the enlarged editions of Paulus Diaconus and Landolfus; smaller critical editions, C. Wagener (1884), F. Ruehl (1887). J. Sorn's _Der Sprachgebrauch des Historikers Eutropius_ (1892) contains a systematic account of the grammar and style of the author. There are numerous English school editions and translations.

EUTYCHES (c. 380-c. 456), a presbyter and archimandrite at Constantinople, first came into notice in A.D. 431 at the council of Ephesus, where, as a zealous adherent of Cyril (q.v.) of Alexandria, he vehemently opposed the doctrine of the Nestorians (q.v.). They were accused of teaching that the divine nature was not incarnated in but only attendant on Jesus, being superadded to his human nature after the latter was completely formed. In opposition to this Eutyches went so far as to affirm that after the union of the two natures, the human and the divine, Christ had only _one nature_, that of the incarnate Word, and that therefore His human body was essentially different from other human bodies. In this he went beyond Cyril and the Alexandrine school generally, who, although they expressed the unity of the two natures in Christ so as almost to nullify their duality, yet took care verbally to guard themselves against the accusation of in any way circumscribing or modifying his real and true humanity. It would seem, however, that Eutyches differed from the Alexandrine school chiefly from inability to express his meaning with proper safeguards, for equally with them he denied that Christ's human nature was either transmuted or absorbed into his divine nature. The energy and imprudence of Eutyches in asserting his opinions led to his being accused of heresy by Domnus of Antioch and Eusebius, bishop of Dorylaeum, at a synod presided over by Flavian at Constantinople in 448. As his explanations were not considered satisfactory, the council deposed him from his priestly office and excommunicated him; but in 449, at a council held in Ephesus convened by Dioscurus of Alexandria and overawed by the presence of a large number of Egyptian monks, not only was Eutyches reinstated in his office, but Eusebius, Domnus and Flavian, his chief opponents, were deposed, and the Alexandrine doctrine of the "one nature" received the sanction of the church. This judgment is the more interesting as being in distinct conflict with the opinion of the bishop of Rome--Leo--who, departing from the policy of his predecessor Celestine, had written very strongly to Flavian in support of the doctrine of the two natures and one person. Meanwhile the emperor Theodosius died, and Pulcheria and Marcian who succeeded summoned, in October 451, a council (the fourth ecumenical) which met at Chalcedon (q.v.). There the synod of Ephesus was declared to have been a "robber synod," its proceedings were annulled, and, in accordance with the rule of Leo as opposed to the doctrines of Eutyches, it was declared that the two natures were united in Christ, but without any alteration, absorption or confusion. Eutyches died in exile, but of his later life nothing is known. After his death his doctrines obtained the support of the Empress Eudocia and made considerable progress in Syria. In the 6th century they received a new impulse from a monk of the name of Jacob, who united the various divisions into which the Eutychians, or Monophysites (q.v.), had separated into one church, which exists at the present time under the name of the Jacobite Church, and has numerous adherents in Armenia, Egypt and Ethiopia.

See R.L. Ottley, _The Doctrine of the Incarnation_, ii. 97 ff.; A. Harnack, _History of Dogma_, iv. _passim_; F. Loofs, _Dogmengeschichte_ (4th ed., 1906), 297 f., and the art. in Herzog-Hauck, _Realencyk. fuer prot. Theol._, with a full bibliography.

EUTYCHIANUS, pope from 275 to 283. His original epitaph was discovered in the catacombs (see Kraus, _Roma sotterranea_, p. 154 et seq.), but nothing more is known of him.

EUTYCHIDES, of Sicyon in Achaea, Greek sculptor of the latter part of the 4th century B.C., was a pupil of Lysippus. His most noted work was a statue of Fortune, which he made for the city of Antioch, then newly founded. The goddess, who embodied the idea of the city, was seated on a rock, crowned with towers, and having the river Orontes at her feet. There is a small copy of the statue in the Vatican (see GREEK ART). It was imitated by a number of Asiatic cities; and indeed most statues of cities since erected borrow something from the work of Eutychides.

EUYUK, or EYUK (the _eu_ pronounced as in French), a small village in Asia Minor, in the Angora vilayet, 12 m. N.N.E. of Boghaz Keui (_Pteria_), built on a mound which contains some remarkable ruins of a large building--a palace or sanctuary--anterior to the Greek period and belonging to the same civilization as the ruins and rock-reliefs at Pteria. These ruins consist of a gateway and an approach enclosed by two lateral walls, 15 ft. long, from the outer end of which two walls return outwards at right angles, one to right and one to left. The gateway is flanked by two huge blocks, each carved in front into the shape of a sphinx, while on the inner face is a relief of a two-headed eagle with wings displayed. Of the approach and its returning walls only the lower courses remain: they consist of large blocks adorned with a series of bas-reliefs similar in type to those carved on the rocks of Boghaz Keui. Behind the gateway is another vestibule leading to another portal which gives entrance to the building, the lateral walls and abutments of the portal being also decorated with reliefs much worn. These reliefs belong to that pre-Greek oriental art generally called Hittite, of which there are numerous remains in the eastern half of the peninsula. It is now generally agreed that the scenes represented are religious processions. On the left returning wall is a train of priestly attendants headed by the chief priest and priestess (the latter carrying a _lituus_), clad in the dress of the deities they serve and facing an altar, behind which is an image of a bull on a pedestal (representing the god); then comes an attendant leading a goat and three rams for sacrifice, followed by more priests with _litui_ or musical instruments, after whom comes a bull bearing on his back the sacred _cista_ (?). On the lateral walls of the approach we have a similar procession of attendants headed by the chief priestess and priest, who pours a libation at the feet of the goddess seated on her throne; while on the right returning wall are fragments of a third procession approaching another draped figure of the goddess on her throne (placed at the angle opposite the bull on the pedestal), the train being again brought up by a bull.

These are all scenes in the ritual of the indigenous naturalistic religion which was spread, in slightly varying forms, all over Asia Minor, and consisted in the worship of the self-reproductive powers of nature, personified in the great mother-goddess (called by various names Cybele, Leto, Artemis, &c.) and the god her husband-and-son (Attis, Men, Sabazios, &c), representing the two elements of the ultimate divine nature (see GREAT MOTHER OF THE GODS). Here, as in the oriental mysteries generally, the goddess is made more prominent. Where Greek influence affects the native religion, emphasis tends to be laid on the god, but the character of the religion remains everywhere ultimately the same (see Ramsay, _Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia_, ch. iii.).

AUTHORITIES.--Perrot, _Explor. de la Galatie_ (1862) and _Hist. de l'art_ (Eng. trans., 1890); Humann and Puchstein, _Reisen in Kleinasien u. Nordsyrien_ (1890); Hogarth in Murray's _Handbook to Asia Minor_ (1895); Chantre, _Mission en Cappadoce_ (1898). See also HITTITES. (J. G. C. A.)

EVAGORAS, son of Nicocles, king of Salamis in Cyprus 410-374 B.C. He claimed descent from Teucer, half-brother of Ajax, son of Telamon, and his family had long been rulers of Salamis until supplanted by a Phoenician exile. When the usurper was in turn driven out by a Cyprian noble, Evagoras, fearing that his life was in danger, fled to Cilicia. Thence he returned secretly in 410, and with the aid of a small band of adherents regained possession of the throne. According to Isocrates, whose panegyric must however be read with caution, Evagoras was a model ruler, whose aim was to promote the welfare of his state and of his subjects by the cultivation of Greek refinement and civilization, which had been almost obliterated in Salamis by a long period of barbarian rule. He cultivated the friendship of the Athenians, and after the defeat of Conon at Aegospotami he afforded him refuge and hospitality. For a time he also maintained friendly relations with Persia, and secured the aid of Artaxerxes II. for Athens against Sparta. He took

## part in the battle of Cnidus (394), in which the Spartan fleet was

defeated, and for this service his statue was placed by the Athenians side by side with that of Conon in the Ceramicus. But the energy and enterprise of Evagoras soon roused the jealousy of the Great King, and relations between them became strained. From 391 they were virtually at war. Aided by the Athenians and the Egyptian Hakor (Acoris), Evagoras extended his rule over the greater part of Cyprus, crossed over to Asia Minor, took several cities in Phoenicia, and persuaded the Cilicians to revolt. After the peace of Antalcidas (387), to which he refused to agree, the Athenians withdrew their support, since by its terms they recognized the lordship of Persia over Cyprus. For ten years Evagoras carried on hostilities single-handed, except for occasional aid from Egypt. At last he was totally defeated at Citium, and compelled to flee to Salamis. Here, although closely blockaded, he managed to hold his ground, and took advantage of a quarrel between the Persian generals to conclude peace (376). Evagoras was allowed to remain nominally king of Salamis, but in reality a vassal of Persia, to which he was to pay a yearly tribute. The chronology of the last part of his reign is uncertain. In 374 he was assassinated by a eunuch from motives of private revenge.

The chief authority for the life of Evagoras is the panegyric of Isocrates addressed to his son Nicocles; see also Diod. Sic. xiv. 115, xv. 2-9; Xenophon, _Hellenica_, iv. 8; W. Judeich, _Kleinasiatische Studien_ (Marburg, 1892), and art. HELLENISM.

EVAGRIUS (c. 536-600), surnamed SCHOLASTICUS, Church historian, was born at Epiphania in Coele-Syria. His surname shows him to have been an advocate, and it is supposed that he practised at Antioch. He was the legal adviser of Gregory, patriarch of that city, whom he successfully defended at Constantinople against certain serious charges. Through this connexion he was brought under the notice of the emperor Tiberius Constantine, who honoured him with the rank of quaestorian; Maurice Tiberius made him master of the rolls. His influence and reputation were so considerable that on the occasion of his second marriage a public festival was celebrated in his honour, which was interrupted by a terrible earthquake. Evagrius's name has been preserved by his _Ecclesiastical History_ in six books, extending over the period from the third general council (that of Ephesus, 431) to the year 593. It thus continues the work of Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret. Though not wholly trustworthy, and often very credulous, this work is on the whole impartial, and appears to have been compiled from original documents, from which many valuable excerpts are given. It is

## particularly helpful to the student of the history of dogma during the

5th and 6th centuries, while the political history of the time is by no means neglected. Evagrius made use of the writings of Eustathius, John of Epiphania, John Malalas, Procopius, and (possibly) Menander Protector.

The best edition of the History is that of L. Parmentier and J. Bidez (London, 1898), which contains the Scholia; it is also included in Migne's _Patrologia Graeca_, lxxxvi. There is an English translation in Bohn's _Ecclesiastical Library_. See Krumbacher, _Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur_ (1897); F.C. Baur, _Die Epochen der kirchlichen Geschichtsschreibung_ (1852); L. Jeep, _Quellenuntersuchungen zu den griechischen Kirchenhistorikern_ (1884).

EVANDER (Gr. [Greek: Euandros], "good man"), in Roman legend, son of Mercury and Carmenta, or of Echemus, king of Arcadia. According to the story, Evander left the Arcadian town of Pallantion about sixty years before the Trojan War and founded Pallanteum or Palatium on the hill afterwards called the Palatine. This is only one of the many Greek legends adopted by the Romans for the purpose of connecting places in Italy with others of like-sounding name in Greece. To Evander was attributed the introduction of Greek rites and customs into his new country; of writing, music and other arts; of the worship of Pan (called Faunus by the Italians) and the festival of Lupercalia. In Virgil he receives Aeneas hospitably, and assists him against Turnus. Probably Evander was identical with the god Faunus (the "favourer"), and the tale of his Arcadian origin was due to the desire to establish connexion with Greece; the name of his reputed mother (or wife) Carmenta is genuinely Italian.

See Livy i. 6. 7; Ovid, _Fasti_, i. 471, v. 99; Dion. Halic. i. 31-33; Virgil, _Aeneid_, viii. 335.

EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE, an association of individual Christians of different denominations formed in London in August 1846, at a conference of over 900 clergymen and laymen from all parts of the world, and representing upwards of fifty sections of the Protestant church. The idea originated in Scotland in the preceding year, and was intended "to associate and concentrate the strength of an enlightened Protestantism against the encroachments of popery and Puseyism, and to promote the interests of a scriptural Christianity," as well as to combat religious indifference. A preliminary meeting was held at Liverpool in October 1845. The movement obtained wide support in other countries, more especially in America, and organizations in connexion with it now exist in the different capitals throughout the world. The object of the alliance, according to a resolution of the first conference, is "to enable Christians to realize in themselves and to exhibit to others that a living and everlasting union binds all true believers together in the fellowship of the church." At the same conference the following nine points were adopted as the basis of the alliance: "Evangelical views in regard to the divine inspiration, authority and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures; the right and duty of private judgment in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; the unity of the Godhead and the Trinity of persons therein; the utter depravity of human nature in consequence of the fall; the incarnation of the Son of God, His work of atonement for sinners of mankind, and His mediatorial intercession and reign; the justification of the sinner by faith alone; the work of the Holy Spirit in the conversion and sanctification of the sinner; the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the judgment of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ, with the eternal blessedness of the righteous and the eternal punishment of the wicked; the divine institution of the Christian ministry, and the obligations and perpetuity of the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper," it being understood, however, (1) that such a summary "is not to be regarded in any formal or ecclesiastical sense as a creed or confession," and (2) that "the selection of certain tenets, with the omission of others, is not to be held as implying that the former constitute the whole body of important truth, or that the latter are unimportant."

Annual conferences of branches of the alliance are held in England, America and several continental countries; and it is provided that a general conference, including representatives of the whole alliance, be held every seventh year, or oftener if it be deemed necessary. Such conferences have been held in London in 1851; Paris, 1855; Berlin, 1857; Geneva, 1861; Amsterdam, 1867; New York, 1873; Basel, 1879; Copenhagen, 1885; Florence, 1891; London, 1896 and 1907. They are occupied with the discussion of the "best methods of counteracting infidelity, Romanism and ritualism, and the desecration of the Lord's Day," and of furthering the positive objects of the alliance. The latter are sometimes stated as follows: (a) "The world girdled by prayer"; a world-wide week of prayer is held annually, beginning on the first Sunday in the year, (b) "The maintenance of religious liberty throughout the world." (c) "The relief of persecuted Christians in all parts"; the alliance has agents in many countries to help the persecuted by distributing relief, &c., and in Russia there is a travelling agent who endeavours to help the Stundists. (d) "The manifestation of the unity of all believers and the upholding of the evangelical faith."

The following publications may be mentioned:--_The Evangelical Alliance Monthly Intelligencer_, _The Evangelical Alliance Quarterly_, both published in London; A.J. Arnold, _History of the Evangelical Alliance_ (London, 1897); and the reports of the proceedings of the different conferences.

EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION of North America, a religious denomination, founded about the beginning of the 19th century by Jacob Albright (1759-1808), a German Lutheran of Pennsylvania. About 1790 he began an itinerant mission among his fellow-countrymen, chiefly in Pennsylvania; and meeting with considerable success, he was, at an assembly composed of adherents from the different places he had visited, elected in 1800 presiding elder or chief pastor, and shortly afterwards rules of government were adopted somewhat similar to those of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The theological standards of the two bodies are also in close agreement. In 1807 Albright was appointed bishop of the community, which adopted its present name in 1818. In 1816 the first annual conference was held, and in 1843 there was instituted a general conference, composed of delegates chosen by the annual conferences and constituting the highest legislative and judicial authority in the church. The members of the general conference hold office for four years. In 1891 a long internal controversy resulted in a division. A law-suit awarded the property to the branch making its headquarters at Indianapolis, whereon the other party, numbering 40,000, that met at Philadelphia, constituted themselves the United Evangelical Church. The Association in 1906 had about 105,000 members, besides some 10,000 in Germany and Switzerland, and has nearly 2000 churches and 1200 itinerant and other preachers. There are four bishops. It distributes much evangelical literature, and supports a mission in Japan.